Discourses upon the modern affairs of Europe tending to prove that the illustrious French monarchy may be reduced to terms of greater moderation.

DISCOƲRSES, &c.

Chap. I.

THe great thing which has disturbed the Peace of Europe, filled it with blood and slaughters, and shaken the dismembred Kingdoms and States thereof, has been the huge designe of the Universal Monarchy; a designe which (by a kind of Fascination) has possessed the Genius of the Spanish and French Monarchies, which therefore, in their turns, have been dangerous to all Europe. But the French have made nearer approaches to the Throne of such extended Empire then the Spaniards. Let us then look upon the means and advantages, the most Christian King has, to pursue so vast a designe, as if he would plow up the Air) To the end our minds may be stirred up, (if any thing will stir them: to raise up those Banks, which (under that Providence, to which, nothing is so high, to be above it; nothing so low, to be beneath it; nothing so large, but is bounded; nor, nothing so confused, but is ordered by it.) will circumscribe such wild and boundless ambition, within its own limits.

And for our incouragment, let us by the way, hear the judgment of that excellent Man, Sr. Walter Raliegh, in the case of the Spanish Mo∣narchy, which then was, what France now is, to the rest of Europe. His words are these. Since the fall of the Roman Empire (omitting that of the Germains, which had neither greatness nor continuance) there hath been no State fearful in the East, but that of the Turk; nor in the West any Prince that hath spred his Wings far over his nest, but the Spaniard; who since the time that Ferdinand expelled the Moores out of Granada, have made many attempts to make themselves Masters of all Europe. And it is true, that by the treasures of both Indies, and by the many Kingdoms which they possesse in Europe, they are at this day the most powerful. But as the Turk is now counterpoised by the Per∣sian, so instead of so many, millions as have been spent by the English, French, and Neatherlands in a defensive War, and in diversions against,

them, it is easie to demonstrate, that with the charge of two hundred thowsand pound; continued but for two yeares or three at the most, they may not only be perswaded to live in peace, but all their swelling and overflowing streams, may be brought back into their natural Chan∣nels and old Banks. But to go on.

France then is come to the greatest perfection in respect of Domestic Empire it is capable of. For 1. whereas heretofore the body of that Kingdom was not intire, but subject to several great Barons, who were able not only to expostulate, but to contend with the King, the are all brought now to a dependence on the Crown, and becom most obse∣quious to it. And besides, many of the richest and most potent of them are of the blood Royal; so that upon the failer of those who are before them, they, or their posteritie may succed to the Crown, which keeps them firm to it. 2. All those mighty members into which that King∣dom was formerly divided, are now annexed to the Crown: So that for largeness of Territory, and compacted and united strength, it is be∣com the most formidable Kingdom in all Europe. And as by the for∣mer of these, they have secured themselves against all intestine Wars, which many times through the interests and feuds of those Barons, shook the whole Frame of that Kingdom; So, by the latter, they have fenced themselves against all Forreign invasion. For heretofore all the neighbouring Princes were ready upon every occasion to invade the Kingdom of France, The Dukes of Burgundy, Britannie, Guienne or Flanders, being alwayes tempting them thereunto, and giving them ac∣cesse, passage, and reception. By this means England made two Con∣quests of France, and at other times forced them to buy Peace of them, and pay▪ them tribute. But now whosoever would invade that King∣dom, shall not only want these for their confederates to invite and assist them, but shall have them for their enemies. Thus far Machiavel has observed for substance. 3. By abrogating the Convention of Estates, that King has spoyled the people of that power and share in Govern∣ment, which they have originally had in all the mixt Monarchies of Eu∣rope, and made himself absolute even in the point of raising money, which is the blood that fils the veins of that mighty Body. By this mea∣nes he has changed the constitution of that Kingdom, from mixed to absolute Monarchy for the kind of it; which is the Form that inables a

Prince to do most mischief bot at home and abroad. 4. Buth that which is the Crown of this perfection, and may be the strongest stay of it, is the Naval force now added to the other strengths of that powerful Monar∣chy, wherein it now equals, if it be not an overballance to, either England or Holland. For this is a maxim; That the power of a Prince whose Dominions border on the Sea, cannot be perfect without a force in Shipping able to command the Sea. Wherefore in my opinion (which nevertheless is exceeding weak) one of the greatest mischiefs this War has produced, is, That it has given occasion to France to becom mighty in Naval power. And that mischief can never better be demonstrated then by this consideration: That there was never before any example upon Earth of a Triumvirate of mighty Nations in a vicinity of neigh∣bourhood one to another, and bordering upon the same Seas, equally powerful in Naval strength. The consequence of which must of necessi∣ty in time to com, be, a perpetual emulation and jealousy, greater, by how much either an Union or division of three is more perfect then of any other number. Whereby it must necessarily com to pass, either that som two of the three shall alternatly, or by turns fight against the third; Or that two of the three shall agree to extinguish the power of the third, that themselves may remain in indifferent terms, without jealousy one of another. It is now long since France wanted but one of three things to help them to drive on that huge designe of ambition for the univer∣sal Monarchy, which has so long swelled their hearts. To bring Holland under a kind of feudal protection of that Crown, by which means they might serve themselves of their Ships and Seamen: Or to make themselves masters of the Spanish Netherlands: Or lastly to grow great in Naval strength at home. For France has been dangerous enough to the rest of Europe, whilst they were in a manner without shipping: Insomuch that those two things were observed of them in the time of Queen Eli∣zabeth; That France could never abstain from War for above two or three years together; And that they could never be poor. 5. and lastly, To all these may be added the new Conquests and acquisitions of the French. But nevertheles it may be doubted, whether that Monar∣chy has received any real accession of strength by those Conquests, in case it should com to feel the shock of a powerful and vigorous Enemy. It is true indeed (what Machiavel has said) That the Conquests of Com∣mon,

