Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. XIII. Of the Intellectual Faculty; which is peculiar to the Humane Soul.

[unspec 1] BEfore we enter upon any other Discourse rela∣ting to this Subject, it is necessary to observe the Seat or Instrument of this Faculty, and then its Action, or Method of Operating.

Now the Seat,* 1.1 or rather the Throne of the Rea∣sonable Soul, where it sits and reigns Supreme, is not the Heart, (as was generally supposed before Plato and Hippocrates) but the Brain: For the Heart is not capable of Wisdom, but is properly the Seat and Source of Vegetation. Now the Brain, which in Man much exceeds the Quantity assign'd to any other Creature, must be so contriv'd and dispos'd, that the Reasonable Soul may act freely; and in order hereunto, the Figure of it must be almost like that of a Ship; it must not be a perfect Round, it must not be too Great, nor too Little; though of the Two Extremes the Excess is much less to be found fault with, than the Defect: It must be compos'd of a delicate fluid Substance, of fine and subtle Parts, and these well joyn'd together, and all united without any Separation, or void Spaces throughout the whole. It hath Four small Cavi∣ties

or Ventricles, Three of which lie forward in the middle, and are plac'd in a Collateral Line to one another: The Fourth lies behind these, toward the hinder part of the Head, and is single by it self. This is the Shop in which the Vital Spirits are first form'd and united, in order to the being afterwards converted into Animal Spi∣rits, and then convey'd into the Three Cavities that lie forward: And these Animal Spirits are the In∣struments made use of by the Soul, for discharg∣ing her several Functions, and exercising all her Faculties. Those Faculties are likewise Three; the Understanding, the Memory, and the Imagination: And these are not exercis'd distinctly and apart, nor hath each of them a different Ventricle of the Brain ap∣propriated to it; (which is all an old and vulgar Errour concerning them) but their Operations are alltogether, and in common. All the Three Fa∣culties exert themselves in all and every of the Three Cavities; somewhat like our Bodily Senses, which are double, and have Two Organs, in each of which the same Sense performs all its Opera∣tions entire. From hence it comes to pass, that a Man who is hurt or disabled in Two of these Three Ventricles, (as one in a Palsie, for In∣stance) does yet continue to have the use of all his Three Faculties: That is, He understands, and remembers, and forms Idea's still, by virtue of that One Cavity, which the Disease hath not yet sei∣zed upon. It is true, he does this more weakly, and every Operation of every kind is more im∣perfect than it was formerly, because the Strength and Vigour of One is not equal to the united Force of Three: But yet it evidently follows from hence, that each Faculty hath not its Workhouse in a distinct Apartment, and entire to it self a∣lone; for then, assoon as any of these Ventricles begins to be disabled, that Faculty to which it

belongs, must immediately cease, and cou'd never more be exerted in any Degree at all.

[unspec 3] Some Persons have been of Opinion, * 1.2 that the Reasonable Soul is not Organical; that is, that it can act separately and independently, and hath no need of any Corporeal Instrument to assist it in the Discharge of its Functions. And this Notion they have been more fond of, because they ima∣gine it of consequence for proving the Immorta∣lity of the Soul. Now without engaging in a vast and dark Labyrinth of Dispute, about a Matter which we are incapable of knowing perfectly, this Question may be brought to a short Issue: For if we will but credit our own Eyes, and our own Experience, every Day gives us Demonstra∣tions, which overthrow this Opinion, and esta∣blish the Contrary. It is certain that all Men have not equal Capacities, nor do they apprehend things, or argue upon them alike, but the Disparity is very great and visible between one Man and an∣other. It is no less evident, that the same Per∣son changes, and differs from himself; that his Reason is more clear, and perfect, and strong at one Time, and at one Age, in one Disposition of Body, and in one Circumstance of Fortune and Life, than it is in another. One Man can do nothing except he have Ease and Leisure; another requires Dangers and Difficulties to rouze him, and never thinks to purpose, till he be prest hard, and driven to Extremities: A Third finds himself much more capable in Health than in Sickness: And a Fourth feels his Mind most vigorous and active, then when his Diseases and Weakness have reduc'd his Body lowest. The same Man at one Season excels in Judgment, and flags in his Fancy; so that One Faculty decays in proportion as Another improves. Now the most probable Account that can be given for all these Differences and Alte∣rations,

