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CHAP. I. Fol. 1 THe several Ends of Courtiers, and the Means to obtain them.
CHAP. II. Fol. 3 The Ways to Obtain the Prince's Favor.
CHAP. III. Fol. 4 The Ways to become Known to the Prince.
CHAP. IV. Fol. 7 The Humour and Inclinations of the Prince, and His Familiars are to be Known.
CHAP. V. Fol. 11 The Prince's Affections, whether, and how to be Complied with.
CHAP. VI. Fol. 15 The Scarcity and Condition of Honest Men, in Corrupt and Vicious Court. The Swarms of Ill Men, and their Arts of Ingratiating themselves.
CHAP. VII. Fol. 19 Whom, when, and How we ought to Flatter; the Nature of a Free and Tolerable Flattery, and the Necessi∣ty of it in Court.
CHAP. VIII. Fol. 21 How to Manage the Counsels of a Prince.
CHAP. IX. Fol. 26 The Sudden Resolutions of Princes, How to be Moderated.
CHAP. X. Fol. 31 The Several Natures, and Tempers of Princes, How to be Handled; with the Art of Courtiers in Introducing their Companions.
CHAP. XI. Fol. 39 That Age, Business, Custom, and Sick∣ness, alter the Temper of the Bodies and Constitution of the Minds of Princes.
CHAP. XII. Fol. 43 How much Impostors are able to Do by Flattering Princes; and How a Prince is to beware of Them.
CHAP. XIII. Fol. 46 Of the Familiars and Servants of the Prince, and the Ways to Win them.
CHAP. XIV. Fol. 49 Four kinds of Noble Courtiers; how to be Handled, and Made use of; How warily we ought to Deal with Ʋnconstant Princes.
CHAP. XV. Fol. 54 The Three other Kinds of Noble Cour∣tiers; How they are to be Dealt with.
CHAP. XVI. Fol. 58 The Meaner sort of Courtiers, How they are to be Handled; as also Such as are Enemies to us, for the sake of Others, to whom we Relate.
CHAP. XVII. Fol. 61 How we are to Treat with those Ene∣mies that Hate us for our Own Sakes; also concerning threats and Injuries.
CHAP. XVIII. Fol. 65 The Injuries of the More and Less Powerful, How to be Avoided, and Handled; the several Artifices of Reconciliation.
CHAP. XIX. Fol. 69 Of Envy, How it is to be Overcome.
CHAP. XX. Fol. 73 Of Emulation, the Sister of Envy, and the Remedies of it.
CHAP. XXI. Fol. 76 How to avoid a Threatning Ruine; and When it is upon us, How to make the Best use of it: Examples of the Fall of Great Men.
CHAP. XXII. Fol. 88 Boasting, Presumption, Arrogance, too much Familiarity, Pride, and Per∣fidy, Noted with Examples.
CHAP. XXIII. Fol. 91 How we must, not only take Care to Pre∣serve the Prince's Favour, but also that of Those in Power about him.
CHAP. XXIV. Fol. 94 Pride even in the Meanest Persons at Court, Noted with Examples; as also Treachery in betraying the Prin∣ce's Secrets.
CHAP. XXV. Fol. 97 The Causes, Kinds, and Examples of Conspiracies with the Prince's Ene∣mies.
CHAP. XXVI. Fol. 98 That our Courtier must not be the Au∣thor of Hazardous Counsels, the Variety of Errors, whereby the Prin∣ce's Favor is Lost.
CHAP. XXVII. Fol. 101 Of the Arts whereby Courtiers are Sup∣planted by Others; and First, under Pretence of Specious Imployments A∣broad, or of Calling them from their Commands, to Attend upon the King's Person.
CHAP. XXVIII. Fol. 105 How Calumnies are used to make Men Suspected, or Hated by the Prince.
CHAP. XXIX. Fol. 114 Examples of other Treacheries in Subor∣ned Witnesses, and Forged Letters.
CHAP. XXX. Fol. 117 Confirmation of Slanders under the Co∣lour of a Feigned Friendship; and
the Inclinations of the Prince to the Accuser.
CHAP. XXXI. Fol. 120 The chief Arts and Ways of Slanderers.
CHAP. XXXII. Fol. 121 The Deceits and Danger of Court-prai∣ses, and Masqued Courtiers. Last∣ly, The Third way of Oppressing our Courtier by Force.
CHAP. XXXIII. Fol. 127 Sometimes the Prince's own Ill and Cru∣el Nature, Envying the Deserts of his Servants, is Cause of the Cour∣tier's Fall; and This, How it is to be Handled.
CHAP. XXXIV. Fol. 130 How to Preserve our Favour and Office, with the Succeeding Prince
CHAP. XXXV. Fol. 134 Ostentation of the Prince's Favour, to be Avoided: Something also Concern∣ing our Friends and Followers.
CHAP. XXXVI. Fol. 136 How to Manage and Dispense the Prin∣ce's Favour, Advices, and Comforts in Adversity, with other Rules.
CHAP. XXXVII. Fol. 140 How to make a Judgment of the Con∣stancy, or Change of the Prince's Affection to us.
CHAP. XXXVIII. Fol. 141 The Prince's Favour to Women: In∣structions for the Prince's Mistresses; Benefits Conferred on Princes, often make those persons hated by them, with other documents.
CHAP. XXXIX. Fol. 145 Sundry precepts concerning the Plea∣sures, and Inclinations of the Prince, &c.
CHAP. XL. Fol. 149 Concluding with many choice, and ne∣cessary Admonitions.
The several Ends of Courtiers, and the means to attain them.
IT is necessary that all Men, who desire with Prudence and Order, to Govern their Affairs, do in the first place, propose unto themselves, an End whereunto all their actions must tend. Those that look towards the Court, do not all fix up∣on the same Ends; some the Hope of Gain, and others the Desire of Honour, leads; the Ambiti∣on of Rule, draws not a few; and very many
steer that Course, meerly out of a ……∣sie inclination, to the Engrossing, Crossing, or interposing in other mens affairs; whilst the number of those is very small, who Primitively intend the Honor, Safety, and Advantage of the Prince.
But though their Ends be diverse, yet the way to attain to whatever End any man there hath pitcht upon, is but one, and Common to all that move in that Sphere, to wit, the Favour of the Prince; in ob∣taining which the industry, and labor of all Courtiers is imployed. In order whereun∣to it is in the first place necessary, that you be known unto your Prince; and then ei∣ther by your Behaviour, your Parts, your Actions, or some other laudable means, that you make your self Grateful in his eye; yet there are those for whom the Splendor of their Family, the Authority of their Office, or Convenience of their imployment (whe∣ther it be high, or low, come unto them by inheritance, or got with money) hath pre∣pared an access unto the Prince's person; so that they being hereby exempted, from the toil of seeking how to become known unto the Prince, find half their work performed unto their hands; whilst those to whom these Introductions are denied, find their greatest difficulties in their first beginnings: But when they are once known unto the Prince, as he judges them sit for his Service
they are often preferred and trusted before others; by reason that being Raised from a low Condition, or a mean Fortune; they are more addicted and subject to the Prince's will whom they submissively Reverence, as the one∣ly Author of their Advancement.
It is otherwise with Courtiers that are born Great, for upon those the Dignity either of their Imployment, or their Family, impo∣ses a necessity of having a regard unto their own Honor, and of Preferring sometimes their own to the Prince's opinion; who be∣sides is more oft unwilling to promote These through a certain Emulation, or Fear least their Swelling Greatness should insult at last against him that is the Author of it; and he not able to repress them without dan∣ger to Himself and his Kingdom; whilst on the other side, the Oppression of him that riseth from a mean Condition, is far more easy; onely let the Prince turn his back upon him, or abandon him to the Great ones who for the most part look with envy upon such) and he is Lost. I intend here only those wise Princes that have known, how to limit within due Bounds, the Power of those they love and advance; not conferring all the authority and trust of his Kingdom upon one of these men, in subjecting even the Peers unto him which having been done by some Princes, did seldom or almost never succeed well.
The ways to obtain the Prince's Favour.
THe ways whereby Courtiers get into Au∣thority and Favour with the Prince, are two, above all other most usual and fre∣quented. The one is of those that seek af∣ter Publick Offices and Dignities, Climbing up the stairs of honour till they come within a stage of the Favorite himself. The other is of those that follow the Court, sedu∣lously seeking all occasions of being imploy∣ed in the secret affairs of the Prince, and made use of in business of the Greatest Trust.
The Last of which ways, is without doubt the shortest, and traced with their steps, who have lived in the greatest Favour with their Princes; as Mecaenas was to Augustus, and Sallust both to him, and his Successor Tibe∣rius, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 3. Sallust, although the ways of honour were easie unto him, imitating Mecaenas, without the Sena∣torial Dignity, outwent in Power many that had been honoured, both with Triumphs and the Consulship, and varying from the custom of the Ancients, through his delicacy, and neatness, seemed prone to nothing but the Plenty and abundance of luxury; although he had indeed a vigorous mind, capable of the weightiest business; by so much the more sharp
and active by how much the more he made shew of dulness and sloth.
Like to him was Mella, of whom speaks the same Tacitus, Annal. 12. Mella born of the same Parents, that Gallio and Seneca were; through a Preposterous ambition laid aside all pretence to publick Honours; to the end, that being only Roman Knight, he might equal in power Those that had been Consuls; Besides, he believed it the shortest way to the get∣ting of Money, to be imployed in Agencies, and Solliciting the Prince's business.
The ways to become Known to the Prince.
THe ways of becoming Known and Grate∣ful to the Prince, are various, accord∣ing to the Diversity of the Courtiers, and the Times; there are some that make them∣selves known by their Actions signally, either Profitable, or Glorious; or else by a more than Common Vertue, and Honesty. The Commendation of others gives to many, both Access to, and Interest in the Prince, which is indeed the most usual way of all. For Princes live in such a degree of eminence above others, and are so Hedged in with the number of Peers and train
of Veterane Courtiers, that a Stranger can hardly thrust in amongst the throng that stand in his way, unless either there be some one to take him by the hand, and make his passage, or else that himself, by some extraor∣dinary enterprize do attract the Eyes of all men upon him, and, amongst others, those of the Prince.
And here the Fact of the Architect Di∣mocrates, or as some call him Stasicrates, is very memorable. He desiring to become known unto the Great Alexander, when all the Courtiers had refused to bring him to the King, bethinks of a way of presenting himself all naked, anointed with Oyl, a pop∣lar Crown on his head, upon his left shoul∣der a Lyon's Skin, and holding a great Club in his Right hand: And thus Accou∣tred, he comes into Alexander's Presence, as he was sitting on his Throne. The no∣velty of the thing drew the Eyes of all upon him, and moved Alexander himself so far, as he caused the Man to be brought unto him; and though he approved not of what he propounded, yet he command∣ed he should be Enrolled amongst his Fa∣mily.
I do not bring this Example to perswade any body with the like Foolery, to insinuate himself into the Prince's Favour, but to the end I may demonstrate, That those who are Strangers and unknown, unless they be assisted
by some one in great Authority, can hardly Scrue themselves into so great a train, as do Surround the Prince, except either by some memorable Action, as we have said before, or by some unusual Accident, they deserve, as the Poet says,
With fingers to be pointed out, For some strange thing amongst the rout.
The Humour and Inclinations of the Prince and his Familiars, are to be known.
OUr Young Courtier, who desires to be Known and Loved by the Prince, must observe well the Manners and Conditions, not onely of the Prince himself, but also of such of his Followers, as he most Trusts and re∣lies upon; together with the Peers, and all others who may either afford him any Help or Countenance; or else on the contrary (stirred up either with Emulation, Fear, Envy, Hate, their own, or their Friends concernments) work him any prejudice. It is chiefly necessary that he make a full discovery of the Inclinations and Customs of the Prince, that for the most part follow the temperature of his body;
which though by wary Princes, they be much Concealed and Smothered, yet it seldom hap∣pens but that sometimes they break out, and as it were laying aside disguises, show themselves. Since all their Actions are so exposed to the eyes of Men, it cannot be, but Some one or other, must observe where∣unto their Inclinations tend. Sometimes they are so Opprest and Vext with the weight of Bu∣siness, that forgetting their Artifices, they betray their dispositions; Tiberius himself, although a most skilful Master in Dissembling, could not set so good a face upon it, but that Time would by little and little, bring all his Arts to light.
But since Those of other Men are so many, the Propensions of Princes must needs be Di∣verse, and almost Infinite; yet they may be reduced to two Heads. The one of which, includes all that tends to the Greatness of his State; The other his Personal Pleasures; His Greatness consists either in his Fame and Au∣thority, or in Riches; the duty of his Sub∣jects; or lastly, in the Strength and Faithful∣ness of his Armies. In these things he ought to accommodate his Endeavours to the Na∣ture, and Disposition of the Princes affairs; which he that shall with Dexterity and Skill perform, provided he be neither sus∣pected nor hated for other Reasons, cannot fail of becoming Acceptable unto the Prince.
Make the same judgment of the Pleasures, and vicious Affections of the Prince. If he be Diffident, and of a Fearful Disposition, believe that a Bold Informer will be grateful unto him, who sticks not at the displeasure of the Great ones, and is ready to Execute the Prince's commands, whatsoever they be; as Tacitus Describes Sejanus. He had a body (says he, Annal. 4.) patient of toyl, a bold mind; he was a close concealer of himself, and a rash accuser of others: Composed he was of a mixture of flattery, and pride, with an exterior face of modesty; and yet inwardly fraught with an excess of Ambi∣tion.
If the Prince delight in Drunkenness, he will also take pleasure in men addicted to the same Vice; for which cause Tiberius lo∣ved Pomponius, and Lucius Piso, of whom Suetonius, Cap. 24. de Tiberio. After this, the Prince, to the corruption of publick Man∣ners, spent two whole days and nights, eat∣ing and drinking with Pomponius Flaccus, and Piso; to one of which he gave imme∣diately the Province of Syria, and to the other the Government of the City, calling them in his Letters, his most pleasant and familiar Friends. The same Tiberius, as Suetonius re∣lates, preferred a most ignoble Fellow to the Questorship, before many Noble pretenders, be∣cause at a Banquet, where himself was drinking, he drank off Nine Gallons of Wine.
Their society in their Lust, did indear Ti∣gellinus to Nero. Tigellinus was more Power∣ful (saith Tacitus, Annal. 14.) in the bo∣som of the Prince, as being admitted to his most Private Lusts. So Petronius, that Ma∣ster of elegance (for those are the Historians words, Annal. 16.) was taken in, amongst few, to the Familiarity of Nero; who thought nothing Pleasant or Sweet, but what Petroni∣us Approved of. And according to this ex∣ample, did Commodus and Heliogabalus, con∣fer all the Dignities of the Empire upon men for Lust and Licentiousness, most like unto themselves.
Mutianus was not beloved by Vespasian so much for his Fidelity, Duty, and the Merit of his passed Services, as that because he was more dexterous than others in Feeding his Avarice. To Isacius Angelus, who after the death of Theodorus, got the Empire, the same Avarice endeared a certain Boy, who though he scarce knew how to Write, kept the Accounts of his Exchequer, out of hope onely of sharing in the Bribes, which were given him largely, from all those that used his assistance.
Manuel Commenus, also Emperor, seeking some Rough Exactor and Crafty raiser of his Tributes, that might supply his Prodigality with Money, chose John Pucius, a rude un∣sufferable Man, difficult of access, and in∣tolerable harsh.
Whose Language, and his looks did well His Nature and his Office tell.And not content with this, lifted him up to that Authority, that he did not onely Excel all others in Dignity, but also would Dare to violate the Edicts of the Prince, and Or∣ders of the Senate; abrogating, under pre∣tence of encreasing the Treasury, some of the greatest and most necessary Offices of the Empire: Such as was the Commander of the Gallies, the chief strength and defence of that Imperial Monarchy.
The Prince's Affections, whether, and How to be complied with.
BUt that they who desire to become Ac∣ceptable to the Prince, ought to Sooth him in all his Inclinations, is not onely a thing publickly granted, but also authorized by the daily practice of Courtiers. An ho∣nest man will wonder at it, and think that by this Rule that teaches us to Humor all the dispositions of the Prince, he is shut out from Court; since Princes often run courses much astray from the paths of Rea∣son and Justice. Truly, he that desires to
lead a life altogether Innocent, and Remote from the conversation of men addicted to vice, and to their own Corrupt Inclinations, shall in my opinion, do very well to absent himself from that great Courtezan, the Court (if I may so call it) that sometimes Corrupts men of the greatest Integrity and Inno∣cence.
Let us see an example or two of this Corruption. Festinus the friend of Maxi∣minus, during Valentinians's Reign, gover∣ned Asia with a wonderful repute of Gen∣tleness and Modesty; being a sharp reprover of the Violence and Cruelties of Maximi∣nus, and of the Calumnies and Frauds, wherewith he circumvented many: But at last observing that his Companion by these means had gotten the command of the Praetorian Bands, next in dignity to the Emperour himself, he changed his manner of life, and imitating Maximinus, did many unjust and cruel things. John Pucius (whom I mentioned but a little before) administred for a time the Affairs and Treasures of the Emperour Manuel with great integrity; which caused, that the Emperour's pride and inhumanity was in some sort tolerable to those that were well disposed amongst the Subjects: but at last (as Nicetas wit∣nesseth) giving himself over to the desire of wealth, he was in covetousness inferi∣or to none, that ever had born those
offices before him; exhorting his very friends and servants, to imitate his exam∣ple, as many of them did; and the rest, though better, and incorrupted them∣selves, yet were fain silently to suffer o∣thers to be depraved, for fear of the danger that hung over those that should op∣pose him.
Aristides the first, both in name and na∣ture, being by the Athenians made Treasurer; In the first place, according to his own Dis∣position, and the duty of an Honest man, went about to hinder all those that were under his charge, from robbing the Treasury; where∣upon they presently accused him of Cheat∣ing, and Bribery, as one of the corruptest persons that ever bore that office; inso∣much, that he had like to have been con∣demned: But being at last quit, and his office still continued, he determined to imitate his Predecessors, and wink at the thefts of his Companions; by which means, he pre∣sently reobtained the name of a Good man, in the opinion of all.
Such things often fall out in the Courts of Princes, either through the Malice of those that are in most Authority, who can endure no man more vertuous than themselves; or else through the Folly and Imprudence of the Prince. The preservation of our integrity in Court, I confess, is therefore very difficult: yet if any, either through the necessity of his
Fortune, the Eminence of his Birth, the Dig∣nity of his office, or the desire of serving, either his Friends or Country, is lead unto it, or called thereunto by the Prince, shall un∣dergo this kind of life; and as occasion shall require, seek to do thereby good unto himself, and serve his Friends; in my judgment he may persist therein, with∣out prejudice to his upright heart, at least∣ways for a time.
I speak of the Courts of the worst Prin∣ces; for to live in the Court of a Wise Prince, that loves Honest and vertuous men, the dif∣ficulty is not so great. In times past, good men did not always undergo Publick em∣ployments with a desire of doing service to their Countrey, so much as meerly to keep wicked and corrupt men out of those charges: And for the same reasons, ought they to seek access unto Tyrannical, and volup∣tuous Princes; to the end, That if they durst not directly, at least obliquely, and as much as in them lay, they might im∣pede the evil, and pernicious Counsels of the Prince; either by framing delays, and contriving difficulties in his way, or by of∣fering unto him more Mild and Plausible resolutions.
Burrhus and Seneca, who according to the Rate of those times, were accounted not only good Courtiers, but vertuous men also, when being made Governors of Nero's youth,
they observed the humor of this Prince apt and prone to Lust and Pleasure; lest he should break out to the Rapes of the Noblest Women, they permitted him a Mistriss, where∣by for a time they kept him in order: Who took into his Familiarity Annaeus Serenus for a cloak unto his Lust, Who feigning to be in love with this freed Woman, did openly own those gifts to be his (saith Tacitus, Annal. 13.) which the Prince in private bestowed upon her. This must a good man do, who not being able to master the Luxury, Liber∣ty, and Perverseness of the Prince, must at least divert them, and bend them other ways, whence there is least danger like to arise, either to the Publick, or the Prince's honor.
The Searcity and Condition of honest men, in Corrupt and Vicious Courts; The Swarms of Ill Men, and their Arts of Ingratiating themselves.
Perhaps some one will say, that it seldom falls out, that a Tyrant, or a dissolute Prince, will take into his Favour an Honest Man; I do not deny but it is very rare, but
yet I must affirm there are few Princes Courts, in which there are not some good men found; if not call'd thither by the Prince, at least drawn thither by their own desire of doing good to others, and infringing the power of evil men: Who stand their ground there to that end, through the assistance of the best disposed Courtiers, and through the friendship and patronage of some Great man, observing carefully there, that wholesome rule of Le∣pidus, whom Tacitus (Annal. 4.) brings for an example of a Good and wise Courtier, who neither with an unseasonable Contuma∣cy did exasperate the Prince, nor with a sordid flattery Sooth him in his vices. The same Tacitus for these reasons commends Ca∣pito and Labeo. That age (saith he) had at once two Ornaments of peace; But Labeo was of a more incorrupted liberty, and therefore more esteemed, whilest Capito's pleasing humour was more acceptable to the great ones.
