A Collection of cases and other discourses lately written to recover dissenters to the communion of the Church of England by some divines of the city of London ; in two volumes ; to each volume is prefix'd a catalogue of all the cases and discourses contained in this collection.

THE CASE OF A Doubting Conscience.

I Have in a former Discourse spoken to the Case of those Dissenters who separate from the Established Church for this Reason, That they are Perswaded that they cannot Lawfully joyn in our Communion. I now come to speak to the Case of those who separate from us for a less Rea∣son, viz. Because they Doubt whether they may law∣fully Communicate with us or no; and so long as they thus Doubt, they dare not come near us, be∣cause they fear they should sin against God, if they should do any Action with a doubting Conscience.

To this indeed a short Answer might be given from the former Discourse, and that is this, That let the Obligation of a doubting Conscience be as great as we can reasonably suppose it, yet if Communion with our Church as it is Established be really a Du∣ty, then a Mans Doubts concerning the Lawfulness of it, will not make it cease to be so, or justifie his Se∣paration from it. For if a Manssetled Perswasion, that an Action is unlawful, will not ordinarily acquit him from Sin if he omit that Action, supposing Gods

Law hath commanded it (as I there shew'd); much less will a mans bare Doubt concerning the Lawful∣ness of an Action, justifie his Omission of it in such a Case.

But because this Answer seems rather to cut the Knot, than to unty it; it is my meaning in the fol∣lowing Discourse, particularly to examine and dis∣cuss this Plea of a Doubting Conscience, and to shew what little force there is in it to keep any man from Conformity, that would otherwise Conform. Hoping that some Reader whose Case this is, may, by what he here finds offer'd toward his satisfaction, either be prevail'd with to lay aside his Doubts in the matter of our Communion, or at least be con∣vinced, that it is more reasonable and safe to commu∣nicate with us doubting as he doth, than to conti∣nue in separation from us.

In handling this Case of a Doubting Conscience, I shall observe the same Method I did in the former Discourse, because indeed I cannot think of a better. That is, I shall endeavour to give an account of these four things:

• I. Of the Nature of a Doubting Conscience, and how it is distinguished from the other Kinds of Conscience.
• II. Of the Rule of a Doubting Conscience, or what Measures a man is to proceed by for the de∣termining himself in a doubtful Case.
• III. Of the Power that Humane Laws, Ecclesiastical or Civil, have to Over-rule a mans Doubts in any matter.
• IV. Of the Authority of a Doubting Conscience, i. e. Whether at all, or how far a man is Obliged by it?

These four Heads do, I think, take in all the Difficulties that are in the Case of a Doubting Con∣science.

I. I begin with the first Head, The Nature of a Doubting Conscience. In speaking to which, I shall Treat of these three things. 1. Of Doubting in ge∣neral. 2. Of such Doubts as do affect or concern a Mans Conscience. 3. Of the Difference between the Doubting Conscience, and the Scrupulous.

1. As to the first of these, which is concerning the Nature of Doubting in general, we may take Notice, That a man is properly said to doubt, when he can∣not give his Assent to either part of a Contradiction, that is, cannot make a Judgment whether the thing he is considering, be so, or be not so; but through the equal, or at least fair probability that is on both sides of the Question, continues irresolute and unde∣termined; now, perhaps, he thinks this Side the more probable, and by and by the other, but he is uncer∣tain as to both, and cannot fix upon either.

So that a Doubting Mind is not more usually than properly, resembled to a Ballance, which by Reason of the equal Weight which is put into both Scales, is not cast on either side, but hangs in the same Posture, or waves up and down, without either Scale coming to the bottom.

Nevertheless, in a doubtful Case, a man may lean more to one side of the Question than the other, and yet continue doubtful still. Just as there may be so much more Weight put into one Scale than the other, as will be sufficient to incline the Ballance more to that side; while yet that Weight is not so considerable as to be able perfectly to turn it, so as to carry down the Scale to the usual mark of Down-Weight, and there to settle it.

There is indeed this difference between these two things, that a Ballance through the exact equality of the Weights put into each Scale, may be so poised, as to hang perfectly in oequilibrio, without inclination either way, and continue so to do: but it will be diffi∣cult, if not impossible, to put a Case or a Question, where a mans Mind, after all things considered, is so perfectly indifferent to both sides of it, as not to be more inclined to chuse one, than the other.

When once there appears so much more Evidence on one side of the doubtful Case, that the Mind is enabled to determine it self, and to give a settled assent on that side, then the man ceaseth to doubt any longer; for that which was a Doubt before, is now turned into a Perswasion. And if it be a Case wherein Conscience is concern'd, that which was before a Doubting Consci∣ence, is now changed into a Resolved Conscience. Here, to resume our former Comparison, the Ballance no long∣er hangs in oequilibrio, or moves unsetledly this way or that way, but is plainly turned and fixed on one side.

It is true, in this Case a man doth not always de∣termine himself with the same degree of Perswasion, or Satisfaction to his own Mind. Sometimes the Evidence is so strong, as to command an entire Assent of his Understanding; an Assent so full, that it hath not the least mixture of doubtfulness in it; and this we call an Assurance, or a full Perswasion. At other times, the Evidence may be of force enough to gain an Assent, but yet not so strong an Assent as to ex∣clude all Doubt of the contrary; and this kind of As∣sent we call an Opinion, or a probable Perswasion. And something like this we may observe in the Ballance: The Scale that preponderates, is not alwayes carried down with the same Force and Briskness; but accor∣ding

as the Weight that turns the Ballance is greater or less, so in proportion it may plainly be discern'd that the Scale descends eithe more strongly and nimb∣ly, or more weakly and slowly. But still, in both these Cases, the man hath formed a Judgment of the Point; the Ballance is turned, and where ever this happens, there is an end of the Doubt or Aequilibri∣um, and consequently, if it be in a Case that concerns a mans Conscience, it ceases to be any longer a Doubt∣ing Conscience, and becomes resolved and determi∣ned, though perhaps not fully satisfied and free from all kind of doubt and scruple about that thing.

2. And thus much of Doubting in general. I now come to consider it with Respect to Conscience, i. e. to enquire How far, or in what Cases a mans Conscience is af∣fected with his Doubts? Which is our second Point under this Head.

There are a thousand Cases in which a man may be doubtful, as to which his Conscience shall be no way concerned. A mans Doubts may indeed be as various as are the Objects he hath to consider, and to make a judgment of; and therefore unless we will say, that every thing that a man thinks of, or saith, or doth, affects his Conscience, we must not say that every Doubt doth.

As a mans Conscience is not touched, nor affected with any thing but his own Actions; so neither do a mans Doubts affect or touch his Conscience any fur∣ther than they concern his Actions. So that Doubts about matters of meer Speculation, (as whether such a Proposition be true or false,) and likewise Doubts about matter of Fact, (as, whether such a thing was done or not done,) which do not relate to the Govern∣ment of a mans own Actions, these doubts do not concern his Conscience.

As a mans Conscience is not affected with his own Actions under any other Notion, or Conside∣ration, than only as Gods Law is to regulate them, viz. as they are either commanded by that Law, or forbidden by it: so neither do a mans Doubts con∣cerning his Actions affect his Conscience any farther, or upon any other account, than only as Gods Law may be transgressed by doing or not doing the Acti∣on he doubts of; that is, as he may sin against God, either by omitting the Action when Gods Law hath commanded it, or by doing it when Gods Law hath forbidden it.

So that in all doubtful Cases, where a man appre∣hends no danger of transgressing Gods Law, whe∣ther he doth the Action he doubts about, or doth it not, there his Conscience is not properly con∣cerned.

And this is so true, that though we should sup∣pose one side of the Action in question to be really, all things considered, more expedient and more eli∣gible than the other, yet so long as we are satisfied that we may without breach of Gods Law chuse ei∣ther side, we are not concern'd in Conscience to chuse that side which is the most expedient, or the most eli∣gible. For the truth of this, besides the reason of the thing, we have the authority of St. Paul, who when this Case was proposed to him, Whether it was better for the Christians in those times to marry, or not to marry? he thus resolves it, That though in∣deed, as things then stood, it was better not to mar∣ry, yet they might do what they would; for if they did marry, they sinned not: and though (as he saith) he that gave not his Virgin in marriage did bet∣ter than he that gave her in marriage; yet he allowes, that he that gave her in marriage did well, and

consequently did act with a good Conscience. Vid. 1 Cor. 7.

3. From what hath been said, we may be able to give a clear account of the Nature of a Doubting Conscience, and to distinguish it from the other sorts of Consci∣ence; particularly, that which they call the Scrupu∣lous; which is our Third Point under this Head.

Conscience is usually, though how properly I will not now dispute, distributed into these three Kinds, the Resolved, the Scrupulous, and the Doubting.

When we speak of a Resolved Conscience, every body knows that we mean no more by that Phrase than this, that a man is satisfied and resolved in his own Mind, concerning the action he hath been deli∣berating upon, viz. that he is bound to do it, as being a Duty; or that he is bound to forbear it, as being a Sin; or, that he may either do it, or forbear it, as being an Indifferent action, neither commanded, nor forbidden by God. Now this Perswasion, if it be according to the Rule of the Divine Law, we call it a Right Conscience. If it be contrary to that Rule, we call it an Erroneous Conscience: But of this we need speak no more here, since it was the whole argument of the former Discouse.

As for the Scrupulous Conscience, as that is made a distinct sort of Conscience from the Resolved and the Doubting, we may thus define it: It is a Con∣science in some measure resolved, but yet accompanied with a Fear of acting according to that Resolution. It is the unhappiness of a great many, that when they are pretty well satisfied in their Judgment concern∣ing this or the other Point, which they made a Matter of Conscience, and have nothing considera∣ble to Object against the Evidence that is given them, but on the contrary are convinced that they

ought, or that they may lawfully Act thus or thus▪ Yet for all that, when they come to act, they are very uneasie, and make a World of Difficulties. Not that there is any new Reason appears that can pretend to unsettle, much less overthrow the Grounds of their first Determination: But only their unaccountable Fears must pass for Reasons. This now is to have a Scrupulous Conscience in the proper Sense.

But a Doubting Conscience, (which is that we are now concerned in,) though in Common Speech it be often confounded with the Scrupulous, is quite different from both these sorts of Conscience. For in both those a man is supposed to have passed a Judg∣ment in his own Mind whether the Action before him be according to Gods Law, or against it. But in the Case of a Doubting Conscience, it appears from what I have said, that a man hath not, nor cannot, so long as he doubts, make any Judgment at all, but is uncertain as to both sides; having, as he thinks, as many Arguments to incline him one way, as the other; and when once he comes to have so much Evidence as to create a Perswasion or Opinion on one side, then he ceaseth to have a Doubting Conscience.

So that the True Definition of a Doubting Consci∣ence, as it is commonly called, is this. The Suspence of a mans Judgment in a Question about the Duty or the Sin of an Action, occasioned by the Equal (or near Equal) Probalities on both sides.

And likewise the true Difference between a Doubting, a Resolved, and a Scrupulous Conscience, is this; That the Resolved Conscience is satisfied about its Point, and acts confidently, at least chearfully: The Scrupulous Conscience is likewise satisfied in the general, but either dares not act, or acts fearfully. The Doubting Conscience is not satisfied at all, for the Point be∣fore

it is still a Question; of which it can make no Judgment, no Resolution, because of the equal ap∣pearances of Reason on both sides.

This is a plain account of the Doubting Conscience. But after all, it must be acknowledged, that this which we call a Doubting Conscience, and which we have been all this while discoursing of, is, truly and strict∣ly speaking, so far from being any particular sort or kind of Conscience, as we have hitherto supposed it, that it is no Conscience at all.

Conscience, as we have often said, is a Mans Mind making a Judgment about the Morality of his Acti∣ons; But that which we are now talking of, is a mans Mind making no Judgment as to that Point, but con∣tinuing wavering and undetermined. Now how a mans Judgment and his no Judgment, which are the Contradictories to one another, should agree in the same Common Nature of Conscience, is not easie to be understood. The Truth is, by the same Logick or propriety of Speech, that we say a Doubting Con∣science, we may also if we please say an unresolved Resolution, or a Perswasion without an Assent. But however, because Use hath given the Name of Con∣science to the Doubting Mind; and because Consci∣ence is sometimes really concerned about Acting in Doubtful Cases, I chuse to follow the common way of speaking.

II. I now proceed to our Second general Head, which is concerning the Rule of a Doubting Conscience.

In speaking to this, I shall do these two things. viz. I shall shew,

First, What kind of Rule we here speak of, that is, which Conscience needs in a Doubtful Case.

Secondly, What that Rule is, or wherein it doth consist.

1. As to the first of these. When we speak of the Rule of a Doubting Conscience, we do not mean such a Rule by which a man shall be enabled to resolve all his Doubts concerning every Point, so as that he shall cease to doubt any longer concern∣ing that Point: But we mean only such a Rule by which a man may be directed how to determine himself in every Doubtful Case, so as to act with a safe Conscience, whether he can get rid of his Doubts or not.

There is just as much difference between these two things, as there is between Doubting, for Instance, whether a thing in general be lawful, or not lawful; and Doubting what I am to do in a particular Case, where I doubt of the Lawfulness of the thing. The first of which Doubts, the Casuists call a Speculative Doubt, the other a Practical.

It is plain, that a man may often very easily come to a Resolution of this latter kind of Doubt; that is, be very well satisfied what it becomes him to do as to this present Action, without being able to resolve his Doubt of the former kind.

Thus, for instance, a man may not be able to resolve this Question, Whether it be lawful or not lawful to play at Cards or Dice? which is the speculative doubt, as the Schools call it: But he may be very able to resolve this Question, What is most reasonable for him to do in the Case of such a Doubt? Again, a man may not be able to resolve this Doubt, Whether the present War in which his Prince is in∣gaged, be a just War or no? But yet he may be ve∣ry well able to satisfie himself as to the practical Doubt; that is, What is his Duty to do in case his Prince command him to serve in that War, concern∣ing which he doth thus doubt?

Now it is the Doubts of this latter kind, these Practical Doubts, as they are call'd, that Conscience is directly and immediately concerned with, and con∣sequently, for the resolving of which, it chiefly needs a Rule to direct it. For if a man can but get satis∣fied what is most agreeable to his Duty to do, as to the present Action he doubts about, it is no great matter as to his Conscience, whether he can get his General or Speculative Doubts about that Acti∣on resolved or no. These kind of Doubts, if they cannot be Resolved, must be Over-ruled.

The truth is, it is a very idle thing for men to talk, that a man must do no Action, till all his Doubts about it be resolved. Thus far we grant it con∣cerns him, that his Doubts should be resolved, viz. That he should be satisfied in his own mind, that that side of the Action he determines himself to, is, all things considered, the more fit and reasonable to be chosen: And to direct a Man in making such a Choice, is our principal business under this Head. But if it be meant, that a Man must so resolve all his Doubts about an Action, as to see clearly through all the Speculative Points which occasion his Doubts, so as to be able to untie all the Difficulties which before entangled his Understanding, and from Intrin∣sick Arguments, drawn from the nature of the thing, to pronounce concerning the merits of the Question: I say, if this be their meaning, there is nothing more absurd than to say, That a man is not to do an Action till he has resolved or deposed all his Doubts about it.

For in many Cases this is utterly impossible to be done; the person concerned perhaps having no sufficient Means for the obtaining such a Resolution of his Doubts as we spoke of; or if he had, the

Case may be such as will not allow him suf∣ficient time of Consideration for the doing it; for he must either act or not act presently; and he is in equal Perplexity, both as to the one, and as to the other. What now in such a Case can a Man possibly do more than this? viz. by his own Reason, and the advice of his Friends, to get satisfied what is most reasonable, and most agreeable to his Duty, for him to do in the present Circumstances, and to proceed accordingly; for as for other kind of Resolution of his Doubts, as things stand with him, he hath not the least Prospect of it.

And indeed, when all is said, we see de facto that this is the usual way of proceeding among Men, even those that are very Honest and Conscientious. I dare say, if we take all the Doubtful Cases that happen; where there is one Case in which a Man proceeds to Action upon such a Resolution of his Doubts as we before spoke of, there are ten Cases where the Doubt is over-ruled, and the Man proceeds to Action without such a Resolution; sitting down satisfied with this, that though he cannot answer the Difficulties on both sides, yet, all things consi∣dered, it is most reasonable for him, in the present Circumstances, to act thus, rather than otherwise; for this he takes to be most agreeable to his Gene∣ral Duty; or this is that which Wise and Good Men, whom he hath consulted, do advise him to.

And now having sufficiently explained what kind of Resolution of Doubts that is, which a Mans Conscience stands in need of in order to his acting safely in a doubtful Case,

II. I come now to the second Question upon this Head, which is, What that Rule is by which we are to proceed in thus Resolving our Doubts, or

determining our selves to one side or other, in any Doubtful Case that happens to us.

In answer to this Enquiry, I shall do these two things. First, I shall give some account of the Ge∣neral Rule by which a Doubting Conscience is to be guided. Secondly, I shall apply this General Rule to the several Heads, of Doubtful Cases wherein a mans Conscience may be concerned: That so every one may be furnished with some Principles, for the de∣termining himself in any Matter concerning which he happens to have a Doubt.

1. As to the first of these, Whoever hath Consi∣dered what we have before said, will easily be per∣swaded, that nothing ought to turn the Ballance in a Doubtful Case, but the greater Weight of Reason on one side than the other. For since the very Notion of Doubting, is the suspence of a mans Judg∣ment in a Question, upon account of the equal ap∣pearances of Reason on both sides of it: It is plain, that that which is to settle the Judgment, and to de∣termine the Doubt can be nothing else but this, viz. That, after all things considered, there doth appear greater Reason to lye on this side of the Question, than there doth on that. So that the General Rule of a Doubting Conscience, and from which the mea∣sures of resolving all particular Cases are to be taken, can∣not be laid down otherwise than thus. viz. That in all Doubtful Cases, that side which, all things duely considered, doth appear more reasonable, that is to be chosen.

