CHAP. IV. The Question stated; It is proved, that it is not Law∣ful to Act contrary to the Opinion of a Mans parti∣cular Conscience, by five Arguments; because the particular Conscience is the Proximate Rule of Acti∣on, granted by all Divines. Because of that Text, Rom. 14.23. Because it Subjects a Man to conti∣nual Terrors of Conscience. The contrary Principle over-throws the Natural Order of the Souls Operati∣on, and plucks up a great Pillar of the Protestant Religion, and would make the Scriptures and Ar∣gumentative Books of little Ʋse but to Torment Men.
§. 1. WE come now to assert our Proposition, That it is not Lawful for any Person to act against an Opining Conscience, i. e. (as we have largely opened). That, supposing a Person, though he hath not demonstrative Ar∣guments, to prove this or that unlawful, which he is required to do: Yet if he hath formed up a particular Judgment of Conscience, from Arguments, which seem to him very pro∣bable, so as he cannot Answer them, nor rest satisfied in the Answers of others, while he so judgeth, it is sin and wicked∣ness in him, especially in Matters which concern the Wor∣ship of God, to do that Action, however required of him. This we shall make good by several Arguments.
§. 2.1. To swerve from what God hath made the Proxi∣mate Rule of our actions, is sinful. But to act contrary to the Opi∣nion of our own Consciences, is to swerve from what God bath made the Proximate Rule of our Actions — Therefore it is sinful. The Major can with no Modesty be denyed; for, what is sin, but a Transgression of, or deviation from the Rule of Page 50our actions? The Minor is as Evident. It is granted by all Divines we have met with, both Popish and Protestant, that the Practical Conscience is the Proximate Rule of our Actions; nor did we ever meet with it denyed by any Learned Man. And indeed it must be so; For, That Gods Word and Law is the Remote Rule, must be owned. Now, we would ask how we shall know what the Will of God in his Word is, but by the Judgment of our particular consciences at last; be the Will of God in it self what it will: The Will of God to us must be Interpreted as to Practise by our own Judgments and appre∣hensions. Hence Dr. Ames saith well, that he who acteth against his Conscience, Interpretatively acts against the Will of God. And Filiucius saith right; such Actions declare, that Men chuse, and love sin: For so far as they know what is sin∣ful, they do sin; and if they miss of sinning in their Actions, it is but as the blind Man hits the Crow, there's no thank to them; out of choyce they sin: It is involuntarily, if they do that which is right. No Action materially good, can possi∣bly be so formally, if done contrary to the Judgment of our Conscience; because it is impossible it should have the con∣currence of the Will, whiles the Practical Conscience faith it ought not be done. The Will cannot will what it judgeth evil, it may indeed be mis-guided by the Understanding, but it cannot will evil, sub ratione mali; and so consequentially cannot will what the Conscience telleth the Man he ought not to do. So as indeed it is but a Natural Principle, That the Practical Conscience is, and must be the Proximate Rule of our actions. Filiucius saith right, that the Law of God, and the Law of Nature respecteth our Actions as they are free, which they cannot be, unless they proceed a Principio cognoscente, from a knowing Principle within our selves. We proceed to a second Argument.
§. 3. That Principle, which allowed perverteth the whole Or∣der of Nature in the operations of a Reasonable soul, must be false. But this opinion, That it is Lawful for us to act contra∣ry to what appears to us Lawful, from probable arguments, Page 51perverteth the whole Order of Nature in the Operations of a Reasonable Soul—Ergo. The Major needeth no proof to any who will believe, that it is not the Will of God, a Man should be Metamorphosed into a Beast. So that all our bu∣siness must be to prove the Minor. To which purpose let us but take a view of the Noblest Empire in the World, I mean, that of Reason in Man; and Observeth the Order which God hath (by the Law of Nature prescribed) by which Reason, sitting as a Queen, should Rule there.
