Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. VII. The First Part of Justice; or Those Universal Duties, due from All to All in Common. And first of Love.

[unspec 1] LOVE is a Pure, a Holy, and a Generous Fire, * 1.1 kindled in our Breasts by Nature; Its Primitive and Original Warmths were first discern'd in the mutual Affection of Hus∣band and Wife, Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters: But then, cooling by degrees as it dilated it self, Art and Human Invention found means to blow it up again, and supply fresh Fewel, by the Institution of Alliances, Societies, Fraternities, Colleges, and other Incorporations by which the parts of Mankind are cemented and united. Now in re∣gard

that These Artificial Flames underwent the same Fate with those Natural; and burnt more feeble and dim, as they were expanded and subdivided; as also, that their Heat is much allay'd, by the Mixture of Profit, Conveni∣ence, Delight, and such other Selfish Considerations; there∣fore to cherish and recruit this Fire again, Choice hath contriv'd to unite its scatter'd Forces, and contract them into the narrowest compass that can be, by the ferventest and tenderest of all Affections, that between true Friends. And This indeed is Love in Perfection; as much more ardent, and endearing, and refin'd than any other, as the Vital Heat in the Heart is more intense than than of the Li∣ver, or the Blood in the Veins.

[unspec 2] Love is the very Life and Soul of the World; more ne∣cessary to its Subsistence and Well-being (say the Philoso∣phers) than those two Servants which we cannot want, Fire and Water. The Latins therefore have given a good Inti∣mation of This, in terming Friendship Necessitudo, and Friends Necessarii: This is the Sun, the Staff, the Salt of Life; all is dark and comfortless without the Light of this cheering Fire; all seeble and tottering without this firm Support; all flat and insipid, till this Seasons and gives it a grateful Relish.* 1.2 To this purpose that Wise Man, * A Faithful Friend is a strong Defence, the Medicine of Lise; and He that findeth him, sindeth a great Treasure.

[unspec 3] Nor may we suppose this Virtue serviceable and necessa∣ry to private Persons only; * 1.3 or that the Pleasures and Charms of it are confin'd to small Numbers, and secret Retirements; Its Joys and its Beauties are equally, nay more ravishing and delightful, more useful and seasonable to larger Bodies, and publick Communities of Men. For This is the true Mother, the Bearer and Breeder up of Human Society; and all States and Politick Constitutions are maintain'd and preserv'd by virtue of her Influence. None but Tyrants and Monsters are jealous of, or have a dislike to it; not but that even They adore this Virtue in their Hearts, and have a secret Esteem for it; but because they themselves cannot come within the Verge and Benefit of it, therefore they bid it open Defiance. Love is powerful enough of it self to keep the World in order, without the Addition of any other Helps: And were it suffer'd to have free Course, and operate every where with its utmost Vigour, the ne∣cessity of all Laws would be quite superseded. For Laws were only a Resuge taken in to help at a dead List, and

as the best Remedy that cou'd then be found, to supply the Defect and Decays of Love; and the very End and Aim of these is to bring Men by Authority and Compul∣sion, to do That almost whether they will or no, which they ought to have done freely and out of Inclination, upon a Principle of Kindness. But still Laws fall far short of This in Point of Efficacy and Extent: For These can only take cognizance of Overt-Acts, and pretend not to restrain or make Provision against any other: Whereas Love goes to the Bottom, regulates the Heart as well as the Tongue and the Hands; purifies the Will and directs its Operati∣ons; thus sweetning the very Spring, whence all our Acti∣ons flow. Upon this Account Aristotle seems to have said, That Wise and Good Lawgivers have a greater regard to Love, than to Justice. And because in this wretched De∣generacy of Mankind, both the One and the Other of these are but too often slighted and defeated, therefore a Third Remedy hath been thought of, but That still less effectual in its Operations, and less valuable in it self, than either of the Former; which is Force of Arms; than which nothing can be more directly contrary to that first Princi∣ple of Love. And thus you have a short Scheme laid be∣fore you of Politick Institutions and Government; and by what Steps they grew, or rather indeed fell and sunk down into that Condition we now see them in. But still the first and single Principle of Amity is worth All, incompa∣rably above all the rest; as indeed it usually happens in other Cases, that the Second and Subsidiary Remedies ne∣ver come up to the First and Principal; for These are the Effects of Choice, and taken for their own Sakes; but Those the last Shifts of necessitated Men, who in their Ex∣tremity lay hold on any thing that comes next, and must be content to take what they can get.

[unspec 4] There is, it must be confest, * 1.4 great Ambiguity in this Term of Love, and many Distinctions have accordingly been made, which were but needful to give Us a true Idea of the Variety of Passions proceeding from it. The Ancients were wont to divide it into Four sorts, Natural, Social, Hospitable, and Venereal. But this Division so far as I can apprehend, does not do the Business; and therefore we will try another Method, and distinguish it these Three fol∣lowing ways.

First with regard to the Causes that create it; and They are Four. Nature, Virtue, Profit, and Pleasure; and these sometimes advance all together in a Body; sometimes Two or Three of them; and very often One of them appears single. But of all these, Virtue is the noblest Cause, and the most powerful; for This is pure and refin'd, and hath it's Residence in the Heart, the Seat of Love it self. Na∣ture runs in the Blood, Profit lies in the Purse, and Pleasure is consin'd to some particular Part, and works but upon the Senses of the Body, except at a distance, and by Reflection only. Accordingly Virtue is more free, and open, and pure, and firm in its Affection; for all the other Causes, when destitute of this, are sordid and mean, fickle, and of short Continuance. He that loves upon the Account of Virtue, can never be weary, because there are always fresh Charms to attract and entertain him; and if such a Friendship hap∣pen to break off, he hath no reason to complain, because the Breach could not have been, if all that was worth his Love had not fail'd. He that Loves for Profit, if a Breach happen there, is full of immoderate Complaints; but expo∣sed to very just Reproach, for having spared no Pains, and yet gaining nothing by all his Trouble. He that Loves for Pleasure, when the Satisfaction ceases, the Passion ceases too; and he takes leave of the Object, without murmuring or complaint.

[unspec 5] The Second Distinction relates to the Parties concern'd in this Affection; * 1.5 and of These there are Three sorts remark∣able. One proceeds in a direct Line between Superi∣oural, as between Parents and Children, Uncles and Ne∣phews; or Legal and Political, as between a Prince and his Subjects, a Lord and his Vassals, a Master and his Servants, a Turor and his Pupil; a Prelate, or Preacher, or Magistrate, and the People under his Care. Now, if one would speak properly, and go to the Nicety of the thing, This is not true Love; by reason of the Distance and great Disparity between the Circumstances of the Parties, which hinders that Easiness and Privacy, that Familiarity and entire Commu∣nication, which is the Principal Fruit and Consequence of Love; as also, upon the Account of that Obligation there ••es upon them, which leaves such Persons very little at their own Disposal in this Matter, and so takes off from that Free∣dom supposed in this Virtue, making the Affection rather an Effect of Duty and Necessity, than of Choice. And in

consideration of This it is, that we call it by other Names more suitable to those Engagements. Thus Inferiours, we say, owe Honour, and Respect, and Obedience to those above them; and Superiours owe Care, and Protection, and Vigilance, and kind Condescension to those beneath them.

The Second sort of Love, with regard to the Parties, pro∣ceeds in a Collateral Line; and This is between such as are either almost or altogether Equals. This again is Two∣fold, either Natural, or Voluntary. The Natural first, as between Brothers, Sisters, Cousins, and the like; which is more properly call'd Love than the Former, because there is less Disparity in their Condition, and so more room for Familiarity and free Converse; But then here is an Obli∣gation from Nature too, and that such a one as loosens or slackens that Knot in one respect, which it ties and binds us by in another. For many Quarrels and Misunderstandings commonly arise between these Relations, upon the Account of Portion, Inheritance, and that variety of Business and Interests, wherein they are mutually concern'd. Besides, that very frequently there wants that Similitude and exact Agreement of Humours and Inclinations, which is the very Life and Essence of true and entire Affection. I must con∣fess, he is an ill Man, or a Fool, but he is my Brother, or my Relation, are Complaints exceeding common in the Mouths of such Persons: But then there is likewise a free and vo∣luntary Love between Equals, such as that of intimate Ac∣quaintance, and Friends; which hath no other Band of Union but Affection only; and This is what in the strict and proper Signification of the Word, we call Amity or Love.

The Third sort, with respect to the Persons concern'd, is a Mixture and Compund of the two Former; from whence it follows, that each Ingredient having its due Force, this Composition ought to be much stronger than either of the other can possibly be alone. And such is the Conjugal Af∣fection between Husband and Wife. This hath somewhat of the direct and descending Line, by reason of the Supe∣riority of the Husband, and the Subjection of the Wife; and it hath a great deal of the Collateral Line too, upon the account that This is a Society instituted for Familiarity and mutual Comfort. An Intimation whereof Almighty God himself seems to have given us, in the first Creation of Woman, by taking her out of the Substance of Man, yet

not out of his Head, nor his Feet, but his Side. And thus married Persons do, and are oblig'd to exercise these two sorts of Affection in their Behaviour to each other; but each of them so, as may be most seasonable and becoming. In Publick, the Duties of the direct Line take place; for a Wise Woman will always be sure to treat her Husband be∣fore Company with Submission and Respect; but in private and alone, the Familiarities of the Collateral Line, and all imaginable Freedoms are to be practis'd. This Conjugal Affection is likewise twofold; and of a compounded Nature in another Respect. For it is both Spiritual and Corporeal; an Union of Bodies as well as Souls; which is a Qualifica∣tion peculiar to This alone, and such as no other kind of Love can pretend to, except That which is abusively and most injuriously styl'd so, and such as not only all wholsom Laws, but even Reason and Nature it self have always disallow'd and condemn'd. Upon these several Accounts then this Affection of a marry'd State is fitted to be ex∣ceeding great and strong, powerful and endearing. But yet there are two or three Rubs in the way, that check and cool it, and very seldom suffer it to rise up to all the Per∣fections of a just Friendship. One is, That no part here is left to their own Liberty, but the first Entrance upon it. When once they are in, they must even make their best on't, for there is no getting out again. The persisting and conti∣nuance in this Soceity is irreversibly bound upon them; and this Constraint is the universal Condition of all the best and most Religious, that is of all Christian Marriages; For in other Persuasions Men are left more to their Liberty, by the allowing Divorces, sinal Separations, and Nullities of this Obligation. Another (if the Ladies will give us leave to say so) is the Weakness of the Sex; whose Strength of Mind is not sufficient to keep up, and hold pace in a per∣fect Conference, and unreserv'd Communication of all a Man's Thoughts; and the Contemplations of a penetrating and judicious Mind. So that here is quite another Turn of Soul; it wants Substance and Solidity to keep the Knot right; and this Conjunction is like the fastening of one thing which is stubborn and inflexible, to another that is slender, and limber, and yielding; which for want of Strength to bear up against it, buckles under, and slips away from it. A Third Impediment to that entire Affection in a Conjugal State, may be imputed to the great Intricacy of Business that attends it; the Children, the Relations on both sides;

and a great many other Uneasinesses and Perplexities, which, tho' but an Accidental Inconvenience, and not constant and unavoidable, as the two former are, yet is frequent and considerable enough to deserve a Remark here, and too of∣ten disturbs the Happiness and Quiet, and cools the vigour of that Affection, which is the Blessing and Ornament of that State.

[unspec 6] The Third Distinction of Love concerns the Strength and Intenseness, or the Weakness and Remissness of it.* 1.6 With regard to This Consideration it is again Twofold. One Common and Imperfect, which indeed ought rather to be term'd Benevolence or Well-wishing, Familiarity, Particular Acquaintance: And this varies exceedingly, and may differ almost infinitely in the degrees of it, each of which may be more or less close, and intimate, and strong than other: The Other is Perfect; and this is a sort of Phoenix, few, if any one Instance of it to be seen in the World; so far from being practised by Mankind, that they can scarce form a tolerable Idea of it to themselves; or reach up to the Force and Excellencies of the thing, by all the Strength of mere Imagination.

For the clearer and more distinct Understanding of this Difference, it may be of some Service to us to give a De∣scription of each, and to confront them with one another; as for Example:

• 1. The Common may be conciliated, and come to its utmost Pitch in a very little while; but long Time, and great Deliberation must go to the Finishing a perfect Amity. Such Persons, according to the Proverb, must eat at least a Bushel of Salt together, before they can be qualify'd to con∣tract an entire Friendship.
• 2. That which is Common may be contracted and car∣ry'd on by an infinite variety of Accidents, which contribute to our Profit and Delight; whereupon a Wise Man prescri∣bed these two Rules for the attaining to it; That a Man should be entertaining in his Discourse, and obliging and serviceable in his Actions; for if the One of these do but furnish out Pleasure, and the other promote the Interest of the Persons with whom we converse, all that a Common Friendship pretends to, is done effectually: But now, That which I call a Perfect Friendship is never built upon such mean Considerations. Nothing less than the Contemplation and mutual Experience of an unfeign'd and vigorous Virtue can be Foundation strong enough for so noble a Super∣structure.