wealths that are ill Governed, and contrary to the Model of the "Romans, do conduce more to the ruin, then advancement of their af∣fairs. But when we shall a little penetrate (what he elswhere sayes) That when we have observed the Histories of former times, we shall find, that Common-wealths had generally but three wayes of enlarging their Empire. One is that which was observed by the Tuscans of old, who entered into a League of Confederacy with several other Common-wealths, with condition of equality, that no particular should have any degree or authority above the rest, and that comprehension should be lest for all their new Conquests to com in, not much unlike the practice of the Switzers and the Hollanders of late, and the Achaians and Aeto∣lians of old. Another way of extending your Empire, is, by associating with several Cities, but so, as that the dignitie of the Command, the seat of the Empire, and the honour of the enterprise may remain with you, which was the way observed by the Romans, and it was pe∣culiar to them; no other people has observed it, and certainly no bet∣ter is to be found. The third is the way of the Spartans, and Athenians, who entertained no Confederates, but whatever Territories they con∣quered, they annexed them to their own. Which way is undoubtedly the worst of the three, as appeared by the two said Republicks, who were ruined upon no other accompt, but because they had grasped more Dominion then they were able to hold. I say, these things distinctly considered, and the last way being that which the French practice in their Conquests, it makes the doubt yet greater.

From that of the State, if we descend to the consideration of the person of the King, it gives us these two momentuous Observations. 1. It shewes us how necessary a thing it is for a Prince that would either defend or enlarge his State, to excel in practical Wisdom, which con∣sists in application, conduct and pursuit. For by that meanes he shall alwayes be served of wise and excellent men. For it ever was, and ever will be true; as the Prince himself is, so are his Counsel, and those that are about him. A weak Prince will never endure wise men; nor can wise men ever be safe under an inadvertent Prince. And it gives him mighty advantages over the Princes and States that are about him; especially if their administrations be slow, weak, and re∣miss. And it is commonly seen when a great man rises in the World,

either that he is alone, or that the magnificence of his actions swallow up the weaker efforts of others, as the Sea does the Rivers. And se∣condly, That when a wise and Martial Prince rises, and is succeeded by one or two Princes of equal condition to himself, without a pusillani∣mous interposed, they may do very great things in the world; since the succession of two such Princes alone, Philip, and Alexander, in the King∣dom of Macedon was sufficient to Conquer the World. I conclude therefore, That if the present King of France should be succeeded by a Prince of equal Vertue to himself, they would swallow up the greatest part of Europe. But because the great things of a Monarchy begin and end with one or a few Princes; and it is rarely seen, that three suffici∣ent Princes immediately succeed one another, without some effeminate or ill-consulted Prince between, I am of opinion, that Monarchy will sink with its own weight.

Now having taken a view of the force and strength of this Monar∣chy, and the sufficiency of her present King, let us next consider what their next attempts are like to be. In general they will do these two things, What they begun by War, they will pursue in Peace: for they had no other design in making Peace, than to disarm their Enemies, break their Confederation, and hinder England, from com∣ing into it, that they might insult over the world, by a Peace more ty∣rannical than the War of a Gallant Enemy. And then when the injur'd World can bear their insolencies no longer, out of the elements of this Peace they will raise up a new War. For that Prince that would make great Conquests, must make short Wars, and renew them often. Holland they will not attaqne, at least not this year, for two important reasons. Because Flanders lies between that and France. And be∣sides, they will go as softly as they can, till towards the latter end of the Summer, for fear of awaking them out of that sleep, their wasted Spi∣rits, and trading Humour have cast them into. And England their stomacks do not serve them to meddle with. For though it be true that whosoever he be, that shall attempt to set up an Universal Monarchy in Europe, will first or last find England the strongest bar in the way; I say England, which is not only the strongest, but now the only strong Kingdom that is in Europe, next to France. And therefore Philip II. of Spain, after al his vain attempts and pursuit, turned himself upon

England; in which though he miscarried, yet he maintained a long War in Ireland. Yet the French will think to serve themselves of the supine negligence of England, and still hope that they may have Proro∣gations therefor their mony, till they have ••ate•• up the rest of Europe, as they eat bread. And besides, they wi•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a better way to distress England, and more effectual than by any point blanck attaque which they can make upon it, as we shall see anon: Lastly, there is yet one very important reason, and that is, they are afraid of England; and tru∣ly, if God had not placed in man the irascible affection of fear, he would be much a wilder creature than he is. But lest the truth of this should be doubted; it will not be amiss to call a Foreign Witness, and that is Machiavel, whose own words are;