I do not deny, but a Courtier's life will be far more difficult to an honest man than to another; But withal I must affirm, that the advantage of Glory and content of Mind, that will arise from thence, will much re∣compence the trouble of it. Since that, if he carry himself wisely, and accommodate him∣self to those things that he sees, he cannot change nor overcome; I dare say, he will at last become acceptable to the worst of
Princes, and dearer than others that are of a worse repute; who seldom manage the Prince's business with a due fidelity and care; or at least not equal to that he might easily promise to himself from the hands of a vertuous and honest man. And hither tends the Counsel of Sallust and Me∣caenas, whereby the first recommended to Julius Caesar, and the latter to Augustus, the choice and friendship of Good men. Because Conscience and care of their Re∣putation restrains these more powerfully from dishonest things, than the fear of punishment, or the want of Power doth others.
But as I have said, the vicious are always in Court in greater throngs; who chiefly by two ways do Ingratiate themselves with the Prince; first by Flattering and Fulfilling whatever he shall please to command; and that by so much the more servilely, by how much the more their hopes of gain are grea∣ter. Next for that Princes are pleased to have those about them, in comparison of whom, themselves, though bad God knows, seem to be good. Some there are that think al∣so their lives more secure in the company of those that are most like unto themselves. Dionysias the Tyrant, being requested to ex∣pel out of his Court one, who for his villainy was hated by all men, answered, No, he would keep him, lest otherwise he himself should
become the most hateful person in the Court. It is natural to those who find themselves ob∣noxious to any vice, by comparing them∣selves to those that are worse, to seek to purchase to themselves some shew of Pro∣bity; And it hath been an Old trick of Princes, on purpose to choose unlikely Suc∣cessors, to the end their own acts and ver∣tues might appear better and more illustri∣ous: For Tacitus is of opinion, that for no other reason did Augustus adopt Tiberi∣us, whose arrogance and cruelty he knew full well; nor Tiberius choose Caligula.
It is principally necessary, that a good man be very Sober and Circumspect in his discourse; for Princes seldom or never love an unwary and careless liberty in any kind of men, how vertuous soever they be. Neither did Plato's freedom with Di∣onysius succeed well, for therefore was he delivered up to a needy Mariner, and sent to be sold in the Isle of Creet; whence being redeemed by certain Philosophers, he was admonished either to abstain wholly from the conversation of Princes, or to speak plausible things: With the like advices did Aristotle furnish his Cozen Callisthenes, then going to attend upon Alexander, to wit, That he should very seldom speak, and then never but pleasing things, to him upon whose Tongues-end lay the disposal of his life.
Whom, When, and How we ought to Flat∣ter; the Nature of a free and tolerable Flattery, and the necessity of it in Court.
THough it be Inconsistent with the strictest rules of Morality and Vertue, yet of Necessity, if you live in Court, you must sometimes so Flatter the Prince, as may gain him unto you. But all manner of Flattery is not Tolerable, a Base and Ser∣vile one was displeasing even to Tiberius himself, of whom it is written by Tacitus, Annal. 3. that going out of the Senate, he was once heard to say of those Flattering Senators in Greek; O Men born to slavery. There are circumstances wherein Flattery used, is as prejudicial, as when it is wholly omitted; For it happens often, that be whom we Flatter too grosly, suspects de∣ceipt. It is requisite still that Flattery have something of truth, and some show of liberty mixed with it, (it is the opinion of Aeschines and Plutarch) whereby we may perswade not onely the Prince, that we speak heartily, and as we think, but others also, and so preserve our Credit.
Croesus, who whilest he was a King him∣self, had learnt well the humor of Kings, and what would either please or displease them: When upon a time Cambyses, King of the Per∣sians, demanded of those that were about him, What they thought of him in Comparison of his Father Cyrus: They all affirmed, That he was greater than Cyrus, as who unto his Fa∣thers Kingdoms had added Aegypt, and the dominion of the Sea. When Croesus (then a Captive) came to speak, he affirmed, That he was much inferiour to his Father, by reason that he had as yet begotten none equal to himself. This answer had some taste of freedom, and therefore was more pleasing to Cambyses's-vanity, than all the rest had said.
That Flattery is very notable of Valerius Messalla, recorded by Tacitus Annal. 1. Messa∣la Valerius added, That it was convenient the Oath of Allegiance should every year be renewed in Tiberius's name; who being demanded by Ti∣berius, whether he had any commandment from him to give that advice, he answered, That he spoke it of his own accord; and that in what concern'd the Common-wealth, he would use no man's advice but his own, whatever the offence or danger were: Which was a wonderful un∣practised kind of Flattery.
Like unto this, is that which the same Author relates of Ateius Capito, Annal. 3. Lu∣cius Ennius, a Gentleman of Rome, was accused
of Treason for melting the Image of the Prince, and making it into Plate; Caesar commanded he should not be prosecuted for it: Ateius Ca∣pito openly complained with a seeming liberty, that the power of determining in such a case ought not to be taken from the Senate, nor so great a Crime pass unpunished; and that he was slow in resenting his own, least he should also punish an injury done to the Common-wealth. It were easie to bring more examples of this kind, but these are sufficient to in∣struct those upon whom there is imposed a necessity of Flattering, that they may take heed, lest their Flattery bring upon them∣selves, or others, any Private or Publick damage; it is sufficient that it be such as may sometimes satisfie the Prince's va∣nity.
How to Manage the Counsels of a Prince.
OUr Courtier ought to beware how he engages himself (though called) in the Counsel of a Proud and Violent Prince; for such as those do ask Counsel in no other sort, than as Xerxes did when he went to invade Greece: He called together the Prin∣ces of Asia, as it were to deliberate with
them about the Conduct of the War; but they being come before him, he said, Lest I should seem without your advice to act all things according to my own will; I have called you my Lords to Counsel: yet I would have you know, that I expect here from you obedient minds, and not trouble∣some debates. Cambyses, the Predecessor of Xerxes, being about to Marry his Sister, de∣manded of his Counsellors, whether any Law of the Persians prohibited such a Mar∣riage; They perceiving the King did not ask this question, so much to resolve him∣self of any doubt, as to Sound the disposi∣tions of the Nobles, answered, That truly there was no Law that warranted expresly this that the King was about to do; but there was one that affirmed, that whatever the King thought fit to do, was Lawful. Thus out of the Humour of the Prince, and the Nature of the affair, we must first make a judgment, whether it be fit, or safe, when he asks our Counsel, to deliver freely our opinions; or to humour him in his in∣clinations.
You have Royal examples of this already, I will now bring you one of a man, who though he were not a King, yet bore the Office of a King; not above an Age ago in Spain: Ferdinand being dead, the Pope and Maximi∣lian the Emperour, exhorted Charles of Austria, then in Flanders, to take upon him the title
of King of Spain; although his Mother Joan, Ferdinand's daughter, were still living, but wholly unfit for Government, by reason of her want of health. The States were here∣upon assembled, and before them Cardinal Ximenes, to excuse the novelty of the thing, discoursed excellently of the reasons of what was done. The Grandees more obser∣vant of ancient customs, and the Queen, than was fit against a King that was short∣ly to succeed of Course; Protested very obstinately against it. Ximenes being an∣gry, rises up and tells them, the thing that was treated of, was not to be called in question; neither was there any need of their advice in the case: That Kings being to enter upon their Kingdoms, are not to expect the consent of their Subjects; that they who were assembled, were not called out of any necessity, but that they might have occasion by the Promptitude of their suffrages to endear their Prince unto them. But since they interpreted that as a due, which was only a favour, they should see that without their approbation he would proclaim King Charles at Madrid; which exam∣ple all the rest of the Cities quickly follow∣ed.
Such a manner of proceeding, not only in these cases, but mostly in all others do Princes use; scarce asking any mans ad∣vice, but either to the end they may Coun∣tenance their own resolutions with the con∣sent
of many, or else to discover the dis∣position of the person they advise with∣al, as Tacitus witnesseth that Tiberius oft did. The Courtier must therefore Sol∣licitously sift into the Prince's mind, lest o∣therwise he should chance to give offen∣sive Counsel. If the Prince's inclination in the thing debated be doubtful unto him, let him seem to discuss the matter, and so laying down arguments both for the one, and the other side, let him leave the Prince to his own election: Who (if the thing advised of, be not unalterably resol∣ved upon already) having heard the rea∣sons that may be brought against it, if he be discreet, will change his Mind.
Neither in this case will there be any ground for that bashfulness (of blushing, to seem so much inferior to any body, as to follow their Counsel) which though it be very hurtful and unbecoming unto them, is very familiar amongst Great Men; for having said what you can, you leave the freedom of determining all to the Prince's Prudence, whereby you will also avoid the danger that many times Counsellors are ob∣noxious unto, if their Advices succeed ill. And if the Prince following his first resolutions meet not with success, he will, by so much the more acknowledge and esteem the prudence of that Courtier, who foresaw the Approach∣ing misfortune, when it was yet avoidable.
If you be Prest to deliver your opinion in an unlawful matter, either seek some pre∣tence of delay, or else intreat that some third person may be called for the better discussing of the business; whereby the case being more maturely weighed, it may appear what is most for the dignity and safety of the Prince. By this means Burrhus defeated Nero's first attempt against his Mother's life; Promising that himself would kill her if she were found guilty; But since it was afforded unto every other person, a trial could not be denied unto his Mother. Whilst the examinations are taking, Nero's fury asswages, and his Fears grows less, so that his determination, though it was not quite altered, yet it was laid aside to another time.
But this manner of proceeding takes not place upon all occasions, being proper on∣ly in desperate and ambiguous cases. More∣over, before we adventure upon it, we ought to know, whether the Nature of the Prince is compatible with delays: for there are some so headstrong and impatient, that there is no means more certain of incur∣ring their displeasure, than by using de∣lays.
The Sudden Resolution of Princes, How to be Moderated.
WHen (as it often falls out) our Advice is not asked in the resolution, but for the manner of executing what is resol∣ved upon already; if the business do seem in∣consistent with reason and honesty, we must propose the remotest means we can think of for the effecting of it; and countenance this our Advice with the pretences of Facility, Equity, and Security; shewing withal, that sudden undertakings, are full of hazard, and difficulty. When we have to do with those impatient kind of Princes, we ought to be ready, and have always our Wits about us for these sudden occasions, and then if they be not unsufferably rash and wil∣full, no doubt but they will follow that course which we shall demonstrate to be most Safe and Easie: Yet if their madness be such, that they will not hear mild and gentle Counsels, his Adviser may yet ex∣cuse this his wary Prudence with a Care and Affection to the Prince; desiring rather, that things should be done Slowly with secu∣rity, then Rashly with the ruine of his Master.
Now if so be, that in that Headlong course that the Prince hath Wilfully chosen, Diffi∣culties
or Straits do occur, he will much more reflect upon the Prudence of him that would have disswaded him in time, and perhaps for the future, be willing to hear∣ken to him, propounding Milder ways. Besides, this gaining of time doth fre∣quently afford Subject of Moderating the Prince's passion, and of Bridling his desires, or else of letting him see, that what he is about is either wholly impossible, or else cannot be effected without great ab∣surdity.
For it after happens, that the ways which Princes propose unto themselves, are accom∣panied with such circumstances of difficul∣ty, as are not to be overcome; and to these kind of Straits, as I would not have you ex∣hort him, so I would not have you too much disswade him from them, (rather suf∣fer him with a respective silence to take his own course, least you disswading out of these difficult ways, he seek out some more easie one of compassing his will;) which o∣therwise having toil'd himself out of breath amongst the Obstacles that he met with, he would voluntarily give the business over. But sometimes it falls out that Princes com∣mit the execution of some Wickedness or Injustice to an honest man: In which case truly (though all good men ought to suffer any violence or misfortune rather than con∣sent to be made the Minister of villainy) I
fear the number of these is very few that are so Generously resolved, as by a passive dis∣obedience to expose themselves to the sacri∣fice for another; especially if the occasion offered, and the nature of the Prince admits of no denial, or excuse, nor affords any way of casting that displeasing imployment up∣on some third person.
Which later course Burrhus took, Nero resolving the second time upon his Mo∣ther's Murther, full of so much the more care and eargerness, by how much the danger of her contrived Shipwrack in the Tyber had produced no other effect, than that the Woman always before malici∣ous and greedy of revenge, was after so great an injury become more enraged than e∣ver. Burrhus and Seneca, being call'd to Counsel, stood long ambiguous and doubt∣ful what to say, as Tacitus reports Annal. 14. saying: They were both of them a long time silent, fearing lest they disswade in vain; At last Seneca, hitherto the forwarder man, cast his eye upon Burrhus, as if he would have asked, whether the execution of that Murther should not be left to the Soldiers; Burrhus prevented him with an answer, and says that the Pretorian Bands were all devoted to Cae∣sar's house, and so mindful of Germanicus, that they would act nothing of cruelty against his Progeny; and therefore that Anicetus should perform his promise. So he freed
both himself and his soldiers, from the ex∣ecution of that ugly act.
I confess, he is not beholding unto you, whom, to save your self innocent, you shall intangle in such an employment: But should such an occasion happen, I thing it fitter that some such man as Anicetus was, should undergo the infamy of such an act, than any vertuous or honest man.
Yet the safest way of all is in time to foresee, and in their birth to prevent, and occur to the unjust desires, and the unlaw∣ful designs of the Prince; and before they either take Root, or appear above Ground, to suppress and pull them up. There are many, who with Seasonable and Gen∣tle Admonitions, and Silken words, as Pa∣risates calls them, have done much good, and had wonderful success in these cases; yet it is necessary, that whosoever would use such Remedies as these be of Great Authority with the Prince, who, must hear as much out of Reverence as Love: And nevertheless, when all is done, though it may succeed well in this or that case, it will hardly do so in all. I am much plea∣sed with the way of those men, who are of a Conceited and Pleasant humour, and for that Faculty, acceptable with the Prince; who as it were, intending something else, with a fit Similitude, or a well chosen Story, will represent unto the Prince the Danger,
and Foulness of those Counsels, wherewith he seems to be carried Headlong away.
But to do this, there is a great Nimbleness of wit, and Pleasantness of discourse requi∣red; besides, they must take heed the Prince smell not out, that himself is the argument of the Jest. As Tiberius, who in the Tragedy of Atreus, composed by Scaurus believed he was reproached of his Brother's murder; and Domitian, in that which Helvidius had writ of Paris and Cenon, thought himself upbraided with his divorces: Wherefore it is necessary, that these kind of stories be skilfully interwoven amongst other things, not Squaring or Applyable to the Prince; and it is very pertinent to this purpose, That they take care not to Inculcate too plainly, that matter which makes most to the pur∣pose; though, least it should quite escape the Prince's observation, it may be, as it were, by a casual repetition iterated. The conceit and continuance of the story, by how much the greater, and more chearful it is, by so much the more it will imprint those things that are said; and because they seem to come by Chance, not of Pur∣pose, or Design, they will not distast the ticklish ear of the Prince.
For this kind of Moderation, whereby you may neither contribute to the Prince's vices, nor in vain resist them; there are many critical times, and means, which
those that attend upon the persons, and are imployed in the affairs of Princes, cannot but meet with. If so be that the Case be such, that you must needs contradict the Disposition and Inclination of the Prince, you must seek out some other Passion or Hamor in him, whereunto he is equally inclined, and so beget a Strife and Contention in the Prince's mind; but we must carefully pretend still, that what we say, comes from the Duty and Reverence that we bear him. By this means did Mutianus keep Domitian in order, and hinder him from joyning with Cerealis, as (out of what hopes, I know not) he was about to do, says Tacitus, Hist. 4.
The several Natures, and Tempers of Princes, How to be Handled; with the Art of Courtiers in In∣troducing their Companions.
YEt to do these things successfully, it doth much conduce, that we know the Inclinations of our Princes, which de∣pend upon the Natural Temperature of their Bodies. The difference and variety of
which is common to them with other men; except, that as they are more Powerful then others so they are less Masters of their Af∣fections and Inclinations; which are for the most part, more violent and more unreaso∣nable in them, than in meaner persons.
He, in whom Choler rules, is Hasty, Proud, and prone to Anger; a lover of Ceremony, and Respect; a sore enemy to those that are but in the least sort Refractary; impatient in Execution, and rash in Resolution; a con∣temner of all mens opinions, that differ from his own; very apt to commit Injuries, yet soon Friends with those he hath wrong∣ed, if they renew not the memory of Pas∣sed Enmities; but a hater of those that rip up old Offences, and to the end, he may prevent such as he is afraid of, watches all occasions of doing them a greater mis∣chief.
Whoever hath to do with such a Prince, must always have his Eyes and Ears open, that he may readily understand and obey the first Beck, without making any reply or delay, least by Contradiction the Prince come to suspect him of Arrogance, as one that would seem to think himself wiser than he; let him not stick to submit himself to the low∣est kind of Imployments, if need be, though they suit not with his condition. He must be Patient of Injuries, and no ways mindful of them; but after a wrong, so much the more
officious: He must not brag of his merits, least he should seem to reproach the Prince with them; but rather heap Services up∣on Services, least the memory of those that are past should wear out, and to the end, the pleasure and gratefulness of fresh ones, may Revive the Remembrance of the Old. When the Prince is angry, let him not come near him, for all things displease him then; neither are those that are dearest unto him, grateful in any thing they can devise, to say or do. Familia∣rity with such Humours as these, turns in∣to Contempt; which for that reason, al∣though the Prince invite us to it, is to be avoided; Let all things rather tend to Modesty and Respect. For these Lions, though sometimes they be Meek and Gentle, are at other times Enraged against those they Love best, and who are in most Authority with them.
They that are of a Sanguine Constitution, are for the most part of a Pleasant Humour, Lovers of Mirth, and Recreation; flying Sad∣ness, the seriousness of Business, and trouble of Debates, Lovers of Peace, leaving the ad∣ministration of their affairs to others, in whom they suffer nothing more unwilling∣ly, than Complaints. They are Courteous, Gentle, and Free, if not from all, at least, from any Grievous Injuries; more mindful of benefits Received from others, than done by
Themselves; Complacent, willing to help, and for the most part Liberal.
He that lives with such as these, must omit no circumstances of Veneration and Re∣spect, but very seldom must they treat of Business, or serious Affairs. Those that are imployed in the Greatest, and most Im∣portant Offices, and concernments of the Kingdom, ought not to come near these Princes, before they be either Called, or certain that the Prince is not engaged in any Recreation; least otherwise, they should interrupt him in his greatest Delights, and make him Blush to be surprised by those, who, he may apprehend, are Secretly Angry, to see him no better Entertained. For so when Philip of Macedon, was once at play, it was told him, That Antipater was at the door, who presently troubled, and con∣scious of his Transgression, hid his dice un∣der his Pillow, Blushing that Antipater should catch him at that Sport. There∣fore with such a Prince, as those that ma∣nage the Greatest Affairs of the Kingdom, in serious and weighty Trusts do exceed others; so also are they out-gone by o∣thers, in a familiar and free access to the Prince's person; who naturally avoids these kind of Serious Men, as much as may be. Those men that are of a Jovial and well tempered Disposition, and capable as well of Pleasure, as of Business, are chiefly
acceptable to these kind of Princes. Pro∣vided, That whilst they are out of the Prince's Sight, they do not with too much Facility and Complacence, lose their au∣thority with others; but they must pre∣serve the Honour of their Rank intire, for without that (as the Proverb says) Fami∣liarity breeds contempt, and Contempt gives encouragement to Quarrels, upon the first appearance of an Injury: Which the Prince being an enemy to Trouble and Strife, to free himself of, will endeavour to remove him that shall appear most Faul∣ty.
A Melancholy Prince is Slow in his Coun∣sels, Anxious, Thoughtful, Diffident, Jealous, Witty, and for the most part Peevish; given to Silence, and when he speaks, Involving himself in Ambiguous Words, a Dissembler, apt rather to Sound other mens Opinions, than Deliver his own; an enemy of Jests, and Freedom; a lover of Solitude, difficult of Access, a friend to Few, and to those but Coldly; prone to Hatred, out of Diffi∣dence, an inseparable Companion unto him; Covetous and Fearful, even to Absurdity; one that Hates equally those that he hath Offen∣ded, with those that have Offended him; implacably greedy of revenge, and whom, though reconciled unto you, you ought to be jealous of.
