Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. X. Of the Senses, which are the most Exalted and Noble Parts of the Body.

[unspec 1] THE Ordinary way of being conducted to the Knowledge of Things, * 1.1 is by the Assistance and Ministry of our Senses; so say the Schools, but it is not universally true. These are our first Instructers:* 1.2 All our Learning begins with them, and is at last resolv'd into them: We can go no farther back than they lead us, or give occasion for us to build Consequences upon. Each of These is supreme within its own Territories; and a large Dominion each of them possesses: An infinite Num∣ber

of Reflections and Notions arise from each; nor does any One of them hold under, depend up∣on, or stand in need of the rest: Thus the Power of them all is equally absolute, though some of them have a wider Range, and more Business, and a longer Train of Consequences and Instructions, than some others. Nor are we to wonder at This, since the Case is the same in other Instances: For a Petty Prince is as independent, as truly Sovereign within his own small Territories, as the greatest Monarch upon Earth in Kingdoms of the largest extent.

[unspec 2] It is a Maxim universally receiv'd, * 1.3 That there are but Five Senses in Nature; and that which in∣clines all the World to think so, is, because we can observe no more in our selves: But possibly there may be more, and some question may be made of it; nay indeed some probable Reasons may be offer'd, that there are more. But suppo∣sing that there are, it is certainly not in our Power to know it; nor can we possibly assert or deny the thing positively; For there is no way to disco∣ver the Want or Defect of a Sense we never had. Several Brutes enjoy all the Advantages of Life that are necessary to them, notwithstanding they do not enjoy all the Methods of Sensation, which Nature hath given to Mankind; and I see no Rea∣son, why an Animal may not subsist without any of the Five Senses, that of Touch only excepted, which alone wou'd supply the bare Necessities of Life. It is plain we live very conveniently with Five; and yet perhaps there may be One, or Two, or Three more in Nature, which we in no degree partake of. But, as I said, this is more than we do or can know; for each Sense is consin'd within its own Division, and can make no Discoveties, nor hath any Jurisdiction out of its own Compass. A Man Blind from his Birth can never be brought

to any Idea of Sight; nor can he (strictly speak∣ing) either desire it, or be concern'd for the want of it. 'Tis true, he will tell you perhaps, that he wishes to See, but this is spoke by rote, and according as he hears other People express them∣selves; for indeed he wishes he knows not what: And all it comes to at last is, that he wou'd be glad to have somewhat which he is told the rest of the World have, and himself hath not. The reason of all This is, Because the Senses are the Doors,* 1.4 at which all our Knowledge makes its first Entrance; and that which did not begin, and is not let in that way, cannot come in at all. Thus a Man is not capable of forming to himself a Con∣ception of more Senses, than those Five which himself hath, and consequently cannot persuade himself, that there are, or can be more in Nature; but it does not follow from hence that there can be no more, because he hath no Notion of any more. Who knows whether the many Difficulties which still remain unaccounted for in many of the Works of Nature, and the Operations of Ani∣mals, that escape the nicest Enquiry, and subtilest Penetration of Humane Wit, may not be charg∣ed upon the Want of some Sense, which we are not provided with to discern them? What the World usually expresses by the Title of Sympathies, Antipathies, and Occult Qualities, may have some Sensitive Faculties in Nature, accommodated to perceive, and make a competent Judgment of them; and perhaps our Ignorance of them is owing to our being desicient in this Point. Who can tell, whether it be not some particular Sixth Sense, which informs the Cock, when it is Mid∣night, and the first Dawning of the Day, and by some secret Impulse, puts him constantly up∣on Crowing at those times? The same may be said of that Direction, by which some Brutes are

led to such Herbs, as are proper for their Recovery, when sick or surfeited; and of many other such things as these, which are notorious Matters of Fact, but the reasons of them perfectly unknown. This is a Case in which we are utterly in the Dark; and no Man can be positively assur'd on either side of the Question.

