A divine antidote against a devilish poyson, or, A scriptural answer to an anti-scriptural and heretical pamphlet entituled A designed end to the Socinian controversie, written by John Smith answered by Francis Gregory, D.D. and rector of Hambleden in the county of Bucks.

SECT. II. (Book 2)

THis Author, in the very entrance of his Work and his first two Se∣ctions, makes it his only business to prove these two Propositions. 1. That there is a God. 2. That this True God is but one in Nature and Essence. Were this Man disputing against an Atheist, who thinks that there is no God; or a∣gainst a Pagan, who thinks that there are many, the proof of these Proposi∣tions had been necessary; but in a Book levelled against us Trinitarians only, who own a God, and but one, it might have been spared. For, to what pur∣pose should a Man take Pains, muster up Arguments, and cite several Texts, to confirm those Truths to us, who, be∣ing already convinced and satisfied a∣bout them; do acknowledge them as readily as he? That God is, and is but one, is a Truth so evident from the Light of Scripture, and right Rea∣son too; that, as no Christian doth, so no intelligent Heathen, who improves

and exerciseth his natural Understand∣ing, can deny or doubt it, if this Au∣thor thinks us guilty of Polytheism, let him prove that Charge against us, if he can; but if he hath no such Thoughts concerning us, what need he have spent his two first Pages in confirming a Truth, which none of us, against whom he writes, ever did, nor can deny.

There must indeed be something of Prudence and Policy in beginning with these two granted Truths; that his Rea∣der's mind, being prepossess'd and well seasoned with both these Preliminaries and well known Verities might be the less inclinable to suspect any Falshood in any of those Assertions, which are to follow; for a few Truths, intermingled amongst many Errors, seem like a little Sugar sprinkled amonst a greater quan∣tity of Ratsbane, which renders the Poy∣son the more palatable, and tempts the silly and cheated Vermin to swallow it down so much the sooner.

But if this Author laid down these Truths, as the necessary Foundations of his future Buildings; sure I am, those Superstructures, which he hath thought fit to add, can never be cemented to them, nor stand firm upon them; for, the Unity of the Godhead is very con∣sistent

with the Trinity of those glori∣ous Persons, whom we believe and worship.

But, in Opposition to this, our Au∣thor doth in express Terms lay down a third Proposition, namely this, That this one true God is but one in Person; and this, saith he, is evident; and tru∣ly if it be so indeed, it will do this Man's work: and according to his De∣sign, it will bring the Socinian Contro∣versy to an end; but if the Truth of this Proposition be indeed so Evident, as this Man makes it; How come so many thousand Persons, who had very good Eyes in their Heads, not to see it? How come we poor Men, to be so far mistaken, as to think this third Propo∣sition to be as False, as the other two are true? The Scripture tells us that there is but One true God, and we be∣lieve it; the Scripture also tells us, There are Three Persons that bear record in Heaven; and why should we not believe that too?

And yet notwithstanding this and many other Texts, which clearly prove the Trinity, and notwithstanding the General Belief of the Christian Church concerning it, this Heretical Clock-maker, in despight of God and Man, makes

bold to say, 'Tis Evident that God can in no sense be any more than one in Person.

This bold Assertion is not absolute and perfect Atheism, but 'tis somewhat like it, and a fair step towards it; it is a degree of Atheism to limit the Pro∣vidence of God, and confine it, as some have done, to Heaven; and what is it less to limit the Personality of God, and to contract Three Persons into One? Verily, this Man, who doth so, had need secure himself upon the most in∣fallible Grounds, that those two Per∣sons, whom he thus excludes from the God-head, are but imaginary, such as have no Entity, save only in the Thoughts of deceived Men; for, if these Persons should at length prove real Subsisten∣ces, as millions of very understand∣ing Persons formerly did, and still do believe; he, who denieth, and as far as he can, dethrones these Glorious Per∣sons, may justly expect to feel the ut∣most severity of that Divine Vengeance, which is due to such horrid Blasphemy and Impiety.

And if this Socinian Hypothesis, if false, be certainly attended with the greatest Danger; then every Man who owns it, and valueth his own Soul, is

highly concerned by the most undeni∣able Arguments to make it good. The question then is, How comes this Au∣thor to be so fully satisfied about the Truth of this Assertion, as to publish his own Perswasion of it to the World, and as a publick Act of Charity to his Neighbours Souls, to recommend it to other Men? How doth he prove it? I answer two things,

1. To prove this bold Assertion, That there is but one Person in the God∣head, this great Pretender doth make no use of Scripture.