With these kind of dispositions, we
cannot deal with too much Wariness and Circumspection; Principally we must take care of our Tongues, and call, as it were, a Counsel upon every thing we say; to the end we may speak nothing Strange or Offen∣sive, nor indeed, scarce at all, unless we be called upon: In our Respect, we must rather Exceed, than fall Short, and alto∣gether Abstain from Contradiction, without Pressing him, when he Demurs in his Coun∣sels, least his Melancholy once kindled in Choler, never quench till it convert to Hatred. In our Demands, we must not be Importunate, when we see him deny us Readily; for it is not convenient to ac∣custom the Prince, to give us Repulses, e∣specially such a Prince, who being by his nature prone to ill Suspicions, will think that man his Enemy, that he hath given a Refusal unto; neither will you Easily af∣terward, by any skill, take this Appre∣hension out of him; for with such, the Me∣mory of an Injury endures Long; and mea∣suring Others by Themselves, they believe all men as Malicious, and as Obstinate in their Hatred, as they. In short, These kind of men are the Worst, and most difficult of all Others; and whose Temper, by reason of the variety of Cloudy Thoughts, that Hover in their Dark Imag••nations, is most Ʋnequal; which makes their Conversation exceeding troublesome.
The Phlegmatick Prince participates of the Heaviness and Slowness of the Melan∣choly; but as in Ʋnderstanding, so in Pee∣vishness and Distrust, is Inferior to him; for his heart is, as it were, Congealed with Cold; and hence it comes to pass, that he is Diffident of none so much, as of Himself; Fearing to undertake great matters, because he Despairs of the Success, and knows not how to go about it. He is Doubtful in his Counsels, Fearful in Execution, not of a Quick Capacity; and as his Hate is not Great, so his Love is not Vehement.
To supply the Heaviness of these Princes, an Active and Ready Minister is necessary. When the Prince hath once found him ca∣pable to Effect those things, that himself thought Desperate, discovering the weak∣ness of his own wit; he Loves, Admires, and Cherishes this Man, as necessary un∣to him. And that kind of Favor, which leans upon the opinion of such a Necessity, is of all others ••••st Durable. Which our Courtier once observing, let him make it his business to bring to a Prosperous Issue, those Businesses that seemed most Diffi∣cult, and from which, the Prince expect∣ed little or no success; as it was the Con∣stant Practice of that great Minister of France, Cardinal Richelieu, who always kept the King Intangled in such Dange∣rous Ʋndertakings, That if he would,
he knew not How to be without him.
Let our Courtier also, if it can be so con∣trived, compass these things, and Execute the most material part of his Business him∣self alone, taking heed, however he do, that he take not to his assistance, a Helper or Companion, more Habile and Dexterous, than Himself: Withal, let him beware he be not too long absent from Court, least he chance to lose the Prince, who if he shall once find one more Able or Ʋseful than him, he will be either less valued, or at least be held less necessary; and so being laid aside once or twice, in imployments that shall succeed in Other Hands, will at last fall into Contempt.
Wherefore it is an Old art of Courtiers, not to take unto themselves any Compani∣ons, but such as in Vertue and Prudence they shall much excel, to the end, that in comparison of these, their own Lustre may so much the more Appear, and that the Prince being surrounded with such as these, may not easily know where to find one, whom he may either Prefer or Op∣pose unto the Introducer of these. Moreo∣ver, these Grosser Souls, as often as he hath need of them, to whom they do now their Present, and may owe their Future advancement, are easie and obn••xious to be Debauched by him, and ready for Corruption, which he cannot easily ex∣pect
from one that is his Equal in Condition, or in Parts, and who stands upon his own legs. These are the several kinds of Hu∣mane Inclinations, whereunto Princes are no less Subject than other Men, inclining now to This, and then to That side, accor∣ding to the prevalence of This or That, Temperature in Them.
That Age, Business, Custom, and Sick∣ness, alter the Temper of the Bodies and Constitution of the Minds of Princes.
NOtwithstanding that for the most part things are thus, yet these Rules are not Infallible and without Exception; for Age, Custom, and Business, alter the Temper of the Bodies; yea, and the Inclinations and Acti∣ons of Princes. In the time of War, the Prince cherishes Military Men, but Peace be∣ing returned into his Kingdom, the Authority and Interest of these Men doth soon wax Old; and then, if the Prince inclines to Pleasure, or any other Affection, he will be
apt to save those that can Serve, or Fur∣ther him in it.
See what Tacitus Writes of Tiberius, An∣nal. 6. He changed his Manners strangely with the Times, whilst he was a Private Man, and under Augustus his Government, both his Life and Manners were of good repute; as long as Germanicus and Drusus lived, he was Close and Crafty in counterfeiting Vertue, as long as his Mother was alive, he kept a mean be∣twixt Vertue and Vice: For Cruelty he was Infamous; but for his Lusts, as long as he either Loved or Feared Sejanus, Secret. But in the end, he burst out into all Wick∣edness and Dishonesty, and casting away both Fear and Shame, he suffered himself to be car∣ried wholly by his vicious Inclinations.
Of Caligula, this judgment of Passtenus is very notable; There was never a better Servant, nor a worse Master. It is almost incredible, what variety of Dispositions were found in Marius and Sylla; so that Plutarch doubts, whether Fortune wrought this Change in their Natures, or onely brought to light what before of wick∣edness lay concealed in them. In which case, if I should speak my opinion, I would declare, I thought they did not change their Natures; but onely pull off those Masks, that fear, and a narrow Fortune had Muffled them withal. Just as Leontius said of Zeno, That a Serpent
frozen with Cold, hurts not; but Warm'd by the fire, thrusts forth his sting.
Tryphon, as Josephus witnesses, whilst he led a Private Life, to win upon the People, did Personate a Good Man; but being made a King, he threw off his Dis∣guises, and quickly let them see, that all that Vertue which appeared in him, was Forced and Counterfeit: And that of A∣gamemnon is not much unlike, if what Euripides Writes of him be true; he was Modest, Affable, and Easie of Access, be∣fore he was chosen Generalissimo of the Greeks. But after that Election, he be∣came an Enemy to his Friends, and Inac∣cessible to All, in keeping himself shut up, whereby he became so distastful, that the Precept the Poet gives upon this occasion, is worth Recording.
Those Men are wise, that great advancement gain, And still their ancient modesty retain.
An excellent Sentence, but observed by few. Pollio truly seemed to follow it, if we may believe Seneca. Afterwards (saith he) be∣ing promoted to the Highest Degrees of Honour he never was corrupted by any occasion, or deviated a whit from his former Modesty, Temperance, & ci∣vility: he was never pust up with Prosperity, nor with the variety of Business was he so disordered, as that any one could surprize him in a humor
derogating from the Reputation he had gained before.
For truly, the Defects and Blemishes of Princes and Courtiers, proceed, for the most part, out of Pride, the inseparable Handmaid of Greatness. This is that makes them De∣spise other Mens Counsels, being vainly per∣swaded, that they do excel other Men, as much in Prudence, as they do in Power. And some are so carried away with this Stream, that they think it below them to keep within the limits of Law or Reason; believ∣ing they cannot be Princes, to whom all things are not lawful, they have a mind un∣to, according to that of the Poet.
Vertue, Truth, Faith, such private things as these, Are not for Kings, they must do what they please.
But if these kind of opinions did onely corrupt the weakest, and worst of Princes, I should wonder the less; but I see the minds of the Best Men to be Blinded also with the withcraft of Power and Rule. No Man ever yet Exceeded the Seven Sages of Greece, in giving Precepts of Modesty; nor ever were there worse Tyrants, than such of them as came to Government. Appianus be∣ing to speak of Aristo, reckoned up not a few that bore the name of Philosophers, that had plaid the Tyrants at Athens; naming
also some of the very Pythagoreans, who being called to Government in Italy, did Exceedingly abuse their Power; which makes me doubt much, whether most of those Philosophers, who so Proudly Contemn Honours and Dignity, do it in good Earnest, or not rather for a Cloak and Cover to their Small Deserts, their poverty and idleness. Sure∣ly, if we will believe Aristophanes, they did not live so Frugally and Nearly, so much out of Vertue, as Necessity; and would not refuse to feast plentifully, when ever they were invited.
How much Impostors are Able to Do by Flattering Princes; and How a Prince is to Beware of Them.
THere are oftentimes Impostors, who with Flatteries, and hidden Sly Suggestions, Creep into the Prince's Bosom, and Corrupt their Nature. To these kind of Men, doth Tacitus impute the Pride and Cruelty of Vitel∣lius. Vespasian, who was of a Gentle Nature, learnt from these people to Oppress his Subjects with heavy Tributes, as the same Tacitus
affirms: In short, it is certain, that many who have used the Service of these kind of Men, have sadly degenerated. These Im∣postors seek Favor unto themselves, by show∣ing the Prince ways to Greatness, Power, and Profit; who by so much the more wil∣lingly doth hearken to Them, by how much the less he understands himself. He poor Man, not reflecting, nor observing that these Men praise and sooth him; to the end, they may at last Betray him to Contempt, and Expose him to the Hatred of his Peo∣ple. And truly, to humor and comply with the Cruelty, Covetousness, and Lust of a Prince, is of all others, the securest way to betray him, for he cannot condemn the Traytor, without discovering his own Guilt and Vices.
The Franconians, by the help of Aegidius, at that time governing in Gaul for the Ro∣mans, had Expelled Clodius Comatus out of his Kingdom, whom one of his Friends desiring to see Restored, goes over to Aegi∣dius, and Fostered, upon all occasions, as much as in him lay, the Avarice and Cruel∣ty of the Man, which was but too notori∣ous before; whence the Injuries of this Roman growing Insufferable, the Franconi∣ans begin to wish for their King again, and at last Recal him to his Kingdom. Thus this honest Franconian made good use of his Flattery, and by feeding him in his own Vices,
betrayed his Masters enemies. Sejanus, who gaped after the Roman Empire, (see what arts he used,) after he saw that Tiberius, who by his instinct had Imprisoned Agrip∣pina, and her Children, grew weary of the City; spur'd that inclination on, hoping, that when the Prince was once retired, the Trust and Government of the Empire should be cast upon him, as indeed it came to pass; so that for a time, Tiberius was one∣ly Lord of a little Island, and Sejanus Empe∣ror. Perrennius also thirsting after the Em∣pire, first circumvented and made away all those that stood in his Light, under pre∣tence of a Conspiracy, that Lucilla had con∣trived against Commodus; and then Intices the Emperor to Pleasures, whereby he himself might come to the managing of all things, and at last attain unto the Em∣pire.
The same way took Bardas, Uncle to Mi∣chael, Emperor of Constantinople, who having taken away Theoctistus, his Associate, and Tu∣tor to the young Prince, contrived also his Mother's Banishment; perswading Michael to take the Government into his own hands; whose young years incapable of Rule, he soon Diverted to Delights, and Pleasure; so as he gave himself wholly to these En∣tertainments, and intended nothing else: Bardas, in the mean time, fishes eagerly af∣ter the love of the People, and to that end,
converses with Good and Learned Men, resto∣red Learning in the City, and made many good Laws; by which means he would doubtless have Stept at last into the Imperial Throne, if another had not prevented him. I do not bring these examples, that I may teach how Princes are to be Circumvented, but that I would have Princes themselves learn hence, what Prudence and Caution is necessary for them to Discern, and Distinguish the Counsels of their Ministers; and chiefly, that they may beware of those who are apt to sooth them in, and applaud their Lusts and Vices; and learn to think well of such, as will sometimes Modestly adventure to express their dislikes of their Excesses.
Of the Familiars and Servants of the Prince, and the ways to win them.
HAving considered all things, that our Courtier was to observe in the Prince himself, let us come to his Servants, who, by reason of the Offices they bear, are conti∣nually about his Person, and may be useful to those that pretend at Court, either by pro∣curing them Extraordinary Accesses, or by
making Seasonable mention of them, or by instructing them of the Ways, Times, and Occasions of doing their Business. There are many Princes, who being Private, put on a quite other face, than that they bear in Pub∣lick; and who more willingly do Trust and Disclose their thoughts, to such of their Ser∣vants, as they think faithful to them, esteem∣ing the Lowness of their condition incapable of Treachery, or Wicked Practices: Who does not know, that Claudius was governed by his Freedmen, one of which, called Pallas, he had so enriched, That upon a time com∣plaining of Poverty to some body, he was advised to get Pallas adopt him for his Heir. By this Man's perswasion, Claudius Married Agrippina, after by the help of Nar∣cissus (a Freedman also) he had destroyed Messalina.
Who can be ignorant, that during the continuance of the Eastern Empire, the Eunuchs many times Governed all? if that had not been so, it had been impossible for Arbetio, the Chief Ruler of the Empire, to have escaped with life, when Verissimus accused him. Borilus and Germanus, two slaves, by the absolute Authority they had with Botoniates, one of the Emperors, made him an enemy to Isacius, and Alexius Comnenis.
Yet let us suppose, That the Prince does not impart his Counsels to these Men, they
are more easily Pryed into by these, than any others: for it cannot be, that Princes al∣ways wear their Masks in private, often∣times the Throng, and a Publick life, makes him suppress and hide those Affections, which when he is at liberty, and in private, do break out. Wherefore, I conclude it is very necessary in Courts, To think all kind of Men, even the meanest, useful unto you. And we must believe for certain, That together with their Authority and Fortune, their Pru∣dence and Discretion, will grow up; which Arrian demonstrates to Epictetus in Epaphro∣ditus, and his two slaves; The one of which coming to wait upon the Emperor at his Stool, and the other to have the charge of his Shooes; Epaphroditus himself, who had sold them not long before as unuseful, sought now their Favor, and praised their Pru∣dence.
Fortune hath never scarce been so favou∣rable to any one in Court, as not to afford him as many Enemies as Friends; neither hath it ever yet cast any Man so low there, as that he was neither able to Hurt, nor Help another: Whence it was, that in the time of Tiberius, as Tacitus says, It was a great honour to be known to Sejanus his Door∣keepers. It will therefore be a Wise Man's part, by all Becoming ways, to endear the Servants of the Prince, whatever their Con∣dition be.
Four Kinds of Noble Courtiers: How to be Handled, and made use of; how Warily we ought to Deal with Inconstant Princes.
FRom the Prince's Servarts, we come to the Nobles of the Court, which are of sundry kinds: There are some Illustrious for their Birth, but Destitute of the Prince's Favour; others in Favour with the Prince, but not Laden with Honors; a third Sort, that have Honors and Offices, far exceeding their Interest and Favour; and lastly; Those who flourish both in Favour, and great Imployments. The Friendship of the first of these, will perhaps avail our Courtier very little, who are nevertheless to be Honor∣ed and Respected, according to their Quality; least, though they cannot hurt you them∣selves, by their Friends and Followers, they should do it: For in such Trains of Depen∣dencies and Followers, great Families are often very powerful, either by reason of Old Benefits, or reverence to their greatness; or lastly, (since Princes minds are mutable) out of respect to the Fortune and Favour these Great Men may yet chance to come into; with this, or the succeeding Prince.
Archelaus, King of Cappadocia, to his great
disadvantage, did neglect to Honor and Court Tiberius, when he came to Rhodes; for Tiberius afterwards meditating Revenge, but pretending another Cause, called him to Rome, where he Perished miserably: Which Respect nevertheless the Historian says, He omitted not out of Pride, but for that he was warned by some of Augustus his Favo∣rites, That whilst Caius Caesar flourished and was sent into the East, the Friendship of Tiberius seemed unsafe. We must look there∣fore upon these Great Men of Fortune, though not able to deserve well of us, yet powerful enough to Hurt us: And though they be unacceptable and suspected by the Prince, we must yet Reverence them, to avoid the Blame of others, and their Emnity.
If it chance, that the Prince will oppose you to one of these Great Ones, as it is usual with Princes to do; as you must not Refuse the Task, so you must with great Art, Dex∣terity, and Choice of Occasions, undertake it; taking care that you may both Satisfie the Prince, and justifie your endeavors to other men: It is an enterprize-full of Danger, but if at the Prince's instance, it be taken in hand, it is the way to rise.
Yet after you are once ingaged in one of these Brigues, there are the choice of two ways to be taken, according to the nature of the Prince you act for, the Persons you have
to do with and the Times you are in: Some men act all these things in their own name so boldly, and with so High a hand, That all kind of men, except those that are Great indeed, strike easily Sail unto them for fear of offending the Prince; who ap∣proves (as they believe) all these men Say or Do. There are others yet, that take ano∣ther course more safe and sweet, by con∣tinually Waiting upon the Prince, their In∣terest, in whom they will make no shew of, but upon the Best Opportunities; neither will they take any occasion for these Con∣tentions, but such as with Great Choice they have Selected, as both likely to Suc∣ceed; and having took effect, to re∣dound much to the Advantage of the Prince and Publick.
For you must take great heed you under∣take nothing you cannot go through with; for besides that, the Common People judge of all things by the Event, believing still, that Justice and Prudence, are on the side that Fortune is; by Ill successes, you will soon di∣minish the Esteem and Favour, you have with the Prince. For he to take away the Dis∣grace received, and by reason, That he fears either to be Despised of his Subjects or Con∣temned by his Enemies, whom he hath oppo∣sed in vain, will be compelled to remove his Favour from, and Abandon you.
Beware, that when I speak of your con∣tention
with these Great Persons, that you understand not, that I wish you to inter∣meddle, when you see it cannot be done with Tumult, or that you should provoke them with Contumelies and Reproaches, for that becomes onely a Base Soul, whose judg∣ment is Corrupted by Fortune: The end of which kind of men is seldom happy; as is to be observed in Piso, whom Tiberius sent into Syria, to Cross the Hopes and De∣signs of Germanicus; against whom he car∣ried himself so Insolently, that when Prince Germanicus was dead, Caesar was compel∣led to Sacrifice and abandon Piso to the publick Hate.
When I advise you to oppose these Great Men, it is in Cases onely, wherein they are to do something that is unjust, or against the Publick good, or Religion, or that is prejudi∣cial to the Government of the Army, or the Treasures of the Kingdom: In which occa∣sions, you must so comport your self with Prudence and Modesty, that all others that are Concerned, and all Honest men may per∣ceive, that what you do, proceeds not out of any private Enmity, but onely from your zeal to the Publick good. If you demand an example to imitate, behold Cardinal Xime∣nes, chosen by Isabella, Queen of Castile, on purpose to Tug with those Grandees, that were not so subject to the King's pleasure, as they are now: Of a Franciscan Frier, he
was first made the Queen's Confessor, after∣wards by the advice of Cardinal Mendoza, Archbishop of Toledo and Inquisitor Gene∣ral of Spain; which Offices he bore with great Authority, being there during the whole Reign of Isabella, and Ferdinand, and was even to the time of Charles the Fifth, the sole Arbiter and Moderator of all Affairs; ever contending with the Great Ones, but so discreetly, That he always held both the Prince and People fast unto him.
It is reported that he was Poysoned, and he himself suspected it, but the fact could never be proved. Wherefore it is better to attribute so Late a Death as his (for he was very old) to Age and Nature; and not with∣out reason, since he preserved his Fortune and Authority (both which he owed prin∣cipally to his own industry) Entire unto his End. Chico Simoneta had not so good suc∣cess, who whilst Francis Sfortia ruled in Milan, was called to the helm of Business, and afterwards chosen by young Galeaeius's Mother, by reason of his known fidelity and experience in Publick Affairs, to con∣tend with his Master's Brethren. He to pre∣serve the Dukedom for Galeacious, banished Galeacius's Brothers, and Robert de St. Seve∣rin out of Milan, with how much envy you may imagine: Yet see how wickedly he was afterwards deserted, for the Widow,
Galeacius his Mother, reconciling her self with her Adversaries, sacrificed Simoneta to their new friendship; by whom being cast into Prison, and there Flayed alive, he died miserably. Learn hence, how Warily we must trust Princes, of whose Steadiness we are not assured; for often upon a light oc∣casion, they are wont to Prostitute their Ser∣vants to the will of their Enemies.
The Three other kinds of Noble Courtiers; How they are to be Dealt with.
THere are a second kind of Noble Cour∣tiers (as I said before) who are in Favour with the Prince, and yet not very eminent in any Dignity or Imployment. These though they can Contribute nothing else unto us, may make our Way unto the King, Seasonable and Easie, besides they may be useful in Calling to mind our Deserts, or if occasion require, in Excusing our Errors; protecting us also from the Calumny and Detractions of our Enemies; by which means, if they be real∣ly our Friends, they may serve us Highly; as on the contrary side, if they be our Foes; they may Prejudice us exceedingly: Where∣fore
we must seek the Friendship of these Men, by all means, that are not Ʋnworthy our condition; and we must consider, that they seldom stay any long time about a Prince, unexalted to Honour: Nay, suppose that for some reason or other, they be not Advanced, yet by their Help and Commendations, they do Advance their Friends, and lift them up a∣bove others, though either Equal or Superi∣our to them in Desert.
The third sort of Nobles, are those who are in great Offices of Authority, and have a great share in publick Business, and yet have little interest in the Prince's Favour. And these kind of men are chiefly found about such Princes, who live quietly, attending to their Pleasures, mindless of Publick Bu∣siness, which they commit wholly to one or two of their Tryed Servants, abhorring the Trouble that is attending it themselves. In such a Court as this, we must rather seek the Favour of these Ministers, than of the Prince himself; who since he trusts them with the Administration of his Affairs, leaves also the choice of his Officers to these men, being himself unfit to chuse Men for Duties, which he knows nothing what belongs un∣to.