I am not ignorant that the Casuists have usually proposed this Rule in other Terms. viz. That in all Doubtful Cases the safer side is to be followed. But I do purposely avoid the expressing it so, because of the uncertain meaning of the safer side? For accor∣ding

as that Word is expounded, (as it may be expoun∣ded different waies), so is the Rule so worded true or false.

If we take safety in the strict and proper Sense, and as it is indeed usually understood, viz. as it is opposed to any Hazard or Danger: it is so far from being an Adaequate Rule of a Doubting Conscience, in all Cases to follow the safer side, that in many Cases it will be very unadvisable so to do.

Sure I am, that in Doubtful Cases which concern the Civil Life, no Wise man doth alwaies make this a Rule to himself. We see a hundred Instances eve∣ry day, where men venture upon the less safe and the more hazardous side, upon the account of other Reasons and considerations, which they think ought more to prevail with them.

It is certainly, in general speaking, more safe (that is, more free from hazard or danger) to Travel on Foot, than on Horseback; to stay at home, than to go into Foreign Countries; to Traffick by Land, than to venture ones Stock on the uncertain Seas. But yet for all this, the consideration of the Ease and Expedition that is to be had in the first Case, and the Improvement and Benefit that is to be hoped for in the second, and the Gain and Profit in the last, do we see every day overballance the consideration of Safety in these Cases, and determine a man not to that side which is freest from Danger, but to that which is more Convenient, or more Ʋseful, or more Advantageous.

And thus it is likewise as to those Doubtful Cases wherein a mans Conscience is concerned. I suppose that when we speak of the safer side of any Action with reference to Conscience, we generally mean that side on which there appears the least Hazard or

Danger of transgressing any Law of God. But now in this Sense of safety, I do not think that it is al∣ways a good Rule, for a Doubting Conscience to chuse the safer side: On the contrary, I think, that if the Rule be thus put, and thus understood, it will often prove a Snare to a mans Mind, and rather en∣tangle him further in Difficulties, than help him out of them.

If it was receiv'd as a Rule, That a man is in all his Actions to keep himself at the greatest distance he can from the Danger of sinning, (which is the No∣tion of safety I here speak of), I dare say, there are very few Persons that converse much in the World, but have reason, almost every day, to call themselves to account for transgressing this Rule. For they do every day ingage in such Actions, in which they cannot but acknowledge that they do expose them∣selves to a greater danger of sinning, than if they had not ingaged in them.

Thus, for instance, what man is there among us who, although he know himself to be prone enough to the sin of Intemperance in eating or drinking when Temptations are offered, and accordingly for this reason doth most seriously set himself against this particular sin; yet makes any great Scruple of go∣ing to Feasts and Entertainments when he is invited by others; nay or of making them himself, when Decency or Civility, or the serving any of his Tem∣poral affairs doth require him so to do? But yet it is certain, that by thus doing, he runs a much grea∣ter Hazard of falling into the sin he fears, than if he should forbear all such Occasions or Temptations of Intemperance.

Many other Instances which daily occur in Hu∣mane Life might be given, wherein good men, nay

even the best of men, do for the sake of their Bu∣siness, or other Laudable Designs which they think fit to pursue, frequently venture to expose them∣selves to such dangers of sinning as they might have avoided; and this without any Reproach from their own Conscience, or any Censure from other Men.

The truth is, God hath no where commanded us to avoid all possible danger of sinning, but onely to avoid all sin when we are in danger. It is enough for the securing a mans Duty, that he doth not transgress the Laws of God in any Action that he takes in hand: But it is not required that he should in every instance of his Conversation, preserve him∣self from the utmost possibility, or, (if you will) Danger of so doing. For upon this Supposition, it would be impossible for one to live like a man of this World, and perform the common Offices of Civil Life, and much more to live to any great pur∣poses for the serving his Generation. Indeed the Result of all would be, That whoever would approve himself to be truly Religious and Conscientious, must abandon all Secular Affairs, and retire to a Cloyster or a Desart.

But it may be said, What is this to our Business? Those we now spoke of are supposed to be fully satisfied in their own Minds, that they may safely venture on the more dangerous side of an Action, for the sake of some considerable good that they design in that Action: But the Case we are now concerned in, is that of one who is altogether Doubtful whether he may Lawfully do the Action or no. To this I answer, That my Business is now to give an ac∣count of the Rule by which men are to proceed, in determining themselves in Doubtful Cases; and that which I have said, doth thus far I think come home

to that Business, that if it be allowed that it is advisa∣ble in any Case to forsake the more safe side of an Action, and to chuse the more hazardous: we will take it for granted, that it may be as advisable in a Doubtful Case as in any other, untill it be made to ap∣pear, that God hath apointed a Rule for Doubting per∣sons to govern themselves by, different from that he hath given to other men: Or, to speak the thing more plainly, till it be made to appear, that those who are so unhappy as to Doubt, are debarred of the priviledge of Acting according to the best of their Reason and Discretion, which men that do not Doubt are allowed to do.

But to come more strictly to the Point. I do believe there do abundance of Doubtful Cases, properly so called, frequently happen, in which no Man of Understanding, although we suppose him never so Honest, doth think he is obliged to determine himself to that side of the Acti∣on on which he apprehends there is least Danger of sinning: But on the contrary, he will often forsake that side which is safer in this sense, for that which doth more recommend it self to him upon other Accounts.

Thus for instance, some times Doubtful Cases do happen, in which the greater Probability on one side, will turn the Ballance against the greater Safety on the other. Thus if a Man should Doubt whether it may be Lawful to eat any thing Strangled, or that hath Bloud in it, (because there are some Passages in the Scripture that seem to forbid these Meats); and should repair to some intelligent Person about this matter, who should give him such an account of those Texts, and of all the other Difficulties in this Affair, that the Man comes away satisfied, that it is far more Pro∣bable that all kinds of Meats are allowed by the

Christian Religion, than that any are forbidden.

I ask now, Whether this degree of Satisfaction have not weight enough to put an end to a Mans Doubt in such a Case as this, so as that he may with a quiet Conscience eat of these Meats as there is occasion? I believe most Men will be of this Opinion; but yet the Doubt here is not determined on the safer side, but on the more unsafe. For it is certain, a Man is in less Danger of sinning, if he wholly forbear these Meats, than if, for the serving a present Convenience, he do eat of them. And the Reason is plain; be∣cause there are fair Grounds from the Scripture, and Antiquity, for making it a Question whether these Meats be Lawful or no; and it is really yet a Questi∣on among many, and it was lately so to the Man himself: But no man in the World ever made a Que∣stion whether these Meats might not at any time be Lawfully forborn; there being no Law of God pre∣tended that obliges a Man to eat of them.

Again, As a greater Probability will turn the Bal∣lance against the safer side of a Doubt: So oftentimes such Doubtful Cases do happen, in which, when the Probabilities are equal on both sides, the Considera∣tion of the greater Temporal Advantages on the one side, will have Weight enough with a very Honest Man to over-ballance the Consideration of the greater Safety on the other. [Still taking Safety in the sense we before gave.]

Thus for Instance, Suppose one should demand of ano∣ther Man a Sum of Money which he pretends to be due to him, and the Man of whom it is demanded, af∣ter the strictest and most conscientious Enquiry he can make, is not satisfied in his own mind that it is due. But such is the Confidence of the Demander, and such appearances of Reason he offers, that the

Man comes to doubt equally, whether it be due or no; so that there are here equal Probabilities on both sides. The thing in Question now is, Whether it be advisable in point of Conscience for the Man to pay the Money demanded, till he have better Evidence of the Justice of the Demands?

If a Man be to follow the safer side, it is certain he must pay it. For it is undeniably more safe, that is, farther removed from the Danger of Sin, to satisfie the Demands, though it be to his own loss. For by this means he perfectly sets himself free from the Appre∣hensions even of the possibility of wronging his Neighbour, which is the sin that he fears in this Case: Whereas if he do not pay the Money, he is uncer∣tain whether he detains the Mans Right from him or no.

But then, on the other hand, if he should pay the money when it is no way due, (as he hath as much Reason to believe that it is not due, as that it is), how shall he answer to his Wife and Children for part∣ing with such a Sum, which, as his Circumstances may be, he cannot spare without great prejudice to them?

This is the Case, and these are the Arguments that are to be urged on both sides of it, And I leave it to any considering Man to judge which ought to prevail. I am pretty confident, that most Men will thus determine, viz. That since in this Case it is as Probable, that the Demands aforesaid are Ʋnjust, as that they are Just; and since no man is obliged to depart from that he is possessed of, till it do appear by good Evidence that it is due to another Man: And since withal it is unreasonable so to do, when it will be to the Prejudice of a Mans Self and his Fa∣mily: These things being so, it will be more ad∣visable for the Man in this Case to keep his Money,

till it be either by Law adjudged, or he have more convincing Proofs to his own Conscience, that he ought to pay it.

I think I need not use either more Instances, or more Words, to shew that it is not alwaies a Rule to a Doubting Conscience to chuse the safer side of the Doubt, taking the safer side for that which is at the greatest distance from the danger of sinning: It being abundantly plain, that many Doubtful Cases may, and do happen, in which, though one side may appear farther removed from the Danger of transgressing Gods Law; yet while it doth not appear that the other side is unlawful, and withal it is evident that upon other accounts that side is more eligible to a Prudent Person, no good Man (if he be but as Wise as he is Good) will make any Difficulty of waveing the safer side for the more Prudent, and that without think∣ing himself ever the less Conscientious for so doing.

But after all this, If on the other hand, any man have another Notion of Safety than that we have now been speaking of; that is to say, will enlarge the signification of the Word, and will call by the name of the Safer side, not that which hath only this to recommend it, that it is farther removed from the danger of sinning; but that which is freest from all Dan∣gers and Inconveniences of all kinds whatsoever: So as that shall alwaies be the Safer side of a Doubtful Case, which, after all things considered, doth appear to be most agreeable to the Mans Duty in the Cir∣cumstances he is in, or which is attended with the fewest Absurdities and evil Consequences of all sorts, and doth best serve all the Interests Spiritual and Tempo∣ral taken both together, that a Wise and a Good Man can propose to himself: I say if any man do mean this by the Safer side, I do readily agree with him, that

it will for ever, and in all Cases, be a True, and a Wise, and a Good Rule (nay, I add), the only one, to a Doubt∣ing Conscience to follow the safer side.

But then, in this sense of Safety, the safer side and the more Reasonable is all one thing. And consequently, this Rule of following the safer side, and that I before laid down, of following the more Reasonable, are the same in sense, through differently expressed. Only I think this latter way of expression is more plain, and less liable to misconstruction, and therefore I chose it. But it is indifferent to me how Men Word things, so long as we agree in our Sense.

II. Having thus given an Account of the General Rule by which a man is to determine himself in Doubt∣ful Cases; I come now, in the Second place, to treat of the several Heads, or Sorts of Doubtful Cases, wherein a Mans Conscience is concerned, and to make Applicati∣on of this Rule to them; and this it will be no hard mat∣ter to do, admitting the Grounds we have before laid down.

There is no Doubt wherein Conscience is concerned, but it will of necessity fall under one of these two Sorts. It is either a Single Doubt, or a Double one.

We call that a Single Doubt, when a man doubts only on one side of the Action, but is very well satisfied as to the other. As for Instance, he doubts concerning this or the other particular Action, whether it be Law∣ful for him to do it: But on the other side, he hath no Doubt, but is very well assured, that he may Lawfully let it alone. Or, on the contrary, he is very well satis∣fied that the Action is Lawful, and that he may do it: But he doubts whether Gods Law hath not made it a Duty, so that he cannot Lawfully omit it. This is that which we call a Single Doubt.

We call that a Double Doubt, where a man doubts on

both sides of an Action, that is to say, he doubts on one side whether he be not bound to do this Action; Gods Law, for any thing he knows, made it a Duty: But on the other side, so is the Action circumstantiated with respect to him, or he with respect to it; that he doubts whether he be not bound to forbear the Action as it is now presented to him; Gods Law having for any thing he knows forbid it. So that he is at a loss what to do, because he fears he may sin, whether he doth the Action or doth it not. I say, it will be impossible to put any doubt∣ful Case wherein a mans Conscience is concerned, which will not fall under one of these two Heads.

I. Now, as to the Case of a Single Doubt, we may thus apply the General Rule. That when a man doubts on∣ly on one side of an Action, there it is more Reasonable to chuse that side of the Action concerning which he hath no Doubt, than the other, concerning which he Doubts, supposing all other Considerations be equal.

And here comes in that famous Maxim which hath obtained both among Christians and Heathens, Quod dubitas ne feceris; which, with the restriction I have now mentioned, will for ever be good Advice in all Cases of this Nature.

It must needs be unreasonable to venture upon any Action where a man hath the least Fear or Suspicion that it is possible he may transgress some Law of God by it, when it is in his power to Act without any Fear or Suspicion of that kind; supposing all along this Consi∣deration of the possibility of offending by this Action, be not over-ballanced, and so the Fear of it removed, by other Considerations which the Circumstances of the Action do suggest.

Thus for Instance. Here is a Man Doubts whether it be allowable in a Christian to drink a Health, or put out Money to Interest, or to go to Law; as having

conversed with such Men, or such Books as do condemn these Practices, and that not without some Colour from the Word of God. The man is not indeed so con∣vinced by their Discourses, as to have taken up any O∣pinion or Perswasion that these Practices are unlawful; nor would he censure any man that uses them, because he sees there are as Good Men, and for any thing he knows, as good Arguments for the other side: But he is not so clear in his judgment about these Points, as to be able to pronounce any thing positively concerning them either way. He cannot say, that he believes them Lawful, though he is not perswaded that they are unlawful, which is the true state of a Doubting mind. Now in these and all other such like Cases the Rule is plain, That while a mans judgment continues thus in suspence, it is more Reasonable for him to forbear these Practices. For there is no pretence of obligation upon him from Gods Law to engage in any of them, and why should he rashly throw himself into danger, by venturing upon an Action concerning which he is uncertain whether it be Lawful or no? He runs no hazard by forbearing these things; but if he practise them, he doth.

Thus far is right. But then, as I said, this is always to be understood with this Proviso, Caeteris paribus. For if there should happen to be such other Considera∣tions in the Action, as have force enough to over-bal∣lance this Consideration of Ʋncertainty; it will then be reasonable to chuse that side of the Action concerning which I did before doubt, rather than that of which I had no doubt at all.

Thus if the Man that makes a Question about any of the three things I before mentioned, should light in∣to such Circumstances, that, for Instance, he must ei∣ther drink such a single Health, or a quarrel is like to

ensue, nay, and that perhaps to the danger of some of the Lives of the Company. Or again, that he has no means of improving his Money (in which his whole Fortune consists) in any other way but by that of Ʋsury; so that he and his Family must in time starve, unless they be maintained by this Course. Or lastly, if an Orphan be trusted to his Care; and the Estate of that Orphan is so entangled, that he must be put upon the necessity either of waging a Law Suit for the clearing it, or suffering his near Relation, committed to his Charge, to be defrauded of his Right. I say, if the Cases happen to be thus circumstantiated; he that before doubted in General, whether it was Lawful to drink a Health, or to put out money to Ʋsury, or to in∣gage in Law-Suits; may, I should think, certainly satis∣fie himself, that it is not only Lawful, but Expedient in this particular Case, notwithstanding his General Doubt, to do any of these things; and if he be a Wise Man, he will make no Scruple of Acting accordingly.

Indeed he cannot be well excused if he do not thus Act. For it will not be sufficient to say, I doubt whether these Practices are Lawful or Ʋnlawful, and therefore I dare not ingage in them. Why Man? if you only Doubt about them, you do by this ackonwledge, that for any thing you know they may be Lawful, as well as that for any thing you know they may be Ʋnlawful. And if you be thus in aequilibrio, sure such pressing Con∣siderations as those which are presented in this Case, ought to turn the Ballance. Otherwise I do not know how you will answer either to your self or the World for the Consequences that may ensue. For my part, in such Cases as these I should think, that nothing less than a Belief or Perswasion, that the thing in Que∣stion is unlawful, will justifie a mans Prudence in Acting on that side which he calls the Safer, and

which, had not these Circumstances happened, would really have been so.

To conclude, if a great Good may be compassed, or a great Evil may be avoided, by doing a thing concerning which we have a General Speculative Doubt whether it be Lawful or no: This very Consideration is in Rea∣son sufficient to silence the Doubt: That is, it is enough to perswade us, that it is not only Lawful but Advi∣sable to do that in the present Circumstances, which be∣fore, and out of those Circumstances, we Doubted in general whether it was Lawful to be done or no.

II. And thus much concerning the Rule by which we are to proceed in the Case of a Single Doubt, I now come to consider that which we call a Double Doubt, and to shew what is to be done in that Case.

A Double Doubt, as I have said, is this, when a man doubts on both sides of an Action; that is to say, he doubts on one side whether he be not bound to do this Action, Gods Law having for any thing he knows commanded it; but on the other side, so doth the Acti∣on come circumstantiated to him, that he doubts whe∣ther he be not by some other Law of God bound to forbear it as it is now offer'd: So that he is at a loss what to do, because he fears he may sin whether he do the Action, or do it not.

That which is commonly said in this Case, viz. That the Man that is entangled must get his Doubt remo∣ved, and then he may with a safe Conscience act or not act, according as he is satisfied in his own mind; is, as I said before, very often impertinent: For it is no more in a mans power to leave off Doubting when he will, than it is in the power of a Sick man to be Well when he will. And besides, though it might be supposed, that the man with Time and good Counsel might be enabled to extricate himself out of this Perplexity; yet in our

Case that Benefit is not always allowed: For perhaps the Circumstances of the Case are such, that the man is under a present necessity either of acting or not acting, and whether he doth the one or the other, he doubts he offends God.

But what then is a man to do in this Case? Why, he is to follow the same Rule that he doth in all other Doubt∣ful Cases, and which we have been all this while in∣sisting on; that is to say, he is to Act as reasonably as he can: And if he do this, I am sure he incurs no blame, whether he do the Action he doubts about, or do it not. If there should happen to be any sin in the Action, it comes upon some other account than that of Acting with a Doubting Conscience.