The French are in great fear of the English, for the great inroads and devastations which they have made anciently in that Kingdom; insomuch that among the com∣mon people the name of English is terrible to this day: But he adds, There was not then the same reason for it.

it is true, there are not so strong reasons why they should fear us so much now, as they did for∣merly, our advantages which we had over that Kingdom being most of them soft, and that Monarchy come to its full strength, and the greatest perfection it is ever like to see. And yet there be very strong reasons why they should yet fear us, and if they do not apprehend them, it is no bo∣dies fault but our own. And I say, that both the Spanish and French Monarchies inherit such a remembrance of the English as the Romans did of Hannibal. Nay, I think it may be truly affirmed, That France is more afraid of the Parliament of England (that is, the King and the Estates of Parliament, for they are all comprehended under the word Parliament) than of any one, if not of all the Princes and States of Eu∣rope.

But if France will do neither of these, what is it then that they will do? I answer, We must not take our measures by those reports they cause to be given out up and down the world, to cast a mist before the eyes of their Neighbour-Princes and States as Jugglers do; nor when they seem to look far abroad must we regard it; but consider by the ex∣act Rules of Prudence, what is sit for them to do, and what we our selves would do, were we in their case. I say then, that the greatest and wisest thing which France can do next, is to make himself master of the residue

of the Spanish Netherlands, and particularly to seize upon Ostend and Newport. And when he has don that, to turn his whole force upon the Empire, not omitting in the meane time to attempt all that he can do there, as well to amuze and divert them, as to open his way to the com∣pleat Conquest of that branch of the miserable house of Austria.

To demonstrate this, I know no better way, then a little to consider, and discourse upon the consequences of this, with respect unto England and Holland. For England. If the French be permitted to become ma∣sters of the Spanish Netherlands, and to possess Ostend and Niewport, then England will not only not have a footing on the Main, but all the Sea-coast opposite to the whole body of it will be in the hands of the French, always Enemies to England in Interest and Humour. And if he pleases to look over the Sea, he may seize upon Ireland when he plea∣ses, which will always lie open to him, and where he will find Papists enough to entertain and joyn with him. And let it be remembred, that Ireland is in a manner already cut off from England by the Irish Act. And what would England then be, but an Island hemm'd in by the Sea, and their Enemy its master, and shut out of the world? By this means they will be precluded from sending any succours to the rescue or relief of those Provinces. And by this means also it must necessarily come to pass (which is worst of all) that England must lose both the Dominion of the Sea, and their Trade; and in time will not be able either to build or sail Ships out of their own Ports, without the License of France, And so will be in a fair way to become a Feudal Province of France. And thus we see England may be distressed without warring directly upon it. It is the greatest blemish in the Reign of Henry the Seventh, (celebrated in our Histories for one of the wisest of all our Princes) that he suffered Britany to be lost, and annexed to the Crown of France; a soul spot in so beautiful a Picture, as he is taken by the Pencil of my Lord Bacon. And the more I think of these things, the more I am confirmed, that we shall stir up the just indignation of those that are to come after us, against our memories; and it will be the wonder of succeeding Genera∣tions, that so great a King as the King of England; in a War that had for its ends an Universal Monarchy for the most Christian King, and the subversion of the Protestant Religion and Interest; The one as foolish and impossible to be effected, as the other is full of monstrous and de∣testable

impiety towards God, And to which ends our Enemies have been travelling through a Sea of Blood, and all those crooked ways the first attempter against God, beat out to those that travel with Pride, Am∣bition, and Impiety: I say, that such a King, in such a War, and such a Peace as followed it, should sit still, and suffer himself to be (as it were) besieged in his own Kingdom, whilst he suffered France, not only to grow to an over-ballance to England in Naval force, but to plant himself all along on the opposite shore of the main Continent, and in the mean time to suffer the greatest part of Europe to be consumed with the flames of an unjust War, and be sacrificed to the ambition of France. An ag∣gravation greater, by how much England has been famous for holding and casting the Ballance of Europe, and protection of the Protestant Religion. Since therefore it is a royal vertue in Kings, not only to avoid Flatterrers as a Pest, but to encourage some body to tell them the truth roundly, still preserving the dignity of their persons, and the majesty of their state; I think a man cannot do better than to bring things home to them: for if Princes would but a little reflect, and look back upon the times past, where they might see the beauty that is upon the memo∣ry of good Princes, and the deformity of that of the bad, they would see the excellency of plain dealing, and the odiousness of pernicious flattery.

For Holland. It will be enough to say, That if they suffer the Spa∣nish Netherlands to be lost, France will not only claim, by a Title prior to theirs, all the Conquests and Dominions of this State in Flanders and Brabant, but may set up the Title of the House of Burgundy to the whole Seventeen Provinces: and finally, that they will have a very bad Neighbour.

I conclude therefore, That it is the interest of England and Holland, by all means, not only to preserve the rest of the Spanish Netherlands from falling into the hands of France, but to make him vomit up what he has already swallowed of them. For besides what I have already said, If France once becomes master of those Provinces, Holland and the rest of the Provinces of the League will become an easie and cheap prey to him, which concerns England not a little in point of Interest. And to keep those Netherlands in the hands of Spain, is, (I think) more the advantage of England and Holland, than it is of Spain it self.