There are other Princes more Jealous of their Majesty, and Sparing in their Power; who though they intrust one or two with their Affairs, do seldom or never admit
those men to their Presence or Conversation, but when they are to treat of Weighty Busi∣ness; and do not leave the Disposal of places to them, for fear that by the multitude of Creatures and Dependants, their Power should Swell to that height, that it cannot be A∣bated, if they Transgress. Wary Princes are wont to keep their Ministers in awe, and make them believe, That they can in a Moment cast them from all their Autho∣rity, and divest them of all that Pow∣er, that with the Services and Labors of many years, they have been Acquiring to∣wards Such persons as these; whose power is thus circumscribed, you will have a Hard Task, how to Demean your self. Their Friendship can Avail you little, nay perhaps if the Prince observe it, it will do you Hurt. Again, if they Stand in your Light, you will hardly come to the Manage∣ment of Affairs, and yet you must of neces∣sity run the hazard of Clashing oftentimes with them. Wherefore, a most circum∣spect Gentleness of Nature will here be need∣ful, for you must render them all the Duties of Respect, and as occasion presents it self (yet warily) express the Inward Devotion of your mind unto them. But in the mean while, without openly Seeking to, or Relying upon the Patronage of any other, you must your self, work out your way unto the Prince's person, and hïs Favour.
There remains now unspoke of onely the last kind of Noblemen, who are, in short, The Favorites, as being both Highly in the Prin∣ce's Favor, and Great in the Administration of Affairs: Which kind of Men, are to be ho∣noured with a Respect almost Equal to the Prince himself. Their Wills and Inclinations are to be Pryed into, as being more neces∣sary to be Known and Executed, than the Prince's own. Here you see what you may expect, or hope for, from the Authority and Patronage of the Peers, and Grandees of the Court; and how you may use each of them in his several Degree and Kind.
Truly we must carefully take heed, that we ask nothing of either the Prince, or any of all these that is Impossible, or cannot be Effected without great Absurdity; For no∣thing is more troublesome to Humane Na∣ture, than not to be Able to fulfil the Re∣quests of those we love; and surely, the Friendliest and Gentlest Dispositions that are, will be offended with an Ʋncivil and Ʋn∣reasonable Suit. Know moreover, that he from whom you have received such a Re∣pulse, is not pleased with Seeing you again, for fear lest with the Impudence of a like Request, you should make him Ashamed; and also, lest he should seem to want Authority, or Means to Perform what you desire. But you must note by the way, that Access unto the Great Ones, is not sudden∣ly
obtained, we must by degrees also gain That; and to this end, All that have any Interest in Them, whether they be Strangers or Domesticks, and the Dependants of these (according to their usefulness) are to be won unto you.
The Meaner sort of Courtiers, How they are to be Handled; as al∣so such as are Enemies to us, for the sake of others, to whom we Relate.
THere are yet in Courts below these Great Ones, others of a Lower stage; some of which are our Betters, others our Equals, and some perhaps our Inferiours; all which, since we are to make use of, we will divide into Two Kinds: The first, of those that may help and Advantage us; the Second, of those that are likely, or able to Hurt us. The Interest and Power of both of them, is diligently to be weighed, to the end, we may gather what Help or Impediment we are to expect from them. We must consider also, their Friendships and Alliances, to the end, that if necessity press us to seek their Votes for the
promotion of our Designs, if they Themselves are through Envy or any such respect, backward or Averse unto us, we may work upon them by their Friends and De∣pendants: But we must be sure to take heed, that we do not then begin to seek their Friendship, when we have apparent need of them, or their Assistance; we ought to have it prepared long before, and as∣sured unto us by the Pledges of a long professed Kindness, and Good will. Let this suffice for the first Sort, (to wit, of those that may help us) for every man's Industry will prompt him, How to insinuate with such, as he finds may be useful unto him.
Of the Second Sort (to wit) those that may Hurt us, there are Three Kinds; either those that are our Enemies, or those that Envy us, or lastly, those that are our Competitors. Those I call Enemies that hate us for our Own, or our Friends Sake; but this latter kind of Hatred, is not for the most part so in∣veterate and sharp as the first; and it may be Mitigated much by our Civilities and Pro∣fessing, That we can Love our Friends, notwith∣standing our Relations to their Enemies: Yet the Friendships of the Court are for the most part Factious and cruel; compelling us to break off all Friendship and Familiarities that may bring us into suspicion: For which reason, many Publickly pretending a friendship to
one, have notwithstanding complied Ʋnder∣hand, and kept fair quarter with the Adverse Party; not out of design to betray their Friend, but to the end, if he should chance to fall, they may find a Refuge and Support. And truly, this care of our preservation may be sometimes Blameless, but all kind of Treachery is unworthy an Honest Man.
This kind of Prudence hath not onely been practised in the Brigues of the Court, but in Kingdoms also, and that very For∣tunately. Syenneses, President of Tharsus, when the War broke out between Cyrus and Artaxerxes, Fearing to Resist Cyrus, took his Part in Person, and sent his Son to Artax∣erxes, to the end, that if Cyrus were van∣quished, he might be a Refuge to his Fa∣ther. Bardus Durus escaping out of the hands of the Saracens, where he was Pri∣soner; seeing Phocas created Emperor a∣gainst Basilius, applied himself to gain the Friendship of Phocas, hitherto his Enemy, and followed him; but caused his Son, with a contrived Flight, to take part with Basilius, to the end, that if Pho∣cas were vanquished, he might Intercede for his Father, as it afterwards fell out. Solon made a Law, That in case of a civil discord in the Common-wealth, none should be permitted to stand neuter; not intend∣ing, I believe, that Friends taking several sides, should break off their private Friend∣ships,
but rather hoping that Friends being severally engaged, could not but labor for the Publick Peace, by so much the more Ea∣gerly, and with more Success.
After this manner, in Court, a Man, tho of a different Faction, may yet Discreetly, and without prejudice to Integrity, retain his Friendship with a Man of another Party; to the end, That he may both have a Re∣treat in the change of Fortune, and that if their Animosities should begin to Asswage, he may be a fit Instrument of Reconciliation be∣tween the Factions: Which is the safest and most commendable way amongst the Strifes and Discords of Great Men; and the means of gaining at last the Favor of both the Con∣tending Parties.
How we are to Treat with those Enemies that Hate us for our Own Sakes; Also Concerning Threats and Injuries.
THose who Hate us for our Own sakes, do so either, because we have Offended Them, or else (as it is frequent from Great Men to∣wards their Inferiors) because They have In∣jured Ʋs; and the Italian Proverb says, He
that Offends, never Forgives. It is a custom amongst Minds, Puft up with a prospe∣rous Fortune, to Hate Those themselves have Wronged. The Injuries that, These Kind of Men do us, are best Remedied in our seem∣ing not to Ʋnderstand them: but if it chance, that the greatness of the Wrong, do wrest out of us some Testimony of our sense of the Injury Received, we must quickly after our grief is over, Seem to have Lost the Memory of All; otherwise if they see us still Impatiently suffer it, fearing our Revenge, they will seek to Prevent us with a greater Mischief.
Chiefly we must beware of Threats, if we be not Ready, and sure to Execute them; for Threats do both Warn our adversary to Be∣ware, and Provoke his Hatred to Double our In∣juries; affording us nothing but Shame, in seeming to Breath Revenge; but to be Destitute of Power. I know this kind of Moderation will not be approved by all kind of men, especially such as are Greedy after Venge∣ance; who think no Injury is to be passed over without Resentment, not only by rea∣son of the Sweetness that is found in Revenge; but also, because they say by suffering one Injury, you invite another; wherefore we must Persecute those that offend us with an Immortal Hate: But these men whilst they desire to Render themselves Formidable, do effect nothing else but make all men flie
their Company. For since we Mortals are Creatures prone to Falls, and Slips, and are carried away sometimes with Affection, and at other times with Passion; and in conside∣ration, every one for Fear of Offending, will flie from these kind of Malignant, Rash, and Revengeful persons; and as Wild beasts leave them to their own Solitude. Since, if any one Offends one of them, he must expect all that Rage and Malice can afford at his hands. Lastly if any one Provoke one of the Malicious Hot-spurs, he ex∣pecting a Severe Resentment, and fearing a Home Revenge, will strive to be Aforehand-with him.
For this Reason therefore, for the avoid∣ing all these Evils, I think the contrary way is to be chosen, and Gentleness to be Preferred which truly, in the Greatest Injuries is not hard to be Personated, when we consider the Reasons and Consequences of a Passionate Resent∣ment, and the Condition of the persons from whom we receive them. In Lighter Injuries, that we see arise rather out of Passion, than Malice or Design, we ought to be so little offended with them, that it may not be perceived we are Sensible of them. If the Injury is Great and Foul, we must not show our selves wholly careless of our Esteem and Reputation; yet without seeming too Impla∣cable towards them that provoked us, as they may have Reason to think there is no Hope of
a Reconcilement, or place for Pardon upon any Reasonable Satisfaction left them. And there∣fore it will be pertinent in this case to Com∣plain unto his Friends that hath injured us, of our Wrongs, and to make them judge of our Difference.
Injuries that are offered in a Petulant In∣sulting Humor, I think ought to be presently vindicated, not so much out of a Desire of Revenge, as for the Chastisement of him that did them; and to Teach him how to Demean Himself more Modestly hereafter, as well towards Others, as Our Selves. But these In∣juries also are not to be Prosecuted with an Inveterate Hatred, nay, we ought to declare, that the Necessity of Complaint, and seeking Revenge is Put upon us, and that we are ready to be friends after a Satisfaction given us, that is any way Compatible with the In∣jury we received. And if so be they give a∣ny Secret Testimonies of Regret, or seek in the least manner unto us, we must Return into Favor with them, and by way of Amends, let this suffice instead of a Submission, That they profess, They cannot want your Friend∣ship.
The Injuries of the More and Less Powerful, How to be Avoided, and Managed; the the several Artifices of Reconciliation.
BEcause these kinds of Injuries are done, for the most part, by Those that are much More Powerful than Our selves, and who have some way or other, great advantage of us: The First way to avoid them, is to Treat These kind of men Respectfully, and to Avoid all Freedoms as much as may be with Them: Or if they be very Cross and Ʋnruly, to Flie their Conversation altogether. This saying of Mar∣tial is in this case very notable.
Wouldst thou avoid what may Displease? Or seek'st thou for Content and Ease? With no man be thou over Free; As joys, so Griefs will Fewer be.
The Second Way will be, as I said more than once before, to seem. Ʋnsensible of the Wrong; for it is neither Safe nor Prudent for us, to strive too much with One that is too Powerful for us; and the Inequality, of our Forces, will be a just pretence to excuse our Dissimulation. I know there are some that are perswaded, That if we can but Eright
our Adversaries, they would soon seek unto us, and desire to be Reconciled; and I do not deny that there are some Slie Disposi∣tions that will Descend to do so; but believe me, it is always a Dangerous. Ʋnsound, and Faint Reconciliation: And these will seldom or never omit (if an occasion of Injury Present it self) to give way to their Disposition; which is by so much the more Revengeful, by how much their Dissembling was the Tamer; besides, a Private Enemy is harder to be taken heed of, than one that is Publickly so. It is better to have such as these, our Professed Enemies, than out of Fear, our Reconciled friends; yet I mean Those who are not Grea∣ter than our selves, nor whose Friendship being lost, can Hurt us notably.
For if we have to do with one that is much Superior to us, and whose Enmities will stand in our Light, it is better to have a Feigned Friendship, than open Enmity with him; though he Offer us the Wrong, yet we must endeavor by the Mediation of Friends to appease him, as if We had done the Injury. To discern who is most able and likely to Prejudice us, we must consider not only their Power, but also the nature of their Malice towards us; for some have a Desire of Revenge, like a handmaid, always waiting upon their Hate; others a Fear, lest that ha∣ving got what we Aspire unto, we should be
more able to hurt them. Though the sting of this Revenge is very sharp, yet the Fear I mentioned, is the most violent and frequent cause of our Court Oppressions, and far the most unavoidable. The first may be miti∣gated with the satisfaction of a Continued Duty and Respect; but you shall hardly ever perswade Fear, to put on the Confidence of Friendship, and Good will again; yet we must seek by all means possible to effect it: and Occasion will better instruct us How to do it, than any Rule can.
Agesilaus desiring to become friends with those that he had Offended, did put them into Great Offices and Imployments, which whilst they Ill Administred, bringing Envy (as is usual) upon them; being Accu∣sed, they were Compelled to have re∣course unto the Prince; who delivering them from the Danger and Infamy, won them by the benefit, to be afterwards Sin∣cerely and Heartily his Friends. It is an ordinary thing in Courts to Supplant one Secretly, to the end that being sup∣ported by your Favour, he may become your Creature. It is no less frequent as Eu∣trapelus Craftily practised in Horace, to lend those men money to feed their Lusts and Vanities, whom we desire to Ruine. So it proves, that for the most part, they who applaud us in our Pleasures, our humors, and Expences, and exhort us to undertake things
that are Ʋnreasonable, and above our strength, do seek our Destruction.
But let us now return unto the ways of Renewing our Friendships with our Enemies. Amongst all which, it is none of the worst to Help both with your Counsel and Assistance, the Desires and Endeavours of your Enemy, in such things as you see by Succeeding will no∣thing Hinder, nor Prejudice you; to the end, he may seem to owe you his Love, for your Benefits. In this manner Cardinal Ascanius Sforza observing, That in vain he opposed himself to the practices of Julian the Car∣dinal, who laboured to advance John, the Nephew of Alexander the Sixth, to that Dig∣nity; did so eagerly move in the business for John, that it succeeding, he got the start of Julian in his Friendship. If the stub∣bornness of our Enemy be such, as that all our Endeavours for a Reconciliation are fruit∣less; we must at last look out, if there be any body else that he hates or fears more than he doth us, and let us fain this man (if the circumstances will bear it) to be a Competitor to us, and him; to the end, That his Hate towards the other prevailing, may induce him either to Favour, or less Oppose us in our Designs.
An Artifice not much unlike to this, was that which Gerlachus Achbishop and E∣lector of M••ntz used, when he intended to create Adolphus of Nassau, his Kinsman,
Emperour: He knew that those Princes that stood for the Empire, (for which a Governour was now a chusing) were Divided amongst themselves; which Discords and Factions, he to make use of, dealt thus with the Electors severally apart. He tells Wenceslaus King of Bohemia, That the Votes of the Electors, for the most part, would favour Albert, Duke of Austria, Wenceslaus his Enemy: But if he were certain of Wenceslaus his concurrence, he was ready to hinder it. Having thus won Wenceslaus, he sets upon the Duke of Saxony, and tells him, that his Enemy Brunswick was like to carry it; and then assures the Palatine, That Wenceslaus (at that time Hated by him) unless prevented, was like to Defeat them all. So promising to op∣pose every mans Enemies, he Circumvented them all; making by that means, his Kins∣man Emperour, who if he had been first Pro∣pounded, had without doubt been rejected by the Common Consent of all.
Of Envy, How it is to be Overcome.
NOw I must say something of Envy, which is so great an evil, that we have need of a Strange Felicity, and Fortitude to
overcome it; which is not to be Satiated with any thing, but the Participation of that which it Envies in another; for every one eager after its own advantage, desires to toyl in nothing but that, whence if not the Whole, at least a Great share of the Honor, and Emolument will redound unto Himself. Yet although, I confess, it be very hard, yet this Envy is nevertheless with In∣dustry and Prudence, to be Mastered; and that not onely by this means alone, of sharing with them, That very Thing we seek for: For sometimes it will suffice to per∣swade them that Envy us, That the thing they desire, if it chance to light upon us, will turn much to their Honor and Profit. To which end we must Court them with Friendship and Familiarity; and though their Envy to us be very Palpable, yet must we express on our parts great Inclina∣tions and Affections towards them; profes∣sing, that we wish nothing more, than that their desires should succeed, and that we desire this very thing that we now pursue, for no other end so much, as that we may become capable to serve our friends, and principally themselves. In short we must act our part so, as from the Augmentation of our Fortune, they may conceive hope of Ad∣vancement to their own.
By those that desire to be Free from Envy, all Pride, Over-sumptuous manner of Living, un∣seasonable
Feasts, and Boasting, is Sedulously to be avoided; especially, by those who have risen from a mean Condition; unless the Pleasure of the Prince, or the Dignity of their Office, require it otherwise; for then a Becoming Magnificence will not be unfit, provided, That in these Expen∣ces, he lets the world see, he doth ra∣ther comply with the Pleasure of the Prince, Then follow his own Inclination. With this kind of Modesty and Prudence, the begin∣nings of Cardinal Ximenes were very For∣tunate, and Notable; for he was born of so Mean a Parentage, that it was doubtful whether he were a Gentleman, or no; al∣though his Prosperous Fortune found those afterwards, that would undertake to prove his Nobility. This Ximenes whilst the world went hard with him, became in his youth a Friar, whence soon after for his Singular Endowments, he was by the com∣mendation of Cardinal Mendoza, made Confessor to Isabella, Queen of Castile, and not long after Archbishop of Toledo, (as I said once before) which Archbishoprick upon Mendoza's death, Queen Isabella having ob∣tained of the Pope for Ximenes; he finding himself too Weak for the Envy it would draw upon him, refused to accept it; and was so Stiff in his Refusal, that he scarce suffered himself to be won to the acceptance of it, by all the Nobles of the Court, who one by one,
at the Queen's direction, prest him to Im∣brace it: And having Accepted of it, he was fain to be so intreated over again, before he could be perswaded to live in a Condition and Splendour equal to his Dignity; nay, after that, he was Personally so Observant of his former manner of life, in this great Fortune, that no way else, but by the Pope's Express Command, could he be induced to change it.
This Modesty succeeded so well with him, that hereby he Appeased and Avoided that Great Envy, which must otherwise of Necessi∣ty have Oppressed him, being the Possessor of a Dignity Gaped after, by all the Grandees of Spain, and of Revenue scarce inferiour to those of the Crown.
But yet as this manner of Proceeding is in the Best of our Fortunes, an Antidote against Envy, so it little avails those who have once already carried themselves Insolently and Proudly; for the Moderation of these men is still looked upon as Counterfeit: Of which thing, the Constantinopolitan History affords us an example in a Metropolitan, called Con∣stantine; who being banished from the Courts, both of Isacius Angelus, and Alexi∣us, the Emperors, returned afterwards with the Empress Euphrosine; pretending a great aversion from Business, and a Courtiers life, to the end, he might be the more Credited, and sought unto the more eagerly, he took
orders upon him: In short, he carried his business so craftily, That the Emperour him∣self causing him to be Absolved from the Oath of Priesthood, called him to Court, and trusted him with the management of his Greatest Affairs: Who presently, not content with his own Advancement, introduced his two Brothers to wait upon the Emperor; and as it were, to stand Centinels for him, if at any time his business called him away: But because his former Prosperity had dis∣covered the Insolence of his Nature, every body Feared him still, although he now made show of Great Temper and Moderation, which was the cause that he was again Supplanted and removed from Court, without ever be∣ing Restored more.
Of Emulation, the Sister of Envy, and the Remedies of it.
THe same Remedies that are good against Envy, prevail also against Emulation, which hath Less Malignity in it truly, than Envy hath; but more of Ambition, and the Treachery of Self-concernments. But these Competitors of ours, are to be Stroked with a
a certain Specious Respect, and Ceremonious Veneration, which will Powerfully divert these kind of humors; especially, if we Feed their Hopes with Higher Things than those We aim at, and seem to Contribute our Votes and Assistance to them; on the other side, Vilifying that which we seek for, as Below them to stoop unto, and fitter for Our selves; whose Merits as they are Less, so our Pretences ought not to be so High. If we fear that they will smell our Drift, we are to hold them in Suspence, and seem to Discourse the Case with Argu∣ments on both sides; yet giving the Grea∣test Weight to those which we intend should Divert their Ambitions. But the surest and best course of all, is to Conceal, if it be possible, what we Aim after, till it be out of the power of our Enemies, or Competitors to hinder us.
A Too Great Eagerness in our Pretences, is sometimes odious, even to those that would if it were more modest, Contribute their Assistance to us; pulling with it besides, other Greater inconveniences upon us, as if we succeed, More Envy, and if we fail, a Greater Disgrace: It is much more safe, as I said even now, to Hide our Designs, and as Rowers do, turn our Backs upon the place we are going unto. Those that look, after the greatest Commands, have taken This way; nothing hath been more usual unto them, than after
the example of Agamemnon in Euripides, to express a greater desire of Rest and Re∣tirement, than of Honor or Imployment. And many have found this a singular Remedy, to divert the Wiles of those that would Oppose them, and to escape the Disgrace which attends those Fierce Pretenders; nay they have had hereby the Glory, to have often thought, That this Honor or Imploy∣ment was cast upon them, meerly for their Merits, and not obtained by Begging or Bying of Voices, as it too often falls out.
