The Catholick doctrine of the Eucharist in all ages in answer to what H. Arnaud, Doctor of the Sorbon alledges, touching the belief of the Greek, Moscovite, Armenian, Jacobite, Nestorian, Coptic, Maronite, and other eastern churches : whereunto is added an account of the Book of the body and blood of our Lord published under the name of Bertram : in six books.

BOOK I. Wherein is treated of the Method which the Author of the Perpetuity hath followed.

CHAP. I.

That I have reason to take for granted, as I have done, the Proofs of Mr. Aubertin, against the Book of the Perpetuity, till Mr. Arnaud hath shewed them to be Invalid.

ALthough the Passion, which appeareth throughout Mr. Ar∣naud's whole Book, doth in a manner perswade me that his Censures are not always reasonable, yet shall not this hinder me from examining them with a composed Mind: If they are found just, I ought to make my Advantage of them, with∣out minding the sharpness which accompanies them; and if they are not, the Interest of my Cause requires I should endeavour to ma∣nifest the Injustice of them by a modest and Christian Defence.

AND this Method I intend to use, not only in the beginning but likewise in all the following parts of this Work, which I dedicate to the discovery of Truth, and the advancement of Gods Glory, who is the Author and Father of Lights, and of Truth.

IT is certain, saith Mr. Arnaud, in the beginning of his Book, that pro∣vided Mr. Claude may be granted the Priviledge, which he immediately lays

hold on, of inventing, and supposing, what he lists, he takes a very sure way to conclude from thence what he pleases. I only admire that while he

fancies he has this peculiar Liberty, he yet still busies himself in writing Books: For he can absolutely determine all our Differences with a great deal less trouble. For he has no more to do but only immediately to sup∣pose that the Reason is on his side, and that the Catholicks are in the wrong, and so the whole Controversie will be at an end, and thus may he satisfie himself with writing half a Page instead of an entire Answer, for it decid∣eth the whole; 'Tis but supposing that Mr. Aubertin's Book hath gotten the Victory over the Romish Schools, and that he has manifested to all the World, the Change the Roman Church hath made; That the Proofs are clear, strong, and numerous, which make the Change sensibly apparent, and that he hath not been opposed with any other than false and imaginary Reasonings: What need is there then of any other reply, and to what pur∣pose does Mr. Claude take upon him all this Trouble? Calvinism hath now won the Day, and Catholick Religion is utterly Routed.

THE right of opposing to the reasonings of the Author of the Perpetuity, the Proofs of the matters of Fact contained in Mr. Aubertin's Book, and to speak our Thoughts concerning it, is not so marvelous, nor such an extraor∣dinary design that Mr. Arnaud should need raise such a Contest about it. This Author having undertaken to make us confess, if we are not desperately ob∣stinate, that the Belief of the Roman Church, touching the Eucharist, is the same with that of all Antiquity, and having made use of no other reasonings for this purpose, but those which are taken from the moral Impossibility of this Change which we believe hath hap'ned; Common Sense convinces us that he is bound to examine the Proofs of Matters of Fact on which the Opi∣nion, he would root out of our Minds, is established, for till then all his Ar∣guings will be to no purpose. Neither can we justly be denied the Liberty of mentioning these Proofs according to our real Thoughts. For seeing we offer them against the Author of the Perpetuity, only as a prejudication which hinders us from heark'ning to his Arguments, it is therefore very requisite we should speak our Thoughts about them, to the end that if this Author continues in the design of bringing us to an acknowledgment of what he pretends, he especially take care to remove, as much as in him lies, those things which render all his other Endeavours ineffectual.

I do not at all doubt if mens Minds were free from Prejudice, but it would be granted that Mr. Aubertin's Book doth perfectly decide the Controversie touching the Eucharist. It being a complete Piece, in which this matter is searched to the bottom. He hath answered those who have treated on this Subject before his time, and yet his Book has layn even to this present unan∣swer'd, which is a sufficient Reason to presume he hath gotten the better, and that his Proofs, let Mr. Arnaud say what he will, are plainly evident and nu∣merous; but for as much as it is needful for the ending of a Difference, and quieting Contradiction, to suppose Principles granted by both Parties, and seeing the Church of Rome doth neither agree in the Proofs nor in the Change, here in Question, I do thereupon freely confess the Controversie lyes still open in this respect, and that in general we cannot stop any mans mouth by the simple supposition of the Strength and Solidity of that Book, for every Man is at liberty, and hath Right (if he pleases) to examine and answer it.

BUT had not Mr. Arnaud suppressed a great part of what I wrot on this Subject, as well in my first as second Answer, it would immediately appear,

I have bin so far from making such a claim as that wherewith he chargeth me, that I have every where expresly maintained the contrary.

SEEING that Mr. Aubertin has made it appear, by express Passages taken out of the Fathers (these are the Words in my first Answer.) That Transubstan∣tiation was unknown to the antient Church, we may then well conclude there has hap'ned a Change, especially considering that this same Transubstantiation was not heard of till the 11th. Century; Now considering this, for a Man to Philoso∣phize on the impossibility thereof, is to give himself a great deal of Trouble to no purpose. If there yet remain'd any thing farther to be done, it would be to shew that the Passages produced by Mr. Aubertin are either false, or alleaged imper∣tinently against Transubstantiation: but to pass by these matters of Proof, which are clear, express and conclusive, to adhere to I know not what kind of pre∣tended impossibility, this is to trifle with the matter in hand.

OBSERVE here again what I said in my second Answer. We had reason to hope that the Author, treating my Abridgment in the respects and relations which the sequel of its Reasons oblige him to, should have applyed himself unto one of these two things.

EITHER to make it appear that Mr. Aubertin's Proofs, on which we have relyed, are false, and of no force, or that the Consequence, which is pretended to be drawn from them, is untrue; That is to say, it do's not follow a thing is possible, altho it be made apparent that this very thing has actually hap'ned.

WHEN a man makes Suppositions of this kind, how absurd is it to say, such a one puts himself in Possession of any Priviledge, or usurps that mar∣velous Right, of terminating Differences, or deciding Controversies by groundless Suppositions? For I not only give this Author of the Perpetuity the liberty of opposing Mr. Aubertin's Proofs, and to shew, if he can, the falsity of them, but I conjure him so to do, being engaged thereunto by the consideration of his own Reputation, and the necessity of this Course to end the Controversie. Now if this may be stiled by Mr. Arnaud the decid∣ing of a Difference, I am certain that in the style of a more impartial Judge, this would be called, a disengaging of the Debate out of an endless turning, to bring it back to a necessary Discussion on which dependeth the decision of our Controversie. Mr. Arnaud therefore unjustly chargeth me with intend∣ing to decide the Question, and terminate the Difference by a simple Sup∣position, and 'tis through want of Sincerity he has suppressed those Passages in my Answer, which plainly evidence my real Design. But besides these two Defaults which immediately offer themselves to be observed in his Pro∣ceedings, I must ingeniously declare that 'tis very hard for me to compre∣hend what he would have me to do. He seems to desire me to prove that the Proofs of Mr. Aubertin's Book are clear, strong and numerous, before we suppose them to be such. But pray what means proving of Proofs? How can a man otherwise prove them than in producing them, and engaging to defend them when they shall be attacked? Now this hath bin done, they have bin produced, in referring to a Book which is easily met with, there has bin an Abridgment made thereof, they have bin set forth with some Enlargments; The Author of the Perpetuity hath bin requested to shew the insufficiency or falsity of them. What can Mr. Arnaud desire more? Would he have Mr. Aubertin's Book reprinted at the Head of mine, together with a Commentary on the Solidity of his Proofs? But yet still

perhaps he would not grant us the Liberty to speak advantageously of it, we must have proved the Solidity of the first Commentary by a second, and that of the second by a third, and so heap up Commentary upon Commen∣tary till Dooms-Day. For he that would have us prove the Proofs of Mr. Aubertin's Book may, by the same reason, require us likewise to prove the solidity of our Commentaries, and having set no bounds to his Demands, 'tis probable he would have extended them farther. These are the first Fruits of Mr. Arnaud's frollicksom Philosophy, the next time when he lights not into so pleasant a Humor, we shall have others, but perhaps not such di∣verting ones. But be it as it will, there is (I am sure) a great deal of disor∣der in this proceeding, for the strength of a Proof is with good Reason sup∣posed by that Person who offers it, till it hath received a satisfactory Answer, and so likewise the solidity of an Answer is taken for granted by him who makes it, till such time as it shall be opposed by a good Reply. And cer∣tainly such a man would appear Ridiculous, who would offer to put a stop to a Dispute, and exempt himself from replying thereunto, by saying, prove to me the solidity of your Answer. If a Proof be not good, it belongs to him who answereth it, to shew its Defects, and if an Answer be impertinent, it lies upon the Opponent to discover the absurdity thereof. For till then e∣very man is at liberty to speak his Thoughts.

ALTHO this is not a proper Place to treat on the different Use which may be made of Suppositions in a Controversie, yet will I not forbear to speak somewhat thereon to discover more plainly Mr. Arnaud's Mistakes.

THE Suppositions then commonly made use of, are of two sorts, some of them tend absolutely to decide a Difference, others serve only to re∣gulate it.

WHEN a man makes a Supposition to decide absolutely a Difference, there ought to be supposed no other things but those which are acknowledged and granted to be true by the Adversaries themselves, for these Suppositions are as common and inviolable Prejudications which ought to serve as a Law to direct the Judgment in the whole Controversie.

BUT when we make Suppositions only to regulate the form of a Con∣troversie, and hinder men from casting themselves into fruitless Contests, it sufficeth the things supposed be esteemed true by them who suppose them, others remaining still in the liberty of judging and opposing them, if they think fit. So that after this manner each Party supposeth his Senti∣ment true, and termeth it his Hypothesis, that is to say his Supposition; and if a man supposed it not true, he would not maintain it. We suppose like∣wise at the same time the Sentiment of the contrary Party false, for if we supposed it not false, we should not reject it. And this is the true state of a Controversie. That every man be permitted to suppose he hath truth on his side, and act, or defend himself on this Supposition, yet allowing others the li∣berty to suppose the contrary; And this is not that which decideth a Debate, but that which forms it; For by this means there is given to the Controver∣sie its just Bounds, and a man avoids wand'rings, in running after needless things; both parties have a just Equality allotted them, and so far as this, a Person cannot be required to shew his Proof for what he supposeth, provi∣ded he fully and unfeignedly declares his Opinion.

IN the following Parts of a Controversie, there ought to be a distinction made between that Person who opposeth a thing, and he who answereth or defendeth it. The first of these designs so to order it that his Adversary shall be obliged to change his Opinion, and therefore he ought not to pro∣pose any thing which he makes not good by Proofs; but he has likewise Right (as I said just now) to suppose his Proofs good, till such time as the contrary party has made some Answer. And it would be very absurd to affirm such a one designs to end the Difference by his Suppositions, or is obliged to prove his Proofs are good, seeing he grants every one the Liber∣ty to answer them, and in effect if there appears no Answer, the Dif∣ference is decided.

NOW as to him who answereth a matter, having upon this account no other aim but that of rendering ineffectual the Attempt of his Adversary, he has always the Right to suppose his Opinion true without proving it, being only obliged to answer the Proofs which are brought against him, and discover either the falsity or insufficiency of them. A man cannot perhaps fall into a greater irregularity, than to constrain him that Answereth, (and who has no more to do than to refure the Arguments alledged against him,) to make Arguments himself, and to pretend that he hath no right to propose his Answers taken from the Opinions themselves which he defend∣eth, if he hath not before this proved his Opinion. Either he who opposeth must make apparent the falsity of the supposed Opinion, or else he must yield it to be true.

I know that in a publick Dispute, mannaged by writing, it commonly happens, that the same Person opposeth another and defendeth himself, pro∣pounds and answers, according as the occasion and matter requireth, but we are notwithstanding obliged to distinguish these two Qualities, of Aggressor and Respondent, and preserve to each his Right apart; for it would be a very disorderly matter to expect a man should do that when he answereth, which he is not obliged to do but when he opposeth, or to expect he should do that when he opposeth, which he is not obliged to do but in answering. It sometimes happens that an Adversary makes an Exchange, and whereas he is obliged to answer directly to the Proofs of the contrary Party, or to op∣pose others against him of the like Nature and Force, he shifts them and falls into a Discourse to no purpose, and all this while the contrary Proofs he should have answered, remain firm. In such an occasion we have Pow∣er to reduce such a one from his affected Wand'rings, by supposing the Proofs he has left unanswered, strong and sollid. For in such a case they are not supposed good and firm, but only to oblige him to answer them, and shew their weakness or falsity, and if he answereth them not, we may reckon as to him the Question in effect is decided, because when a man hath nothing to say against the Method of proceeding, and that the forementi∣oned Proofs have bin proposed according to the exact Rules of Disputation, a man must then either acquiesce in them or answer them, and to do neither of these is mere wrangling.

NOW to apply these Maxims to the matter in hand, and to judge of Mr. Arnaud's Censure, we need but consider first, That when I supposed Mr. Aubertin's Proofs to be firm and good, I did not thereby propose to my self an absolute end of the Question touching the Change which hath hap∣ned in the Church of Rome, by this simple Supposition; but only to regulate

the Debate, and reduce it within those Bounds wherein it ought to be. Secondly, that in supposing them good, I have only delivered my Opinion which I take upon me to maintain against the Author of the Perpetuity, without depriving him of the Liberty of defending the contrary. Thirdly, that I have supposed them to be good without proving them so, because we ever suppose Proofs sufficiently firm, till such time as something at least is objected against them, and hitherto Mr. Aubertin's Book has layn unanswe∣red. Fourthly, that I made use of them as a means whereby to resist the Author of the Perpetuity's attempt, and when a man only defends himself in a Dispute, he is not obliged to prove any thing. Fifthly and lastly, I did not offer them but only as Prejudices at his Opinion, which ought necessa∣rily to be removed out of our Minds, before the Arguments of the Perpetui∣ty be offered us; for as much as these Prejudices make the Author's Reaso∣nings ineffectual and improper to that design of making us acknowledg there hath bin introduced no Change into the Roman Church. From whence it follows, that I may not only suppose these Proofs are clear, firm, and nume∣rous, seeing that 'tis under this Notion we have entertained these Prejudices; but morever suppose them without proving them, and I do so, to the end I may oblige the Author of that Treatise to shew us (if he can) that they do not amount to what we imagine.

IN short if he would obtain his end, he must shew us that our Prejudice ought not to hinder us from hearkning to what he hath farther to offer us, (which is to say,) supposing our Proofs to be most firm and evident, yet ought they not to avert our Minds from considering his moral Conjectures;) or shew us that our Prejudices have no grounds, and that our Proofs are neither plain nor sufficient. The first of these is absurd, the second is what we desire him to take in hand. But instead of this Mr. Arnaud has bethought himself, and requires us to prove the validity of our Proofs.

IF our Proofs, being supposed good, are in effect the Calvinists Victory, and the Romanists Defeat, as Mr. Arnaud himself granteth, we have rea∣son to admire he should think he hath overthrown them, by five or six Lines stuffed with Raillery.

HATH he bin more concerned at the calling of the Reasonings of the Perpetuity, imaginary Conjectures, than at the glorious Victory over the Romish Church which hath bin attributed to Mr. Aubertin's Book, and this Innova∣tion brought in by the Church of Rome, which is apparent to all the World? Doth he more value the Reputation he thinks he hath gotten by writing a small Treatise, than the settlement of the Catholick Church? and ought he, for the interest of a particular work, to have rifled both East and West, whilst in the mean time the Catholick Church perisheth before his eyes, lying pro∣strate * 1.1 at the Feet of Victorions Calvinisme. I will grant my Supposition resides but in my own Imagination, and in theirs of the same Communion, yet certainly this a man would think, should be sufficient to stir up the Zeal, of a Person whom the Son of God hath given to the Church to be a Teacher of Truth, and who hath bin enlightned by his Grace, and filled with his Spirit, on purpose to rescue and vindicate Truth from the Subtilties, and false Glosses of Error, as speaketh one of his Approbationers.

THIS I think should be sufficient to make him prefer the Reputation of his whole Church before that of a single Author, of whose name the

greatest part of the World is still ignorant. And moreover, as hath bin already said, this Prejudice under which we labour, whether true or false, makes a distinction between the interest of this Treatise, and those of the Romish Church, for it puts a stop to all the pretensions of the Author, and bereaves him of all the Conquests he promised himself. For to regain the Author of the Perpetuity's Reputation, will be to no purpose, seeing that Calvinisme will not give over celebrating Aubertin's Victories, and stand firm to his Proofs. The Confutation of Aubertin's Book would be to give such a mighty stroak, as would ever stop the Mouth of Calvinism, and at the same time, raise up the Glory of the Catholick Church out of the Dust. There ought to have bin no waverings between these two Parties, and yet Mr. Arnaud, this Doctor who hath bin given to the Church furnished with such Gifts, betakes himself to the writing of a Treatise, and sends the Church away till another time.

IN short, to finish the justification of my yet unproved Supposition, I need but propose the Example of a man who, to shew me the Victorys which the Treatise of the Perpetuity hath obtained against us, if we have any Reason left us, supposeth without proving it, that the Proofs of this Book are plain and solid. If I should apply to him Mr. Arnaud's Maxims, and tell him that provided he may have the Liberty which he immediately makes use of, inventing and supposing what he pleaseth, he is in a sure way to conclude thence what he will, that these kind of discourses founded on unproved Suppositions, are not wholy judicious, and that they shew he knoweth not how to distinguish between the things which he is not permitted to assert till he hath proved them, and those which may be justly supposed without being proved.

IF this man reply to me, he has only made this Supposition to oblige Mr. Claude to acknowledg he hath no other means left to defend himself, but by shewing (if he can) the Reasonings of this Treatise are not just; May I not then justly retort upon him, that I only suppose Mr. Aubertin's Proofs are plain and firm, that I may thereby force the Author of the Perpetuity to confess he hath no other way left him to defend himself, but to shew, if he be able, that these Proofs are invalid? Mr. Arnaud perhaps would be so rea∣sonable as not to deny me the liberty of making use of these Principles, and so much the rather because there is a very material and advantagious diffe∣rence on my side, seeing, as already mentioned, I am Respondent in this Dis∣pute; whereas this Person would be the Aggressor. But you will ask me, who this man is, that is so little acquainted with Mr. Arnaud's Maxims? Even Mr. Arnaud himself, who having produced a long train of Arguments in the fifth and sixth Chapters of his first Book; to shew us that the Learned, and Unlearned, the Simple, and Obstinate, and all Persons in general ought to acquiesce in the Proofs of the Perpetuity, he thereupon makes this Conclu∣sion, 'Tis true, saith he, that these Arguments being applyed to the Book of the * 1.2 Perpetuity, suppose the Proofs are clear and solid; and therefore I make use of them in this place to remove these vain Exceptions of Mr. Claude, who would have them rejected without examining them, on this general Reason, That they are Argumentative Proofs. Mr. Claude hath no other way of defending himself than by shewing, if he can, the Arguments in this Treatise are not sound. We shall see by what follows, whether he had reason to make this Supposition, I shall content my self at present with concluding according to his Example, that every man may make Suppositions, provided he intends not thereby to end the Debate, but only oblige an Adversary to come to the Discussion

of that Point which he is not willing to meddle with. And thus doth Mr. Arnaud censure in another that which he doth himself.

CHAP. II.

That the Author of the Perpetuity's Method may be justly Suspected to be deceitful, and that his manner of assaulting Mr. Aubertin's Book is Disingenuous.

THE Method the Author of the Perpetuity makes use of to make us confess, as he says; that the Doctrine of the Roman Church, touching the Eucharist, is the same with that of all Antiquity, hath appeared so strange and irregular to me, that I have made these following Reflexions thereupon.

I. That it may be justly suspected of Artifice and Illusion.

II. That this way of Assaulting Mr. Aubertin's Book is Disingenious and Indirect.

III. That the Author hath bin to blame in pretending to shew the Inva∣lidity of Mr. Aubertin's Proofs by Arguments which at most do amount but to mere Conjectures.

IV. That to confute at once all these Arguments, we need but oppose against them these same Proofs of matters of Fact, and by gathering them into an Abridgment, to give a general view of them.

Mr. Arnaud confesses that I were not to be blamed for having in my Answer * 1.3 fall'n first upon the Faults which I pretend to discover in the Author of the Perpetuity's Method, provided, saith he, that I maintained Equity and Truth; It may be, I think, then supposed I have so far done nothing con∣trary to Rule, it only remains I make good the four above-mentioned Re∣flections.

I shall not insist long upon the first of these, because Mr. Arnaud hath al∣ledged * 1.4 nothing against it, appearing undenyable in it self. It is grounded on this, That when the Question concerns what we ought to believe touch∣ing the Eucharist, the Author of the Perpetuity would have this Question decided, not by the word of God, but the Churches Consent in all Ages, and Depositions of the Fathers, and when it comes to the Enquiry after this Consent of the Church, he would have this second Question resolved not by Passages taken out of the Writings of the Fathers, but by Arguments. Now this is certainly a most tedious and preposterous Course; it being a Principle of common Sense, that Questions in matters of Right ought to be naturally de∣cided by the Rule of Right, then when the Rule determining that Right is distinct and separated from matters of Fact, and that again naturally the

Questions in matters of Fact ought to he decided by an exact Consideration of the Facts themselves, or by Witnesses who can make a lawful Depo∣sition.

Seeing then the Christian Religion offers us a distinct Rule, and that too as it lies separate from matters of Fact; (which is that holy Scripture, wherein God hath made a full Revelation of his Will;) it is in it we must search for what we ought to believe, and not in the consent of the Church in all Ages. For as the Fathers thought they were obliged to ground their Belief on the Scriptures, so likewise we, who have the same Faith with them, ought to ground our Faith on the same Principle. The Scripture hath been given us to determine thereby our Apprehensions of the Mysteries of Reli∣gion, but their Belief who preceded us can be no more at farthest, than an Example for us to Imitate, and an Example too submitted to the same Rule, which requires no farther our Approbation than it agrees with that; so that to decide Questions of this Nature by the Examples of former Ages, is to pervert the natural Order and Design of things.