For of Spain we are secure, because he is weak, at that distance, and nei∣ther will, nor can incroach upon his Neighbours: and so we preserve the greatest Bank of security to both, against the Inundations of France.

To conclude this part. For the most Christian King, we are no doubt to look upon him as the minister of Gods indignation, howbeit he mean∣eth not so, but has done all these things in pride and cruelty, and attri∣buted their success to his strength and wisdom: For the power both of Satan and wicked Kings is from God, but the will and malice is their own. Therefore the French King has made use of all these powers and advantages to do evil; evil I say, than which the most merciless Ty∣rants, and destroyers of the earth (whom God has said he will destroy) have not in any the most barbarous age of the world, committed greater, or more crying to the righteous God for vengeance. And a Prince affe∣cted with so vast and wild ambition, is to be looked on as an enemy to mankind, as a proud attempter to destroy the bounds which God has set. And therefore if so excellent hope, that God will stop the way against our enemies, if we return to him; if the preservation of the true Re∣ligion; the liberties of our Countreys; the great interests of mankind; or whatsoever other excellent consideration we can propose to our minds will move us, let us behave our selves like men, and do some great thing worthy our remembrance.

And this brings me to the second part of my discourse. In the first we have seen the mischiefs, let us now consider of the remedies.

Now because there is no separate Kingdom or State in Europe suffici∣cient to ballance the weighty Body of the French Monarchy, nor any of their strengths in disjunction, competent to be opposed against so for∣midable force; therefore there must be a new fond of Power and Inte∣rest raised up, sufficient to keep the ballance of Europe from being called back into a Chaos, out of which the French may form an Universal Mo∣narchy, according to the Idea they have conceived thereof.

And this can by no means better be done than by England and the United Provinces, entring into a new League, for the mutual and reci∣procal defence of themselves, and their Confederates, that shall be ad∣mitted into such League, and for preservation and defence of the Spa∣nish Netherlands; and for restraining the further growth and increase of the French Monarchy, and hindering their incroachments upon the rest

of Europe. The excellency of which League will appear by this; That the ends of it are in a manner common to all Europe: For though the preservation of the Protestant Religion be most the concernment of England and Holland, yet the special and immediate end of the preserva∣tion of Flanders, and the general end of holding the Ballance of Europe is Universal.

Upon occasion of the beginning of the War between the Latins and the Romans, Machiavil has delivered this Rule;

That in all Con∣sultations, it is best to come immediately to the point in question, and bring things to a result, without too tedious a hesitation and suspence.

And the reason of this is founded upon divers observations which he ga∣thers out of several parts of the Roman Story: as,

That weak Com∣monwealths are generally irresolute, and ill-advised, as taking their measures more from necessity than election: That 'tis the property of weak States to do every thing amiss, rnd never to do well but in spight of their teeths; for there is no such thing as prudence amongst them: That weak and irresolute States, do seldom take good Counsels, unless they be forced; for their weakness suffers them not to deliberate, where any thing is doubtful; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent necessity, they never come to a resolution, but are always in suspence: And that it is a fault peculiar to all weak and improvident Princes and Governments to be slow and tedious, as well as uncertain in their Coun∣sels, which is as dangerous as the other.

With divers more of the like nature. Wherefore thete may seem to be but one thing that may per∣plex us, and that is, Whether this course may sort to the nature of the times and our circumstances? Touching this point the same Author gives this Rule,

That the occasion of every mans good or bad fortune con∣sists in his correspondence & accommodation with the times.

The wary course that Fabius took against Hannibal was good, because the times and the condition of the Romans suited to it: But had the same course been holden on when Scipio undertook the War, Hannibal might have staid in Italy; but the times being changed, they also altered the me∣thod of the War. And it is certainly true, That to every purpose there is a time and a judgment, therefore the misery of man is great upon him, because the time is hard to be discerned: for, if the time be missed, things cannot succeed: for man knoweth not his time. If a man chuses a wrong

time, he may labour and travel, not only in vain as to the issues designed, but may bring forth his own destruction; for the universal influence and concourse of the first Providence is wanting. But when we shall se∣riously consider, that there is no other way left; that the French King will neither be quiet himself, nor let any body else alone; and that we must either throw up the Cudgels, and let him domineer as he pleases, or do something that may either deter him from attempting further, or if he does, may shew him there is as good iron in the world as any he has in France. I say, things being thus, I can foresee no objection of weight against the proposition. That State that will defend it self, must be in a condition to offend its enemies. And so long as this State shall give oc∣casion to France to apprehend that they are afraid of him, he will use them as Dogs.

Therefore since this is like to be a League of as great importance as has been made in the world a good while, to render the same secure to the parties; to add majesty and grandeur to it; to render it more sacred; and to give it weight and reputation in the world; it will be necessary, that the same be approved, ratified, and confirmed both by the Parlia∣ment of England, and the General Estates of the Seven Provinces, in an extraordinary Assembly. I confess the thing is both very extraordinary and magnificent, and will make the times famous. But the arguments that inforce the necessity thereof are irrefragible; the demonstration whereof I shall leave this whole discourse, and the dignity and weight of the matters themselves, to give evidence unto: and shall say no more in this place, Than that there is nothing that Princes and States may more justly value themselves upon, than Faith and Sincerity, in their Leagues, and Treaties, and Negotiations with other Princes and States: and insincerity or Stare-hypocrisie less becomes the majesty of State, than it does private persons in moral and civil actions.