The Will is the great Minister in this State, the great wheel, which by its imperate Acts moveth the whole Man. The Object of it is Good or Evil; about these two it is Exer∣cised, chusing the former, refusing the latter, and then Com∣manding all the Inferiour Faculties of the Soul, and Mem∣bers of the Body, to move according to its Judgment and Choice. The Philopsoher telleth us, The Will is blind, and that its work is onely to keep its Seat, and Judge, and Com∣mand. The Understanding serves it with the Notion of things that takes cognisance of them, discerns, and repre∣sents them as true, or false; whether reference to Specula∣tion or Practice. The Understanding in its work is served by the Interior and exterior Senses. So then this is the Or∣der of the Ceasonable Soul in Man, whereas all Objects are either Sensible, Rational, or Spiritual. The exterior Sen∣ses, the Eye and Ear, &c. bring Intelligence of sensible Ob∣jects. The Fancy, Memory, and Imaginative Power bring Intelligence of Objects proper to their Sphear. The Under∣standing takes notice of all Propositions thus brought in to it, discerneth them, and judgeth concerning them, whether they be true or false according to Principles of Sense, Reason, and Revelation, according to the variety of the Matter; upon this the Will maketh its choice. Those which the Under∣standing discerneth true and good, it willeth and chuseth; what it discerns false and evil, it refuseth, nillete, and re∣jecteth; and accordingly Commandeth the Soul to believe, or not believe; to love, or hate; to desire, or fl•e from what∣soever the Understanding discerneth, and judgeth evil and Page 52noxious. Here now is the Government of a Reasonable Soul. Now, let us Observe how guilty the Principle we op∣pose is of Treason and Sedition against this Noble Govern∣ment of the Soul instituted in it by God himself. We cannot make a better Judgment, than by putting a particular case. Suppose this the Proposition.
It is, or it is not Lawful for Persons once Ordained to be re-ordained.
The Case now is to be Judged in the Court of Reason.
〈◊〉 Senses bring in this Proposition; as what they have some where seen or heard to be brought into Practice. Upon this the Court of the Reasonable Understanding taketh cog∣nisance of it. The Understanding discerns it a Proposition relating to Instituted Worship, and that the Truth concerning it, is to be determined, not from Principles of Sense, or Prin∣ciples of Natural Reason, but from Scripture and Reason working upon things Revealed, and comparing things Spiri∣tual with Spiritual. The Eye is therefore employed to Read what can be. The Ear to hear on all sides what is spoken about it. The Fancy or Imagination is also set on work to find out Mediums to prove the one part or other, and so the thing cometh with all these helps to be Discoursed by the soul within it self. Then the Ʋnderstanding discerneth and judgeth which part of the Proposition is true, and consequently, fit to be Practised; which is false, and fit to be rejected. It either concludes one part Demonstratively, and certainly false, or probably, and in all likelihood false; or else it hangs in equilibrio, not knowing what to determine. In the present Case we suppose the Ʋnderstanding to bring in its report in this Sense.
As to this Practical Question, Whether it be Lawful for them, who by Ministers have been Ordained and made Ministers, to be re-ordained, and made, first, Deacons, then Priests, by Bishops.
I have done my best to try the Truth or Falshood of either part. The Eyes and Ears have given me an account of what they have seen in any Books, or heard from any Discourses of Page 53Learned Men about it. The Fancy hath also been employed to weigh, and consider Propositions to consider Arguments brought by others on one side, and the other; and devise Me∣diums for one part, and for the other. Now, upon my ut∣most Judgment of the thing from weighing Arguments on all sides, it is not demonstratively certain, that this Proposition is false. That Persons once Ordained, may not be re-ordained, and that a Submission to such a re-ordination would be sinful: But it doth appear to me very probably so; I cannot Answer the Arguments which I have thought on, or others have brought to prove it so; and though I dare not arrogate in∣fallibility to my self, and determine the Arguments I have for the Negative unanswerable; yet I can find no Answer I can acquiesce in, and so far as I can judge, it is sinful; and will certainly issue in horror of Conscience, or Eternal Damnati∣on, or both, without pardoning Mercy. Now, the business is ripe for the Will's Election. What shall the Will do? Shall it, can it (notwithstanding this) chuse the thing, and com∣mand the soul, to will, desire, embrace it, or the outward Man to do it, because it is Commanded. If this be not to turn a Man into a Beast, to turn the Rational soul out of doors, and set a Man with his heels upward, and to pervert the Na∣tural Order of the Souls Operations, we know not what is?