[unspec 3] Some indeed have undertaken to give a Reason for this particular Number of Five Senses, * 1.5 and to prove that These are suflicient, by comparing and distinguishing them, and the Uses they serve. All Bodies (say they) without us, which are Ob∣jects of our Senses, are either very near and close to Our Body, or they are at some distance from it: If they be close to us, and still remain with∣out us, then they fall under our Touch: If they approach, and come into us, then they are the Objects of our Taste: If they are more remote, and stand before us, so that their Distances are measur'd by a Right Line, then the Sight discerns them: If the Line be Oblique, and the Motion Reflex, then the Hearing does it. Now methinks the Distinction were better thus: Of the Five Senses accommodated for the Service of the whole Man, as he is compounded of Body and Soul, some are appropriated to the Use of the Body on∣ly; and These are the Touch and the Taste; the One for all that enters within, the Other for that which continues still without it. Some again are first and chiefly design'd for the Benefit of the Soul, and those are Sight and Hearing; the For∣mer to assist Invention, the Latter for Improve∣ment, and Instruction, and all manner of Com∣munication. And One more in the midst of these Extremes, sitted to those Spirits and Avenues, that belong to Soul and Body both, which is Smel∣ling. Again, They answer to the Four Elements, and their respective Qualities; The Touch to the

Earth; Hearing to the Air; Taste to Water and Moi∣sture; Smelling to Fire; and Sight to a Compound of Water and Fire, because of the Brightness of the Eye. It is likewise pretended, that there are as many Senses, as there are General Divisions of sen∣sible Objects; and these are Colours, Sounds, Scents, Relishes, and a Fifth sort, which wants a Name to express it, adapted to the Touch, and comprehend∣ing all the Tactile Qualities, as Hot, Cold, Hard, Soft, Rough, Smooth, Sharp, and the rest of them. But This is evidently a Mistake; for the Number of the Senses is by no means adjusted, according to the Number of the Objects they are capable of. Nor are these Objects the Cause of their being just so many, and no more. Were this a good Account, it wou'd follow, that we must have been endu'd with a great many more than we now have; whereas now one and the same Sense entertains Objects of different Kinds; and one and the same Object creates a Perception, and impres∣ses it self upon several Senses at once. The most probable Account of this Matter seems rather to be, That the Senses were intended for Means and Instruments of conveying Knowledge to us; and that Nature, which, as she is not niggardly, so neither is she profuse, hath given us as many Sen∣ses as are suflicient for this purpose; and that when she had supply'd us with enough for our Use, she did not think sit to give us any more.

[unspec 4] Of These the Sense of Seeing does surpass all the rest in the Quickness of its Operation; * 1.6 For it reaches the very Heavens in an Instant, and acts in the Air, which is full of Light and Ima∣ges, without any Trouble or Motion; whereas all the rest of the Senses receive their Impression by the Motion of those Bodies which make it. And all Motion requires Time to be perform'd in; so that all the other Senses must needs proceed more

slowly than This, which need but open its Organ, and is sure to find Light and Colours stand always ready to be discern'd by it. All the Senses are likewise capable of Pleasure and Pain; but This is observable of the two grossest of them, That the Touch is capable of abundance of Pain, and but very little Pleasure; and the Taste, just contrary, feels a great deal of Pleasure, and little or no Pain.

[unspec 5] The Weakness and Uncertainty of our Senses is the Great Cause of our Ignorance, and Errour, * 1.7 and all sort of Misapprehension: For, since Knowledge is attain'd by the Mediation of the Senses only, if these make a false Report, what can we do but receive and stick to it? But after All, who can tell what Reports they make, or how can any Man accuse them of Falshood, since we learn all from Them, and consequently even That which gives us this Jealousie, and is the Ground of the Accusation? Some indeed affirm, That the Senses are faithful in all their Messages, and represent the very Truth; That, when we imagine they deceive us, the Fault is not in Them, but in something else; and that we ought rather to lay it at any other Door; for no other thing is so free from, so incapable of imposing upon us. Some again run into the contrary Extreme, cry out up∣on the Senses as downright infamous Lyars, and tell you, that nothing at all of Certainty can be had from them.* 1.8 But the Truth lies between these Extremes.