• 3. The Common Friendships may extend themselves to a great Number of Persons: But the true entire Friendship admits but of One Partner; and this is to all Intents and Purposes a Second Self: so that altho' the Persons are Two, yet their Hearts and Affections are One and the Same. And the necessity of confining such Friendships to Two on∣ly, is very evident from the Nature of the thing. For to suppose more, destroys the Notion, and obstructs all the Offices and Operations of it. For instance, To succour and assist a Friend in his Distress, is an indispensable Obligati∣on; but if we put the Case of Two such standing in need of our Help at the same time; and not only so, but de∣siring Kindnesses which are inconsistent and contrary to one another, Which way shall I turn my self; or how can I discharge my Obligations, when one of these is favour'd and relieved to the Prejudice and Neglect of the other? Again, My Friend imparts a Secret to me, What Distraction is here? If I reveal it, This is a Breach of Trust and Friendship, which obliges me to be Faithful in keeping what is thus de∣posted with me: But then, if I do not communicate it to my other Friend, this is Unfaithfulness too; for it is ano∣ther Law of true and entire Friendship, to unbosom themselves freely, and to have no Reserves from each other. Thus you see the Confusion and Perplexity, the Impracticableness and utter Impossibility indeed of more Friends than One, in the highest and most genuine Acceptation of the Word. And, no doubt, Multiplication of Parts, and Division, is, gene∣rally speaking, an Enemy to Perfection, as Union is a natu∣ral and inseparable Property of it.
• 4. The Common Friendship admits of Diminution, and Increase; it is subject to Exceptions, Limitations, different Modifications and Forms; it grows warmer and colder; and comes and goes by Fits, like an intermitting Fever; according as the Person is Absent or Present; as his Merits are more or less; and the Kindnesses he does more or less frequent and engaging; and many other Considerations there are, capable of making an Alteration in our Affections of this kind. But now, That Friendship, which is perfect and entire, is much otherwise; firm and constant to it self, even and steady: Its Warmths are healthful, its Temper regular, and all its Motions vigorous and uniform.
• 5. The Common Friendship admits and stands in need of several Rules for its Direction; several Wise Cautions con∣triv'd by considerate Persons for the regulating and restrain∣ing

• it, and preventing any future Inconveniences, which may happen to arise from Unwariness, and an unguarded Con∣versation. One of these is, To love our Friend so far as may be consistent with the Preservation of our Piety, and Truth, and Virtue. For even that old Expression of Ami∣cus usque ad Aras, implies this Restriction. Another is to love him so, as if you were sure one Day to hate him; and to hate a Man so, as if you were hereafter to love him; that is, To be prudent and reserv'd in your Passions and Affections, and not abandon one's self so entirely, or be so violent in either Extreme, that a Man should have just oc∣casion to repent, and condemn his former Behaviour, if, at any time hereafter there should happen to be a Breach, or any Coldness grow betwixt them. A Third is, To come into our Friend's Assistance of our own accord, and without being call'd. For it puts a Friend out of Countenance to demand his Right; and he buys a Kindness dear, when forc'd to ask what he looks upon as his just Due, and that which he conceives he ought to be prevented in. Therefore these Obligations are never fully satisfy'd, except we be always ready and early in our Courtesies, and, if that be possible, beforehand with his very Wishes. A Fourth is not to be troublesome to our Friends, by entertaining them with dis∣mal Stories of our own Misfortunes, and being always in the complaining Strain. Like Women, that make it their whole Business to move Pity, and are constantly magnifying their own Hardships and Sufferings. Now all these are very useful and seasonable Directions, fit to be observ'd in common Friendships: But in That more sublime and perfect one, there is no occasion at all for these; This disdains all Forms, and is above the Pedantick Niceties of Ceremony and Reserve.

[unspec 8] This is what we shall attain to a more just and distinct Notion of, * 1.7 by giving the Reader a Draught and Descri∣ption of Friendship in Perfection: Which is no other, in short, than a free, full, and entire Mingling of Souls through∣out, and in every part and point. To explain this now in Three Particulars. I say First, It must be a Mingling and (if I may so express it) an Incorporating, and not a Con∣junction of Souls only. For this gives us a Resemblance of Solid Bodies, which, how strongly and artificially soever they may be tack'd together in one part, yet do not touch in all; And not only so, but that very Ligament which joins them together, may be dissolv'd, or cut asunder, and each of these Bodies may subsist, and remain, and feel it self entire, after

Separation. But now in these perfect Friendships, the Souls of Men are entirely absorpt in each other; so confounded, as never to be distinguish'd, never to be parted again; like Liquors well mix'd, which can never be drawn off from each other. And That is the perfect, the universal Com∣munion of Minds, that entire Agreement of Judgments and Inclinations, which I rather chose to express by mingling of Souls, as a Phrase that gives us a stronger Idea of this U∣nion, than any Resemblance taken from Solids could possi∣bly do. Secondly, It is free, and purely the Work of Choice, a generous and spontaneous Act of the Will, without any Obligation, or distant Inducement, foreign to the Worth and Agreeableness of the Parties. For nothing is more vo∣luntary than Love; and so much of Constraint as you put upon it, so much you weaken the Affection, and take off from the true Nature and Commendation of the Virtue. Thirdly, It is universal, and without Exception; no Reser∣vation of any thing, nothing that can be call'd ours in bar to our Friend's Title and Pretensions. Estate, Honours, Preferments, Judgments, Thoughts, Wills, all laid open and in common; nay, even Life it self is what both have equal Right in. From This so universal and entire Com∣munication it is, that that those Maxims have taken place, of Friendship finding or making all equal; of Friends having no Property; and the like; such can no longer lend or bor∣row; they cannot give or receive; there is no such thing as Beneficence and Obligation, Acknowledgments or Returns, or any such Offices of Kindness or Gratitude practicable or in force for Their Condition. These indeed are the Arts and Methods by which ordinary Friendships are cherish'd and maintain'd; but at the same time that they are Te∣stimonies of Affection, they are Marks of Distinction too. Whereas, in this Case, it is as with one's own Self; and as a Man cannot be oblig'd to himself for any Service done to his own Person, nor owe any Gratitude upon the Ac∣count of that Kindness and Readiness to relieve his own Wants, which he feels in his Breast, no more can one true Friend be indebted to another upon any the like Occasions. Nay, even Marriage, tho' it give us the best, yet is even That but a distant and feeble Resemblance of the Divine Union we are now treating of. The Laws allow no such thing as Distinct Properties, and Donations betwixt Man and Wife. And therefore in Friendship could there be any such thing as giving and receiving, the Benefactor would be

That Person who made use of his Friend's Kindness, and so put it in his Power to do what became him. For the prin∣cipal Design, and eagerest Wish of each Party, being to snatch every occasion of mutual Assistance and Benefit; He who surnishes the Opportunity, and gratifies this Desire, is properly the Donor. Since it is to his Bounty that the o∣ther ows his greatest Happiness; for such is the Satisfaction of compassing his Desires, and effecting that which is incom∣parably more pleasant and dear to him, than all the Advan∣tages and Enjoyments in the World besides.

[unspec 9] Some few Instances there are of this entire Friendship, * 1.8 and unreserv'd Communication of Souls in ancient Story. When Blosius was apprehended, upon the Account of a mighty Friendship known to be between Him and Tiberius Gracchus, who was already under Sentence of Condemnati∣on for Seditious Practices; upon Examination what he would have done for his sake, he reply'd, That he would have stuck at nothing to do him Service. The Judges pro∣ceeded further, and asked, Whether if Gracchus had defir'd him to set the Temples on Fire, he would have comply'd with so Sacrilegious a Request: He answer'd again, That Gracchus was not capable of desiring so wicked a Proof of his Friendship; but upon supposition that he could, he should not have refused it. Now This was a very bold and a dangerous Answer. The first part of it indeed, that Grac∣chus could not entertain a Thought so impious, was no more than he might well enough venture to say; because, ac∣cording to the Account we have already given of this Mat∣ter, every Friend in perfection is not only fully acquainted with the Disposition, and all the Thoughts of his Friend, which sufficiently qualifies him to be responsible for them all; but he is absolute Master of them, and so can dispose of them, as much as of his own. But that last Clause of doing so if Gracchus had requir'd it, was idle and impertinent; for it does not in any Degree take off from what he had affirm'd before, concerning his Assurance of Gracchus not en∣tertaining any such Desire, nor make the thing one Whit better or worse. Now this Instance shews us the perfect Harmony of Souls, with regard to the concurring Judgments and Inclinations of such Friends.

The Second Instance relates to their Fortunes. To which purpose we read of Three Friends, (This Number of Three I confess is a Contradiction to the Rules here proposed, and tempts us to think that this Friendship, tho' very ex∣traordinary,

had not yet attained to all the Degrees of just a Perfection) But Three however there were: Two of them in very plentiful, the other in as low Circumstances, who had a poor old Mother, and a young unmarry'd Daughter, both lying upon his Hands. This Person upon his Death∣bed makes a Will, and bequeaths to One of his Friends his poor feeble Mother to maintain; to the Other his Daugh∣ter, with a Charge to see her as well match'd as possibly he could; and in case either of these happen'd to fail, the whole Care of both was to devolve upon the Other. A notable Legacy you'll say; and so the World then thought it; for every Body made themselves extremely merry with so odd a Bequest. But, while the World ridicul'd this un∣usual piece of Executorship, the Heirs themselves took the Administration upon them with wonderful Satisfaction; and each was greedy to get his Legacy into his possession. Within a very few Days after, the Legatee to whose share the Mother fell, happen'd to die too; and then the surviving Coheir, succeeding into the whole Concern, took particu∣lar good Care of the Mother; and, assoon as conveniently he could, enquired out convenient Matches for both, mar∣ry'd his own only Daughter, and that of his deceas'd Friend, upon one and the same Day, and divided his whole Estate equally between them. Now, according to this Case thus stated, as you see, it hath been the constant Opinion of the Wisest Men, that He who dy'd first, gave greater Demon∣strations of his Friendship, and was a more bountiful Bene∣factor, than either of the Survivors; that he really be∣queath'd them the most valuable Inheritance, by putting in∣to their Hands such occasions of doing good; and allowing them the Satisfaction of laying themselves out in his Service, as became their Character, and the Necessities of his own Family requir'd.

The Third Example goes higher still, and reaches to Life it self. And here we may reflect upon that well-known Story of two Friends. That a Tyrant had condemn'd one of them to die, and had appointed the Day and Hour of his Execution; but he with great Importunity obtain'd Leave to go and take Care of his Affairs and Family, upon this Condition, that he should give Security, and find one to be bound Bo∣dy for Body, for his surrendring himself again at the Time prefix'd; and in case he fail'd, then his Bail to undergo the same Capital Punishment, which had been awarded to his

Principal. The Condition was readily accepted, and the Prisoner produces his Friend to be bound for him, who accordingly was imprison'd in the other's stead. The Day of Execution came, and this Bondsman prepar'd himself to die with all imaginable Cheerfulness. But, as he was going about it, the Condemn'd Person came in, releas'd his Security, and offer'd himself to the fatal Stroke. This strange Genero∣sity made such Impression upon the Tyrant, that, much out of Countenance, and full of Astonishment, he was con∣quer'd into Mercy; set them both at Liberty, and made it his Request, that these brave Men would accept of the Proffers he made of his Kindness and Affection, and do him the Honour to admit him into their Number, and reckon that they had now a Third sincere and generous Friend.

CHAP. VIII. Mutual Faith, Fidelity; Perfidiousness, Secrecy.

[unspec 1] ALL Mankind are highly sensible, * 1.9 and unanimously a∣greed, that Mutual Faith is the common Band and Cement, by which Human Society is held together, the very Bottom and Groundwork of all Justice; and even those perfidious Wretches, who are the most infamous in practice, and delight most in Falshood and Wrong, cannot but acknowledge the Excellence of this Virtue, and that it is of infinite consequence to have it strictly and religiously observ'd.* 1.10 Nothing, says Tully, is more noble, nothing more venerable than Fidelity; for This is the Foundation of Justice; it knits Men to one another, and contributes as much as any one thing whatsoever, both to the Security of the Publick, and that of Private Persons. Faithfulness and Truth are the most Sacred, most reverend Excellencies and Endowments of a Hu∣man Mind.

* 1.11Eternal Truth, Sister and Twin to Jove, Glory of Men below, and Gods above; The vast expanded Globe's diffusive Soul, By thy fixt Laws, Sun, Stars, and Seas do roul. Firm on thy Base, and knit in Sacred Band, Peace, mutual Trust, and equal Justice stand. In Man thy Native Light is shed abroad, And every Breast is fill'd with a Domestick God.

[unspec 2] And yet, notwithstanding this general Consent in the Spe∣culative part, * 1.12 Men differ extremely, and in practice con∣tradict themselves. For the World is full of Treachery and Falshood; and very few shall we be able to find who are truly and entirely True and Just in their Dealings. Nay, even those who make a Conscience of being so, yet are frequently guilty of Breach of Faith, such as not only the World does not easily discover, but such as they them∣selves who commit it, are not sensible of. For if they can but six upon any colourable Pretence to varnish over such an Action, and give it a tolerable good Face; they present∣ly persuade themselves, that all is well, and they have done nothing amiss. Others there are eternally upon the Hunt for Niceties and subtle Evasions, by which to justifie their Proceedings; and here they retreat and shelter themselves. If the World take upon them to censure their Doings, or their own Conscience be either Scrupulous before, or Clamorous afterward, they cast up an Intrenchment of Distinctions round about them; and under this Covert go on, without boggling, or being asham'd of any thing. Now, in order to the clearing all the Difficulties that may arise upon this Occasion, I shall endeavour to set this whole Matter in its true Light, and direct Men how to behave themselves. And the whole, I think, of what needs to be said, may conveniently enough be reduc'd to Four Considerations. The Person that engages his Faith; the Party to whom that Engagement is made; the Subject-Matter, or the Thing covenanted for; and the Manner or Form of entring into that Engagement.

[unspec 3] First, As as to the Person engaging his Faith, it is one necessary Qualification to the rendring that Promise valid and legal, that he have Power to promise, and to make it Good; If he be under the Direction, and at the Disposal of an other, he is in no Condition to engage at all; nor is there any Force in such a Covenant, till it be ratified and confirm∣ed by the Person, under whose Authority the Promiser is. Thus God himself hath determined and stated the Matter at large, under the Levitical Law;* 1.13 where the Vows of Wives, and Children, and others in a State of Pupillage and Subjection, are declared of none Effect, till known and ap∣proved by their Husbands, or Parents, or Guardians. And the Reason of this is plain, because Nature and Duty have vested these Persons with an Original and Antecedent Right in those under their Care, which no After-act of such, with∣out Their Consent, can convey away, or disannul: They have nothing to give, and therefore they promise what is none of their own. Thus in the Roman Story, the Tribune Saturninus, and his Accomplices are esteemed to have been justly put to Death, notwithstanding they quitted the Capitol, (which they had rebelliously invaded, and possest themselves of,) upon the Consuls Word of Honour. For these very Consuls were Sub∣jects to the Common-wealth and Ministers of Publick Justice only; and therefore they had no Right to promise Indemnity, for Crimes against the State and People of Rome in general But, when a Man is entirely at his own Disposal, and cove∣nants for such Things as he hath an indisputable Right to make Good, he is obliged to keep his Word punctually, let him be otherwise never so Great, never so Absolute. The rather indeed upon these Considerations; because the more Absolute he is, the more Free he is to Promise, and the bet∣ter Able to Perform. And therefore that common Maxim is a very Just and True One, That the bare Word of a Prince, ought to be as Sacred and Obligatory, as the solemnest Oath of a Private Man.