IT will be to no purpose to alledge The Church of Rome will not allow the Scriptures to be the only Rule of our Faith, seeing it likewise taketh in Tradition. Yet this Answer will not clear the Author of the Perpetuity from that Reproach with which I shall charge him: For when a man lays down a Method in a Controversie, and proposes it as sufficient to convince those who are not of his own Opinion, he must ground this Method on Principles grant∣ed by both Parties; for if his Positions are such as may be questioned, he is then obliged to a solid Proof of them, before he can suppose them. For if he take not this Course, he will quickly be at a loss, and his whole Work soon rendred ineffectual. Now this the Author of the Perpetuity has not done, for he has not proved that the Consent of all Ages ought to be our Rule in matters of Faith. 'Tis true he has told us of the ill Consequences which would follow the condemning the Antient Fathers, and that we should do, if we suppose them guilty of an Idolatrous Worship. But this reaches not our Question: for it doth not hence follow that their Writings are the Rule of our Faith, neither in the matter of our present Debate, nor in any other: For the Fathers may be free from damnable Errors in any Article of our Re∣ligion, by the agreement their Doctrine hath with that Rule which enjoyn∣eth us to believe, without becoming a Rule themselves and without arroga∣ting this supreme Authority over mens Consciences, which ought to decide all Questions of this Nature.

But perhaps it will be replyed that, provided we attain the knowledge of the Truth in what we ought to believe concerning so important a Subject as that of the Eucharist, what need we matter, by what means we obtain it, whether by means of the holy Scripture, or by Consent of the antient Church? If we follow not the Fathers as the Rule of our Faith, let us follow them then as an Example held out for us to imitate. To which I answer, That the cause which I have taken upon me to defend would in the main lose nothing, though we should take the Belief of the Antient Church in this matter for the Model and Rule of ours, so that this doth not at all trouble us.

BUT be it as it will, we must not forsake the Word of God, nor wholly build our Faith on any other Principles but those which are drawn from the Holy Scriptures. Our Faith would not then be what it ought to be, that is

to say, A Divine Faith, were it but an imitation of the Belief of the Fathers. This Maxim of regulating our Religion by an Imitation of them who have preceded us, without having any fixed Principle, is certainly of very dan∣gerous Consequence. For 'twould happen at length after some Ages, that the last would have no resemblance with the former, because that humane Imperfections which commonly mix themselves in such an Imitation, would never be wanting to disorder and corrupt it, as is commonly seen in the drawing of a Picture, Draughts of which being taken one from the other, become still every time less Perfect, as they are farthest distant from their Original.

THE Author then of the Perpetuity cannot be excused for his perverting the order of the Dispute with which I charge him, that he would decide this Question of Right by matters of Fact; Neither is he less inexcusable when he would have the Question of matter of Fact, to depend on the force of his Reasoning. The matter before us is to know what has bin the Opinion of the Fathers touching the Eucharist, and he pretends to decide this Question not by the Testimony of the Fathers themselves, but by certain Impossibilities he imagines in the change which we suppose. I know very well that there are sometimes Enquiries made into matters of Fact, the Truth of which can∣not be attested by any Witness, and I confess in this case, no man can be blamed for having recourse to Reasonings, because there being no other E∣vidence to help us in our Search, even Necessity warranteth this way of Pro∣ceeding, altho it be indirect. But we are not in these Circumstances, see∣ing we have the Writings of the Antients, and those no less considerable for their Number than for the many clear Passages they contain touching the Eu∣charist; which if we will apply our selves unto, we shall soon discover their Opinions about it. What need is there then, for us to leave our enquiries into the Opinion of the Fathers, to hearken to the Author of the Perpetui∣ty's Arguments? May we not now justly complain of him, and answer him, this is the way of Inquiry which Nature it self hath prescribed us, and comparing these two ways, the more natural appeareth to us to be the more direct and certain. From whence it immediately follows, That his manner of proceeding, may well be suspected as artificial and deceitful, for it is u∣sual with us to suspect that Person who leaves the common Road, to walk in by-Paths.

MY second Observation on the Author of the Perpetuity's Method, re∣spects * 1.5 the manner of his Assaulting Mr. Aubertin's Book. And seeing Mr. Arnaud hath charged me with falsity, for affirming Mr. Aubertin's Book hath chiefly occasioned this Controversie, and that the Author of the Perpetuity hath set upon it after an indirect manner. I am thereupon obliged to divide the Subject of my justification under two Heads. I shall first then make it ap∣pear that Mr. Aubertin's Book hath bin assaulted, and hath bin the first oc∣casion of this Debate. Secondly, that his Book has bin Assaulted after an unjust manner.

THE first of these Particulars shall be dispatched in two Words, for on one hand I have no more to do, but only desire the Reader himself to peruse the second Section of the first Treatise of the Perpetuity, where he shall find that in fifty one Pages which it contains, his whole design is only to re∣fute Mr, Aubertin's Account of the Innovation which hath hap'ned touching Transubstantiation: And on the other, I have no more to do but declare to

the World, That from the first Moment of our Debate, which was precisely then when I began to answer this Treatise, I proposed to my self not only particularly to maintain the Truth of this Account, but defend in general the whole Book, against the indirect attempts of that Treatise. Now if this may not be called the first occasion of this Contest, I know not any long∣er how to name things. For what is there which maketh a Book the first occasion of a Debate, which is not here? Must a Book be assaulted? this hath bin so. Must it be defended? this hath bin so. Ought he who takes upon him the Defence of it, to do it with a design of keeping up its Credit? This hath bin likewise my Design, because its Interests have appeared to me to be the same with those of the Truth. Where then is this notorious Falsity with which Mr. Arnaud chargeth me?

THE Author of the Perpetuity, saith he, never pretended his Treatise was * 1.6 a refutation of that Ministers Book, and in a matter as this is, which dependeth on the Intention of a man yet living, it were sufficient to convince Mr. Claude of rashness to tell him, as from him, he is mistaken, and that this Author never designed what he charges him with. Moreover he adds, That this Treatise was primarily intended only as a Preface to the Office of the blessed Sacrament: and that we seldom find any man undertake to refute a Book in Folio, in a Preface: That he handleth the Question of the Impossibility of an Innovation: That he refuteth Blondel and Aubertin by the way, who had imposed fabulous Relations on the World: And that he directly indeed argueth against Mr. Aubertin's pre∣tended Innovation, but medleth farther with no other part of his Book.

Mr. Arnaud I hope will pardon me, if I affirm that there's not one word of Truth in all this. For, to speak properly, the occasion of this Contest can be no other but that taken from the Obligation I had to enter into this Dis∣pute, seeing our Debate began but from that time I interposed. For had I not stept in between, the Author had talked only to himself, and when a man does so, we are not wont to say, such a one is in a Dispute. To find then the real Occasion, Mr. Arnaud should have sought it in the causes mov∣ing me to interpose, and not in the Author of the Perpetuity's Intention. Mr. Arnaud hath not considered there is a Difference between the Occasion of a Debate, and whether the Subject of it be real or imaginary. For to de∣cide the latter of these Particulars, we must look back to the Author of the Perpetuity, and consider what he has done, and what he would do, but to be ascertained in the first of them, I ought thereupon to be consulted: and when it shall appear I was deceived by a groundless Imagination that Mr. Aubertin's Book hath bin assaulted, then it might be truly affirmed I raised a Quarrel to no purpose, seeing the occasion of it only sprang out of my own Fancy, but yet what I have said since cannot be charged with notorious Falsity, viz. That this Book was the first occasion of the Debate betwixt us, seeing that in effect I only engaged in this Controversie to defend it.

THERE is moreover in Mr. Arnaud's Discourse a false Supposition in the Term of Refuting, for he supposeth I charge the Author of the Perpetui∣ty with a design of formally and directly refuting Mr. Aubertin's whole Book, and 'tis thereupon he tells us, that seldom any man undertakes to refute a large Folio in a Preface. But he does not consider, that I did not for this reason use the Term of Refuting, but Assaulting, and that far from charging the Author of the Perpetuity with this Design of a Refutation, my complaint hath bin on the contrary, that he has not refuted this Book, and which

hath been grounded on the Necessity urging him to have done it, as I shall shew hereafter. Now to justifie what I said, that Mr. Aubertin's Book hath been the first Occasion of this Debate, and at the same time, that this is not an ill grounded Supposition, I need not repeat that the Author of the Treatise designed to refute that whole Book, it appears to me sufficient he hath assaulted the last part of it, and undertaken to answer it throughout the second Section of his Treatise. It sufficeth me that his first Section tendeth to render incredible Mr. Aubertin's account of an Innovation. It sufficeth me, the drift of his whole Work is to make Mr. Aubertin's Proofs of matters of Fact altogether useless to us. And this is more than need to be said to refute this fierce Accusation of notorious Falsity, with which Charge Mr. Arnaud hath begun his Book. Now this is apparently true, and a man needs but his Eyes and common Sence to be satisfied in it.

Mr. Arnaud may tell us what he pleases concerning the Author of the Per∣petuity's real Design. Yet shall I answer him, that when men judge of a Work, their Judgment is guided by what appears in the Work it self, and not by the secret Intentions of its Author. For mens Designs many times lye hid, but the drift of their Work lies open. I do not pretend to penetrate into mens Hearts, yet cannot I be withheld from judging of the Treatise of the Perpetuity, because 'tis before my Eyes.

THAT this Treatise was at first, but a simple Preface, or that it was not, it avails me little to know, for I am not usually so much in Love with Rari∣ties, as to extend my Curiosity into the Author of the Perpetuity's disavowed Designs. If this Work hath been heretofore but a Preface, and that it hath been since raised to the dignity of a Treatise, there hath been reason perhaps for its ennobling, its Desert hath made it worthy of this Honour; and they are at this day to blame who have reproached it with the meanness of its for∣mer Condition, in an occasion, which called for the establishment of its Glo∣ry. But be it what it will, Preface, or Treatise, it is all one to me, it assault∣eth never the less for this Mr. Aubertin's Book.

BUT saith Mr. Arnaud, he refutes it by the way. By the way, of four score and eight Pages which it contains, there are one and fifty of them imployed in a formal Refutation of Mr. Aubertin's account of an Innovation, and the drift of the rest, as I have already said, is to shew that this Account is incre∣dible, because tis impossible, and indirectly to overthrow the whole Work. So that here I think the charge of our first notorious Falsity, appears to be un∣true. Let us see the second, which is that I affirmed, The Author of the Per∣petuity hath assaulted Mr. Aubertin's Book after an indirect manner. But to apprehend throughly the truth of this Observation, Mr. Aubertin's whole Book must be granted to be a Discourse only touching the Eucharist, and which is divided into three Parts. In the first he handleth this Subject by Arguments drawn from Scripture, and humane Reason. He produceth the Passages thereof, and Arguments fetched from thence, and refutes the An∣swers made thereunto, nay he near upon answereth whatsoever Controver∣tists have stated hitherto considerable on this Subject. In the second, he ex∣amines the Churches Belief, during six Centuries, by an exact Discussion of all Passages produced on either side, makes it plainly appear that Transub∣stantiation, and the real Presence are Doctrines which have bin unknown during all that time. And in the third, he gives an account after what man∣ner their Doctrines have been introduced.

THE first part treateth of the Question of Right, shewing the true Rules of it, and serves as a Foundation to the second. The second Part handleth the Question of matter of Fact, by a faithful deposition of Witnesses, that is to say, by the Fathers from Age to Age, and serves as a Foundation to the third. And the third Part shews the Degrees of this Innovation, the Time when it begun, its Authors, and the Opposition which it hath met with.

THIS being so, I say, it is an indirect Proceeding, to single out this last Part from the second, and attempt the refuting of it alone, as the Author of the Perpetuity hath done. And the Reason is manifest, because the on∣ly Foundation on which the last Part is built, and which communicateth to it all its force of Perswasion consisteth in its second. For wherefore do we believe, for Example, what it saith concerning the Innovation which Anastasius Sinaite hath introduced, in reference to Expressions, he having bin the first that rejected the Terms of Type or Figure on the Subject of the Eucharist? It is because he shews us in his second Part, that the Fathers who preceded Anastasius, ever made use of this manner of Expression, for we find not any one of them who rejected them. Wherefore do we take Paschasius to be the first who ever thought of the real Presence? The Rea∣son, is because we never meet with any before his time, who thus deliver themselves. So that the second Part of Mr. Aubertin's Book does necessari∣ly prepare the Reader for the third. In the second Part he sheweth the State of the Church, for the six first Ages, to be quite different from what is seen at present in the Church of Rome: The Reader then thereupon finds there has bin an Innovation, and supposes it to be not only possible, but that it hath actually hap'ned, so that it only remains to know, when, by whom, and by what Degrees this Change has bin introduced, and this is suffici∣ently set forth in the third Part. It cannot therefore be singled out from the second to be opposed alone, without the greatest Injustice and Disinge∣nuity; for this is to strip it of all its Strength, and to deal with it, as the Philistims did with Samson, cut off his Hair before they set upon him.

Mr. Aubertin offered not his Account to the Reader till he had prepared him by a necessary Premonition to receive it; Whereas the Author of the Perpetuity would have it considered and examined with an unprepared Mind, or rather, to speak better, with a Mind fill'd with contrary Dispositions. Now this is not fair Dealing. For to proceed orderly, he ought to have be∣gun with these first Preparations; and made it appear (if he could) that they were fallacious, and so discover the unjustice, falsity, or weakness of them, and afterwards set upon the Account he gives us. Had he taken this Course, we should have had nothing to charge him with, touching his Me∣thod; but to stifle these Preparations, and cut 'em off from the Dispute, and fall immediately upon his Account of the Innovation, is that which will ever deserve the name of indirect Dealing.

AND if we consider likewise the manner after which the Author of the Perpetuity hath endeavoured to overthrow this Account, it will be found his Proceedings are in this Respect as disingenious as in the former. As for Instance, Mr. Aubertin observes that Anastasius Sinaite hath bin the first who varied from the common Expressions of the Antients, in saying, The

Eucharist is not an Antitype but the Body of Jesus Christ. Now to refute directly this Historical Passage, (being agreed as we are in this Particular relating to Anastasius) there ought to have bin the like Passages produced of them who preceded him, and to have made it thence appear he was not the first who thus expressed himself. But instead of this, the Author of the Perpetuity takes another Course, for he demands, how this can be, That * 1.7 Anastasius, who could not be ignorant of the Churches. Belief in his time, should offer an Opinion which would be formally opposed, and this without acknowledging, he proposed a contrary Opinion? He indeavours to shew this Innovation could not overspread either East or West, and that Anastasius's real meaning, and that of them who spake like him in this particular, could not be the Impannation of the Word with which Mr. Aubertin seems to charge them. And the same doth he, in respect of Paschasius, whom Mr. Aubertin Affirms to be the first Author of the Real Presence, for instead of shewing others held the same Opinion, and that he did not teach a new Doctrine, he sets himself upon shewing, that if Paschasius had bin an In∣novator, he would have bin taken notice of in some one of the Councils held in his time, that he would have bin opposed, and never offered his Opinion as the received Doctrine of the Church, as he has done. I will not now enquire into the strength of his Arguments, neither will I say they ought to be re∣jected for this Reason alone, that they are indirect, The Question is here whether this course of refuting Mr. Aubertin's Book be warrantable, and it must be granted, it is not; for the chief design of this his Account be∣ing only to demonstrate, that Anastasius, and Paschasius introduced Innova∣tions; Now to make it appear they were not Innovators, there ought to have bin produced several Passages out of the Writings of those who pre∣ceded them, which should come near the same Expressions, or at least a∣mounted to the same Sence as that of theirs, which the Author of the Per∣petuity hath not done.

LET Mr. Arnaud consider again then, if he pleases, the Question, and whether I have broached two notorious Untruths, the one, that Mr. Auber∣tin's Book was the first occasion of this Contest, the other, that the Author of the Perpetuity hath attacked it after an indirect manner. Now to the end I may have from him a second Sentence more favourable than the former; it will not be amiss to answer his Objections, and shew him first, That I pretend∣not to hinder any Person from choosing those Points or Matters for which he hath the greatest Inclination: for, provided he handles them in a regular manner, he will thereby oblige the publick. Secondly I do not so much as pretend to hinder any man from refuting part of a Book, and leaving the other, provided this Part may be well refuted alone, and there be no cause to complain that the force of the Arguments is spoiled by such a separati∣on. Thirdly, Neither do I take upon me to call the Author of the Perpetui∣ty to account about his employing himself, and require of him two Volums in Folio. For I am willing to believe his Employs are great and difficult, and therefore afford him not time enough to make a direct and compleat Refutation of Mr. Aubertin's Book.

AND as to what he tells us, that we cannot reasonably require more from * 1.8 a Person who handleth any Subject, than that he suppose nothing which is False, or Obscure, and draw not from thence ill Consequences, seeing the truth and clearness of Principles, and the justness of their Consequences are in them∣selves sufficient, to assure us of the Truth, and gives us a clear and perfect

notion thereof. To which I answer, This is true, when Persons are agreed to treat on this Subject, and do take this course to decide the principal Questi∣on of it, for in this case, only the Principles and their Consequences ought to be examined. But if this be not consented to, but on the contrary there are general Observations made upon the Method, then it is not particularly minded Whether the Principles are disputable or not, nor Whether their Consequences are true or false, for this follows afterwards. The Method of handling the Subject is only considered, without regard to the Princi∣ples or Conclusions; That is to say, Whether 'tis direct or disorderly, na∣tural or against Nature, sufficient to perswade, and end the Controversie or not, and on this account, it may be justly expected from a Person that he take a right Method rather than a wrong, one which is a Natural, ra∣ther than that which is not so. For such a one may well be told, He spends his time to no purpose, that takes not a right way to obtain the end of what he designs. Now this is exactly what we have to alledge against the Author of the Perpetuity, as will appear in the following Chapter. We have rea∣son to wonder that Mr. Arnaud should deny us the liberty of making these general Reflexions, he I say, who confessed in the second Period of his first Chapter, that I am not to blame for having grounded my chief Accusa∣tions against the Author of the Perpetuity's Method, upon the Defects I found therein, provided I establish Truth and Reason. But this doth not well a∣gree with what he saies here. That there cannot be any thing justly required of a man who treateth on any Subject, but only this, That he lay down good Prin∣ciples, and draw thence true Conclusions. For the falsity of Principles, or Con∣sequences, proceeds rather from a defect in the Matter, or Form of an Argu∣ment in Particular, than in a Method in General.

CHAP. III.

THE third Observation justified, viz. That the Author of the Perpe∣tuity has bin to blame in pretending to overthrow the Proofs contain∣ed in Mr. Aubertin's Book, by Arguments which can amount to no more than mere Conjectures.

MR. Arnaud seems unwilling to grant, That the Author of the Perpetuity has endeavoured to invalidate our Proofs of Matters of Fact contained in Mr. Aubertin's Book by his Arguments, and thereupon has only proposed the Question in these Terms: viz. Whether a man may not argue against matters of Fact: And takes it for grant∣ed * 1.9 he may in some particular Cases. It is then our part to shew, he wan∣ders from the Point, and that the Author of the Perpetuity has not only de∣signed to oppose, but even overthrow by his arguings our Proofs of Fact, so that the Question now is whether this Endeavour of his is just or unjust, whe∣ther according to a regular Course or contrary to it.

AND for this purpose, I shall only desire Mr. Arnaud to consider, That the Design of the Method, or advantage expected by it, as it hath bin ex∣presly

declared in the fourteenth Page of the first Treatise, Is to bring a∣ny unprejudiced Person, to acknowledge the Church of Rome's Belief touching the Eucharist to be the same with that of all Antiquity; and this new Method is proposed to remedy an Inconveniency, usually attending that ordinary Method, called Discussion, wherein it frequently happens, that men seldom sufficiently comprehend the strength of Proofs; because they are not considered in their right order, which ever so placeth them as that they mutually assist and for∣tifie each other. I need but entreat him likewise to remember the first Title of the Treatise, before it was printed, when it was put into my Hands to be answered; which was as follows, A Treatise containing an easie Means to convince Hereticks, by shewing them there has no alteration bin made in the Churches Belief touching the Eucharist, as I already observed in the Preface before my Answer. Lastly I have no more to request of him, but only to remember the new Title under which the first Treatise, and them which followed, were published, which is; The Perpetuity of the Faith of the Ca∣tholick Church touching the Eucharist. For what else can be expected from a man that promises to make us confess, the Church of Romes Belief is the same with that of all Antiquity, and hopes to convince us of the Truth of this, but that he should invalidate all our Proofs of matters of Fact, by which we think we have established the reality of an Innovation? Would Mr. Ar∣naud grant me the favour to suppose a while that I am not obstinate: and I will likewise on the other hand suppose I was mistaken in Mr. Aubertin's Book, and that the Perswasion I had of the truth of his Proofs concerning an Innovation hath bin false. Now should the Author of the Perpetuity pre∣tend, that his Method is able to undeceive me and dissipate all the false Im∣pressions which Mr. Aubertin's Proofs have wrought in my Mind; should he, I say, pretend to this, he has imagined, as I have already mentioned, that he is able by his Arguments, to invalidate our Proofs; and again on the other hand, if he pretends not to do this, he hath bin certainly to blame in saying, He would convince Hereticks, and make them acknowledge, (if they are not In∣vincibly Obstinate) the Perpetuity of Transubstantiation, and the Real Pre∣sence. We shall see by what follows, whether or no Mr. Arnaud has up∣held the honour of so great a Design, or whether he has not abated some∣thing of it. I shall content my self at present with only shewing the pre∣tension of the Author of the Method.