seems to be a difference in the State and Disposition of the Organs, which are to the Soul as Tools to the Artificer. Which way but this shall we answer for the strange Effects we see produc'd by Drunkenness, by the Bite of a Mad Dog, by a high Fever, by a Blow upon the Head, by the Vapours that rise from the Sto∣mach and annoy the Brain; and by several o∣ther Accidents which affect any of the Parts there∣abouts? What Confusions do they make, how perfectly stupid, and childish, and frantick do Men grow upon them, lose their Memory quite, and feel their Heads turn'd upside down, their former Idea's eraced, their Judgment destroy'd? All the Wisdom of Greece is not able to maintain it self against them; and if the Shock be very violent indeed, then it does not only disturb and enfeeble, but quite drive away the Soul, and constrain her to remove out of the Body. Now it is plain, that these Accidents are purely Corporeal, and conse∣quently they cannot affect what is not so; they can never fly so high as the exalted and Spiritu∣al Faculties of the Reasonable Soul; all that they can do is to vitiate the Organs, to put Them out of their Course, and intercept the usual Commu∣nications; and when This is once effected, the Soul can no longer act regularly; She may com∣mand, but They cannot obey; and if these Or∣gans are sore bruised, and distorted very grievously, then She and They can no longer subsist toge∣ther: The Lodging is no longer sit to entertain her, and she must be gone.

Now I do by no means see, how this Opinion can be guilty of any Prejudice to that of the Im∣mortality of the Soul; For first, We are not here en∣quiring what the Soul is, but how she operates, and what Laws of Action she is bound up to, while in Conjunction with a Mortal Body. And

Secondly, The making Use of Corporeal Instru∣ments, does by no Means prove the User to be Corporeal or Mortal. God, without all Question, is Immortal, and yet God himself does not think it below him to use such; and to proportion the Effects and Operations of his Providence to them. He produces Men of different Understandings and Parts, according to the Constitution of their Pa∣rents, and the Concurrence of other Natural Causes; nay, even according to the different Climate, and Country, and Air they are born in. For Greece and Italy have ever been observ'd to produce Men of quicker, and clearer Wit, than Muscovy and Tartary. And as God does in this Case, so does the Mind in o∣thers. It reasons better or worse, remembers more or less Faithfully, hath a more fruitful, or more barren Imagination, according as the Organs (which are the Corporeal Instruments appointed to serve it upon these Occasions) are better or worse di∣sposed to do their Duty. Now the Brain is pro∣perly the Instrument of the Reasonable Soul, and therefore upon the due Temperament of This, a great deal must needs, indeed the Whole in a manner, will depend: That therefore shall be the next Thing we attempt to give an Account of.

[unspec 4] By this Temperament is to be understood the Mixture and Proportion of the Four Prime Qua∣lities, * 1.3 Hot and Cold, Moist and Dry; or rather a Fifth Quality, which is, as it were, a Harmony resulting from a due Conjunction of all these together, like that Concord in Sounds, which arises from a Friendly Complication of different Notes. Now upon that Mixture of the Brain it is, that the State and the Operations of the Reasonable Soul depend. On∣ly This is Man's great Unhappiness, that the Three Faculties, Understanding, Memory, and Imagination, do each of them require different, nay, contrary Tem∣peraments, for their Exercise and Perfection. The