As to the Person, to whom the Engagement is made, This is a Consideration, which makes but little Diffe∣rence in the Case; for let him be Who or What he will, it ought to be discharged. There are but Two Excepti∣ons which are sufficient to dissolve this Obligation, accord∣ing to the Judgment of Those who have discuss'd this Point. The One is, if he did not accept of this Engagement, so as to rest satisfied in, or place his Dependence upon it, but re∣quired some other Security, and rested his Faith upon That: For, as the Giving of Faith ought to be look'd upon as Sa∣cred,

so should the Receiving it be too; and Distrust in the one Party is no less a Disparagement to it, than Fallacy and Trick in the other. If it be not relied upon for the Sake of its own binding Force, the Confidence is lost and broke; and it ceases to be mutual Faith any longer. The demanding of Hostages, and keeping Men under Guard, and so entring into Caution, and requiring Pledges of any sort, is not trusting to Men's Truth, but to their Security; and it is Ridiculous and Senseless, to call This trusting to Men's Honesty. He that is confined, either by a Keeper, or a Prison, hath been false to no Engagement, if he make his Escape; nor can he be said to have deceived those, who ne∣ver repos'd any Confidence in him. Had such an one been left at large upon his Parole, or had he prevail'd with o∣thers to stand bound for his Appearance; Honour and Con∣science would have obliged him to suffer any Inconvenience rather than falsify his Word, or give up his Bail, or any manner of way disappoint the Expectations, and betray the Trust of those who depended upon him. And therefore the Reason of that Roman seems to carry a great deal of Force,* 1.14 Every Man is desirous to find Credit; and a Promise is then binding indeed, when an entire Dependence is repos'd in it; For Faith is mutual, it implies and requires Trust and Belief in the Person to whom it is given; These two are Relatives, and, as such, stand and fall together.

The other Exception is, If the Promise were con∣ditional, and mutual, and the Person to whom it was made, broke Articles first. For in this Case (say some old Au∣thors) Men are to be paid in their own Coin, and† 1.15 He that breaks his Word, gives those he deals with a Priviledge of doing so too; according to that Declaration of the Roman Senator; When you cease to treat me as a Member of the Senate, I shall think my self dispensed with from paying you the Respect due to a Consul. The false and perfidious Man hath forfeited all his Natural Right to Truth and Fair-deal∣ing; For the Obligations of this kind, so far as they are founded in Nature, are Reciprocal and Universal; and there∣fore, whatever such an one can challenge, must be from some Supervening Title. But whatever is indented for by Po∣sitive

Agreement afterwards, cancels all the Advantage, that might otherwise have been taken of his former Unfaith∣fulness, and makes it Unreasonable to revenge and reta∣liate it. These Two Cases are generally look'd upon, as Reservations from the general Rule of being punctual to one's Word; and we shall do well to give even these a Careful Censideration, for perhaps there are some Junctures and Occasions, in which They may not be able to bear us out; or at best, if it be our Priviledge to regulate our selves by them, it is not our Duty to do so; and a Man may sometimes see good Cause, rather to submit to an In∣convenience, and forego the Use of his Liberty, than to stretch it to the utmost Point, and do All, that in Point of Rigour he might well enough justifie himself in. But however; allowing the most that can be made of the Mat∣ter, where the Promise does not fall within the Compass of these Two Cases, no Consideration relating to the Par∣ry for whose Assurance it was made, can excuse us from looking upon it as Sacred and Indispensable.

• 1. For First,* 1.16 a Man is obliged to keep his Word with his Subjects, as will be proved and enforc'd more at large in the following part of this Treatise; and no Authority, though never so Arbitrary and Full, can set him above the Obligations of Conscience in this particular.
• 2. So is he likewise towards his Enemy; witness That so much Celebrated Act of Regulus, the Edict of the Roman Senate, against all those to whom Pyrrhus had given leave to go to Rome upon their Promise of returning; Witness a∣gain Camillus, who would not so much as reap the Ad∣vantage of another's Treachery, though he was to have had no part in the Fact it self, but sent the Children and their villanous Schoolmaster bach to the Falisci.
• 3. Nor have considering Persons thought themselves at Liberty to be unfaithful even to Robbers, and notorious Malefactors; for Pompey was punctual with the Pirates and Banditi, and Augustus was so to Crocotas.
• 4. As little Privilege to be false does any Difference in Religion give one, as is sufficiently evident from the In∣stance of Joshua and the Gibeonites. The safer and more honourable Way therefore, is never to treat, or enter into any manner of Terms with those whom we think unwor∣thy of common Honesty from us; to disdain any Capitu∣lation, and contracting any sort of Alliance with Wretches we pretend such Detestation to, is much more agreable to

• the Pretensions Men make to Zeal and Religion. And to Persons possest with so great an Abhorrence to Hereticks and Apostates, much may be said for this. Perhaps indeed, no other Reason but extreme Necessity, and the hopes of reducing them; or the Prospect of some very great and Publick Good, by amicable Accommodations, should be sufficient to induce them to plight their Faith to them; but if they condescend thus far, no question they are bound to stand by their own Act and Deed; for sure They that are good enough to be treated with, are sit to have the Terms of the Treaty made good to them.

[unspec 5] As to our Third Consideration, * 1.17 which respects the Mat∣ter of the Promise, if That be unlawful or impossible to be performed by us, we are absolutely discharged from the Obligation; And in all Cases of Injustice, the best thing we can do, is to disclaim and get quit of it; for the Performance would but aggravate our Crime, and make our Guilt double, by the obstinate persisting in it. All other Excuses, such as Loss, or Displeasure, Difficulty, Inconve∣nience, the Trouble, or the Expence of the Undertaking, are too Weak to pass Muster. And of this the old Ro∣mans have left us many brave Examples, who very fre∣quently* 1.18 used to forego very considerable Advantages, rather than be guilty of any thing, that might bring Truth and Fidelity into Question.

[unspec 6] The last Particular relates to the Manner or Formalities made use of in the Act of engaging; * 1.19 for, as all the Ways of binding our Consciences are not equally Solemn, so neither are all equally Obligatory; and therefore several Doubts and Controversies have been started upon this Point. Several Persons are of Opinion, that a Promise extorted by Force, and Fear, or obtained Fraudulently and by Surprise, does leave no Tye upon the Conscience: Because, in both these Cases, the Will hath not it's free Course; nor can the Judg∣ment act with that impartiality and clearness, which is ne∣cessary to the making a just Determination: Others again tell you quite otherwise; that the Will is not capable of being constrain'd; and though the Choice be not absolutely voluntary and free, yet there is Choice enough left to in∣duce an Obligation. Accordingly we find, that Joshua was far from thinking himself at Liberty; nay, that he was commanded to fulfil the Covenant made with the

Gibeonites; though perfectly tricked into it by Surprise, and a false Representation of their Case. The most I think that can be said, (if thus much may be said) in Favour of the Former Opinion is, That a bare Promise may be dispensed with in such Circumstances; but if that Engage∣ment were confirm'd by the Solemnity of an Oath, a Man must look upon himself to be bound by it: Bound, though not in Respect of strict Equity, and the Merits of the Cause; yet in Respect to the Name of the Just and Holy God, who was invoked as a Witness and a Judge upon that Occasion. But that a Man in such Cases may be very well allowed to seek any Redress or Reparation, which the Laws will give him, and which he hath not positive∣ly ty'd up his own Hands from requiring, for such Violence or Deceit. And this Resolution too seems to have some Countenance given to it, by the Method Jeshua took, who, when the Fraud was discovered, did not treat those Gi∣beonites as common Friends and Allies, but made them Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water; and though he spared their Lives, revenged their Falshood, and crafty Dis∣simulation, by keeping them under, and employing them in servile and laborious Offices. That the Formality of an Oath, and interessing Almighty God in our Promises adds to the Engagement, and makes it more forcible and bind∣ing, no Doubt can be made; for Breach of Faith is then a double Offence, and Aggravates that Unfaithfulness which is bad in its self, with the Addition of wilful Perjury, which is much Worse. But to think to tye Men up by new and fantastical Oaths, as some do, is altogether useless and un∣necessary; and so is the multiplying of common Oaths without some urgent and very important Occasion. For it is certain, that honest Men need not be thus dealt with; and those that are not so, will be bound by nothing we can devise. The best and most commendable Course is to Swear by the Name of the One True Everlasting God; and to do this with a becoming Reverence, and serious De∣liberation; as considering, that he is a severe Avenger of those who take his Name in vain; that they must give Account for all breach of Faith, and Trust; but especial∣ly, that he will be very rigorous with those, who by a most monstrous Hardiness, and detestable Impiety, take Ad∣vantage of the Solemnity of an Oath; and turn the Use of his Name into an Opportunity of deceiving the more effectually.

[unspec 7] For in Truth, if we consider the Matter nicely, it will appear that Perfidiousness and Perjury are more execrable Villanies, and higher Affronts to Almighty God, than even bold and avowed Atheism it self. The Atheist, who dis∣believes a God, acts more consistently with his own Princi∣ples, and dishonours him less, in thinking there is no such Being at all; than he who is persuaded, and acknowledges that there is a God, and yet in despight of his own Sense, and in defiance of the Divine Justice, mocks him, by call∣ing upon him to attest a Lye, and will not stand by what he hath appealed to that All-seeing Judge for the Confir∣mation of. Now he that swears with an Intention to de∣ceive, does plainly mock God; and shews that he is afraid of Man only, but under no Concern for what God can do in vindication of his injured Honour. And sure to be mistaken in one's Notions concerning God, is much more pardonable, than to be rightly informed, and fully convinced, and yet to trample all those Convictions under Foot, and put a studied Affront upon the Deity we confess, and pretend to adore. The Horrour and Absurdity of Falshood and Per∣jury, cannot be more fully and significantly exprest, than by that Character given of it, by One of the Antients, who calls this, The giving a publick Testimony of our Despi∣sing God, and standing in Awe of Men. And what can be more Monstrous, than to shew one's self a Coward with regard to poor Mortals, of the same Frailties and In∣firmities with our selves, and Hectors with regard to the Irresistible Vengeance and Power of an Omnipotent God? But, besides the horrible Impiety and Irreligion of such Proceedings, the False and Treacherous Man is a Traitor and Mortal declared Enemy to all Laws, and the very Being of Human Society: For mutual Confidence is the very Link, that holds all this together; and if once that Knot be untwisted or broken asunder, the whole Chain falls to pieces immediately. Words are then but Air and empty Noise; and yet by these it is, that all Commerce can only be maintained; so that when Credit can no longer be given with Safety to what People say, all Business is at an end, and no new Method can be found to hold them in.

[unspec 8] One Branch of this Fidelity remains yet unmention'd; * 1.20 which is that of Keeping the Secrets imparted to, and in∣trusted with us. And This is more troublesome than Peo∣ple commonly imagine; especially, when they are such as Great Men have either committed to us, or are concerned

in. Were the Difficulties that attend this Duty rightly con∣sidered, it would give a mighty Check to curious and in∣quisitive Tempers. For sure, that Man acts most prudently, who declines this Trust as much, and knows as little of this kind, as possibly he can: For he that thrusts himself under these Obligations, entangles himself in more Snares, and Uneasinesses, than he is aware of. For, besides the constant Guard he must keep upon his Tongue, that none of these Things make their Escape, he falls under a Ne∣cessity many times of lying or disowning what he knows, in a manner irreconcilable with Sincerity and a Good Conscience; or at least of evading it by such mean and little Shifts, as are very grating to a Man of Generosity and a Great Soul. This therefore of avoiding such Trou∣blesome and Dangerous Knowledge, is the first and best Advice. But if there be no Remedy, and Men will un∣lock their Breasts to us, notwithstanding all the modest Pains we are at to be excused, the Next Rule is, To be Faithful and Exact in the safe Custody of all committed to us under the Seal of Secrecy; and to this Purpose to practise a prudent Reserve in all our Conversation; Which is an Art, that every Man cannot be Master of; for it re∣quires something of a Disposition in Nature, as well as Art and Industry afterwards, and the Sense of that Obligation we are under in these Cases; Attendency to Silence, as well as a Custom of it: For the open and gay Tem∣pers are always in Danger; and They who affect to Talk much in all Companies, will be sure very often to say a great many Things, which ought to have been supprest.

CHAP. IX. Truth, and Freedom in Advising and Reproving.

[unspec 1] BY Truth here, * 1.21 I mean the venturing to say bold and unacceptable things; for free and cordial Advice, and Reproof is a most wholesome and admirable Medicine: It is one of the most noble and useful Offices of Friend∣ship; the best Argument, that a Man's Affection is Sincere, when he is content to run the Hazard of giving some little Uneasiness, in Prospect of doing a great deal of Good: For

it is Profiting, and not Pleasing, that every Friend should aim at; and one of the most important, as well as most ex∣press Commands, which the Gospel hath left upon us with regard to Conversation, is This; If thy Brother offend against thee, admonish him.

[unspec 2] There is no Man so perfect, * 1.22 so circumspect in all his Be∣haviour, as not sometimes to stand in need of having this Phy∣sick apply'd to him. But Those, who are prosperous and great in the World, seem to require it more than others; For there is somewhat in that Condition, which by natu∣rally disposing Men to a loose Gayety, and unthinking Heedlessness, makes it exceeding difficult and rare, to be very fortunate and very wise at the same time. But espe∣cially Princes, who are always in view, and curiously watch'd; who sustain a publick Character, and have an in∣finite deal of Business constantly upon their Hands; who are fain to take things upon Trust, from the Observation and Report of other People; and who are used to have by much the greatest part of what is true, and highly concerns them to know, conceal'd from them; These Persons above all others have very great need to be freely dealt with, and set right in their Proceedings: And they who are not so by the Persons about them, either run a desperate Hazard for want of it, or else are wise and penetrating, much above the rate of common Men, if they do well without it.