IT cannot be alleadged in his behalf, he had not these aforementioned Proofs in his Mind, but only offered his own; which he judged conclusive; for besides that when a man lays down a Method as sufficient to produce an effect, he ought consider whatsoever may hinder the producing of this or the contrary Effect. We may farther observe he assaults Mr. Aubertin's Book in this Treatise, wherein are contained these Proofs, concerning which he could not pretend Ignorance, seeing they make up the greatest part of that Book. It ought moreover to be considered, that he refuteth, as I alrea∣dy said in the foregoing Chapter, an Account whose whole strength is ground∣ed on these Proofs of matters of Fact, an Account which taketh them for its Foundation, and borroweth from them whatsoever it would perswade, and refutes it not in opposing other Proofs after the same manner, but by Arguments. Whence it follows he imagins his Arguments are sufficient to overthrow these Proofs, it being impossible if they stand firm, but that the account of the Change or Innovation should do so too.

Mr. Arnaud's way of shifting the Question that he might draw on the

Reader to another matter, is so plainly evident, that I need not give him the least hint of it. For there is certainly a great Difference betwixt barely Op∣posing Arguments against our Proofs, and pretending to invalidate them by Arguments. The first of these may be done without thinking on the second; these Arguments may be examined and compared with our Proofs, without any other Pretence than the keeping the Mind in Suspence, and hindering it from determining on either side. Had the Author of the Per∣petuity kept himself within these Bounds, we should have answered him af∣ter another sort; but he hath extended his design so far as to bring us to a final Acknowledgment. The Question then is not so much about his bare Opposition; altho that shall be shewed him at length to be useless, and that he cannot expect any advantage from it, for the Debate at present con∣sists either in the Justice or Injustice of his Design, when he imagined this Opposition was sufficient to convince us, notwithstanding our Prejudices against it, occasioned by Mr. Aubertin's and other Ministers Proofs.

BUT to state the Question clearly, it ought to be farther supposed, that we compare not here the Proofs drawn from Arguments, then when they are made use of to establish Matters argued, with Proofs of matters of Fact, which are intended for a confirmation of the same matters of Fact. For I am far from denying, but there may be at some times Proofs drawn from Arguments, which are as conclusive in their kind, and bring along with them as much certainty of Evidence, as Proofs of Fact do in theirs. The Debate concerns the comparing these two sorts of Proofs, in respect of a matter of Fact; for the Principal Question betwixt us, is whether the Do∣ctrine of the antient Church is the same with that of the Church of Rome at present, now this is a matter of Fact, which on one side is demonstrated by Proofs of Fact, and which the Author pretends on the other side to demon∣strate by Proofs drawn from Arguments; which two sorts of Proofs form contrary Conclusions on the same subject.

IT is farther to be considered, the Question lies not in supposing our Proofs are frivolous, or uncertain, for then they might be opposed by Proofs drawn from Arguments; by pretending that the Fact would be more plainly demonstrated by this means than by the other. Had the Author of the Perpetuity made this Supposition and well grounded it, we could not a∣ny longer keep to our Proofs of Fact, of whose weakness and insufficieney he had already convinced us, we must then have hearkned to his Arguments. But we are not in this case, for he leaves our Proofs of Fact untouched in their whole strength, and we are perswaded of the truth and solidity of them. It being then thus with us, it remains to enquire, whether his Proofs drawn from Arguments can be sufficient to make us alter our Judgments. The Author of the Perpetuity pretends they are, and I deny them to be so, so that to decide clearly this Point, we must compare these two ways of Proving, one with another.

I affirm then first of all, our Proofs of Fact are regular and natural, as I made apparent in my second Chapter: whereas those of the Author of the Perpetuity are unjust and preposterous. Now to compare these two Methods one with another, that which is natural is least suspicious, for there can be nothing said against it, common Sense leads us to it, but the other is ever lyable to Exception, by reason of its contrariety and obliquity. The

latter of these leads a mans Mind by several Turnings and Windings, and the other makes it go straight.

MOREOVER, our Proofs of Fact demonstrate the matter immediate∣ly in it self; but Proofs drawn from Reason cannot do this, but by a Pro∣spect thro other things, and by means of Connexions and Consequences; Now it cannot be denyed, but of these two ways of knowing things, the one being immediate, and the other mediate; the one near, and the other distant, but that the first of these is the most distinct and certain: for not to say, that the Ideas of things grow weak, when they are discovered by a Medium, and that the Mind is more attentive, and so by consequence more distracted, and less able, when it is forced, to apply it self at the same time to three dif∣ferent Objects, viz. on the Conclusion, Principle, and Dependance which the Conclusion hath on its Principle, than when it hath but one only Ob∣ject to consider; besides this I say, the orderly Connexion of things being less known to us than the things themselves, it is easier to take for a Conse∣quence what is not one, than to take one thing for another. It is easier to deceive us by affirming, if an Alteration hath hap'ned, there must such and such Accidents have followed it, than it is by only telling us, Loe here the Alteration, and certainly a man is in less danger of being deceived this way than the other.

WHEN two Methods are offered as proper to demonstrate a Question in Debate, it seems to me, that a mans Reason will incline him to choose that way which brings him to the consideration of the Point debated in all its several Relations and Circumstances, rather than that which shews it him but in one. The Mind must be permitted to make several Reflections, be∣cause divers Reflections strengthen one another, and uniting together, they form a more extended and perfect Knowledg, even as several Rayes uni∣ted give the greater Light. Now it cannot be denyed but our Proofs of Fact have this Advantage over them of the Perpetuity. For the latter of these respects no farther than the only impossibility of an Alteration; and concludes from thence, that the Doctrine of the Antient Church hath bin the same with that of the Church of Rome at present. But our Proofs ex∣amine the Belief of the Antient Church, in all the ways it can be examined in it self, by its necessary Consequences, by its Consequences of Congruity, by way of Negation, and Affirmation, by Circumstances of Time, Places, Persons, and Occasions, and in a word, after all manners imaginable, whereby the Mind may form a more solid and certain Judgment. What likelyhood is there then, that being already perswaded by a considerable number of Proofs, which this Method draws from all these Particulars, we should receive a contrary Impression by the Author of the Perpetuity's Arguments?

A greater humane Certainty than that of Sence cannot be found, now that of Reasoning falls commonly under this Degree, especially when we apply it to matters of Fact.

BUT when Proofs drawn from Arguments shall be extended to the same Degree of Conviction, as those of the Eye-sight, and common Sence, they can never ascend higher, or proceed so far as to convince us, and make us renounce their Evidence. It seldom happens that these two Lights justle one another, but when this falls out, a mans Mind never fails of tak∣ing

one part or the other, it may remain for some time interdicted and a∣stonished; but unless some vain Philosophy, as that of the Academicks, or Pyrrhoniens has corrupted it, and made it wander, it will soon rally it self on the side of common Sence. I will produee an Example drawn from Physicks. Our Eyes and Sences shew us that a grain of Sand is not only fi∣nite, but far less than a Mountain, or the whole Globe of the Earth; yet there are People who endeavour to demonstrate by the force of their Ar∣guments, that this little grain of Sand comprehends an infinite number of Parts actually existent, because it may be divided ad infinitum, and it is not, say they, well conceivable how a thing can be so divided, if there be not in it actually an Infinity of Parts, seeing each Division supposeth the actual Existence of its Parts, from whence it seems, that this grain of Sand is as bigg as a Mountain, and the whole World besides, it being impossible, say they moreover, there should be a greater and larger heap than that which actually contains an Infinity of Parts. I doubt not but a mans Mind would be soon entangled in this Labyrinth, but he would extricate himself thence, not by the help of his Senses but his Reason, he will turn it on every side, and invent Distinctions which will signifie nothing, as are the greatest part of them which have bin made on this Subject; yet will he still keep firm to his Eye-sight and common Sense.

IT will be replied perhaps, that unless we are extream Obstinate, we cannot pretend our Proofs of Fact are of this kind, which is to say, that they have the certainty of our Senses; for they are taken from the Testimo∣ny of the Fathers, whose Faithfulness may be called in question, by setting up this fantastical Hypothesis, mentioned by Mr. Arnaud, which is, That all our Passages are false, and invented by the Disciples of John Scot, or else in saying, that the Fathers are mistaken, or some such like matter, which may * 1.10 make the Truth and Validity of these Proofs to be called in Question; and moreover that our Passages are not so plain, but they may well be questi∣oned, seeing there have bin great Volums written concerning them on both sides. To which I answer, in supposing two things which seem to me, to be both undenyable by Mr. Arnaud, we can pretend against him our Proofs of Fact have such a kind of Certitude, as is that of our Senses.

MY first Supposition then shall be, That the Writings of the Fathers are faithful Witnesses of the Belief of the Antient Church. He cannot disagree with me in this Point, for we have not receiv'd it but from them of the Church of Rome, they produce it themselves, and we use it only out of Conde∣scension to them, not having need, as to our own particular, of any thing but the Word of God to regulate our Faith in this Mystery of the Eucharist. And when this Point should be questionable, yet must then the Author of the Perpetuity put it out of Question by his refuting of it, before he proposes to us his Arguments, and not having done it, we are at liberty to act against him on this Principle. The other Supposition we must make is, That we know very well, what is the Church of Romes Belief touching the Eucha∣rist, and that we rightly apprehend it, so that there is no danger of our Mi∣stake in this matter, and this is that which hath never yet bin disputed a∣gainst us. In effect, we neither say, nor imagine any thing on this Subject, more than what we find in Books, and hear discoursed on every Day, which is, that the whole Substance of Bread is really converted into the Substance of the Body of Jesus Christ, and the whole Substance of Wine into the whole Substance of his Blood, there not remaining any thing more of the Bread

and Wine but their meer Accidents, which are not sustained by any Sub∣ject; and further, that the Substance of our Saviour's Body, is really present at the same time both in Heaven and Earth, on all the Altars whereon this Mystery is celebrated: that they which communicate, eat and drink this Sub∣stance with the Mouths of their Bodies, and that it ought to be Worshipped with the Adoration of Latria. This is undenyable.

I say then, on these Grounds, we have reason to presume our Proofs of Fact are evident even to Sense it self. For we read the several Passages of the Fathers which speak of the Eucharist, our Eyes behold them, and our Senses are Judges of them. But there are not any of these Articles to be met with, which do distinctly form the Belief of the Roman Church, neither in express Terms, nor in equivalent ones. We are agreed in the Contents of these Articles, and in what they mean; we are likewise agreed of the Place where they were to be found, in case the Antient Church had taught them. We know likewise, that it belongeth to our Eyes and common Sen∣se to seek them, and judge whether they are there, or no; for when a Church believes and teaches them, she explains them distinctly enough to make them understood, and we must not imagine they lie buried in far fetched Princi∣ples, or couched in equivocal Terms which leave the Mind in Suspense; or wrapt up in Riddles, from whence they cannot be drawn but by hard Study. If they are in them they ought to be plain, according to the mea∣sure and Capacity of an ordinary and vulgar Understanding. Yet when we seek them, we cannot find 'em: if they were set down in express Terms, our Eyes would have discovered them; had they bin in Equivalent ones, or drawn thence by evident and necessary Consequences, common Sense would have discovered them. But after an exact and thorow Search, our Eyes and common Sense tell us, they are not to be found in any man∣ner. This altho a Negative Proof, yet is it of greatest Evidence and Cer∣tainty. After the same manner as when we would know whether a Person be at home, we are agreed both touching the House and the Person, that one might not be taken for the other; and after an exact Search, if a mans Eyes and Senses tell him that he is not there, the proof of a Negative Fact hath all possible Force and Evidence. Yet we are upon surer Terms, for a man may easily hide himself in some corner of his House, and steal away from the sight of those that seek him; and therefore the Negative Proof serves only in this Respect, to justifie we have made a full and thorow Search. But if the Articles of the Romish Creed were established in the universal Consent of all Ages, (as is pretended,) it would not be sufficient they were hid in some one of the Fathers Writings, they must near the matter have appeared in all of them; whence it follows, our Negative Proof is yet more certain, by the Confirmation it receives from an Affirmative Proof, which consisteth in that our Eyes and Senses find out many things directly Opposite to these Articles, and these two Proofs joyned together do form one, which appeareth to be so plain and intire, that there needs nothing to be added to it. And yet this is it which the Author of the Per∣petuity doth pretend to strip us of by his Arguments. But let him extend his Pretensions as far as he will, I believe he will find few Persons approve of them, and who will not judge, that even then when our Eyes should have deceived us, which is impossible after so diligent and careful a Search, the only means to disabuse us would be; to desire us to return to the using of them again, and to convince us our Inquiry hath not bin sufficient, we should at least have bin shewed what we our selves were not able to find.

For whilst nothing is offered us but Arguments, they will do us no good, we may be perhaps entangled with them, if we know not how to answer them, but they will never make us renounce the Evidence and Certainty which we believe to be contained in our Proofs of Fact.

WE are confirmed in this Belief, when we consider the Nature of the Author of the Perpetuity's Arguments. For they are not Demonstrations which convince a mans Mind, or of equal force with them which appear in our Proofs; being at farthest but mere Probabilities. They are Moral Impossibilities which he finds in the Alteration we suppose; as tho it were not possible but that the Bishops and others of the Clergy, together with the People, would have opposed these Innovations, and disturbed the Peace and Unity of the Church, under so great a Contrariety in their Opinions; and many such like things doth he alledge, which are not grounded on any certain Principles, nor drawn from undeniable Consequences. In general, its a hard matter to determine which are impossible Events, if you except them which carry along with them a palpable Contradiction; for the Cau∣ses or Principles of things are at a great distance from us, we know little of them but by their Effects, and these Effects not always shew themselves at the Bottom, so that a man cannot positively say, this can be, or this can∣not be. Moral Impossibilities are for the most part doubtful, especially those grounded on the Inclinations of the People, whose ways are many times so uncertain, and have so little of Uniformity in them, and so great Depen∣dance on particular Circumstances, that we cannot take any certain Rules from thence. Had the Author of the Perpetuity shewed us, That the Alte∣ration we speak of, doth imply a Contradiction, That 'tis contrary to the Nature of things, That there follows from it evident and intolerable Ab∣surdities, we should then have examined his Arguments without troubling our selves with his Method. But to tell us what the Clergy and People would do in this, this can amount to no more, at farthest, but meer Conject∣ures, and even Conjectures very uncertain; for he is not the Arbitrator of all humane Actions, neither doth he know all their Principles and different Interests, nor understands all the Causes which concur in great Accidents, or all those things which hinder them from hap'ning.

IT is then a great piece of Injustice to desire, our Proofs of Fact should yield to his way of Reasoning, and I hope Mr. Arnaud will not take it ill that in making use of his own Terms, and accomodating them to my Sub∣ject, I tell him, That 'tis in vain that he contesteth, and heateth himself a∣bout * 1.11 this Subject of an Alteration. Arguments signifie nothing in matters which are obvious to Sense, and we can make them appear to be so in this Case.

IT remains, for the finishing of this Chapter, I should satisfie some of * 1.12 Mr. Aruands's minute Observations. The first of which is, That it is every whit as bad to oppose vain Arguments against Proofs of Fact which are firm and solid, as to object solid and convincing Arguments against vain and Fri∣volous Proofs. But there is no body who doubts of the Truth of this, and this is not the matter in Question. When he shall have made it appear our Proofs are vain and frivolous, he shall be permitted to oppose against them his Arguments: Yea, and call them solid and convincing ones, 'till such time as they be refuted. But our Proofs must always be begun withal, their

weakness and vanity laid open, for without this we shall still be at liberty to hold them for good, firm and Conclusive.

HE addeth, That not only Proofs of Fact are Invalidated by Proofs of Reasoning; But likewise, that Proofs of Fact are reducible in some sort to Proofs of Reasoning; and even all of 'em grounded on Arguings like unto those of the Author of the Perpetuity, that is to say, on the impossibility of certain Events, and that 'tis from these Arguings they borrow whatsoever they have of Solidity. And this he proves by the Example of the literal Proofs taken from History, to establish certain matters of Fact, and by the Proofs of Moses's Miracles, and the Refurrection of our Saviour; concerning which the humane Certitude depends on a Moral Impossibility, which yet is not perceivable but only by force of Reasoning. From thence he concludes, That a Proof is not to be Rejected, because it is called a Proof drawn from Reason; no more than it is to be believed, because 'tis called a Proof of matter of Fact; but that both one and the other are contemptible, or estimable, accordingly as they are Obscure or Evident, True or False, Slight or Solid, and that 'tis on the Quality of a Proof and not by its Kind, we ought to form our Judgment.

TO which I answer, we must distinguish two kinds of Proofs of Fact, the one Immediate, the others Mediate; the Immediate depend on our Sen∣ses, the Mediate consist in the Deposition of Witnesses. The certainty of the first of these doth not depend on Arguments, it being evident in it self by its own Nature and Original; for in that we believe our Senses; this Perswasion cometh not simply from Reasons dictitating this to us; but because their Testimony is perswasive in it self, and that we cannot doubt of the things we see, unless we have corrupted our own Natures by a strange Extravagancy.

AS to the second kind of Proofs, we must consider them either absolute∣ly, or in their Circumstances; if absolutely it is clear, their Certitude de∣pendeth on Arguments, for we do not give Credit to Witnesses, but only upon the account that Reason dictitateth we ought to believe them. Yet doth not this hinder them from being commonly stronger, in respect of the Fact they prove, than the Reasoning grounded on the same matter of Fact; and that which distinguisheth them is not their simple kind, but the Matter, or Subject to which they are applyed, seeing that an Argument is more Just and Certain, when it establisheth the Fidelity of Witnesses, than when it would decide the Fact it self concerning which the Witnes∣ses make their Depositions, whence it follows that the Testimony autho∣rised by stronger Arguments, ought to be preferred before those which are weaker. And after this manner do we prove the Truth of our Sa∣viour's Resurrection, beause the Testimony of the Apostles, being grounded on mighty Arguments, stands more firm, than all that the Wit of man is a∣ble to devise against it. But if the Proof taken from Witnesses is attended with this Circumstance, that is to say, that the Fidelity of the Witnesses be agreed upon, and that this be an acknowledged and uncontroulable Prin∣ciple, then, I say, this is no longer a Mediate Proof, but an Immediate one, it depending no longer on Arguments. For the Validity of a Testimony being a Point once decided, which ent'reth not into the Proof, but only as an undoubted Principle, it then remains only to know what the Witnesses depose, and this is a Matter of which we may be informed by our Senses,

whence it follows, we must examine their Testimony, and that this way is to be preferred before that which is Argumentative on the same Fact.

IF we consider the Fathers, not in respect of their own Belief, but as Witnesses of the common Belief of the Church, I confess, their Authority dependeth on Reasonings, and that it may be questioned; but besides, it would not hence follow that the Proofs drawn from Arguments in this mat∣ter, that is to say, on the Churches Belief, would be more certain than their Testimony, seeing their Testimony may be established on a Reasoning stronger than these Proofs, and consequently may be preferable to them. I say, besides all this, this Point of the Fidelity of the Fathers is a Principle, we have the Advantage of supposing against Mr. Arnaud, seeing that hither∣to the Church of Rome hath never questioned it, and that we take the Fa∣thers only from his Hands, and descend to the Examination of their Testi∣mony only out of complyance with him, as I have already mentioned: so that to speak properly, we have no more to do, but only to know what hath bin their Doctrine. Now this is another matter of Fact, of which we think we can be informed by our Eyes, and by the Light of common Sense, and we cannot imagine without a great Mistake, that there hath bin more per∣spicuity and certainty, in the Proofs drawn from Arguings; whence I may conclude again, that we are at Liberty to reject these Proofs, without troubling our selves with any farther Examination of them.

IT appeareth then clear enough (I think) that Mr. Arnaud's second Chapter is but a vain Amusement. And I cannot but be troubled, find∣ing my self obliged to alleadg several things which cannot but be grievous to them who shun Contention. But I could not but mention them, to fol∣low Mr. Arnaud, to the end he might not take Advantage by my leaving him unanswered.

WHAT he saies concerning pretended Proofs of Fact, viz. That they are often invalidated by Proofs fetched from Arguments, toucheth not our Question. For there is no body denys that Reason doth not sometimes cor∣rect a Mistake in Sense; and sometimes again invalidates the Deposition of Witnesses, whether by making it appear that these are False-Witnesses who impose on us, or else in shewing they themselves are mistaken, or lastly that their Testimony contains quite another thing than what is pre∣tended. But altho that Proofs of Fact ought to be tried by Arguments, to know their Goodness, yet doth it not follow that when the Question re∣spects a matter of Fact, but that the way of Proofs is to be preferred before that of Arguments, on the same Subject; it doth less follow that when Persons are prevented by Proofs of Fact, that they can be made to alter their Judgments, by simple Proofs drawn from Arguments, with∣out shewing them that their pretended Proofs of Fact are not good. What he addeth concerning the Proofs of Fact, that they are all of 'em redu∣cible in some sort to Proofs of Reasoning, is not true, in reference to im∣mediate Proofs, and whatsoever there may be of Truth in this, yet is it useless, because the Question is not about a general Comparison of Argu∣ments with Proofs of Fact, but concerning the Comparison applyed to the Fact it self, which the Proof establisheth, and which lies now in Debate. All the following Discourses, touching the Fidelity of Historians, the Bat∣tle of Canes, of Pharsalia, of Philippes, Actium, Caesar, Pompey, and the

City of Constantinople, are Digressions which our Dispute hath nothing to do with. The Proofs of the Truth of Moses's Miracles, and them of the Resurrection of our Saviour, are good, but they belong not to our Subject. If the Question concerned the proving the Fidelity of the Fathers Testi∣mony, we would consent to the making use of Arguments, after the same manner as they are made use of to prove the Fidelity of Moses and the A∣postles Testimony. But this is not the Point, our whole Question is on∣ly to know what the Fathers have believed; and for this, Arguments are far less fit than Passages faithfully collected from their own Writings. Mr. Arnauds Hypothesis, that all our Quotations of the Fathers have bin foyst∣ed in them by John Scot and his Followers, is, as he is pleased to express it on another Occasion, a Fantastical Hypothesis, from whence he can draw no Advantage, and what at farthest can have no Ground but in the Dis∣quisition of the Passages themselves. And lastly his Conclusion that the Proofs of Fact, and the Proofs taken from Arguments, are either to be valued or slighted, as they are either Obscure or Evident, False or True, Vain or Solid, and that 'tis by the Quality of the Proof, and not by the kind of them that we must judge, this is I say a disingenious Conclusion, for it is true that Proofs are estimable or despicable by their Quality, and not by their Kind: but their Kind and the Matter to which they are applied serve to foreshew us their Quality, and their Quality being foreknown, rendreth them Estimable or Contemptible. A Proof drawn from Argu∣ments, being made use of to subvert a matter of Fact, which is found e∣stablished by the sight of our Eyes and common Sense, bears, in this sim∣ple Comparison, a sufficient Number of false Characters, to make us con∣clude that it belongs to the number of those subtile and loose Proofs Mr. Arnaud mentions, which evaporate of themselves, and vanish out of the Mind, * 1.13 as the Ayr doth out of our Mouths, it not being necessary to enter into a more particular Examination of them. Seeing then we have Reason to suppose our Proofs are good and Substantial, as I made it apparent in my first Chapter, we may likewise well conclude in this, that the Author of the Perpetuity's Reasonings are vain and groundless, and consequently to be re∣jected without troubling our selves any farther with them.