Temperament proper for the Understanding is a Pre∣dominance of Dry; and this gives us some Ac∣count, how it comes to pass, that Persons far gone in Years, are more Intelligent and Judicious, than those that are Younger. For, besides the Advantages which Art, and Study, and Experience may give them; they have a Disposition to it from Nature; The Brain, as Men grow older, purifying it self from Excrementitious Humours, and growing dryer every Day: For the same Reason, in all likeli∣hood, Melancholy Persons, and those under Af∣fliction, and Want, and Persons that are fasting (it being an Effect of Grief and Fasting to keep the Brain dry) may be better disposed to think; and qualified to do it to good Purpose, as well as some of them are necessitated by their Circum∣stances, to apply themselves to it. This is farther observable in Brutes; Ants, and Bees, and Ele∣phants, as they are the Dryest, so they are the most capable, and ingenious of any; and those of a moist Constitution, (the Swine for Instance) are Stupid and Senseless. Thus again in Men; Those of Southerly Countries, excel in Wisdom, from the Drought of their Brain, and their inward Heat being moderated, by that of a Violent Sun with∣out, which exhales it.

The Temperament best accommodated to the Me∣mory is Moist; and hence it is, that Children are more ready and perfect in it, than old People; hence it is most apt and faithful in a Morning, when the Brain hath been well refreshed, and throughly moistned by a good Nights Sleep; hence also the Inhabitants of the Northern Climates, have the strongest Memories, for These are under a moister Air, by Means of their great Distance from the Sun. But this Moisture must not be so mi∣staken as if I meant, that the Temper of the Memory is fluid, like Water; but rather such a

Moisture as we may observe in Air, Glew, Grease, or Oyl; something of such a Substance and Con∣tinuity of Parts, as may both take the Impression easily, and keep it a great while; as we see Pictures do, that are laid in Oyl Colours.

The Temperament sittest for the Imagination, is Hot, which makes Distracted, Hair-brain'd, and Feverish People, excel all others in bold and lofty Flights of Fancy. Thus Poetry, Divination, and all that de∣pends upon Imagination, were always thought to pro∣ceed from a sort of Fury and Inspiration. This Fa∣culty is for the same Reason most Vigorous in Youth and the Flower of our Age: The Poets according∣ly flourished at these Years, and Almighty God, (who even in Supernatural Influences and Effects, made great use of Natural Causes, and did as lit∣tle Violence as was possible, to a Course of his own Instituting) ordered the Matter so, that most of the Prophets should do so too. The same Rea∣son holds likewise for those Middle Regions, and more Moderate Climates, between the North and the South, where Men are observ'd to excel in those Arts and Sciences, which are derived from the Strength and Sprightliness of Fancy.

Now, from this great inequality of these Mix∣tures and Proportions, it frequently happens, that a Man may be tolerably well to pass in all these Three Faculties, and not arrive at an Excellence in any one of them; as also, That a Man may be conspicuous, and exceeding well Accomplish'd in one of these Respects, and yet very Wanting and Despicable in the other Two. It is manifest, the Temperaments adapted for the Memory, and the Understanding, are the most Distant and Contrary in the World; for what can be more so than, Moist and Dry? That of the Imagination does not seem so remote from the Rest, for Hot will agree well enough with Moist or Dry, and is far from being

Incompatible with either; and yet, though these seem so consistent in Nature, we see them very seldom reconcil'd in Fact; For those who are e∣steemed most Excellent in Imagination, are general∣ly found very Weak both in Point of Memory and Understanding; and thought near a Kin to Fools or Mad-Men. The Reason whereof may possibly be This. That the Heat, which feeds and exalts their Imagination, wasts and exhausts that Moisture, with which the Memory is assisted; and also the finest and most volatile of Those Spirits, of which that Dry∣ness Partakes, which is serviceable to the Under∣standing; and the Faculty, when destitute of these, grows flat and heavy. So that in Effect This is an Enemy to both the other Temperaments, and Ex∣perience shews it to be Destructive of them.