But before we go any further, it will be but necessary to answer an Objection that may be made on the part of England, and that is, That to confirm a League by the Parliament, will weaken the Kings Preroga∣tive. To which I answer 1. Ad hominem; That which has been don in the time of former Kings, and those the greatest and wisest of our Princes, and did not lessen their Prerogative; may be don again without weakening the Prerogative of the present King. But this thing has been

often don in former Parliaments, as our Rolles of Parliament, Records, Law Books and Histories shew. But I shall content my self to name two or three of the most Principal, as sufficient.

A League and Alliance was made between King Henry 5. his Heires and Successors, and Sigismond King of the Romans his Heires and Suc∣cessors Kings of the Romans, and was confirmed by Act of Parliament. Coke Inst, pars 4.156. Rot. Parl. 4. H. 5. N^o. 14.

That illustrious Peace, 9. H. 5. made between Charles the 6. of France, and the said Henry 5. of England (who was the very Alexander of the Kings of England for magnificence) by which the King of England had confirmed to him the Regency of the Kingdom of France during the life of Charles, and the succession of the Crown after his death, was ratified by the three Estates of France, and sworn to by the King of England in Parliament, and by the same Parliament ratified.

And 11. Henry 7. the same case happened again. The three States of the Kingdom joyned with the King in the ratification of a Peace with France in the same manner. This King was a Prince of great wisdom and sufficiency (as I said before); He invaded France with a Royal Army, made them buy a Peace of him, and pay him Tribute, which continued yet in the times of Henry 8. his Son; nevertheless he ratified a Peace by the Parliament. So you see two Kings, one the greatest Conqueror, as the other was the greatest Polititian of the Kings of England, ratifying their Leagues (which nevertheless they purchased with their own swords) by Parliaments.

And so sacred were our Leagues and Truces held to be in those times, that 2. H. 5. c. 6. It was enacted by Parliament, That the breaking of Truces should be High Treason in the subjects of England.

But 2. I answer ad Rem; It is said the Kings Prerogative is to make War and Peace. If the King then make a League, and the Parliament confirm that League, it is so far from lessening that it confirms that Au∣thority.

That there must be a New League, and that it must have not only more, but larger dimensions, then the present League in being, is evi∣dent: Because the House of Commons in the late long Parliament voted, That the League offensive and defensive, between his Majestie and this State, is not according to their Advices given to his Majestie,

nor pursuant to the ends by them proposed. Which vote has blasted the present League: And if you should call twenty Parliaments, they would all be of the same opinion.

And because all humane Providence is short-sighted, there may be a provisional clause added; That where the ordinary provisions and re∣medies of this League shall fall short or disproportionate, the Parlia∣ment shall be called to deliberate of supplemental complements of pro∣visions, that may be adequate to the force that shall attacq the League; which will yet add both strength and reputation to it.

But not to enter into Common-place discourses, I will insist upon but one thing more in this place, and it is this: There is a Rule which Machiavel has observed, That the best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and powerful State, is to preclude and stop up those wayes by which he would come to his greatness: and that there is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-bite the designes of such, then to take the same ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them. Now then, I think it would be of great advantage to this League (as every body may easily apprehend) to put Ostend and Neuport into the hands of England. And if Spain will suffer themselves to hear reason, and be persuaded to do it, I am without all doubts, a way may be found how they may do it with infallible security to themselves, of having the said places restored to them, so that their end may be obtained, and their hazard prevented.

Having now spoken to that part of the Parliaments confirmation, I shall discourse, and that very briefly, the other part of the ratification by the General Estates; and the more willingly, because I think it may import this State in a double respect. And I have conceived it thus. The prescien••e, predetermination and concourse of God, none denies, tho all have not conceived of them in the same modus. But the Politi∣tian has said, That 'tis a certain truth, that the things of this world are determined, and a set time appointed for their duration; but those run throw the whole course which is assigned them by their Stars, who keep their body in such Order, that it may not alter at all, or if it does, it is for the better. And the way to preserve such Bodies (mixt bodies, he speaks of, as Common-wealths) is renovation: for no mere bodies are of long duration, unless they be often renewed; and the way be renew