§. 4. Willany say, the Case is here partially represented, because under the Circumstance of Superiours Command. The Understanding hath also a report to bring in about that Pro∣position, That it is by Divine Precept necessary to Obey Supe∣riours. We Answer, if the Proposition be laid down so Uni∣versal, the Understanding must either Deny it, or distinguish about it. It must therefore be onely laid down thus.
In all Lawful things it is necessary to obey Superiours.
Now, it hinders not, for this is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 this is the Que∣stion, whether the thing be Lawful or no: The Soul judgeth otherwise. Now, we would gladly know of our Modern Casuists, Whether the Law of Nature having obliged the Will Page 54to move According to the dictate of the Ʋnderstanding, is be possible that a rational Soul without presumptuous sinning, and offering violence to the very Law and Principles of Humane Nature, should, will, chuse, command, or allow a thing so represented to it as before, probably unlawful. What we can∣not apprehend good, I hope we cannot will it, for this were to will evil under the Notion o• evil (a thing Naturally im∣possible.) Now, how shall•• judge that good (being to take all its Evidence from the ••••llect) which the understand∣ing judgeth false, and naught? Will any one say, that it is possible that from extrinsecal Arguments (such as the Autho∣rity, and Testimony of Men, the Will and Command of Superiours) &c. it may judge that true and good, which from intrinsecal Arguments, it judgeth false and naught. This is indeed the Jesuites Doctrine. (Yet they will not allow a Superiours merum imperium, a sufficient Topick in the case) but as was said before, it is justly abominated by all Prote∣stants, of what sort, size, or perswasion soever.
§. 5. Exabundanti, if any will be so vain, as to say, the Soul hath warrant enough to judge the thing probably Lawful, because Superiours bave Commanded it; when in the mean time from Arguments appearing to it very probable, it judg∣eth it sinful and unlawful. We would gladly know, from what Principles it should form such a Judgment; the Princi∣ple must be one of these.
1. Either these Superiours are Infallible, so am not I in the Exercise of my Reason. So inded the Papists hold, as to the Pope, and so may be justified in their perverse Judgments in this case from that Maxime, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Granting one absurdity, a thousand will follow: But all Pro∣testants reserve Infallibility from him, who is Truth it self, and deny it to any Creature.
2. It must therefore be this Principle: Though Superiours be fallible, yet it is better their Judgments (though in fol∣lowing them there be a danger of a troubled Conscience, and eternal damnation) than my own. But is it possible an inge∣nuous, Page 55Rational Soul should so Judge? This being neither sensibly, not rationally demonstrable: It is impossible that the Soul should apprehend any such thing but upon Revelati∣on. It must teerefore (as Hooker saith) appear to be The will of God; and to that (as to the highest Reason) (if it can be shewed) Reason Sanctified and Regulated by Religi∣on, will submit. Aut alas! who shall shew us any such Text? Ante retro Simoeis stuet, &c. Will they urge Rom. 13. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers, and other Texts of the like import. We allow the Scripture, we say, the matter to be our Duty, but we say, it must be in things which do not appear to us sinful and wicked (this were to set up some higher than the highest?) Otherwise the Apostles, Acts 3. much erred, not onely in their Practice, but in their Princi∣ple too there laid down, It is better to obey God than Man: In vain had they said that, if every Obedience to Man as a Superiour were, co nomine, Obedience to God, will any say? But this was where a Magistrate Commanded a thing unlawful. How did that appear, but by the dictate of their Consciences? It indeed now doth otherwise appear to us, because the Scrip∣ture so represents it since written; but how did it appear to them otherwise? Why might not the Magistrate have then told them, as some now Interpret that revealed will of God to us. He that doubteth, is damned, if he eateth; that is, (except his Superiour Commands ••m to eat.) And why might not Nebuchadnezzar have told the three Children, It is true, God had forbidden them to Worship Graven Images, but it must be understood, excegt the Magistrate Commanded them so to do: But this Objection is too ridiculous to Answer further. Let this be enough for our Second Argument.