[unspec 3] And yet this Office, * 1.23 as necessary and useful as it is, is discharg'd faithfully by very few. For indeed, few are ca∣pable of discharging it; There being Three Qualifications requisite to capacitate Men for it. These are, Judgment or Discretion; Freedom or Courage to speak what one thinks; and Affection or Fidelity. All These make the Compositi∣on perfect; and all must concur, to give a Relish and due Temper to each other. But if Men had all these Accom∣plishments, yet it is to be question'd, whether they would put them in practice. So that the Difficulty is double: For very few undertake this ungrateful Office for fear of displeasing; and of those who have Sincerity enough to at∣tempt, few have Skill enough to perform it as it should be. Now This is an extremely nice Undertaking; and if ill done, like a Medicine improperly given, tho' never so So∣vereign in its own Nature, it puts the Patient to a World of Uneasiness, and is sure to do more hurt than good. The Effect of it is only to harden him the more; and thus Re∣proof

hath the same Operation that Flattery would have; only with this Difference, that the One gives Pain and Re∣sentment, and the Other Pleasure and Self-Satisfaction. For, as excellent and noble as Truth is, yet hath it not the Pri∣vilege of being always seasonable and becoming; but re∣quires a great many favourable Circumstances to soften and recommend it. For, let a Man's Intention and Mean∣ing be never so Holy, and the Substance of his Advice ne∣ver so excellent, yet there may be Faults in the applying it; and such as, that it were as well, and perhaps much better let alone.

[unspec 4] Now, * 1.24 That we may know how to govern our selves in so very ticklith a Point, I shall take the Liberty to offer these following Directions. Which yet are to be lookt up∣on, as calculated for such Persons and Circumstances, where something of Distance, and Ceremony, and a Fear of being offensive, may be expected. For, in case there be any intimate Familiarity, or particular Confidence; any Power or Authority in the Person reproving, that may set them above such Formalities, then all the necessity of ob∣serving these following Rules, is quite superseded. But They, who cannot pretend to the Privilege of an open and unrestrain'd Freedom, will do well,

• 1. To have a due regard to Time and Place; for a great deal depends upon the Nicking of these Two. For Instance, It should not be done at a Publick Entertainment, nor amongst Persons met together for Mirth and Diversi∣on; for This is to be very impertinent, and to spoil good Company. Nor is it seasonable, when we see the Party in some more than ordinary Trouble, Melancholy, and out of Humour, or under some very sore Affliction. This looks like an Act of Hostility, and barbarous Insulting; as if we took the Advantage of his Misfortunes, or Dejection of Mind, and only waited for an Opportunity to grieve, and teaze, and quite oppress him; when his Condition calls rather for our Comfort, and Encouragement, and Assistance. It is an Act of great Cruelty to chide Men in Distress; and Perseus King of Macedon was so incens'd at this ill Treatment, that he killed two of his particular Friends, for presuming to make this Addition to his Calamity.
• 2. It must not be done for all Faults indifferently; Not for such as are inconsiderable, and of no very ill Conse∣quence; for This savours of Peevishness and Ill-nature, and

• betrays too much of Eagerness and Delight in this, at best ungrateful, Office. A Man will be apt to tell himself, that such a Man is fond and glad of such Opportunities, and makes use of them, more to gratisie his own Spleen, than with any Design of prositing his Friend. Nor yet should it be done for very gross, notorious, and dangerous Actions; such as cannot but leave a Sting behind them, and the Enormity whereof he must needs be affected with, without our awakening his Conscience, or taking the trouble of working him up to a Sense of them. For he will be sure, upon such Occasions, to dread the Reproach and the Un∣easiness of an Admonition; and will fancy that we lie upon the Catch for his Fall, and labour to put him quite out of Conceit with himself.
• 3. This Admonition and Reproof ought to be private, that there may be no Witnesses of his Disgrace; for it is very grievous to be publickly expos'd. We are told of a Young Man, who was so overwhelm'd with Shame and Confusion at a Rebuke given him by Pythagoras, that he could not bear to out-live it, but immediately went and hang'd himself. And Plutarch delivers it as his Opinion, that the Provocation which enrag'd Alexander, and trans∣ported him to the killing his old Friend Clytus, was not so much any Offence he took at what he said, as the Rude∣ness of saying what he did before Company. More par∣ticularly yet, We must be sure to forbear all Liberties of this kind, before those Persons, whose Approbation and E∣steem, either the Person is ambitious and tender of, or the Character he bears renders necessary to him. And there∣fore it is not to be done to either Husband or Wife before each other; nor to a Parent before Children; nor to a Ma∣ster before his Servants, nor to a Minister or Teacher be∣fore his Parishioners or Scholars.
• 4. It should be deliver'd with a plain, easie, unaffected Freedom; somewhat that looks unstudy'd, and as it were by the bye: And, to be sure, without any regard to pri∣vate Interest, or the least Appearance of Passion and Dis∣order.
• 5. This is capable of being sosten'd a little, by including our own selves, and not seeming to confine the Blame to Him alone, as if it were a strange or particular thing; ex∣pressing our Sense likewise in general Terms; as thus: We are all apt to forget our selves upon these Occasions; One would

• wonder what Men think of, when they do such things; or the like.
• 6. A Man should always begin with the Commendations of something that is good or well-done in his Friend, and close all with Tenders of Service and Assistance; (This sweet∣ens and takes off very much from the Smart and Severity of the Correction; and makes the necessary bitter Pill go down more glibly) And then by comparing these things to∣gether, we may shew the Miscarriage more evidently; as thus: Such a Thing becomes you, and you do mighty well in it; I wish I could say as much of this: Or, Good lack! what a dif∣ference there is between such an Action of Yours, and such an one! Who could ever imagine that Pieces so unlike could ever be done by the same Hand?
• 7. It is likewise advisable, to express the Fault in Phrases as soft and gentle as we can, and such as fall very much short of the Enormity and real Proportion of the thing. For instance; instead of You have done very ill; to say, Sure you did not consider what you did; you were mistaken, or not well aware; or the like. Instead of Have nothing to do with this Woman, why should you ruine your self upon her Account? Pray never think of entertaing a Woman, who will certainly be the Ruin of you: Instead of desiring him not to bear such an one a Grudge; to beg, that be would engage in no dispute, nor concern himself with him.
• 8. Lastly, When the Business is over, a Man must not immediately leave the Party with uneasie Impressions upon his Mind; for these will but ferment there, and gall him; and therefore it is necessary he should stay with him till all that Uneasiness be got over: In order whereunto, he must con∣trive to turn his Discourse upon some common entertaining Subject, which may divert the present remembrance of the Reprehension, and bring them to part very good Friends, and in perfect Humour.

CHAP. X. Of Flattery, Lying, and Dissimulation.

[unspec 1] FLattery is a most dangerous Poyson to all private Persons, that drink and suck it in. * 1.25 But as for Princes, it is al∣most the Only, the Universal Cause of their Ruin, and infi∣nitely fruitful in Mischiefs to their Subjects and Government in general, by betraying them to, and supporting them in their Tyranny and Male-Administration. It is a Thousand times worse than False-witness: That deceives and mis-leads the Judge, it draws a Sentence from him, wicked and un∣reasonable in it self; but not so with regard to Him; for his Will and Judgment are blameless: They proceed ac∣cording as Matters appear in Evidence; and so the Man preserves his Integrity still: But here the very Mind and Judgment is debauch'd; the Soul is charm'd and bewitch'd, made incapable of improving in the Knowledge of the Truth, and utterly averse from the Love of it. It is a Rank and spreading Evil; for if once a Prince be corrupt∣ed by Flattery, and fond of it, there is a necessity that all about him, who desire to be well in his Opinion, and hope to make their Fortunes by his Favour, should turn Flatterers. For Interest and Ambition will not fail to make Converts enough; and the Rule these govern themselves by, is to study and practise what they see agreeable, and likely to recommend them most to the good Graces of their Patron. Whatever can be said to shew the Excellence of Truth, all That proves the Baseness and Deformity of Flattery: They who esteem and adore the one, must in proportion despise and detest the other; which indeed is nothing else but the Corruption and Perverting of the Truth. It is a pitiful mean Vice, the Submission of a poor degenerate Spirit; an Effeminacy and Weakness, as unbecoming a Man, as Garishness, and Affected Confidence is to a Woman.

* 1.26Not Friends and faithless Flatterers differ more, Than a chast Woman, and a common Whore.

Upon this Account Flatterers are compar'd to Strumpets, to Sorcerers, Poysoners, Publick Cheats, Debauchers of Man∣kind; nay, to Wolves, and Foxes; and a wise Author de∣clares it better to fall among Birds of Prey, and be Crow's Meat, than come into the Hands of Flatterers.

[unspec 2] There are two Sorts of Persons, who lie open to Flatte∣ry; and as they never want sawning People, who are al∣ways ready to offer them this Trash; so they for the most part as greedily receive and swallow it. These are Prin∣ces, with whom these Hucksters get into Credit, and grow acceptable by this means; and the Ladies, who are so mar∣velously delighted with hearing well of themselves, that the most usual and successful Stratagem for corrupting their Virtue, is generally thought to be the entertaining them with their own Commendations.

[unspec 3] It is really very hard to avoid the Danger of Flattery, and so to arm and strengthen our Minds, that they shall be proof against all its Insinuations. 'Tis particularly so to Women, by reason of their natural Disposition, which by a Weakness almost universal to the Sex, inclines them to be fond of Vanity, and greedy of Praise. And it must needs be so to Princes; by reason their Relations, and Friends, and prime Ministers, such as they must of necessity hold constant conversation with, are all bred up to this Trade, and value themselves upon being expert and dextrous in it. Alexander, who was so great a Monarch, with all the Philosophy of his Tutor Aristotle to Arm him, could not stand against it. And, tho' we commonly pretend to lessen and condemn Kings for suffering themselves to be thus imposed upon, yet there is never an one of us all, but, if we were in Their Circumstances, and perpetually laid at by Parasites and Sy∣cophants, as They are, we should be a Thousand Times worse than They. No Man of ordinary Condition can be a competent Judge in this case, because he cannot have any Thing like the Tryals and Temptations of an elevated Post. But, tho' Flattery, like Diseases, do not seize all Persons and Constitutions alike, yet contagious it is, and no Man lives utterly out of the reach of its venomous Infection. There is somewhat so agreeable, that even They who hate and seem most to reject it, conceive a secret Pleasure, and shut the Door against it so faintly, that after many preten∣ded Denyals, it is let in, and kindly entertain'd in private. That which adds to the danger is, that Men are tainted by it insensibly; for it is so cunningly varnish'd over, so

disguis'd with a Mask of Friendship, which it affects al∣ways to wear, that one cannot very easily distinguish between them. It usurps and invades all her good Of∣fices, puts on her Air and Countenance, calls it self by her Name, counterfeits her Voice; in short, observes the Tone, the Meen, the Readliness, the Zeal; so that you would swear it could be none but she. The Business of Flattery is to please, and be taking: It pays marvellous Respect and De∣ference, is very liberal in Praises, exceeding officious and eager to serve the Person apply'd to, and careful to be al∣ways in good Humour; or indeed in any Humour that prevails, and will be most agreeable at that time. Nay, to shew how exquisite the Hypocrisie of this Vice is, it goes a great deal farther, and ventures upon the last and highest, the severest and most dangerous Act of Friendship, and is free and full in its Expostulations and Reproofs. In own Word, the Flatterer's Care is always to profess and make himself believ'd much more sincere and passionate in his Affection and Concern for the Person whom he addresses to, than he is or can be to Him in return. But all these boasting and pompous Pretensions notwithstanding, there is not in the World any thing more destructive of true Friend∣ship: Ill Language, Affronts, open and avowed Enmity, are not in reality greater Contradictions, how different soever they are in Figure and outward Shew. It is the very Bane of all Sincerity and true Love; they are irreconcilable, and cannot dwell together.* 1.27 When once I am your Friend, I cease to Flatter; and when I begin to Flatter, from that very instant you may conclude me none of your Friend. And therefore that Observation is most true,† 1.28 That the Wounds and Strokes of a Friend are better and more desi∣rable, than the Kisses of a Flatterer. Those, tho' we feel some Pain in them, are yet well intended, and may contri∣bute to our Benefit and Amendment. These are soft and smooth, but full of Treachery and Mischief; and the End of all those kind Caresses, is to keep us un∣acquainted with our selves, and so to lead us hoodwink'd in∣to Ruin.

[unspec 4] Since therefore it so highly concerns us not to be mista∣ken upon this Occasion, and since the knowing these two so very contrary Qualities asunder, is no such obvious and

easie Matter; I shall endeavour to draw off the Vizor; and draw, if not the whole Face, yet so many of the Features and principal Lines of it, as that by these Strokes my Reader may be able to distinguish Flattery and Friendship from each other.

• 1. First, Flattery is always follow'd close at the Heels by private Interest and Advantage: This is the Scent it follows, and you may know it by the manner of Hunt∣ing, and the Game it pursues: But a Friend is generous, and undesigning; hath no By-Ends, nor is Self at the bottom of what he does continually.
• 2. A Flatterer is perpetually veering and changeable in his Judgment and Opinion of Things; like a Looking-Glass, that readily reflects all Faces, or Wax prepar'd to receive any manner of Impressions. He is a Camelion, a Polypus, never of one Colour and Complexion, longer than you determine and encourage him to it. If you appear to commend and love a Man, he admires and exalts him to the Skies; pretend Dislike, or Resentment, or Aversion, He tacks about streight, and is in with you There too; he censures, condemns, aggravates, as he finds You stand affected: For You are the Principal, the Substance, the Original; and He your Image, your Representation, the Shadow, the Copy, the constant Attendant and Mimick of all you are, and say, and do; affecting every Motion, and putting on every Shape, as he sees his Pattern alter. Whereas a Friend is firm, and uniform, and consistent with himself; For Truth and Reason are the Compass he steers by, and these are fix'd and unchangeable.
• 3. Another Mark to distinguish him by, is his Carriage; which is always eager, and officious to a great excess; and especially in such things as he is sensible will be observ'd, or otherwise like to come to the Knowledge of the Person he addresses to; and, as in all other respects, so is he particularly forward in his Commendations, in proffering his Service and doing every little thing that may look like Deference and Zeal. In all his Behaviour there is nothing of Steadi∣ness or Moderation; and yet, as fair a Shew as all this makes outwardly to the World, there is not any solid Bot∣tom, not one Grain of cordial Affection within. Now a Friend is the very Reverse of all This; an Enemy to Osten∣tation and large Pretences; and content, that the Sincerity of his Kindness should prove it self by solid and substantial Testimonies: Not at all the less disposed to act as becomes