[unspec 5] From all that hath been said we may plainly see, that the Principal Temperaments, which serve, * 1.4 assist, and set the reasonable Soul on working, and which distinguish the Excellencies of the Mind, according to its Faculties, are Three, and cannot ex∣ceed that Number. For Cold which is the Fourth, is of no significance at all; Hot, and Moist, and Dry only, can contribute to Mens Ingenuity. The Other is a sluggish, unactive Principle, and, instead of quickening, does only benumb and stupifie the Soul, and put a Stop to all its Motions. There∣fore, when in reading some Authors, we find them recommending Cold, as of use to the Understand∣ing, and saying, that Men of a Cold Brain, such as those of Melancholy Complexions, or under the Southern Climes, are Prudent, Wise, Ingenious and the like; we must not there understand the Word Cold in its Natural and most received Sense, but interpret it of a large Abatement and more moderate Degree of Heat only. For nothing can be more opposite to Wisdom, and a good Under∣standing, than that Excess of Heat, which yet to

the bettering of the Imagination, and refining the Fancy would be of great Importance. And ac∣cording to the three Temperaments, of the Brain, there are three corresponding Faculties of the Rea∣sonable Soul. But both the One, and the Other of these admit of several Degrees; and may be vari∣ously subdivided, and distinguished.

[unspec 6] The Principal Offices, to be discharged by the Understanding, and the different Qualifications of Men, * 1.5 with regard to it, are Three; To conclude tru∣ly, To distinguish nicely, and To choose wisely. The Sciences that fall properly under this Faculty, are School-Divinity; The Speculative Part of Phy∣sick, Logick, Natural and Moral Philosophy.

The Memory hath likewise Three Qualities to be distinguished by. For there is One sort of Memory, which easily receives Impressions, and easily loses them again. A Second, which quickly remembers, and seldom or never forgets; and a Third, where the Impression is hard to be made, and yet is pre∣sently worn out again. The Sciences proper to this Faculty are Grammar, and the Theory of the Ci∣vil Law, Dogmatical Divinity, Cosmography, and Arithmetick.

The Imagination abounds in Distinctions, and Differences are occasioned by it, much more than either the Memory or the Understanding is capable of. To this belong, after a more peculiar manner, Fanciful Inventions, Pleasant Conceits, Witty Jests, Sharp Reflections, Ingenious Repartees; Fictions and Fables, Figures and Comparisons, Propriety and Purity of Expression; and in a Word, All that Quaintness, and Elegance, and Easiness, which adorns Conversation, and becomes the Character of a Man of Sense, and Good Breeding. And there∣fore we may range under this Division, Poetry, Eloquence, Musick, Correspondence, Harmony, and Proportion.

[unspec 7] Now, from hence it appears, that Sprightliness, * 1.6 Subtilty, Readiness of Parts, and all that which commonly goes by the Name of Wit, is to be imputed to the Warmth of Imagination. Solidity, Mature Judgment, and Truth to the Dryness of the Understanding. The Imagination is Active, and Blu∣stering, and Busy; keeps all about it awake, and sets the other Faculties on work. The Understanding is a grave, sedate, and severe Action; The Me∣mory acts not at all, but is purely Passive; and the manner of these Operations, seems to be thus. In the First Place, the Imagination collects together the Idea's and Figures of Things, not only such as are present by the conveyance and ministry of the five Senses; but those that are absent too, by the As∣sistance of that Inward and Common Receptacle, called the Sensorium commune, where the Forms of them lie deposited. The Next thing in Order is to represent these to the Understanding (if that be thought fit) and then this Faculty takes them in∣to Consideration; examines, digests, and makes a Judgment of them. When That is over, the Ima∣gination lays them up carefully to be preserved in the Memory; (as a Man takes down a Memoran∣dum in his Table-Book) that so they may be con∣sulted, and made use of again, when any future Occasion shall call for them. Or if the Imagina∣tion be not so disposed, then she commits these things into the Memory's Custody, without refer∣ring them to the Understanding at all, and so the Second Branch of this Operation is wholly Super∣seded. Now this Account informs us, that the Acts of Recollection, Representing to the Intelle∣ctual Faculty, laying up in the Memory, and drawing out those Stores again for Use, are all of them Operations of the Imaginative Faculty. So that That Common Repository, the Internal Sense, (Reminiscence, as it is called) and Fancy, come