Last of all, in our Pretences we must take heed, that we Clash with no Rival, that is greater or more powerful in Friends and Dependants, than our selves. In this case we must imitate Marcus Lepidus, a man in Tacitus his opinion, of Great Wis∣dom; who being Drawn, as it were, in∣to the Senate by Tiberius, to stand with Junius Blaesus, Sejanus his Uncle, whether of them should be chosen Proconsul of Africk, pretended presently against him∣self, Want of Health, the Tender years of most of his Children, and the Marriage of a Daughter, that he was to take care of; fearing doubtlesly to make Sejanus his Enemy, if he carried away the Province from Blaesus. Neither must we obstinately contend with him, whom some great man is about to Advance, although the Law favour us against him; for without doubt, Favour
weighs down the Law, as Tacitus instances in Germanicus and Drusus, creating Haterius Agrippa Praetor, notwithstanding the Ex∣press contradiction of a Law; But let the Historian speak himself. There arose a dispute of substituting a Praetor in the place of Vipsa∣nius Gallus lately dead; Germanicus and Drusus favoured Hateriut Agrippa Germani∣cus his Kinsman; others on the contrary side did contend, That the number of Children should carry it, according to the Law. Tiberius was glad to see his Sons, and the Laws of the Senate, clash together; without doubt the Law was o∣vercome, but yet not easily, nor by many voices: By which means, when they were in their great∣est vigor, they were wont to be overborn.
How to avoid a Treatning Ruine, and When it is upon us, how to make the best use of it: Ex∣ample of the fall of Great men.
HIthetto we have observed the Principal Precepts that are to be observed by our Courtier; if any want, every Rational mans (for such only we intend to instruct) Prudence and Dexterity will supply it. Now
because these kind of Rules are no less necessary, for the Preserving our Greatness and Fortune in the Court, than for the Gaining of it; it will not be impertinent to have by us the examples of some of those that have Fallen from their Power and Greatness, to the end, we may grow Wise by other men's Mischances; and learn, if not to Avoid a Ruine, at least to Arm and Prepare our selves for it; for this Latter is almost as necessary as the First, since the endeavours of those that seek to escape their Approaching Misfortunes, are for the most part Vain; whilst he that Prepares him∣self for it Long before, makes that Fall (which few or none of them can Avoid that For∣tune hath lifted up on high) to be much More Gentle and Easie, than otherwise it would.
These Falls happen unto us, either through our own Faults, through the Arts and Contrivance of our Enemies, or through the Perverseness of the Prince's Nature, or perhaps his Death. Since the lives of all men are obnoxious to Faults, and full of Errors, and Failings, it is so especially with those that are on High, who by reason of their Greatness, are out of the Lists of Reprehension; all that are about them, being compelled to approve of Whatever they Do, be it well or ill. A∣mongst all which Faults, the foulest they are incident unto, is, A Treacherous Turning against
their Prince, who is the Author of their Dignity and Power: A crime marked out with the Blackest note of an Ʋngrateful and Faithless Soul; and a most just subject of the Prince's Hate and Indignation. All men that are in Authority ought to flie the very Shadow of this Crime, and to the end of taking all ground of Suspicion from the Prince, to decline those Honors and Places, that are opportune for such At∣tempts.
Paterculus esteems Sejanus to have been one of the wisest Courtiers that ever was and truly it is likely, That He that flourish∣ed so long in the Favour of a Prince, so Subtil and Diffident, as Tiberius was, did Comport himself with great Modesty and Wariness. He was (saith our Author) in appearance given to ease; assuming nothing to himself, and by that means obtaining all things; Crouching still willingly beneath the opinion of other men, and striving to come behind them in repute; His countenance and his life, was Calm and Quiet, although his Mind was Restless, and ever awake; yet Ambition at last transported this Provident and Wary man so far, as to aspire to the Empire. To which end, Drusus being dead, he married Livia his Widow, that so being linked into the House of the Caesars, he might more easily compass his Desire: And although he perceived out of Tiberius his Tergiversations, when he demanded his
consent in the case, that it had drawn a Suspicion upon him; yet did he not change his mind; but what he had failed of this way, he sought to compass another.
He knew that Tiberius was grown weary of the City, whereupon he presently Spurs him on, and perswades him to Retire to Caprea; read Tacitus, Annal. 4. who says That lest he should either infringe his Power or weaken his Authority, by debarring the Mul∣titude from the Court, or minister matter of Slander, and suspicion by Entertaining them, he took this Course: He perswaded Tiberius to go live in some Pleasant place, far from Rome; foreseeing many conveniences in it. First There could be no access to the Prince but through him; then, That the Disposal of all Letters would be in his hands, since the Soldiers, by whom they were to be Con∣veyed, would be at his Devotion; and last∣ly, That Caesar now growing old and waxing Effeminate with the privacy of the place would easily transfer the burthen of Affairs, and Go∣vernment upon him, and truly, his hopes de∣ceived him not, for in a short time, under Pretence of easing Tiberius his age, he drew all the power of the Empire into his own hands.
Yet at last, the event showed, That this way of Sejanus, was both Perilous and Tedi∣ous; to mention which more accurately seems worth my labor here, to the end,
That both Courtiers may be more Wary in governing their Fortune, and Princes more Cautious in exal••ing their Minions. Tiberius did either love or suffer patiently Sejanus, as long as he found his help useful to the Op∣pression of Agrippina, and her Children, Nero, and Drusus; to which kind of Imployments, Sejanus shewed himself very Ready, know∣ing, That thereby he should not onely win the Favor of the Prince, but also establish his own Power and Hopes; there being none left of Caesar's House now, but two youths, whose tender Age, if they should come to the Government, must needs leave the Au∣thority, and ordering of Affairs, to him; un∣til he saw his opportunity of Usurping the Empire it self.
But mark how Rash and Blind Ambition makes us; He did not see, that the nearer he came to the Top, the more he became Suspected of this jealous Prince; who now sought all means of Lessening, ra∣ther than Advancing him; that strove as much on the other side to Climb still on; For though he wanted nothing, but the Name of Emperor (which some did not stick to give him) and the Tribunes pow∣er (which the Emperors never intrusted to any) yet was he not Content, but daily Endeavoured to Augment his Autho∣rity. By which course, as he rendred himself Venerable to all others, so he
made himself Formidable to Tiberius; For when he saw that Sejanus had not onely Won the Praetorian Guards, but also very many of the Senators, and principal Fami∣lies of Rome, by either Benefits or Hopes, or Fears, unto himself; and likewise, That his Secrecies were by his own Servants told un∣to Sejanus, and not Sejanus his to him again; he determined his Destruction, as one that was become his Rival: But be∣fore he went about it, he thought fit to Sound the Inclinations of those about him, to the end, That he might know how to Chuse out some that would like of his Design.
Lest that Sejanus should smell out any change in Caesar's affection towards him, he makes him Consul, and calls him both Pre∣sent and Absent in his Letters to the Senate, and the People, his Friend, and Companion of his Labors. Lastly, he feigns himself Sick, to discover thereby, the affections both of Sejanus, and several others. Sometimes he Writes to the Senate of his Recovering con∣dition, and that he would shortly come to Town; sometimes Praising, sometimes Blaming Sejanus; sometimes Receiving those that came Recommended by him, and at other times Refusing others; that thus he might keep him suspended between Hope and Fear, who, whether trusting to his Favor with the Prince, or for Fear of losing of
his Hopes, Resolved to attempt nothing by Force; hoping, that the Disgusts of the Prince, if there were any, would wear out with time. In this interim, Others who had hitherto Fawned upon Sejanus his Fortune, not upon Himself, seeing Tiberius stagger, began to carry themselves more Warily, and the Devotion of many towards Sejanus, grew Cold.
Tiberius having discovered long ago the Pride and Insolency of Sejanus, and fearing withal, lest provoked by Contempt, he should Run some Desperate Course, Caused it to be given out, That he intended to Confer the Tribunical Power upon Sejanus; and presently after, Commands him to be laid in Prison, writing Letters, to that end, to the Senate, which were carried by Macro, Cap∣tain of the Guards: Who coming to Rome, first communicated the Prince's pleasure to Memmius-Regulus, then Consul (for the other Consul was more addicted to Se∣janus) and then to Graecinus Laco, Cap∣tain of the Watch, it being not yet break of day. Thence going to the Senate∣house, he met Sejanus, who startled to see him, demanded if he had brought him any Letters from Tiberius, he whis∣pered in his ear, That he should anon be saluted Tribune; whereupon, he en∣tring the Senate-house, not without an inward joy, Macro commanded the Pre∣torian
Guards to go home, showing them to that end, a Warrant from the Emperor, in which also, he promised them a Largess. The Pretorian Soldiers being departed, and Laco's Company placed there in their Room, Macro enters the Senate, and delivers his Letters; Immediately going forth, without expecting the Reading of them, to bid Laco stand well upon his Guard, lest Se∣janus raising a Tumult in the Senate, should break away; and went thence himself to the Pretorian Gua••ds, to hinder them, lest they should attempt any thing.
The Letters that were then a Reading, were spun out into a Great length, to the end, That Macro might have Time enough to order his business; and truly they were interwoven with a wonderful Contrivance, In the beginning there was no mention of Business, nor any thing concerning Se∣janus; a little after he was touched up∣on, as they say, with a Gentle hand; then some other things interlaced, there fol∣lowed a More Open, but that also a slight Accusation against him: At last, after sun∣dry Excursions about the Affairs of the Common-wealth, two of Sejanus his Favo∣rites were named, and the Senate com∣manded to Proceed against them; and with∣al, that Sejanus himself should be Secu∣red. All mention of his Death being pur∣posely left out, to the end, That Hope
might be left to the Accused, of Clearing himself of those Crimes, and those but Light ones, that were there objected against him.
The Letters being read, many that had Waited upon him into the Senate, seeing things of another nature in hand, than making Sejanus Tribune, rose up and com∣passed him in, lest he should Escape; which it is believed, that he would at least have Attempted to do, if in the beginning, the Em∣peror's Letters had thundered any thing sharply Against him. But he then despising those Slight Touches, sate still in his place; and being called upon, either two or three times, by the Consul Memmius to rise up, with much ado he Obeyed at last, as being accustomed to Give, and not to Receive Com∣mands. When he was risen, Laco follow∣ed him Close at the heels and after him came Regulus, accompanied with other Senators, who led him from the Senate to the Prison; and thence, soon after, to Exe∣cution at the Scalae Gemoniae, where he was put to Death.
Behold here the ruine of a great Courtier, and a Favorite, who for Craft and Power had scarce ever his equal▪ The Contrivance of wh••se Fall, though it may seem due to Tibe∣rius his Prudence, ye•• it is rather to be at∣tributed to his own Greatness and Prosperity, which ruined it self with its own Weight, so evidently, That all those Sleights and Strata∣gems
of Tiberius, were not very needful; as may be gathered out of the example of Perennius, who aspiring to the same Height that Sejanus did, and by the same Arts, was Subverted by Commodus, a Prince of a judg∣ment far inferior to Tiberius. It may well be, that many will not be moved with these Examples, because they will seem to be Wiser than others, and to know some∣thing more than these did, whose Misfor∣tunes are here recounted. I will not move them to Passion, with telling them what I think; although truly, I will not deny, but in those latter Ages, there have been some, whose Projects succeeded less unhappily, as Boylas, whose story we read in the History of Constantinople; who being Caught in a Conspiracy against Constantinus Monomachus, then Emperor, did not undergo so hea∣vy a Punishment as for such Crimes is wont to be inflicted, the reason be∣ing, because he had the Luck to Trans∣gress against a Mild and Gentle Prince.
It will not be amiss to recite the Sto∣ry briefly here, to the end, you may see how the Secretest Counsels, and Un∣discoverable by the eyes of Man, are of∣tentimes Discovered by the Divine Provi∣dence, after an unlookt for Manner; not being able to escape Punishment, by whatsoever Caution they are managed. No Mortal Man would have believed, that
this Boylas should have any Inclination to, or could have any Ground for, so great a Vil∣lainy. The greatness of the Favors, which were Heaped upon him, had possessed the good Prince with a great Hope and O••inion of his Singular Fidelity, who seemed also by nature unapt for Great Ʋndertakings: He was not onely of very Mean Birth; but also Stammered so much, as he could hard∣ly be understood; which Stuttering, since he saw it pleasing to the Emperor, he did afterwards Affect on purpose: With this Assentation and Flattery, he so Insinuated himself into the Prince's Familiarity, That the Bed-chamber, and Cabinet of Constan∣tine, were always opened unto him: At last, being Inriched by the Prince, he was chosen into the number of the Senators, and begins to cast his thoughts Higher; wherein he went so far, that he determi∣ned by the Murther of the Prince, to make his Own Way to the Scepter. This design he first opened to those he knew sure∣ly hated the Emperor, promising Moun∣tains to such as Approved it, and Offer∣ed him their Assistance; and Praising Greatly those that Disliked it, and Refused it, out of their Affection and Loyalty to∣wards the Prince; as whose Spie, he would seem to propound Such things, to discover the Inclinations of his Subjects.
By which means he was undescryed by
all, but such, whose Fellowship in the Treason, make him secure of them; and had, at last, Effected that Abominable Act, if at the very time, when he had the Weapon in his Hand, which he had prepared for the Emperor's Throat; one of the Conspirators, touched with a sudden Remorse of Conscience, had not seasonably Disclosed, and discreetly Pre∣vented it. The Emperor t••ok the Injury so patiently, That having Condemned some of the Conspirators to die, he was satisfied in inflicting Banishment onely on the Author of the Treason.
It were too long to recount all those here, who having undertaken such Treasons, were caught in them, or else, though In∣nocent, were falsly believed to be Guilty of some such design, and made Shipwrack in Court. But contenting our selves with what we have already said, this onely is to be added, That all Pride, whether through Ambition, Bragging, Reproaches, Detraction, Ostentation, or other Pompous manner of li∣ving, it displease the Prince, is the high Rode to Ruine.
Boasting, Presumption, Arrogance, too much Familiarity, Pride, and Perfidy, noted with Examples.
THis Boasting and Recounting of services past, destroyed Philotas and Clytas in the Court of the Great Alexander; and Cra∣terus himself had like to have been over∣born with those Winds: Certainly, he had been much more acceptable to the Prince, if he had contained himself within the bounds of a Generous Modesty; So Cajus Si∣lius with Tiberius; Antonius Primus with Ves∣pasian; and Sillas with King Agrippa, by Boasting of their Services, deprived them∣selves of all the Fruit of them; as Tacitus witnesses of the two first, Annal. 4. and Hist. 4. and Josephus of the last. Princes do believe their Fortunes and Favors lost, and cast away upon these Braggadocio's, for they will have their Subjects seem to owe all they have to Them, and their Bounty; not to their own Vertue, and Merits.
The liberty of Reprehending the actions of Princes, or Inveighing against others in their Presence, is to be carefully avoided, as bordering upon Arrogance, and Presumption, Eumenes complaining before Alexander,
something Petulantly, That Hephaestion should Assign the Soldiers Quarters to Mu∣sicians, Comedians, and such kind of peo∣ple, incurred the displeasure of the King.
To treat with the Prince over famil arly, or to seem to make ones self the Sole Arbi∣ter of his Principal Cares, savours of Pride, although it may proceed onely out of Va∣nity and Covetousness; as it appeareth in the example of Zotirus, once the Favou∣rite of Heliogabalus; and also of Turi∣nus, who scarce worse than Zotirus, yet more unhappy, was commanded to be sti∣fled to death with smoke, by Alexander the son of Mammea; the Executioner crying out, Let him Perish with smoke, who Sold smoke. He was wont to brag, That the Prince was governed by his Advi∣ces; and so by Intruding upon the Prin∣ces Retirements, and with Impertinent Senceless Whispers in Publique, pretending to Favour, was sought unto by very many and gathered together great Riches, through the Tribes, and Presents of Those, to whom all his Interest in the Prince, could not a∣vail a straw.
The Arrogance of Plancianus is also wor∣thy of Memory, which being accompanied with great Vanity, broke out at last into open Perfidy: His Arrogance was such, That he did not stick to contend with Bassianus, the Emperors Son; who was Author both
of his Dignity, and Fortune; and he was withal so Vain, that as he passed through the City, he would not only Interdict all Access unto him, but also would not suffer them to Behold him; his Ushers going before still to Clear the streets, of all that they could see. Becoming a Traytor at last against his Prince, and convicted of his Treason, he was Beheaded. In France, during the time of Philip le Bell, Enguarrandus Marigny, daring to contest personally with Charles de Valoy, what Misery he did pull upon himself, and his friends, may be observed in the French Histories.
Above all things, we must take heed, That we give not our selves in Court, to sowing of Strife between Princes, and Great men; for they becoming friends, do for the most part Sacrifice such unto their Friendship; of which, though the stories of all Nations are full, yet the Bavarian History furnishes us with one Example very memorable, of Otho Crondoserus, who flou∣rishing with Rodulphus the Palatine in singu∣lar savour, was the Author of Great Enmi∣ties between the Frince and his Mother, for a time; but the Mother afterwards reconcling her self unto her son Crondo∣ferus had his Eyes and Tongue pull'd out.
How we must, not only Take Care to Preserve the Prince's Favour, but also That of Those in Power about him.
IT is not enough that the Princes them∣selves be not Averse unto us, but we must also keep our selves Aright with those that are in Favour with them. Germanicus at his death, gave that advice to Agrippina his Wife, of which Tacitus, Annal. 2 speaks thus. Then turning to his Wife, he intreated her by his Memory, and for their Children sake, which were common to them both, That she would pull down her stomach, and submit her Great heart to the rage of Fortune; lest re∣turning to the City, she should with Emulation of her Greatness, stir up against her, persons more powerful than her self; Agrippina's neglect of this Document, Ruined her and her children, I told you before, how much Eumenes his favour was diminished with Alexander; after that, railing against Hephaestion, he carried himself irreverently towards the Prince; and discovered his Spleen and Envy to him that he accused.
Wherefore, when we see any one in the Prince's favour, we must carefully weigh his Authority, and compare it, as it were, in a
Balance against our own; that we may know certainly which weighs down the other: And in the tryal of this, we are not so much to observe Outward Appea∣rances, as the circumstances of Inward Cau∣ses. Craterus and Hephaestion, for a time did flourish both of them, in Great and Equal Favour with Alexander; until Alex∣ander himself determined the business, in calling one of them, The Kings friend, and the other, Alexander's friends.
Out of which decision Craterus might have made this judgment, That since Princes, for the most part, are more in love with their Own Wills, than their Au∣thority; they also are held More Dear unto them, who rather adore and worship Alexander, that is their Person, than their Fortune and Kingly Dignity: And though that afterward upon a strife that arose between Him and Hephaestion, when all the Court was divided into Factions, Alex∣ander seemed to incline to neither side; but chiding them both heavily threa∣ned punishment, if ever they should Harp upon that string again; yet his man∣ner of dealing with them, shewed ra∣ther his Singular Prudence, to be imitated by all Princes, than his Equal Affection to them both. He apprehended, that this Discord might produce Great Tuinults, and Mischief; For he knew both Craterus his great interest
in the Macedonians, and how much He∣phaestion was Envied for his favour to him. Therefore to diminish Hephaestion's Envy, he reprehended him publickly; and to a∣void giving offence to the Macedonians, he Reproved Craterus in private.
Amongst those that in this tryal and ex∣amen of the Prince's favour, between them∣selves and others, were out of negligence and in discretion, most grosly Mistaken: Anto∣nius Primus ought to have the first place, who daring to contend with Mutianus, learnt at last, That he had better have con∣tested with Vespasian himself. And in this manner, you will find it is a thing wit∣nessed by the examples of all Courts, To vindicate more sharply an injury against the Favourites, than against the Prince himself. Dio tells us the reason of it, when he had re∣counted how the same thing happened to Sejanus, thus, As those whom vertue and con∣sciousness of their own Deserts, hath lifted up to Dignities, do not much stick upon the vain Cere∣monies, and outward Circumstances of Honor: So on the contrary side, those who seek to climb by Ambition, Pride, and Vice, thereby to hide their unworthiness, and meanness, do presently take ill, and understand as a contempt, the least neglect of Ceremony, and respect towards them. Insomuch, that it is harder to preserve the friendship of these men, than of the Prince
himself, for he thinks it a Glorious and Prince∣ly Act to forgive Injuries: When these, lest they should seem to Remit that which they cannot Revenge, even to ostentation, do use their Borrowed Power, in persecuting those that have offended them.
Pride even in the Meanest Persons at Court, noted with Examples; as also Treachery in Betraying the Prince's Secrets.