CHAP. IV.

My fourth Observation Justifi'd; viz. That we need but oppose our Proofs of Fact against the Author of the Perpetuity's Arguments, to make them Invalid.

IT will be needless to prove this Observation, seeing Mr. Arnaud ac∣knowledgeth enough to establish the Truth and Justice of it. We do not in any wise pretend, saith he, to deny him (he means me) the use of his Proofs of Fact, (if he hath any) provided he makes a right use of them, and follows the Rules of Reason, in so doing. He may then Con∣clude * 1.14 as long as he will, that the Alteration in Question is possible, in making it appear if he can, That it hath actually hapned. He may deny the Impossibi∣lity of a thing, by proving its actual Existence. All this is allowed him, nei∣ther are we so unreasonable, to deprive him of these kind of Proofs. He wrongs the Author of the Perpetuity, in charging him with such a Thought. This Acknowledgment is not of so small Importance, but that it deserves to be considered; for it perfectly overthrows the Author of the Perpetuity's re∣al Design, and makes all those great Hopes he conceived of his Method, to vanish away, in two or three Periods. We have allready seen that he hath offered it, as a sufficient Means to convince us; and make us confess, by the Evidence of Truth, if we are not desperately Obstinate, that the Church of Rome's Belief touching the Mystery of the Eucharist, is the same with that of all Antiquity. But this Discourse do's not well agree with that of Mr. Arnaud's. For, if this Method will lead us so far on one Hand, as the making of us come to this last Confession, mentioned by the Author of the Perpetuity, the Dispute ends there, and our Proofs of Fact are Insig∣nificant, seeing they are Succors which will stand us in no stead, being al∣ready overthrown. And on the other, if we may employ our Proofs of Fact against the Method, provided we make a right use of them; if we may deny the Impossibility of an Alteration, in shewing it hath actually hapned; we have at least the Power to Suspend this Acknowledgment, to which the Author of the Method would oblige us, until such time as it is examined whether we make a right Use of our Proofs of Fact, and draw a true Conclusion from them. But how shall we make these two Gentle∣men agree? Seeing one of 'em would have the Dispute ended by his Ar∣guments; and the other would have us keep it still up by our Proofs of Fact. The one pretends, we ought to reckon our selves Vanquished as soon as ever he has done speaking, and the other gives us time, and allows us to produce our Passages. If we Expound the Author of the Perpetuity's Meaning by Mr. Arnaud, he hath undertaken no more than the bringing us to make this forementioned Acknowledgment, Exclusively; for between his Proofs and our Confession, we may put in our Proofs of Fact, which is to say in short, that he hath supposed his Method able to effect any thing, but what it ought. And if we expound Mr. Arnaud's Meaning, by that of the Author of the Perpetuity, he designs, that we shall not make use of our Proofs of Fact till such time as we acknowledg there hath no Alteration hapned; which is to say, that he will not grant us the use of them, til we

confess, they are of no use to us. So that should we comply with both these Gentlemen, we oppose and contradict our selves; for we must then acknowledg that we have bin to blame, and yet at the same time maintain that the Reason is on our side: And so again we shall acknowledg, the Doctrine of the Church of Rome is the same with that of the Primitive Church, and yet still prove that there hath bin made an essential Alterati∣on. And thus are we guided by these Gentlemens Speculations.

TO speak ingenuously, I take Mr. Arnaud to be a very bad defender of the Method; for he not only forsakes it in a Capital Question, wherein its Honour is chiefly concerned, (which is to know whether it be sufficient to Convince us in the State we are in, and make us confess the Truth of what it proves) but he moreover exposes the Uselesness and Vanity of it; for if after all his Endeavours, we may still return to our old Proofs of Fact, I see not any Use that can be made of it; unless it be to entangle and length∣en out our Debate, wherefore I think it may well be laid aside, and the Au∣thor of it content himself with his Method of Discussion.

NOW to clear up this Dispute, it will not be amiss to examine here, what Mr. Arnaud tells us touching these two sorts of Methods of Prescrip∣tion, and Discussion. The Method of Prescription, saith he, is that in which, by the Examination of certain principal Points, the Controversy is decided, * 1.15 the other is that in which is particularly laid down the Proofs of all the Matters debated, and all the Objections against them answered, From thence he takes occasion to discourse of the Advantages which the Church hath over us by these Methods of Prescription; and afterwards coming to a Conclusion, It is necessary addeth he, For the Method of the Prescriptions keeping its Advan∣tages, and producing the Benefit expected from it, that it remain separate from the Method of Discussion, because otherwise we should inevitably fall into Pro∣lixity, and the Perplexity of particular Examinations, which we intend to avoid. So that, whereas the Discourses designed for the Discussion of particular Matters, ought to be written with the greatest Exactness, no difficulty, which may perplex the Mind being omitted in them; So on the contrary, those which are made ac∣cording to the Method of Prescription, ought precisely to contain no more than may serve to illustrate the Proof which a Man intends to make use of, and it would certainly be a great Defect to joyn thereunto the Examination of particu∣lar Questions, which do but confound the Mind by their Multiplicity. At length he concludes, That the Author of the Perpetuity could not with Pru∣dence undertake to answer Mr. Aubertin's chief Difficulties in his Treatise. That had this Treatise bin made according to the Method of Discussion, he had bin in a manner obliged thereunto, but being a Method of Prescription he could not do it without spoiling his Design, and evidencing he understood not the Na∣ture and Advantage of the Method he followed, which was short, perspicuous, and accommodated to all Capacities.

ALL this Discourse is nothing to the Purpose, for by it we understand no more than this, that when men consent to make use of the Method of Prescription, they must only serve themselves with it according to the Rules which it enjoyneth. Very good! But this decides nothing if we are not a∣greed, but on the contrary, dispute against it, for then the Question is no longer, how we ought to use the Method of Prescription, nor whether it ought to be joyned with that of Discussion, this is no longer the Point, but the Question is only whether we ought to use it or not. Mr. Arnaud per∣petually

imposes on his Readers, he carries them off from one place to ano∣ther, from the matter in Question, to that which does not concern it, and thereupon entertains them at his Ease. We do not dispute the manner after which the Author of the Perpetuity ought to have ordered his Method of Prescription, supposing this were a proper Place for it, this is one of Mr. Arnaud's Delusions; but our Dispute lies, whether he could reasonably use it against our Proofs, even so far as to promise the Effect which he hath pretended to draw from thence. Now this is a Difference which hath bin already dispatched by what I represented in the foregoing Chapters. And in effect, seeing he would convince us there hath bin no Alteration made touching the Eucharist, notwithstanding we are prepossessed to the Con∣trary, by literal Proofs, how can he, I say, take from us this Perswasion, and give us another quite contrary to it, unless his Method of Prescription hath an Evidence and Certainty beyond that of the Proofs aforementioned? This he ought to shew us, and not straggle into the common place of Methods of Prescription. But this would be to undertake to shew a thing impossible; for a Method made up of Proofs taken from Arguments: all of 'em drawn from a genere probabili, as the Schools term them, could not surmount the strength of our Proofs of Fact, which depend on the sight of our Eyes and common Sense, a great part of which propose the thing imediately in it self.

BUT how then? may we never establish our Sentiments by a Method of Prescription? We do not say so. We only mean thus much, that when the Sentiments of Persons are opposed, which are grounded on Proofs of Fact, and which they believe to be (as I have already said) as certain as any thing which falls under the Judgments of their Senses, it is then I say an unreasonable thing, to pretend to make them alter their Opinion by a Me∣thod of Prescription, grounded on moral Impossibilities. This is the Knot of the Question. If a man hath to do only with People prepossessed in favour of his Opinion, he may then use his Method of Prescription, to con∣firm them in the thoughts they have already entertained. There could no∣thing be alledged against his manner of Proceeding, the strength of his Proofs are in that Case only to be considered. If he has to do with indiffe∣rent Persons, that is to say, with such who have not yet taken any side, and desire to be instructed, he might then likewise use a Method of Prescripti∣on, provided his Principles be well grounded, and his Conclusions more decisive, than any thing which can be alledged against them; There need then be nothing to be replied, unless there were something indirect in his Me∣thod; but this could do no more at farthest, but only oblige People to examine with greater Care the Truth of his Principles, and that of its Consequen∣ces, and not make them reject them; for indirect Arguments conclude some∣times with as great Evidence as direct ones. Nay I will not fear to say, that when he should have to do with Persons prepossessed with Opinions contra∣ry to what he would perswade them, he might then lawfully use a Method of Prescription, for it would not be sufficient to say that a man is prepossessed by another Method, nor object that that of Prescription proceedeth indi∣rectly, or follows not the Order of Nature, these kind of Objections may cause Suspicion; but they ought not to proceed so far, as to make men absolutely reject Arguments, which perhaps, are attended with a greater Perspicuity and Certitude, than those which have occasioned the Prejudice. But as to what concerns us, against whom the Author of the Perpetuity hath written, we are in none of these Circumstances; being not only

led by a natural and direct Way in my Hypothesis, and by Proofs which propose us the Point in Question immediately in it self; but by Proofs which we believe to be above all Contradiction, and yet he would have us change our Minds, by Proofs which are not only indirect and mediate ones, and which at farthest can amount to no more but meer Probabilities, being appli∣ed to the Subject in hand. We have then Reason to say, that these are mear Chimeras in our respect, and that without considering them any o∣therwise than in their own kind, and in the matter on which they treat, they cannot make such a strong Impression on us, as to deface that which we have already received; for 'tis not likely that any rational Man will be more affected with Probabilities, than with solid Proofs which are grounded on common Sense.

MOREOVER this is not the proper Place to make Comparisons, of the Methods of Protestants with them of the Church of Rome. It may be made apparent that we have surer and shorter ones than those which it pro∣poseth. But this is not our Question, and I am resolved not to follow all Mr. Arnauds fruitless Digressions. His Words cost him nothing, and Peo∣ple are disposed to receive them, be they what they will, as Oracles. But 'tis not the same with me, for, should I wander from my Subject as often as he does, there would be few Readers who would not be tired with our De∣bate. I shall only tell him, he is mistaken when he imagines that to be of our Communion, a man is obliged to an examination of all the Controver∣sies which to this day have perplexed the Christian Religion. We have the holy Scriptures which every man may read, or hear them read pub∣lickly: Which do fully and clearly contain whatsoever is necessary to Sal∣vation, and by the Concurrence of Gods Grace, even the most illiterate may judge whether the Minister, under whom they live, is able and wil∣ling to shew them the way of Life, and whether our Society be the true Church. For in this Case we need but examine two things. The first whether we are taught in it all things clearly contained in the Word of God, and secondly, if there be nothing taught which corrupteth the Strength and Efficacy of these things; for if we find in this Communion wherewithal to satisfy our Consciences, and to live in the fear of God, and to ascertain our selves in our Saviours Promises: and moreover, if nothing be taught or practised which overthroweth the fundamental Doctrines of Christianity. For if nothing doth offend the Conscience, we ought to be perswaded, we are in the true Church, it being needless for us to enter into a Discussion of all the Errors which have troubled, or still perplex the Christian Religion. Af∣ter the same manner as 'tis not necessary to Salvation, for a man to know all the particular Heresies which have troubled the Peace of the Church, nor to make a formal and positive Renunciation of them, for it is sufficient that we are not tainted with any of them, and firmly to believe the fundamen∣tal Truths of Religion, neither is it likewise necessary to assure our selves, we are in the true Church, that we inform our selves of the several Opi∣nions of men: It may suffice us to know that the Church of which we are Members, teacheth what it ought, concerning Gods Glory and our Souls Edification, and maintains nothing which doth not answer these Ends. Now this every man may find in our Church, for if he compare his Mi∣nisters Doctrine with the Word of God, he will be satisfied that what he teacheth is exactly contained therein, he shall perceive likewise that we mix no Doctrines of men with it, which overthrow its Foundation. This way of Examination is short, easy, and proportionable to the Capacity

of all People, and thereupon there may be made a Judgment, as certain as if every single Controversy had bin examined apart.

THE most simple then among us may live in perfect Peace; But it is not so in the Church of Rome; for these Methods of Prescription, menti∣oned by Mr. Arnaud, are not built but upon one of these two Principles, either that the Church, which is to say, the Body of the People, cannot err, nor cease to be the true Church, in ceasing to believe what it believes, or in beginning to believe that which it did not believe; or that the represen∣tative Church, that is to say, the Councils, or the Pope, cannot err. The first of these two Principles is natural; the second is of a Supernatural Or∣der. I handle not at present this Point, whether they are false or true at the Bottom, it sufficeth me to say that they are in their own Nature so dif∣ficult and require so much time, that to expect ordinary Apprehensions to examine them, is plainly to deride them: I shall speak of the first of these in the sixth Chapter: where I shall make it appear that 'tis impossible for a man to extricate himself out of those Perplexities wherein the Author of the Perpetuity engages him, or to rest secure on the Grounds on which it's built. It suffices me to say, that People are not commonly so regular in things, which they believe by a distinct Faith, but that they are willing likewise to receive new Doctrines, and enlarge by this means the number of popular Mysteries. The Author of the Perpetuity tells us, that the Truths of Divine Grace were never popular in all the Consequences drawn from Theology: and yet we know that all imaginable care has bin taken to make these Consequences popular. There has bin made on this Subject, I know not how many Books adapted to Womens Capacity; there have bin Catechisms compiled, intit'led Catechisms of Grace. Which evidently shew, it has bin believed, that it was not impossible to make the People re∣cieve by way of Illustration or Addition, Articles which they knew not be∣fore, whence it follows it has bin supposed they are capable of Change; for else to what purpose serve these Catechisms, if the People cannot of themselves, either diminish, or augment the number of Mysteries which they hold by a distinct Faith. This Principle is not then so certain, but that it may be doubted of, nor so clear, or evident in it self, that the most simple may be ascertained in it, having before their Eyes a Matter which appeareth so contrary to it.

AS to the second, it is evident that the Question of the Infallibility of Councils, or Popes, is not so easie, that the most simple People may master it. All Societies separate from the Church of Rome oppose it. If this Church hath this, she hath it by a particular Priviledg, which must be ex∣amined before it be received. For it cannot be entertained on the bare word of this Church, without falling into an extravagancy and ridiculous Circle, which is, that we believe the Church of Rome to be Infallible, because she saies so; and we believe what she saies in this matter to be true, because she is infallible. Before that the most simple People can acquiesce in its Autho∣rity, this Authority must also appear to them to be undeniable, by things independent on the Church of Rome, and which may be judged of distinctly by themselves. Otherwise this would be to begin an Argument by its Con∣clusion. For this would be near the matter such a kind of reasoning as this is. That the Church of Rome is Infallible in what she saith; now she af∣firmeth she is infallible, from whence it follows that she is so. A person in whom we suppose there is the least Dram of Sense, will never be con∣vinced

by this Argument. The Church of Rome then must first make out its priviledge of Infallibility to the most simple man living, before it can be supposed that such a one, or any other will receive its Doctrine, founded on this Principle. Now I affirm that this Disquisition is beyond the reach of mean Capacities, for if it be proved by way of Scripture, it is not so plainly described therein, but that the Places on which it is grounded may be capable of another Sense. They are controverted Places, and a man must read whole Volums to prevent his being rash or passionate in his Judg∣ment. Now if a man be able to make such a Disquisition, and a Judgment accordingly, he will then be able to enter upon the Examination of parti∣cular Doctrines, and to discern the Conformity which each of 'em hath with the Scripture, in relation to what is produced on either side.

NOW if this Doctrine be attempted to be proved by Arguments: he that endeavours to do this, engageth himself yet farther into tedious Pro∣lixities, and Difficulties, which surpass ordinary Apprehensions. In a word Mr. Arnaud doth himself decide the Question. This Infallibility, saith he, * 1.16 is not a thing clear in it self, seeing it dependeth only on the Will of God, which he hath made known unto us by the Scripture. The Church not being naturally Infallible, we must prove that it is supernaturally so, either by the Principles of Faith, or by a long Series of Arguments. Ordinary Capacities are not able to examine this long sequel of Arguments, nor sufficiently to discuss the Principles of Faith, to discern if this pretended Infallibility may be drawn thence. And 'tis for this Reason, that the Author of the Perpetuity hath chosen rather to take the popular Infallibility for his Principle, than that of Priviledge. Mr. Arnaud testifies as much; for speaking of the Impossibility of the Churches altering its Belief on the Articles which are not popular, that is to say, of this Infallibility of Priviledg now in Question. Reason, saith he, doth not clearly shew us this Impossibility. So that this Author (mean∣ing the Author of the Perpetuity) being desirous to ground his Arguments on * 1.17 a Principle of Reason and humane Evidence, and not on a Principle of Iraditi∣on and Authority, or on abstracted and remote Arguings, he must then necessa∣rily contain himself within the reach of things, in which the Impossibility of a Change appeareth plainly by Reason. There are particular ways of proving that the Church never fell into an Error, on any Point which it proposeth. But it's evident to Sense, that the whole Church cannot fall into Errors, relating to matters of Faith, seeing they are distinctly known and understood by all the Faithful. The Infallibility then of Priviledge is not a thing which is imme∣diately apparent to Sense, there needs more abstracted and remote Argu∣ments to prove it, whence it appears that Persons of ordinary Capacities are not able to do this. Much less are they fit for this, should this Point be undertaken to be proved by the way of Tradition, for it would be to send them far enough, in obliging them to read the Fathers and Councils, to be informed in this matter; besides that the Fathers and Councils are themselves the representative Church, and whose Authority is now in Question and so consequently, their Testimony upon this account would signify no∣thing.

IT is then manifest, that common Apprehensions not being able to as∣certain themselves in the Infallibility of Priviledge, as I come now from proving, nor in the Point of popular Infallibility, as I have already hinted, and which I shall do more fully in the end, they cannot remain in the Church

of Rome, with a safe Conscience, there being nothing which holds them in it but deceitful Bands, such as are, Birth, Education, Interest, Custom, and the Example of others, which are things very unproper to determine an honest Mind in matters of Salvation. They are then obliged to range them∣selves on the side of the Reformists, from whom they receive for a Rule, things clearly contained in the Holy Scripture, and where they may be assured there is none of them withheld in the publick Ministry, and more∣over, where there is nothing taught which corrupteth the Efficacy of Gods Grace. If it be replied, that we must first, satisfy such Persons by proving the Divinity of the Scriptures. I answer first, that this Principle doth not fall under Debate, seeing the matter in hand relates not to the several Religions in the World, but only to the particular Opinions of Christians, for they all in general acknowledg the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures. Secondly, I answer, that the Church of Rome is no less obliged to prove this Authority of the Scriptures, than other Churches, seeing that before she can make her self acknowledged as Infallible, she must evidence her self to be a Church, which she cannot do, if the Divinity of the Scripture be de∣nyed her, and she will not take the Pains to prove it; besides that all the Proofs by which she pretends to establish her Infallibility, depend either mediately or immediately on the Scripture, and consequently they suppose its Divinity. But in fine, I say the Characters of Divinity, which shine in all parts of these Writings, are so lively, and so many in Number, that the most ordinary Capacities cannot but be affected with them, if they apply them∣selves to the Consideration of them, with a pure Heart and unspotted Con∣science. Now this is it, to which the meanest Capacity is obliged, as well as the greatest, and if they do it not, their Damnation is just, and their Im∣piety without Excuse.

AND this is what I thought I was obliged to speak, briefly on these pretended Methods of Prescription, this not being a proper Place to handle this Point more largly. But to return to the principal Subject of our Dis∣pute, we are obliged to Mr. Arnaud, in that he takes it not ill, I endeavour to prove by several Passages, that the Alteration pretended to be impossible, is real and true. The Author of the Perpetuity must likewise consent to this, seeing Mr. Arnaud hath said it; and if he doth agree to it, he must suffer me to draw this Consequence, that I could have hindred the Effect he promi∣sed himself from his Method, which is, to make us confess if we are not ex∣tream Obstinate, that the Doctrine of the Church of Rome, touching the Sacra∣ment, is the same with that of all Antiquity. This Confession cannot be justly extorted from us, as long as there shall be any reasonable Occasion of disputing this Point between us, and the Production of some Passages of my Writings, starteth a particular Debate, which Mr. Arnaud approveth, for he only complains, I have not produced them in a right manner, but mained, and dislocated from their Consequences, and that I have con∣cealed all those which might be opposed, and understood. But this Com∣plaint is Unjust, and he should not conceal the Reason I alleaged to justify the form of my Abridgment, which is, That that Book was made in Rela∣tion to that of Mr. Aubertins, whose Proofs I take upon me to defend. If he did not like to insert two large Volums in Folio, into a Preface, neither have I liked to put a great Volum into a short Answer, which contains no more than thirty Pages.