[unspec 6] Now, Whether the Senses themselves are de∣ceiv'd or not, thus much at least is evident, * 1.9 that they put a Cheat, nay sometimes a Constraint up∣on Reason; and that by an unhappy Vicissitude, Reason pays them back in their own Coin, and returns the Cheat upon Them. And is not Man, think you, like to be wonderful Wise and Know∣ing, when the outward and the inward Instru∣ments

of Instruction are Eternally tricking one another, and his whole Composition is full of Fals∣hood and Weakness in the most necessary and essential Parts of it? Now, that the Senses deceive, and commit a Violence upon the Understanding, we see plain enough in those Instances, where Some of them immediately put us in a Rage, O∣thers sweeten and appease the Soul, and Others again tickle and please it exceedingly. And why shou'd Men turn their Heads away, when they are let Blood, or lanced, or suffer Incisions and Burn∣ings, but from their Consciousness of the Power the Senses have to disturb their Reason; and that the same thing is better born, when the Eyes do not observe the Operation? The Looking down a Pit, or vast Precipice, disorders and confounds a Man, though he knows at the same time, that he stands safe himself, and cannot reasonably appre∣hend any danger of salling into it? And, to in∣stance in no more, 'tis evident, that Sense of Pain and Pleasure both, does every Day vanquish, and utterly confound the best and bravest Resolutions of Virtue, and Temperance, and Patience.

Again, It is no less evident, that the Senses on the other hand are cheated by the Understanding. This is demonstrated by those Agitations of An∣ger, and Love, and Hatred, and other Passions, which impose upon us, and make us see and hear things quite otherwise than they really are. Nay sometimes our Senses are not only deceived, but perfectly stupify'd, and bound up from all power of Action, by violent Disorders of the Soul, as if the Soul retir'd inwards, and were entirely taken up there; For thus it often happens, when our Mind is very intent upon somewhat else, the Eye never sees, nor takes the least notice of those Objects that stand directly before it, and present themselves to our View. And Reason and Sense judge very

differently of the Magnitude of the Sun and Stars, and of the Shape of a Stick in the Water.

[unspec 7] Other Living Creatures have a Share in this Gift of Nature as well as We, * 1.10 and sometimes are more liberally dealt with in it: For Some are quicker of Hearing than Men; Others have a stronger and clearer Sight; Others a nicer Smell; and Others a more distinguishing Taste. The general Opini∣on is, that a Stag excells all other Creatures in Hearing, an Eagle in Seeing, a Dog in Smelling, an Ape in Tasting, and a Tortoise in Feeling. But yet the Pre-eminence in this last hath been allow'd to Man; which is not much for our Credit, since This of all the Senses is reckon'd the grossest and most Brutal. In the mean while, this Reflexion upon what hath gone before, may not be unsea∣sonable; That if the Senses are the Means and Instruments of Knowledge, and Brutes have Sen∣ses too, nay frequently more acute and penetra∣ting than Ours, there may a fair Argument be drawn from hence, for Their partaking in Know∣ledge with us, as well as they partake of the Helps and Means that convey it to us.

[unspec 8] But though the Senses be the Instruments of Know∣ledge, yet are they not the only Instruments; * 1.11 much less are our own Senses alone to be consulted or depended upon in the Case: For if it happens that Brutes have from Their Senses a Report dif∣ferent from that which Ours make, and the Judg∣ment given upon that Evidence do consequently disagree with the Notions we form to our selves, (as in sundry Instances 'tis plain it does happen) which of these two Testimonies shall we believe? Our Fasting-Spittle cleanses and heals our own Wounds, and yet it kills a Serpent; Now from Two so different Effects, what Conclusion can be made concerning the true Nature of Humane Spittle? Shall we say that it is of a Drying and a Cleansing,

or of a Poysonous and Killing Quality? To make any certain Determination of the Operations of Sense, we shou'd do well, methinks, to agree with the Brutes, who have the same Faculties as well as We. But the least that can possibly be requir'd in order to it, is That we shou'd be consistent with our own selves, and that the same Judge, and the same Evidence shou'd always concur in the same Sentence. And yet even This we are not come to: Shut your Eye, and put your Fin∣ger upon part of the Lid, and this Eye so press'd sees things after another manner, than it does in the Natural and Common Posture. Stop your Ear, and the Sound is vastly different from what it is in the ordinary Impression: These Disseren∣ces every Man, when he will, may make for himself. But some there are which Nature hath made to our Hand: A Child Tastes, and Hears, and Sees much otherwise than a Grown Man; and a Man in his full Strength dislers no less from an Old Man; One in perfect Health, from a sick Person; a Wise Man from a Fool. Now where the Diversity and Distance is so great, nay, where there is even a Contrariety of Per∣ceptions, where shall we fix, or what can we de∣pend upon for Truth? Even One Sense contra∣dicts, and gives the Lye to another; for a Piece of Painting which seems Raised, and in Relief (as they term it) to the Eye, when we come to feel it with the Hand, is perfectly flat and smooth.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN order to giving the Reader a right Notion of the Matter treated of in this Chapter, I shall beg leave to detain him a little, with the Conside∣ration of these Three Particulars.