But now the Application of this General Rule to our present Case is various, according to the Degrees of the mans Doubtfulness, compared with the Degrees of the sin he is in danger of, by acting on the one side or the other. And likewise according as other Conside∣rations do happen about the Action, which ought to have some influence in determining the man. How∣ever, I think all those varieties may be comprized in these Four following Propositions.

First, If the Sin we are afraid of, in doing or not doing the Action, doth on both sides appear equal, there we are to determine our selves to that side where we have the least Doubt of offending God; that is to say, to that side which to our Reason appears more Probable to be free from the dnager of sin, rather than that o∣ther which is less Probable to be free from that danger: For certainly this will always be reasonable, that a man should chuse a greater Probability before a less, supposing all other things equal.

But Secondly, If we doubt equally on both sides; so that we apprehend that we are in like danger of

transgressing Gods Law whether we do the Action or do it not: In this Case we are to determine our selves to that side on which it doth appear we shall be guilty of the least sin. For certainly, by the same reason for which we are obliged not to sin ••n at all, we shall be obliged to chuse a less sin rather than a greater, where we annot cavoid sinning.

Thirdly, If the Doubt be unequal, and the Sin like∣ways unequal; that is, if it so happen that one side of the Case is more probable, but the other side less sinful, as not involving a man in so heinous a Crime as the other would, if it should prove that he was mis∣taken: In this Case a man may chuse either the one side or the other; according as the degree of the Pro∣bability, or the degree of the Sin, compared with one another, do preponderate.

The Case may be such, that there is so much more Pro∣bability on the one side than the other, and likewise so in∣considerable a difference and disproportion between the sins we are in danger of on each side, that a Wise man will be determined to the more Probable side, and venture all the consequences of his mistakes on the other.

But then, on the other hand, the Case may likewise be such, that the Consequences on one side, if a man should happen to be mistaken, are so terrible, that they will over-ballance all the Probabilities on the o∣ther side, let them be never so great; (supposing they do not amount to so much evidence as to create a Per∣swasion, and so put a man out of the state of Doubting). Now here a Wise man will not Act on the more Pro∣bable side, but on that which sets him free from the danger of these Consequences. Thus if a Priso∣ner was tryed for a Capital Offence, and the Evidence against him doth not appear so full as to create a Per∣swasion in the Judge or Jury that the man is Guilty,

though indeed it is more Probable that he is, than that he is not: In this Case I believe all men will say, that considering there is so great a disproportion between the Evil of condemning an Innocent Person and acquit∣ting a Guilty one, (it being Murder in the one Case) the Judge or Jury should rather follow the safer side than the more Probable, and so clear the man, rather than find him Guilty.

Fourthly, If the Case be such, that the Man doubts equally on both sides, and the sin he is afraid of appears likewise to him to be equal on both sides: Here other Considerations are to turn the Ballance. In this Case he is to consider what Prudential Inducements he has to do the Action, or forbear it; as how far his Ease and Quiet, his Advantage and Benefit, his good Name and Reputation, his Friends or his Family is con∣cerned one way or other; and since all other Con∣siderations, that are of a Moral Nature, are equal on both sides; those of this kind, which are the strongest, must add so much weight to the Scale, as to determine the Man either to do the Action he doubts about, or to let it alone.

And indeed, it cannot be denyed that these Con∣siderations will often have a great Influence even up∣on a good Man, not only in the Case I have now put, where the directly Moral Arguments are equal on both sides, but in all the other doubtful Cases I before mentioned.

We may talk very rationally about the Degrees of Probability, and the Degrees of Sin, and what weight each of them is to have with us, and all this with so much Evidence, that no Man can deny the reasona∣bleness of the Rules we lay down in Thesi: But yet when we come to Act, we find that scarce any Man doth exactly proceed according to these Rules; but

mixes some of these Prudential Considerations which I have mentioned with his Deliberations, and though they do not wholly, yet they help to turn the Bal∣lance. And for my part, I dare not say, that all those who thus proceed, are to be blamed for so doing; supposing that the Case wherein they thus Act, be a Case of pure Doubt, and there be no Perswasion on either side; and withal, that the Man who thus proceeds, is satisfied in his own Mind with his proceeding. The truth is, when all is said, every Man in doubtful Cases is left to his own Discretion; and if he Acts ac∣cording to the best Reason he hath, he is not culpa∣ble, though he be mistaken in his Measures.

These are all the Rules that are to be given in the Case of a Double Doubt. And I think no body can ob∣ject against the Truth of them. But I am sensible of another Objection that may be made, and that is, Why I do mention them at all. Since to the Gene∣rality of Men, for whom this Discourse is intended, they seem altogether unpracticable. For how few are there who are Competent Judges of these diffe∣rent Degrees of Probability or Sinfulness in an Action that we here talk of, and much less are capable of so ballancing these things one with another, as to be able from thence to form a good Judgment upon the whole Matter?

But to this I answer, That if Rules are to be given at all for the determining Men in Doubtful Cases, we must give these, because we can give no other. These being the only Principles that Men have to govern their Actions by in these Cases. And I trust also, they will not be wholly useless to the most ordinary Capacities, for the Purposes they are intended. Because all may hereby at least learn thus much, viz. What Methods they are to proceed by for the guidance of

their Actions in Doubtful Cases. And though they may have false Notions of the Dangers and the Degrees of particular Sins, and so may sometimes make false Applications of these Rules to their own Case; yet it is enough for their Justification, as I said before, that they have Reasoned as well as they can. Since they are not bound to Act in Doubtful Cases, according to what is best and most reasonable in it self: But it is abundantly sufficient, that they do endeavour it.

But to render these Rules about a Double Doubt more intelligible and more useful, I think it will not be a∣miss to give my Reader a Specimen, both how they are to be applyed to particular Cases, and likewise when they are applyed, what light they give to a Man for the chusing his way in any Doubtful Case he happens to be ingaged in. And since it would take up too much room to give every particular Rule a several Instance, I shall pitch upon one Case, under which I may consider all the Varieties of a Double Doubt I have now represented; and it shall be that Celebrated Case of the Sacrament, than which we have not a greater or a more frequent Instance of this kind of Doubt in any Case among us. And because I would not by the discussion of this Case, divert my Reader (against his will) from the main Argument, I have taken care to have it so marked in the Print, that e∣very one may without trouble (if he have no mind to read it) pass it over as a long Parenthesis, and go on to the next Point.

This is the Case.

Here is a Man that believes it to be his Duty to take all opportunities of Receiving the Sacrament, or at least to take them frequently. But on the o∣ther side, such is his condition, that he is constant∣ly under great Fears and Apprehensions of his being

unqualified for it; and to receive the Sacrament Ʋnworthily he knows to be a great Sin: Not that there is any grievous notorious Sin lies upon his Conscience unrepented of; much less that he is in∣gaged in some vicious Course, which he is unwilling that his new Vows at his approach to the Lords Table should divorce him from: For indeed he de∣sires and endeavours in all things to live honestly, and to keep a Conscience void of offence towards God and towards Man.

But this is the Case, He is not so devout a Chri∣stian, nor lives so Pure and Spiritual a Life, as he thinks becomes the Partakers of such Heavenly Food. Or perhaps he cannot bring himself to so feeling a Sense and Contrition for his past Sins, or such ar∣dours of Love and Devotion to our Saviour, as he hath been taught that every worthy Communicant ought to be affected with. Or perhaps he wants Faith in the Blood of Christ, not being able to apply the Benefits of his Passion so comfortably to his own Heart as he thinks he ought to do. Or perhaps, in the last place, his mind is so haunted with a company of idle and naughty Fancies, especially when he sets him∣self to be more than ordinarily serious, that he thinks it would be a great Profanation of the Sacrament, for him to come to it in such Circumstances.

These, or such like, are the things that trouble him. And though he hath several times endeavoured to put himself into a better condition, yet he could never satisfie himself, nor get over these difficulties. What now must this Man do? He would fain receive the Sacrament, as thinking himself bound to do it; but he dare not receive it, as looking upon himself to be unqualified for it. If he do not come to the Lords Table, he denies his Attendance on the most Solemn

Ordinance of Christianity, and so doubts he sins on that account: If he do come, he doubts he approach∣es unworthily, and so sins upon that account.

It is here to be remembred, that the Question to be spoken to in this Case, is not this; What course the Man is to take for the Curing or Removing his Doubtfulness in this matter, that so he may come to the Sacrament with Satisfaction to his own mind: But this; Supposing the Man after all his endeavours cannot cure or remove his Doubt, what he must do? must he come to the Sacrament, or must he forbear? One of them he must do, and yet, which of them so∣ever he chuseth, he fears he sins.

If the former had been the Question, the Resolu∣tion of it would have been thus: That the Man is to use the best means he can to get better Instruction and Information about the Nature and Ends of the Christian Sacrament; and about the Qualities and Di∣spositions that are needful to fit a man for it, particu∣larly those of Faith and Repentance. For it is the Mans Ignorance or Mistake about these things, that makes him pass so hard a Censure upon himself, and so occasions all the Doubtfulness in this Case. If he once come rightly to understand these Points, his Doubts would of themselves fall to the Ground; and the Man would be perfectly satisfied, that as his Case is (supposing it to be such as I have now repre∣sented) he may without any Fear or Scruple in the World at any time approach to the Holy Table; be∣cause he is indeed in such a state and disposition of mind as renders him habitually qualified for the per∣formance of that Duty.

But this, as I said, is not the Question before us; we here suppose the Man, either through want of Means of Instruction, or through strong Prejudices from Education,

or the like, to be incapable at present of this Satis∣faction, and to be in great perplexity on both sides; and that which we are to enquire into is, to which side of the doubtful Case he must determine himself. Shall he receive the Sacrament doubting as he doth? or shall he forbear it doubting as he doth?

Now I say, a man hath no other way of coming to a Resolution of this Question, but by applying the Rules I before laid down to his present Case: which may be done in this manner.

Since the Man we speak of doubteth that he sins whether he come to the Sacrament, or forbear, the First thing to be considered is, on which side he doubts least; or which side appears to him most likely and pro∣bable to be free from the danger of sinning: For, if all other things in the Case be equal, the Ballance is to be turned on that side according to our first Proposition.

Now if our present Question be put upon this Issue, I am confident the Man whose Case I am re∣presenting will think it more reasonable to repair to the Sacrament, even in that evil posture he takes himself to be; than customarily to abstain from it: Because by thus doing, he doth certainly follow the more probable, and the less doubtful or dangerous side of the Question. For it is evident, he cannot pretend to be half so certain of this Particular, viz. That he is unprepared for the Sacrament, which is the reason of his abstaining, as he is certain in the General that it is his Duty to frequent it.

If indeed the Man was a person of ill Life and Man∣ners: Or if he had been lately guilty of any Noto∣rious Wilful Sin, and came to the Lords Table with that sin upon his Conscience unrepented of: Then I will grant, he had some reason to believe that he was as much in danger of sinning, by receiving unworthi∣ly;

as by withdrawing himself from Gods Ordinance. But the Case here is not so. The Man is really an honest well-meaning Christian, nor hath he done any thing of late, which can give him any suspicion of his having forfeited that Title. Only through his Mi∣stake about the Notion of preparation for the Sacra∣ment, he apprehends he is not qualified as he ought to be, though yet if most others were to be Judges of his Condition, they would say he was. Why? cer∣tainly in this Case, it must be evident to the Man that he runs a greater danger of transgressing the Law of God by absenting himself from the Communion, e∣specially if he do it customarily; than if he should come to it with all his Fears and Doubts about him. For, as I said, his Fears and Doubts of his own unwor∣thiness, cannot possibly be so well grounded as his Fears and Doubts that he sins against God by habitu∣ally denying his attendance on that great Christi∣an Service. For those are founded on the express Laws of the Gospel: The others are founded onely on uncer∣tain conjectural Surmises about his own condition. That is to say, he is certain that he is bound to take frequent opportunities of paying his homage to Jesus Christ in the Sacrament; but he cannot pretend to have such assurance in his Case that he is unqualified for paying that homage.

But Secondly, Let us suppose the Doubt is equal on both sides: That is to say, that the Man hath as much reason to believe that he is an unworthy Re∣ceiver if he receives at all, as he hath reason to be∣lieve that it is a Sin in him if he do not receive. Which yet can hardly be supposed in our Case, but let us suppose it, nay, if you please, let us suppose the Man doth certainly sin, whether he recives or for∣bears: Here then this comes to be considered; which

of these two Sins is the least: To Receive unworthily, yet out of a Sense of Duty, or not to receive at all. For on which side soever this last sin happens to be, to that side the Man is to determine himself accord∣ing to our second Rule. It being eternally reasona∣ble, That of two Evils we should chuse the least, when we cannot avoid both.

Now putting the Case before us upon this Issue, there needs no more to be done for the resolving it, than only to ask this general Question.

Which is the greater sin of these two; for a Man to omit a known Duty, and so to break a known Law of God for Conscience sake: Or to yield Obedience to that Law for Conscience sake, when yet it so hap∣pens, that a Man cannot do that, without breaking another Law of God in the manner of his Performance of that Duty? For my part, I should think that the Man who doth this last, though he cannot be said to be Innocent, yet is he guilty in a far less degree, than the Man that practiseth the former, and a great deal more is to be said in his justification.

Let us suppose two Men, both of them conscious to themselves, that as things stand with them, they are not in a fit condition, so much as to say their Prayers, or to perform any other act of Religious Worship as they ought to do; now one of these Men doth upon this account forbear all Prayers both Publick and Pri∣vate; neither using his Closet, nor frequenting the Church. The other hath such a Sense of what both Natural Religion and Christianity do oblige him to in this matter, that he dares not forbear his usual Offices either in Publick or Private, though yet he be∣lieves he sinfully performs them.

If the Question now be put, which of these two is the better Man, or the least Offender, I dare say that all men will give their Judgment in favour of the

latter, though yet no Wise man will think that this Person is to be excused for living at such a rate, that he cannot say his Prayers without Sin.

This Judgment, I say, men would pass in this Case; and there is a great deal of Reason for it. For certain∣ly, no indisposition that a man hath contracted, of what nature soever, will take off from his Obliga∣tion to obey the Laws of God. If a man cannot do his Duty so well as he ought, he must at least do it as well as he can. And therefore let his Circumstan∣ces be what they will, he must needs be less Crimi∣nal in performing a known Duty in the best man∣ner that his Condition will allow him, though with many and deserved Reflections upon his own Ʋn∣worthiness, than in wholly omitting or disusing that Duty. Because a neglect in the manner of perform∣ing a Duty, is a less fault than to neglect the Sub∣stance of it.

Let this now that I have said be applyed to our Case, and we have an easie resolution of the Question before us. viz. That since a greater sin is to be avoid∣ed before a less, when a man supposes himself to be un∣der a necessity of being guilty of one; it is more rea∣sonable that the man we speak of, should come to the Sacrament with all his Doubts concerning his un∣worthiness, than that he should customarily and ha∣bitually withdraw himself from it, because it is a greater sin to do this latter than the former.

Well, but some say, How can this consist with St. Paul's Doctrine? Who expresly affirms, That whoe∣ver eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh * 1.1 Damnation to himself. Can there be any more dread∣ful sin than that, which if a man be guilty of, it will actually Damn him? Certainly one would think by this, that a man runs a much less hazard in not Re∣ceiving

at all, than in venturing to Receive whilest he hath the least Doubt that he Receives unworthi∣thily, considering the dreadful Consequences of it.

But to this I briefly answer. Such a man as we all along suppose in our Case, is in no danger at all of Receiving unworthily, in the Sense that St. Paul useth this Term. For the unworthy receiving that he so severly Censures in the Corinthians, was their approaching to the Lords Table with so little a sense of what they were about, that they made no di∣stinction between the Lords Body and common Food: * 1.2 But under a pretence of meeting for the Celebrati∣on of the Lords Supper, they used the Church of God as if it was an Eating or Tipling House: Some of them Revelling it there to that degree, that they went away Drunk from these Religious Assemblies. All this appears from the Text. But I hope none a∣mong us (especially none of those who are so doubt∣ful about their being duly qualified) do profane the Sacrament in this manner.

But further, Perhaps the Damnation which St. Paul here denounces, is not so frightful as is commonly apprehended. For all that he saith (if either the O∣riginal or the Margin of our English Bibles be con∣sulted) will appear to be this, He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh Judgment to himself. Meaning hereby, in all probability, that he who doth thus affront our Lords Instistution, by ma∣king no distinction between the Bread of the Sacra∣ment and common Meat; doth by this his pro∣faneness draw severe Judgments of God upon him∣self. For, for this cause (saith he) many are weak and * 1.3 sickly among you, and many are fallen asleep: But here is not a word of Everlasting Damnation; much less of any mans being put into that State by thus receiving

unworthily: Unless any man will say, that all those who are visited with Gods Judgments in this World, are in the State of Damnation as to the next. Which is so far from being true, that St. Paul in this very place affirms the contrary, viz. in the 32. Verse, where he tells us, That When we are thus judged [in this World] we are chastened of the Lord, that we should not be con∣demned with the World, i. e. with Wicked men in a∣nother Life.

But further, Admitting St. Paul in these words to mean Damnation in the usual Sense, yet still the ut∣most they can come to, will be no more than this: That whosoever eateth and drinketh thus unworthily, as the Corinthians did, is guilty of a Damnable sin. But now there are a great many other Cases besides this of the Sacrament, in which a Man is equally guilty of a Damnable Sin, if he do not perform his Duty as he ought to do. He that Prays or Hears unworthily; He that Fasts or gives Alms unworthily. In a word, He that in any Instance performs the Worship of God, or professeth the Christian Religion unworthily: I say, such a Man, according to the Protestant Doctrine, may be said to do these things to his own Damnation, upon the same account that he is said to Eat and Drink his own Damnation that Communicates un∣worthily in the Sacrament; though indeed not in so high a degree. That is to say, such a Man is guilty of a Sin that is in its own Nature Damnable, and may prove actually so to him, unless either by a parti∣cular or general Repentance he obtains Gods pardon for it. But yet for all this, there is no man will for these Reasons think it adviseable to leave off the pra∣ctice of these Duties; but the only Consequence he will draw from hence, is, that he is so much the more concerned to take care that he perform them as he ought to do.