• his Character, tho' he were sure that he should never be ta∣ken notice of, or thank'd for it: And therefore the Inte∣grity of his Heart and Intentions, often puts him upon stu∣dying secret ways of obliging; and, provided his own Duty be done, and his Conscience satisfy'd, he can very well abate the publishing his Endeavours to serve his Friend.
• 4. The Flatterer constantly yields the Prize to his Pa∣tron, declares him in the Right in all he says, applauds his Prudence in all he does, and this without any other De∣sign, but only to please, and render himself agreeable. Hence it is, that he over-shoots the Mark so much, com∣mending All without Distinction, and All extravagantly and in excess. Nay sometimes he will not grudge to do it at his own expence, and to lessen his own Desert, that he may magnisie his Patron's. Like Wrestlers, that stoop and bend, only to shew the Cunning of their Play, and mend their Hold; that so they may gain the Advantage of throwing the Adversary a fairer Fall. Now a Friend goes to work plainly and bluntly; Preference and Esteem are of small Consideration with Him; nor is his Design so much to please and minister Delight, as to bring substantial Prosit, and to do much Good; and what way this is done is of little concern to him; he is not nice and scrupulous in the Choice of Methods; but, like a good Physician, consi∣ders the Case and the Necessities of his Patient; and pre∣pares his sharp and painful, or his gentler Remedies, not according as they sute the Palate, but the Exigencies of his Friend. Recovery and Amendment is his End and Business, and all things else are indifferent to him, except so far as they may prove subservient to this Great Design.
• 5. Sometimes he will needs take upon him to rebuke his Friend, but he does it so very aukwardly, that a Man may easily discern This to be only a Copy of his Countenance; and that at the same time he puts on the Hardiness of a Friend, his chief Care is not to incur Displeasure by hand∣ling Matters too roughly. To this purpose he will be sure to six upon light and trivial Faults only, or some very excusable Defect, pretending himself blind all the while to those that are grosser, and much more obnoxious to Censure and Reproach. He will express himself with great Severi∣ty and Bitterness against Relations, or Acquaintance, or Servants, as if They were wanting in the Diligence and Respects due from them. Or else he will introduce the Li∣berty

• he takes with a Pretence of some idle Stories he hath heard, and profess great Sollicitude to be inform'd of the Truth from his own Mouth, that so he may be ca∣pable of doing him Service in a just Vindication of his Innocence. And, when his Patron either denies the Fact, or excuses himself, he will not fail to catch at this Op∣portunity of exspatiating in his Praise,

  I confess, Sir, says he, this was a wonderful Surprise to me, and what I could not prevail with my self to give Credit to. I was satisfied I knew you better; for how is it possible you should be guilty of any such Thing? I told your Enemies who taxed you with Injustice, that they, must pardon me, if I was peremptory to the Contrary. For who could imagine that you should invade another's Right, who are so far from insisting Rigorously upon your own? One, who to my Knowledge is so Gene∣rous, so Bountiful, so Charitable, could never, you may be sure, pass upon me for a griping or covetous Man. Such Jealousies, I said, might find Entertainment with Strangers, but with me, who have the Honour to be so well acquainted with your Virtues, they would all go for nothing.

  Or else he takes Occasion to chide him kindly, for having no more Care of himself, and exposing that Person so much, which is of such infinite Importance to the Publick; as one of the Senators particularly is said to have curried Favour with Tiberius, in a full Se∣nate, after a very nauseous and fulsome manner of Com∣plementing.
• 6. In a Word; I shall need to add but this One Mark of Distinction more. A true Friend always regards, and advises, and promotes that which is agreable to Reason, and Duty; he consults the Character and Circumstances of the Person; and observes what is sittest and most be∣coming; but the Flatterer spies out a blind Side, and strikes in with Pleasure, and Interest, and Inclination. So that no Man is so proper an Instrument for corrupting Mens Principles, and soothing them in all manner of Ex∣travagance and Vice: None so improper for the putting forward any thing of Virtue, or Difficulty; or Danger. Indeed he is like an Ape, that serves to none of those ne∣cessary Uses which other Creatures are assisting to us in; but seems cut out merely for the Jest and Diversion of Mankind.

[unspec 5] To this Vice of Flattery, That of Lying is very near of Kin,* 1.29 and usually goes along with it: And This is likewise of the same infamous Quality; a mean, and dishonoura∣ble, and rascally Vice. For what can be more Despica∣ble and Base, than for a Man to speak contrary to his own Knowledge and Sense of Things? The first and bold∣est Step toward the Corruption of Manners, is the banishing Truth out of our Discourse; as on the Contrary, the Courage and Resolution to be true, is, according to Pin∣dar's Account of it, the Beginning and Foundation of a Brave and Eminent Virtue. But, besides the Despicable∣ness of this Vice in it self, it is likewise highly Destructive to Humane Society. For we cease to be Men, and are loose from all the mutual Tyes, and Securities possible to be had upon one another, when mutual Confidence, and Truth, the only ground of it, is lost. Speech indeed is rightly said to capacitate Mankind for Society; but if once That be abused to Falshood and Deceit, Silence is a Thousand times the more sociable Quality of the Two. If a Lye indeed were constant to it self, and wore but one Face, as Truth does, then there would be some Hopes at least, and the Mischief were more tolerable; for we might depend upon it, that the direct Contrary of what the Lyar says is True. But alas! it is our Misfortune, that the Reverse of Truth hath a Hundred Thousand se∣veral Shapes, and the Space it ranges in is Infinite. Good, (that is, Virtue and Truth) is certain and circumscribed, staked down to One single Spot, and fixed beyond the Power of Variation, as there can be but One Way to hit the Mark. But Evil, (that is, Vice and Errour) is Infinite and Uncertain, and there are a Thousand Ways to shoot beside the Mark: For short or beyond, too high or too low, on this or on that Side, all are wide of the Matter. Without all Doubt could Mankind be made duly sensible of the Horror, and mischievous Consequences of Lying, they would be so far from practising or giving the least Countenance to such Wickedness, that they would set them∣selves to drive it out of the World with Fire and Sword; and think no Punishments too severe, no Methods too cruel for the utter Extermination of it. And This is a good Hint to those, who make the Education of Youth their Care, with what Vigilance the very first Tendencies to this Evil ought to be observed, and the Growth of it prevent∣ed and opposed. This should be their first Business, and

the Checking of a positive and obstinate Humor their next; and both these should be taken down betimes; for otherwise the Corruption of Nature will be beforehand with us; and it is scarce to be conceived indeed, how very early such rank Weeds spring, and how prodigiously they shoor, if not nipt in the Bud.

[unspec 6] But Men may be guilty of Lying in their Actions, as well as in their Discourse;* 1.30 for what else is all that Hypo∣crisie and Dissimulation, so generally practised in the World? This, I confess, is represented as an Accomplishment, and hath obtain'd the Character and Reputation of Complaisance and good Breeding. But yet, let the Men of refined Manners say what they will, it is in reality a Blemish and Dishonour, a mean Submission, and base Degeneracy of Soul, for a Man to appear abroad always in Disguise. To walk with a Mask, and not dare to shew his Face to the World. Let Men talk of Honour as long as they will, Honour can never be consistent with Dissimulation; and He that is an Hypocrite is certainly the greatest Coward, the most abject Slave.

[unspec 7] Now, whoever he be, that sets up this Trade, he will find enough to do to maintain his Credit, or his Ease by it. For a Hypocrite is under perpetual Constraint. And what a Torment must it needs be, for a Man always to appear Different from what he is really, and in his own Nature? What a constant Eye must he have upon every Word, and Action, what Jealousies of all he converses with, what anxious Fears of being discover'd and exposed? The Difficulty and Disquiet of concealing one's Temper, is a perfect Hell upon Earth; and the being found out is an intolerable Confusion and Reproach. If there be such a Thing as perfect Ease and Pleasure attainable here below, it is certainly to be found only in a Freedom and Openness, and Security of Mind and Conversation. And a Man had better let the World see the Worst of him, though he Hap∣pen to be something less in their Esteem for his plain downright Behaviour; than be always straining to coun∣terfeit some good Qualities which he hath not, or to keep some ill one's out of Sight. So Amiable, so Noble is this Frankness of Temper, that even Reputation it self, as valuable as it is, cannot make sufficient Reparation for the parting with it.

But, besides that this is a difficult and laborious Trade, it is a poor and paltry One; for most Men Break of it in

a very little while. Dissimulation cannot go very sat; It will be discovered at one time or other, and leave those that depend upon it, in the Lurch. It is a common Ob∣servation, and daily Experince proves it to be as true as it is common, that Nothing which is either Violent or Counterfeit continues long. Herein, Art and Force differ from Nature, that They decay by Time, and This im∣proves by it. And, when once such Men are detected, all they get by it is, never to be trusted afterwards; to have no Stress laid upon what they Do, nor any Credit given to what they Say. Nay, Truth it self suffers by this means, and can gain no reception, when it comes out of their Mouths. And how Despicable a Wretch is That, whose Authority is lost, and whose Example goes for nothing; whose whole Life is look'd upon as one continued Banter; and his most serious Actions are thought to smell so rank of Trick and Design, that they only serve to awaken Mens Suspicion, and warn them to be more upon their Guard?

[unspec 9] Now, this is a Case capable of being misunderstood, and misapply'd; and therefore, as there is some room left for, so indeed there is great need of Prudence and Mo∣deration, to prevent an Errour in the other Extreme. For if a Man's Disposition be crooked and deform'd; if there be any thing vicious and offensive to the World; this ought certainly to be kept in; or, to speak more properly, be brought into Shape: For there is a vast Dif∣ference between living easie and unconstrained; and being rude, and slovenly, and careless in our Behaviour. We should not take Pains to impose upon those we converse with; but we are not therefore bound to turn their Sto∣machs. A Man should not tell a Lye; but he is not oblig'd to tell all the Truth neither. That then, which we are to take Care of in this Point, is, to speak as much as is convenient, and to be sure that all we do speak be True; To distinguish between Twatling and Openness in Conversation; and in Behaviour between a Freedom consistent with Sincerity and Good Manners; and a Morose Indifference, which breaks through all Reserves, and declares War with all Decency and Re∣spect.

[unspec 10] There are indeed Two sorts of People, in whom Hy∣pocrisie is in some Degree excusable; I might say indeed, Necessary and Becoming; but the Reasons which vindi∣cate and uphold them in it, are very different from each

other. The First are Princes, who, as I have observed before, may sometimes be obliged to dissemble upon very important Considerations. The Publick Good, the Safety of their Persons, the Peace of the Government may require it; all these might be ruined and lost, if the Counsels and Methods that support them, were carried so openly, that every Stander by could see through, and pe∣netrate into the bottom of the Governour's Designs. And therefore, taking the Condition of the World as it now stands, so full of Treachery and Villany; it is no Dero∣gation to Justice or Religion to say, that Princes may be allowed some Measures in their Publick Character, which neither They, nor any other Man, is privileged to take in his private one. Would all their Subjects be Faithful and do their Duty, then indeed the Rules of Political, and Private Virtue would be the same; but now Men must be governed, not according to what they should be, but to what they actually are. And, as Laws, when made for the Reformation of Vice, suppose the worst of Men; so the Administrators of those Laws, must by their Wariness and Wisdom provide against the Worst.

The Second sort of Dissimulation in some Degree al∣lowable, is in Women; and the Reason that enforces it, is Decency, and the Gracefulness of Modesty and Reserve, in Their Sex more especially: For what would be inter∣preted Freedom and Assuredness in a Man, would in one of them be condemned for Impudence. And therefore the little Disguises in their Carriage and Looks, the making up their Mouth, and affected Ignorances, look pretty enough; and have a becoming Air of Bashfulness and Innocence: And besides, These do no manner of hurt; for they pass for Things of Course, and no body but Fools and Men ut∣terly unacquainted with the World, can ever be imposed upon by them. But This is a Trouble I might have spared my self; for the Sex are so naturally addicted to Hypo∣crisie, that it is very needless to recommend, or to instruct them in it. They are indeed a fair Outside all over; their Faces, their Cloths, their Talk, their Looks, their Smiles, their Tears, have all but too much of Art in them; and are contrived to make a Shew: Nay, which is still Worse, they do not only dissemble with the Living, but with the Dead too; The Long Veil, and the Dark Room; the Bed so many Days, and the Chamber so many Weeks; what are these but the Pomp and Pretence of Sorrow.

Appearances which all indifferently are obliged to make, whe∣ther for good or bad Husbands, in point of Decency, for∣sooth, and conformity to Custom; when yet there is so little at the Bottom of this composed Formality, and the Farce is so very Gross, that many of these disconsolate Widows have much ado to hold their Countenances. It was observ'd long since, that* 1.31 Counterfeit Grief is always most Ambitious to shew it self; and a Man would almost be tempted to suspect, that all those Solemn Fopperies, a∣bove the Reasonable and comely Expressions of Grief, were invented to make out in Ostenation, what was wam∣ing in the Reality of their Concern.

CHAP. XI. Of Beneficence and Gratitude.

THE Art of doing and receiving Good Offices, as That Respects the Beneficence of the Donor, and the Obligation and Gratitude in the Person to whom they are done, is a Subject of great Compass, and Extent; of great Use, but withal of much Intricacy, and Difficulty. There is not any one Instance, in which Men are more Deficient. Very few know, either how to oblige, or how to be obliged, as becomes them. It looks as if Goodness, and Desert, and Gratitude were in the Declension; and Re∣venge and Ingratitude in the Ascendent; as if Those were a Loss and Diminution, and These a Gain and Privilege; so eager and zealous we are generally in the former, so so very cold and indifferent, so averse indeed to the lat∣ter. Thus Tacitus observes, that† 1.32 Thanks are reputed Trou∣ble, but Revenge an Advantage; and Seneta, That Injuries and Affronts make much deeper Impression than Favours and Kindness. We will therefore endeavour at present to cor∣rect and redress this so common Defect; (or Corruption rather,) of Mankind; by treating at present, First of Be∣neficence, under which I comprehend Humanity, Liberali∣ty,

Charity or Relief of the Poor and Distressed; and of their Contraries, Inhumanity, Niggardliness, Want of Com∣passion: And then Secondly, of the Obligation, the Gra∣titude of the Receiver, or the Neglect, and Ingratitude after such Kindnesses received.