within the Compass of This, and are not (as some pretend) Powers of the Mind, distinct and separate from it. And consequently there is no∣thing in those Operations, that shou'd oblige us to quit the former Division, or allow more Facul∣ties of the Reasonable Soul, than the Three al∣ready insisted upon.

[unspec 8] The Common People, who (to give them their due) are very seldom in the right, have an high Esteem, * 1.7 and make a marvellous to do with Memo∣ry, extolling This insinitely above the other Two; The only Reason whereof seems to be, that this hath more of Shew, is more pretending and for∣ward, and makes a greater Noise in Conversation. Hence it is, that a Man whose Memory is well stored, is usually reputed a great Scholar; and that to pronounce one a Person of good Parts, you look no farther than his having a good Memory; as if Learning were to be preferr'd before Wisdom, which indeed comes infinitely short of it; and this Faculty from whence it is furnish'd, is the least valuable of all the Three; For it is consistent with great Folly, and insufferable Impertinence; and very rarely to be met with in any great De∣gree, where the Person excels in Understanding and Wisdom; for the Temperaments indeed from whence they result, are contrary to one another. From this vulgar Errour, I suppose the impro∣per Methods of teaching Children, to have taken their Rise; it being the Custom of Country-Schools almost every where, to follow them close with Tasks to be got by Heart (as they call it) that so they may be able to repeat, and quote things readily out of Books. Thus they stuff their Memories full, and load them with the Riches of other Men, without taking any care to awaken and whet the Understanding; to form or to re∣fine the Judgment: Which, after all, is the most

necessary part of Instruction, to shew them the true worth of their Natural Faculties, to draw out the Stores and Abilities of their own Mind, and by the Exercise and Improvement of their Home-Growth, to render them considerate, and wise, and qualify'd for all manner of Business. Accordingly we see, that many of your Scholars, which car∣ry all Aristotle and Cicero in their Heads, are mere Prigs and Puts, and incapable of any management at all; and, that, (generally speaking) the World is led by the Nose, and all the weightiest Affairs of Governments entrusted with Men of little or no Learning. Which yet no doubt is of infinite Advantage, and wou'd render even the prudentest and cunningest Politicians, yet more capable than they are, if wisely instill'd, and well us'd. But then they must not (as the way of the World is) value themselves upon Other Men's Wis∣dom; nor think it their Own, because they re∣member it; but make it so, by digesting what they read, incorporating it with their own Thoughts, refining and improving upon it, and knowing how to convert it to the Use and Benefit of themselves and others. But to return; All Wise Men have given the Preference to the Understanding; and ad∣mit it to be the most excellent and choicest Piece of Furniture belonging to the Mind. If this moves right, all the rest goes true, and the Man is wise; and if this be false, the whole Movement is out of Course. Imagination is the Second in Dignity; and Memory is the Last and Lowest.

[unspec 9] The following Similitude may perhaps contri∣bute something to our apprehending the true State of these Faculties, and the different Circumstances and Relations they are in, more perfectly. * 1.8 The Reasonable Soul then cannot be more painted to the Life, than by forming an Idea of it to our selves, as a Court of Judicature. Now in eve∣ry