them is to reduce them to their first principles; and they are reduced partly by external accident, and partly by internal prudence. Those alterations are therefore salutiferous, which reduce them towards their principles. But my designe is not to enter into the common-place of renovation, therefore I go on. And since it is in the nature of all things to decline, and tend to depravation; It is the wisdom of Governments to look often back to their first constitutions, which are the very Formalis Ratio, and Fundamental Laws of their Governments. Therefore let the General Estates of the seaven Provinces be summoned to meet in the great Zael in the Hage, to these two general ends. 1. To renew their Com∣mon-League among themselves, which will have these two admirable effects: First to cure their internal disease, and especially that kind of Politic Paralysis of the two Provinces of Groeningen and Friesland, which tends to mutulation. Secondly to restore a kind of new life and vigour to their Government. No Government can live, that has not extraor∣dinary remedies to have recource to in extraordinary cases: Rome had its Dictators, which kept it in health; and England has its Parliament, without which its Government could not stand. For this cause has our Parliaments so often renewed our Magna Charta; neare forty times. And 2. to ratifie this League with England: For as the first defends them against internal diseases; So this against external Force; the two discases of which all Governments die. And this will also give reputa∣tion abroad to the States thus recreated and fenced. And if there be any other Argument necessary to inforce the proposition, it may be drawn from the nature of the Government it self. There are in Story and Po∣litiks, but three Divisions of Common-wealths. First, They are either Single, as Athens, Lacedemons, &c. Or by Leagues, as the Achaians, Aetolians, Switz, and the States. Secondly they are divided, into such as are for preservation, as Lacedemon and Venice; or for encrease, as Athens and Rome. Or thirdly, Into Equal and unequal in Libration. This is a a Government of a League, and for preservation only, and very unequal; which whosoever shall thorowly penetrate, shall find cause to apprehend the weight of this proposition: for such another War would shake the States in pieces. And there are but one of three wayes for them; War; Submission to France; or a League with England.

And if there were time, I think a man should not feare to want either

matter or words, to set home the Argument. They are now but newly delivered from the most dangerous Crisis that ever their State passed un∣der since its first formation; wherein they have laboured under, not only very dangerous domestic Convulsions, but the powerful assaults of Forreign force. And therefore what Phisitian that is not a Mounte∣bank, would not prescribe some potent restorative in such case?

I have now but two things to do, to finish this second part of my dis∣cours. The one is to set down some the just praises of the English Na∣tion, to the end these people may be moved to rely upon their friend∣ship with the greater confidence. And I would have don it elabouratly, but that my discourse has already drawn it self out to so great a length. The other is, The admirable effect that will be produced by oposeing the English courage to the French fierceness. Let us then but run them over.

The English have alwayes been sincere in their Leagues, Alliances, and Treaties. I know presently what will be cast in our teeth, and that is the infamous breach of the Triple League. But as he shall alwayes be very far from making a true judgment, that shall determin upon one or a few single actions; so nothing can be more injurious then to impeach the Faith of a gallant Nation, for that which no body have regreted more then themselves. The Philosopher has said, that actions denomi∣nate not the subject to be such. And it is true in Divinity, That a man is not to be júdged by a few, or many single actions; but by the course and tenor of his life. I say then, that the excellent virtue of faithfulness, has been the general tenor of the English in all times. Let not so foul an in∣dignitie therefore be charged on them; but let the crime lye at the doors of those few men who were the Authors and Counselors of it. And in the mean time I will comfort my self with this hope, that when the San∣ction of our Parliament shall come to be put upon this League, his Ma∣jestie and the whole Nation with him, will be restored to the good opi∣nion of all whose interest it is not to believe lies. And let me say this, that I have not found in Story any nation to be preferr'd to them for the above mentioned excellent qualitie; wherein I may affirm that they have exceeded the Romans themselves: For the Romans passionatly affecting an Universal Soveraigntie and Dominion, were not seldom constrained shamefully to prevaricate, to make strained constructions

of their Leagues, to violate their Faith, and to pass over all whatsoever respects of honour, to travel to the ends of their ambition. Whereas the English never can have any interest to propogate their Empire upon the body of Europe beyond those bounds, which God by nature (his instru∣ment) prescribed to them: The most they pretend to is, to be Arbiters be∣tween the Princes and States of Europe, as we may see in the example of Henry 8. who living in an active time, when three such great spirited Princes met, as himself, Charles V. and Frances I. of France, might have made his own markets; yet sought no more than to keep the Ballance equal between those two. England then, in Peace, has been famous for the excellent vertue of loyalty and faithfulness: and in all times for keeping close to that righteous Maxim of holding the Ballance of Eu∣rope steady a Maxim they took up above six hundred years ago. In War they have been renowned for their courage, redoubted strength, and great atchievements. In a word, in War they have been just, as well as valiant; in Peace kind, and in both sincere. And for the profes∣sion of the true Religion (without which all other things are either no∣thing, or as good as nothing) they have been celebrated above all the Na∣tions of Europe. It began there early, and continued in the worst of times: and since the Reformation, her Divines has been the most lear∣ned and pious of the Christian world; as all Forreign Divines will be ready to testifie. These methinks should be powerful encouragements to this State to joyn with England. England, in whom the publick ver∣tue of true meaning, is inherent: from whom both in Peace and War we may expect not only Justice, but even generous goodness (to allude to the most ancient distinction of the Jews:) and who against all other Na∣tions are zealous against Popery.