NEither truly hath it been Destruction to Great Ones only, to have carried them∣selves Insolently and Amiss, but also to Men of the Lower Stage. John King of Arragon, loved Alvarez de Luna so much, that he Trusted him with all his Affairs, and even his Kingly Power it self, notwithstanding the Repining of all his Nobles. But when he by reason of his prosperous Fortune, fell into that Pride and Presumption. That he caused a Nobleman, who in the King's name admonished him of his Duty, to be Precipitated and Murthered; he was by the King's command beheaded. It is also an ordinary cause of shipwrack in Court, when any one hath rendred, either himself,
or the Prince, Hateful to the Peers, or Peo∣ple; For, either the Prince is fain of his own accord, to cast such a one off, to Rid himself of Envy, or else others never leave, till they have Overthrown him. During the Reign of Commodus, Cleander once armed the Pretori∣an Guards against the Roman People; which was a ground of so great tumults in Rome, that unless the Emperor had Sacrifiecd Clean∣der to the Peoples Fury, he himself could not have been Secure.
The same Commodus, had Rendred him∣self Odious to all Men, by his Affection to one Anterus; from which envy, that they might Free their Master, some of Commodus his Servants being very desirous, slew this Anterus as he was coming from Court. Eu∣tropius, who had been long dear to Arcadi∣us the Emperor, since he was believed to be the Author of the Sedition raised by Tribigildus, was given up, as a Price of the Peace, by the Prince, to the Enemies.
Amongst the Evils that subvert Cour∣tiers, there are two remaining yet, as ve∣ry dangerous, so very frequent; A be∣traying of the Prince's Secrets, and Conspi∣racy with his Enemies. Crimes, for the most part, arising out of Perfidy, but ma∣ny times also out of Levity, and Indis∣cretion onely. And forasmuch as con∣cerns the Secrets of Princes, I think they do very well, who Pry not into them; and
who, if their Office exact it not at their hands avoid the bare knowledge of them: For if you be the Onely person, to whom they are imparted, and Fame (which often makes witty Conjectures) chance to scatter any thing like unto them, you cannot avoid the sus∣picion, that the Secret came out by you: And although the Prince perhaps hath im∣parted it to some one else, yet it may fall out so, that he hath forgot; or else, that he is more Confident of the other mans si∣lence, and so the foil remain upon you still.
Not without cause, did Philippides the Comick Poet, when he was asked by King Lysimachus (to whom he was very dear) of what things he did chiefly desire to be made partaker by his Prince, answer, That he would refuse nothing that came from the Prince, his Secrets onely excepted; from which he desired to be Excused. Let us learn from the example of this man, as much as we can, and esteem it safer to be Ignorant of Secrets, so difficult and dangerous to be kept, than to Know them. Hiero, Tyrant of Syracusa, was wont to say, That those who discover Princes secrets, do wrong both to Themselves, and to Those they Impart them unto by exposing them also together with themselves, to the hatred of the Prince.
The Causes, Kinds, and Examples of Conspiracies with the Prince's Enemies.
YEt their Condition is, of all other, most Hazardous and Ticklish, who led either by Avarice, Ambition, or Desire of Providing for their own Security, do Conspire with the Prince's Enemies; whether they be either Strangers or Domesticks. Cardinal Balaeus, a Taylor's son, being by Lewis the Eleventh, made his Treasurer, and afterward a Bishop, at last also by the King's intercession, and the Pope's willingness, to oblige one that had been so sharp an Adversary unto him was promoted to the Dignity of Cardinal: But afterwards being Convicted of a Conspiracy with the King's Enemies, he was sent to the Tower of Loches, where he dwelt twelve years un∣til Sixtus Quintus by great Intreaties, and much Ado, procured his Release. For the like crime, the Cardinal of Prata under∣went the like punishment, in the Reign of Francis the Fifth; and had never, perhaps, got his Liberty, had he not deceived his Physicians with an opinion of the Strangury, by drinking his Ʋrine: When the King fear∣ing the anger of the Pope, if consumed with
that disease, a Cardinal should die in Prison, Dismist him. Petrus de Vineis, a chief Coun∣sellour of the Emperour, Frederick the Se∣cond, being Suspected of Intelligence with Pope Alexander third, the Emperour's Ene∣my, lost his Eyes.
Not only designs of Ʋsurping the Empire of the East, but also Private Intercourse be∣twixt him and Alaricus, King of the Goths, are believed to have caused Stilico's death: Which that shameful Peace he made with the same Alaricus, against the will of the Senate, seems to confirm; Lampadius (who always disclaimed it) calling it not a Peace, but a Contract of slavery; whereby the Em∣perour was obliged to pay Tribute to Barba∣rians.
That our Courtier must not be the Author of Hazardous Counsels; the Variety of Errors, whereby the Prince's Favour is lost.
THe Courtier that we are all this while a forming, must chiefly beware, That he never be the Author of Hazardous Coun∣sels; for the Ill Success of these, is always
wont to be imputed to the Ʋnfortunate Ad∣viser, and the Good unto the Fortune of the Prince: not onely by the Vulgar, who judge all things by the Event, but also by the Prince himself; who is Always Glad to have some one, upon Whom to Derive the Envy of an Ʋnluckie Ʋndertaking, and scarce ever willingly that any one should share with Him in the Glory of a Prosperous Acti∣on. A good while before and after Stilico's death, the Argument of the Publique Complaint, was his Ʋnseemly Peace with the Goths; until at last, Olympius who had procured his ruine, seeking fame from contrary courses, broke the Truce, Ala∣ricus in vain, Pleading the injustice of the deed; But afterwards having made War for some time, still with ill Success, this very Man was, in the opinion of the people, esteemed, The Author of all their Evils; And at last, being accused by the Eunuchs, who were in great favour with the Emperor, he was fain to leave the Court, and flie into Dalmatia.
When either the beginning of a War, or breaking of a Peace, is Treated of; the part of a wise Counsellor is to bring Arguments for Both Sides, and leave the Prince at Liberty to make Choice of What Likes him best. And if he be Prest to deliver his Opinion, it will be the Safer Course to Incline to Peace; unless Invincible Necessity, or an Apparent Advantage,
perswade the Contrary: Which Course was Prudently taken by Jovius, the Successor of that Olympius, we lately mentioned.
He, though he was more Inclined to War, that so himself might be more Neces∣sary to the Emperor; yet after the manner of some Statesmen, seemed to preferr a Love to Peace, having met with Alaricus at A∣riminum, whither he was sent to Conferr with him; he sends the Conditions that Alaricus propounded to Honorius; perswa∣ding him in other Letters apart, That he should offer the command of his Armies to Alaricus, to make him more Reasonable in Other Things. The Emperor denying, That it was not Safe for him to com∣mit the strength of his Empire to a stran∣ger, that had been hitherto his Enemy, answered, That he had rather consent to pay him Tribute.
When Jovius had read these Letters to Alaricus, he Angry to see himself, and his Friendship Rejected by Honorius, broke off the Treaty of Peace, and Jovius returns to Hono∣rius; who being much Offended with the Insolence of his Enemy, Swore, He would never have any peace with Alaricus; and gave the same Oath to all his Courtiers and Com∣manders. Thus Jovius by the same Art, re∣moved from himself, the envy of the Broken Truce, and Endearing himself to Alaricus, by the Testimony of his good-will, in ad∣vising
Caesar to give him the Command of his Armies, engaged Honorius in a War; whereby the Power and Authority of Jovius was wonderfully established. There is in Story so great variety of those Errors, by the means of which Courtiers have faln from their Prince's Favour, that no man's diligence can reckon them all up so; but when he hath Recounted many, he shall find still More behind. Wherefore having here cull'd out some of the Principal, we leave the rest to the Industry and Discretion of e∣very Observing Reader.
Of the Arts whereby Courtiers are Supplanted by others; and First under Pretence of Specious Im∣ployments Abroad, or of Calling Them from their Commands, to Attend upon the King's Person.
WE have seen already, How by His own Fault, a Courtier may lose the Prince's Favour; let us now show the Means whereby his Enemies are wont to Supplant Him; which are of three Sorts. Either they
will Endeavour to Remove him from the Court under an Honorable Pretence; or else they will Render him Suspected, and Hateful to the Prince; or lastly, will by Open Force Com∣pel the Prince to Remove him.
Of the first kind of these three; as there are Divers Ways, so the Ends are Divers. For some are with Shows of Honor, or with the desire of Living amongst their Friends, willingly perswaded to Depart the Court. Which Course, during the Reign of Ma∣nuel Comnenus, Styppiota craftily used, to Remove out of his way Hagiotheodorita that stood in his Light: For there ari∣sing a Controversie between Michael Paeda∣gogus, and Joseph Balsamon, Styppiota per∣swaded the Emperor, That if Hagiotheodo∣rita were made Governor of Peloponnesus, it would put an End to the contention of these Great Ones. Hagiotheodorita out of de∣sire of assisting his Kinsman, undertakes the Imployment; not Dreaming that Styp∣piota having got his Rival out of the way, would by this means come to the Sole Management of Affairs, as indeed it fell out.
Some men also Tired out with the Brawls and Strifes of their Enemies in Court, to pro∣vide for their Own Quiet, do Easily Embrace any Plausible Imployment for a Pretence of their Departure. As Agrippa did, who, Velleius testi∣fies, went into Asia, under the Colour of a
Great Imployment, onely to withdraw him∣self from Court, where he had Private Grudges and Heart-burnings against Marcellus, as the report goes.
Tiberius, whilst Caius Caesar lived, Retired to Rhodes, upon pretence of following his studies, and by his Mother's means (they are Suetonius his words) to Hide the Disgrace of it, Obtained to be sent, as it were, Ambassador from Augustus. If there want a Pretext, whereby he whom you desire to Remove, may vo∣luntarily seek leave to go, and esteem it for a Benefit; the Prince must be per∣swaded to give him some Charge, by rea∣son it can be Executed by none, so well as He: So also, if there be any man Great and Powerful in any of the Provinces a∣broad, and have Emulators that seek to Eclipse him; they must labour to call him thence to Court, as necessary to the Prince's person; that so being Crouded up amongst the Courtiers, his Lustre may be Obscured.
This art used Apelles in Polybius, when he stript Taurion of the Government of Pelo∣ponnesus. So Darius by the advice of Mega∣byzus, recalled Hyesteus out of Ionia; not, that he had any need of his Presence, as he pretended, but to Weaken his Authority. If these Courtiers would rest contented with Removing others out of their way, for their Own Advancement, and Proceed no further,
in comparison of many Worse, these Arts and Practices would be something Tolerable; but the Most of them rest not here: In the Reign of Constantius, Sylvanus, Gene∣ral of the Foot (as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us) by Arbetio his Procurement, was sent into France to chastise the Barbarians for the injuries they offered to the Gauls; whither he being once come, and Growing into Favour with the Na∣tion, and also Rich; the envy of Arbetio wrought at last his Ʋtter Destruction with the Emperor.
Almost the same Fortune under this very Emperor had Ʋrsicinus, the General of the Horse: Eusebius, the Eunuch, had together with some other Courtiers, Conspired his Ruine; and by these mens Means, to the end he might be far enough from Court, he was sent upon some Expedition to the Con∣fines of Persia; where having staid ten years, Sabinianus was sent to succeed him, neither in Judgment nor Experience, equal to the charge: Whereupon, presently a Rumor being spred, That the Persians were prepa∣ring for a War, he was commanded to stay there still, though the Power was already given to another. Eusebius Contriving it so on purpose, to the end, That whatsoever Good Success hapned against the Persians, might be Attributed to Sabinianus; and what ever Fell out Amiss, might be Imputed
to Ʋrsicinus, as the event witnessed; for Ʋrsicinus cast down for another Man's Faults, Retired, and past the rest of his life in Private. The Reign of this Emperor doth furnish us yet with another Example; For Ruffinus, the Uncle of Gallus, Captain of the Guard, was sent to Appease a Mutiny of the Soldiers, out of no other Intention, but that he might Perish in the Rage of the Tu∣mult: As Clytus did complain, That he was sent by Alexander against the Sogdians, to no other End.
How Calumnies are used to Make Men Suspected, or Hated by the Prince.
THus much for the First way, whereby Courtiers are by their Enemies Supplant∣ed, and stript of the Prince's Favor. Now let us come to the Second, which are, The Calumnies that are used to Render us Hated and Suspected by the Prince: In Calumny, two things are to be Observed; the first is, Whether it be sufficient to Deprive him of the Prince's Favor? the second is, Whether it be Probable? Of the first, We must make our judgment out of the Present State of Things,
out of the Humor and Inclination of the Prince, and out of the Nature of the Calumny intended. No kind of Slander doth subvert more Great Men, than that which Accuses us of Conspi∣racy against the Prince's Person, or his Em∣pire, or else of Contempt, or Disdaining to O∣bey, with Detraction, and Derision towards the Prince.
These Calumnies are Rendred likely to be True, not onely by the Words and Actions of those that are Accused, and of their Servants, Friends, and Kindred, but also by Contrived Letters, and the Disposition of the Prince; too Apt to believe the Calumny, or too Prone to think Ill of the Person Accused; especially, if he were ever suspected before. These things which are by Calumny converted into a Crime, he that is Traduced, either Did, or said of his Own Accord, or else was Ticed into them by the sleights of his Enemies, and Competitors: The knowledge and practice of which Malice, whets the wits of those who will Curiously Watch their Occasions, and know dexterously How to use them.
There are some Men that will put Projects into our heads, to the end, That if we imbrace them, they may make these very things, a Subject of Calumny against us, and accuse us to the Prince of some Wicked Intention. There was a certain Magician, called Santa∣barinus, very much beloved by Basilius,
Emperor of Constantinople, but as much ha∣ted by Leo, the Emperor's Son; who this Magician desiring to Overthrow, did so be∣siege him with Counterfeited Duties, and Feigned Respects, that at last winning up∣on him, he grew into credit with the young Prince: Then having got an Au∣thority and Interest in him, he takes his time, and warns Leo, with great Art and So••i••itude, That whensoever he went a Hunting with his Father, he should carry a Poignard under his Garments, to Defend himself withal: He obeying this Advice, the Magician goes to his Father, Informing him, That his Son intended to murther him, and for a Testimony, told him, That he always carried a Dagger hidden about him, waiting for an Occasion of Performing it. In short, the business came to that pass, the young Prince was Searched, and the Poignard found, where∣upon he was cast into Prison; and though he were protected by the joynt intercessi∣on of all the Co••rt, yet he hardly Escaped with his Life.
Whilst Valentinian was Emperor, Aetius accused Earl Boniface, who was very dear unto Valentinian, and Governor of Africa, unto Placidia, the Emperors Mother, of Treachery towards the Prince, and of a De∣sign he had of Subjecting Africk to himself; perswading her withal, That he should
be Recalled quickly. At the same time he warns Boniface by his Letters, That he was Accused at Court, and for that reason Recal∣led; wherefore he should take heed how he Returned, if he loved his own Safety. Boniface giving credit unto him, obeyed him so far, That (resolving to oppose those that would come to reduce him) he called in Gontarus, King of Valladolid, and Gensericus his Son, then Reigning in Spain, unto his aid; who, upon this occasion, possessed themselves of Mauritania. The Deceipt be∣ing afterwards found out, to the end the Truth might appear more plainly, they were permitted the Tryal of a Combat, wherein Aetius being vanquished, was Banished the Court.
Not unlike unto this was the Craft of Sa∣mona, beloved by Leo, Son to the Em∣peror Basilius (by reason of his Detecti∣on of the Treason of Basilius, Kinsman to the Empress Zoa) who Resolving to Ru∣ine Andronicus, that was General against the Saracens, Caused him to be Warned by a Friend, that he should take heed of Hymerius, who came to Deprive him of his Eyes; which was in those days a Punishment Ʋsual towards Great Persons, whose power was Overgrown, and be∣come Formidable: Andronicus believing this to be true, which was Feigned by Samona, withdraws himself from Hy∣merius,
unto a place of strength, which he seized upon. This fact of his, Samona did not omit to Exaggerate unto the Emperor, insomuch, that by his Procurement, an Army was sent against him, which forced Andronicus, driven to Despair, to Quit the limits of the Empire, and Flie unto the Saracens. A little before, we mentioned Ar∣hetio, and it will be worth observing, how he added Deceit upon Deceit: When he ob∣served the Emperor Angry with Sylvanus, and Feared, that he should come to Rome to Clear himself of the Objected Crimes; he gives the Emperor his Letters, wherein he called Sylvanus, to his Presence, to an In∣strument of his own, called Apodenius; who arriving in France, suppressed the Letters as he was directed, and tells Sylvanus, That Nothing but Destruction Hung over him; where∣by Sylvanus Running into Rebellion, as the onely Means of his Preservation, made good Arbetio his Calumnies.
But we have too long been silent con∣cerning Sejanus (to whom being Expert in all these Tricks) this Artifice we now treat of was very Ʋsual. That he might render Agrippina suspected to Tiberius, He Inveigled her Friends to Puff up her Haughty Spirit; and her own Kindred were Inticed to Feed the Swelling Hopes of Agrippina, with Crooked and Perverse Discourses; whilst in the interim, he
causes Claudia Pulchra, Agrippina's Cousin-Germain, to be Accused by Domitius Afer; which Injury, this Fierce and Passionate Wo∣man, Complaining of Heavily to Tiberius, did thereby Exceedingly Encrease the Suspici∣ons of this jealous Emperor. Yet Sejanus not content with this, but seeking the Ʋ••ter Ruine of this Ʋnwary, and Sorrowful Lady, sent those unto her, who, under a Shadow of Friendship, should warn her, That Tiberius meant to Poyson her, and that she should Beware of his Feasts; whereupon she over-Credulous, Refused to take an Apple out of Tiberius his hand at Table, which grievously Incensed Caesar against her, By the same Sejanus now, when Soldiers were set to watch over Agrippina and her Children, were Men Suborned to Advise her, to Fly to the German Army, or to run to the Image of Au∣gustus for Sanctuary; and there to Invoke the help of the Senate and the People.
With the same Ʋgly Arts, whereby he en∣deavoured to supplant this Lady, by ma∣king her suspected of Tiberius, he Utterly Overthrew her Friend Titius Sabinus; which thing, as it is described by Tacitus, you may read here in his own words, because the Circumstances are very Notable, An∣nal. 4.
Junius Silanus and Silius Nerva, being Consuls, the year had a foul beginning; for Titius Sabinus, an honourable Gentleman
of Rome, was cast into Prison onely for his Friendship to Germanicus, which was such, That he never omitted any occasion of honouring or serving his Wife and Children; Of all Germanicus his Follow∣ers, being the onely Man which Visited them at their house, and Accompanied them abroad; wherefore as he was much praised by the Good, so was he much ma∣liced by the Bad: Against him, Latinius Latiani, Porcius Cato, Petilius Rufus, and Marcus Opsius, who had sometime been Consuls, bent their Spight, through a de∣sire of the Consulship, which they could not obtain, but by Sejanus his means, and Sejanus his liberty could not be purcha∣sed, but by some notable piece of Villainy. Wherefore they plotted amongst them, That Latiani, who was somewhat a-kin to Sabinus, should lay the snare, and that the rest being privately witnesses to what past, they might begin their Ac∣cusation.
Hereupon Latiani began at first to cast Speeches out at Random, and to Extol Sa∣binus his Constancy, that he did not as o∣thers did, Fawn in Prosperity, and Shrink from a house in Adversity; with other Ho∣norable mention of Germanicus, bewayling Agrippina's estate. And seeing Sabinus (as Mens Minds are soft and tender in Calamity) to pour down Tears, and
complaints; Latiani began more boldly to touch Sejanus's Cruelty, Pride, and Ambi∣tion, not forbearing to reproach Tiberius; These seeming dangerous Speeches, and such as durst not be avouched, made a strict friendship in shew between them: So far, that Sabinus often frequented La∣tiani's house, and as unto his Faithful Friend uttered his Griefs unto him. Those I mentioned before, now began to devise with Latiani, how these Speeches might be heard by them all: For the place of Meeting, must be, in appearance, private; and if they should stand behind the door, they did apprehend some noise, or other accident of suspicion might discover them; wherefore, between the Cieling and the Roof, the Three Senators (in a place no less Unseemly, than the Treachery was detestable) hid themselves, laying their ears close to the Holes and Chinks, to Li∣sten what was said.
In the mean time, Latiani having found Sabinus in the Market-place (as if he had some New Matter to tell him) inticeth him home into his Chamber, beginning there to rip up things past and pre∣sent in a great abundance; and to load him with new Fears. Sabinus was not behind hand with him, the nature of griefs being such, that when once we enter into them, we
can hardly make an end. This done, they began immediately their accusation, and writ unto Caesar the whole contrivance of their own Lewd and Shameful Act. The City was never in Greater Perplex∣ity, and fear than at that time, Every man estranging himself from his nearest Kindred, and acquaintance; avoiding all Meetings and Conferences as well with their Friends, as Strangers; yea they grew jealous of mute, and sense less things, Prying into the Roofs and Walls of their houses. But Tiberius Re∣questing in his Letters that the Solem∣nities of the new year might be Cele∣brated on the Calends of January, falls at last upon Sabinus, Charging him that he had corrupted some of his Freed-men to Attempt something against his Person, and therefore boldly demandeth a Re∣venge, which without delay was grant∣ed.