§. 5. We proceed to a Third Argument, which we form thus.
For any Person to do that in the doing of which he can ne∣ver have any quiet, and peace in his own Conscience, is sinful and wicked.
But for a Man to Act (under any Circumstance) contrary Page 56to the Opinion of his own Conscience, is to do that, in the do∣ing of which he can never have any quiet, and Peace in his own Conscience. — Ergo.
We are much at loss to fancy which Proposition any can be hardy enough to deny. Will any deny the Major? Sure∣ly Charity begins at home; and every Man, in the first place, is bound to keep Quiet within himself, if he can. Thou art bound to the Peace of thy own Conscience. Thou canst not Obey (saith Mr. Fulwood, in the place before cited) a very remarkable Sentence for the Author of the Doctrine of Schism, to think upon professing so much oneness of mind with Mr. Fulwood, in that Book) and certainly, he is the greatest Self-destroyer in the World, that doth not first look in his Actions, to secure the Peace of his Conscience. Next, throwing a Man's self into Hell, the greatest mischief he can do himself, is to set his Conscience upon a continual belch∣ing in his Face.
§. 6. For the Minor: It is as plain, for he must have a dull, a very dull and lazy Conscience, that will let him Act contrary to its Judgment, and yet be quiet, and not conti∣nually tell him, thou subjectest thy self to the wrath of God, thou sinnest wilfully, presumptuously; and there is nothing remains for thee, but either a quick Repentance, a sorrow for what thou hast done, and a leaving off to do it any more; or a certain dreadful looking for of Divine and fiery Indigna∣tion.
§. 7. Will any say, why should not a Man's Conscience be as unquiet while a man contrary to the Command of God for Obeying Superiours, doth not Obey them? The Answer is easie. No Law of God Obligeth a man to Obey Superi∣ours in things which he verily believeth are unlawful; about other things we have no Dispute. This Argument is so Evi∣dent, as it needeth not more words. We therefore proceed to a fourth.
Page 57§. 8. He that doubteth is damned, if he eateth; and what∣soever is not of Faith, is sin, Rom. 14.23.
But he who doth that, which upon probable Arguments he verily believeth unlawful; doubteth, and yet actethnd acteth not of Faith. — ergo he sinneth, is damned, &c.
The Proposition is the Apostles, Rom. 14.23. therefore not to be denyed; but yet we find some, who will not allow it a Proposition of immutable Truth, but with some Circum∣stances. That is (as they expound themselves) if the Per∣son be sui juris, at Liberty, and Perfectly in his own Power, not required to do the thing, by the Command of his Supe∣riours, of the Lawfulness of which he doubteth: But (say they) if the Superiour Commandeth, then he who doth the ••ing, (though he doubteth of the Lawfulness of it) runneth no guilt, no hazard of Damnation. Now, we would fain believe this if we could, for it would ease us of many per∣plexing thoughts, but we cannot, for these Reasons, amongst others.
§. 9. First, because what the Apostle saith, seemeth to us but to be according to the Law, and Order of Nature in a ra∣tional Soul. That the Understanding should first represent that as true, and good, and therefore Eligible, which the Will should chuse.
§. 10. Because it seemeth to us possible by admitting their Interpretation to elude the whole Law of God, and make any thing Lawful. For what Reason can there be, why what God saith in one place, should be understood with that limi∣tation, and not what he saith in another? Why may we not Venerate Images, Go to Mass, Pray for the Dead, Prophane the Sabbath, Ʋse Oyl, Spittle, Cream, &c. in Baptism, if the Superiour Commandeth, as well as wear a Surplis, use the Cross in Baptism, &c. Doth any one doubt whether these things be Lawful or no, or upon probable Arguments, believe the contrary? And is he restrained by this Text? Not Page 58at all by this Interpretation; if Superiours Command these, or any of these things, will any say, That this Text speaks of things onely in their own Nature indifferent? We ask, who shall Judge what those things are? Shall the Superiour? If so, what we said, holdeth; for it is not to be presumed, he would Command them, if he judgeth them sinful. Shall the Inferiour? He Judgeth them from probable Arguments Unlawful.