But in the last place. Let the sin of coming to the Sacrament unworthily, be as great and as damnable as we reasonably can suppose it: Yet this is that we contend for, the sin of totally withdrawing from it, is much greater and more damnable. So that if he who partakes of it unworthily, doth eat and drink Damnation to him∣self; He that partakes not at all, is so far from mend∣ing the matter, that he doth much increase that Damnation.

The truth of this doth fully appear from what I have before spoke in General, concerning the much greater sin of transgressing a known Law of God, than of observing that Law as well as we can, though with much unworthiness. I will only add this further, with reference to this Particular of receiving the Sacrament.

Though I am far from encouraging any to approach to the Lords Table without due Qualifications; or from extenuating any mans sin that comes unwor∣thily; (unworthily I mean in the Scripture Sense of that word, and not as it is understood by many me∣lancholly scrupulous Persons) Yet this I say: That if Men did seriously consider what a sin it is to live with∣out the Sacrament, it being no other, than living in an open affront to the express Institution of our Lord Jesus, and a renouncing the Worship of God and the Communion of the Church, in the great Instance of Christian Worship and Christian Communion: And withal, what dreadful Consequences they bring upon themselves hereby, even the depriving themselves of the chief of those ordinary means which our Lord hath appointed for the obtaining Remission of sins, and the Grace and Influence of his Holy Spirit: I say, if men did seriously consider these things, they would not look upon it as so slight a matter, voluntarily

to Excommunicate themselves as to the partaking in this great Duty and Privilege of Christians; but what apprehensions soever they had of the sin, and the danger of receiving unworthily, they would for all that, think it more sinful and more dangerous not to receive at all.

I have said enough in answer to this Objection from St. Paul; perhaps too much, considering how often these things have been said. I will now go on with our Case.

In the Third place, therefore let us suppose our Doubting Man, (for these or such like Reasons as we have given) to have such a Sense of his Duty, that he generally takes the opportunities that are offered him, of doing Honour to our Lord, by partaking in his Sup∣per, though perhaps he is not often very well satisfied about his Preparation: But so it happens, that since his last Communicating, he finds his Mind in a much worse frame than it used to be. He hath lived more loosly and carelesly than he was wont; or perhaps he hath been very lately guilty of some grievous sin that lies heavy upon his Conscience: So that when his next usual time of Receiving comes, he cannot but apprehend himself in a very unfit condition to Communicate in so sacred a Mystery. Upon this he is in a great perplexity what to do. For on the one side, he thinks he hath more reason to believe that he offends God if he comes to the Sacrament in these Circumstances, than if he forbears; because he is more certain, that there is a Law of God that for∣bids him to come unworthily; than he is certain, that there is a Law of God that commands him to receive every time that he hath opportunity. But now, on the other hand, if it should prove that he is really bound by Gods Law to Commemorate the Death

of Christ in the Sacrament, every time that an opportunity is offered; He is sensible in that Case, it is a greater sin to neglect this Duty, than to per∣form it unworthily, so long still as he performs it out of Conscience. What now is the Man to do in these Circumstances?

This is an exact Instance of the Case I spoke to in my third Proposition; where on one side the Man runs a greater danger of sinning; but on the other side, if he should prove mistaken, he sins in a greater degree.

Now for a Resolution of this Case, I say; That if the Question be put concerning the Mans absenting himself only once or twice from the Communion, in order to the exercise of Repentance, and the put∣ting himself into a better frame of mind, against a∣nother opportunity: The Answer (according to our Third Proposition) must be this, That it is very rea∣sonable thus to do.

And there is good ground for this Answer. For certainly a Man is more in danger of sinning, if he receive unworthily, than if he do not receive every time that there is a Communion. There being an express Law against the one; but no express Law ob∣liging to the other. For Christ hath no more ap∣pointed that we should receive the Sacrament so ma∣ny times in a year; than he hath appointed that we should Pray so many times in a day; or that we should give such a determinate proportion of our Annual In∣come to Charitable Uses. As to these things he hath bound us in the General; but as to the Particulars, the Circumstances of our Condition, and the Laws of our Superiors are to determine us. Only this we are to remember, that the oftner we perform these Duties, it is the better; and we can hardly be said to

be Christians if we do not perform them frequently.

This now being so: Though it be true, that a Man would be guilty of a greater sin, if he should at any time, though but once, abstain from the Communion, than if he should come to it with such unworthiness as we are here speaking of; supposing that Christs Law had precisely tied him up to communicate every time that a Communion is appointed: Yet since there is so little appearance of Reason to conclude that Christ has thus tied him up; and withal on the other hand, he runs so certain a danger of sinning if he should Communicate at this time, apprehending himself to be so unworthy as he doth: This Consi∣deration of the certain danger must needs in this Case overballance the other of the greater sin, and make it appear more Reasonable to the Man to suspend his receiving to another Opportunity, a∣gainst which time he hopes to be better prepared; than to adventure upon it in his present Circumstan∣ces.

But then if the Question be put concerning the Mans absenting himself Customarily and Habitually from the Lords Table upon this account of unwor∣thiness; that which I have now said, will not hold. For in this Case, the Man is in as much danger of sinning by not receiving at all, as by receiving un∣worthily, nay, and a great deal more, as I shewed in my first particular about this Case. And withal he is guilty of a much greater sin in wholly withdraw∣ing from the Sacrament, than in coming to it though with never so great Apprehensions of his own un∣worthiness, as I shewed in my second. And there∣fore since the danger is at least equal on both sides, he must chuse that side on which the least sin lies: That is to say, he must Communicate frequently (at

least so often as the Laws of the Church do enjoin him, which is three times a year, though he be in danger of doing it unworthily; rather than not Com∣municate at all.

Having thus gone through Three of our Pro∣positions concerning a Double Doubt: All that remains is, to put our Case about the Sacrament so, as that it may serve for an Instance or Illustration of our fourth and last.

Here therefore we are to suppose our Doubting Man to be in such a Condition, that he apprehends he runs an equal danger of sinning whether he receives the Sacrament, or receives it not. And withall, so unskilful a Judge is he of the morality of Actions, that he apprehends no great difference in the degree of the sin, whether he do the one or the other.

In this Case now, all the Man can do, is to con∣sider what Inducements he has in Point of Prudence or Interest to do or to forbear the Action he doubts about; for since all other Considerations in the Case are equal, those of this kind are to turn the Ballance, according to our Fourth Proposition.

But if the Case turn upon this Point, I dare say no man will be long doubtful, whether he should fre∣quent the Sacrament in obedience to the Laws, or for∣bear it. For it is plain, that he Acts more Prudently, and more consults his own Advantage both Tempo∣ral and Spiritual.

As for the Temporal Advantages which a Man receives by obeying the Laws in this matter, I will not now insist on them, though they are neither few nor inconsiderable. That which I desire chiefly to be here considered, is this, That in point of Spiritual Ad∣vantages; it is much more advisable for our Doubt∣ting Person to come to the Sacrament, than to abstain from it.

For by frequenting this Ordinance, he takes the best method both to grow more worthy, if he be now un∣worthy; and likewise to cure the Doubts and Scru∣ples he is now troubled with. But if he neglect this means of Grace, he not only takes an effectual course to increase and perpetuate his Fears and Doubts (it being very probable that the longer he defers his receiv∣ing the Sacrament, still the more doubtful will he be of his being qualified for it): But also is in great danger to lose that sense of Virtue and Religion that he now hath upon his Spirit; because he denyes him∣self the use of those Means and Helps which are most principally necessary for the preserving and maintain∣ing it.

Now I say, supposing all other things in the Case equal, this very Consideration alone will prevail with a reasonable Man to come to the Sacrament, rather than forbear it, even at the same time that he mighti∣ly doubts whether he shall not receive unworthily.

Thus have I given a large Exemplification of all our Rules concerning a Double Doubt in this instance of receiving the Holy Communion. If I have dwelt too long upon this Subject, I hope the Frequency and the Importance of the Case, will in some measure excuse me.

III. Having thus prepared our way by settling the Notion and the Rule of a Doubting Conscience, I come now more directly to the main Business that is before us, and that is, to give an Account what share Humane Laws, Ecclesiastical or Civil, have in the Rule of a Doubting Conscience, or what Power they have to over-rule a mans Doubts in any Case? which, according to the method I proposed, is the Third general Enquiry I am to resolve.

This is indeed the great Point that is disputed be∣tween us and those of the Separation. Nay, I may say

it is the Point upon which that whole Controversie turns, so far as a Doubting Conscience is concerned in it. And therefore I shall discuss it as carefully as I can; but yet in such a general way as that what I have to offer, may serve for all other Doubtful Cases of this Nature, as well as this which we are now con∣cerned in.

Their Assertion generally is this, (generally, I say: For there are some of the Dissenters, and those as Learn∣ed and Eminent as any, who have declared themselves of another Opinion) viz. That wherever a Man Doubts concerning the Lawfulness of an Action; that very Doubt of his is a sufficient Reason to make him forbear that Action, though Lawful Authority hath commanded it.

On the other side, our Assertion is; That wherever Lawful Authority hath Commanded an Action, that Command is (generally speaking) a sufficient Warrant for a Man to do that Action, though he Doubts whether in it self it be Lawful or no.

That I may speak clearly to this Point; I shall First premise some things in order to our more distinct un∣derstanding the State of the Question. Secondly, I shall shew the Grounds and Reasons of our Assertion. Third∣ly, I shall endeavour to answer the Chief Arguments that are brought on the other side.

I. What I think needful to be premised for the right apprehending the State of the Question, I shall comprise in these following Particulars, by which it may be easily discerned how far we agree with the Dissenters in this matter, and in what we differ from them.

First, We do readily own with them, that no Au∣thority upon Earth can oblige its Subjects to do any Action which the Law of God hath forbidden, or to for∣bear any Action which the Law of God hath command∣ed.

Secondly, We agree likewise with them in this; That wherever any Subject hath taken up an Opinion or Per∣swasion that such an Action which his Governours have obliged him to, is against the Law of God; though it be a false Opinion or Perswasion, yet it will so far bind him, that he cannot in that Instance obey their Laws without offending God. But then we say, on the other hand, That though he cannot Obey without sin, so long as this Perswasion continues; yet he is at the same time guilty of sin in disobeying, if he should prove to be mistaken; supposing that it was through his own fault that he fell into that mistake.

Thirdly, We acknowledge further, That in a Case where a Man cannot be said to be Perswaded that the particular Action enjoyned by Authority is a sinful Action; but only he Doubts whether it be so or no: Yet if the Man hath a general Perswasion that no Pub∣lick Law will warrant him to act against his Private doubt; in this Case he can no more do the Action enjoyned without sin, than he could in the former Case. But then if this Notion of his be false (as it is my present business to shew that it is so;) he cannot be excused from sin, in disobeying his Superiors, unless upon the former account of inculpable Ignorance.

Fourthly, We say this farther, That a Culpable Doubt doth no more excuse the doing an Evil Acti∣on, than a Culpable Ignorance, i. e. it doth not excuse it My meaning is this. If a man should be so little instructed in his Religion, as to Doubt whether that which is plainly enjoyned by Gods Law be a Duty or no: Or whether that which is plainly forbid by Gods Law be a sin or no: (so plainly, I mean, that it is the duty of every Honest Man to know this, and he must be most criminally Ignorant that can be so stupid as to

make a Doubt of it). If, I say, in such a Case as this a man should Doubt whether the thing commanded by his Superiours was Lawful or no: We are so far from say∣ing that a Man doth well in obeying his Superiours in such an instance where their commands do so manifestly contradict the Laws of God; that on the contrary, we affirm the man is highly accountable to God for all such Actions that he doth, though they were done purely in obedience to that Authority which God hath set o∣ver him; and purely in compliance with this Principle we are now contending for, viz. That in all Doubtful Cases it is most reasonable to govern our Actions by the Commands of our Superiours.

Far are we therefore from asserting, That whatever our Governours do command, the Subject is bound to perform, so long as he only Doubts, but is not perswaded of the unlawfulness of the thing commanded: And that if there be any sin in the Action, he that commands it is to answer for it, and not he that obeys. For we do believe, that in matters where a mans Conscience is con∣cerned, every one is to be a Judge for himself, and must answer for himself. And therefore, if our Superiours do command us to do an Action which their Superiour God Almighty hath forbid; we are offenders if we do that Action, as well as they in commanding it, and that whether we do it Doubtingly, or with a Perswasion of its Lawfulness.

But then these two things are always to be remem∣bred. First, That this is true only in such Cases where (as I said) a man is bound to know that Gods Law hath forbid that Action which his Governours do command, and it is either through his gross carelesness, or some other worse Principle in him, that he knows it not, or is doubtful of it. For wherever a man is innocently, and

inculpably Ignorant or Doubtful, how the Law of God stands as to such a particular matter which Authority hath obliged him to; as neither having means to come∣to the knowledge of it; or, if he had, the Circum∣stances of his condition not requiring that he should so accurately inform himself about it: In such a Case as this, I say, a man cannot formally be said to be guilty of sin in obeying his Lawful Superiours, though the in∣stance in which he obeys should happen to contradict some Law of God. For the Law of God here, is as no Law to him, that is, it doth not oblige him, because he neither knows it, nor is bound to know it. And where there is no Law, there is no transgression.

And then further this is also to be remembred, that when we own that a man may be guilty of sin as well in obeying his Superiours, when he only doubts of the Lawfulness of the Action commanded, as when he is Perswaded that the Action is unlawful: I say, this we are to remember, that when ever this Case happens; the mans sin doth not lye in his obeying his Superiours with a Doubting Conscience (which is commonly run away with): For the man would as certainly sin, if in this Case he did the Action with a Perswasion that it was Lawful; as he doth in doing it with a Doubt, whether it be Lawful or no. But the sin lies here: viz. in do∣ing an Action which Gods Law hath forbid; and which the man would have known to be an ill Action, if he had been so honest, and so careful in minding his Duty as he should have been. It is his Acting contrary to a Law of God, that here makes the matter of the sin; and it is his vitious criminal Ignorance of that Law which gives the Form to it. But as for the obeying his Superiours, whether with a Doubt or without one, that is no part or ingredient of the sin at all.

Fifthly, We add this further, That whatever Power

or Right we give to our Superiours, for the over-ruling a Private Doubt; It is not to be extended so far as ei∣ther to destroy the Truth; or to supersede the Ʋse of those Rules I have before laid down in order to the directing a mans proceeding in the Case of a Double Doubt. For this Case of obeying the Commands of our Su∣periours when we doubt of the Lawfulness of them be∣ing a Double Doubt as properly as any other, those Rules are here to take place as much as in any other instance.

And therefore where ever a mans Doubts are in this Case very unequal: That is to say, he apprehends him∣self in much greater danger of sinning if he obey his Su∣periours in this particular instance, than if he obey them not; as having abundantly more Reason to believe that their Commands are Unlawful, than that they are Law∣ful: In that Case we cannot say ••e is obliged to obey, but should rather disobey, supposing all other Conside∣rations be equal. For no man is bound to obey his Su∣periours any farther than they command Lawful things. And therefore if it be two to one more Probable that their Command is Ʋnlawful than that it is Lawful, it is likewise more Probable that a man in this Instance is not to obey them. And a greater Probability, caeteris paribus, is always to be chosen before a less, according to our First Rule

But, then though the Authority of our Superiours alone will not in this Case be of force enough to re∣trieve the Ballance which is so far inclined the other way, and to turn it on its own side: Yet there may be, and very usually are, such other Arguments drawn from the Consideration of the greater sin, and the more dreadful Consequences, of disobeying in this instance, than of obey∣ing: As will to any reasonable man out-weigh all the Probabilities on the other side (so long as they are not so great as to create a perswasion) and make it

reasonable for the man rather to do the Action; how strong soever his Doubts be of the unlawfulness of it (so long as they are but Doubts); than to omit it after Lawful Authority hath enjoyned it.

But however this happen: It is always to be born in mind, as before, that if it should prove that our Superiours do command nothing in the particular Instances, but what they Lawfully may do: It will not justifie any mans disobedience, to say, that he appre∣hended it was more dangerous or more sinful to obey them, than to disobey them: For our Mistakes and false Reasonings, will not take off from the Obligation that is upon us to obey our Lawful Superiours in their Lawful Commands; unless, as I have often said, we can satisfie our selves, that in those Instances we neither were bound, nor had sufficient means to un∣derstand better.

And now having thus cleared our way, by removing from our Question those things that are Foreign to it, and which indeed, by being usually blended with it, have made it more Intricate than otherwise it would be; we are pretty well prepared to propose our Point.

In the Sixth place then. Excluding (as we have done) out of our Case all those Things and Circumstances we have been speaking of, with none of which we have here to do; the plain Question before us is this.

Whether in the Case of a pure Doubt about the Law∣fulness or Ʋnlawfulness of an Action, where the Pro∣babilities are on both sides pretty equal and where likewise the Man concerned, hath done all that he was obliged to do for the satisfying him∣self: Whether, I say, in this Case the Command of a Lawful Superiour ought not so far to over-ballance the Doubt, as not only to make it reasonable for the Man to do that of which he doubteth; but also to oblige him so to do?

We hold the Affirmative of this Question, and I now come to give the Reasons why we so hold, which is the Second thing to be done under this Head.

II. Our Proposition is this, That if Lawful Autho∣rity do Command us to do a thing which as on the one hand we cannot say it is Lawful; so on the o∣ther hand, we cannot say it is Ʋnlawful; but our Judgment remains suspended, as having equal, or near equal Arguments on both sides: In such a Case as this, though if we were left to our own Choice, we should generally forbear the Action for the Reasons I before gave; yet being Commanded by our Supe∣riours, who by the Law of God have Authority over us; it is not only reasonable, but our Duty to do it.

For First of all, even in point of Humility and Mo∣desty, though there was no other consideration; one would think that a Subject owes as much deference to the Judgment and Discretion of his Superiours as this comes to.