such Court there are Three Degrees and Orders of Persons concern'd: The Uppermost and most Ho∣nourable Order is the Bench of Judges; and here there is little or no Noise, but a World of Busi∣ness and Dispatch: For they proceed calmly and quietly; and without any Hurry or Passion, try Causes, decide Controversies and Claims, make Decrees, and give the Final Determination to all Matters brought before them: This carries a very lively resemblance to the Understanding, which is the highest, the most honourable, and the judging Faculty of the Soul. The Second is the Bar, where the Council and the Attorneys are plac'd; and here is a world of Clutter, and Bawling, and Noise, but nothing done; for they can bring no∣thing to an Issue; They make no Orders nor A∣wards, pronounce no Sentences: All Their Busi∣ness is only to discuss Matters, to plead the Cause, and to lay it before the Judge. This is a lively Picture of the Imagination, which is a loud, a blustering, and a restless Faculty; never lies still, not even then, when the Soul seems perfectly bound up in the profoundest Sleep; but is eternal∣ly buzzing about the Brain, like a boyling Pot; and this can never six, or come to a peremptory Resolution in any thing. The Third and last De∣gree is that of the Notaries, and Registers, and Clerks; where there is neither Noise nor Action: It is no part of their Concern which way things go; they are purely Passive; and all they have to do, is to make Entries of what passes in Court, and to take Care that the Records be faithfully kept, and ready to be produc'd upon occasion. This gives us no ill Idea of the Memory, and its Office.

[unspec 10] The Action or Employment of the Soul is Know∣ledge or Understanding; * 1.9 and this is of Universal ex∣tent: For the Mind is a House open to every

Guest; a Subject ready to receive any Impression. As the Philosophers say the Primitive Matter is disposed to be moulded into any Forms; or as a Looking-Glass receives and reflects all Faces; so this Soul is capable of considering all things in∣differently, be they Visible or Invisible, Univer∣sals or Particulars; Objects of Sense or not, the Understanding is in at All. But (if we may be al∣low'd to argue from the vast, and almost infinite Diversity of Opinions, and the still growing Doubts upon this Matter) it is acquainted with it self the least of any thing. This Knowledge is but dim and indirect: It is attained by Refle∣ction only, and the Knowledge of other things brought home, and apply'd to it self: By which it feels, that it does understand, and thence infers a Power and Capacity of this kind. This seems to be the Method, by which our Minds attain to the Knowledge of Themselves. Almighty God, who is the Sovereign Mind, knows Himself first, and all things else in Himself: But Man, who is the last and lowest of all the Intellectual World, inverts that Order quite, and discerns other things before he can come to any Knowledge of Him∣self; for His Mind is in Contemplation of Other Objects, (like the Eye in a Looking-Glass) which cannot work upon it self without the help of a Medium, and sees nothing at Home, while the Vi∣sion is continu'd in a streight Line, but can do it by Reflection only.

[unspec 11] But the great Difficulty to be enquir'd into upon this occasion, * 1.10 concerns the Manner of Ope∣ration, and by what Method the Soul attains to the Knowledge of Things. The most receiv'd O∣pinion is that deriv'd from Aristotle, importing, That the Mind understands and is instructed by the Senses: That it is naturally and of it self, a perfect Blank, a clean White Paper; and that

whatever is written in it afterwards, must be di∣ctated by the Senses, and cannot be convey'd thi∣ther any other way.

But first of all, This is far from being Uni∣versally true; for, (as was hinted before, and the Point referred hither for a farther Disquisition) there have been great Authorities of Philosophers, that the first Seeds of all Sciences, and Vertues, and necessary Knowledge, are originally sown in our Minds, and grafted there by Nature; so that Men may if they please, live very comfortably, and grow Rich out of their own Stock; and, provided they take but a little care to cultivate and cherish the kindly Beginnings, the Harvest will not fail to be plentiful, and abundantly to reward their Pains.