§. 11. Thirdly, Because (whatsoever some Modern Do∣ctors say) We see no Scripture Translating the guilt of any Personal Action of ours to our Superiours, which in Reason we should find, if his Command would Justifie us, in doing any thing we judge wicked. Especially considering, that whether we Judge it right or no, it may in it self be sinful, and there∣fore we had need have our Souls secured, as to the guilt of it. We think, with the Apostle, that Sin is an Anomie; a trans∣gression of the Law, by Omission, or Commission, or Non∣conformity, how we believe, that there is an inseparable guilt which he cleaves to every Omission or Oblique Action: every sin bindeth over the Doer or Omitter to an Eternal death: and want one Scripture to prove, that the sin, or Per∣sonal Obliquity of an Inferiour Action, should be Translated to the Superiour, and set upon his score: Thus while some deny Christs imputed Righteousness, they have devised a new Doctrine of Imputed guilt to the Magistrate or Superiour; a Doctrine which no Superiour will thank them for, that un∣derstandeth the weight of Divine wrath for sin. We have heretofore heard, that Superiours may make themselves guilty of sin, by Commanding others to sin: But that the guilt of the Inferiours Personal Action, should also be Transla∣ted from him, and that not to Christ, but to the Superiour, is a Novel, idle Fancy, a brutish, and irrational, as well as unscriptural figment, and such a one, as if admitted, would make the Crowns of Kings, and Mitres of Bishops not worth taking up in the Streets. Let God therefore be true, and these New Diviners all Lyars; God hath said, That Soul that Page 59sins, shall dye, and that every Soul shall bear its own Iniquity; and Iniquity that must be (if St. John describes sin right) whatso∣ever is a Transgression of the Divine Law.
§.12. Fourthly, We cannot admit of this Interpretation, be∣cause of what followeth in the Apostle, Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. By Faith, saith Dr. Sanderson, in his Sermon on Rom. 14.23. is meant,
§. 13. For the Minor, he who denyeth it, must say, That he who Opineth doth not doubt, which indeed we think strictly he doth not; for he hath, as we said, a Moral certainty, but that doth but raise the Argument to à fortiori: If he, whose Consci∣ence is pendulous, and who hangeth in Equilibrio, is damned if he doth the thing, of the Lawfulness of which he doubteth; then is he much more damned, who doth verily think the thing un∣lawful, and yet will do it. But in the largest Notion, Opining is a Species of doubting; and if that Text of the Apostle be true, of Doubting, in any sense, it must be in that sense, which is of all, the highest. We are able to discern no chink, at which our Adversaries may creep out from the Prison of this Argument, but shall leave it, attending to any thing they shall any of them here∣after offer in Answer to it.
§. 14. Our next Argument shall be this.
That Principle which destroyeth the Pillar and Foundation of the Protestant Religion, is not to be granted by those who own that Re∣ligion.
But to assert it Lawful under any Circumstance, to Act contra∣ry Page 60to the Opinion of a Mans own Conscience, destroyeth the Pillar and Foundation of the Protestant Religion— Ergo.
We confess this is but Argumentum ad homines, and concerns not those whose business is to oppose, and Root up the Religion of Protestants; but we are speaking to Protestants, who cannot deny the Proposition.
For the Assumption, all that we have to do, is to prove that the Asserting of this Principle, destroyeth, at least, one of the Foundations of the Protestant Religion, as it stands disting••••d from Popery. This is that, which Divines call The Judgment of Private and Practical Discretion. Divines say, there is 〈◊〉 ••••∣fold Judgment concerning Propositions of Truth.
1. The first is Authoritative, or Nomothetick. This belong∣eth onely to God; all the Men in the World, all their Opinions and Arguments cannot add a Cubit to the stature of Truth, nor make an hair of its Head either white or black.
2. The Second is Ministerial, and Declarative. This belongs to the Church (in the Scriptural Notion of it.) The Apostle therefore calls her the Pillar and ground of Truth: She keeps the Sacred Records, and when there is a doubt about any portion of them, Ministerially declareth what is the Truth.