So much influence as this, even a Confessor or a Pri∣vate Friend hath over our Consciences. In a Case where we are altogether uncertain on both sides, we usually so far submit our selves to them, as to be swayed and over-ruled by what they advise; and that oftentimes not so much upon Consideration of the weight and force of their Reasons, as meerly upon this account, that we take them to be abler to guide us in these Affairs than we our selves are, as ha∣ving better considered them, and seeing farther into them than we do.

I dare say there are few of those we are now di∣sputing with, if a Doubt should happen to arise in their Conscience about the Lawfulness of any Practice in their Trade, or their other civil Concernments, and they should upon this apply to some Friend of theirs,

of whose Learning and Prudence, and Honesty they have a good Opinion, and put their Case to him: But would (if the Doubt was so equal on both sides as in our Case we suppose it) without any great difficulty be concluded and determined by the Judgment of the man they thus apply to; especially if that Judgment be seconded by the suffrage of some other Learned Pious men, whom they have thought fit upon this occasion to consult likewise.

If now the Opinions of one or two Private men be of so much weight as to over-rule a Doubt about the Lawfulness of an Action, when the Reasons on both sides are equal: Is it not very hard if the joynt Resolution and Determination of our Publick Gover∣nours, whose Office and Business it is to Consult and Command for the Best, should not in such a Case have the same Influence upon the Minds of their own Subjects? Or would it not argue much Self-conceit and Arrogance, and a very mean Opinion of our Supe∣riours, and a great Contempt of their Authority, to refuse that respect to them which we give to every private Man almost that we think wiser than our selves.

Secondly, I desire that may be taken notice of, which the Casuists, and in particular our Excellent Bishop Sanderson have urged in this affair, viz. It is a known Rule in Law, That in all disputed Cases, he that is in pos∣session of the thing contended for, hath the advantage of the other that contends with him, supposing all other things be equal. In controverted Matters, the Right is always presumed to be on the side of the Possessor, unless there be a good Reason shewn to the con∣trary.

Thus for Instance, If I be in possession of an Estate which another man makes a claim to: And it is equally

doubtful whether that Estate belongs to him or me, yet so long as I have the Possession of it, I have a good Title to it by the Laws of God and Man; nor can I without injustice be dispossessed of it, till my Ad∣versary hath made it appear that he hath a better Title to it than I.

Let us now apply this Rule to our present Case. Here is a Contest or Dispute between the Superiour and the Subject, about a matter of Right as to a parti∣cular Action. The Superiour saith it is his Right to Command his Subject in this Instance, and according∣ly doth Command him. The Subject saith that he doubts whether his Superiour hath Right to Com∣mand him in this Instance, because he doubts whe∣ther this Command be not against the Law of God.

But in the mean time the Superiour is in actual possession of the Power and Authority to Command, though it be uncertain and doubtful whether as to this Instance he do not exceed the just Limits of his Power.

Why, certainly by the former Rule, so long as the Case is thus doubtful, the Subject must yield; and at no hand by his disobedience dispossess his Superiour of that Authority he is possessed of, till he be convinced in his own Conscience that he hath greater reason to disobey in this Instance than to obey; which in our Case it is impossible he should have, because we here suppose that the Reasons on both sides are equal.

But, Thirdly, If this Argument appear too subtile; let the Question before us be decided by the Common Rule, viz. That in all Doubtful Cases the safer side is to be chosen.

Now putting the Point upon this Issue, I ask which is safest, with respect to Conscience, for a man to obey his Superiours in such a purely Doubtful Case as we here

speak of: Or to disobey them? I think this Questi∣on will soon be answered by any Man that will attend to what I am going to represent, viz.

There is a Plain Law of God, and acknowledged by us to be so, that Commands us to obey our Superiours in all Lawful things: But as to the particular Case about which we are now supposed to Doubt, it is ve∣ry Ʋncertain and Questionable to us, (even after our best endeavours to satisfie our selves) whether there be any Law of God which forbiddeth that thing which our Superiours have enjoyned us.

This now being so, we thus argue. If it should prove that our Superiours do in this Instance command an Ʋnlawful thing; yet the hazard we run in obeying them is very small and inconsiderable, in comparison with that we run in disobeying them, supposing it should indeed prove that they command nothing but what is Just and Right, and conducing to the Publick Good.

For by doing the former, by obeying our Superiours, the only hazard we run, is of transgressing some Ʋn∣known Law of God; some Law which doth no way appear to us; all that we can pronounce after our best enquiry being no more than this, that it may be there is such a Law, and it may be there is not: And there∣fore we may reasonably presume that if there should indeed be such a Law of God; it is either not of such consequence that we in our Circumstances were bound to know it, or if it was, that we had no sufficient means to cometo the Knowledge of it: in each of which Cases, as I said, a Mans Ignorance doth excuse the violation of the Law.

But now, on the other side, if in such an Instance as this we disobey Authority when it hath peremptorly laid its Commands upon us; we venture upon a much greater danger. For in that Case we run the hazard of transgressing a Plain Law of God; a Law of which

no man can or ought to be supposed Ignorant; and withal, a Law it is of such Importance and Consequence to Mankind, that we may truly say, the very being, as well as the Happiness of all Societies depend upon it.

Supposing now this to be a true Account of the ha∣zard we run in Acting on one side or the other in our present Question, I leave it to any indifferent person to judge, whether it be not much safer in such Circumstances as we here speak of to obey our Lawful Superiours with a Doubting Conscience, than to disobey them with a Doubt∣ing Conscience.

Fourthly, If there yet remain any dispute in this mat∣ter, let, if you please, our Saviour's Rule determine it, As ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye unto them. We desire no more favour for our Superi∣ours, than this eternal Law of Equity will oblige us to.

If a man will but be so impartial, as to pass the same Judgment in the Cause of Authority when he is a Sub∣ject, as he doth in his own Cause when he is a Superi∣our, we believe there would be presently an end of this Controversie.

For let men talk as gravely as they please about the danger of obeying the Publick Laws with a Doubting Conscience: Yet I dare appeal to themselves, whether they would not think it very unreasonable for any Domestick of theirs, over whom they have Lawful Au∣thority, to live in Contradiction to the Private Rules and Orders of their Family, upon a pretence of doubting whether those Orders were Lawful or no.

If a Parent, for Instance, should command his Son to sit uncovered before him; He would not take it for a good Answer from the young man, to say, Sir, I am doubtful whether it be not unlawful to use any such Ceremonies to Men, and therefore I pray excuse me, if I do not pay you that Respect you require.

If a Master should order his Servant to provide Dinner for him on the Lords Day; and he should re∣ply; I would do it with all my heart, but that I am in doubt whether it be not forbidden by Gods Word to do any Work on the Sabbath. I am not indeed perswad∣ed that it is forbidden, but in the mean time I am not satisfied that it is Lawful, and therefore till I be resolved in this Point, I pray Sir, be pleased to Pardon me.

Would now a Parent or a Master think these An∣swers Reasonable? would he take them in such good part as to think his Son or his Servant had done no∣thing but what they were bound to do in thus refu∣sing to obey his Commands? No, I dare say he would not, but on the contrary would tell them; you are my Son or my Servant, and you must leave it to me to judge what is fit for me to command and for you to do. I will take care to command you nothing but what is lawful and justifiable: But in the mean time, you must not think by your foolish Doubts and Scruples (so long as you confess you know nothing un∣lawful in what I bid you do) to control my Orders and Commands, that I think neither becomes you to do, nor me to suffer.

I dare say most men would judge this a very fitting and just Reply in such a Case. And if so, it is a strong Argument, that we are all naturally apt to think that in purely Doubtful Cases, our Superiour is to be obey∣ed notwithstanding our Doubt, and that if in any Case we think otherwise, it is where our own Liberty and Interest are concerned, and where consequently we may be justly presumed unequal Judges, as being pre∣judiced in favour of our selves.

Fifthly, Let me add this one Consideration more, and I have done. If in meerly Doubtful Cases, our Superiours have not a Power of Determining us;

what will their Authority signifie? If it be not of weight enough when the Scales hang even to turn the Ballance; it is truly the lightest thing in the World. Indeed it is worth nothing; and there will not be left Power enough in those that are to govern us, for the securing in any tolerable degree the Peace and Happiness of the Society they are to govern.

For I pray consider, What can there be so wisely Commanded, or Provided for, either in a Family, in a City, or in a Kingdom, but may be liable to exception, and become a matter of Doubt to some Person or other?

There is nothing in the whole compass of indiffe∣rent things (and such chiefly are the Matters of Hu∣mane Laws) but some Person or other will be found to doubt whether it be fit or lawful. And if such a Doubt be a just Reason to deny Obedience to the Law or the Command, in what a condition are all Fami∣lies, and Corporations, and Societies in the World? What will be the Consequence of such a Principle? Why certainly nothing but perpetual Jars, and Di∣sturbances, and Confusions.

For Instance, If whenever a Prince declares War against his Enemies, it should be supposed Lawful for any Subject to withdraw his Assistance from his So∣veraign in Case he doubts whether that War be a Law∣ful War or no; in what a sad case would that Prince or that Kingdom be, that is to be supported and pro∣tected upon these Terms? Every man is hereby made a Judge of the Merits of a War; and though he be never so Ignorant, never so Unexperienced, ne∣ver so Ignorant, never so Unexperienced, ne∣ver so unable to make a Judgment of these mo∣mentous Affairs of the Kingdom; yet if some Ru∣mours or uncertain Stories have reached his Ears, that make him doubt whether this War was lawfully be∣gun or no: Why he is upon this Principle warranted

to deny not only his Personal Service, but his Contri∣butions towards the Charge of that War. But these Consequences are intolerable; and therefore the Princi∣ple from whence they flow, must needs be thought intolerable also.

III. Having thus given the reasons of our Assertion, I come now in the Third place to answer the Argu∣ments that are brought on the other side.

All the Arguments I have met with against the Do∣ctrine we have been establishing, may be reduced to Three; and of those three, the First I have prevented by my stating the Question; the Second I have already an∣swered in my Proofs of our Assertion: so that the Third only remains to be spoken to. However I will name the two first.

The First Argument is drawn from the mischievous Consequences of our Doctrine. For, say they, If a man should think himself obliged in every doubtful Case to be determined by the Command of his Superiours, it would be the ready way to involve him often times in most grievous sins. As for instance, if a man should so halt between two opinions, as to doubt whether Jeho∣vah or Baal was the true God, as the Isralites some∣times did; and at the same time (as it then happened among them) the Chief Ruler should command that Ba∣al should be worshipped: Why now in this Case (say they) according to your way of resolving Doubts, the man must be obliged to worship an Idol, and to renounce the true God.

This is the Argument. But it is no Argument against us: Because in the stating of our Question, we have ex∣cluded all such Doubts out of it, as do proceed from a mans Gross and Criminal Ignorance of his Duty (as it is Apparent and Notorious that the Doubt in this In∣stance doth). On the contrary, we are as forward to

acknowledge as they, that if any man do an Action that is plainly contradictory to the Laws of God, it is not his Ig∣norance, and much less his Doubtfulness, that will excuse him, though he do it in obedience to his Governours. So that though this Argument would fall heavy enough upon those that plead for an Absolute Blind Obedience to Authority in all things indiscriminately, (which no man of the Church of England doth): Yet it doth not at all touch us, who only assert, That where we doubt equally, whether an Action be Lawful or no, and have used our best endeavours to satisfie our selves how the Law of God stands as to that matter, there the Command of our Superiours is to over-rule our Doubt.

But further, to shew what little force there is in this Argument, which indeed hath made a great deal of noise; we will try whether it will not make as much against our Adversaries, if they will give us leave to put the Case, as it seems to make against us, when they put the Case.

Let us suppose therefore, as before, that an Israelite was very Doubtful whether Jehovah or Baal was the true God: And let us suppose likewise (as we reasonably may) that the King of Israel made a Law, that all the Temples and Altars of Baal should be demolished, and that Jehovah only should be worshipped. What advice now would they give to the doubting Man in this Case? Will they say that he must comply with the Kings Laws, and wor∣ship Jehovah only, while yet he is doubtful in his own mind whether Baal be not the true God? Why this is against their own Principle, and gives away the Cause to us. But, will they then say, that while this Doubt remains, the Man must not obey Authority in worship∣ping Jehovah only; but he must either worship Baal and not Jehovah; or both Baal and Jehovah together;

Why, this is indeed agreeable to their Principle; but then I appeal to my Reader, whether according to their way of resolving of Doubts, a man is not as necessarily ingaged in Idolatry, and other grievous sins, as he is by our way.

So that you see this Argument concludes as strongly against them, as against us. But in Truth it concludes nothing either one way or other, but is wholly For∣reign to the Question, as I shewed in my stating of it, whither I refer the Reader.

The Second Argument is drawn from the Limitati∣ons which God himself hath put to the Obedience we are to pay to our Governours, and it may be formed thus. God hath not commanded us to obey our Su∣periours absolutely, and in all things; but only in all such things as are not contrary to his Law: So that where ever we are uncertain whether the Commands of our Superiour be Lawful or no, we must at the same time be as much uncertain whether we be bound to obey: And if so, how can you say that it is any more our Duty to obey them, than to disobey them in a Doubt∣ful Case?

To this we answer, That though we acknowledge that no Man is bound to obey his Superiours any far∣ther than they command Lawful things: Yet when e∣ver it happens that they command such things as we equally doubt whether they be Lawful or no; there are so many weighty Reasons to be given, why a man should obey rather than disobey in that Case, as will perswade any Wise and Good Man to think it his Duty to obey. And for those Reasons I refer my Reader to the Five Particulars I before insisted on.

The Third and indeed the Principal Argument, is drawn from the words of St. Paul in the 14th of the Romans, and the last verse, He that doubteth is damned if

he eat, beause he eateth not of Faith; and whatsoever is not of Faith is sin. From whence they thus Argue, If it was a sin in those Christians that St. Paul speaks of to eat any Food, though in it self Lawful to be eaten, so long as they Doubted whether it was Lawful or no: Then, by parity of Reason, it must be a sin to do any other Action, so long as we have a Doubt in our minds con∣cerning the Lawfulness of it; and if so, it is not the Ma∣gistrates commanding that Action, that will make it cease to be a sin in us to do it.

This is the great Argument that is brought against our Point, and I shall give it a full and a just discus∣sion: Because, in truth, if we come clearly off from this Text of St. Paul; not only all that is said against Obeying Authority with a Doubting Conscience will fall to the ground: But likewise most of the difficulties which entangle and perplex the Case of a Doubting Conscience in other matters, will be in a great measure removed.

But before I enter upon a particular discussion of this Text, with reference to our present Controversie, it will be needful to premise some general Account of it, for the sake of ordinary Readers, that so under∣standing before hand the Case which the Apostle speaks to, and the meaning of the Expressions he here useth, they may be the better able to go along with us.

First, therefore, I shall give an Account of the Sub∣ject matter of St. Paul's Discourse in this Chapter. II. Of what is meant by Doubting in this Text. III. What is meant by eating not of Faith. IV. What is meant by being Damned or Condemned for so doing.

First, As to the Subject Matter of St. Paul's Discourse in this Chapter; it is undoubtedly the Case of those Jewish Christians that were not so fully instructed in their Christian Liberty, but that they still believed all the Ceremonial Laws of Moses, concerning the Obser∣vation

of Days, and the Difference of Meats, to be still in force, and to oblige their Conscience: Or at least they mightily doubted whether they did or not. So that whereas other Christians, who were better instructed, made no scruple of eating any kind of Food, though forbidden by the Law of Moses: These men had great Reason to forbear such kind of Meats, because they were Perswaded, or at least it appeared more probable to them, than otherwise, that they were bound so to do.

That this was the Case of those that St. Paul here styles the weak Christians, appears from several pas∣sages of this Chapter, nor I think is it much question∣ed by any. As for what is intimated in the second Verse, concerning their abstaining from Flesh altogether, and only eating Herbs; which would make one think that it was not purely their respect to the Law of Moses, but some other thing, which made them thus to put a difference between Meats; because by that Law, they were no more tyed from Flesh (excepting only Swines-Flesh and a few other sorts) than they were from Herbs: St. Chrysostome hath well obviated this diffi∣culty, in the Account he gives of the Case of those Christians.

There were (saith he) several of the Be∣lieving Jews, who taking themselves to be obliged in Conscience by the Law of Moses even after their Christianity, did still retain the Observation of Meats, not daring wholly to throw off the Yoak of the Law: These now, lest they should be found out, and reproached by the other Christians for thus abstain∣ing from Swines-Flesh, and the like, upon account of Conscience; chose to eat no Flesh at all, but to feed altogether upon Herbs; that so this way of living of theirs, might pass rather for a kind of Fast or Religi∣ous Abstinence, than for a Legal Observance. Thus St. Chrysostome; and to the same purpose Theodoret and Theo∣phylact.

But if any one be not satisfied with this Account of that Business; but will further contend, that St. Paul here doth not only speak to the Case of Jewish Chri∣stians who were zealous for Moses's Law: But also takes in the Case of some Gentile Christians at that time, who (upon a Pythagorean Principle they might have enter∣tained) were Averse to the eating any kind of Flesh; as thinking all such Food to be Ʋnclean: They may, notwithstanding what I have said, enjoy their own O∣pinion. For it is indifferent to our Controversie, whe∣ther the Persons whose Case is here spoken to, were Jews or Gentiles. Only thus much appears plainly, that the most of them were Jewish Christians, who, together with their Christianity, had a Conscientious regard to the Law of Moses.

Secondly, As for what is meant by [Doubting] in the * 1.4 Text, the Reader may be pleased to take notice, that the word [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] which we here translate [He that doubteth] doth as properly signifie to distinguish or make a difference, as to Doubt, or Hesitate. And thus it is used both by Profane Writers, and in Holy Scripture, as par∣ticularly in the 22d. of St. Jude's Epistle. And of some have compassion, making a difference, [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] the very word in the Text.