I never pretended that my Abridgment alone, should absolutely determine

his Thoughts. I know this cannot be expected; but I was willing to shew the way which must be taken for the finding out of the Truth, which is to make an exact Search into the Belief of the Fathers; I design'd to shew them of my Communion, what might be objected against the Author of the Perpetuity's Arguments, and thereby obliged him to dispute henceforward in a regular manner, we may be permitted to make Abridgments of this kind, and that of mine hath nothing but what distinguisheth it from that which we call A Heap of Difficulties, the matters of Proof with which it is furnished, their Nature and Force, do contribute that Truth to it, which an Abridgment ought to have, and the relation it hath to Mr. Aubertin's Book makes it evident and certain. There can be nothing more required to con∣clude that the Doctrine of the Church of Rome, is not the same with that of the Fathers, and that there has bin made an Alteration, for the Princi∣ples of this are marked out, and their Consequence doth plainly appear, that exact perspicuity which ought ever to accompany Arguments is in the Book to which we refer the Reader; Mr. Arnaud need not conclude then, * 1.18 that there are Difficulties in the Doctrine of the Eucharist, for we may ea∣sily conclude from what I said, that the Doctrine of the Antient Church hath not bin the same with that which is taught at this Day by the Church of Rome. His Mistake lies in that he has only read these kind of Abridg∣ments, which allways refer to another work, in supposing that the Princi∣ples they mark out are clearly established in that Book, to which they refer, and from whence they draw their Conclusion. And this is all that can be desired in this matter, but yet this is a way of concluding; and concluding too quite another thing than what Mr. Arnaud imagined, viz. That there are Difficulties in the Eucharist. I confess that to determine his Judgment, we must not regulate our selves only by this Conclusion, we must go to the Spring, and see whether what is supposed issues thence; but it doth not thence follow, that the Abridgment is in fault, nor that it should be esteem∣ed as a Heap of Difficulties; and indeed it would not be an Abridgment, if in effect it did not abridge some other work, wherein the Matter is handled at large.

A Heap of Difficulties, to speak properly, is a Collection of several Ob∣jections which are formed against a Doctrine, without examining either the Grounds on which this Doctrine is established, nor the Proofs or Argu∣ments by which it is recommended, nor the Answers which may be made against these Objections, and in short, without supposing any other work wherein all these things are handled. It is certain that in a Controversy, this manner of proceeding is confused and captious, and ought not to make any Impression on a rational Mind. But it belongs to Mr. Arnaud, to say whether the Treatise of the Perpetuity is not of this Kind; for as to my part, I find that it hath all the Characters of it. For being a Collection of Objections against our Belief, touching the Change which hath happ'ned concerning the Eucharist, of moral Impossibilities heaped up one upon ano∣ther, without any examination of the Grounds or Proofs of our Belief, nor of the Answers which may be made concerning these Impossibilities, and without any Supposition of another Work. For to tell us, as Mr. Arnaud doth, that he sends us back to all the Catholick Books, this methinks, seems to be a kind of shifting and evading, and is not sufficient to protect the Trea∣tise of the Perpetuity, from that just Title I have given it of a Heap of Diffi∣culties. Now if this Author meaneth all the Books written by Catholicks, when shall I be able to judge of them? This will be perhaps when I have

run thro above two hundred Volums. And if I should say on the other side, that my Abridgment after the same manner, supposeth all the Pro∣testant Books, and I send all Persons to them; Our Readers without Questi∣on would be very well informed and edifyed.

BUT saies Mr. Arnaud, People do not use to call Matters which are per∣fectly handled, a Heap of Difficulties, but those things which are hard to be * 1.19 judged of, whereas the Author of the Perpetuity hath handled whatsoever relates to his Design in an orderly length. I answer first that this Author very im∣perfectly handles what respects his Design in General, which is to make us forsake our Belief, concerning the Church of Rome's changing the Primi∣tive Doctrine: And secondly that he yet more imperfectly handles what respects his Design in particular, which is to shew the Impossibility of a Change; for he does not consider of any Answer which may be given his Arguments: so that to speak truly, it is nothing else but a Heap of Difficulties. It can bear no other Title until such time as shall be published the two Vo∣lums in Folio, which Mr. Arnaud mentions to us. We will receive them whensoever he will please to give 'em us; but we shall not be in haste to make that Confession, to which the Author of the Perpetuity hath promi∣sed to oblige us, till we have seen them; and in the mean time, because Mr. Arnaud will have it so, we will have once more the Pleasure, or rather the Pain of examining (altho it be needless) the Author of the Perpetuity's Proofs. I say because Mr. Arnaud would have it so, and not because the reason of the thing requires it; for what he alleageth concerning the Passages of my Book, that they contain but an indirect Answer to the Author of the Per∣petuity's * 1.20 Argument, and therefore it is necessary immediately to examine what I have answered directly. This I say is not a sufficient Cause, we ought to see rather which of us two is first found in the Possession of this Argu∣ment, that is to say, which of us has bin first answered indirectly, and it will appear without doubt that it hath bin my self, seeing the Author of the Perpetuity hath assaulted Mr. Aubertin's Book, and that he hath assaulted it in∣directly. Whence it follows that he ought at least to have begun by the Ex∣amination of our Proofs.

CHAP. V.

The pretended Advantages of Mr. Arnaud attributeth to the Trea∣tise of the Perpetuity Examined.

ALTHO the Conclsion which I have drawn from Mr. Arnaud's Confession, in the preceding Chapter, is clearly enough establish∣ed, yet do I not think he will be satisfied, till I have examined what he saith in the fifth and sixth Chapters of his first Book. He will tell us without doubt, that it doth not hence follow we should defer the rendring our selves up to the Arguments in the Perpetuity, altho I have still the liberty of opposing against them our Proofs of Fact, and that this he hath clearly shewed in these two Chapters I last mentioned. Let us then see what he saies in them; and judge of them without Partiality.

Mr. Arnaud imediately meets with a Difficulty, For I much marvel, saith he, Mr. Claude has not observed when a point of Doctrine, as this in Question, * 1.21 is established on one side by considerable Proofs, and on the other by Proofs which are believed to be valid, that we must if we intend to judge aright, compare these contrary Proofs together, and prefer the strongest before the other; from whence we may conclude, that it will always be necessary to come to that which the Author of the Perpetuity will not yield to, which is, to examine our Proofs of Fact; For to solve this Difficulty, he supposeth; first, that they who read the Treatise of the Perpetuity, have their Sentiments alrea∣dy wholly formed on the Proofs of Fact, produced by Mr Aubertin and o∣ther Ministers; but that these Sentiments are not Uniform, because some judge of them from what they are in themselves, others by what they have heard of them, and by external Circumstances, which give them to un∣derstand what they ought to believe concerning them. That some do esteem them, others on the contrary slight them, and others again are in a Dispo∣sition of Indifferency, He afterwards represents us with a Calvinist or Re∣ligionary, (for so is he pleased to call us) who being dissatisfied with the Scripture and Fathers, by reason of the uncertainty wherein he findes him∣self, by harkning to different Voices, which call to him from all sides; and moreover less satisfied with the Divines of either Party, who cannot con∣tent him in the Solutions which they give to the Passages of their Adver∣saries; he thereupon turneth himself towards the Treatise of the Perpetuity, which shews him, that the Doctrine of Transubstantiation and the real Pre¦sence, have bin received by the Greek and Latin Churches, and in all other Societies, which are equally Enemies both to the Latins and Greeks, toge∣ther with the Impossibilities which are in this insensible Change, which the Ministers have invented; whereupon this Calvinist determines, in for∣saking all these Doubts, to believe the same which is believed thro out all the Earth, seeing the whole World would never believe it, if it had not derived this Faith from the Channel of Tradition. And for as much as this Contrivance could not be well ended, unless I were brought in as a Party, he therefore introduces me, with my Aubertin in my hand opposing this Re∣solution. But my Mouth is imediately stopt, being told, that these Proofs

are Unsatisfactory, and thus am I sent away with my Rhetorick and En∣thusiasmes.

BUT this being no more than a Supposition, it must be established. And for this Effect, Mr. Arnaud calls to his Assistance several learned Divines from Germany, Switzerland, France, and Holland, by whose Suffrage he concludes, that the Fathers are rather against us than for us, in what con∣cerns the Eucharist, or that at least, the Proofs taken from Passages out of their Writings are very uncertain. And so here is already the understand∣ing People among us convinced, and as for others that are not able to make a Judgment themselves, they must have recourse to Persons of greater Knowledg, by which means both the one, and the other, are obliged to rend∣er themselves up to that Evidence which appears in the Treatise of the Per∣petuity, because our Proofs of Fact cannot be accounted by them, but as unevident and uncertain▪ and moreover this Treatise being fitted to all Ca∣pacities, and grounded on the Light of common Sence, it may be under∣stood by all in general. This is the Summary of the fifth Chapter.

IN the sixth Chapter, he extends his Pretention a great way farther, for having gained the Learned and Unlearned to his side, he will not suf∣fer even those who are obstinate amongst us to escape his Hands, It not * 1.22 being necessary for this, saith he, to enter into an Examination of all those Passages, without which Mr. Claude would make us believe that the Treatise of the Perpetuity can prove nothing. But lest this Pretention should at first amaze People, observe after what sort he declares his meaning. He saith then, that our Proofs of Fact appearing to us evident on one hand, and the Proofs of the Treatise of the Perpetuity on the other; these two con∣trary Evidences necessarily cause a suspension of our Judgments, and hin∣der us from determining, and throw us upon Doubts and Uncertainties. And thus far tends the Treatise of the Perpetuity, which leading us hither, Mr. Arnaud takes us in hand and tells us, we cannot any longer refuse to leave our Sect, and pass over to the Catholick Religion, first because the Church of Rome is the Maternal, Original, Successive, and Catholick So∣ciety, from which we must never make aschisme. Secondly, because we must ever be fully convinced of this Churches Errors, before we separate from it, and at the same time have a full certainty of the Purity of that So∣ciety we are of, to keep in it. Thirdly, because the Church is in Possession of the Ministry, of the ordinary Vocation, and Authority, and that the Mi∣nisters who have not been above a hundred years standing, have none of these things. Fourthly, because that People of ordinary Capacities amongst us, being obliged to yield themselves to the Proofs of the Perpetuity, and consequently to return to the Church of Rome, they ought to serve for Ex∣amples to the Judicious, it being impossible for us all not to return to this Society, to which the greatest part of Men must necessarily belong. Lastly he confesseth, that all these Arguments suppose the Proofs of the Treatise are clear and substantial, and maintains that be may reasonably make this Supposition, to convince me I have no other way left to defend my self, than by shewing these Proofs of the Treatise are Invalid, and so by conse∣quence I ought not to beat the Ayr as I have done, by declaming against the Author of the Perpetuity's Method.

AND thus have I Epitomiz'd these two mighty Chapters, in which Mr. Arnaud hath taken care to illustrate the glorious Designs of the Author

of the Perpetuity, and this perhaps being one of the most important Points in his whole Work, he has therefore spent thereupon the greatest part of his Wit and Eloquence. Yet howsoever it comes to pass I know not, we are so different in our Apprehensions, that having beheld the explication of all this curious Project, I have found nothing at all therein of Reason, nor co∣herence of Parts, neither in his Suppositions nor Consequences, and this I shall briefly and clearly manifest.

FIRST, methinks that Mr. Arnaud imposes on the World, in propo∣sing as it were from us, a Difficulty, which weakens our Cause, altho it do's not concern us. For I do not pretend that one of our Communion, into whose Hands shall be put the Treatise of the Perpetuity, and who is able to read it, is absolutely obliged, before he forms his Judgment thereupon, to make a particular Comparison of our Proofs, with those of that Treatise; I maintain that he may reject these last, by the general Consideration alone which he may make, without entring into the Examination of each Parti∣cular, because that in this general View he will find sufficient Grounds for rejecting them, viz. That they amount to no more but bare Probability, nor cannot equal our Proofs of Fact in Clearness and Solidity, which are ground∣ed on common Sence. Whence it follows that the Proofs of this Treatise ought not to be admitted, and that if we take the trouble to examine them, 'tis out of Condescension, not Necessity.

IN the second place Mr. Arnaud has not exactly reckoned up the seve∣ral ranks of Men, who may profitably read the Treatise of the Perpetuity. For the greatest part of them in our Communion, judging this Perusal needless, will not mind it, for they will neither have Leasure nor Curiosity enough for this; the Title alone will disgust them without proceeding any farther. But then he will say that these are unjust and obstinate Persons. We believe it a Point of Rashness to judge of a piece of Ground before we have * 1.23 heard the Owners Experience of it; would it not then be a more inexcusable Rashness to pretend to judge of a Difference which respects our Salvation, by Ar∣guments offered only on one side, in suffering our selves to be transported by the first Impressions? The least which ought to be done by them, who pretend to judge of Differences in Religion; is to hear both Parties, and weigh their Reasons. I answer, that these Persons I mentioned, will act very Justly and Reaso∣nably in doing what I said. For there being two Questions, the one touch∣ing what we ought to believe concerning the Eucharist, and the other touch∣ing what has bin believed by the Primitive Church. The first Question be∣ing once dispatched, we need not trouble our selves about the second. Now as concerning the Persons in our Communion, the first Question is solved to them by the Word of God. For this is the Fountain and Rule of our Faith. This is it which judgeth us all, and had the Author of the Perpe∣tuity guided his Reasonings by this Principle, there is not one of us but would gladly hearken to him; but instead of this, he immediately tells us of nothing but the Consent of all Ages, and perswades himself, that hence∣forward the Ministers will be no more hearkened to, when they say in ge∣neral, that we must only apply our selves to the Word of God.

THIS Question touching the Consent of all Ages, may be decided three ways; First, by the Rules of Christian Charity; Secondly, by the Confidence we ought to have in our Saviours Promises, and cares of his Providence; Thirdly, by an exact Knowledg of the History of all Ages.

Now this last means being above the Capacity of most People, is need∣less. It is enough to a well meaning Person, that he sees in Scripture what he ought to believe, touching the Eucharist, and thereupon charitably pre∣sumes, that the Fathers have not deviated from this Faith into Capital Er∣rors. It sufficeth him to believe that our Saviour's Promises to the Church, that he would never forsake it, have had their accomplishment, and what∣soever Clouds have fallen on the Ministration of it, by the mixture of mens Devices with Gods everlasting Truths, yet has our Saviour taken care to preserve the Faithful, and execute the Decree of his Election. So that such a one has no need to perplex himself with History, nor with reading over of three or four hundred Volums, which will not yield him the least Satis∣faction, much less need he entangle himself in the Author of the Perpetui∣ty's Method, which is a fourth way the World hath yet never been acquaint∣ed with. When such a Person hears of Mr. Aubertin's Book, and the account he gives of the Change which hath hapned, I doubt not but he is glad to hear that even by this way, which is only proper to the Learned, the Truth he believes has bin illustrated, neither do I doubt but he believes with a humane Faith, what is told him concerning it; but we must not imagine that his Belief touching the Eucharist hath changed its Foundation, and left its Relyance on the Word of God, for it remaineth still where it was; so that when he should be questioned concerning the solidity of Mr. Aubertin's Proofs, or that of any other Minister, relating to this Subject, he will not be troubled about it, nor farther concern himself in these Debates, for he knows his Incapacity. He will content himself with a favourable Opinion of the Fathers, and with his Confidence in God, leaving these Debates to those that have Skill to manage them.

NOW as to such as contemn Mr. Aubertins Book, I know none in our Communion of that number, and perhaps in the Church of Rome, there will be found as few of that Mind, if we except Mr. Arnaud and his Friends, who have given their Judgments about it, after a very slighting and pe∣remptory manner. But I shall not take any farther Notice of this here, but continue my Observations. I do affirm then, I never yet had the Luck to meet with this wretched Calvinist whom he has described in such pittiful Strains. I was never yet told, That the Scripture fills the Mind with Doubts, * 1.24 which it doth not resolve, and that such a Person finds the Writings of the Fa∣thers Obscure, and that the Divines of either Party could not satisfy him, and there was nothing but the Arguments of the Perpetuity which could win his Heart. Is not this such a Model of Calvinism as Mr. Arnaud desires, drawn from an Idea of his own Conceiving, and offered to them who would hence∣forward be of the number of its Proselytes. But what likelyhood is there that any man to become Mr. Arnaud, or the Author of the Perpetuity's Pro∣selyte, would Sacrifice the Scriptures, Fathers, and Divines of both parties to them. What Probability I say is there that their Pretention should so far prevail upon any man? Howsoever it be, it's an idle Fancy to imagine that a Person who is really of our Communion can fall into this Condition, and thereupon take up a Resolution of changing his Belief; and the Proof which Mr. Arnaud gives us is entirely faulty, for it can at farthest but conclude an Uncertainty, touching the Fathers, but not at all as it relates to the Word of God, from which a good man will never depart, even when he shall fall into Doubts touching the Opinions of the Fathers.

BUT let us see who these Persons are, who are represented to us float∣ing

on Doubts and Scruples. They are two sorts of Person, the most know∣ing Ministers on one hand, and all the unlearned Calvinists on the other. It is * 1.25 most False, saith Mr. Arnaud, that the most able Ministers are perswaded the Fathers are manifestly for them. To which he addeth, that all Protestants of mean Capacities, who are not able to make this Search, are rash in be∣lieving it, and cannot be perswaded of it but by a fond Humor. The for∣mer of these Points is grounded on slight Proofs. Observe here the first of them. Lewis Lavater relates that Oecolampadius began to doubt of the Truth of Transubstantiation and the Real Presence, in reading St. Austins Works; that he was strengthened in his Doubtings by reading of the E∣vangelists; that he immediately rejects his first Thoughts, by considering these Doctrines were generally entertained; yet being willing to overcome this weakness of Mind, he applyed himself to the reading of the Fathers; but could not be fully satisfied by them, because he oftentimes met in their Writings, with the Expressions of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Sacra∣ment. Whereupon at length rejecting the Authority of men, he wholly applied himself to the Word of God, and then the Truth appeared more clear∣ly unto him. This Testimony concludes nothing unless it be this, that it is not easy for a man that has imbibed the Principles of the Romish Church from his Infancy, to discover immediately the Truth, seeing that Oecolam∣padius who perceived the first Beams of it shining in St. Austins Works, and afterwards received deeper Impressions by reading of the Holy Scriptures, was puzled by reading the Fathers, till such time as he wholly applyed himself to the studying of the Word of God, by which he was put out of Doubt, and afterwards came more easily to the Knowledg of the real Do∣ctrine of the Fathers, whose Writings from that time he vehemently urged against all opposers of the Truth. This shews us the strength of Prejudice, and how necessary it is for the Understanding of the Fathers, to become first well exercised in the Holy Scriptures.

AS to the Centuriators of Magdebourg, it is known they held the Ausbouyg Confession, and taught the Doctrine of the Real Presence, and consequently are not competent Judges in this Controversy. For they have bin greatly concerned to have the Fathers on their side, some of them choosing rather to impose the Sence of Transubstanciation on the indefinite general Expres∣sions, which import that the Bread is made the Body of Jesus Christ, or that it is changed into the Body of Jesus Christ, rather than to understand them in a mystical Sence, which would overthrow their Doctrine. How∣soever it be, they are not of the number of our Ministers, and Mr. Arnaud ought not to stray thus beyond the Bounds of this Controversy.

THAT Passage of Scaligers which he urgeth against us, is taken out of one of the most impertinent Books as ever was written, and Mr. Arnaud hath more Leasure than he pretends, seeing he sets himself upon inquiring after such kind of Proofs. This Book being a Collection of what Scaliger is pre∣tended to have discoursed in a familiar Colloquy, which is stuffed with all manners of Fooleries, and Absurdities. For the School Boyes, from whose Memoirs these Exercitations were committed to the Press, have inserted whatsoever came into their Heads, after a childish and inconsiderate man∣ner, which shews us they had not yet arrived to years of Discretion. More∣over Mr. Arnaud informs us himself that one of these Youths who helpt to make this Rhapsody, turned Roman Catholick, which might well transport him by a Zeal common to young Converts, to make his Master speak a

word or two in favour of Transubstantiation, Mr. Arnaud seems moreover to speak of Ministers, but it is known by every one that Scaliger was none.

WITEMBOGARD was one of the chief of the Arminian Party, in∣teressed against the French Ministers, neither is he a Witness to be fully be∣lieved in what he tells us concerning Casaubon; yet if what Spondanus has written of Casaubon; be true, we must acknowledge that this Person, who altho otherwise was extraordinarily learned, did not excel in Judgment. He was a man, saith he, of a fickle Mind, and ever wavering in maters of Re∣ligion, * 1.26 he was willing to please both Parties, and by that means pleased nei∣ther. It is very likely that near Familiarity he had with Cardinal Perron, drew him into this ambiguos Humour, which ought not to be made use of against us, much less to be proposed as an Example for the regulating of our Conduct. And besides he may more justly be said to be Critick than a Minister.

I shall not here trouble my self with what is alleaged concerning Socinus and his Followers; for there is a great deal of Passion and Injustice shewed, in Confronting them with us, seeing the Point here in Question is what our most knowing Ministers hold about this matter; I confess the Socinians reject Transubstantiation and the Real Presence, but it is moreover so much their interest to decry the Doctrine of the Fathers, that 'tis no marvel if they speak so unjustly of them. They have built on the antient Heresies of Photinus, Macedonius, and Pelagius, and seeing themselves opposed by Councils, and by the writings of the Fathers, this hath moved them not on∣ly to have no respect for them; but likewise to lay to their charge things which they never believed; to the end they might render them odious, and marr their Credit. So that Mr. Arnaud, imposes on us (when he tells us) that the Socinians have no interest in acknowledging that the Writings of the * 1.27 Fathers favour the Catholicks, and that it would have bin more to their Ad∣vantage to deny this. The contrary of which is apparent.