[unspec 1] Which Way soever we turn our Eyes, they are every where presented with Arguments and Instances,* 1.33 for the Exercise of Kindness, and Beneficence. God, and Nature, and Universal Reason, and Equity, All joyn in their In∣vitations to it, In God, whether we consider his Effence, or his Providence, what he is, and what he does, we see nothing but Goodness; for He is the very Perfection of it, Goodness it self; and That not a speculative and un∣profirable Excellence, but the most diffusive and com∣municative Goodness; and* 1.34 of all the Resomblances and Imitations of the Divinity that Human Nature is capable of, the nearest Approach we can make toward him is in this Particular; as Tully very justly observed. And Pliny; when one Man succors another, he does an Act more than Human, and becomes as it were a God to his Brother. The Inducements, which Nature furnishes us with, are many. Such as, The sensible Satisfaction a Man feels in seeing the Person whom he hath obliged; the Consideration, that he is a Person of the same Condition with himself, cast in the same Mould, wrought up of the same Materials, a Transcript of the same Original; For† 1.35 nothing is so a∣greable to the Dictates of Nature, as to assist one who is a Partaker of the same Nature; It is a Generous and Noble Act; worthy a Person of Honour and Virtue, to be use∣ful and beneficial to others, to embrace and improve, nay, to seek Opportunities of being so. For the⁂ 1.36 Liberal Man does not content himself with taking them when they come in his Way; but he goes out to meet, and takes Pains to find them. And it is an old Adage, that Truly Noble Blood will neither let a Man tell a Lye, nor be want∣ing good Offices, where they are Seasonable. There is somewhat of Greatness and commendable Pride in doing Kindnesses, as there is of Meanness in having them done

to us; and this may be one convenient Sense of that Say∣ing, which St. Paul ascribes to our Saviour; It is more Bles∣sed to give than to receive. He that gives, gets himself Honour, and gains an Advantage; he becomes Master of the Receiver, and acquires a Right in him; as on the other hand, the Receiver sells his Freedom, and is no longer at his own disposal. The First Inventer of Good Offices, (says one with Ingenuity enough) contrived the strongest Fet∣ters that ever were, to bind and captivate Mankind. Upon this Account several People have refused to accept of Kind∣nesses, because they would not suffer their Liberty to be entrenched upon; and particularly, if the Person confer∣ring the Favour were one, whom they had no Kindness for, and did not care to be obliged to. For which Rea∣son it is, that the old Philosophers forbid us to receive any Kindnesses from ill Men, because in so doing we let them get a Hank upon us. Caesar used to say, that no Musick was so charming in his Ears, as the Requests of his Friends, and the Supplications of those in want. The Motto of Greatness is, Ask me. And that Command and Promise gives us a Noble Idea of the Majesty of God, Call up∣on me in the time of Trouble;* 1.37 so will I hoar thee, and thou shalt glorifie me. This is likewise the most Honourable way of employing our Power and Plenty; which, while we keep by us, and in our own private Possession, are called by the mean Names, of Houses, and Lands, and Money; but when drawn out into Use, and expended to the Benefit of our Brethren, they are dignified with new and August Titles; and from thenceforth commence Good Actions, Liberality, Magnificence, Alms, and Treasures in Heaven. Nay it is not only the most Honourable, but the most prudent and profitable Method of trafficking with them;* 1.38 the gainfullest of all Arts, the best and least hazar∣dous Way of Merchandise; for here the Principal is secu∣red, and the Interest arising upon it rises exceeding high. And, to say the very truth, no part of what we have is so properly our Own, none turns to such a prodigious Increase, so comfortable Account, as that which we expend upon good Uses. What lies by us is lock'd up, and hid pri∣vately; it lies and wasts; or at least it never grows upon our Hands; and it is sure to give us the Slip at last, either by some of those infinite Accidents, by which all such Things

are liable to be snatch'd from Us; or by that certain and inevitable Separation, by which Death will shortly snarch Us away from Them. But so much of these as is thus put out, can never fail, never be wrested from us; never rust, or decay, or lie buried in Unprofitableness. Hence it was, that Mark Anthony, when deprest, and at an Ebb of Fortune so low, that he had nothing but Death lest at his own Disposal, cryed out, that* 1.39 he had lost All, except what he had given away. And thus you see, what a brave, and noble, and becoming Temper, this Compassionate, and good Natured Frame of Soul is; how worthily a ready Inclination to do Good to all the World, attracts the Love and Admiration of all that consider it; How Amiable and Engaging, how Powerful and Irresistible the Charms of Generosity are. As indeed, on the other Hand, nothing is so Mean and Sneaking, so Detestable and Despicable, so Deformed and Unnatural, as Hard-heartedness, and Insen∣sibility of other Peoples Misfortunes; It is therefore de∣servedly styled Inhumanity; to intimate by that Name, that such People are Monsters, and not Men. And, as the Vices themselves, so the Source and Causes of them stand in direct Opposition to each other. For, as Beneficence springs from Greatness and Gallantry of Spirit, so unreaso∣nable Parsimony and Hard-heartedness is the Spawn of Cowardice, and Brutish Degeneracy of Soul.

[unspec 2] Now, there are two ways of becoming Beneficial to our Neighbours; either as we minister to their Profit, * 1.40 or to their Pleasure. The First procures us Admiration and Esteem; the Second Love, and good Will. The First is much more valuable, because it regards Mens Necessities and Distresses; it is acting the Part of a Tender Father, and a True Friend. There is likewise a Difference in these Acts of Kindness themselves; Some are due from us, such as the Laws of Nature, or positive Institution require at our Hands; Others are free, and what we are under no express Obligation for, but the Effect of pure Choice, and Love. The Latter of these Two sorts, seem to be more Brave and Generous; But yet the Former too, when dis∣charged with Application, and Prudence, and sincere Af∣fection, are very Excellent and Commendable, though they have the Nature of a Debt, and are such as we cannot be faithful to our Duty, and dispense with our selves in.

[unspec 3] Now the true Beneficence or Kindness is not properly in the Gift it self, * 1.41 that which a Man sees, and feels, and tasts; this is too gross a Notion; and all we that can allow, is that These are the Matter, the Signs, and the Demonstrations of our Kindness; but the Thing it self is the Disposition and good Heart. The Outward and visible part may be very small and inconsiderable; and yet that within may at the same time be wondrous great. For This may have pro∣ceeded from an exceeding Eagerness and Affection; a hun∣ger and thirst of doing good; watching, and contriving, and seeking Occasions for it; and esteeming such Actions in our Saviour's Terms, One's Meat and Drink; snatching them as greedily, and receiving as sensible a Satisfaction and De∣light from them, as from the most necessary Refreshments, by which this Life of ours is sustain'd. A Man may have given to the very utmost of his Ability, and by this means exhaust that little Store, which is scarce sufficient for his own Occasions; or he may part with that which is parti∣cularly valuable and dear to him. These are the Conside∣rations, that enhanced the value of the Widow's Mite; and render'd one small piece of Money, not equal only, but far superiour to all the large Donations of the Rich Contributors. And thus Heathen Authors have likewise concurr'd in their Estimate of good Works.* 1.42 In every Be∣nefit, say they, we are to have a more than ordinary respect to that, which a Man by relieving his Neighbour, streightens him∣self in; and for the sake of another's Convenience and Advan∣tage, postpones and forgets his own. On the other Hand, where the Gift it self is large, the Obligation may be very small; and indeed, in great Gifts there are some Circum∣stances, which most commonly make it so. For such are bestow'd frequently with Unwillingness and Reluctancy: They expect to be much intreated, and long attended for them, and take time to consider, whether they shall bestow them or not: Now This hath too much of Pomp and For∣mality in it; such a Man is desirous to magnifie his own Bounty; and after all, he gives more to gratifie his own Vanity and Ambition, than to supply the Necessities of them that want; and so Himself is the Giver and Recei∣ver both. But that which gives another very just Prefe∣rence in the Case before us, is. That the External Benefit may

be presently wrested from us again; or if not by Fraud and Force, yet it may be spent, or lost; it may decay upon our Hands, and in process of time vanish quite; but the inward Disposition, with which it was conferred, is permanent and firm. The Liberty, or the Health, the Wealth, or Honour, or Preferment bestow'd upon us, may by some fresh Acci∣dent be lost in an instant; but still the Kindness and the Ob∣ligation remains entire.

[unspec 4] Now the Directions, by which a Man may do well to govern himself in the exercise of this excellent Virtue, * 1.43 are such as follow.

First, With regard to the Persons; who are the proper Objects of our Liberality, and whether it be fit to extend it to All, as their Wants, and our own Abilities furnish Op∣portunities for it. This is a very reasonable Enquiry, and highly necessary to be resolv'd; because, by doing good to wicked Men, and such as do not deserve our Kindness, a Man may seem to be guilty of a great many Faults at once. This derives Censure and an ill Name upon the Do∣nor, and exposes his Bounty to very vile Interpretations; It hardens and supports such People in their Wickedness and Extravagance; breeds Envy and malicious Thoughts; takes away all Distinctions between the Good and the Bad, by allowing the same Countenance and Encourage∣ment to Vice, which is due to Virtue and Desert. For certainly those Assistances, which depend upon our own free Choice, and are the Effect of Grace, and not any Debt by virtue of Obligation and Duty, Worth and Goodness have the best Title to; but yet extreme Necessity, and the ge∣neral Good of Mankind lay all in common. In these two Cases none are excluded, but even the Wicked and the In∣grateful have Right to come in for a Share, if their Ne∣cessities are urgent; and if they be so mingl'd and inter∣spers'd with the Good, that One cannot enjoy the Benefit, without the Other partaking of it too. And undoubtedly it is much better to do good to those who do not deserve it for the sake of them that do; than to with-hold our Assi∣stance from those that do deserve, in revenge, and for the discouragement of Them who do not. Accordingly we see, that God sets us a daily example of Universal Beneficence, He causeth his Sun to rise on the Evil and on the Good; and gi∣veth Rain to the Just and to the Ʋnjust. These are the Ef∣fects of a general Providence: But then he bestows, over and above these, some special Blessings, which are the Ef∣fects

of a distinguishing Providence; There he makes choice of his own Faithful and Beloved ones; and that Rule mention'd by our Blessed Lord takes place; It is not meet to take the Children's Bread, and to cast it unto Dogs.* 1.44 There is a vast deal of difference (says the Philosopher) between not exclu∣ding a Man, and making him your Choice. In Cases of Ex∣tremity, when Affliction and Necessity cry aloud for present Redress and Assistance, we should extend our Charity with∣out Distinction of Merit, and it will not serve us to say, that Men are unworthy.† 1.45 Nature calls upon us to be ser∣viceable to all without exception; and the Consideration of his being a Man is sufficient to excite our Compassion, when Opportunities of doing Good offer themselves to us. Humanity bids us bear a tender regard, and lend our En∣deavours to those that seek, and stretch out their Hands to implore our help; not to pursue them, who turn their Backs upon us: And our Kindness is much more due, much bet∣ter bestow'd, where we are able to do good, than where They who receive it are capable of doing good to Us. It is an Act of Generosity to take the weaker Side, to sup∣port those that are sinking, to heal a broken Fortune, and support a drooping Spirit, and to rob the Conqueror of his Pride and Triumph, by snatching the Spoils, and rescuing the vanquish'd Prey out of his Hand. Thus Chelomis is said to have done. She was both the Wife and Daughter of a King. These two Princes had a Dispute with one ano∣ther; in which, while her Husband had the Advantage, she shewed her self a dutiful Daughter, and follow'd her Father's Fortunes, never forsaking him in his greatest Di∣stress; but when the Chance of War turn'd, and cast the Scale on the other side, then She turn'd too, and left her Father to enjoy his Prosperity; and thought This a pro∣per Season to exert the Affection and Fidelity of a Wife, by sticking close to her Husband in his Calamitous Con∣dition.

[unspec 5] A Second Rule for the Exercise of this Virtue is to do it frankly and cheerfully; Not grudgingly, or of necessity, says St. Paul; for God loveth a cheerful giver. And⁂ 1.46 The Kind∣ness you do is doubly welcome, when what is seasonable and

necessary comes of its own accord, without staying to be ask'd, or press'd to it. For so much of Entreaty and Attendance às it costs, so much of the Value and Satisfaction is abated. And* 1.47 No Man takes any great Joy in being beholding to a Man for that which he did not so properly receive, as extort. That which is gotten by Importunity is dear bought: He that obtains by dint of asking, ought not to esteem his Supply a Gift; for Attendance, and Address, and earnest Supplications are a very high Price, and pay well for the Purchase. He that asks, humbles and debases himself; he acknowledges himself inferiour; is ashamed and out of Coun∣tenance; pays mighty Deference and Respect to the Party apply'd to; and the true English of all his Behaviour is that beggerly Form, Your Petitioner, as in Duty bound, &c. This is the very Ground of what I observ'd of Caesar; it was the Pride of his Heart that made him say, after the Defeat of Pompey, That He never took so much Delight in any thing, as in being supplicated and sought to; and, to gratifie his own Vanity in this particular, he gave All, even his Enemies, some Hopes of obtaining their Requests in time, that so he might drill them on to repeat and conti∣nue their Applications to him. And what can we make of This? It was not out of any good Intentions to others, but meerly to please himself, that he shew'd himself exora∣ble, and easie of Access. For Kindness comes easie; and therefore as an Emblem of its doing so, the Graces of old were described and painted, with loose, transparent Gar∣ments; not girt close about their Bodies, but flowing and free; to shew, that Favours should have nothing of Trick or Design, nothing strait-lac'd, or of Constraint in them.

[unspec 6] A Third Qualification necessary to recommend any Fa∣vour, is the conferring it readily, and out of Hand; This indeed seems to have some Connexion and Dependence upon the former. For all Kindnesses are to be rated by the Good-Will and Disposition of the Donor; And† 1.48 He who delays his Relief, was so long in a State of Unwil∣lingness to give it. And as that Loathness is a very great Rebate, so the speedy Complyance and Alacrity of the

Mind is a great Enhancement, and doubles the Gift. That cold Indifferency, and those trifling Put-off's, commonly practised upon such Occasions, are approv'd by no Body but Men of Insolence, who make it their Diversion to ban∣ter and abuse People: For Diligence and Dispatch are commendable in all Cases, and in none more requisite than in This now before us. There are Five different Methods of proceeding in it; Three of which are liable to Censure, and the other Two as worthy of Commendation. A Man may deny, but he may keep one in suspense and Expecta∣tion a great while first; This is a double Injury. He may refuse immediately, or he may grant at last; and both these amount much to one, when the Matter comes to be fairly computed; at least,⁂ 1.49 He that is soon said Nay, is less deceiv'd. The Fourth is to grant speedily; and This is very well: But the Best of all is, To prevent a Re∣quest; to foresee Men's Wants and Wishes, and never put them to the Expence of asking at all.