To prove some other of his Asserti∣ons, he doth sometimes quote great va∣riety of places out of the Prophets, E∣vangelists and Apostles; but in this case, where he had most need to prove this, he doth not, because indeed he could not cite so much as one single Text. The Scriptures indeed do often tell us, that there is but one God; but they do no where tell us, that there is but one Person in the Godhead; nor can this be ever proved by any Consequences fair∣ly drawn from Sacred Writ; for no Consequence can be Genuine, which contradicts the express Letter of those Texts, which are not figurative, and wherein the Trinity of Persons is clear∣ly avouched.

2. To prove this bold Assertion, That there is but one Person in the God∣head, this great Schoolman, or some body for him, makes use of an Argu∣ment drawn from some of God's Attri∣butes, and naming three, he argues thus, If the Divine Nature did contain in it several Persons, then each of those must he truly Immense, truly Almighty, and truly most Wise: We grant it, and be∣lieve that the whole Trinity is so; but this Author thinks this impossible, and that impossibility he endeavours to il∣lustrate by two Instances, relating to the Omnipotence and infinite Wisdom of God; and thus he Reasons;

Suppose, saith he, two such beings as A and B; now if the Person of A can do more than the Person of B, then the Per∣son of B cannot do more than the Person of A; but hold a little, this Conse∣quence is often false; for suppose by the Letter A, we should mean our Author, and by the Letter B, we should mean his Answerer, then the Argument must run thus, If this Au∣thor can do more than his Answerer, then his Answerer cannot do more than this Author. This Inference is mani∣festly untrue, for this Author can make a Clock, which is more than his An∣swerer

can do; and yet his Answerer can make some shift to understand Greek and Latin Authors; which, I presume, is somewhat more than our Clockmaker can do.

But I am of Opinion that by A. and B. our Author intends two Persons by him only supposed, but by us firmly be∣lieved to subsist in the Godhead, I mean the Father and the Son; now if this be his meaning, his Argument must run thus. If the Person of the Father can do more than the Person of the Son, then the Person of the Son cannot do more than the Person of the Father; for if he could, then would not the Father be able to do more than the Son, and by consequence he could not be Al∣mighty; so reasons this subtle Sophister; but verily this way of argumentation is much to blame; upon a double ac∣count: For,

1. Here is a plane; Petitio principii, the begging of a question. He takes that for a granted Truth, and grounds his Argument upon it, which we be∣lieve and can prove to be a Falsehood; he presumes and takes it, pro concesso, that the Father can do more than the Son; which we deny.

2. Whereas we affirm that the Father cannot do more than the Son, he sub∣sumes, and saith, that then by conse∣quence the Father cannot be Almighty.

But truly this Gentleman, if he seeth the necessity of this Consequence must have more and better Eyes, than ever Argus had; for cannot the Father be Almighty unless he can do more than the Son, who is Almighty too? It is the Belief of the Catholick Church, warranted either by express Texts, or evident Deductions from them, that the whole Trinity is one and the same Al∣mighty God; Co-essential, and Co-equal, in Power, Wisdom, and all other Essen∣tial Perfections, which are natural to, and inherent in the Deity; whatever any one of them can do or know, every one of them can do and know.

But here perhaps this Author may thus reply, that by our equally ascribing the whole Divine Nature to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we make three Gods as well as three Persons; perhaps he may say, as some have done before him, that as the humane Nature, being communicated to three distinct Persons, doth constitute three several Men; so the Divine Nature being communi∣cated to three distinct Subsistences, must

needs constitute three several Gods.

To this supposed Objection we an∣swer thus; The forenamed Compari∣son, and the inference from it, are both naught, and so cannot hold; for, there is a vast difference in the Case, the hu∣mane Nature being finite and limited, cannot be communicated to three Per∣sons without separation; and consequent∣ly where it is so communicated, it must of necessity constitute three several Men, whose Nature is, not numerically, but specifically the same. But with the Di∣vine Nature it is not so; for, that be∣ing infinite, and indivisible, and entirely communicated to three Persons, distinct indeed, but not divided, doth not con∣stitute three several Gods, for, the Divine Essence of each Person is not specifi∣cally, but numerically the same.

And from this Unity of their Essence ariseth the Identity of their Divine At∣tributes; they are alike in Power, alike in Wisdom, and so in all other essential Excellencies; so that notwithstanding this Author's absurd Hypothesis, the Father may be, and certainly is, both Almighty and All-Wise, tho' he cannot do nor know more than the Son; and the Son also may be, and certainly is both Almighty and All-Wise, though he

cannot do nor know more than the Fa∣ther; so that this Man's Argument drawn from the Divine Attributes, doth no way prove that, for which he brings it, namely— That the True God is but One in Person.