Again; That Opinion seems highly injurious to God and Nature, and taxes them with unreaso∣nable Partiality: For upon these Terms the Ra∣tional Soul is more sparingly dealt with, and left in a much worse Condition, than either the Ve∣getative, or Sensitive, or any other Creature what∣soever: For all These, as hath already been ob∣serv'd, exercise their Functions readily, and are sufficiently instructed by their own Native Endow∣ments, in all things necessary for their Purpose. Thus Beasts apprehend several Things without Ex∣perience, and the Discipline of Sense: They make Inferences, so far as their Case requires, and con∣clude Universals from Particulars: From the sight of One Man they know the Humane Shape where∣soever they see it again;* 1.11 they are forewarn'd to avoid Dangers, even while invisible; and to fol∣low after That which is agreeable and beneficial to Themselves, and their Young: And wou'd it not be a Reproach, or scandalous Blunder and Ab∣surdity in Nature, if this Noble, this Divine Fa∣culty, shou'd have no Provision at all of its own,

but sent about a begging, and depend for mere Necessaries upon so mean, so frail Relief, as what the Senses are able to give?

Once more; How can we perceive that the Un∣derstanding shou'd go to School to the Senses, and be taught by Them, who are not able to teach themselves? What precious Masters are these, whose utmost Knowledge goes no deeper than bare∣ly the Accidents and Outsides of Things? For, as to the Natures, Forms, and real Essences of them, they know nothing at all of the Matter. And if This be the Case of Individual Substances, much less are they capable of penetrating into Universals, the dark and profound Mysteries of Nature, and all those things which do not affect the Sense at all.

Besides; If all Knowledge were deriv'd from the Senses, the Consequence of this (one would think) shou'd be, That They, whose Senses are the quick∣est, strongest, and most discerning, wou'd always be the Persons most conspicuous for Ingenuity, and Learning, and Skill in Reasoning. But we frequently see it happen just contrary; that such People are the dullest, most stupid, and most in∣capable of all others. Nay, some Persons have thought their Bodily Senses rather an Obstruction than any Advantage to their Improvement: And upon that Account have wilfully depriv'd them∣selves of them, that so the Soul might be more expedite and free, and do her Business without Di∣straction, when the Avocations and Disturbance of Sensible Objects were taken out of the way.

Now if this Matter be as I have represented it; you will ask perhaps, Why these things are not always perform'd by the Soul, and why not by every Man alike? What hinders that all should not be equally Wise and Knowing; but especial∣ly, why it shou'd lie dormant, without be∣ing reduc'd into act; Or, if it do act, how comes

it to pass that its Operations are not always equal, that it goes about its Duty feebly, and performs its Functions much more lamely and imperfectly at one Season than at another? This is the Case even of the Wisest and most Capable Persons; and some are so miserably stupid, that the Intel∣lectual Soul seems never to exert it self at all. Where it does, the Vegetative Soul is vigorous and active in Youth, and very weak in Old Age: It is then decay'd, and spent, and cannot repair the Losses of Nature, (those of Teeth especially.) Which yet it does with the greatest Ease imagina∣ble, in Children and Young People. The Reasona∣ble Soul, quite contrary, is evidently weaker in In∣fancy, and Youth, and cannot exert it self then, as it does afterwards in riper Years, and old Age: This also performs some sort of Actions in some sorts of Distempers, which it hath not power to do in time of perfect Health: and Others again there are perform'd in time of Health, which it is utterly incapacitated for, when the Body labours under a Distemper.

Now all these Objections are insufficient: For, First of all, They who hold the Opinion I am now contending for, never pretend, that the Facul∣ty and Power of Understanding is communicated to eve∣ry Man in equal Proportions. They admit a very great Inequality; from whence that Ancient and Noble Aphorism became so usual in the Mouth of Philosophers, That the acting Intellect is given to very few; and this very Inequality they make use of, as an Argument to prove that Science does not proceed from Sense; since it is very manifest, ac∣cording to what hath been urged already, that They who are most advantageously provided for in point of Sense, are oftentimes least so in point of Learning and Wisdom.