Now considering the Apostles Argument in this Chapter is the Case of the Jewish Christians, who were divided in their Perswasions about the Legal Observa∣tions, some making a difference between clean and un∣clean Meats, and such like things; and others ma∣king none: It seems every whit as proper and natural, and more suitable to the scope of the Place, to take the Word in this Sense in this place, rather than in that other, according to which it is usually translated. So that the Text is thus to be rendered, He that ma∣keth a difference between clean and unclean Meats; If he do eat any thing which he judgeth to be unclean, he is damned or condemned for so doing, because he eat∣eth not of Faith.

And so probable is this rendring, that our English Translators took care to put it in the Margin of our Bibles, as may be seen by every one. Nor doth it want good Authority, for the Ʋulgar Latine thus translates the place, and not only so, but Erasmus Hentenius, and generally all the Latine Expositors, if we may believe Estius, who yet himself interprets it the Common way.

Indeed I doubt not but this is the true Version of this Word in this Text, However I do not so much stand upon it, as to preclude any man from the liberty of taking the other if he likes it better. For though this way of rendering doth better serve our Purpose, (as quite putting an end to the Controversie): Yet our Cause doth not so absolutely depend upon it, but that we may very well allow of the common Translation; as will appear hereafter.

Thirdly, As for the Word Faith, which is here us∣ed; let it be taken notice of, that when in the verse before the Text, the Apostle speaks of having Faith; and in the Text, of eating without Faith, or not of Faith; and that, whatsoever is not of Faith, is Sin; We are

not to take Faith here in the large sense, as it signifies a Belief in Jesus Christ, or an Assent to Gods Revelations, particularly those of the Gospel; which is the usual No∣tion of Faith in the New Testament: But only for a mans Assent to the Goodness or Lawfulness of any par∣ticular Action that he takes in hand.

So that to have Faith about an Action, is to be per∣swaded that that Action may be Lawfully done in the present Circumstances, or at least not to be Conscious of any Reason that should make it unlawful. And, on the other side, to do an Action without Faith, or not of Faith, as the Apostle here expresseth it, is to do an Action of the Lawfulness of which we are no way sa∣tisfied, but, on the contrary, think we have good rea∣son to believe that it is an unlawful Action.

Fourthly, Whereas St. Paul saith, that he that doubteth or differenceth, is damned or condemned, if he eat; we are to take notice, that that expression is not to be un∣derstood of the punishment of his eating in the other World, (which is that which in common speech we call Damnation): But only of the guilt of his eating as to his own Conscience. Indeed there is no colour why our Translators should here use the Word [Dam∣ned], since [Condemned] is the natural Word, whether we consider the Propriety of the Greek or the English Language.: So that this is the meaning of the Proposi∣tion. He that doubteth (with such a Doubt as is here spoken of) and yet eateth; such a Man is condemned for so doing. Condemned, how? why condemned of him∣self, (as the Apostle had expressed it in the verse before), condemned of his own Conscience, because without neces∣sity, having free power over his own Actions, he doth that which he apprehends to be sinful.

I dare say, the Reader will be satisfied of the Truth of our Interpretation, as to both the last named Parti∣culars,

if he will carefully read the foregoing verse together with the Text (as indeed they do but both make one compleat Sentence) and judge of one by the other.

St. Paul hath for a good while been addressing him∣self to the stronger Christians, in order to the perswa∣ding them so to use their Knowledge and their Christi∣an Liberty, that they might edifie the Weak Brethren among them, but in no ways give Scandal to any of them, and he thus concludes his Advice in this Chap∣ter.

Hast thou Faith? have it to thy selfe before God. Hap∣py is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth: But he that doubteth (or maketh a diffe∣rence) is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of Faith, and whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin.

I dare appeal to any indifferent person, that hath read St. Paul's foregoing Discourse in this Chapter, whether the meaning of this whole Passage be not to this Ef∣fect.

Art thou so well instructed in thy Religion, as to be perswaded that the Gospel hath taken away all diffe∣rence of Meats, and that thou mayest Lawfully eat of any Food that is set before thee? why, it is very well for thee; but then, be content that thou art thus per∣swaded, and do not upon every occasion make such an ostentation of thy Faith in this matter, nor despise o∣thers that have it not; as to lay a Snare before thy Weak and Un-instructed Brethren, who are of another perswasion, to sin against their Conscience, by Acting as thou dost. It is sufficient for thee that God seeth thy Faith, and that thou canst justifie thy eating to thy own Conscience. For I can assure thee, it is no small Happiness for a Man to be able to satisfie his own Consci∣ence in that Action which he takes in hand.

[This is undoubtedly the meaning of that expression, Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he approveth. That is, it is a great Comfort to a Man that his Conscience doth not condemn him in that Action which he thinks fit to do. In ea re quam agendam susci∣pit, saith Grotius; In eo quod agendum elegit, saith Estius; En ce qu'il veut faire, saith the late excellent French Translation. And it is just the same thing that St. John saith in other words. Eph. I. 3, 21. My Breth∣ren, if our own hearts (i. e. our Conscience) condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God.]

But then, (as the Apostle goes on) as to those that are so uninstructed in the Nature of Christianity, as still to make a difference between clean and unclean Meats; as it infinitely concerns them to have a care what they do; so it concerns thee likewise to have a care how thou layest a stumbling block before them. For in what a Condition would any of them be, if being tempted by thy Insolent Carriage, and Unreasonable Example, he should through Fear or base Compliance venture to eat such things as he judgeth to be unclean? Why, cer∣tainly he is both an ill and a miserable man for so do∣ing; because he is condemned of his own Conscience. For he eats not only without being convinced of the Lawfulness of his eating, but presuming the contrary, and whatever is thus done against Conscience, must needs be a sin. This I take to be the true meaning of this whole Passage, for which, if need was, we might pro∣duce several Authorities, particularly that of St. Chryso∣stome, who gives much the same account of it.

Having thus given an account of the Text as it lies in the Chapter, and with relation to the Business that St. Paul had there in hand. I now come to consider it with reference to our present Controversie with the Dis∣senters, and to take off the Argument they bring from

it, against the Position we are now contending for.

Their Argument, as I said, is this.

St. Paul here affirms, That whosoever Doubteth a∣bout the Lawfulness of any particular Meat, and while that Doubt remaineth, eateth of that Meat, such a man Sins, and is Condemned for so doing; because he eateth not of Faith. If now it be so in this particular Case, it must be so in all other Doubtful Cases; and conse∣quently in the Case of Obeying Authority, where a Man Doubts of the Lawfulness of the thing enjoyned. That is to say. Whosoever, in any Case whatsoever, doth an Action of the Lawfulness of which he Doubts; he sins, and is Condemned for so doing, because he acteth not of Faith.

This is the Argument fairly put, and I shall now endeavour as fairly to answer it.

And first of all, I say, This Argument proceeds up∣on a false Ground. For it supposeth St. Paul in this Text to speak to the Case of a purely Doubting Conscience, (which is the Subject of our present Controversie): Whereas it may be made to appear with good Evidence, that it is the Case of a resolved Conscience only, that he here Treats of. So that this Text is wholly mis∣applied by the Dissenters, and makes nothing at all to the Business. For though there be indeed in this Text a very severe Censure of all those that Act a∣gainst any kind of Perswasion; yet there is nothing here said that toucheth a mans Acting Doubtingly, ei∣ther one way or other.

That this is true, appears from the Account I have before given of the Subject matter of the Apostles Dis∣course in this Chapter; which is, the Case of those Christians who were not barely Doubtful and Waver∣ing in their own Minds, whether they might Law∣fully eat of such Meats as were then Disputed: But

were Perswaded they ought not; as believing that the Law of Moses, which had declared them Ʋnclean, was still in force; or else believing them to be Ʋnclean in themselves.

That this was indeed the Case here discussed, seems very clear from the 2d and 5th Verses of this Chapter, where the Apostle states it; and more particularly from the 14th Verse, where he gives a summary Resolution of it; and in my Judgment the very same Resolution that he doth in the Text. I know (saith he) and am perswaded that there is nothing unclean of it self, but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. So that it seems the Person whose Case St. Paul speaks to, was not uncertain or unresolved whether the Meats under Deliberation were clean or unclean; but he was perswaded they were unclean, he esteemed them to be such, and he must of necessity do so, so long as he believed the Law of Moses to be in force, as by all that appears in this Chapter he did believe.

But may some say, If this was the Case, why then doth St. Paul use the word Doubting in the Text? To Doubt of the unlawfulness of an Action, is quite ano∣ther thing, than to be Perswaded of the unlawfulness of it.

In answer to this, I refer my Reader to the Ac∣count I have before given of the Word [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] which may as properly be rendred, He that maketh a difference between Meats; as he that Doubteth about Meats. Now if this Version be admited, the ground of this Objection is quite taken away. And I see no reason why it should not be admitted, since (as I said) it is as natural as the other, and withal, it makes the A∣postles Sense to run more coherently with what he had said before.

But further, Let if you please the common Transla∣tion

be retained; let the Text be interpreted of one that Doubteth, and not of one that maketh a difference: Yet still this will make nothing against what we have now said. For it is undeniably plain, that what St. Paul here calls Doubting, is in our way of speaking a degree of Perswasion. My meaning is this. The Doubting which St. Paul here speaks of, is not that where a mans Judgment is suspended, upon account of the equal Probabilities on both sides of the Question, which is the proper Notion of Doubting, and that which we are now concerned with: But he speaks of a Doubt strengthned with so many Probabilities, that it want∣ed but very little of a Perswasion; or, to speak more properly, it was a real Perswasion, though with some mixture of Doubtfulness in it. That is to say, the man had so strong Convictions of the Ʋnlawfulness of eat∣ing on the one hand; and so little satisfaction about the Lawfulness of it on the other; That if he was not fully perswaded that it was a sin to eat; yet it ap∣peared by many degrees more probable to him that it was a sin, than that it was not.

That this now was the Case, is evident beyond all exception, from the words that follow. He that doubteth (saith the Text) is condemned if he eat, that is, Condemned of his own Conscience, as I shewed before. Now how could that be, if the man was not in some degree perswaded that his eating was unlawful? It is certain no man can be further Condemned of his own Consci∣ence for doing any Action, than he doth believe that Action to be forbidden by some Law of God. To say therefore, that a man is Condemned of his own Conscience for eating, must of necessity imply, that he doth be∣lieve his eating to be unlawful, and if so, it is certain he doth more than simply douht whether it be lawful or no.

Well, But doth not the Apostle say in this very Chapter, Let every one be fully perswaded in his own mind? What is the meaning of That, but that every one should assure himself that the Action he takes in hand is a lawful Action, or else he doth not act with a safe Conscience? And is not that the very same thing that is here said, He that doubteth is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of Faith, or with a full perswasi∣on? There is therefore good Reason why we should interpret this Text in the proper Sense of Doubting, the Apostle himself directing us so to do by this pas∣sage.

This is the most considerable Objection that can be made against our way of expounding this Text, and probably it was with a respect to that passage that so many Interpreters have Translated it as they have done; but whether they had any just reason from thence so to do, is the Question. Or rather I think it will be no Question with any one who attends either to the design, or the words of the Apostle in that pas∣sage.

The passage is in the 5th Verse of this Chapter, where the Apostle is giving an Account of the state of the present Controversie. One man (saith he) esteem∣eth one day above another, another man esteemeth e∣very day alike: Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind. So we render it, but how truly, I shall now examine.

It cannot well be conceived by the coming in of these words, that St. Paul had any such thing in his mind when he writ them, as we would now make them to express. It was certainly none of his busi∣ness in this place to oblige the contending Parties to get full perswasions in their several ways, and then all would be right, for there was too much of that al∣ready

amongst them. Neither was it his meaning here to tell them, that if in any Case they acted without a full persuasion of the Lawfulness of the Action, they sinned against Conscience; for besides that this is cer∣tainly false, it was nothing at all to his purpose.

But this was that which he design'd in this passage, to perswade both the contending Parties quietly to per∣mit each other to enjoy their several Opinions and Persuasions (in those little matters, which did no way concern their Duty,) without Censuring or Judging one another.

This now is a meaning that perfectly suits with all the other good advice he gives them in this Chapter, and this meaning he doth express in as apt words as can be thought on. One man esteemeth one day a∣bove another, another man esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be filled with his own mind. Or, satis∣fied with his own Perswasion. The Original words are [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (without the Prepositi∣on) as is read in some good Copies) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉]. Which, saith Grotius, is an Hebrew way of expression, and sig∣nifies no more than this, Quis{que} fruatur sua Senten∣tia. Let every Man enjoy his own Opinion: Or, as the Vulgar Latine most properly Translates, Ʋnusquis{que} in suo sensu abundet. i. e. Let every one abound in his own Sense: Or lastly, as the Commentaries that go under the Name of St. Ambrose, Ʋnusquis{que} remittatur suis Consiliis, Let every one be left to his own Coun∣sels. And to the same sense also both St. Crysostome and Theodoret do expound this passage. This Interpretati∣on, though it be very different from that in our Eng∣lish Bible, yet expresseth the Signification of the O∣riginal Text as well as that, and withal, hath better Authority to recommend it: but that which we chiefly stand upon, is, that the Subject Matter, and the scope

of the Apostle doth necessarily require this Interpreta∣tion.

For, in truth, If this passage be rendred the common way, so as that it shall import that every Man, in every Case, is to be fully perswaded in his own mind, I do not know how the Precept here given, can be supposed to be either Reasonable or Possible. It is certainly no more in every Mans Power to be satisfied about all his Doubts; than it is to believe or disbelieve what he pleases. When there appears Reason of Doubting, it is in vain to com∣mand a Man not to Doubt. Nay, it is as much a Mans Duty to Doubt, and to keep his Judgment in suspence, when the weight of Probability is on both sides equal, as it is to believe or to disbelieve upon clear Evidence. Or rather in that Case a Man cannot chuse but Doubt. He cannot reasonably, nay, he cannot possibly do other∣wise.

I think, by what hath been said, it doth plainly ap∣pear, that this Text of St. Paul we are upon, [viz. He that Doubteth is condemned if he eat] hath nothing to do with a Doubting Conscience in our Sense; but only with a resolved one; and consequently, that the Ar∣gument which is brought from hence against our As∣sertion, is nothing at all to the purpose, because it is grounded upon a false Exposition of the Text.

But though this is (as I think) the true Answer to this Argument; and the Answer indeed which I main∣ly stand upon: Yet there is another Answer given to it by the Casuists; which, because it is the Answer that our Learned Bishop Sanderson thought fit to pitch up∣on, I ought not to pass it by without mention, nor, if I can, without some improvement.

I must confess, if we do admit this Answer, the Au∣thority and Obligation of a Doubting Conscience will be set higher than I do in this Discourse suppose it:

But however, it may be a good Answer to the Dissen∣ters; because it unties the difficulty upon their own Principles: The Answer is this.

2. In the Second place, Allowing that the Man whose Case St. Paul speaks to in this Text, was really a Doubting Person, and not one that was Perswaded (as we have hitherto supposed): Yet it doth by no means follow, that, because this Man was guilty of Sin, and Condemned for eating those Meats, of the Lawfulness of which he Doubted: Therefore a Man that Obeys Authority in an Instance where he Doubts of the Lawfulness of the Command; that such a Man Sins and is Condemned for so doing. This, I say, doth not at all follow.

For there is a vast Disparity in the Cases; and to argue from one to the other, is to argue from a Par∣ticular to an Ʋniversal, or from one Particular to ano∣ther, without respect to the different Circumstances of each Case; which is against all the Rules of Lo∣gick.

If St. Paul had said, [He that Doubteth is Damned if he Act] there had been some pretence for making his Sentence an universal Proposition, so as to extend to all Doubting Men in all Cases: But now only saying, [He that Doubteth is Damned if he eat] it shews that he only spoke to the Particular Case that was be∣fore him; and that other Cases are no farther con∣cerned in his Proposition, than as they do agree in Circumstances with the Case he there speaks to.

Now the Case the Apostle there treats of, and That which we are now concerned about, are so far from a∣ny way agreeing in the main Circumstances, by which a Man is to measure the Goodness or the Badness of an Action, that there cannot be two Doubtful Cases put, that are more different, as •• shall now shew.

If St. Paul do at all here speak to the Case of a Doubting Man; he speaks of one that Acted Doubt∣ingly in a matter where it was in his own Power to Act without a Doubt: That is, He was in such Cir∣cumstances, that he knew he might certainly with∣out sin refuse to eat those Meats concerning which he doubted; for there was no colour of obligation up∣on him to eat them: But yet in this Case, where he was perfectly at Liberty to let alone; for the serving some evil unwarrantable ends, he would not chuse that side which was safe, and where he need fear no sin, which was to forbear; but would chuse that side that was Doubtful; that is, would run a needless hazard of transgressing some Law of God. It is of such a Man, and in such a Case as this, that St. Paul speaks, when he saith, He that Doubteth is condemned if he eat: Sup∣posing indeed that his words are at all to be expound∣in this Sense.

But now because it is thus in this Case (and in all such like, if you please): Doth it therefore follow from these words, that a Man that is in other Cir∣cumstances; that is not at Liberty to chuse his own way; as not being at his own disposal, but under the Direction and Government of Authority: That this man sins and is condemned if he obey the Orders of his Superiours, when he is Doubtful of the Lawfulness of the thing in which he expresseth his Obedience? No, by no means. For this Case hath a quite different Consideration.

In the former Case there was only danger on one side, and that was in Acting, and the Man might forbear if he pleased, and that without any danger: But in the other Case there is danger on both sides, and the man runs at least as great a hazard in forbearing the Action, (nay, we say, a much greater,) as if he should do it.

So that undeniably (unless we will make one Rule to serve for all Cases, though never so different, which is the absurdest thing in the World): For any thing that St. Paul hath here said to the contrary; this latter man may not only without sin do the thing he doubts of; but is bound to do it. Whereas, if the other man spoken of in the Text, should do the Action he doubts of, it might be a sin in him.

But further, That St. Paul meant not to extend his Proposition to all Doubtful Cases, but only to such Cases as he here treats of; is pretty evident from the Reason that he gives, why he that eateth Doubtingly sins in so doing; viz. Because he eateth not of Faith.

