CHAP. II.
That the Author of the Perpetuity's Method may be justly Suspected to be deceitful, and that his manner of assaulting Mr. Aubertin's Book is Disingenuous.
THE Method the Author of the Perpetuity makes use of to make us confess, as he says; that the Doctrine of the Roman Church, touching the Eucharist, is the same with that of all Antiquity, hath appeared so strange and irregular to me, that I have made these following Reflexions thereupon.
I. That it may be justly suspected of Artifice and Illusion.
II. That this way of Assaulting Mr. Aubertin's Book is Disingenious and Indirect.
III. That the Author hath bin to blame in pretending to shew the Inva∣lidity of Mr. Aubertin's Proofs by Arguments which at most do amount but to mere Conjectures.
IV. That to confute at once all these Arguments, we need but oppose against them these same Proofs of matters of Fact, and by gathering them into an Abridgment, to give a general view of them.
Mr. Arnaud confesses that I were not to be blamed for having in my Answer * 1.1 fall'n first upon the Faults which I pretend to discover in the Author of the Perpetuity's Method, provided, saith he, that I maintained Equity and Truth; It may be, I think, then supposed I have so far done nothing con∣trary to Rule, it only remains I make good the four above-mentioned Re∣flections.
I shall not insist long upon the first of these, because Mr. Arnaud hath al∣ledged * 1.2 nothing against it, appearing undenyable in it self. It is grounded on this, That when the Question concerns what we ought to believe touch∣ing the Eucharist, the Author of the Perpetuity would have this Question decided, not by the word of God, but the Churches Consent in all Ages, and Depositions of the Fathers, and when it comes to the Enquiry after this Consent of the Church, he would have this second Question resolved not by Passages taken out of the Writings of the Fathers, but by Arguments. Now this is certainly a most tedious and preposterous Course; it being a Principle of common Sense, that Questions in matters of Right ought to be naturally de∣cided by the Rule of Right, then when the Rule determining that Right is distinct and separated from matters of Fact, and that again naturally the