3. The third Divines call, The Judgment of Private and Pra∣ctical Discretion. This, Protestants say, belongs to every pri∣vate Christian, who, by his own Conscience, (using the best means first which he can for the Information of it) is to deter∣mine (as to his own belief and Practice, what is true, and Law∣ful. And indeed here lyes the great difference betwixt the Re∣ligion of Papists and Protestants. The Papists will not allow the Private Christian to Judge of Truth with reference to his own Practice, but Obligeth People To believe as the Church believeth, and defendeth Blind Obedience to Superiours as Christians Duty. They make it Lawful for Men, contrary to their own Judgment, and the Dictate of their Conscience from intrinsick Arguments, to Practice according to the Opinion of one or more Doctors, and necessary to Obey all the Decrees of the Popes, and the Com∣mands of Superiours, if things be not apparently and demonstra∣tively unlawful. It may be one Adrianus or another, or two may enter their dissent to this Brutish Doctrine, but they do ge∣nerally agree it, and this is Fons & Origo mali. The very first Page 61thing to be taught their Prosilytes, (as silence was in the School of Pythagoras.) Hence their vernacular Bibles are burnt, and all their other Doctrines are easily swallowed. The necessity of an Infallible Judge is Concluded, &c.
§. 15. On the other side it is essential to a Protestant to be free and in Bondage to no Man, nor as to his Practice to be guided by any but God alone, and his own Conscience, and his Superi∣ours Commanding him what his own Conscience first perswades him to be necessary, or, at least, Lawful. He who denyeth this, and pretendeth to hate Popery, doth but abhor Idols, and commit Sacriledge. Nay, he doth indeed but deny that in words, which he owneth, chuseth, and preferreth; nor is it possible, there should be greater Factors for Popery in any place, than those that perswade Men, that it is Lawful for them under what Circumstances they can Imagine to Act contrary to the Opi∣nion of their own Conscience, and do what (from which to them seem very probable) seems utterly to swerve from that which is right, (to use Mr. Hooker's Phrase.)
§. 16. Now, let any pluck up this Flood-gate of Private and Practical Discretion, and tell us what should hinder most of the absurd Doctrines of Popery coming in upon us like an overflow∣ing Flood, if ever we should be so miserable (which is not a thing impossible) as in Future Ages, to have a Superiour that shall Command the receiving of them, or Practice according to them. As to the falshood of most of them, we have but a Mo∣ral certainty, at least, our perswasion must be Judged no more according to the Modern Divinity; for how can we be Infallibly, and demonstratively certain in things, as to which so great a part of the World is of another mind, and so many such Learned Men, as Bellarmine, Stapleton, and an hundred more, who dissent from us? Besides, as we shewed before, we are told, that in Disputable things, we can have but an Opinion of one part. And this we take to be a Meditation worthy of those Honourable Per∣sons amongst the Nobility and Gentry of England, who have shewed their Zeal so much of late against that Religious Pagean∣try of Rome. If any doubt whether Christians have such a Pri∣viledge given them by God, as this of Private and Practical Di∣scretion; let them consider those Texts, 1 Thes. 5.21. 1 John 3.1. usually quoted for it; and but Read what Bishop Davenant, Page 62in his most Learned Treatise, De Judice & Normâ fidei, and all other Protestant Writers have said for it. Whoever plucks up this Hedge, we understand not if he doth not feel the Romish Ser∣pent quickly biting him by the heel; and we cannot but think that Man will be Cursed, that goes about to remove this Land-mark of all Protestants; and cry out to our Superiours, in the words of Solomon, Prov. 22.28. Remove not the Ancient Land-mark, which our Fathers have set.