But that it may appear we do not lay our stress upon general and rhe∣torical discourses, there are other considerations of a more particular na∣ture, which must not be passed over. England has been the principal in∣strument of saving this State twice from destruction; once in the Infan∣cy of their Common-wealth, in the time of Queen Elizabeth, against the Spaniard; and now again in the late War, from the French. Again, nothing can secure this State for the future, against the mischiefs impend∣ing from France, but the friendship of England. And that England, in conjunction with this State, is able to ballance the French Monarchy, I

shall thus demonstrate. France is larger than England, but England will always afford more Souldiers than France, I mean Foot: and the strength of all Armies consists in the Infantry. The reasons of this are these two. 1. The division of the people. In France, and generally in all other Countreys, there are but two divisions of the people, the Nobless and the Peasants; but in England we have three. 1. The Nobless, that is the Nobility and Gentry, competent to furnish a sufficient Cavalry. 2. The Yeomanry, or middle sort of people, which make up the great Body of the Kingdom, and who are sufficient to furnish the greatest and strongest In∣fantry of any Kingdom or State in the Christian world. And 3. the in∣ferior sort or Servants; I mean such as work for day-wages, which are very inconsiderable in number to the Yeomanry. The division of the people is one of the principal foundations of Empire: and the division of the people in England, being the best and most perfect of any other in all Europe, it must necessarily follow, that England is capable to endure stronger shocks than any other Kingdom or State, founded upon the same ballance of Government, and is the most perfect Government of its kind in Europe. 2. In England, the People, that is, the inferior Gen∣try and Yeomanry are an over-ballance, both to the King, Nobility, and Church, which is a defect in Monarchy, and tends to the generation of a Commonwealth. In France and Spain, the King and the Nobility have destroyed the People; but in England the King and the People have de∣stroyed the Nobility. I say then the strength of the Kingdom of Eng∣land is in the inferior Gentry and Yeomanry, and these exceeding all other Kingdoms in number, strength, and courage, it must needs follow if the business should come to be tried, where blows must decide, that England would be found an over-match even to France it self, if Demon∣stration be Demonstration. But the cause and occasion how these two things come to be so, that is, why the Nobility of England are so depres∣sed, and the people become so formidable; as you may see they are, if you look but upon the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, in our present Parliaments. I say, the cause is, those popular Statutes of Population, against retainers of the Nobility, and for Alienations of their Lands, made by Henry 7. (the Romulus of the English Kings) which shews the unwariness of that politick King, who in seeking to cure that dangerous flaw in the Government, of the Nobilities being an over-match

to the Prince, made a far greater, of making the Commons formidable: for the one strikes only at a King they dislike, the other at the Throne it self; although it be true those effects came not to manifest themselves, till above one hundred years after his death. Therefore a wise Prince in∣deed he was, but not long-sighted.

To the second. The French have beaten and baffled the greatest part of the Christian world without fighting, and have oppressed them at their own charge. But if ever they should come to deal with an Enemy that would force them to fight, they would shew themselves to be Frenchmen, that is, would suffer themselves to be perswaded to submit to more reasonable terms.

If you look upon the carriage of this whole War, you may presently see, that the wisest thing which the French thought they could do, was ever to avoid fighting, supposing surely, that therein they imitated the wisdom of Fabius Maximus. But this is most certain (as the discour∣ses upon Livy proves) That a General who desires to keep the Field, can∣not avoid fighting when the Enemy presses, and makes it his business to engage him. For in such case there are but one of three ways. The first is the way of Fabius, of standing upon your guard, and keeping your Army in places of Advantage, and this is laudable and good, when your Army is so strong that the Enemy dares not attaque you, as it was in the case of Fabius and Hannibal: for if Hannibal had advanced, Fabius would have kept his ground and engaged him. The second way to avoid fighting, if your Enemy will needs attaque you, is flying, and fight or fly you must. Philip of Macedon being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to come to a Battel; and to avoid it, he took the way of Fabius, en∣camped his Army upon the top of a Mountain, and intrenched himself so strongly, that he believed the Romans durst not have ventured to come at him. But alas, the Romans were another kind of Enemy, they not on∣ly adventured, but removed him from his Mountain, and forced him to fly with the greatest part of his Army; and had it not been for the un∣passableness of the Country which hindred the pursuit, the Macedonians had all been cut off. The French were strongly encamped at St. Dennis, and did not at all believe that the Prince of Orange would attaque them, and yet for all their confidence, they could find no other remedy than to betake themselves to their heels. And this was the greatest and most fa∣mous

action of the whole War. The third way to avoid fighting, is to shut your self up in some strong Town, which is the most pernicious way of all, as making your ruine inevitable. Therefore (as Machiavel says) to keep the Field, and avoid fighting, is to be done no way so se∣curely as by keeping fifty miles off, and sending out store of Spies and Scouts that may give you notice of the Enemies approach, and oppor∣tunity to retreat.

Nor is it necessary to do all this, that your Army should be very nu∣merous. The Romans and the Greeks always carried on their Wars with a few men, depending more upon their great order and the excellence of their Discipline, than great numbers; but the Eastern and Western Na∣tions did all by their multitudes. Alexander conquered the world with 30000. men. Pyrrhus was wont to say that with 15000. men he would go through the world. And yet Pyrrhus fought against the Romans, and beat them in two Battels, and was in the judgment of Hannibal himself, one of the greatest Captains of the world. The ordinary Roman Army consisted of about 24000. men, and if they were at any time overpressed with numbers, they exceeded not 50000. with which number at one time they opposed 200000. Gauls, or, if you will, call them French∣men.