A Fourth Commendation is the Giving without any prospect of a Requital; and indeed This is the very thing, wherein the Virtue of Beneficence chiefly consists; for when once you make it mercenary, it ceases to be a Virtue.* 1.50 There is a great deal less Kindness where there are Ex∣pectations cherish'd of the Benefit reflecting back again up∣on the first Mover. But when there is no Opportunity, no Possibility of a Return; nay, when Matters are carry'd so privately, that the Party oblig'd does not so much as know his Benefactor, then the Benefit shines in its full Lustre. If a Man study the Point of Retaliation, he will give but slow∣ly, and by Peace-meals; because this is the thrifty way of being as little out of Pocket as he can. Now it were much better to renounce all Thoughts of being paid again, than to be slack in doing good; because by coveting this Re∣turn, which is accidental only, and foreign to the purpose, he loses that which is the true and natural Recompence, the inward Complacency of Mind, and the ravishing Satisfacti∣ons which result from a Sense of doing good. A Man should not need to be twice intreated for the same thing. For, as the being guilty of Injustice is of it self abominable and base, and there needs no other Consideration, than the Dis∣honour and Obliquity of the Thing to defer us from it; so

the doing Good is a generous and becoming Act, and it is a Fault to want any other Motive, more than its Native Beauty and Excellence; the staying till we are argu'd and importun'd into Matters of this Nature, betrays either much Ignorance, or great Indifference. In a Word,† 1.51 To keep one's Eye upon the Return, and the Account our Kindness is like to turn to, is not properly doing good with our Sub∣stance, but turning the Penny, and putting it out to Inte∣rest; These are Methods too distant to be reconcil'd, and confounded together; and⁂ 1.52 we should always distinguish between Giving, and driving such a Trade. Such Men are right enough serv'd, when their Expectations are disappoint∣ed. As That Woman must not pretend to Honour and Virtue, who denies her Lover, only to inflame his Passion the more, and in hopes that he will renew his Courtship; so That Man must not think to pass for Liberal and Gene∣rous, who sends away his Petitioner to Day, that he may see him again to morrow, or expends that which he hopes will shortly come home to him. For this Reason Hesiod, and the old Poets, describ'd the Graces in a State of Vir∣ginity; that no Man when he does good Offices, should have regard to multiplying and increase. And especially this falls infinitely short of a Christian's Virtue, whose Ma∣ster hath positively commanded him, upon these Occasions, to hope for nothing again, to look at no other Recompence than that distant and future one, reserv'd for him by his Paymaster in Heaven; and hath describ'd the very Hea∣thens and Publicans, the most ignorant and most scandalous sort of Men by this Character, that even They will give and lend to those, from whom they have any hopes of re∣ceiving as much again.

[unspec 8] Another Rule is, To oblige Men in their own way, so as may be most to the satisfaction of the Receiver; for this convinces him, that what we do of this kind, is entirely for his Sake and Service. And here we shall do well to take notice, that there are two sorts of good Offices. Some are such, as derive Credit and Honour upon the Receiver, and these should be contriv'd in as publick a manner as possible; Others tend to his Profit only; they supply his Wants, or support his Weakness, or cover his Shame, or assist him in

some other Necessity or Distress. And these should be car∣ry'd with all the Privacy imaginable; so much that, if it be possible, none but the Person himself should know it: Nay, if that can any way serve his Interest, or be more acceptable to him, it will be very fit and prudent to keep Him in Ignorance too; to let the Kindness drop into his Mouth, and convey it to him under-hand. For many times a Man's Circumstances require a Relief, which he is out of Countenance to accept; and there is a Tenderness due to the Modesty of Persons reduc'd by Afflictions and Casualties, who cannot change their Souls with their Fortunes. Be∣sides, that all divulging of Kindness is perfectly useless to one that does it upon a true Principle; for a Man's own Conscience cannot possibly be ignorant of his Merit, and this single Witness is as good as Ten thousand others.

[unspec 9] It must likewise be done without the Detriment or just Offence of any other Person whatsoever; but especially without the least Violation of Equity and Justice. For a Man can∣not with any tolerable Sense be said to do good, when he does ill at the same time; Those that want our Relief ought to have it; but we must not relieve Them at other People's Expence. What the Wise Man says of the Hypocrite's Piety is every whit as true of his Liberality and Charity,* 1.53 He that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten, his Offering is ri∣diculous, and He is as one that killeth the Son before his Fa∣ther's Eyes.

[unspec 10] A Seventh Qualification is, To do it prudently and con∣siderately. A Man is sometimes very hard put to it to an∣swer People's Requests, and at a loss, either how to grant, or how to refuse them. This is a Difficulty owing to a very ill Disposition common to most Men, but most pre∣dominant in those that make the Requests; which inclines them to resent a Denial, tho' never so reasonable in its self, and never so tenderly exprest. Some by this means are driven to a very poor, and indeed a very dishonest Refuge; which is, To promise every thing to every Body, tho' they are sensible oftentimes, that it is not in their power; and, which is still worse, conscious to themselves, that it never was in their Intention to make it good; but, all this notwithstand∣ing, they shift off the Difficulty, till it comes to the very Point of Performance; and trust to some Accident or other, to bring them off, by making such an Alteration in their Affairs, that the Obligation shall cease: Or else, if it be still expected, that they should stand by their Engagements,

some paltry Evasions are laid hold of in their Excuse: But still the Evil Day is put far from them; and the Suitor's Mouth is stopp'd for the present. Now All this is quite wrong, and a miserable Instance of Human Frailty; for no Man ought to promise, or encourage the Expectation of any thing which he either is not able, or may not lawfully, or does not really and sincerely design, to make good to the uttermost. And when he finds himself at a Bay, enclos'd between these two Difficulties, of making a Promise, which is either unjust, or inexpedient, or dishonourable and unbecoming his Character to fulfil; or else of giving a De∣nial, which is sure to be ill taken, and breed Mischief and Discontent; the best Course to extricate himself, is to break, to evade the Blow; either by declining a positive Answer, or else by wording his Promise so cautiously, and in gene∣ral Expressions of Civility and good Inclination, that the Person may have nothing of a punctual Engagement to fa∣sten upon. There is, I confess, somewhat of Management and Cunning in doing so, which may make this Advice seem strange and inconsistent, with that Frankess of Tem∣per, and Sincerity in Conversation, which I have been lately recommending; but we are to consider this as a Case of Necessity, that when Men will be unreasonable, we must deal with them as we can; and that they deserve at least to be thus treated.

[unspec 11] An Eighth necessary Ingredient is, That all Things of this Kind be done with a true Spirit of Humanity, and sincere Affection; for such a Temper will be very sensibly concern'd for the Benefit of all Mankind; but more particularly it will bear a very tender regard to the Miseries of the Indi∣gent and Afflicted; which is a Virtue more particularly di∣stinguish'd by the Name of Mercy and Pity. Those who want these Bowels, are Irregularities and Deviations from Nature, and so distant from Grace and Goodness, that the Apostle reckons This, as one of the Characters of the last and worst Times. But then the Compassion I mean here, is a Brave, and Masculine, and Generous Quality; not a Softness and Effeminacy of Soul, which melts into Tears, and creates Perplexity and Disorder of Thought. For This is a faulty Passion, such as weak and wicked People are capable of falling under; concerning which I have already made some Remarks in its proper Place; and demonstrated, that there is a criminal and foolish Pity, as well as a wise, well-govern'd, and commendable one. We ought in∣deed

to succour the Afflicted; but we must not afflict our selves for them, nor make their Miseries our own. This were unprofitable to Them, and greatly prejudicial to Us; nor may we strain a Point of Decency or Duty upon their Account; for Charity cannot dispense with Justice, nor set aside our other Obligations. God himself hath positively forbidden us to favour a Poor Man in his Cause. And God Himself and the Saints are said to be Pitiful and Com∣passienate; but yet not so, as to give any Disturbance to the Perfection of their own Happiness; any more than to impair the Perfection of their Holiness; in the Me∣thods made use of for the succour of those they do pity.

[unspec 12] A Ninth Rule is, to avoid Boasting of our Kindness, and all manner of unnecessary Publication of it. This is a sort of Upbraiding and Reproach; it cancels the Obligation quite, and is the most invidious way of making Men our Enemies; by turning our Favours into Provocations; and therefore it is very well observ'd to this purpose, That he who receives a good Turn, should never forget it; but he who does one, should never remember it.

[unspec 13] A Tenth is, To proceed, and not be weary of well∣doing, but keep our old Favours always fresh, by the Ad∣dition of new one's. This will be a powerful Charm to at∣tract the Affection of all the World, and make Men ambitious of our Friendship. Nor should a Man ever repent of his past Obligations, tho' sensible, that he hath had the Misfor∣tune to scatter his Seed in a barren and ungrateful Soil.* 1.54 Let even the Miscarriage of your Kindness give you Satisfacti∣on, (says the Philosopher) and let not any such Expression es∣cape you, as, I wish I had never done so; For indeed there can be no just Foundation for grudging our Kindness. The Un∣thankful Wretch injures no Body but himself; and the Fa∣vour, that was misplaced, is not utterly lost or thrown away, it is devoted to a Holy and Excellent use, and cannot be destroy'd or profan'd by the Receiver's Fault. If another will needs be wicked, and act otherwise than becomes him, this can never justifie my ceasing to be good. But further, The generous and noble Spirit distinguishes it self by Per∣severance; and triumphs in the Conquest of Ingratitude and Ill-nature, when invincible Beneficence hath heaped Coals

of Fire upon their Heads, melted them down, and softned them into good Temper, and a better Sense of Things. So says the Moralist,* 1.55 A Great Soul bears the ingrateful Man so long, till at last he makes him grateful; for obstinate and reso∣lute Goodness will conquer the worst of Men.

[unspec 14] The Last Direction I shall lay down upon this Occasion is, That when a thing is given, we should let a Man use and enjoy it quietly, and not be troublesome and unseason∣able with him; like some, who when they have put one into any Office or Preferment, will needs be thrusting in their Oar, and execute it for him: Or else procure a Man some considerable Advantage, and then make over what proportion of the Profits they see sit, to themselves. Re∣ceivers in such Cases ought not to endure the being thus im∣posed upon; and any Resentments or Refusals made upon this Account, are by no means the Marks of Ingratitude, but a preservation of their own Rights. And whatever the Benefactor may have contributed to our Preferment, he wipes out the whole Score, and acquits us of all our Obligations, by these imperious and busie Interpositions. The Story is not amiss concerning one of the Popes, who being press'd hard by one of the Cardinals to do somewhat inconvenient, or perhaps unjust, in his Favour; and (as a Motive, which was thought irresistible, or at least a Resentment which he look'd upon as reasonable in case of refusal) the Cardinal re-minding him that His Interest had been formerly at his Service, and his Popedom was owing to it; His Holiness very pertinently reply'd, If You made me Pope, pray let me be so, and do not take back again the Authority you gave me.

[unspec 15] After these several Rules for the directing Men in the Ex∣ercise of Beneficence, it may be seasonable to observe, * 1.56 that there are Benefits of several sorts; some of them much more acceptable than others, and thus some more, and others less engaging. Those are most welcome that come from the Hand of a Friend, and one whom we are strongly dispos'd to love, without any such Inducement: As, on the contra∣ry, it is very grievous and grating to be oblig'd by one, of whom we have no Opinion, and desire of all things not to be indebted to. Those are likewise so, which proceed from a Person whom we have formerly oblig'd our selves;

because This is not so much Gratuity, as Justice and Pay∣ment of Arrears, and so draws very little or no new Debt upon us. Such again are those done in a time of Necessi∣ty, and when our Occasions were very urgent: These have a mighty Influence; they utterly deface all past Injuries and Misunderstandings, if any such there were; and leave a strong Tie upon a Man's Honour; as, on the other Hand, the denying our Assistance in Cases of Extremity, is extremely unkind, and wipes out all Remembrances of any former Benefits. Such, once more, are Those, that can be easily acknowledged, and admit of a suitable Return; as, on the contrary, such as the Receiver is out of all Ca∣pacity to requite, commonly breed Hatred, and a secret Dislike: For there is a Pride in most Men, that makes them uneasie to be always behind-hand; and hence he who is sensible, that he can never make amends for all he hath receiv'd, every time that he sees his Benefactor, fancies himself dogg'd by a Creditor, upbraided by a living Wit∣ness of his Insufficiency or Ingratitude; and these secret Re∣proaches of his own Mind, give great Uneasiness and Dis∣content; for no Bankrupt can bear being twitted with his Poverty. Some again there are, which the more free and honourable, and respectful they are, the more burdensom and weighty they are; provided the Receiver be a Per∣son of Honour and Principle: Such, I mean, as bind the Consciences and the Wills of Men; for they tie a Man up faster, keep him more tight, and render him more cau∣tious and fearful of failing, or forgetfulness. A Man is Ten times more a Prisoner, when confin'd by his own Word, than if he were under Lock and Key. It is easier to be bound by Legal and publick Restraints, and Forms of En∣gagements, than by the Laws of Honour and Conscience; and Two Notaries in this Case are better than One. When a Man says, I desire nothing but your Word, I de∣pend upon your Honesty; such a one indeed shews greater respect: But if he be sure of his Man, he puts him upon a stricter Obligation, and himself upon better Security than Bonds and Judgments. A Man who engages nothing but his Word, is always in Fear and Constraint, and upon his Guard, lest he should forfeit or forget it. Your Mort∣gagee, and he that is under the power of Legal Forms, is deliver'd from that Anxiety, and depends upon his Cre∣ditor's Instruments, which will not sail to refresh his Me∣mory, when the Bonds become due. Where there is any

external Force, the Will is always less intent; and where the Constraint is less, there in proportion the Application of the Will is greater.* 1.57 What the Law compels me to, is ve∣ry ha••dly my own Choice; for I do not properly choose, but sub∣mit to it.