WHEN he should produce some of our Ministers who doubted whe∣ther the Writings of the Fathers favour us in the point of the Eucharist, or who even believed they were against us, should this appear so strange to us? It is not an easy matter for a man to disentangle himself out of all the cor∣rupt passages which are fasly attributed to the Fathers, and set forth un∣der their Names, and from all the Artifices made use of to disguise their Doctrines. I have written a Chapter on purpose in my Answer to Father Noiiet, wherein I produce several Examples of this, which the Readers may peruse at their Leasure. Even Casaubon himself whom I now mentioned, is one of them who hath fallen into this Snare, for he hath taken two prepa∣ratory Prayers for the Mass, to be the true and undoubted Works of St. Ambrose, altho that in effect, they are composed by Anselme Bishop of Can∣terbury. Now if any Person has bin deceived like Casaubon, and doubted whither the Fathers were for us, must this be used as a Proof against us, ought such a ones Mistakes to be the Rule of our Thoghts, this certainly is contrary to reason.

BUT for one Minister or two whom Mr. Arnaud can bring against us, we can produce a great number who have not hesitated in this matter. Cal∣vin himself, who lived in a time when these Fopperies were scarely disco∣vered, yet asserts that the Fathers have retained the pious and orthodox Sence

of this Mystery, and affirms, that not having found them at all to derogate * 1.28 from the only Sacrifice of Jesus Christ, he could not therefore consent to the charging of them with Impiety, altho he doth not think them wholly excusable in the form of the Action. To Calvin we may add Cook (who was Tutour to King Edward of England, and supposed to be Author of a Book intit'led Di∣allacticon;) Thomas Crammer Arch-Bishop of Canterbury; Bp. Jewel, Peter Martyr; the Author of the Orthodox Treatise; Andrew Volan, the Divines of the University of Heydelberg; Du Moulin, Chamier, Rivet, Faucheur, Mestresat, and Blondel; not to mention Du Plessis, and Mr. De Saumaise, nor several others who have written on this Subject, by the Testimony of the Fathers; which sheweth with how great precipitation Mr. Arnaud hath asserted: that it is most false, the most knowing Ministers are perswaded the Fa∣thers are manifestly for them, and the Solutions they give their Passages are good and Solid.

WHAT he mentions concerning Mr. Daillé, is taken in a contrary Sence; for he never designed to deny the Advantage we have in the Fathers touch∣ing the Eucharist, nor leave it to be questioned. His Book against Mr. Adam, and Cottiby is an authentick Proof of this, and being as yet thro Gods Grace, in a Capacity to declare his own Thoughts, there needs no more but to ask his opinion touching this Point, and see what Answer he will make. There will appear no Difference betwixt his Opinion and mine, provided his Words are understood as he meant them.

Mr. Daillé sais, 'tis a hard matter to gather from the Writings of the Fathers, * 1.29 their Opinions touching those Articles in Religion, about which we differ, because the matters they treat of are for the most part very remote. His meaning is that it is a hard matter to find a formal and express Declaration of their Sence in these matters; which should be declared in such Terms as these, I deny, or affirm, I approve, or condemn, I reject, or receive; and the Reason he al∣leages do's sufficiently confirm this: for he saies, That the Matters they treat of are remote from our Controversies, and that they thought not of us when they wrote.

MY Sence differs not from his, and therefore I shall not fear to say with * 1.30 him, that they that expect to find the Belief of the Fathers clearly set down in their Writings, are generally mistaken, even as he who thinks to meet with the Affections and Desires of his Mind amongst the sound of Bells. And indeed, if we expect to find a positive and precise Rejection of the Romish Doctrine in the Writings of the Fathers, like unto that which is at this day amongst us, we shall be much mistaken, and the Reason is apparent, in as much as the Doctrine of the Church of Rome being not extant in the time of the Fathers, they have not expresly condemned it, for men are not wont to condemn O∣pinions before they appear. Yet do's not this hinder but that the Fathers are against Transubstantiation, by way of Negation, that is to say by their Si∣lence, because they never inserted it amongst the Articles of their Faith, they never propounded it to their Hearers, nor unfolded the Mysteries of it, nor defended its Consequences, as doth the Church of Rome, as they had with∣out question done, had they believed it. And this is what I say; and Mr. Daillé dos not gainsay it; but on the contrary a few lines after what Mr. Ar∣naud has recited, he lays down this general Proposition: That the silence of the Fathers on the controverted Points which they so much value, is of some weight, and amounts perhaps to a clear Proof; but surely not in favour of them * 1.31

who hold the Affirmative. So far Mr. Daillé and I speak precisely the same language. But I affirm likewise, that besides the silence of the Fathers there is to be found several things in their Writings; inconsistent with the Belief of Transubstantiation, and the Real Presence, and I hold this Proof doth e∣vidently conclude they did not believe these Doctrines; Mr. Daillé speaking in general of this Order of Proofs, saith, he freely confesseth that every wise mans Faith is as a Body, whose parts have a dependance on each other. So that we * 1.32 may know by the things he expresseth, what he thinks of those which he expresseth not, whether he doth believe them or not, it being unlikely he would admit what doth evidently oppose his Opinions, or reject their necessary Consequences, to which he addeth, that he does acknowledg that this way of handling the Wri∣tings of the Fathers would be most profitable, and more proper to dive into their bottom, than any other, provided we suppose two things, the one, that the Be∣lief of the antient Doctors is all of a Piece, and does no way contradict it self, and the other, that he who would judge after this manner, must have a piercing Wit, a good Memory, and a Judgment free from Prejudice.

AS to the first of these Suppositions, he saith, that it is not absolutely out of doubt; and as to the other, that all these Qualities do seldom meet in one man. What he saies is true, in this general Consideration. But this does not hinder me from adding, that in the particular case of Transub∣stantiation, and the Real Presence, the first supposition is out of doubt; and the second is not absolutely necessary. To make this apparent, we need but consider, on one hand the rank these Doctrines hold in a Church which be∣lieves them, and on the other, the number and nature of those things which oppose them in the Writings of the antient Fathers. The Example of the Church of Rome shews us, that they that believe them, respect them as in∣violable Mysteries which must not be called in question, and such as are of greatest Importance in Religion, and which must be defended against the Contradiction of Sense and Reason, and for which we ought to be armed with the greatest Caution; as being in short, Mysteries which are daily re∣presented us, in their Celebration and Participation of them, which should be distinctly known by all the Faithful, and cleerly and plainly taught the People, to the end every one may know that what he receiveth is the pro∣per Substance of his Saviour, and give him the Worship due to a Creator. Whence it follows, that if the antient Church believed these things, it has believed them in this Degree, and that 'tis not possible but the Fathers in general would take such care as not to maintain things which overthrow them, or reject others which are the necessary Consequences of them. It is not possible I say, that they should all of 'em be thus inconsiderate as to assert several things which may justly scandalize their Followers and that in so tick∣lish and well known a Point, as is that of the Substance of Jesus Christ, which they every day received. On the other hand, if we consider the Nature and Number of things to be met with in the Writings of the Fathers, contrary to Transubstantiation and the Real Presence, we shall observe they are con∣trary to them by a primary, immediate and evident contrariety, for which there is no need of a sharp Wit, nor great Memory, but a sound understand∣ing, and disinteressed Judgment: we shall find that these things are in great Number, and as well prevail over a mans Mind by their Multitude, as their Quality. And this Mr. Daillé has not denyed, so that as I do not thwart his Rule, so he does not oppose my Exception, therefore there is no Contra∣diction betwixt us.

BUT Mr. Arnaud will reply, Mr. Daillé do's oppose our Exception, for he applies his Rule to the Subject of the Eucharist, acknowledging that as there are Passages in the Fathers Writings, which seem to be inexplicable, in * 1.33 the Church of Romes Sence, so there are likewise some which can in no wise admit the Sence of the Protestants, as them which expresly import that the Bread chang∣es its Nature, that by the Almighty Power of God it becometh the Flesh of the Word: and such like. If Cardinal Perron, saith he, and other sublime Wits on both sides, protest they find no Difficulty, we must acknowledg they said it only out of a Bravadoe, turning the best side outwards, or else that the rest of the World are very dim sighted to perceive nothing but Darkness, where these People behold nothing but Light. And elsewhere, taking notice of some Passages (which seem to deny the Consubstantiality of the Son, determined in the Council of Nice,) which are to be met with in the Writings of the Fathers who pre∣ceded that Council. Let the Fathers, addeth he, affirm or deny that the Eu∣charist is really the Body of Christ, they will not for all this contradict thy Opi∣nion, whosoever thou art, whether Romanist or Protestant, more strongly than the Fathers of Antioch did in appearance contradict them of Nice. To which we may now add, that as the Arians had no reason to draw to their Opinion, and alleage, as decisive parts of their Question, such transient Discourses as were in∣nocently meant by the antient Fathers, without any Design of treating on this: so likewise we have no cause, neither thou I say nor I, to alleage as Sentences pro∣nounced in our case, which has bin stated but of late, the sayings of the Fathers, which were written by them on other matters, several Ages before our Controver∣sies began, concerning which they have expressed themselves very differently and obscurely, and even sometimes in appearance contradictorily. Having shewn af∣terwards that the Fathers designed to be obscure in their Discourses concern∣ing the Eucharist, to hide this Mystery from the Catecumenists.

SEEING then, saith he, that in this and other Matters, they designed to conceal their Thoughts, we must not therefore wonder, if their Expressions have bin oftentimes obscure, and that which commonly is an effect of Obscurity, if they seem sometime to differ and contradict one another.

I answer that this being well understood, doth not at all obstruct my Ex∣ception, nor what I said in my Answer to the Perpetuity. Mr. Daillé speaks of the particular Judgment which we may make of some Passages of the Fathers produced by both Parties; and I speak of the general Judgment which ought to be made on the whole Body of our Proofs, and Difficulties brought against them; and as to what Mr. Arnaud alleageth concerning my Answer, wherein I speak touching the Sence which People Assisted by the light of * 1.34 Scripture, strength of Reason, and plain Instructions of their Ministers, may give to the mystical Expressions, which were then in use. These are things wholly different. I do not deny but that there are several difficult Places in the Writings of the Fathers. Some of which Mr. Daillé has taken Notice of. He needed not be brought in question for this, seeing I plainly delive∣red my Mind touching this matter, in the beginning of my Answer. I af∣firm that the way of seeking the Truth touching the Eucharist, by the Doctrine * 1.35 of the Fathers, is in it self a way which is indirect, preposterous, and very tedi∣ous, wherein we have great cause to fear Mistakes and Wandrings. These are my Words, and Mr. Daillé has said no more, and I do still affirm, that if a man examines these Passages apart, and protests he finds no obscurity in them, we cannot but take these his Protestations for Bravadoes. But this does not hinder

but that the general Judgment we ought to make of the Belief of the Fa∣thers touching the Eucharist, and which resulteth from an exact considera∣tion of the Proofs relating both to one side and the other, is undoubtedly on our side, whether these particular Passages, which seem at first to be diffi∣cult, are illustrated by others which shew the real Sence of them, or when their Difficulty should remain, it is overcome by the Number and Evidence of the contrary Proofs. The Considerations which Mr. Daillé makes on these difficult Places, do in themselves contribute to the Establishment of the cer∣titude of this general Judgment, which I mentioned: for they discover to us the Causes of this Obscurity, they give us the like Examples in other Mat∣ters, and by this means lessen the Offence which may be taken at them, and satisfy a mans Mind.

BUT he saith, that neither the Romanists, nor the Protestants have any rea∣son * 1.36 to alleage as Sentences pronounced on our Differences which arose but of la••e, the Discourses of the antient Fathers, written by them upon other matters, seve∣ral years before. What he saith is true, for we should be to blame, should we take them for declaratory Sentences. But this hinders not but we may still conclude, they held not Transubstantiation, and the Real Presence, because that if they had held these Doctrines, they would not have expressed them∣selves as they do. Neither doth this deprive us of the Liberty of proceeding by way of Negation, which is to conclude by their Silence in these Doctrines, that they held them ••ot. Neither does this moreover hinder, but that after a due Consideration of all these affirmative and negative Proofs, we may make a certain and decisive Judgment on the Question touching the Do∣ctrine of the antient Church in our own Favour. So that Mr. Arnaud has spent his time to no purpose, when he undertook to shew this pretended Contra∣riety, which he affirms to be between Mr. Daillé and me.

But Mr. Daillé's Design, saith he, is to shew in general, that we must not take the Fathers for Judges of Controversies, and especially in that of the Eu∣charist. * 1.37 I acknowledg it, because these Difficulties he mentions, do shew this way is long and troublesom; and that we meet in it such Entanglements as are hardly to be surmounted, and therefore this is not a proper means for all sorts of Persons, but only for those that have time and all other necessary helps. This I do not deny, but on the contrary do ever affirm, that the ho∣ly Scripture is the only certain Rule, and our having recourse to the Fathers is but by way of Condescension. I say farther that if they to whom this way does properly belong, would proceed in it with that Sincerity and Dili∣gence which is necessary, they would easily be able by the Guidance of com∣mon Sense, to make this Evident and certain Judgment; That the antient Church believed not what the Church of Rome does at this present: and this Mr. Daillé will acknowledg as well as I.

IF I have insisted too long on this Subject 'tis because I believed I ought to reprehend Mr. Arnaud for his Injustice towards two Persons whom he would fain set at Variance, by making of them contradict one another. But return we to the rest of our Observations.

CHAP. VI.

A farther Examination of the pretended Advantages which Mr. Ar∣naud attributes to the Treatise of the Perpetuity.

THE Subject of my fourth Observation is taken from what Mr. Ar∣naud assures us, viz. that all that are of Mr. Daillé's Mind (that * 1.38 is to say, who are perswaded they must not decide the Question touch∣ing the Eucharist, by the Writings of the Fathers, (seeing they are so obscure and intricate, that it is a hard matter to make them agree,) cannot re∣fuse to render themselves up to the Proofs of the Perpetuity, in case they judge them evident; whence he concludes that all-knowing Persons who are sincere, on the one hand, and on the other, all they who cannot judge by themselves, will acquiecse in these Proofs. This Pretension is as ill ground∣ed as the former. For there being, as I already said, two Questions before us, the one, touching what we are to believe concerning the Eucharist, and the other concerning what has bin believed by the antient Church, the first of these, which is that of Right, respects in general all them of our Com∣munion; but the second, for as much as it may be decided by History, on∣ly respects them amongst us, who have sufficient Leasure and Curiosity to inform themselves. So that the Prolixity, Difficulty, and intricacy which we meet with in the Writings of the Fathers, do sufficiently evidence that their Books are very improper for the Decision of the first of these Questions, whereon depends that of our Controversies, seeing these Difficulties will be insuperable to the greatest part amongst us; altho they will not render them unfit to decide the second, because they are not insuperable to them who would apply themselves thereunto as they ought, to satisfy their Curiosity, neither will they hinder them in short from making a most certain Judgment in our Favour. If then the Treatise of the Perpetuity be only offered to them to whom the first Question belongs, they will answer they have no need of it, being satisfied with the Word of God; and if they be demanded what they believe touching the antient Church, they will answer, that they judge of it according to the Rules of Christian Charity, and our Saviours Promi∣ses. But if we proeeed farther, and suppose it be enquired of them, how it has come to pass that the Church of Rome has altered the antient Doctrine; they will answer, their Salvation depends not on this Knowledg, but that it must needs be, it has made an Alteration; seeing it believes at this day what it ought not to believe, and which without doubt hath not bin believed heretofore, as they judge out of Charity to the Antients. Should they be urged to tell how this has hapned, they will answer again, this is not an account wherein their Salvation is concerned, and that this Question ought to be proposed to those Persons who know it, and in all this they will have Reason. If this Treatise be offered to those of the second Rank, that is to say to them who are learned, and have had the Curiosity of informing them∣selves, and to whom properly the second Question belongs; they will like∣wise answer, they have no need of this Method, having already informed themselves by a natural and direct way, which is of more value than all these Conjectures, or if they have not done it, they will do it, being not so silly

as to shut their Eyes, and reject the Evidence of their Senses, to betake them∣selves to a Method wherein there can be nothing but Confusion to be expect∣ed, and these last will have Reason too.

BUT saith Mr. Arnaud, we must suppose that the Proofs of the Treatise are evident, for they cannot be supposed false, till such time as they are exa∣mined. You ought then to have begun here, wherefore your Exceptions signify nothing. I answer that these Suppositions are not juster than his Ar∣guments. For if these curious Persons whom I mentioned, have already taken the Pains they ought, whereby to ascertain themselves in the Proofs of Fact, they will be prepared to judge, that the Arguments of the Treatise are false and captious, because that moral Impossibilities, such as these are, and in such a Subject as this, cannot subsist against Proofs of Fact, which are immediate, certain, and evident as ours are. If they have not yet taken this Pains, I say that without examining whether the Proofs of the Treatise be good or bad, they will only mind the Method, and by comparing it with that of Discussion, if they are men of Reason, they will prefer this last be∣fore the other, because that 'tis in effect most natural in it self, and more cer∣tain in its Proofs.

WHAT shall we do then with the Treatise of the Perpetuity, which has made such a Noise in the World? Will it be of no use? There are a crue of People in the World, who are curious and idle both together, who are willing to know the Opinions of former Ages on these famous Articles, a∣bout which Europe is at this day divided; but yet will be at no Pains for this, because Labour is distasteful to them, and they have other things to do. It is then for such Persons as these, this Treatise has bin written. For it court∣eth them, and presents it self to 'em, whether at Ease or in Business; it only desires them to spend two Hours on its Reading, whereby to decide a Point of this Importance. The Style of it is curious and enticing, and its Expres∣sions emphatical, it winneth on the Mind, and leads it insensibly where it pleases. All this flatters mens Curiosity and Lazyness both together. But if this sort of People loved their Salvation, as we may suppose they ought, we should then have but two or three things to say to them. First, that they beware of these short Methods, which favour at the same time two Inclina∣tions, which seldom agree, I mean Idleness and Curiosity. For we cannot arrive at any certainty in these kind of Questions, if we do not earnestly ap∣ply our selves to them, for Labour and Knowledg do always go together, and it commonly happens that they who thus promise us such great Knowledg, without any trouble, do cheat us two ways, for they lead us into tedious Pro∣lixities, and dreadful Difficulties, and at last having tired us, they leave us as wise as we were at first.

AND this is exactly the case of the Treatise of the Perpetuity, if we right∣ly consider it; for it promises us immediately, nothing but Perspicuity, Fa∣cilities, and Convictions, it being made up of undenyable Truths. Yet let a man take but the Pains to examine only his fixt Point, which is his first Sup∣position, on which the whole stress of his Book lies; and he will find that 'tis impossible to be certain in it. I mean the Year one thousand fifty three, wherein Berengarius was at first condemned, and in which time the Author of the Treatise pretend's the universal Church was agreed in the Belief of Transubstantiation and the real Presence. Now to be satisfied in this parti∣cular, we should have an exact Knowledg of the eleventh Century, to the

end we may discern whether this Condemnation of Berengarius was the re∣al Effect of the Churches Union, or only that of a Party, which was then the strongest at the Court of Rome. We should know each particular mat∣ter of this great Affair, that we may be able to judge whether humane In∣terest had no share in it: whether those that were concerned in it did not act against their Consciences; and whether the Procedings were just and regular. We must examine the State of Princes, Ecclesiasticks, and Peo∣ple, to be satisfied in this supposed Union. We should have before us the Writings of Berengarius and others who held the same Opinions, to under∣stand their Arguments and Defences. But all these things are impossible. We have no other account of this History, than what some interessed Wri∣ters have bin pleased to give us, and in which there are Relations justly sus∣pected to be false. The secret Designs and Motives which then prevailed are out of our reach. We know scarcely any thing more of the Persons who then made up the Church, but that they were the greatest part of them bu∣ried in profound Ignorance. The Writings of Berengarins and his Follow∣ers are lost, for there has bin Care taken to extinguish the Remembrance of them. In short, this is an Abyss wherein we behold nothing, whereby we may be able to affirm with any certainty, that the whole Church was united in the Belief of Transubstantiation and the real Presence. For a man to give Credit to any Relation of Berengarius's Adversaries; (who bragged that their Opinion was that of the whole World,) it would be to be over Credulous, in any Affair of this Importance, and so much the more, because the contrary appeareth by substantial Proofs, which should be examined, before we rest satisfied in them.

SO that here we are already sufficiently perplexed in the first Particular, and shall be no less in the others. If we would be ascertained in the Proofs of the Treatise, we should know perfectly the Tempers of the People, their Condition and principal Circumstances, in the Ages which preceded the e∣leventh Century. We should know, how the Body of the Ecclesiasticks was composed, what was the Humour and Temper of them who held the first Rank, even how far their Credit and Authority reached, what kind of In∣structions they gave the People, and after what manner the People received them. We must likewise examine the nature of the Change we speak of, by what degrees we suppose it has bin introduced, by how many ways and means it may be said to be possible. For if all this be not distinctly known, how can it with any Confidence be affirmed, that this Change is impossible. Moreover before it can be affirmed as an undoubted Truth, that had an In∣novation touching the Eucharist bin attempted, the People would have risen into Tumults, the Religious clamour'd against it, the Ecclesiasticks opposed it, and the Councils taken notice of it, and in short the Bands of an external Communion would have bin broken; how many particulars must be clear∣ed up first! We ought to know what kind of Zeal People had for the Glo∣ry of God in those Days; whether the effects of this Zeal could not be hind∣red by I know not how many things which occur in these different Orders of men, whom I mentioned, as Ignorance in some, simplicity and meanness of Spirit in others, the fear of disturbing the publick Peace, the Favour or Hatred of Persons, and several other humane Causes, which set men on acting or desisting from it. We should likewise have a true and particular Account of the Condition of the schismatical Churches at that time, when Berengarius was condemned, which is not an easy matter, as will appear in the sequel of this Discourse. In a Word, to attain the ends of the Design

of this Treatise, when even its Proofs should be Substantial and Conclusive, a man must be more knowing than an Angel; for unless we knew the Thoughts of all mankind, for the space of two hundred Years together, or could raise the Dead to inform our selves by them of what they have done; and what they have not done, it is not otherwise possible to be at any cer∣tainty. But it will be perhaps answered, we must judge according to the Light of common Sense, and what we see in our times▪ to which I reply, that even common Sense shewes us, that there is no certainty in these kind of Proofs, and that the Experience of our own Age contradicts them. And when it should be imagined that all these Difficulties are surmounted, I come then and trouble this Victory with my Aubertin, and Proofs of Fact, requiring, before the Question be decided, that my Objection be answered. Now should Mr. Arnaud pretend my Objection is groundless, and that I should be silenced in being told, that these Proofs have bin considered, and their pretended Clearness appears only to them, who suffer themselves to be transported by the Enthuthiasms of my Rhetorick, I shall make him an∣swer, that I speak here only of curious and lazy People, to whom the Trea∣tise of the Perpetuity is offered as a short Method▪ to ease them of the lengths of a way of Discussion: which sort of Persons cannot say they know all our Proofs.