There are two Nations whose genius resembles that of the ancient Romans, the Germans and the English, who are descended from them. But there are these two differences between them: The Germans you shall never bring up to make a point blank attaque in the mouth of Can∣nons, in such fashion as the English; nor again after a rout shall you hardly make them rally, as you may the English. From all these things I make this conclusion, That if the French renew the War again, the best way will be to oppose them with an Army of English, and by all means to force them to fight continually, till the Field be too hot for them, and when they can keep that no longer, their Towns will be of little service to them. The English have fought many Battels with the French, and always beaten them; and yet the French have exceeded them much in numbers: as in the memorable Battel of Poictiers, where the English were but about 8000. and the French were 60000.

And thus I come to the third and last part of my Discourse, the office whereof is to dispose into method, such arguments as will be necessary to

be used to the several parties, that is to say, the King, Parliament, and this State, to draw them on to such a League: and they are as followeth.

To the King.

1. It will serve to conciliate, and beget a better understanding be∣tween him and the Parliament, and to remove some part of that jealou∣sie which the people travail with of the Kings administration, and which will never leave burning till it burn to the Foundations of the Throne if not preuented. And if it attains not the end of introducing other co∣operative acts of concord, it will at least avert the hastening on of great∣er evils. There be some of those things which the Parliament would have, which the King would consent to, upon condition he might not be pressed in the rest, as the case of the Duke of York, &c. Therefore let them begin with some popular great thing that may involve the inte∣rests and affections of all.

2. As to that point of the confirmation by the Parliament, I have shewed the presidents of former times.

3. The Ratifi••ation here by the General Estates will be equipolent to the Ratification in England by the Parliament, which saves the Kings honour. For thus the parties rather conspire in one, how to render this League illustrious and great, than on their respective parts to be forced to any thing.

To the Parliament.

1. Let it move from themselves, that is, let some of those in the House of Commons, who are of unquestionable reputation for Wisdom, Ho∣nesty and Integrity, be engaged; let them engage others; and let them communicate their Counsels with my Lord Shaftsbury and that Party in the House of Lords. Then let the Scheme and Project be proposed in the House of Commons, then the Commons seek the Lords concurrence; and then let it be offered to the King, as the advice of the whole Kingdom; for every man is there in person, or by representation.

2. This will shut up those avenues, those back doors, by which the French have had accesses to our Councils, and have influenced them. And consequently will render the sitting of Parliaments more calm and secure, when that mighty trade of theirs, of buying Prorogations shall be spoil'd, and their Factors rendred less malignant.

3. This is an infallible argument, As the end of a thing is, so is the thing. The two general ends of this League are; To preserve the Prote∣stant Religion; and to preserve and restore the Ballance of Europe, by lessening the power of France. And those are the two greatest ends in Christendom; therefore that thing that has those for its ends is the greatest thing: and the minds of gallant men are exceedingly moved with great things, and strongly carried to the pursuit of them.

To this State.

1. The first argument is prudential. Prudence is that vertue, by which, when several things are offered, we are directed which to chuse, and which to refuse; what to do, and what not to do. Holland then must eiaher make a League with France, or with England, or remain Neuter.

To make a League with France is utterly imprudent, for these two reasons.

1. Because France aiming at and designing an Universal Monarchy, would only secure himself of them, till their own turn come, that is, till he hath swallowed up the Spanish Netherlands and Germany, when he would turn his Force upon them.

2. By such means they would lose the best and surest friend they have had from their Foundation of their State, and that is England. And where a State is not sufficient by its own proper force, in respect of the weakness of the same, or the mightiness of its Neighbours, to defend it self, it must of necessity rely some where els for protection.

To remain in a neutral condition cannot be. For so, instead of making one friend, they would make three enemies. And in case France should renew the war upon them, England would be won, upon such terms as France would offer, either to join with them, or to stand still, and see

Holland ruined. Besides how impolitic a thing neutrality is, any man may see that will consider the observations made there on. Mach. Prince cap. 21.

It remains then, and I know nothing els that remains, To make a League with England. For that will have one of two effects. Either France will be wholly deterred from attempting upon their State; or if he does they will be able with the assistance of England to defend themselves. This is the first Argument.

2. The authority and reputation of the Proposers; It is a League pro∣posed by the Parliament of England, to be entred into with the King and Kingdom of England. The Parliament represents the whole people of England, and commands both the parts and persons of a great, rich and valiant nation, from whom neither money nor souldiers will be want∣ing to beat down the power of that proud & insulting nation of France. But these people here are afraid of France, why then, let them make a league with those of whom France it self is afraid. And withal let them remember this League is to be made with a People, from whom they have received the greatest benefits, as I have shewed before. And this argument alone will beat down the most, if not all the objections that would arise against such a League, proposed in any other manner.

3. The great reputation and security such a League will give to this State, which will cover them as with wings of Protection against France, and whosoever else would prey upon them.

If I have not expressed these things so as I would, I have done it so well as I can in a short time. And so submitting it with all decent humi∣lity, to the grave Considerations of those excellent personages whom it may most concern, I leave it to its Fate.

Hague. May 24. 80.

FINIS.