Sabinus being Condemned, was drawn and haled away with his Garments over his head, so that he being almost Throtled was heard to cry out: Is this the beginnings of the new year? be these the sacrifices slain in Sejanus his honor? Which way soever he did cast his Eyes they all fled that he directed his speech unto; the places of Assembly and the Streets were Empty, some came running back and showed them∣selves
again Afraid for that they were seen to be Afraid. And what days think you now were Exempt from Executions, if amongst the sacrifices, and the vows, when the custom was to abstain from profane speeches, Fetters and Manacles were mentioned. It is believed Tiberius could not be ignorant of the Envy he should in∣cur for doing so, but that he did it on purpose, to the end the new Magistrates might open the prisons, when they set o∣pen their Temples and their Altars. For after that he sent Letters of thanks, for that they had punished an Enemy to the State.
Examples of other Treacheries in Suborned Witnesses, and Forged Letters.
I Cannot avoid bringing here another Ex∣ample out of the same Historian. Firmius Cato, a Senator, and one of Libo's inward friends induced this fimple young man, easily led to vanities, to give credit to the Chaldeans Pro∣mises, the Magicians Ceremony, and the Inter∣pretation of Dreams, vainly putting him in mind that Pompey was his Great Grandfather, Scri∣bonia who had been Augustus his Wife, his
Aunt; The Caesars his Cousin Germains; and that his house was full of the Statues and Mo∣numents of his Ancestors: He inticed him to Licentiousness, to Borrow Money, making him∣self a Companion of his Lusts, and Familia∣rities, the better to Intangle him and Convince with many evidences. That there might be wit∣nesses enough, he also Debauched such of his Servants as knew any thing of the Matter. Then he desires Access to the Prince, and by means of Flaccus Vescularius, a Gentleman of Rome, one of Tiberius his Familiars, he Discovered both the Matter and the Man. How after this Libo was treated by Tiberius and made much of, until Accusations were brought against him in such abundance, that he was forced to Kill Himself; Tacitus Annal. 2. will tell you at large, to whom I had rather Refer you, than Exceed the bounds I had proposed to my self in this Treatise.
Styppiota, whose Deceipt in supplanting Hagiotheodorita, I told you of before, could not avoid being Circumvented Himself, as Sa∣binus the Roman was; the Contriver of that Plot was Camaterus Logotheta, who being an Enemy to Styppiota, Accused him before the Emperor as an Impostor, and one that intend∣ed to Betray Sicily. And to the end he might give some face of Truth to his Calumny, he hides the Emperour in his Chamber, and in his hearing begins on purpose to discourse
of the Affairs of Sicily. At which time many things fell from the heedless Styppiota that were very displeasing unto Caesar; not content with this, Camaterus causes Counter∣feit Letters to be mingled amongst Styppiota's Papers, which being searcht by the Emperor's Order, were the cause of Styppiota's Condem∣nation, and the Loss of his Eyes.
This Story leads me to speak of another means of Rendring Slanders probable, to wit, by Counterfeiting Letters; A Deceit indeed that for the most part breaks out at last to the prejudice of him that uses it, but nevertheless is of great Power to make deep impressions of suspicion in the Prince's Mind, and to Alienate his Fa∣vour: Which being once observed by the Accused, will either induce him to Withdraw himself willingly from Business, and the Court, least something worse should follow; or else cast him upon such Attempts and Practices, as will Confirm the Slander. Which appears by that example of Sylvanus I mentioned before.
The perfidy of False Witnesses is no slender confirmation of Slanders, and this is cheifly necessary against such as are Accused of Treason, and Capital Crimes; And truly Do∣mestick Servants as most proper, so oftnest are made use of in this nature. In the Reign of Arcadius, Eutropius seeking the de∣struction of Timasius, a great Captain, and a
man of much Authority; Corrupts his Friend or rather his Inseparable Companion Bargus to Accuse him of Affecting the Em∣pire. The Friendship between Bargus and Timasius gave Credit to the Accuser, all men believing, that he would not unless the Crim was most Certain, Accuse him; To this Coun∣terfeit Letters were added, to prove the Treason, by which means the Innocent Man and his Son were sent into Banishment, to the Isle of Oasis, from whence neither of them ever Returned.
Caius Petronius was for his skill in Plea∣sures preferr'd before Tigellinus by Nero, whereupon the other out of Envy, Accused his Rival of Scaevinus his friendship, (who was convicted of a Conspiracy against Nero) and brought to witness it a Servant of Petro∣nius Corrupted by him.
I Said before that to Confirm Calumnies, the Affection of the Prince to the Slanderer did
much Conduce, and for this Reason did Sejanus, endeavouring to make the Empress Livia jealous of Agrippina, Germanicus his Widow, choose Julius Posthumus to do it; who as Tacitus affirms, by Reason of his A∣dulteries with Mutilia Prisca, the Empresses favourite, was very Gracious with Livia. But Calumnies never succeed so easily, as when they are used against One alrea∣dy Suspected by the Prince: For it is very Probable, That then the Accuser shall not onely Ruine the other, but also Exalt Himself. The Familiars of Vitellius durst not Set upon Junius Blaesus, Till they Observed him to grow less in Vitel∣lius his Favour, and they compassed their desires much sooner, because Lucius Vitel∣lius, the Emperor's Brother, lent them his assistance.
Gracchus, a freed man of Caesar's, and one as Tacitus saith, Annal. 13. All his life bread up in, and by a long Experience, well Practised in the Princes house, thought it the best way to preserve himself in the favour of the Prince, to Accuse Cornelius Sylla, whom Nero he knew was jealous of already. The same art did Tigellinus use against this Sylla, and Plautus afterwards, of which Tacitus, An∣nal. 14. writes thus. But Tigellinus's credit increased daily, who thinking that his lewd practices, wherein he was a great proficient should be more acceptable, if he could engage the
Prince into the Communion of his Villainies, be∣gan diligently to Pry into all his Fears, and perceiving that Plautus and Sylla were above others Suspected: Plautus being banished into Asia, and Sylla into France, he entreth into discourse of their Nobility, and how one was too near the Army of the East, and the other to that of Germany: That Sylla was poor and needy, only Counterfeiting a Laziness; and Plautus Abounding in Wealth, did not so much as Pretend a desire of a Quiet life.
I told you above of Ʋrsicinus accused by Eusebius the Eunuch, to the Emperour Con∣stantius, who was already Shie towards him, by reason of his kindred to Gallus; but I did not set down the Success of the Cause, which was thus. The Accusation Faultring. because the Arguments whereby the Crime was to be proved, were Slender; the Eunuch intending a new Mischief, causes the Accu∣sed to be Inlarged: And things standing in this posture undecided, he doth strive to indear Ʋrsicinus to himself, whom he would seem to have delivered from the Danger of a Tryal; but withal, removes him from the Court (where all his Thoughts were placed) notwithstanding this face of Friendship he put on, perswading the Emperour under∣hand against him.
The Chief Arts and Ways of Slan∣derers.
WHen any one is Accused to have spoke Ill of the Prince, how much the nearer these Reproaches come to Truth, by so much the Easilier is the Accusation credited; as appears in the example of Granius Marcellus, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 1. Whom Coepio Crispinus accused to have Reviled Tiberius, which was an Inevitable Accusation, for he having chosen out the greatest blemishes of Tiberius his life, did impose them on the accused; which because they were True, were believed to have been spoken. This example have many Slanderers followed, Reproaching many Princes of their Vices, under Pre∣tence of Informing them of other mens De∣tractions; which one would think should be a sufficient Reason to perswade them from giving ear to these Calumniators.
And Tiberius truly, who though he was a lover of Informations, yet he Hated his own Reproaches; and therefore least he should hear them in the Senate where they were occasionally brought in by way of Accusing Others, retired to Caprea, Believing (as Taci∣tus avers) that he ought to Avoid the Assemblies of the Senate, least he should be Compelled to
hear Reproachful, but yet true things, uttered o himself in his own hearing.
This way also do some take only to Reprove Princes for their vices; as they that would reprove Nero for his Mother's Murder, did use to inveigh against others for the like Acts in his hearing; yet more with a design to corre the fault in Caesar, than to ruine those that they accuse. These are the Choicest Ways that Slander takes, but who will undertake to Trace her in all her Turnings? For Calumny is a Monster that hath a Thousand shapes, and a Thousand sleights to do Mischief with.
The Deceits and Danger of Court∣praises, and Masqued Courtiers. Lastly, The Third way of Oppres∣sing our Courtier by Force.
FRom Slanders, let us come to Praises, of which also as we have Hinted before, there is great use in Ʋndermining others; for many men do by this means, Palliate Secret Hate, Envy, and Emulation, to the end, they may Deceive more Easily. So Fabius Valens with Secret Criminations, Defamed Martius Valens that suspected no such thing from Him; who
to betray him more securely, did always speak well of him in Publick, Tacitus Hist. 1. So Arbetio with the Blandishments of a Great Kindness, did assault Ʋrsicinus, and frequent∣ly call him in publick, A Valiant Gallant per∣son, thereby Craftily to Intangle in more Deadly snares, that Harmless, and Well-meaning man. Ammianus Marcellinus, Lib. 15.
Alphonsus, King of Arragon, as one was Praising another man Unreasonably in his presence, beyond his wont, Turning about to a friend said, Without doubt this Fellow seeks the Destruction of him he Praises: Neither was the King deceived in his opinion, for six months after, this Intemperate Praiser, accu∣sed before the Seat of Justice, him that he had so Highly Extolled; and had undone him, had not the King interposed for his preser∣vation.
Mucianus having in the Senate heaped ma∣ny Praises upon Antonius Primus, whom he could not openly oppress; loads him also with Secret Promises, and Points him out the further Spain, left void for him by the de∣cease of Cluvius Rufus, giving to his Friends and Followers, several Commands in the Army. And afterward, when he had filled him with Ambition, and Desire, he suddenly Ʋndermines his Power by taking from him the Seventh Legion, which was exceedingly devered to Anthony.
Neither is this way Traced by Courtiers only, but also by Princes themselves, when they desire to Abate or Take down any Body. For Tiberius did thus confer the Praetorship upon, and invite to his Table, Libo, (whom he Secretly Suspected and Hated) without change of Countenance or showing Anger in his words, till he saw his time (he had so Concealed his In∣dignation) as Tacitus tells you, Annal. 2. By the same Artisice, you saw he Overthrew Sejanus: Domitian was never more to be feared, than when he Smiled; the Prai∣ses of Andronicus were the beginning of In∣juries. Nicetas called his Liberality, An Earnest of the Confiscation of that man's Goods, and his Lenity a fore-runner of a Certain Death.
Yet there are some that seek by their Ap∣plauses only, to stir up the Prince's Envy to∣wards them they Praise, for so Tacitus tells, Julius Agricola was Ruined with Domitian. The cause of his Destruction was no Crime nor Complaint against him, but the Prince's Envy to the Vertues and Glory of the man, Stirred up by the worst kind of Enemies, Ʋnseasonable and Trea∣cherous Praisers. There is extant, a saying of the Emperour Julian, That there are no more dangerous Enemies in the world, than Masked Courtiers; whom Mammertinus describes in a Panegyrick saying, That with a Crafty Artifice they did in all company, Slander
Men by way of Praises, and under the Titles of Friendship.
But we see that some have used these Praises towards one, with an Intention of Reproaching Another; whom they desired to Affront with the Dissimilitude of his Merit: Plutarch accuses Herodotus with this spightful kind of dealing in his com∣mendations of the Athenians, for the brave repulse they gave the Persians, which saith he, was not intended so much for the Athenians honor, as the Shame and Dis∣grace of the other Greeks, Seneca attests, that Kings are wont to praise their Dead Servants, to make those Blush that are Alive: So did Augustus Extol the faithful services of Maecenas, and Agrippa when his Daugh∣ters Lusts being discovered; he seeking thereby to Reprove his Familiars and Ser∣vants, as Negligent and Careless of the Ho∣vor and Service of their Prince.
The same was Augustus his end in Praising and Dispraising of Tiberius, of whom Taci∣tus writes thus; Augustus when a few years before he demanded the Tribunitial power in the Senate for Tiberius, although he did in his Speech Touch upon many things of his behaviour, his habit, and manner of living; which, as it were by way of Excuse he did Reproach him with, &c. Therefore these things ought to warn us to look as well into the Intention of those that Praise us, as of those that Caluminate us.
These two first ways of Undermining our Countier, to wit, Of Removing him out of the way, under some Fair Pretence; or of ma∣king him Hated, or Suspected by the Prince; being sufficiently discoursed of, there re∣mains onely untouched, the Third and Last way of all, Open Violence; which princi∣pally takes place, when either the Peo∣ple or the Soldiery offended with the Dig∣nity or Manner of the Favourite, run into a Publick Sedition. The Tumults of the Pa∣risians, when the people raged at the Captivity of their King John, with the English, are sufficiently known; as also the fortune of those, upon that sedition, who bore the Principal offices under his Son, then supplying his Father's place in the Government.
But few years since, the Janizaries, more than once, have by Sedition deprived the Turkish Emperors of their Ministers of Greatest Trust and Authority: Out of more ancient stories, the time of Arcadius will furnish us with some examples; Ruffinus was amongst others, principally beloved by this Emperor with whom Stilico being Offended, and de∣termining his Destruction, sent Gainas with his forces, as it were, to Assist the Emperor, but indeed to deprive him of Ruffinus, as it came to pass: For Ruffinus going to the Army, the Soldiers of Gainas upon the Signal given, Ran together, and com∣passing
Ruffinus in, Tore him in pieces.
Eutropius being then put in Ruffinus his place, when the chief Courtiers likewise grew discontented with him, by the contri∣vance of the same Gainas, Tribigildus raises a Rebellion, overrunning and spoiling all Asia, and denies to accept any Conditions of a peace, till Eutropius were removed out of the way; which by the perswasion of Gainas, the Emperour consented at last un∣to: Neither was this enough, for Gainas being afterward openly joyned with Tribi∣gildus, to the end he might suffer himself to be Reconciled to Arcadius the Emperour, demanded, That Aurelius Saturnius, and John Chrysostome, then the Chief Moderators of the Emperour's Affairs, should be given up to him; which being done, he sent them into banishment, contenting himself with giving them (before their departure out of his presence) the Edge of his Sword for to handle; that they might feel how sharp it was.
Sometimes the Prince's own Ill and Cruel Nature, Envying the De∣serts of his Servants, is Cause of the Courtiers Fall; and This, How it is to be Handled.
OFtentimes, although our Courtiers Un∣derprop themselves with all Other Sup∣ports, yet the Nature of the Prince, as being either Over Light, Vain, Jealous, Envious, Covet∣ous, Cruel, or Timorous, makes their Ruine ine∣vitable. These Diseases as being Incorpora∣ted into them, do for the most part Elude, and Overgrow the Circumspection of the Prudent∣est Men. Seneca, whose authority had with Nero far more of Liberty, than Flattery, in the beginning, being Wise and Skilful in the Arts of Court, was fain to yield at last, as quite Overcome by the Malice of the Prince's Na∣ture: First, he was Envied by him for his Eloquence, then for his Riches, and lastly, be∣ing opprest with Malicious Slanders, he lost both the Prince's Favor, and his Life.
The Jealousie and Envy of Princes, hath been so formidable to some, that they had rather be Lessened to their Loss, than incur their Envy by doing their business Prospe∣rously and well. Publius Ventidius fearing
the Envy of Mark Anthony, under whom he served, Contented himself to have beaten the Parthians by Three Victories into Media, and would not prosecute his Good Fortune any farther. Agathias tells us, that during the Reign of Justinian, the same was done by Belisarius; least the Greatness of his Victories, and the Acclamations of the Peo∣ple, should stir up the Hate of the Peers, and Envy of the Prince against him.
Truly such as these do not Mind their own Honor, and the Profit of the Prince, as they ought to do; but the fault is not so much in them, as in the Prince himself; And therefore it was, that Maecenas per∣swaded Augustus, not to Impute his Ill Successes to his Ministers, nor Envy their Prosperous Acti∣ons. For (saith he) many of them that Man∣age Publick Affairs, have done it very Negli∣gently, for fear of Envy choosing rather to hazard their Glory, than their Safety. Yet I do much more Approve their way, who to avoid Envy, what ever Great and Fortunate Acti∣ons they did, would needs Ascribe the Glo∣ry of it to the Prince, though absent. Agrip∣pa, Augustus his Son in Law, perswades us to Ʋndertake Great Adventures; but having performed them to Attribute the Glory of it to the Prince, as he himself was always wont to do.
So Joab besieging Rabatham, though he could, Refused to take it in, before David
himself came thither. Craterus, when the business of Artacena was to be Determined, waits for Alexander's coming; Julius Agri∣cola (as Tacitus Writes) never did Boast∣ingly Apply his Acts to his own Glory, but Cast all upon Fortune, as the Author and Guide of All he did, who was but her servant.
This Envy and Emulation, though they are diseases incident to the Generousest Princes (such as Philip and Alexander were) yet they are more Predominant and Malig∣nant in some, than others. Theodosius, the second Emperor of that Name, committed the charge of Building a Wall at Constan∣tinople from Sea to Sea unto Cyrus, which work he Effecting in Threescore days; This great Dispatch was so Grateful to the Peo∣ple, that they cryed out in the Streets, That Constantine built the City, and Cyrus had Restored it; which being heard by the Emperor, brought so great an Envy upon Cyrus, that he could not Expiate it any other way, but by putting on a Religious Habit.
He that hath to do with such Princes, is to Consider, That he Walks upon Ashes, under which Fire lies Concealed; and therefore must he still Examine their Inclinations with great Diligence, to the end, he may either Defend himself against them; or, if it fall out that he cannot, that he may have this satisfacti∣on of mind at least, That he hath done
his Duty, and all that in Prudence he ought.
How to Preserve our Favor and Office with the Succeeding Prince.
HE is deservedly to be remembred a∣mongst the Darlings of Fortune, whose Authority and Interest being great with one Prince, continues so with his Successor. It is truly a thing very Rare in Courts, be∣cause He that is to Succeed, is for the most part Suspected by the Present Prince; and therefore, they who Manage his Affairs, are necessitated to be Adverse unto the Heir Ap∣parent; from whence, commonly, Deadly Enmities arise. Besides this also, the Suc∣ceeding Prince hath, for the most part, Servants Known, and Endeared unto him, by a Long Fidelity, and Many Services; for whose Advancement to Dignity, that he may make way, he will Ordinarily, either of his own Accord, or by the Perswasion of those that desire to Succeed, lay aside the Servants of the Deceased Prince.
Yet there are some, whom either the State of Affairs, for which they are more Able,
and Apt than Others; or some other Dexterous Quality, and Taking Humor, doth so Insinuate them into the succeeding Prince, That one Prince Dying, they lose nothing thereby, but his Person. Macro, that he might ob∣tain Caligula his Favor, sets his own Wife Ennia upon him, to Inveigle him with Love, and Bind him in a Marriage. The same man Commanded Tiberius to be Smothered with Clothes, as he was Sick and Dying, as Taci∣tus affirms. Julian the Emperor retained Arbetio still, because he thought him Useful, although he hated him for his Pride, and Turbulent Disposition. And Valentinian, after him, Called the same Man unto him to Op∣pose against Procopius.
We have hitherto Handled onely such things as our Courtier, who will Enjoy the Prince's Favour, ought to Avoid; But the sum of all Counsels that can here be gi∣ven to him, is, A Modesty towards the Prince, such as becomes a Man, More Mind∣ful of his Duty, than of his Swelling Fortune; let him never Boast, nor do any thing Ir∣reverently; and as much as possibly he can, let him Avoid Envy; which hath been so Dreadful to many, and those Great Men, That Some of them with pretending a Love of Ease, others Imbracing a Retire∣ment to Study, have showed themselves A∣verse to Publick Affairs. Examples in both which cases, the Historians give us in Domi∣tian
and Galba. He must take heed, he pass not over Carelesly, either those Treacherous kind of Praises we spoke of before, nor the Slanders that are Cast upon him: They that Calumniate us, do say, That Either we are Wanting in some thing that is Necessary to serve the Prince Well; or else, That we Have Said, or Done Something, either Really, or Intentionally, to the Prejudice of Him, or His Service. As to the Defects Imputed unto us, we must either Modestly Excuse, and Ju∣stifie Our selves, or else Amend them; or last∣ly, Endeavor with some other Vertues to Recompense those Wants. Our Words and Acti∣ons ought to be so Moderated and Weighed, That they may not be Obnoxious to Ill In∣terpretations; we ought Always to Endea∣vor to Search into Other Mens Opinions, and Inclinations, before we Discover our Own; And if either by Chance or Negligence, any thing Slip from us, which may possibly Offend, we must, when we Reflect upon it, by some Re∣spective Means, or by some kind of Occasional Interpretation, amongst other Discourse, let them see, what we spoke was not with an Intention of Offending any body.