As to the Second part of the Objection, That these Functions are not always perform'd alike; The true Reason of this is certainly, The different Condition of those Instruments, which the Soul hath absolute occasion for, and constantly works by; for These neither are, nor can be at all times in the same Order and Disposition. Sometimes they are disturbed so as to be fit for no Business at all: And when they are not put out of their Course, by any accidental Interruption, yet, even in their Natural State, they are not qualify'd for all Business alike; nay they act in perfect Con∣trariety, and cross, and interfere with one another. To express this now in as few Words, and as clear∣ly as the thing will bear:

That Temperament of the Brain, which you have heard so much of already, is the next and imme∣diate Instrument, by which the Soul is assisted and determin'd in her Actings. Now This is exceed∣ing various and mutable; and at those Seasons when it serves well for one Function of the Soul, it obstructs and runs counter to another. In Youth it is Hot and Moist; and this Complication is extremely proper for strengthening the Vegetative Faculty; but it keeps the Rational one Weak and Low. On the other hand it is Cold and Dry in Aged People; and This is a convenient Temper for the Reasonable Soul, but highly prejudicial, and im∣proper for the Vegetative. When this Tempera∣ment of the Brain is soundly heated and refin'd by a high Fever, it is then accommodated to the Imaginative Faculty, and does Wonders in Inven∣tion and Fancy; but this very Condition disables the Intellectual Faculty, and is the most opposite that can be, to Mature Deliberation, and sound Wis∣dom and Judgment.

It is no part of my Intention, by all this Dis∣course, to defraud the Senses of any part of the

Commendation, which is their just due; but on∣ly to prevent their ingrossing All, and assuming more than their due. 'Tis confess'd, that the Mind reaps great Advantage, and is very conveniently served by the Senses; especially in the beginning of its Contemplations, the first Hints and Occasi∣ons, the Invention and new Discoveries of Things. But still we affirm, in vindication of the Mind's just Rights, that it does not depend upon the Sen∣ses entirely; that it is capable of Knowledge and Understanding; can reason and discuss Matters, infer and conclude, without the Senses: Whereas, on the contrary, all Knowledge proceeds from the Mind; and the Senses, when left to themselves, cannot make the least Progress, nor have one single Perception without it.

[unspec 12] It is farther observable, that the Mind proceeds in different Methods, and makes regular and gra∣dual Advances in the Consideration of Things. Sometimes it proceeds by the Addition and Con∣junction of Idea's: As first it conceives a Lion simply and directly, without attending to any of his Qualities: Then it adds the Idea of Strength to the former; and so having from some Effects had reason to believe that these will agree well together, and be true of each other, it concludes, that the Lion is Strong. This is what they call the Affirmative way of Arguing. Sometimes it pro∣ceeds by the Division of Idea's, which is what they term the Negative way. Thus it understands the Hare to be Fearful; for observing her to run away and hide her self, it concludes from this Timo∣rous Behaviour, that a Hare is not Stout. Some∣times again we come to the Knowledge of things by Similitude, and the help of Comparison; and of Others by a Collection of several Idea's, Ex∣aggerating and Amplifying these as we see fit. Other Methods there are, which need not be in∣stanced

in particularly, because any Man, from his own Observation, and what hath been already deliver'd here, may easily represent the manner of them to himself.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The Seat and Instru∣ment of the Soul.
• * 1.2

  How far the Reaso∣nable Soul is Orga∣nical.
• * 1.3

  Of the Tempera∣ment of the Brain.
• * 1.4

  But Three of them.
• * 1.5

  The Facul∣ties Sub∣divided.
• * 1.6

  The Proper∣ties of the several Fa∣culties.
• * 1.7

  The Facul∣ties compa∣red toge∣ther.
• * 1.8

  An Image of the Three Fa∣culties.
• * 1.9

  Its Opera∣tions.
• * 1.10

  The manner of it.
• * 1.11

  See Adv. upon Chap. XXIV.