Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. XI. Of Beneficence and Gratitude.

THE Art of doing and receiving Good Offices, as That Respects the Beneficence of the Donor, and the Obligation and Gratitude in the Person to whom they are done, is a Subject of great Compass, and Extent; of great Use, but withal of much Intricacy, and Difficulty. There is not any one Instance, in which Men are more Deficient. Very few know, either how to oblige, or how to be obliged, as becomes them. It looks as if Goodness, and Desert, and Gratitude were in the Declension; and Re∣venge and Ingratitude in the Ascendent; as if Those were a Loss and Diminution, and These a Gain and Privilege; so eager and zealous we are generally in the former, so so very cold and indifferent, so averse indeed to the lat∣ter. Thus Tacitus observes, that† 1.1 Thanks are reputed Trou∣ble, but Revenge an Advantage; and Seneta, That Injuries and Affronts make much deeper Impression than Favours and Kindness. We will therefore endeavour at present to cor∣rect and redress this so common Defect; (or Corruption rather,) of Mankind; by treating at present, First of Be∣neficence, under which I comprehend Humanity, Liberali∣ty,

Charity or Relief of the Poor and Distressed; and of their Contraries, Inhumanity, Niggardliness, Want of Com∣passion: And then Secondly, of the Obligation, the Gra∣titude of the Receiver, or the Neglect, and Ingratitude after such Kindnesses received.

[unspec 1] Which Way soever we turn our Eyes, they are every where presented with Arguments and Instances,* 1.2 for the Exercise of Kindness, and Beneficence. God, and Nature, and Universal Reason, and Equity, All joyn in their In∣vitations to it, In God, whether we consider his Effence, or his Providence, what he is, and what he does, we see nothing but Goodness; for He is the very Perfection of it, Goodness it self; and That not a speculative and un∣profirable Excellence, but the most diffusive and com∣municative Goodness; and* 1.3 of all the Resomblances and Imitations of the Divinity that Human Nature is capable of, the nearest Approach we can make toward him is in this Particular; as Tully very justly observed. And Pliny; when one Man succors another, he does an Act more than Human, and becomes as it were a God to his Brother. The Inducements, which Nature furnishes us with, are many. Such as, The sensible Satisfaction a Man feels in seeing the Person whom he hath obliged; the Consideration, that he is a Person of the same Condition with himself, cast in the same Mould, wrought up of the same Materials, a Transcript of the same Original; For† 1.4 nothing is so a∣greable to the Dictates of Nature, as to assist one who is a Partaker of the same Nature; It is a Generous and Noble Act; worthy a Person of Honour and Virtue, to be use∣ful and beneficial to others, to embrace and improve, nay, to seek Opportunities of being so. For the⁂ 1.5 Liberal Man does not content himself with taking them when they come in his Way; but he goes out to meet, and takes Pains to find them. And it is an old Adage, that Truly Noble Blood will neither let a Man tell a Lye, nor be want∣ing good Offices, where they are Seasonable. There is somewhat of Greatness and commendable Pride in doing Kindnesses, as there is of Meanness in having them done

to us; and this may be one convenient Sense of that Say∣ing, which St. Paul ascribes to our Saviour; It is more Bles∣sed to give than to receive. He that gives, gets himself Honour, and gains an Advantage; he becomes Master of the Receiver, and acquires a Right in him; as on the other hand, the Receiver sells his Freedom, and is no longer at his own disposal. The First Inventer of Good Offices, (says one with Ingenuity enough) contrived the strongest Fet∣ters that ever were, to bind and captivate Mankind. Upon this Account several People have refused to accept of Kind∣nesses, because they would not suffer their Liberty to be entrenched upon; and particularly, if the Person confer∣ring the Favour were one, whom they had no Kindness for, and did not care to be obliged to. For which Rea∣son it is, that the old Philosophers forbid us to receive any Kindnesses from ill Men, because in so doing we let them get a Hank upon us. Caesar used to say, that no Musick was so charming in his Ears, as the Requests of his Friends, and the Supplications of those in want. The Motto of Greatness is, Ask me. And that Command and Promise gives us a Noble Idea of the Majesty of God, Call up∣on me in the time of Trouble;* 1.6 so will I hoar thee, and thou shalt glorifie me. This is likewise the most Honourable way of employing our Power and Plenty; which, while we keep by us, and in our own private Possession, are called by the mean Names, of Houses, and Lands, and Money; but when drawn out into Use, and expended to the Benefit of our Brethren, they are dignified with new and August Titles; and from thenceforth commence Good Actions, Liberality, Magnificence, Alms, and Treasures in Heaven. Nay it is not only the most Honourable, but the most prudent and profitable Method of trafficking with them;* 1.7 the gainfullest of all Arts, the best and least hazar∣dous Way of Merchandise; for here the Principal is secu∣red, and the Interest arising upon it rises exceeding high. And, to say the very truth, no part of what we have is so properly our Own, none turns to such a prodigious Increase, so comfortable Account, as that which we expend upon good Uses. What lies by us is lock'd up, and hid pri∣vately; it lies and wasts; or at least it never grows upon our Hands; and it is sure to give us the Slip at last, either by some of those infinite Accidents, by which all such Things