• First, What dependence may be had upon the Evidence of Sense.
• Secondly, Whence those Mistakes do really pro∣ceed, which we find sometimes charg'd upon the Deceivableness of our Senses.
• Thirdly, Whether All our Knowledge depends up∣on our Senses, so as that we can know nothing but by Their means.

I. As to the Evidence of Sense; This is what all Mankind, who have ever allow'd any thing of Knowledge or Certainty at all, constantly look'd upon, as the surest and most irrefragable in all those Cases, which are the proper Objects of it: And therefore He that went about to evacuate or weaken this, was esteem'd a Man not fit to be disputed with: Because one must needs despair of producing any better and more convincing Proofs, and so he must continue in incurable Ignorance, unless we cou'd suppose so absurd a Process in ar∣guing, as that a Man shou'd be persuaded of a thing more manifest, by a Medium which is less so. It were an Assront to Humane Nature, to en∣deavour the establishing this by Arguments, since none ever disclaim'd the Truth of it, but They who wou'd not allow us to be sure that any Thing was true; and consequently, cou'd no more depend upon their own Objections against it, than they cou'd upon the Thing they brought them a∣gainst. Therefore Lucretius hath very deservedly ex∣pos'd the Folly of such perverse Scepticks, in his Fourth Book.

Denique nil sciri siquis putat, &c.

He that says Nothing can be known, o'erthrows His own Opinion; for He Nothing knows; So knows not That. What need of long dispute? Those Maxims kill Themselves, Themselves confute: But grant This might be known, and grant He knew; Yet since he hath discover'd nothing true. What Mark, and what Criterion then can show, Or tell, what 'tis to know, or not to know? Or how cou'd He what's Truth, what's Falshood learn? How what was Doubt, what Certainty discern? From Sense all Truth and Certainty inferr, In vain some strive to prove that Sense can err; For that which wou'd convince, which wou'd oppose The Senses, must be surer far than those.

So that upon these Terms, it is evident all Know∣ledge must be given up, because if our Senses be false, we can have no stronger Conviction than what arises from Them, that any thing is true; nor that there is such a thing as Truth or Fals∣hood in the World. But besides, if it were pro∣per to argue in such a Case, any reasonable Per∣son wou'd find no difficulty in the Belief of this Matter; For if he only allow the Being of a God, and considers the mighty consequence of our Sen∣ses to us in all our Affairs whatsoever; it can ne∣ver enter into one's Head, that a Being of such Perfections wou'd leave his Creatures in perpetual Ignorance and Uncertainty, and give them such Organs and Instruments, as shou'd only deceive and confound them: For God indeed is the true Efficient Cause of all our Sensations, and the Foundation of our Certainty; and his Goodness and Truth are our Pledges, that we are not mi∣staken

staken, and always in the wrong, in the due Use of those Faculties he hath given us to distinguish things by.