I shall tell him moreover, that the reading of my Book, has not yet so far transported People with Enthusiastical Raptures, as the reading of his has done to his immortal Praise. For there are Latin Verses under this very Title of Enthusiasms, which Mr. Arnauds Friends its seems have not bin ashamed to print, in which there appears all the lively Characters of a Po∣etical Fury. For they speak of his Book, as of the Sun, which contains in it self a great measure of the Divine Light: His Lines are called new Darts of the Sacred Cupid; and his whole Book is said to be full of God. Puro Nu∣mine, mi Libelle, Plenus. It is compared to our Saviour himself, when he came down from Heaven; and is said to have done the same Miracles; there is one of its Readers introduced, who being filled with its Divinity, cries out, Numen ecce Numen, ibi Numen. Mr. Arnaud is termed, Vir sacro & numinis entheatus oestro, and his Wit, Mentis vigor entheus, and again he is set forth to us as an Hercules armed with Coelestial Weapons, trampling all things under his Feet, conquering the Conquerours themselves, and tri∣umphing over the Triumphers. In short, France is congratulated upon the Glory it receives. Tanto prodigio superba fulge, felix prodigio futura tanto. All which considered, has not Mr. Arnaud pertinently mentioned Enthusi∣asms? Certainly never the Tripos of Delphos, nor the Grove of the Sibyl Cumeé, inspired such like Ravings.

BUT to return to the matter in hand. Is it not possible will some say, to be ascertained of the matter in Question, by some way less tedious and in∣tricate, than the examination of such a great Volum as Mr. Aubertin's Book? Yea without doubt; for, to know as much as is necessary, to the satisfying of a mans Mind, he need but judge according to the instincts of Charity, and the Confidence he ought to have in our Saviours Promises. Now if a man keeps to these Principles, he will draw a Conclusion as satisfactory as can be desired. The Promises of our Saviour assure us that his Spirit shall be with the Faithful to the end of the World; and Christian Charity obliges us to believe that the Fathers are of this Number. From whence I conclude; that there has ever bin a considerable number of true Christians, whose Faith

has not bin corrupted by damnable Errors. This is a sure Conclusion, and sufficient to satisfy my Mind. I conclude likewise, that the Fathers have bin of this Number, this is a Judgment of Charity, and is sufficient to acquit me of my Duty. Should it be told me, if I proceed farther, it would be to give my self a great deal of Trouble, viz. to Read, Study, and Meditate, to compare the Proofs of both Parties, and if this offends me, I can complain of no body but my self, that is to say of my own Lazyness or Curiosity.

IT is then neither just nor necessary to require any other abridged Me∣thods, than those which I now observed. Yet it must not be thought but that there may be such offered, it being no difficult matter. For 'tis but loo∣sing from the Body of the Dispute, one of those captious Arguments, which seem to decide the whole Controversy by the Decision of one only Point. Which the Author of the Perpetuity has done, for he has singled out Bel∣larmins Argument of the Impossibility of a Change, and proposed it with greater Enlargments, tho with less Force than he, and this is all the Myste∣ry of this great Method of Prescription. So that this is not such a famous Undertaking; seeing every little Sophister could do as much. Take the Ar∣gument of the silence of the Fathers on Transubstantiation and the real Pre∣sence; insist largely thereon, write a Treatise on it; and here's then an a∣bridged Method. Take the Argument of the certainty of our Senses; shew that the Fathers supposed it as an inviolable Principle of the Christian Re∣ligion; shew the Absurdities which would follow, had they believed that what we see in the Sacrament is not real Bread; here is then another Me∣thod of Prescription. Take likewise if you will, the Argument of the Si∣lence of the Heathens, and accommodate it to the Treatise of the Perpetuity; and you will make another Method. It is the same with the Argument of the Accidents without a Subject, in respect of Transubstantiation; and of that of the Adoration of the Sacrament; and almost of all others.

TO speak my Sence of these Arguments reduced into Methods, I think they must be considered either absolutely, or in relation to some Circumstan∣ces. If we consider them absolutely; we must not reject them, for this on∣ly Reason that they are called Methods of Prescription. A rational Man will accept of them in a Controversy, as Arguments, he will weigh their Force; but whatsoever Strength they may have, he will not forme his Judg∣ment by them alone, because perhaps there may be on the other side things more considerable. What is there, for Example, of greater Force than the Argument taken from the Silence of the Fathers, touching the Existence of Accidents without a Subject? Yet is it certain that this Argument alone must not determine a Man; for should it be demonstrated that the Fathers expresly taught the Adoration of the Sacrament, and Conversion of the Substance, with all the other Consequences of Transubstantiation, excepting this Existence of the Accidents without a Subject, our Argument would not be strong enough to invalidate these contrary Proofs. They must then be ranked in the order of the Controversy, to the end they may be considered in a decisive Judgment.

THERE is not, to speak properly, but one particular case wherein we ought to be determined by a Method of Prescription, which is when God does or does not declare his Will in Points of Religion; for what is there in the World that can excel, or equal the Validity of his Testimony or Silence. In matters of Religion, 'tis the Word of God which determines us to be∣lieve

positively such and such Points, and 'tis its Silence which determines us to reject others. Our Faith imitates the Wise Men of the East, it fol∣lows the Star that conducts it, (which is the Heavenly Revelation) and stops where this Star settleth, as knowing 'twould be to wander, to go farther. This then is the only true Method of Prescription in Questions of this Na∣ture.

BUT supposing the Argument was taken from the Evidence of all the Senses, and in the Circumstances which make this Testimony Valid and Infallible, may we not determine our selves, without proceeding any farther? I answer that to speak absolutely, the Senses may be deceived, even with all the Circumstances which render their Testimony allowable, for the Devil may impose upon them by his Illusions; yet because a judicious man must judge of things, not out of regard to these extraordinary and rare Cases, but according to rule and common use, it is certain, that such an Argument must decide the Question of Fact.

THE same may be required touching those Arguments which are cal∣led in Philosophy, by the name of Demonstrations. If a Method was ground∣ed on a Proof of this Force, would it not wholly decide the Question? I an∣swer there are few Demonstrations, so evident and certain, that nothing can be opposed against them. Yet were there one offered which convinced the Mind, by an immediate and uncontroulable Evidence, (as those which ma∣nifest an apparent Contradiction, and a formal Incompatibility in the Terms; or those which are established on a necessary and inviolable Dependance, and which cannot be hind'red, or which suppose one only Cause, without which 'tis not possible that a thing should exist; or lastly, such as are grounded on an indissolvible connexion of two Subjects which cannot be one without the o∣ther;) I confess we ought then to yield; as when 'tis said, the Sun is risen, it is then day, or it is day, the Sun then is risen; there is a Son, there must then be a Father; I say, we cannot but acquiesce in these kind of Arguments. But because in things about which we dispute, these sort of primary and immediate Demonstrations are very rare, a judicious Person will not suffer himself to be surprized with every thing which bears the Name of Demon∣stration, or that has the Colour and appearance of it, and especially when it relates to a matter belonging to another Light than that of Reason, as are the Objects of Sense, and those of Faith: he must then suspend his Judg∣ment, and reduce his pretended Demonstrations into the Order of the Dis∣pute, to be compared with the contrary Proofs, to the end he may make a right Judgment.

AND this is what may be said in general of these abridged Methods. In their Circumstances, they are to be considered, either as relating to the Persons they are offered, or to the Question which they decide, or the Rank which they hold, and according to the quality of their Proofs. If they be offered to Persons to whom the Question doth not belong, it is in their Pow∣er absolutely to reject them, in alleaging, that this concerns not them, and they cannot justly be blamed when they should do thus. Should they be of∣fered to Persons interessed in the Question, or who would take part in it, they ought ordinarily to proceed according to the Rules I have laid down, and especially if the Question which they decide is of that importance, as that it ought not to be slightly handled. But if we do suppose on one hand, that the Order of these Methods is indirect and unnatural, and that their Ar∣guments

are not taken but from Probabilities, and on the other, that we may be informed by a more natural Course, and a more certain and infalli∣ble Means. I say, that a wise Man ought to prefer this last way before the other, altho it be more tedious and difficult, for tho he cannot answer these Arguments, yet this does not argue he must be determined by them; for it will be time enough to consider them, when after a due Examination of e∣very thing that may be alleaged on both sides, he shall make his decisive Judgment. In fine, I say, that if we suppose a man already ascertained in the Question, by an orderly way, by numerous and conclusive Proofs, and by a Knowledg humanely Certain, and Infallible, as is that of his Eyes and common Senses on their proper Objects, he cannot reasonably be desired to change his Opinion by an indirect Method, which is from hence suspect∣ed to be artificial and deceitful, in that the Proofs which it offers can amount to no more than Probabilities. If he be wise, he will keep to his first Con∣clusion, and reject this Method as useless, without troubling himself with a particular Examination of it, unless to give himself the greater Satisfacti∣on, he determines to discover the falsity of it.

WE see already what use must be made of the Treatise of the Perpe∣tuity, together with all its long train of Arguments and Suppositions, which Mr. Arnaud has made in its Favour. For first, there is little Sincerity in the Objection he stated in the beginning, in which he doth not explain our real Pretension. Secondly, He passeth over in Silence, amongst the Number which he makes of the Persons of our Communion, several who trouble not themselves with the Dispute touching the Question of matter of Fact, that is to say touching the Belief of the antient Church, and in relation to these, who are the greatest number, we may already affirm that the Treatise of the Perpetuity is of no use. Thirdly, He has very ill proved that the most knowing Ministers do doubt whether the Fathers are for us, whence it fol∣lows, that not being able to finde his Proselytes, neither amongst the 〈…〉〈…〉k of the Illiterate People, nor amongst that of the Learned, it is to be fear∣ed he will find them no where. Fourthly, He hath bin shewed, that when it should be granted, there were Ministers, who doubted whether the Fa∣thers were for us; yet would it not follow, that they would leave the Word of God, on which alone their Faith depends, to yield themselves up to the Arguments of the Perpetuity. Fifthly, He hath bin shewed that when one or two should be of this Opinion, yet could they not carry it away from all the rest who have bin, or are of a contrary Mind: whence it follows, that if the least judicious among us regulate their Opinions on this Point by that of the most knowing, they will 'tis probable range themselves on the side of the greatest Number, rather than on that wherein there is but one or two; so that here is almost all of 'em escaped the Treatises Conquest. Sixthly, It has bin likewise shewed him that the Prolixity and Difficulties to be ex∣pected in the common way, which is that of Discussion, yield no advantage to the Treatise to make it received under the Title of an abridged Method. Seventhly, He has bin moreover shewed the insuperable Perplexities where∣in this Method engages People: So that those who are most in Love with short Ways, and new Fashions, cannot but be disgusted at this. Eightly, It has bin demonstrated, that Persons who were never informed of the real Doctrine of the Fathers, and would willingly be ascertain'd of it, ought in all Reason to prefer a Method of Discussion, whatsoever tediousness and dif∣ficulty there may be in it, before that of the Perpetuity. We have likewise manifested that the Proofs of his Method, have not that just and due ex∣tent,

necessary to the forming of a judicious man's Mind: and which ours have. Tenthly, and lastly, It has bin proved to him that discreet Persons, who know our Proofs of Fact, and have examined them, may justly reject this Treatise as useless.

WHAT he then saies concerning these two contrary Evidences that hold the Mind in suspence between our Proofs of Fact, on one hand, and the Arguments of the Perpetuity on the other, is a meer Fancy. For this Unresolvedness is impossible in a man of Judgment. And Mr. Arnaud does not ground it but only on a Supposition, which he has no right to make, That * 1.39 the Proofs of the Treatise intimate the impossibility of a Change, to that de∣gree of Evidence, as will convince the Mind as much as the contrary Evi∣dence. Which I deny him, and that with good Reason, when I compare his Proofs with ours. His Proofs are grounded on a Supposition, in which it is impossible to be ascertain'd, they are of the kind of moral Impossibili∣ties, which never carry in them a Certitude beyond Exception, and more∣over, the Subject or Matter they handle, makes them still a thousand times more uncertain and doubtful; for what is more uncertain than that which depended on Peoples Inclinations, who lived seven or eight hundred Years ago, and on the Conjunction of a thousand things, of which we scarcely know one. We need but consider these Proofs in this respect, to declare them uncertain; But to demonstrate the falsity of them, we must compare them with ours, against which there can no general Objections be made, seing they are numerous, and throughly handle the Question, and which taken severally, have all possible Strength and Evidence.

TO find out distinctly and clearly the knot of this whole Controversy, and judge of it with less Trouble and more Solidity, it needs only be consi∣dered that Mr. Arnaud and I do make almost the same Suppositions, and draw the same Consequences, but each of us in his own Favour. He sup∣poses my Proofs of Fact are uncertain, and I do not only suppose they of his Treatise are so, but that they are moreover False. He supposeth that they of the Treatise are Evident. I suppose that mine are so. He concludes mine are to be Rejected, and them of the Treatise Embraced. I conclude that they of the Treatise are to be Rejected, and mine Entertained. For to judge aright so far, it needs only be considered which of us two has most reason to make these Suppositions, and settles them on surest Grounds; for he that does so, has the Consequence for him. Mr. Arnaud grounds his on the En∣thusiasms of my Rhetorick, on some pretended Testimonies of the Learned, and his own Judgment on Mr. Aubertin's Book, and that of the Perpetuity. I build mine on the Right a Respondent has to suppose his Opinion in a Dis∣pute. Whence I conclude, I may suppose my Proofs of Fact to be good and firm; I ground them on a general Comparison I make of his Proofs with ours, and manifest that ours are according to a natural and direct Me∣thod, and his according to an indirect and forced one; That ours are suffici∣ent to enable a man to make a sound and solid Judgment, and that his are not so, that ours are obvious to Sence, whereas his are but meer Conje∣ctures. And 'tis upon this we ought to be judged. But we must proceed far∣ther; for Mr. Arnaud goes so far as to suppose his Proofs and mine appear equally evident, and 'tis upon this that he grounds the whole Argument of his sixth Chapter. He would have that these two contrary Evidences form∣ing a Suspension of Mind, a rational Man is thereby obliged to determine himself by the Advantages which appear moreover in the Church of Rome,

and here we begin to take two different ways, for I will not grant him the Evidence of his Treatise, as he grants me that of my Proofs. And in ef∣fect no man may make groundless Suppositions, which being impossible, cannot therefore be reasonable. Now it is not possible that a man who is perswaded of the Evidence of our Proofs, can find any Evidence in his, be∣ing such as they are, because they have a Defect in their kind, which makes them vanish before ours. 'Tis moreover on this we ought to be tried.

YET let us suppose, by way of Divertisement, these two contrary Evi∣dences which hold us in Suspense, what follows thence? that we must be de∣termined by the Authority of the Church of Rome. This indeed Mr. Ar∣naud saies: and I maintain we ought wholly to apply our selves to the Scri∣ptures, and leave those Perplexities touching the Opinions of the Fathers, that we may ground our Faith only on the Word of God; and I pretend by this means we shall adhere to the reformed Church. What must we then do about this new Difference? Mr. Arnaud and I must Dispute concerning the Scripture and Church of Rome, to know which of us two has most rea∣son. And these are the Effects of this admirable Method, the Glory of our time, and Quintessence of Humane Wit, which after several windings and turnings, several hot Debates and sharp Disputes, and after an Invitation of all France; and all them of either Communion to the beholding of this fa∣mous Contest, refers the matter at length to the Holy Scripture and the Church. And this is the fruit of the Treatise of the Perpetuity. And in∣deed if we continue to dispute after this manner, I think the World has lit∣tle reason to concern it self in our Debate, seeing 'tis a vain amusement. We wrestle against one another with all our Might, we sweat, and take a great deal of Pains, and make our Books be bought dear: and after all we are to begin again. For if we must now dispute concerning the Holy Scripture and the Church, wherefore did we not do so in the beginning? Wherefore must the Treatise of the Perpetuity be for a Preludium to this? Is it because the Gate of this Controversy is not yet wide enough of it self, but that the Treatise of the Perpetuity must introduce us? Or is it not worthy our regard, and therefore the Treatise of the Perpetuity must be its Mediatour. Is it that either the Church of Rome, or the Scripture have need, (to the end they may be recommended to us,) the one of the Treatise of the Per∣petuity, and the other of my Answer, and that no man can betake himself to either of these without our Guidance. For my part I pretend not to this, and therefore think it beside the Purpose to begin a new Controversy.

CHAP. VII.

The six last Chapters of Mr. Arnaud's Book Examined.

MR Arnaud's last six Chapters of his first Book being only as loose Pieces, which relate not to the Method of the Perpetuity, nor our Proofs of Fact; and the greatest part of them consisting in fruit∣less Digressions, which have no connexion with the Subject of the Eucharist: it seems thereupon he has intended them only as an enlarg∣ment to his Book, and as a means to tire his readers Patience. Which will oblige me to make only a succinct Answer, it being unreasonable to carry off the Debate to other Subjects, and charge my self with unnecessary matters: but howsoever concise my Answer may be, yet will it manifest the weakness and folly of all these tedious and troublesom Discourses of Mr. Arnaud.

HIS seventh Chapter respects an Objection I made against the Author of the Perpetuity, concerning the Infallibility he attributes to the People; which he grounds on this, that People naturally will not suffer their Opinions to be snatched from them, nor Novelties introduced in matters of Religion; for I had intimated that this would oppose the Infallibility which the Church of Rome attributes to the Popes and Councils. The remaining part of the first Book is spent in treating on some other Innovations, which we sup∣pose to have insensibly crept in, as that in the Establishment of Episcopacy, praying for the Dead, the invocation of Saints, and prohibition of certain Meats. These are the things I intend to treat of in this Chapter. That I may proceed orderly, I shall first examine this pretended popular Infallibi∣lity, by comparing it with the Infallibility of Popes or Councils, for we must see whether I had not reason to make against the Author of the Per∣petuity the Objection contained in my Preface. This Question will be soon ended, if it be considered that I have alleaged some Examples of the Insen∣sible Alterations which actually hapned in the Church, in several Points, as * 1.40 well Practical as Speculative, and that the Author of the Perpetuity could not defend himself but by protesting. That he has not offered in general this Maxim, that there could not happen in the Church any imperceptible Change, in the use of Ceremonies, or in Opinions which are no ways Popular, but Spe∣culative, that he has bin cautious of proposing of it in this generality, and there∣fore has restrained it to capital Mysteries, which are known to all the Faithful, by a distinct Faith. To answer after this manner, what is it but to confess a Change has hapned in Points, which are not popular. Which Con∣fession absolutely overthrows the Infallibility claimed by the Church of Rome.

IT is to no purpose that Mr. Arnaud distinguishes betwixt an Infallibili∣ty * 1.41 of Grace or Priviledge, and a humane and popular Infallibility, and to as∣sert that the Author of the Perpetuity doth in no wise pretend to disavow the Infallibility of the Church and Councils, as it respects all kind of Mysteries, whether Popular or others. For these Examples I produced, do equally op∣pose

all manner of Infallibility, and to acknowledg it in any kind, would be to let go this pretended Infallibility of Priviledge. I will suppose the Alterations I mentioned to have hapned in Points not Popular, yet are they Innovations nevertheless, and when they were not contrary to the natural Infallibility, yet would they be to that which is termed of Grace, seeing that they are actual Alterations in Points of Religion. Whence it follows, that a man who believes them to be true, cannot deny but that he acts contrary to the Principle of the Church of Rome, which is, that the Popes and Coun∣cils are only Infallible, and that Mr. Arnauds Distinction is a meer Illusion: for if the Church of Rome has admitted an Alteration in Points not Popular, she is not then Infallible in respect of these Points. 'Tis certain that the Author of the Perpetuity was minded to wrangle about some of the Exam∣ples I produced, pretending the Doctrine of Faith has not bin altered, al∣tho the Practice of it has bin so; but he does not oppose what I alleaged touching the Doctrine of Grace, which is not a Point of Practice but Belief, contenting himself only with saying, That the Truths of Divine Grace have * 1.42 never bin popular in all the Consequences which have bin drawn from them in Theology, and that 'tis false, they are not still the same in principal and essenti∣al Points. But is not this still to acknowledg that in respect of Points not Popular, and which are neither principal, nor essential, in the matter of Grace, there has hap'ned a Change. Now these Points whatsoever they be, whether principal or not, great or small, are Doctrinal Points which cannot be altered, without passing over from Truth to Error, or from Error to Truth. If then it be true, as I have already said, and as the Author of the Perpetuity has not denyed, that the Church has bin several times of contra∣ry Opinions, upon which account it is impossible, but she has bin in Error, and consequently she is not Infallible in this Infallibility of Grace, and Pri∣viledg attributed unto her. The Author of the Perpetuity's Answer doth e∣vidently suppose the actual reality of this Change; it has then given me just Occasion to make this Objection I have made, and Mr. Arnaud's Di∣stinction comes too late.