He doth not say, He that Doubteth is Condemned if he eat, because he eateth with a Doubting Conscience. If he had said so, I grant the Reason of his Propo∣sition would have reached all Doubting men in all Cases; but this is that which he saith, He that Doubt∣eth is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of Faith.

So that if there be any Doubtful Cases wherein a Man may Act with Faith notwithstanding his Doubt: I hope it will be allowed, that those Cases are excepted out of St. Paul's Proposition.

Now, that there are such Cases; and that our Case of Obeying Authority is one of them, I thus prove.

Whosoever so Acts, as that he is satisfied in his own mind, that what he doth is according to his Duty in the present Circumstances: Such a Man Acts with Faith in reference to that Action. This is evident from the very Notion of Faith, as it is here spoken of, of which I have before given an Account.

But now it is very possible, that a Man may have a Doubt concerning the Lawfulness of an Action, and yet be in such Circumstances, as that he shall be sa∣tisfied

that is very reasonable and agreeable to his Du∣ty, nay, (as the Case may be) that he is really bound to do that Action concerning which he thus Doubts, rather than not to do it: Because the not doing that Action, all things considered, appears to him more dangerous, or attended with worse Consequences.

This now being granted, it undeniably follows: That wherever a man lights into these Circumstan∣ces, he is not a Sinner, even according to the strictest Sense of these words, though he Act with some kind of Doubt, because he Acts in Faith; That is, he is re∣solved in his own Conscience, that thus it behoveth him to act in the present Case, and that it would be unreasonable or sinful to act otherwise.

So that let our Adversaries make the most of St. Paul's words that they can, it is a very Illogical Infer∣ence, to say, That whoever Acts with a Doubt upon his Conscience in any Case, is guilty of Sin; and much more is it so, to affirm it in our present Case of Obey∣ing Authority. For it is certain, that many Men are (and I believe all Men may be) satisfied, that in a pure∣ly doubtful Case, it is not only more reasonable, but their Duty to Obey their Superiours.

Well, But it will be said, Do not we here talk con∣tradictions? Can a Man have Faith about an Action, that is, be resolved in his own Conscience that such an Action is to be done, or may lawfully be done, and yet Doubt concerning it at the same time?

I Answer, This is so far from being a Contradiction, that it is a Case that every day happens, where a Man hath a Doubt on both sides, as it is in the Instance be∣fore us. A man often hath very great Doubts of the Lawfulness of this or the other Action, when he con∣siders the Action in general: But yet when he comes to weigh the Circumstances he is in, and the Reasons

he hath in those Circumstances for the doing the Action; he may be perswaded, that it is better for him to do the Action, than to let it alone, not∣withstanding all the Doubts he hath about it. That is, Though he doubt of the Lawfulness of the Action it self, considered without his present Circumstances; yet as it comes Circumstantiated to him, he doth not doubt but it may be lawfully done by him. But of this I have spoke largly before, in my Explication of the Rule of a Doubting Conscience.

But is not all Doubting contrary to Faith? I answer, No, it is not: For such kind of Doubting as we here speak of, doth, we see, very well consist with Faith. My meaning is, it is not necessary, in order to a Mans having Faith about an Action, that all his Doubts concerning that Action should be destroyed; it is a∣bundantly sufficient that they be over-ballanced.

That which I would say, is this. Whereever a man hath such a degree of Perswasion touching any Acti∣on he is deliberating about, that he believes it more advisable to a reasonable man, all things considered, to do than Action, than to forbear it; such a man hath all the Faith that is needful to the doing that Action with a safe Conscience; though in the mean time he may have such Doubts concerning that Action, as will perhaps be too hard for him to resolve, and will create him likewise some trouble and uneasiness in the doing of it. Though indeed, to speak properly, I think these ought not any longer to be called Doubts, after they are thus over-ruled or over-ballanced; but rather to go under the Name and Notion of pure Scruples, which the Casuists of all Perswasions do not only allow, but advise that a man should act against.

In plain English, That Doubtfulness about an Acti∣on which St. Paul speaks of, and which he Censures

as a sin; was such a Doubtfulness, as after the Action was done, rendred the man Self-condemned; his Con∣science could not but reproach him for doing as he did: But now in our Case, the Man is not at all Self-condemned, because he hath the Testimony of his Con∣science that he hath acted according to the best of his Judgment and Discretion. Though he acts with a Doubt, yet he is satisfied he hath made the most rea∣sonable Choice that he could in his Circumstances. And whereever a man doth so, he both acts in Faith, and without any danger of Condemnation from his own Conscience.

So that after all the Bustle that is made about doing or forbearing an Action with a Doubting Conscience; you see there is no great intricacy in the Case, nor any necessity of sinning on both hands, always supposing a man to be Sincere and Honest. For if he be really so, he will always do that which he judges most according to his Duty, or at least, that which he judges to be con∣sistent with it; and whereever a man doth thus, it is cer∣tain he Acts with a safe Conscience, notwithstanding a∣ny Doubt he may have about the Action. Because more than the former a man cannot do, and more than the latter he is not bound to do.

As for what sins an Erroneous Conscience may ingage a man in; or what troublesome Reflections a Melan∣cholly Imagination may occasion to him in these Cases; I am not to answer for them, they are of another Con∣sideration.

IV. Having thus largly treated of the Nature of a Doubting Conscience, and of the Rules by which a man is to Act, whenever it happens; and that, both when he is left at his own Liberty, and when he is under the the Commands of others: All that remains to be done, is to speak something about the Authority or Obligation

of a Doubting Conscience; which is our Fourth and last general Head.

But in truth the Discussion of this might very well be spared, after what I have said relating to this Argu∣ment in several places of the foregoing Discourse, par∣ticularly under my last Head. However I shall endea∣vour to give some Account of this Point; though I in∣tend it a very short one, because, indeed what I have to offer is not so much any new matter, as an Application of the Principles I have before laid down to our present purpose.

The Point in question is concerning the Authority of a Doubting Conscience: Or, Whether a Doubting Consci∣ence doth bind at all, and how far?

In answer to this, I say in general; It is certain that a Doubting Conscience of it self lays no Obligation at all upon a man any way: Indeed it is a kind of Con∣tradiction to suppose that it should.

For, I pray, What is the Notion of a Doubting Con∣science, but this, That a man is uncertain or unresolved in his mind, whether as to this particular Action he be bound or not bound? To suppose now, that a man is obliged in Conscience either way, by vertue of this Doubt; is plainly to suppose, that a man takes himself to be bound, while yet at the same time he is disputing with himself whether he be bound or no.

To speak this plainer if I can. Since Conscience, as I have often said, is nothing else but a mans Judgment concerning Actions, whether they be Duties or Sins, or in∣different: And since the Law of God Commanding or Forbidding Actions, or neither Commanding or Forbid∣ding them; is the only Rule by which a man can judge what Actions are Duties, and what are Sins, and what are Indifferent: It plainly follows, that a man can∣not be bound in Conscience to do any Action, which it

doth not appear to him, that Gods Law hath some way or other Commanded, and made a Duty; or to Forbear a∣ny Action which he is not convinced in his Judgment, that Gods Law hath some where or other Forbidden, and so made a Sin. And therefore, since in a Case where a Man is purely Doubtful, he cannot be supposed to have any such Convictions that the Law of God doth either Command or Forbid the Action Doubted of (for if he had, he would no longer Doubt:) It follows likewise by undeniable Consequence, that a Mans Con∣science is not bound on either side of the Action, but he may either do it or forbear it with a safe Conscience.

So that if there be any Obligation at all upon a man to Act thus, rather than otherwise in a Doubt∣ful Case; that Obligation must arise upon one of these two Accounts, viz. Either there is some Law of God concerning a Doubting Conscience, which hath tied a man up to such precise measures of Acting: Or, at least a man hath a Perswasion that there is some such Law of God.

Now I grant, That in both these Cases, there doth a direct Obligation pass upon the mans Conscience: But then it is to be remembred, that this Obligation doth not arise from the mans being Doubtful in his Conscience; but from his being resolved in his Conscience. That is to say, if there be really any such Law of God; it is the Obligation of a Right Conscience. Or if there be not, but the man only judges that there is; it is then the Ob∣ligation of an Erroneous Conscience: But as for the Ob∣ligation of a Doubting Conscience there is no such thing.

The great, therefore, or indeed the only Point that is to be inquired into, in order to the Resolution of our present Question, is this. Whether there be any Law of God which doth determine our Actions one way or other, in the Case of a Doubt; and what that Law is?

Now in answer to this Inquiry, I say, That it doth not appear that there is any express Law of God in Holy Scripture, that hath laid any Obligation upon us as to this particular of a Doubting Conscience, either one way or other.

The only Texts that I know of, which are thought to make for this purpose, are the two passages in the 14th of the Romans, which I have before largely given an account of, viz. That in the 5th Verse, Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind. And that o∣ther in the last Verse, He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of Faith. But now I think I have made it plain, by several Arguments, that these Texts do not at all concern our present Case of a Doubting Conscience, properly so called.

So that there being no express Particular Law of God in Scripture, about acting with a Doubting Consci∣ence, we seem to be left as to that Affair, to the General Laws of God, as they are declared, whether by Nature or Scripture.

Now the most that any Man can be Obliged to by the General Laws of God, whether Natural or Revealed, in the Case of a Doubt, is only these two things. First, to use his Endeavour to get himself as well instructed in his Duty as his Circumstances and Opportunities will allow him. And Secondly, where he is at a loss for Information in that Case, to Act as reasonably as he can.

I do not say, that a Man in every Doubtful Case that happens, is strictly obliged to thus much. But I say, it is impossible he should be obliged to more. Because in∣deed more than this he cannot do; and no man can be obliged to more than is in his Power.

Where-ever therefore a Man in a Doubtful Case takes care to observe these two things, he Acts with

a safe Conscience, however he may act Doubtingly in that Case.

Thus far I think we are clear beyond Exception. But it may be, some will not be satisfied with this Account of our Point, but will be putting a farther Question.

We have before laid down several Rules about a Mans Acting in a Doubtful Case, the sum of all which comes to no more than what we have now said, viz. That in every doubtful Case a man is to act as reasonably as he can. The Question now is, Whether a man is strict∣ly bound in Conscience always to follow this Rule? Or, which is to the same effect, Whether a man in a matter concerning which he hath only a pure Doubt, may not without sin indifferently chuse either side of the Action, though yet perhaps one side doth appear to him more reasonable or more safe than the other?

This Question is indeed more curious than useful. But however, since it properly falls under the Argu∣ment we are now treating of, and tends somewhat to the clearing of it: I shall venture to say something to it. Only I declare before-hand, that I mean not in what I shall say, to assert any thing Dogmatically, but only to propose, in order to further Examination: And withal, that whether that which we say be true or false; it doth not at all affect the Merits of the main Cause we have undertaken.

That now which I have to say to this Question, is this. That though it be eternally fit and natural, and conducing to a mans Happiness both in this World and the other, that he should in all Cases, and especial∣ly in Doubtful Cases, govern his Actions by the best Reason that he hath, (and certainly the Wiser and the Better any man is, the more steadily will he pursue this Rule): Yet, on the other hand, I dare not say, that a man is strictly bound in Conscience so to do; so as

that he is properly guilty of sin if he do not.

My Reason is this. Because there is no Law of God which doth oblige us in all Cases, to do that which is Best: And if we be not bound to do always that which is Best, we are not bound to do always that which is most Reasonable; for certainly, that which is Best, is always most Reasonable: And if we be not bound to do that which is most Reasonable much less are we bound to do that which is Safest, because that which is Safest, is not always either Best or most Reasonable And if there be no Law of God that doth oblige us to any of these things; then it is certain we do not sin if we Act otherwise, For where there is no Law, there is no Transgression.

Now, That the first of these Principles is true, we have as good Proof as can be desired, viz. the Autho∣rity of St. Paul, who hath in the 7th. of the first of the Corinthians thus determined: And if that be true, the other two must needs be so likewise, because they fol∣low from it by unavoidable Consequence.

Taking now this for granted. I ask what Law doth a man Transgress, that in a purely Doubtful Case chuseth either side indifferently, without respect to what is Safest or most Reasonable. Always supposing that the side he chuseth, be not in it self evil and for∣bidden by God. I say, according to these Principles he transgresseth no Law at all, and consequently can∣not properly be said to sin at all.

If the man be at all guilty, it is upon one of these accounts, viz. either because he Acteth against the di∣ctate of his Conscience, or because he Acteth against the Law of God, in preferring that which is less reasonable and safe, before that which is more so.

Now, Upon the former account he is not at all guil∣ty, for his Conscience hath passed no Dictate, no Ver∣dict in this matter, and therefore he cannot be sup∣posed

to act against any such Dictate or Verdict: The man is in such a state that he either believes he may act as he doth, without violation of his Duty: Or, at least he hath no belief to the contrary; so that his Conscience doth not any way Condemn him.

And as for the other thing, of his not chusing that side of the Doubtful Case which appeared to him most reasonable; it is true, if there was any Law of God which obliged him to make such a Choice, he would be guilty of sin if he chose otherwise. But now it doth not appear, that there is any such Law of God. Nay, so far from that, that it appears from St. Paul that there is no such Law, but that every man is left to his own liberty in this matter; always supposing that he take care not to chuse, or do any thing that he judgeth to be inconsistent with his Duty; which in our Case we do lik••wise suppose.

But then having said this, we must add further. That though we here have concluded, that no man in a Doubt∣ful Case properly so called, is strictly obliged by any Law of God under the penalty of sin, to chuse one side more than another, but may indifferently chuse either.

Yet in the first place, Whoever doth believe, or is per∣swaded in his own Mind, either that he ought not at all to Act against a Doubt, or that in every Doubtful Case he is bound to follow the safer side such a man, so long as he so believes, cannot without sin Act according to the Principles we have now laid down.

And Secondly, We are far from encouraging any man to act thus hand over head in a Doubtful Case; much less from commending him for so doing. For though we say, that, strictly speaking, a man doth not sin which way soever he Act in a purely doubtful Case; yet on the other hand, I think he is but in a low Dis∣pensation as to Vertue and Goodness, that never looks fur∣ther

into his Actions, nor takes more care about them, than only that they be not directly sinful.

He that is heartily Good, will with St. Paul not on∣ly consider what things are Lawful, but what things are Expedient and do Edifie.

It will not ordinarily be sufficient to ingage such a man in an Action, to satisfie him, that he may do that Action without transgressing any Law of God: But he will examine whether the doing or forbearing the Action doth more serve the ends of Vertue and Chari∣ty. And accordingly as that appears to him, so will he determine his Choice.

In a word, The Better and the more Vertuous any man is, the more delicate and tender sense will he have, not only of that which the Law of God hath precisely made his Duty, and so in a proper Sense doth oblige his Conscience; but also of every thing that is Reasonable and Excellent, and Praise-worthy: So that it will really grate upon his mind, to do many things which, in strict speaking, cannot be accounted unlaw∣ful or forbidden.

And thus it is in our present Case. If we suppose a man to be a Devout Christian, and a sincere Lover of God, he will not be able to prevail with himself, in a Case where he Doubteth, to chuse either side indiscrimi∣nately (though if he should, I do not know, as I said be∣fore, what Law of God he transgresseth): but he will weigh and consider the Reasons on both sides, and that which appears to him after such Consideration, to be most reasonable, and conducing to Gods Glory, and his own and the Worlds good, that shall have the preference.

To come to a conclusion. The sum of what I have now said is this. As Conscience is the immediate Guide of our Actions: So the Rule by which Conscience it self is to be guided, is the Law of God, and nothing else.

Though therefore we cannot be safe in following our Conscience, where our Conscience is not guided by the Law of God, (because, as I have often said, our false Judgment of things doth not cancel our Obligation to act according to what the Laws of God require of us; unless we can justly plead unblameable Ignorance of those Laws):

Yet, on the other hand, where-ever Conscience tells us, that we must do this Action, because the Law of God hath commanded it; we must do it, or we sin.

And again, Where-ever Conscience tells us that we must avoid this Action, because the Law of God hath for∣bidden it, we must forbear that Action, or we sin.

But if Conscience cannot say that this Action is com∣manded or forbidden; there we are not tyed under the penalty of sinning, either to do or to forbear that Action.

But yet if a Mans Conscience should thus suggest to him; Though I cannot say directly that this Action is a Duty, or that it is a sin, because I am at a loss how the Law of God stands as to this matter, and consequently, I cannot lay any direct Obligation upon you either way; yet my advice is, that you would chuse this way, ra∣ther than the other: For this way, all things considered, appears most fit and reasonable to be chosen, for there is more Probability that this is the right way than the o∣ther; or there is less harm, though you should be mi∣staken, in going this way than the other: Now in this Case, though a man be not properly obliged under the Guilt of Sin to obey his Conscience, because Conscience doth not propose the Choice to him under that Conditi∣on; yet if he be a Wise and a Good man, he will undoubt∣edly chuse that side which Conscience, all things consi∣dered, hath represented to him to be the most fit and rea∣sonable to be chosen.

And thus much concerning our Fourth and last Gene∣ral Head.

Thus have I largely discussed the Case of a Doubting Conscience in general, and answered all the Considerable Enquiries that can be made about it. I am not sensible that I have left any material difficulty in this Argument untouched; though I am very sensible I have said a great deal more than needed, in order to the Resolution of that Case, for the sake of which, I undertook this Dis∣course. But I intended such a discussion of this Argu∣ment, as would serve for all other Cases as well as that.

I do not know whether it be needful to make a parti∣cular Application of what I have said upon a Doubting Conscience to the Case of our present Dissenters. How∣ever, it will not be amiss if I offer something towards it; if it be but to save the Reader who is concerned in that Case the Labour and Trouble of doing it.

The Case which I am to speak to is briefly this. There are several Persons that are unsatisfied about the Law∣fulness of our Communion, as it is established and en∣joyned; and that, upon several Accounts. Some per∣haps Doubt of the Lawfulness of all Forms of Prayer. Others about the Lawfulness of our Form. Others Doubt about the Lawfulness of our Ceremonies, or our way of Administring the Sacrament: And others it may be about other things. None of them can indeed say, that any of these things do go against their Conscience, or that they believe the use of them to be unlawful: For that is the Case of a Resolved Conscience, with which we have nothing here to do: But they are undetermined and uncertain whether they be Lawful or no; and so long as they continue under this Suspence of Judgment, they dare not joyn in our Worship; fearing they would sin against God if they should.