If we shall once Discover, that we are Calumniated by any one, we ought as little as may be, be Absent from the Prince, to whom we are Slandered; for besides that, Love abates towards those that are Absent, Detraction also in time takes Root, if it be not
Seasonably Contradicted with Truth; for a Jea∣lousie being once put into the Prince's Head, in Time, through the Many Suggestions of the Accuser, there being no body to Gainsay; takes such Footing at last, That oftentimes the Prince Hates the Person Accused, before he Examines the Crime.
He therefore that will Provide for his Safe∣ty, must Make himself at Court, one Friend or more, to Defend him in his Absence against the Dangerous Assaults of Calumny: But withal, he must take Care they be Persons of Condition and Honor, or at least, Men of Inte∣rest, and such as have Access to the Prince's Ear, as Readily as our Enemies. I confess, the Store of such Friends in Court, is but very Small, where it is the Usual Custom, almost amongst all, if not to Persecute their Companions themselves, at least to Suffer Them to be Oppressed by Others. But yet it hap∣pens sometimes, That there is One that ei∣ther out of Gratitude for Benefits Received, or With a Desire of Obliging us, or else out of Ha∣tred, Towards our Accusers, will Perform that Office.
Ostentation of the Prince's Favor to be Avoided: Something also Concerning our Friends and Fol∣lowers.
LEt our Courtier Avoid all Ostentation of the Prince's Favor, not onely to Avoid the Envy of the Rest of his Companions, but also of the Prince himself: For lately, when the Grandees of Spain went about to Sup∣plant Cardinal Spinosa, under Philip the Second, See with what a Wile they Circum∣vented him: They all Struck Sail to him, they all seemed to Acknowledge, that their Fortunes Depended upon His Favor; the very Domestick Servants of the King, shewed themselves very Obedient, and Ready at his Beck: Which when the Prince observed, he was removed from Court, and all that power and Greatness which he had Acquired, in less than Two years fell to Nothing.
Let therefore our Courtier learn to be Contented with a Modest Train of Attendants, and with a Rate of living rather Beneath the Dignity wherewith he is honoured by the Prince, than Above it; which he must be sure Never to exceed. It is Unseasonable to lessen your Attendants, when your Fortune is Declining. It availed Seneca nothing, after
he had lost Nero's Favor, to Hide himself in his Private House, and betake himself to his Studies, nor to Shut out Visitants with his Pretence of Want of Health. Neither did it Advantage Agricola a whit, to have Entred the City by Night, and with a Slender Compa∣ny of Followers: Wherefore it is necessary, That we put on a Face of Modesty Betimes, and Hold on So.
Yet although I would not have our Courtier be Besieged with too Great a Throng of Friends and Servants, I would not have him neglect to make Many Creatures and Followers; not to serve him in his Pomp, but to Support and Comfort him, if any Adversity should happen: For although an Adverse Fortune finds Few of these Prove Friends, yet there are, for the most part, Some among them, who will Endeavor to Shelter and As∣sist you; if not out of Friendship, yet out of Respect to their own Advantage, which they may well expect from the Restauration of your Fortune.
How to Manage and Dispense the Prince's Favor, Advices, and Comforts in Adversity, with o∣ther Rules.
BUt as it is a Great Content and Help in Adversity, to have Communicated your Prosperity Freely and Generously to many, in using the Favor of the Prince, to their Assistance and Advantage; so our Courtier is to be Warned, That he Warily and Indu∣striously Dispense These Benefits; for it is certain, That whatsoever the Prince shall at our Intreaty Do for any Man, a great part of it is by him Imputed, as Done to us. Where∣fore, unless the Prince's Favor towards us, be Very Large, we must not be too Prodigal of Sharing it amongst Others: And very sel∣dom must we Introduce, or Commend any unto the Prince, who are not, in some measure, Known unto him, as well as to Our selves, whose Deserts we ought first Carefully to look into, observing that saying of Horace,
Till thou art Certain what his Vertues be, In no Man's Praises be thou Over-free; Least he Transgress, and purchase Shame to thee.
Moreover, let those Favors also, which you Demand for any body from the Prince, be
Fit for the Person, and Suitable to the Times, Consistant also with the Dignity, and Emolu∣ment of the Prince; and lastly, such as you know have been Formerly Obtained by Others. If the Prince grants it, we must let him see we take it as a Great Favour done unto our selves; if he Refuse, we must take heed that he do not Perceive we are Offended.
That is also to be Observed here, which we have Touched upon before, That we must never Vainly make show of the Prince's Favour, nor give it out, That he is Governed by us; for we have told you before, how ill that succeeded with some. Princes what∣soever they do, desire to be thought to Do it of themselves, without the Help and Au∣thority of any others, especially their Sub∣jects.
If the Prince shall lay any Weighty Com∣mand upon us, we endeavour to have it in writing, and as Clearly Interpreted unto us, as is possible: We must not omit to Represent unto Him, such Difficulties before we Under∣take the Business, as we apprehend will Oc∣cur unto us in the Execution. If it be a thing Committed to us in Secresie, and Ʋnfit to be written, we are to Repeat the Commands Over and Over (yet without absurdity) in the Prince's Presence, to the end we may better understand the Intention of Him that Gives them, and also that he may not Forget what Orders he gave us.
We must also show our selves Ready for the Meanest Imployments the Prince will cast upon us; for many times a Small Matter is the occasion of a Great Fortune; and Prin∣ces would have their commands to be weigh∣ed not by the Importance of the Affair, but by the Greatness and Dignity of Him the Giver; being no less Incensed at our refusal of sleight Enterprises, than our Declining of Great and Hazardous Ʋndertakings, when Imposed by Him upon us. When we are Attending upon the Prince, we ought to watch Dili∣gently, that we be not Surprised nor Over∣whelmed with Sudden Commands; And to that end, always as much as may be, we ought to Ruminate before hand All things then afoot, and to Prepare our Mind and Understanding for whatever may come in Agitation. We must likewise take heed, that we Importune not the Prince with un∣seasonable nor Impertinent Discourses, but onely with what we both know to be cer∣tain, and judge to be Fit for him to Hear. When the Prince speaks we must appear Attentive not as if we Thought of Some∣thing else; not Sad, not Musing, least we should seem either to Sleight, or Dislike what he says.
If any one Disgusted, or Injured by the Prince, shall come and make his Complaint to us, we must let him see we are sorry for his Misfortune; Perswading him to Patience, and
Silence, and Encouraging him to Hope well; lessening the Injury, and Excusing the Prince. But with such as these, we must deal wari∣ly, for there are those that Counterfeit Wrongs and Discontents, to see if they can Draw any Testimony of an Ill will to the Prince out of us, that thence they may take an occasion to Ʋndo us: Others are Injured Indeed, but yet are Weak and Imprudent, not being able to Conceal what is out of Friendship Com∣municated to them in Secret.
If our Condition be such, that we keep a Train of Servants, we are to take great care that none of them speak Licentiously, either of the Prince, or his Favourites; for many times the Servant's Fault is cast upon the Master, from whom his Words and Acti∣ons are often thought to Proceed. A∣mongst the principal rules of a Courtier's Prudence, this is one, To Discover and Smell out betimes, the Change and Diminution of the Prince's Affection towards us, to the end, that the Knot of love between you, may rather be Gently untied, than cut in sunder. For so many times the Cause of our Distaste being Removed, or Worn way, there is sometimes an easie return for us unto our former Favour, especially, if we seem, ei∣ther not to Remember, or not to have Ʋnder∣stood the Injury.
How to Make a Judgment of the Constancy, or Change of the Prin∣ce's Affection to us.
TO the end our Courtier may judge of Constancy of the Prince's Favour towards him, It is not Enough that he know the Prince's Humor, with the Authority and Power, both of his Friends and Enemies in Court; but he must Principally weigh the Original Cause of the Prince's Love towards him: For, if That once Cease, or be found more Pre∣valent in Another, without doubt, the Af∣fection of the Prince will either wholly Cool, or at least be much Diminished.
Yet sometimes it is hard to Divine what is the Reason, that you are so Beloved; and truly, it is sometimes only a Fortu∣nate Felicity, for which no Reason can be given, though ordinarily the Prince's love arises, either out of Similitude of Dispositi∣on, out of the Pleasingness of your Humor and Manners, out of your Services Done him, or from your Vertue; or lastly, from your Obsequious Pliableness to his Will, That love which comes from the similitude or Takingness of your Manners, although it seem very Great for a Time, yet it wears out Soonest of all; both, because as we have said before
the Nature of man Changes daily with Age, or with Variety of Business; and also because it is Hard to find two Dispositions so Symphathizing together, as that they Differ in nothing; and many times that wherein they differ, is of more Power to Divide them, than all the rest to Unite them together.
Yet I know not what Star doth so Tune and Temper some men still to the Prince's Liking, and Disposition, that they can Hardly, if they would, do any Dissonant or Displeasing thing to him: And I do con∣fess, That these men may make the Best Harvest, with a Prince of all others; especi∣ally, if they know skilfully how to Choose and Use their Times and how to Take in their Sails seasonably before a Storm.
The Prince's favour to Women: In∣structions for the Prince's Mistres∣ses; Benefits Conferred on Prin∣ces, often Make Those Persons Hated by Them, with other Do∣cuments.
PRinces do sometimes also bestow this Favour on Women, according as they are
more or less Prone to Venereal Pleasures; but they also do frequently Fall from Fa∣vour, if not by their own Faults, yet out of the Prince's Satiety, or finding out a fairer Mistress. Wherefore, such Women as are Crafty, are wont to Divert Princes, as Much as may be, from all Commerce with other Women, especially such as may be likely to Intangle the Prince's Mind; some also, by Counterfeiting Dis∣dain, and Keeping State, have Preserved their Lover; and lastly, some more Auda∣cious and Bold, when they saw the Prince once Truly Love Them, have kept him still Drunk in Lust, and Drowned in Plea∣sure.
Which arts Poppaea Practised upon Nero: For when she saw that he was Enamoured of her becoming Proud, If she Entertained him a might or two, it was all she could Afford him, saying, She was a Married Wife, and could not Abandon her Husband Otho, who for his Parts and Be∣haviour Exceeded Nero: That in using a Bond∣slave for his Concubine, had learned nothing from that Servile Familiarity, but Baseness and Nigardice: Thus Tacitus reports her Dis∣courses, Annal. 13. And soon after, Annal. 14 the same Poppaea Despairing now of Marrying Nero, or of seeing him Divorced from Octavia, as long as Agrippina lived, sometimes Taunt∣ingly, and sometimes Merrily, began to Reproach the Prince, calling him a Ward, and Subject to
others Controulment; and said, he was so far from the Government of the Empire, That he Wanted his own Liberty. Some Princes Mi∣stresses have by this Means held their Af∣fections Faster, than by the Dallyings and Blandishments of Pleasure; yet, as I said before, there is no Constancy in this kind of Affection to be relied upon long.
Truly one would think that Love, which you have Gained by your services, should be Stable and more Firm, than what comes from Flattery or Pleasure, as arising out of an Honest Cause; and which being Cherished in you, is apt to stir up others to Me∣rit as well by Vertuous Ʋndertakings. Yet experience often Teaches us, that very Great Services have in Courts been the Ruine of those that have Performed them; by reason, that Princes are wont to Hate, whom they cannot Requite. They will not be Indebted to a Subject, and there∣fore do Fly the Sight of Those that have Exceeding well Deserved of Them, as if they did with their Looks Reproach them of Ingratitude; which is the Reason, why the Condition of such Men in Courts, is much to be Pitied; for when they have Obliged the Prince by any Service, they are Ashamed by and by, to ask a Reward, least they should seem not to have Given, but Sold the Benefit they did him; who in the mean time, as Princes are often Regardless of
the Service Received, and Slow to Reward, Draws out, day after day, till the Memory of the Benefit Wears out in the Minds of those that were Privy to it; whose Silent Reproaches he feared before.
Which some men observing, have judged it fit, to Strike the Iron whilst it was Hot; and when they were Designed for any Business to Look to their Reward, before they Ʋnder∣took the Imployment; knowing well that with Princes the hope of Future Services, is more Prevalent to Induce Reward, than the Memory of Those that are Past; and that it is Better to be Obliged to Princes than to have them Obliged to us; Be∣cause they believe, Whoever they have Obli∣ged, do wish well to them, whilst He that they are Indebted unto, because he is Believed not to Love the Prince that hath Denied him, what he Pretended unto is Recompensed onely with Hate. This Commines tells us, was Lewis the Eleventh his Opinion.
The love of Princes Towards the Mini∣sters of their Pleasure, would seem to be Sta∣ble; and Truly, it is of some Continuance, as long as the Inclinations of the Prince to Pleasure Continue; but those Changing, the Affections to those that Fed them, Change al∣so. Sometimes likewise, the Prince Inclining to the Love of Vertue, doth Reject and Abo∣minate Those that are Instruments of his
Pleasures. But as some of the Inclinations of Princes are more Durable than others, so also is their Favour (as I said) of a Propor∣tioned Continuance, towards the Servants of those Several Inclinations.
I Will not Touch here upon all Pleasures whereunto the Nature of the Prince is Prone, because All of them are not fit, or apt to have the Greatness of any mans Fortune built upon them. Those Passions that are of greatest sway in Princes Minds, and familiar unto them, are three, to wit, Wan∣ton Love, Cruelty, and Avarice: The first, as it is more Vehement than All the Rest, so it is More Ʋncertain, and Inconstant; for though the Vice still remains as to the Subject, yet it keeps not Fixed still upon the Same Object: ne∣vertheless, many have used this as a Founda∣tion, whereupon to Build their Fortunes, not sticking to Prostitute their Wives, so they might gain the Favour of the Prince; as we Read in Tacitus, that Otho did, although it
sell not out well with him; for Nero re∣moved him from Court, least he should have a Rival there.
Others that they might Bind their Prin∣ces unto Them, made themselves Witnesses and Companions of their Wickedness and Lusts by the Example of Tigellinus. These Men do not think that Princes have a Trick to Free themselves of Publique Blame and En∣vy, to sacrifice oftentimes such kind of men unto it. And all those Servants of their Lusts are to Expect the same fortune as hapned to Remirus de Orco, the Minister of Caesar Borgia his Cruelties; whom at last, Borgia caused to be Murthered, as Guilty of All the Ill that he had done.
And from the Example of this Remirus, we may also Read their Destiny, who serve the Prince in his Cruelties; for the Prince's Affection seldom endures towards them, both because he doth, as it were, daily read his Wickedness in seeing them, and also is Afraid of them, whom he knows so Apt to Villainy. Nero although hardned in Vice, and of a Cruel Nature, yet after his Mother's death Hated Anicetus, as one whose face Dai∣ly Reproached him with his Mother's murther.
The Affections of Avarice are least of all changeable; the diversity of the Object doth not vary in these as in those of Love; it is not Diminished, but Increases with Age; and
although it is as Hateful to the People, as Cruelty, yet it is Longer Endured, because it Covers and Cloaks all Exactions, under the pretence of Publick Necessity, Parsimony, and the Common good. Therefore, those that upon this score serve Princes, may long preserve themselves in their Favour, whilst (which is rare in these kind of men) they do not become Froward and Peevish, nor too much intend Enriching Themselves.
Frowardness, which for the most part is likewise Contumelious, begets Hatred both to the Prince, and to it self; The au∣thor of which, the Prince will at last cast away, to Remove the Envy of it from him∣self.
Riches are also obnoxious to Envy, not of the People onely, but sometimes of the Prince himself; who if he be Truly Avaritious, will hardly be Content, till he have Squeezed the Full Sponge, as we read that Vespasian was wont to do; but will rather Imitate the Country Clowns, who when they have Fatned their Hogs, do Kill and Devour them. Truly, France hath seen many such, who being Proud and Peevish, and who making too much Hast to be Rich, have thereby, and by their Insolence, from a great Height of Fortune, faln to Nothing.
In the time of Philip le Belle, Peter Ber∣chius, High Chamberlain, and Treasurer of France, was strangled at Paris; Lewis,
Philip's Son, afterward coming to the Crown, Enguerrandus Marigny met with the same Misfortune: Under Charles the Seventh, Gyacensis, in Dignity Equal to Berchias, was Brought to the Bar, and afterwards Sowed in a Sack, and Crowned; his Successor Ca∣enus Beaulieu was Killed at Poicters; and the Same End had come under Philip the First, to Peter Essart, if with an Hundred thousand Florins he had not Redeemed his Life.
I could Recount More nearer us, but that I am willing to spare their Memory: In the mean time these Examples are suffici∣ent to Instruct, That as the too Great Easi∣ness of these Ministers brings too Great a Detriment upon the Prince's Profit; so their Insolent Griping, and Frowardness, Draws Hate and Destruction upon themselves: And that as we ought not to Refuse a just occa∣sion of inriching our selves, so we must not show our selves too Greedy after Riches, nor Amass so much together, as may Expose us to the Publick Envy.
Concluding with Many, Choice, and Necessary Admonitions.
THere Remains onely now unhandled the last Cause, why Courtiers are Belo∣ved by their Princes; to wi••, An Aptness, and Singular Ability to Dispatch, and Manage their Affairs: For which reason, When we see that we are become Acceptable to the Prince, we must consider, Whether He Love this Aptness for business, because of the Ʋse∣fulness and necessity of it; or else, because the Prince desires to Acquire from us that Aptitude to Himself. If it be Grateful, be∣cause it is Necessary, his Favor to us will endure as Long as the Necessity Remains; but his Love; will rather be a Forced, than Voluntary Love.
If we see the Prince Aspire to the Glory of this Aptitude for business, there is no doubt, but when he sees, that he cannot Either Equal, or Excel us, we shall become an Eye-sore, and Ʋnacceptable to him; for there is in Princes an Innate Desire, as well as in all other Men, of Excelling All Persons in those Arts they Addict themselves unto; and therefore no Man, al∣most, is Pleased to be Excelled in them by his own Servant. Asinius Pollio, some Exhor∣ting him to make a Reply to those Verses
Augustus Caesar had made against him, An∣swered, That he would not, by Contending, to seem the Better Scribe, draw his Envy upon him, that had Power to Proscribe him. There Arising a Dispute once between Favorinus the Philosopher, and the Emperor Adrian, about some word, wherein the Philosopher at last seemed to yield; his Friends won∣dring at it, he said, I am not Ashamed to be Overcome in Knowledge by Him that Commands Thirty Legions.
To this Purpose, that Saying of Solomon is very Notorious, Do not Seem Wise before the King. It is necessary therefore, That whosoever desires to Purchase a Prince's Fa∣vor, must set aside the desire of his Own Glo∣ry; and not onely in Verbal Disputes, but in every thing else, yield him the day: And to that end, it will not be amiss, on purpose to Commit some Errors and Over-sights; so that they be not Two Gross, nor like to take too much from our Repute.
Out of our Discourse hitherto, it is evident, how little Certainty is in all the Greatness and Favor at Court; Where∣fore, the best Counsel that can be gi∣ven to all Courtiers, is; To Prepare Themselves for their Fall; for although it is Thought a more Generous Thing to Fight, than to Flie, when you are once en∣tred these lists; yet if you are to do it with Greater Hazard of Danger, than Hope of Success,
it is not Indiscreet to Sound a Retreat Be∣times, and, in Imitation of the Parthians, to Fight Flying.
As it is also a more Glorious thing to de∣scend gently by steps, and as it were, to go out at the Door, than to be Cast Headlong out at the Window; so it is less shameful, under Colour of some Specious and Contrived Pre∣tences, to bid Adieu to your Honors and Of∣fices, than to Expect to be Stript Disgraceful∣ly of them: And hereunto may fitly be ap∣plyed the saying of an ancient Roman.
Why dost thou Weary Tired Fortune so? Depart the Court, Before thou art Forc'd to go.
Seneca says, it is Happiness to Die in the Midst of your Felicity; but I on the other side think That Courtier happy, who in the Midst of his Prosperous Race Makes a Re∣treat. Perhaps he that shall do So, shall not be Applauded by all, but by some that look upon the Outsides of things, be Judged unworthy of the Fortune that he hath so a∣bandoned. Yet he that is wise, not Regard∣ing such Idle Discourses, will provide for his own Safety, and remember, that in all Games, it is Better to give over a winner, than a loser; as also, that no Prudent Man will exchange, or adventure Certain Things, for Things so Very Ʋncertain.
Though our Ascent to These Heights of Fortune and Dignities, is, as it were, by steps in order; yet our Descents, if not Timely fore∣seen, are for the most part Headlong, and Sudden: So that those that are Flourish∣ing in Favor and Authority, if they chance once to Slip, or Stumble, their Falls are com∣monly Desperate and Fatal.
Behold here the Compendium of All, that I desired to say, for our Courtiers Instructi∣on: Whether these Precepts be Pertinent, and Select or no, I will not Determine, but leave that to the Judgment and Experience of my Friends. For my own part, I confess, I have at present no Great Ʋse of them, and am so far from being Transported with Sad∣ness, at my Private and Retired Condition, that I do heartily say with Seneca;