§. 17. We might further add, that the admission of this ab∣surd and brutish principle, that if a thing be not apparently and demonstratively sinful, it is Lawful for Men to Act contrary to the Opinion of their own Consiciences, representing it to them (from Arguments, which seem to them very probable) unlawful: All Books of Topicks, as to Matters of practice, all Argumentative Books in Divinity would be of no Use at all, but noxious, and mischievous rather: Yea, the Holy Scriptures themselves would be of very little or no use for the use of Argumentative Dis∣courses, in any Science or Discipline is to make a proposition ei∣ther Demonstrative, or Probable to us. Yea, this is the use of the Holy Scriptures, as they inform us of Truth. Things are Demonstrable to us upon the Evidence of Revelation, Sense, or Reason, (indeed the first is improper, for the certainty arising from Divine Revelation, is called Faith, not Demonstration, or Demonstrative certainty, but it is quiddam majus, what is cer∣tain to us upon a certainty of Faith, or Demonstrative Reason, is not so Ordinarily in a moment. This Certainty is Ordinarily hatched out of Topicks, and most Propositions even of Divine Truth usually at first appear to the Soul probable, before they appear indubitably certain. The Gray hairs of that other cer∣tainty (which is distinguished from Moral Certainty) rarely grow up in a Night. This being granted, which every one expe∣rienceth. Suppose but a Convocation, or a Colledge of Superi∣ours, to determine de Omnibus agendis, of all things to be Reli∣giously Observed, and done. To what purpose should any read, or study any Books for the disquisition of Truth, as to any part of a Proposition; for when he hath done, so long as the thing to be done appears to him but probably Lawful, or probably unlawful, which it must do before it appears to him indubitably, and out of all Question the one, or the other, he is according to this Page 63Opinion bound in Conscience (if he be by Superiours Command∣ed) to do quite contrary to what he Judgeth Lawful, if he be not indubitably certain it is unlawful. What need he Read and study the Scriptures, as to Matter of Practice? When he hath found out the most he can there, some or other will dispute the Truth of what he thinks he hath found out; and if so, it is disputable; and if it be disputable, his Notion is not indubita∣ble (according to this Novel Doctrine) and he is bound to do what he is bidden. So as his Notion shall be crush'd in the Egg, and never be suffered to hatch into a Demonstration, or indubi∣table certainty, and all his Reading for the finding out of the truth, shall serve for nothing but to torture him, with a continual re∣gret, and checking of Conscience, which will never let a Man be quiet whiles he Acteth in Repugnancy to it. Will any say yet, he shall do well to Read, to perswade himself of the Lawfulness of what he is Commanded. Suppose another Superiour should then come and Command him the quite contrary (as he may doubtless.) But it may be some will say, so long as he by Read∣ing onely perswades himself it is Lawful; not necessary antece∣daneously to the Superiours Command, he is well enough; he may first Obey the one, then the other: But how shall a Man be able so to govern himself, as by Reading to secure himself that he shall not convince himself the thing is necessary? Thus accor∣ding to this absurd position, we may part with all the practical part of Scripture, and, as the Popish Proselytes use to do, burn our Bibles, onely excepting some few Precepts about Obedience to Superiours, in that will lye the whole Duty of Man, for what∣ever else the Scripture saith (unless in things unlawful, accor∣ding to the Law and light of Nature) must be expounded with a Salvo. This you must not do, except Superiours Command. This you must do, unless Superiours Command the contrary. If not all Scripture, we would willingly know where these Divines will set the Limits? Will they say (as indeed they do) it is onely in things in their own Nature indifferent; this looks like something, but is indeed nothing: Who shall be Judge of those things which are so? Shall the Inferiours Conscience, as to his practice, be Judge? Then the Question is granted on our side. Shall the Su∣periour Judge, for the Inferiours practice? Then the Limitation signifieth nothing. How any will get out of this Noose, we can∣not Page 64Divine; but enough is said in this case, we Conclude it An absurd, unreasonable, unscriptural, Popish, Brutish Assertion, for any to affirm it Lawful, for Christians under any Circumstances, in Matters of Worship especially, to Act contrary to what in the par∣ticular Judgment of his own Conscience, formed from Arguments which to him appear very probable, he Judgeth to be Lawful from intrinsecal Nature, affections, and adjuncts of the Action Let us now shortly enquire what inconveniencies our Opinion in this case is incumbred with, or are charged upon it.