[unspec 16] Benefits produce Obligations, * 1.58 and from Obligations again fresh Benefits spring up: So that Beneficence is recipro∣cally the Child and the Parent, the Effect and the Cause; and there is a twofold Obligation, which we may distin∣guish by an Active and a Passive Obligation. Parents, and Princes, and all Superiours are bound in Duty, and by virtue of their Station, to procure the Benefit and Ad∣vantage of Those, whom either the Laws and Order of Nature, or the political Constitutions of Government, or any other Law relating to their Post, have committed to their Inspection and Care. And not only so, but All in general, whether their Character be Publick or not, if they have Wealth and Power, are by the Law of Nature oblig'd to extend their Help and Bounty towards the Ne∣cessitous and Distress'd. And this is the first sort of Obli∣gation. But then from good Offices thus done, whether they be in some regard owing to us, as flowing from the Duty incumbent upon the Benefactor, by virtue of this former Engagement: Or whether they be the effect of pure Choice, entirely Grace, and nothing of Debt, there arises the Second sort of Obligation, whereby the Recei∣vers are bound to acknowledge the Kindness, and to be thankful for it. All this mutual Exchange, and propaga∣tion of Engagements and good Turns, Hesiod hath intima∣ted to us by his Description of the Graces, when he paints them Three in Number, and all joyning Hands.

[unspec 17] The First, or Original Obligation is satisfy'd by the due Performance of those particular Offices, * 1.59 which each Per∣son's respective Station requires from him. And what these are, we shall very shortly take occasion to explain at large, when the Special Duties, which make up the other Branch of Justice to our Neighbour, come to be consider'd. In the mean while, I desire my Reader to observe, that the Primitive Engagement we are treating of at present, tho' it cannot be utterly dissolv'd, yet it may be tied fa∣ster and closer, or slacken and sit more loose upon us, by several accidental Circumstances; and particularly, it may

be mightily strengthened, or diminished, by the Conditions and Behaviour of those we have to deal with. If the very Relation of a Subject or a Child bind us to them, the Affectionate and Dutiful Carriage of good Subjects, and good Children, enforce the Obligations of Kindness yet more. And so again; Their Misdemeanours, their Ingra∣titude, their Insolence and Unworthy Behaviour, do in a great Measure discharge us of that Tenderness and Care, which they have otherwise a Right to expect from us. And I cannot tell, whether this Observation may not hold in some Degree, with Regard to Natural Defects also. A Man may; perhaps indeed he cannot but, have less Affe∣ction for a Child, or a Kinsman, or a Servant, not only if he be Ill-tempered and Perverse; but if he be deformed, or crooked, or unfortunate in his Person. For God, who made Beauty an attractive Excellence, seems himself to have lowered the Natural Value such Persons are to be rated at. But then, whatever Influence this Consideration may have upon our Minds and Inclinations, it must have none at all upon the outward Administration of our Of∣fice. These unhappy Persons have the same Title to our Justice and Charity; their Necessities put in the same common Claim to our Assistance and Relief; and all the Good we are engaged to upon any publick and general Account, is still to be Punctually performed towards them; and indeed the less to be neglected, because, those Natu∣ral Defects are their Misfortunes only, not their Faults; and as such should excite our Pity to supply the Place of Inclination.

[unspec 18] But that Obligation, * 1.60 which lies before us at present, is the Second Sort; such as arises from Benefits received: And for our better Direction in this Matter, we shall do well to observe.

First of all; That the Laws of Acknowledgment and grateful Returns are Natural and Universal; They are not confined to Humanity alone, but even Brutes them∣selves have a Sense of, and share in them. Nay, and those too, not only tame, and manageable, and Domestick Ani∣mals, which might tempt us to think this Disposition the Effect of Art or Custom; but even the Wildest and most Savage Creatures: For in them we meet with several no∣table Instances of Gratitude; One Example whereof I have formerly mention'd, in the Behaviour of a Lyon, to that

Roman Slave,* 1.61 who was exposed in the Theatre to be de∣voured by him.

Secondly. It is a Virtuous Act, and a certain Indication of a good Mind; for which Reason it is really more va∣luable, than Beneficence it self: For Liberality often pro∣ceeds from Plenty, or Power; Regard to one's own In∣terest or Reputation, and not very often from pure Vir∣tue; But Gratitude cannot spring from any other Cause than an ingenuous Disposition. And therefore, though the doing of good Offices may be the more desirable, yet the grateful Acknowledgment, and studying to requite them, when they are done, is the more Commendable of the Two.

Thirdly, Gratitude is likewise an easie and a pleasant Du∣ty; and yet such as no body can be excused from, upon the Pretence of Disability, or Want of Opportunity; be∣cause it is always in our own Disposal, always present with us. Now, nothing is so easie, as to obey and follow the Dictates of Nature; and nothing so Pleasant and Sa∣tisfactory, as for a Man to acquit himself of Obligations, to come out of Debt, and set himself Free, and upon the Level with his Neighbours.

[unspec 19] From all that hath been said upon this Subject, we cannot but discern, how much of Baseness, and Meanness of Spirit, the Vices of Ingratitude and Neglect carry with them; how deservedly Odious they are to all the World.* 1.62 To call a Man Ingrateful, is the worst and blackest Accusa∣tion you can lay to his Charge. It is an Offence against Na∣ture, and a certain Indication of an ill Temper; a scanda∣lous and reproachful Vice; such as is not to be endured, because it breaks all Society and good Correspondence. The Revenge, which follows upon an Injury, and the In∣gratitude which follows a Kindness, are both Bad and Blameable, but not equally so. Revenge is indeed the stronger and more violent Passion; but it hath less of De∣formity and Degeneracy of Soul, than Ingratitude. The Evils and Diseases of our Minds are like those incident to our Bodies; where those that are most Dangerous and Mor∣tal are not always the most Painful and Acute. And there∣fore Revenge may disorder a Man more, but Ingratitude corrupts his Virtue more. In the Former there is some

Appearance of Justice, Men are not ashamed to pursue and own that publickly; but the latter is all over Infamy and Baseness, and no Man was ever yet so abandoned or har∣dy, to confess or glory in it.

[unspec 20] Now, Gratitude, to render it compleat, and in all Points what it ought to be, must have these following Qualifi∣cations.

First, A Man must receive the Kindnesses done to him, cheerfully and friendly; he must look, and express himself well pleased with them.† 1.63 He that gives a Favour kind Entertainment, hath made the first Payment already. Second∣ly. He must never forget, or be unmindful of it.⁂ 1.64 He that forgets his Benefactor, is of all others the farthest from Gratitude; for how is it possible a Man should discharge this Duty, who hath suffered the Foundation of it to slip quite from under him? Thirdly. He must not be sparing to own and publish it,* 1.65 It is an argument of Ingenuity and becom∣ing Modesty, frankly to confess who we have been the better for; and this is a Reward due to the Maker of our For∣tunes. As we have found by comfortable Experience, the Hearts and Hands of our Friends open to our Advantage, so it is fit they should find our Mouths open too, and our Tongues liberal in the Declarations of their Readiness to assist us. And that our Memory upon this occasion may never want Refreshing, it will be Decent to mention the Advantage we have receiv'd, by the Title of his Gifts, who conferred it upon us. The Fourth and Last is, to make a Return, and Restitution, wherein we may govern our selves according to these Four Rules.

• First, That This be not done too hastily; We should not be extremely Eager and Anxious in the Thing; for this hath a very ill Savour: It looks like Pride, as if we were loath, and scorned to be obliged; and for that Rea∣son were impatient to get out of their Debt. This mini∣sters a very just cause of Jealousie to our Benefactor, that his Kindness was not well taken, when we shew our selves

• so very uneasie under the Engagements it lays upon us. A convenient time therefore is necessary to be taken, and a favourable Opportunity waited for Though this ought not to be very distant neither, nor be put off to too long a Day. For the Graces are painted Young, to hint, that Favours should not grow old upon our Hands. I add farther, that this Opportunity should be one that offers it self of its own Accord; or if of Our seeking, yet so contrived, that it may be void of all Suspicion of Vanity and Osten∣tation.
• Secondly, We should pay back with Interest, and exceed the Proportion of what we receive; like a good Soil, which cannot maintain the Character, if it only produce the Seed again; So a grateful Man* 1.66 will forfeit that Title, if he restore no more than the Principal. But the least we must do, is to return as much as we received; and that with all possible Demonstrations, that we thought our selves un∣der an Obligation, and wished it in our Power, to do more. That what we have done in the mean while, is not look'd upon as full Satisfaction, but only as an Acknow∣ledgment of the Debt, and a Testimony of our Sincerity, and Respect.
• Thirdly, That these Returns be made willingly and chear∣fully; for† 1.67 he is not Grateful, whom Fear, or Force, make desirous to appear so. Especially too, if the Kindness was done Frankly and generously; For we should pay back in the same Coin, and with all the commendable Qualities the Favour brought along to recommend it; And that Man is much to blame who is more ready and cheerful when he is to receive a Kindness, than when it is expected he should requite one.
• Fourthly. If a Man's Circumstances be such, as render him Incapable of actual Restitution, at least he ought to take Care, that he be not wanting in Will, and this Grateful Disposition is the First and Principal Part of the Thing; the very Life and Soul both of the Benefit, and of the Acknowledgment in return for it. This indeed, can have no Witness but it self to testifie for it. But, as the

• Thanks of the Heart, ought to be well accepted, where People are in no Condition to pay more; so the Desires and Offers of obliging us, either when our Friends could not compass their Desires, or when we had no need, or did not think fit to accept their Services, must be acknow∣ledged, as if we had actually received them. For here was the Will, though not the Deed; and this, as I said, is the Chief, and of it self a sufficient Ground of Obliga∣tion to Gratitude.

Notes

• * 1.1

  What it is.
• * 1.2

  Ecclus. vi. 14, 16.
• * 1.3

  Its Useful∣ness.
• * 1.4

  Distin∣guish'd as to Caulis
• * 1.5

  The Persons.
• * 1.6

  Degrees.
• * 1.7

  Perfect Friendship, what.
• * 1.8

  Examples of Friend∣ship.
• * 1.9

  The Excel∣lence of Fidelity.
• * 1.10

  Nihil augustius Fide, quae Justitiae Fundamentum est; nec ulla res vehementius Rempublicam continet & vitam. San∣ctissimum humani pectoris Bonum.
• * 1.11

  Ante Jovem generata, Decus Divûmque Hominûmque; Quâ sine non Tellus pacem, non aequora nôrunt; Justitiae consors, tacitumque in pectore Numen.
• * 1.12

  The Rarity of it.
• * 1.13

  Num. ch. xxx.
• * 1.14

  Vult sibi quis{que} credi, & habita Fides ipsam sibi obligat Fi∣dem. Fides requirit Fiduciam, & relativa sunt.
• † 1.15

  Fragenti fidem fides frangatur eidem—Quando Tu me non habes pro Senatore, nec ego Te pro Consule.
• * 1.16

  Ch. 16.
• * 1.17

  Mat∣•• the ••nise.
• * 1.18

  Quibus tantâ utilitate Fides antiquior fuit.
• * 1.19

  The Man∣ner of pre∣mising.
• * 1.20

  Keeping of Secrets.
• * 1.21

  Its Excel∣lence.
• * 1.22

  The Usefal∣ness.
• * 1.23

  The rarity and diffi∣culty of it.
• * 1.24

  Rules for it
• * 1.25

  Flattery.
• * 1.26

  Ut Matrona Meritrici dispar erit, atque Discolor, infido Scurrae distabit Amicus.

  Horat. Lib. XVIII.
• * 1.27

  Non potes me simul Amico & Adulatore uti.
• † 1.28

  Meliora vulnera diligentis, quàm oscula blandientis.
• * 1.29

  Lying.
• * 1.30

  Hypocrisie.
• * 1.31

  Jactantiùs moerent quae minus dolent.
• † 1.32

  Gratia oneri est, Ultio in quaestu habetur. Altiùs Injuriae qàum merita descendunt.
• * 1.33

  Motive to Beneficence.
• * 1.34

  Nullà re propius ad Dei naturam accedimus, quam Benefi∣centia: Dei est mortalem succurrere mortali.
• † 1.35

  Nihil tam secundum Naturam, quam juvare consortem Naturae.
• ⁂ 1.36

  Liberalis etiam dandi causas quaerit.
• * 1.37

  Psal. l. 15.
• * 1.38

  Ars quaestuosissima, optima Negotiatio.
• * 1.39

  Hoc habeo quodcun{que} dedi.
• * 1.40

  Several sorts of it.
• * 1.41

  Internal and Exter∣nal.
• * 1.42

  In Benesieio Hoc suspieiendum, quod alteri dedit, ablaturus sibi, utilitatis suae oblitus.
• * 1.43

  Rules for Beneficence.
• * 1.44

  Multum refert, utrum aliquem non excludas, an eligas.
• † 1.45

  Hominibus prodesse Natura jubet ubicunque Homini bene∣ficio locus.
• ⁂ 1.46

  Bis est gratum, quod opus est, si ultro ofteras.
• * 1.47

  Nemo Iubenter debet, quod non accepit, sed expressit.

  Non tulit gratis, qui accepit rogans; imò nihil charius emitur, quàm quod Precibus.
• † 1.48

  Qui tardè fecit, diu noluit.
• ⁂ 1.49

  Minus decipitur, cui negatur celeriter.
• * 1.50

  Tunc est Virtus dare Beneficia non reditura.
• † 1.51

  Non est Beneficium quod in quaestum mittitur.
• ⁂ 1.52

  Demus Beneficium, non foeneremus. Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitavit, cum daret.
• * 1.53

  Ecclus. xxxiv. 18, 20.
• * 1.54

  Beneficii tui etiam infoelicitas placeat: nusquam hae•• vox' Vellem non fecisse.
• * 1.55

  Optimi & ingentis animi est tamdiu ferre ingratum, donec feceris gratum; vincit malos pertinax Bonitas.
• * 1.56

  Several sorts of Kindnesses.
• * 1.57

  Quod me Jus cogit, vix à Voluntate impetrem.
• * 1.58

  Of the Obligation.
• * 1.59

  The first Original Obligation.
• * 1.60

  The Second Eligation.
• * 1.61

  Book I. Chap. 8. Sect. 12.
• * 1.62

  Dixeris Maledicta cuncta, cum ingratum hominem dixeris. Ingratitudo grave vitium, intolerabile quod dissociat homines.
• † 1.63

  Qui gratù Beneficium accepit, primam ejus Pensionem solvit.
• ⁂ 1.64

  Ingratissimus omnium, qui oblitus; nusquam enim gratus fieri potest, cui totum Beneficium elapsum est.
• * 1.65

  Ingenui pudoris est fateri per quos profecerimus, & haec quasi merces Authoris.
• * 1.66

  Ingratus est, qui Beneficium reddit sine usurâ.
• † 1.67

  Ingratus est, qui metu gratus est—Eodem animo benefi∣cium debetur quo datur—Errat siquis Beneficium libentiùs acci∣pit quàm reddit.