Again: If we observe the manner how these O∣perations are perform'd, that it is by External Im∣pressions, by which the Object strikes upon the proper Organ, and that Impression is continu'd till it be carry'd on to that, which is called the Common Sensory, or the inward Seat of Sense; All this must depend upon the same necessary Laws of Matter and Motion, by which Bodies in general act upon one another. And therefore, supposing the same Object, the same force of Impression, the same Situation, the same Disposition of the Or∣gan, the same Medium, and the like; the Report of the Sense cannot but be the same: But where there is a Variation in any of these, the Perception is under a necessity of Varying too. Thus, (to use the Instance mention'd by Charron) When part of the Eye-Lid is press'd down by the Fin∣ger, the Rays are differently admitted into the Pu∣pil, and fall upon two several places of the Tunica Retina, which consequently creates a twofold Im∣pression of the Object: And This Duplicity is as natural and necessary in such a Disposition of the Eye, as truly agreeable to all the Rules of Matter and Motion, as a single Representation wou'd be in the usual Posture; so far from a Reflexion upon the Truth of Sense, that our Senses could not be true, if the thing were otherwise represent∣ed. A proportionable Difference must needs fol∣low in the different Modifications of Light and Shades; (which is the Reason of that Appearance taken notice of here, of Pieces in Relief) the dextrous Management whereof makes the great Se∣cret of the Art of Painting. So it is again, if there be any thing uncommon in the Medium through which the Rays pass from the Object to the Or∣gan

of Sense; which is the Case of Prismes, or of Eyes, either distorted in their Situation, or disco∣lour'd in any of the Humours: And as These make a Change in the represented Colour of the Object, so does the Contraction or Dilatation of the Pu∣pil, in the Magnitude or Figure of it. And the Eye, and other Organs of Sense, varying by Age, Sickness, Nature, or Accidents, unavoidably re∣quire different Sensations, in Persons of different Years and Conditions. The Matter coming much to one, whether the Object be variously represen∣ted through Distance, or its own Posture and Form, or through some Change and Defect of the Or∣gan, which receives the Impression. All Which sufficiently accounts for the differing Sensations of Children, Grown-Men, and Aged Persons; the different Tastes of the Sick and the Healthful; and indeed the vast Diversity of Palats among Man∣kind in general: For here is a mighty Diversity in the Organ of Sense; and the making one and the same Report is therefore impossible: For our Senses are like Messengers, and all their Business is, To be Faithful and True in delivering their Er∣rand, as they have receiv'd it. If it were not gi∣ven as it ought to be at first, (that is, if there be any accidental Defects to change the Appearance) This they are not responsible for; but they are to tell what they feel, and hear, and see; and in This they are faithful, and may be depended upon. For, That they may be trusted even in Matters of the greatest Consequence, is beyond all reaso∣nable Contradiction; not only from the most ne∣cessary and important Matters of Humane Life, being carry'd on upon the Confidence of this Te∣stimony, but (which to a Christian is much more considerable) from all the External Evidences of Religion being put upon this Issue. The Life and Death, the Resurrection and Ascension of our

Blessed Saviour, the Doctrines he taught, and the Miracles he did in Confirmation of them, being so many Appeals to the Senses of those with whom he convers'd, and the great Motive to Per∣suasion, which the Apostle urges, is, that he deli∣ver'd That to his Proselytes concerning the Word of Life, of which they had had all possible De∣monstrations, since it was what He and his Fel∣low-Preachers had heard, what they had seen with their Eyes, what they had looked upon,* 1.12 and their Hands had handled. All which was certainly a very weak and impertinent Allegation, if the Senses are so liable to Mistakes, and so uncertain a Foundation of Knowledge, that we cannot with safety fix any Conclusions from the Reports they make to us. And yet it cannot be deny'd, but Men do very frequently err by too easie a Credulity in this respect, which ministers sufficient ground for our Second Enquiry.

II. Whence those Errours do really proceed, which we find sometimes charged upon the Deceiveableness of our Senses. In This, as well as some Other Particulars, Epicurus seems to have been very unfairly dealt withal by the Stoicks, and some other Philosophers of a contrary Party; who, because he asserted the Truth of the Senses, and vindicated their Fidelity in Reporting, have charg'd him with affirming, that a Man cou'd not possibly mistake in forming Judgments according to those Appearances. Where∣as in Truth Epicurus only places the Senses in the Quality of Evidence, whose business it is to relate bare Matter of Fact, but does by no means deny the Jurisdiction of the Court to which those Ac∣counts are given, to pass Sentence as shall seem just and equal. To this purpose is that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which Diogenes Laertius in his Tenth Book menti∣ons; and Gassendus in his Comment upon it, so rationally enlarges upon. By which is meant,

that Men ought to avoid Precipitation, and not rashly pronounce, that things are in reality as they are represented; but calmly and slowly examine Circumstances, and observe the Causes of such Re∣presentations. Thus likewise Lucretius in his Fourth Book, after having instanc'd in several Appearan∣ces, which, when strictly enquir'd into, are found to differ from the Nature of the things themselves, closes his Account with these very significant Verses,

Caetera de genere hoc mirando multa videmus, Quae violare fidem quasi sensibus omnia quaerunt. Nequicquam. Quoniam pars horum maxima fallit, Propter Opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi, &c.