Now of those that thus Doubt there may be two sorts.

There are some perhaps that have only a Single Doubt

in this matter. That is to say, They make a Doubt whether they may Lawfully joyn with us, so long as those suspected Conditions are required of them: But they make no Doubt, but are very well satisfied that they may Lawfully Separate from us.

Again there are others that Doubt on both sides, as they have good Reason to do. That is, As they Doubt on one hand, whether the Terms of our Communion be not sinful: So they Doubt on the other hand, whe∣ther it be not sinful to Separate upon account of those Terms.

Now of these likewise, there may be two sorts.

Some perhaps are equally Doubtful whether the Terms of our Communion be lawful or no.

Others Doubt unequally; that is, are more inclined to believe that they are Sinful than that they are Law∣ful.

That now which is to be enquired into is; What is most Reasonable and Adviseable in Point of Conscience to be done in each of these Cases.

Now as to the first of these Cases where a man hath only a Doubt on one side, and that is, Whether he may Lawfully Communicate with us; but he hath no Doubt that he may lawfully Separate. To this I say two things.

First, That the mans Doubting only on one side in this matter, doth not make it more safe for him to Se∣parate, than if he had Doubted on both sides. Because indeed if he must Doubt at all, it is his Duty, he is bound to Doubt on both sides; and he is guilty of gross and criminal Ignorance of the Laws of God, if he do not. And if so, then his Doubting only on one side, doth not alter the Case, but it must have the same Resolution as if it was a Double Doubt properly so called.

If it be said that it is a constant Rule of a Doubting Conscience, and we have allowed it as such; that in

Cases where a man hath only a Doubt on one side of an Action, it is more safe to chuse that side on which he hath no Doubt, than that other concerning which he Doubts: I do readily grant it. But then it is to be remembred, that that Rule is always intended, and doth only obtain in such Cases where a man may cer∣tainly without danger of sinning forbear that Action of the Lawfulness of which he Doubts; though he can∣not without danger of sinning do the Action so long as he Doubts about it. But now in our Case here, it is evident to all men that are not wilfully blind, that as there may be a danger of Sinning, if a man should con∣form with a Doubting Conscience: So there is certainly a danger of Sinning (nay, and we say a much greater dan∣ger) if a man do not conform. So that that Rule hath here no place at all.

The truth is, Our Case if it be rightly put, is this. A man is here supposed to reason thus with himself.

I am very well satisfied in my own mind, and I make no Doubt at all, that I may Lawfully and without dan∣ger of Sin, cut my self off from the Communion of the Church [which yet by his Christianity he is bound to maintain and preserve as far as he can] And I may like∣wise lawfully and without danger of sinning, live in a constant Disobedience and Refractariness to all that Authority that God hath set over me [to which yet by as plain Laws as any are in Nature, or the Gos∣pel, he is bound to be subject:] I say I am satisfied in my own mind, that I may lawfully do both these things. But I am very unsatisfied and doubtful whether in my present Circumstances, it is not my Duty thus to do so as that I shall Sin if I do not.

What now would any Prudent man say to this Case? Why certainly he would say this? That he who can Doubt after this fashion, is either a very Ill man, or a very

Ignorant one. And that such a man doth a great deal more stand in need of good Advice, and wholsome In∣structions about the plain Duties of Christianity; than of Rules and Directions how to behave himself in Doubt∣ful Cases. Because indeed the best Rules of that kind are not to his Case, so long as he continues thus Igno∣rant. And if he should observe them, yet that would not justifie his Acting, if it should indeed prove con∣trary to the Law of God, because it was both in his power; and it was his Duty to know better. A mans Right proceeding according to the Rules of a Doubting Conscience, in a Case where he is entangled by a wilful∣ly Eroneous one; will no more discharge him from Sin as to his Soul, if he do an evil Action; than the Se∣cond Concoction though never so regular, can rectifie the Errors of the First as to his Body.

But Secondly, Though that which I have now offered be the proper Answer to the Case before us: Yet there is this further to be said to it, viz. Though we should suppose that the Law of God had not obliged us to keep the Unity of the Church, or to obey our lawful Supe∣riors; but had left it as an indifferent matter, and that there was no danger at all in forbearing these things; but the only danger was in doing them: So that the Doubt about Conformity, should have perfectly the Nature of a Single Doubt as it is put in the Case. I say, now even upon this Supposition it will bear a just Dispute, whe∣ther Conformity or Non-conformity be the more eligible side; Nay, I say further, that if the Rule I laid down about a Single Doubt be true, it will appear, that as things now stand, it is more reasonable for a man to Obey the Laws, and Communicate with the Church, so long as he hath only a bare Doubt about the Lawfulness of these things, than to Disobey and Separate.

For thus I argue. Though in a Single Doubt the Rule

be, That a man should chuse that side of an Action con∣cerning which he hath no Doubt; rather than that con∣cerning which he Doubts: Yet as was said before, that Rule is always to be understood with this Proviso, that all other Considerations in the Case be equal. If it should happen that a very great Good may be compassed, or a very great Evil may be avoided, by Acting on the Doubtful side: That very Consideration hath weight enough with a Wise man to turn the Ballance on that side; and to make that which abstractedly considered, was a Doubtful Case, to be clear and plain when it comes clothed with such Circumstances. As I gave Instances in the Case of Ʋsury and Law Suits. And twenty more might be added to them, if it was to any purpose.

If this now be admitted for Truth, we have a plain Resolution of the Case before us, and that is this. There are so many great Advantages both to the Kingdom, and to a mans self, to be obtained by Worshiping God in the way of the Church; and likewise so many both Pub∣lick and Private Mischiefs and Inconveniences that are consequent upon Separation: That if in any Case these Considerations have weight enough to Over-ballance a simple Doubt about the Lawfulness of an Action, they will certainly have sufficient weight in this Case. And that man who is not swayed by them, doth not Act so reasonably as he might do.

For my part, I should think it very foolishly done of any man, that so long as he is utterly uncertain whe∣ther he be in the right or in the wrong (as every one that Doubteth is) should be so confident of his Point; as to venture upon it no less a stake than the Peace of the Kingdom where he lives, and the Security of the Reli∣gion Established; and withal his own Ease and Liberty, and lastly, the Fortunes also of his Posterity. And yet such a wise Venture as this doth every one among us

make, that upon the account of a bare Doubt about the Lawfuless of the things enjoyned in our Commu∣nion, doth persist in disobedience to the Government, and Separation from the Church.

I wish this was well considered by our Doubting Dissen∣ters: They are wise enough as to the World in other mat∣ters; it is to be desired that they would be as wise in this. And if they were, I dare say it would not at all prejudice their Wisdom as to the other World. It will be but lit∣tle either to their Comfort or their Reputation at the long run, to have it said of them; that besides the Disturbance they have all along occasioned to the Publick Peace and Ʋnity, they have also brought their Estates and Fami∣lies into danger of Ruine, by the just Prosecutions of Law they have drawn upon themselves; and all this for the sake of a Cause which they themselves must con∣fess, they are altogether uncertain and unresolved about.

But this will appear much clearer, when we have set the Doubt about Conformity upon the right Foot, viz. Considered it as a Double Doubt, as indeed it is, in its own Nature: Which I come now to do.

In the Second place, There are other Dissenters who (as they have good reason) do Doubt on both sides of this Question. As they Doubt on one hand, whether it be not a sin to Conform to our Worship; because there are several things in it which they suspect to be unlawful: So on the other hand, they Doubt whether it be not their Duty to Conform to it; because the Laws of the Church and of the Land, do require them so to do. And of these, as I said, there are likewise two sorts. Some per∣haps are equally Doubtful whether the Terms of our Communion are Lawful or no, and consequently must Doubt equally whether they be bound to Conform or no. Others Doubt unequally. That is to say, of the Two, it ap∣pears more probable to them, that our Communion is Sin∣ful, than that it is a Duty.

Now as to the first of these Cases, The Answer is very short, and it is this.

We have before proved by many Arguments, that in a Case of a Pure Doubt, a∣bout the Lawfulness of an Action where the Probabi∣lities on both sides are pretty equal: In that Case the Command of Authority doth always turn the Ballance on its own side; so, as that it is not only reasonable for the man to do that in Obedience to Authority, of the Lawfulness of which he Doubteth; but it is his Du∣ty to do it; he sins if he do not. For this I refer my Reader to the Third General Head of this Discourse.

The only difficulty therefore is in the other Case, where the Doubt is unequal. And here the Case is this. As the man apprehends himself in danger of sinning if he do not come to Church, and obey the Laws: So he apprehends himself in a greater danger of sinning if he do. Because it doth appear more probable to him, that our Communion is Sinful, than that it is a Duty: And a greater Probobility, caeteris paribus, is always to be chosen before a less.

But to this likewise we are ready provided of an Answer from the foregoing Discourse, viz.

That though it should be supposed that in such a Case as this, where the Ballance is so far inclined one way; the Authority of our Superiors alone will not have weight enough to cast it on its own side: Yet in this Particular Case of Church Communion, there are so many other Arguments to be drawn from the Con∣sideration of the greater Sin, and the more dreadful Consequences, of disobeying the Laws than of obeying them; as will with any Impartial Conscientious Man out-weigh all the Probabilities on the other side, so long as they are not so great as to create a Perswasion; and make it reasonable for him rather to Conform, how strong soever his Doubt be about the Lawfulness of Con∣formity (so long as it is but a Doubt;) than to continue in Separation. Vide Third Proposition about a Double Doubt. pag. 27.

This is the Issue upon which we will try the Point before us, and I refuse no indifferent Man, that will but have the Patience to hear what we have to say, to be Ʋmpire between us and our Dissenting Brethren, as to this Controversie.

In the first place, let us suppose and admit, that the man who hath these Doubts and Suspicions about the Lawfulness of our Established Worship, doth really Doubt on the true side; and that he would indeed be a Transgressor of the Law of God, if he should Conform to it. But then it must be admitted likewise, that That Law of God which forbids these things in dispute, is wonderfully obscurely declared.

There are no direct Prohibitions, either in the Law of Nature or the Book of God about those things that are now Contested; so that the unlawfulness of them is only to be concluded from Consequences.

And those Consequences likewise are so obscure, that the Catholick Church from Christs time till our Refor∣mation, was wholly ignorant of them. For though it doth appear, that either these, or the like Usages, have always been in the Church: Yet it doth not appear, in all that compass of Time, either that any Particular Church ever condemned them as sinful: Or indeed, that any Particular Christian did ever Separate from the Church upon the Account of them.

And even at this Day, these Consequences by which they are proved unlawful, are not discovered by our Go∣vernours either in Church or State. No, nor by as Learn∣ed and Religious Divines of all Perswasions as any in the World.

The most Divines, by far the most; and those as Pi∣ous and as Able as any, are clearly of Opinion, that there is nothing Ʋnlawful in our Worship; but that, on the

contrary, all things therein prescribed are at least Inno∣cent, and free from sin, if not Pure and Apostolical.

So that if it should at last prove, that they are all mi∣staken: Yet the Law of God, which forbids these things, being so very obscure, and the Sense of it so hardly to be found out; it is a great Presumption that a man may very innocently and inculpably be Ignorant of it. And if so, it will be a very little, or no sin at all in him to act against it. Because if it was not his Duty to know this Law, it cannot be his Sin that his Practice is not accord∣ing to it. And if it was his Duty to know it, yet it being so obscurely delivered, and only to be gathered by such remote Consequences; it can at most be but a Sin of Igno∣rance, in an ordinary Person, where so many of the best Guides are mistaken, if he should transgress it.

And then farther, This must likewise be considered. That if Conformity to our Liturgy and Worship should prove a sin in any Instance: Yet the Evil Consequences of it extend no farther than the Mans Person that is guilty of it. There is no damage ariseth either to the Christian Religion, or to the Publick Interest of the Kingdom, by a∣ny mans being a Conformist. But on the contrary, as things stand with us; Ʋnity and Conformity to the Esta∣blished way, seem to bring a great advantage to both (as I hinted before) and to be a probable means to secure us from many Dangers, with which our Reformed Religion, and the Peace of the Kingdom is threatned.

Well, but now on the other hand. Let us suppose the contrary side of the Question to be true, viz. That our Governours in this matter are in the Right, and we are in the Wrong. That there is nothing required of us in the Church of England, as a Term of Communion, but what is very Innocent and Lawful; however it be our misfor∣tune to Doubt that there is, and in a zealous Indulgence

to these Doubts, we take the liberty to live in open diso∣bedience to our Lawful Governous, and to break the Unity of the Church into which we were Baptized.

I say, admitting the thing to be thus; what kind of Sin shall we be guilty of then? Why certainly we are guilty of no less a Sin than causlesly dividing the Body of Christ, against which we are so severely cautioned in the New Testament.

We are guilty of the Breach of as plain Laws as any are in the Bible, viz. Of all those that oblige us to keep the Ʋnity of the Spirit in the Bond of Peace: that Command us to Obey those that are over us in the Lord; to be sub∣ject to the Higher Powers; to submit to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake; to be subject not only for Wrath. but for Conscience sake. I say, these plain Laws we disobey for Conscience sake; and we disobey them too in such In∣stances, where we have the whole Catholick Church of old, and far the greatest and the best part of the pre∣sent Church, of a different Perswasion from us.

Well, but as if this was not enough. What are the Con∣sequences of this our Sin? (For by the Consequences of a sin, the greatness of it is always to be estimated, I speak as to the Material part of it, with which we are here concerned.) Why, they are most Terrible and Dreadful, both with respect to our selves and others.

By this unnatual Separation, we do, for any thing we know, put our selves out of the Communion of the Catholick Church; and consequently out of the enjoy∣ment of the ordinary means of Salvation.

We maintain and keep up Divisions and Disorders in the Church, and lend a helping hand to all those Animo∣sities and Hatreds, all that bitter Contention and Strife, and Uncharitableness, which hath long torn the very Bowels of Christs Church, and given occasion to that Deluge of Atheism, and Profaneness, and Impiety which hath over-spread the Face of it.

We put Affronts upon our Lawful Governours, who should be in the place of God to us. We give Scandal to all our Brethren that make a Conscience of living Peaceably and Piously. And lastly, as we offer a very fair Handle and Pretence to all Discontented and Facti∣ous men to Practice against the Best of Governments: So we take the most effectual course to Ruine the Best Constituted Church in the World, and with it the Re∣formed Religion in this Kingdom.

This now being the Nature, and these being the Con∣sequences of our Separation from the Established Church among us: I leave it to any indifferent man to Deter∣mine, whether any Doubt about the Lawfulness of our Communion, though that Doubt be backed with greater Probabilities than do appear on the other side; nay, if you will, with all the Probabilities that can consist with the nature of a Doubt; can have weight enough to Bal∣lance against such a Sin, and such Consequences as Sepa∣ration in our Case doth involve a man in? I think there is no unconcerned Person but will pronounce, that sup∣posing where there are Doubts on both sides, a man is to chuse that side on which there is the least appearance of Sin; he is in this Case certainly bound to chuse Com∣munion with the Established Church, rather than Separa∣tion from it. And that is all I Contend for.

But now, after all this is said; it must be acknow∣ledged, that if there be any man who hath other apprehensions of these matters, and that after a Con∣sideration of all things that are to be said for or a∣gainst Conformity, it doth appear to him upon the whole matter, both more probable that our Communion is sin∣ful, than that it is a Duty; and withal, that to Com∣municate with us, will involve him in a greater sin, and in worse Consequences, than to continue in Separation: I say, if any man have so unfortunate an understand∣ing

as to make such an estimate of things; we must ac∣knowledge, that according to all the Rules of a Doubt∣ing Conscience, such a man is rather to continue a Non∣conformist, than to obey the Laws of the King and the Church. But then let him look to it; for his acting in this Case according to the best Rules of a Doubting Consci∣ence, will not (as I said before) at all acquit him either of the Guilt or Consequences of Criminal Schism and Disobedience: Supposing that indeed he is all along un∣der a mistake as (we say) he certainly is; and that there is nothing required in our Communion, that he might not honestly and lawfully comply with, as there certainly is not. Unless in the mean time, the man fell in∣to these mistakes without any fault of his, and God Al∣mighty, who is the Judge of all mens Hearts and Cir∣cumstances, doth know he had not means and opportu∣nities to understand better.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1 Cor. 11. 29.
• * 1.2

  Ibid. v. 29. v. 20, 21, 22.
• * 1.3

  Ver. 30.
• * 1.4

  The word [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] doth no where, either in Scripture or any o∣ther Au∣thor, sig∣nifie to Doubt; but most usually to Discern, or Distinguish, or make a D••fference, as it is frequently used in the New Testa∣tament. Vid. Matt. XVI. 3. Acts XV. 9. I Cor. IV. 7. VI. 5. XI. 29. The word [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] is sometimes taken Actively, and then it hath the same Signification with [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] i. e. to make a difference. As is plain, not only in St. Judes Text here quoted; but in St. James, Ch. II. 4. Where our English Translation hath indeed very well rendred the Apostles Sense thus [Are ye not Pa••tial]. But if they had truly rendred his Words, they must have thus Translated [Do ye not make a difference?]

  Again, sometimes it is taken Passively, and then the Signification of it is this, to be Divided, or Severed, or Distinguished. And when it is used in this Sense, it sometimes happens that the English word [Doubting] doth conveniently en••ugh express it. Doubting, being indeed nothing else, but a Mans being Divided as to his own mind. And accordingly in some places, our Transla∣tors have thus Englished it (though I belive in some of those, more proper words might be found out to express its Sense). But though in a Few Texts it be thus used in Scripture; yet I do not find that any Profa••e Author did ever use it in this Se••se of Doubting. And therefore unless there be evident reason, I do not know why we should depart from the natural and usual Signification of the Word in the T••xt we are now upon.