IT is in vain, he assures us, that the Author of the Perpetuity never had the least thought of denying this Infallibility of Priviledg and Grace; The Question here is not to know absolutely what that Author believed, or not believed, what he thought, or did not think; when this shall be questioned, we shall always be ready to hear Mr. Arnaud's Relation of that matter; but here it concerns us to enquire into the Consequences which may be drawn from his Terms, and whether he hath given me a just occasion to make that Objection against him in my Preface. It will not be sufficient to make De∣clarations on this Matter, it must be shewed that the Consequence is not true.

Mr. Arnaud imagins, he has sufficiently justified his Friend, in assert∣ing, he made not use of the Infallibility of Priviledg, because 'tis a Priviledg to be proved, and not supposed, and the Calvinists denying it, it is thence clear, that to make an advantagious use of it, it should have bin established before, which is to say, there ought to have bin an intire Treatise made of the Churches Infallibility, before it could be made use of in this Dispute. But, saith he, to conclude from thence, he hath denyed it, and doth not acknowledg it, is one of the most rash Consequences as ever was drawn, altho that Mr. Claude hath done this in the Preface of his Book.

AND this is Mr. Arnaud's true Character, that he is never more fierce, than when he is Gravelled, or alleageth things wholly besides the Purpose. We have not grounded our present Objection on the Author of the Perpe∣tuity's not using the Infallibility of Priviledg for his Principle, this is a wil∣ful mistake. For it has bin grounded on this, that the terms of his Answers to the instances of a Change, which I had affirmed, do oppose this Infallibi∣lity which the Church of Rome pretends to, and acknowledg no other but that of the People. Now 'tis to this he should apply himself, and not con∣tinually entertain us with impertinent Digressions.

MOREOVER, what signifies his telling us, that the Infallibility of Priviledge is a Principle to be proved, and not supposed, and that the Rea∣son disswading the Author of the Perpetuity from making use of it, is be∣cause we deny it. We no less deny the pretended popular Infallibility, which is a Principle needs proving, as much as the other. He himself tells us, in the beginning of his eighth Chapter; that the Principle of insensible Alte∣rations, which is directly opposite to that of popular Infallibility, is a ne∣cessary Foundation to the Calvinists, whereon to build the greatest part of their Doctrines, and that all this great Machine of the pretended Reformation, consisting of so many different Opinions, has almost need upon all Occasions of this Supposition, That the contrary Opinion which it undertakes to overthrow, has bin insensibly Introduced into the Church. And thus does he speak, when he would have us deny him his Principle; but when he would have us grant it him, he then holds another Language. The Author of the Perpe∣tuity, * 1.43 sais he, does not design to attribute to the People any other Infallibility than that which all the World allows them, and which Mr. Claude doth him∣self grant. Never any Person disposed more freely of other mens Thoughts then Mr. Arnaud. We Deny, we Confess, according as he pleases, he brings us on his Stage as often as he list; making us say sometimes one thing, and sometimes another, and is not this to Dispute successfully? But whether we Confess or Deny this his popular Infallibility, it is all one to me, for here the Question is not about this, but to know whether the Author of the Perpetuity has not opposed the Infallibility, attributed to the Pope and Councils; this is the true State of the Controversy, and Mr. Arnaud is at a loss how to defend himself from it.

WHAT signifies his telling us, that there are an infinite number of things, * 1.44 wherein not only the whole Church, and all the People of the Universe, but a particular number of People, a Province, a City, a Borough, a particular Person, is Infallible, that is to say wherein it cannot happen he should be deceiv∣ed himself, nor would deceive others? Wherefore must we have the Gaze∣tier brought in for an Instance of this, who is Infallible, when he tells us any considerable News, such as is the Kings going into the low Coun∣tries, the taking of Cities in Flanders, the Canonization of St. Francis de Sales, the Death of Pope Alexander the seventh, and the Election of Clement the ninth; If he relates this News only, to advertize us, he began his Book after the Kings Victories in the low Countries, every man may believe as much as he thinks fitting, for we know it is no hard matter to add a Period or two to the beginning of a Book, altho 'tis already far ad∣vanced; but be it as it will, I dare say, that Mr. Arnaud's Victories will not be so certain as those of our Monarch. If in effect he hath not mentioned this to us, but to confirm by Examples his popular Infallibility,

I have reason to tell him, that these Instances are besides the matter in hand, for there must be a distinction made, betwixt an Infallibility grounded on the Testimony of a single Person, or a particular sort of People, and that which is grounded on a whole Body of People. I would call the first if you will an Infallibility of Testimony, and the second, an Infallibility of Perseverance in one and the same State. There is a Difference betwen these two. The first of these may be attributed to a People, a Church, a Province, a City, or a particular Person, without the second. I will grant likewise 'tis im∣possible, in certain Cases, for the whole Body of a People to be mistaken in the News it relates, tho to speak the truth even this happens not seldom, there being nothing more usually false than popular News. But tho I grant this is Impossible in some Cases, yet this is far enough from acknowledging, that a People governed by certain Persons, may not insensibly without any Noise, alter their Sentiments, and pass over into an Opinion which they knew not before. For to make such a kind of Change as this is, there needs only the Concurrence of two or three great Persons in Authority, to whom all Businesses are referred. We have seen that the face of things in the Church of Rome, hath bin changed not long ago, and which hath bin surprizing to several Persons; Mr. Arnaud himself has bin interessed in some of these Changes, and I suppose he would be sorry if the Infallibility of Perseve∣rance in the same State, should have bin as firm and unmoveable as the Account which the Gazetier gave us of the Death of Pope Alexander. But after all, this does not hinder but that the Author of the Perpetuity has op∣posed the Infallibility the Church of Rome ordinarily pretends to.

AND this is what I would have told Mr. Arnaud, had he done me the Honour he mentions, which is, to have conferred with me about my Objection, and perhaps my Answers would have satisfied him. I would have added two Observations, which would have made him better com∣prehend that his pretended popular Infallibility does not well accord with that which he termeth of Grace, or Priviledge. The first of these Obser∣vations is, that popular Mysteries being only necessary to Salvation, if suf∣ficiently preserved by natural means, that is to say, by the inviolable In∣clinations of the People, there is no great need of the Infallibility of Grace; which will be at farthest, only necessary to the Doctrines which are not popular, that is, to the Questions of the Schools, which the Church may well be without, and which are but (as speaks the Author of the Perpe∣tuity,) Theological Consequences. The second is, that the Reason where∣fore he saith the Author of the Perpetuity chose rather the popular Infallibili∣ty for his Principle, than that of Grace, supposeth that this latter is abso∣lutely less evident, and harder to be proved than the first. This Infallibi∣lity of the Church, saies he, being denied by the Hereticks, cannot be made use * 1.45 of as a Principle against them, unless we establish it by separate Proofs. For the Calvinists without doubt would not take themselves to be sufficiently refu∣ted, upon the Subject of the Eucharist, if we only contented our selves with bringing these Arguments against them. All Doctrines which are condemned by an Infallible Church are false: But the Belief of the Calvinists on the Sacrament is condemned by the Catholick Church, which is Infallible: Therefore it is false. Not but this Reasoning is good: but the minor Proposition which saith that the Catholick Church is Infallible, being a controverted Point, it is thence plain, that before it can be made use of, it must be proved, that is to say, there ought to be made an intire Treatise touching the Churches Infallibility, before this Point could be used. For this Infallibility is not a thing clear in

it selfs seeing it wholly depends on the Will of God, reavealed in Scripture, The Church not being naturally Infallible, 'tis then by the Principles of Faith, or by a long Train of Arguments, that it must be proved she is supernaturally so. Now to make this Argument good, we must suppose that this Infalli∣bility of Grace cannot be proved but with a great deal of Difficulty, what∣soever Course is taken, whether by Scripture or Reason, for if it could be clearly and briefly proved from Scripture, Mr. Arnaud's Excuse would be vain, for he would be demanded wherefore the Author of the Perpetuity has not done it, seeing we require not Arguments where the Scripture plainly expresses it self. His reasoning then to be conclusive, must sup∣pose 'tis impossible for the Author of the Perpetuity to prove the Infallibili∣ty of Grace, without engaging himself in Prolixities and Difficulties. Whence it plainly appears, that this is not a proper Principle for the Un∣learned, who are not able to go thro with a long and difficult Discussion. It is of no use to them, according to Mr. Arnaud, and that so much the ra∣ther, that he himself hath told us that short and easy ways are needful to such, whereby they may discern the true Church; Ways, saith he, which * 1.46 free men from those painful Dicussions, which Ignorance, dulness of Apprehen∣sion, and the Exigences of Life, do make so many Persons uncapable of. So that this Principle of the Churches Infallibility, being not to be proved without a great deal of Difficulty, will be only serviceable to the Learned, and of which in effect they have no great need, seeing they can of them∣selves attain the Knowledg of particular Doctrines, without the help of Authority. And to this is reduced, thro Mr. Arnaud's means, this Infallibili∣ty of Grace and Priviledge, which has made such a noise in the Romish Communion.

THE remaining part of Mr. Arnaud's Book, treats, as I already said, on several other Alterations, which we pretend, have insensible crept into the Church. But seeing these are Points which do not at all belong to the Eucharist, and cannot be well examined without writing a great Volum on each of them, Mr. Arnaud therefore may take the Liberty, of saying what he pleases concerning them, for I think my self no ways bound to answer him. When he shall assault the Books of Mr. Saumaise, Blondel, or Daillé, after the manner he ought, he will not perhaps want an Answer. It is an easy matter, to joyn three or four Passages together, on any Controversy, and thereupon make Declamations. For this is the common course of the World. People usually begin where they will, and end when they please: but were one of these Books I mentioned, examined to the Bottom, and e∣very particular undertaken, I am sure this would not be such an easy Task.

THE supposition of insensible Alterations, is a Principle the Holy Scrip∣ture establishes, which right Reason alloweth and Experience confirmeth. St. Paul tells us of a Mystery of Iniquity, which began to appear in his time, and which would, in the end, produce this great effect, he calls a Revolt, or Apostasy; which has all the Characters of an insensible Change, seeing that the Foundations of it were laid in his time, and at length these mysteri∣ous Projects should come to their Perfection. Our Reason likewise tells us, that important Alterations which happen in Societies, are never introduced all of 'em at one time, but are brought in gradually; and that it is easier to joyn succesfully together several particular Innovations, each one of which apart seems inconsiderable, and to make thereby a great Alteration, than if

this should be undertaken all at once. This is a Maxim amongst all Politici∣ans, and Persons who are capable of prosecuting any Enterprize, but this many times happens of it self without any Design. Experience it self con∣firms this by sundry Examples; for 'tis after this manner several Arts and Sciences arrive at Perfection: Languages and Customs of Countries are al∣tered; 'Tis after this manneer the Power of Princes and other States are encreased or diminished; and not to seek for Instances of this kind, any far∣ther than in the Church, and Christian Religion, by this means hath the Authority of the Romish Prelacy arrived through several Ages to that De∣gree wherein we now see it. Thus were the antient Ceremonies in the ad∣ministration of Baptism abrogated, and other new ones adopted in their places. Thus has the Opinion of the absolute necessity of the Eucharist to the Salvation of little Children, bin abolished, and we have passed over in∣to a contrary Opinion. Null us, saith St. Austin, Qui se meminit Catholicae * 1.47 fidei Christianum negat aut dubitat parvulos non accepta gratia regenerationis in Christo, sine cibo carnis ejus & sanguinis potu non habere in se vitam, ac per hoc poenae sempiternae obnoxios. There is no Christian who holds the Catholick Faith, that either denys, or doubts but that little Children, who have not received the Grace of Regeneration in Jesus Christ, nor participated of the Nourishment of his Flesh and Blood, are deprived of everlasting Life, and consequently ly∣able to eternal Damnation.

LET Mr. Arnaud inform us how this publick Belief came to be changed. St. Austin tells us that 'tis an Article of the Catholick Faith, he assures us there is no Christian who doubts of it, that is, it was a popular Opinion: And yet at this day the contrary is held in the Church of Rome: how comes this Change? We might produce several other Instances, if they were necessa∣ry: but at present one Example is sufficient, to overthrow this false Prin∣ciple of Mr. Arnaud's, and to establish that which appears to him to be so Unreasonable.

YET to speak a word, on each of these Points he has handled, does he think, that on the Subject of Episcopacy, his Discourses will carry it away from St. Jerom, who tells us, That before there were partialities in Religion, * 1.48 and that the People cryed out I am of Paul, and I of Cephas, the Church was governed by a Common-Council of Priests, but since, every one esteeming them whom he had baptized belonged to him, and not to Christ, it was ordained throughout the whole World, that one alone chosen from amongst the Priests, should be set up above the rest, and have the Charge of the Church committed to him, to take away thereby all Occasions of Schisme.

DOES he think that in the Point of Praying for the Dead, we will a∣bandon the Doctrine of St. Paul, who tells us in his second Epistle to the Cor. Chap. 5. That if our earthly House of this Tabernacle were dissolved, we have a Building of God, an House not made with Hands, eternal in the Heavens. These Words do not suffer us to doubt but that they who dye in the Faith of Jesus Christ do enjoy his glorious Presence in Heaven, whence it fol∣lows they have no need of our Prayers. That if the Antients have menti∣oned the deceased in their Prayers, it is certain they never designed thereby to deliver them from the Pains of Purgatory which they undergo to satisfy for their Sins, which is the end the Church of Rome doth at this day pro∣pose in its Prayers. We Celebrate, (saith an antient Author in his Com∣mentaries * 1.49 on Job, which are thought to be Origens) Not the Day of our

Birth, but that of our Death; for the day of our Birth is an Entrance into Sorrows and Temptations; but that of Death is on the contrary, the end of Sorrows, and a Freedom from all Temptations. We commemorate then the Day of Death, because they who seem to dye, do not so. And for this reason we celebrate the memory of the Saints, and devoutly commemorate our Fathers, or Friends who have departed in the Faith, as well to refresh our selves by the remembrance of the Felicity which they enjoy, as also to desire of God, that we may continue in the same Faith.

DOES Mr. Arnaud expect in that Article of the Church of Rome's touching the Invocation of Saints: that we should believe him rather than O∣rigen, who speaks in the Name of all the Christians in his time, in his Dis∣pute against Celsus, who would have them to worship the Sun, Moon and Stars, seeing they are Celestial Angels. We believe saith he, we ought not * 1.50 to pray unto Creatures, who do themselves pray unto God, especially considering, they had rather we should offer up our Petitions to him, whom they likewise serve, than to them, not being willing we should after any sort share our Devo∣tions.

AND as to the abstaining from certain kind of Meats, Tertullian who was a Montanist, will shew us better than Mr. Arnaud can, the Judgment * 1.51 of the Catholicks in his time. Arguunt nos, saith he, quod jejunia propria custodiamus, quod stationes plerumque in vesperam producamus, quod etiam Xe∣rophagias observemus, siccantes cibum ab omni carne, & omni jurulentia, & uvidioribus quibusque pomis, ne quid vinositatis vel edamus vel potemus. They censure us because we observe particular Fasts, that we make them last till the Evening, that we observe Xerophagies, using dry Meats without Flesh, and Juice, and in that we abstain from Fruits which have over much Juice in them, to the end we may not eat or drink any thing which hath the quality of Wine. And a little farther, as to Xerophagies, they say, that 'tis the new Name of * 1.52 an affected Devotion, and which comes near the Heathenish Superstitions, such as the Mortifications of Isis, Apis, and the Mother of the Gods, which puri∣fy by abstinence from certain Meats. And this is in few Words what I had to say on those four Particulars.

WOULD we keep to the exact Rules of Controversy, we need not pro∣ceed to any farther Examination of the rest of Mr. Arnaud's great Volumn, which may be said, without breach of Charity, equally to offend both in its quantity and quality. For having shewed, as I have done, that the Treatise of the Perpetuity of the Faith ought to be rejected, upon the only consideration of its Method, it is hence evident I am not obliged to follow Mr. Arnaud in his Voyages to Greece, Muscovia, Persia, Syria, Egypt, Aethiopia, and the Indias. Seeing we will never part with our Proofs of Fact, what need has he of travelling thro all these Countries? Neither the Greeks nor other Christi∣an Nations, considered from the eleventh Century, or from the seventh, will decide the Question touching what has bin believed in the antient Church, to the Prejudice of the Fathers and their Testimony. Yet shall I make him an exact Answer, not out of any Necessity, but only out of Con∣descension, and upon condition he will remember that I have proved in this first Book these following Particulars.

I. That his Censure touching what I said concerning Mr. Aubertin's Book, is grounded on an extravagant Fancy; That it cannot bear a rational

Interpretation; nor is made with any kind of Sincerity; that it supposeth a great Mistake; that we may conclude thence a Prevarication against the Church of Rome; and in fine, may be refuted by Mr. Arnaud's own Exam∣ple. Which is the Summary of the first Chapter.

II. That the Author of the Perpetuity's Method is Indirect, and contra∣ry to Nature, seeing he would decide Questions of Right by Matters of Fact, and Questions of Fact by Proofs drawn from Arguments: which is such a disorderly way of Proceeding, as makes his Method justly suspected to be artificial and deceitful.

III. That the Author of the Perpetuity has openly assaulted Mr. Auber∣tin's Book, and that after an indirect and artificial Manner, which lies as a Prejudication against him. Which is the Summary of the second Cha∣pter.

IV. That the Design of the Author of the Perpetuity, being to destroy the Impression which the Proofs of Fact, or the Passages out of the Fathers have made on our Minds, does nothing less than this, whence it follows that his Treatise is wholly Useless. Which are the Contents of the third Cha∣pter.

V. That Mr. Arnaud contradicts the Author of the Perpetuity, in pre∣tending to defend him, and ruins the whole Design of his Treatise.

VI. That these Methods of Prescription, which Mr. Arnaud so much glories in, are vain and ineffectual, and that the Course we take to confirm People in the Doctrines of our Church is short, certain, and easy to the meanest Capacities: whereas those Mr. Arnaud offers, are tedious, diffi∣cult, uncertain, and unintelligible to ordinary Apprehensions: Whence it follows they cannot with a safe Conscience remain in the Communion of the Church of Rome.

VII. That the Abridgment of our Proofs of Fact, which I offer'd in my first Answer, has bin regular; and that the Treatise of the Perpetuity is but a mear Chaos of Confusion. These three last Particulars are contained in the fourth Chapter.

VIII. That all those pretended Advantages Mr. Arnaud hopes to obtain by means of the Perpetuity, in relation to the Learned and Unlearned, and to those he terms the Obstinate; are groundless Imaginations, which in fine do only manifest the Unprofitableness of that Treatise. Which is the Subject of the fifth and sixth Chapters.

IX, And lastly, that he cannot excuse the Author of the Perpetuity, nor himself from the Charge of Contradicting and Opposing the Infallibility of Popes and Councils, it being an avowed Doctrine of the Church of Rome; Which is the Contents of this seventh Chapter.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Mr. de Vence in his Appro∣bation.
• * 1.2

  Lib. 1. Ch. 6. pag. 62. pag. 63.
• * 1.3

  Lib. 1. ch. 1. P. 1.
• * 1.4

  The first Obser∣vation justified.
• * 1.5

  The second Observation justified, Lib. Chap. 1. p. 4.
• * 1.6

  Lib. 1 Chap. 1 Pag. 4.
• * 1.7

  Perpetuity of the Faith, P. 50. 51. &c.
• * 1.8

  Lib. 1. Ch. 1. Pag. 7.
• * 1.9

  Lib. 1. Ch. 2.
• * 1.10

  Lib. 1. Ch. 2. Pag. 1.
• * 1.11

  Lib. 10. Ch. 7 Pag. 55
• * 1.12

  Lib. 1. Ch. 1 P. 10.
• * 1.13

  Lib. 1. C 2. P. 10.
• * 1.14

  Lib. 1. C. 2. P. 15.
• * 1.15

  Lib. 1. C. 3. P. 16.
• * 1.16

  Lib. 1. C. 7. P. 66.
• * 1.17

  Lib. 1. C. 7. Pag. 68.
• * 1.18

  Lib. 1. C. 4. P. 30.
• * 1.19

  Lib. 1. C. 4. P. 31.
• * 1.20

  Lib. 1. C. 3. P. 24.
• * 1.21

  Lib. 1. C. 5. P. 32.
• * 1.22

  Lib. 1. C. 6. P. 53.
• * 1.23

  Lib. 1. C. 6. P. 26.
• * 1.24

  Lib. 1. C. ••. P. 34.
• * 1.25

  Lib. 1. C. 5. P. 36.
• * 1.26

  Annals Eccl. ad An. 1600, art. 12.
• * 1.27

  Lib. 1. C. 5. Pag. 41.
• * 1.28

  Inst. Lib. 4. C. 18.
• * 1.29

  De usu Pat. C. 2
• * 1.30

  Ibid.
• * 1.31

  Ibid.
• * 1.32

  Ibid.
• * 1.33

  C. 1.
• * 1.34

  Answer to the Perpetuity P. 192.
• * 1.35

  Answer to the Prpetuity P. 34.
• * 1.36

  Ibid.
• * 1.37

  Lib. 3. C. 5. P. 47.
• * 1.38

  Lib. 1. C. 5. P. 47.
• * 1.39

  Lib. 1. C. •••• P. 54.
• * 1.40

  Perpetuity of the Faith, Part 2. C. 7.
• * 1.41

  Lib. 1. C. 7.
• * 1.42

  Perpetuity of the Faith. Part 2. C. 7.
• * 1.43

  Lib. 1. c. 7.
• * 1.44

  Lib. 1. C. 7.
• * 1.45

  Lib. 1. C. 7.
• * 1.46

  Lib. 1. C. 3. P. 17.
• * 1.47

  Epist. 106.
• * 1.48

  Hier. Com. in Epist. ad Tit. C. 1.
• * 1.49

  Com. in Job L. 3.
• * 1.50

  Origen Cont. Col. L. 5.
• * 1.51

  Tertul. de je∣jun. C. 1.
• * 1.52

  C. ••••