Which the English Reader may take from Mr. Creech thus:

Ten Thousand such appear, Ten Thousand Fees To Certainty of Sense; and All oppose: In vain. 'Tis Judgment, not the Sense mistakes, Which fancy'd Things for real Objects takes.

If then One Light appear to be Two, when the Eye-Lid is press'd; if a Square Building at a Di∣stance seem Round; if a Piece in Perspective seem a Cloyster or a Portico; a Man is not presently to conclude that these are really such; nor can he be excus'd if he do so. For Reason and Conside∣deration wou'd convince him, that these Idea's must be so, and cou'd not be otherwise; That the un∣natural Disposition of the Eye must needs double the Image in the first Instance; That the Distance of the Object will naturally cut off the Angles, and render the Perception less distinct, in the se∣cond; and that Shades artificially cast, and some Strokes of the Pencil or Style bolder and stronger

than the rest, will of necessity create Imaginary Protuberances, and imaginary Distances in the Last. What Course then shall one take to prevent Errours in these Cases? In general; he must not be too hasty in giving Judgment, but bring these things to the Test. The First must be viewed with his Eye in its usual Form and Condition; the Second he must make nearer Approaches to, and view it close at Hand: For the Third he may call in another Sense to his Assistance; and if the Eye alone cannot, the Touch must set him right.

But to this Charron replyes, and not only He, but Lucretius, That no One Sense can possibly cor∣rect another:

An poterunt Oculos Aures reprehendere, an Aures Tactus? &c.

What? Can the Ears convince the Eyes? Can Those Confute the Hand, the Palate, or the Nose? Tell them wherein they err, when e'er they miss, And give false Notices? Fond Fancy this! For Each a proper Use and Power enjoys, A proper Object every Sense Employs.

But after all, What is the true Meaning of this Argument, and how much does it amount to? No more than this. That All the Senses are not equally adapted to receive and distinguish all man∣ner of Objects: that Each of them is equally Faith∣full in those peculiar to it: And consequently, the Eyes cannot correct the Ear in Sounds; nor the Ear the Nose in Smells: But does it follow from hence, that when two, or more of these Evi∣dences are joyned, they will not corroborate the Testimony, and give a firmer Assurance? or that

Reason, which is the proper Judge may not sift out the Truth by confronting these Evidences against one another? This is a Construction whol∣ly foreign to the Place, and to the Philosopher's Design. And therefore (says Empiricus) as Physicians pronounce of a Disease not from One single Symptom, but from the Concurrence of several; and a Fover is distin∣guish'd, not only by the quickness of the Pulse, but by the Ex∣cess of Heat, the Redness of the Complexion, the Height of the Water, the Excessive Thirst, and other Characters known to the Skilful in that Art; So a doubting Philosopher makes a Judgment of Truth, by the Co-incidence and good Agree∣ment of several Ideas compar'd together. And to the same Purpose, Macrobius hath described the Pro∣cess sit for such Cases. If (says he) a Man sees the Figure of an Apple at a Distance, it does not pre∣sently follow that this is a real Apple; because this Re∣semblance may be form'd out of other Materials.* 1.13 What then shall he do to satisfie himself? Let him put it to the Tryal of another Sense, and judge of it by the Smell: But possibly it may have lain among Apples, and re∣tain the Scent: Then consult the Touch, and examine the Weight of it: But perhaps the Cunning Artificer hath been very Nice in adjusting this too; If so, let him have recourse to the Tast, and if he find the true Relish of an Apple; these concurring Evidences leave no reasonable Doubt of its being really the very Fruit it at first seem'd to be. From hence it does not only appear, what Care ought to be taken in judging the Represen∣tations of Sense; but likewise, how it comes to pass, that Men so often err upon this Occasion. That it is meerly the Effect of Rashness, and Negligence; and the determining more than we have Evidence for. For these Ideas, and Impres∣sions give us only the appearances, and external Accidents of things; and so long as we affirm them to Appear so to us, we are safe, and cannot Err. But if from these Accidents we shall

undertake to determine of their Substance and Na∣ture: if we shall definitively say, They actually Are, what they Appear, our own Mind misguides us; and the Fault lies not in the Evidence, which told us true; but in the Judge, who decides the Cause, without canvasing the Witnesses, and de∣clares That for Right and Truth, which was never pos'd before him.

My Reader will easily apply what hath been said here (perhaps too tediously) to what our Author insinuates of the mutual Cheat, in his sixth Paragraph of this Chapter. For hence it is that our Pannick Fears, and other groundless and violent Passions of the Mind, grow to such Exces∣ses, that they run away with the First Impressions, and never call in Reason, to calm and moderate the Disorder of the Spirits; but are perfectly trans∣ported in the present Heat and Agitation, and in∣stead of examining, magnify the tormenting Ideas to themselves. All which is in no Degree owing to the natural Defect, either of Sense or Reason; but to strength of Passion, and Neglect of such timely Remedies, as Nature hath provided us with, if not wholly to prevent, yet at least to abate, and soften, and reduce it to a convenient Temper.

III. I proceed now to the last Enquiry, Whe∣ther all our Knowledge depend upon the Senses, so as that we can know nothing but by Their Means. Here Gassen∣dus forsakes me, and fiercely vindicates that re∣ceiv'd Opinion of some old Philosophers, That no∣thing can come at the Understanding, except it pass through some of the Senses in its Way thither.

It is not asserted by those who undertake to maintain that Opinion, that nothing more can be known by us, than what the Impressions of Sense give us an immediate Perception of; but that we are instructed from Reflection as well as

Sensation; so that, by abstracting, enlarging, or o∣therwise modifying our Ideas, we come to under∣stand the Nature of things; yet so as that we can understand nothing, except the Ideas of it are en∣tertain'd clearly and distinctly; either so as to re∣present to us the thing it self; or so as to give us sufficient Matter for Reflection to work upon, in raising fresh Ideas from it.

• I. Thus it is, that they pretend to answer the Argument commonly urged against them, from that very Power we find in our selves, and the common Exercise of it, to correct the Errors of Imagination. For if all Perceptions of the Mind were Corporeal Images of the Brain, we must ne∣cessarily judge according to the Report of our Sensitive Organs; and so the Sun must be con∣cluded no Bigger than he appears. No (say they) for the Mind knows very well, that Distance lessens the Object to the Eye; and therefore reflecting agreeably to the Rules given in the former Par∣ticular, it pronounces the Sun vastly bigger than it seems. But still, All this will not amount to those Reasons, which adjust its Magnitude, to be 160 times Bigger than the Earth. Or, if they would, yet Proportions and Distances are meer Respects, and such as we can have no Corporeal Images of. These then are the Effect of another Principle; and so is the Determinate Magnitude of this Body; for though Inlarging the Idea, and allowing for Distance, would create an Image vastly Bulky perhaps; yet this could not state the Exact Dimensions, nor form the Comparison in such Odds, between that Globe of Fire, and this of Earth.
• II. Another Argument against all Knowledge pro∣ceeding from the Senses, is taken from Those, which are commonly call'd the Reflex Acts of the Mind, such as we perceive our Own Operations and Thoughts by: For all Ideas, which are intromitted by the

• Senses, come from Material Objects, and such Im∣pressions are subject to the common Laws of Matter; one of which is, To act by Impulse, and upon something else, but not upon it self. So that it is impossible for the Mind to have its own Image convey'd through the Organs of Sense; and consequently these sorts of Ope∣rations, by which it retires inward, and recollects, and views it self; As they are undeniable in Fact, so are they in all Reason to be ascribed to some other Power than Imagination; and such as the Senses and External Impressions have nothing to do in.
• III. But though we should allow, that the Mind (as some have contended, though they have not been able to prove it) can by Similitude, Ab∣straction, and such other Methods, form Ideas even of these things; yet what shall we say to the Case of Immaterial Substances? And that such there are, a Reflection upon our own Souls, the Objects about which they are conversant, their several Ope∣rations, and the Manner of them, very incompati∣ble with Matter and the Laws of Motion, will not suffer reasoning People to Doubt. Now if all Knowledge be derived from our Senses, it must proceed from such Ideas as are drawn upon the Imagination, by Impressions upon the outward Organ, conveyed thither in the usual Course and Method of Sensation; but these Impressions can∣not be made otherwise, than by Matter and Mo∣tion; and consequently, either we can have no distinct Notion, no assurance of any Immaterial Substances; or else we may have some Knowledge which does not depend upon, nor accrew to us from our Senses.
• IV. At this Rate, neither can we have any Idea at all, of the First and most perfect Being, God himself: For what Representations can Sense

• give us? what Reflections can it help us to, of a Being Infinite and Eternal, Independent and pro∣duced from no other Cause; such as hath the Properties of Self, and Necessary Existence inseparable from the Notion of it? It is not the Image of an old Man, nor the multiplying of Years into a vast Duration, that will do the Business here; for still the main Difficulty, of never Beginning, never End∣ing; Self-Origination, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 remains; and will for ever remain, not only incapable of a∣ny sensible Representation, but a Contradiction to them all. And yet Reason assures us, That such a Being, there certainly is; nay, that there needs must be; for without it, nothing could ever have been at all; but We must lose our selves and all our Ideas in a Maze and infinite Circle of Causes; and shall never be able to account for the Existence of any thing, which our Senses are confest to represent to us, unless we admit of One thing, which it must be confest, they never can give us any sort of Representation of.
• V. Once more. To come lower, and observe even Corporeal Substances themselves. Such as we see, and feel, and converse with every Moment. From such as these it is that our Senses are moved. But let us consider, What it is that moves them; or how far we can be informed by such Impres∣sions. Now it is granted on all Hands, that Sense can only instruct us in the Modes and Accidents of Things; and yet All thinking Men must allow, that those Accidents are not capable of subsisting alone. So that we can learn this Way the Powers and Properties of things, but not the Things them∣selves. Thus, while we are forced to make a Dif∣ference, between the Nature and Real Essence, and the Properties or Accidents inherent in that Na∣ture; we must yield plainly, that all our Know∣ledge is so far from depending upon Sense, that

• we cannot know any one thing by it. Since eve∣ry Man's Reason undeniably assures him, that there is something more intimate and deep, which no Ideas can reach to; and without which those Super∣ficial Qualities, of which he hath any Idea, could not possibly subsist.

Upon the whole Matter it is certain, that there must be some common Notices and Principles, such as evidence themselves to every considering Mind, which do not only assist, but carry us beyond any sensible Ideas, or any Reflections they can be im∣proved into: Concerning which, if my Reader de∣sire more full satisfaction, and would see this Ar∣gument illustrated at large, he will do well to con∣sult the incomparably Learned and Judicious Bishop Stillingfleet, in his late Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity. Chap. X.

I add only upon this Occasion, that the fore∣going Reasons are of good Force to prove, that the Humane Soul is of a more Noble Principle than Matter. For indeed, not only Reason, but Sen∣sation is not to be solved upon other Terms. Of which the Modern Philosophers were well aware; who, when they asserted the Souls of Brutes to be mere Matter, soon found an absolute Necessity of affirming, that they were altogether void of Sense too: For though the outward Impression be made upon the Organ, yet it is a Reflex Act, which makes the Sensation, and informs the Patient of it. And such Acts they have not been able to conceive, how Matter should be capable of. Since it is the Property of one Body to Act upon ano∣ther, but no Body can act upon it self.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Of what Consequence they are to us.
• * 1.2

  See Ch. xv. 11.
• * 1.3

  Their Number.
• * 1.4

  See Note.
• * 1.5

  Whether enough of them.
• * 1.6

  A Compa∣rision of them.
• * 1.7

  The Weak∣ness and Uncertain∣ty of them.
• * 1.8

  See Ad∣vertise∣ment.
• * 1.9

  The mutual Deceits of the Mind, and the Senses.
• * 1.10

  These Sen∣ses are common to Men and Brutes.
• * 1.11

  It is hard to trust our Senses.
• * 1.12

  1 John I. 1.
• * 1.13

  Saturn 7.14.