are liable to be snatch'd from Us; or by that certain and inevitable Separation, by which Death will shortly snarch Us away from Them. But so much of these as is thus put out, can never fail, never be wrested from us; never rust, or decay, or lie buried in Unprofitableness. Hence it was, that Mark Anthony, when deprest, and at an Ebb of Fortune so low, that he had nothing but Death lest at his own Disposal, cryed out, that* 1.8 he had lost All, except what he had given away. And thus you see, what a brave, and noble, and becoming Temper, this Compassionate, and good Natured Frame of Soul is; how worthily a ready Inclination to do Good to all the World, attracts the Love and Admiration of all that consider it; How Amiable and Engaging, how Powerful and Irresistible the Charms of Generosity are. As indeed, on the other Hand, nothing is so Mean and Sneaking, so Detestable and Despicable, so Deformed and Unnatural, as Hard-heartedness, and Insen∣sibility of other Peoples Misfortunes; It is therefore de∣servedly styled Inhumanity; to intimate by that Name, that such People are Monsters, and not Men. And, as the Vices themselves, so the Source and Causes of them stand in direct Opposition to each other. For, as Beneficence springs from Greatness and Gallantry of Spirit, so unreaso∣nable Parsimony and Hard-heartedness is the Spawn of Cowardice, and Brutish Degeneracy of Soul.

[unspec 2] Now, there are two ways of becoming Beneficial to our Neighbours; either as we minister to their Profit, * 1.9 or to their Pleasure. The First procures us Admiration and Esteem; the Second Love, and good Will. The First is much more valuable, because it regards Mens Necessities and Distresses; it is acting the Part of a Tender Father, and a True Friend. There is likewise a Difference in these Acts of Kindness themselves; Some are due from us, such as the Laws of Nature, or positive Institution require at our Hands; Others are free, and what we are under no express Obligation for, but the Effect of pure Choice, and Love. The Latter of these Two sorts, seem to be more Brave and Generous; But yet the Former too, when dis∣charged with Application, and Prudence, and sincere Af∣fection, are very Excellent and Commendable, though they have the Nature of a Debt, and are such as we cannot be faithful to our Duty, and dispense with our selves in.

[unspec 3] Now the true Beneficence or Kindness is not properly in the Gift it self, * 1.10 that which a Man sees, and feels, and tasts; this is too gross a Notion; and all we that can allow, is that These are the Matter, the Signs, and the Demonstrations of our Kindness; but the Thing it self is the Disposition and good Heart. The Outward and visible part may be very small and inconsiderable; and yet that within may at the same time be wondrous great. For This may have pro∣ceeded from an exceeding Eagerness and Affection; a hun∣ger and thirst of doing good; watching, and contriving, and seeking Occasions for it; and esteeming such Actions in our Saviour's Terms, One's Meat and Drink; snatching them as greedily, and receiving as sensible a Satisfaction and De∣light from them, as from the most necessary Refreshments, by which this Life of ours is sustain'd. A Man may have given to the very utmost of his Ability, and by this means exhaust that little Store, which is scarce sufficient for his own Occasions; or he may part with that which is parti∣cularly valuable and dear to him. These are the Conside∣rations, that enhanced the value of the Widow's Mite; and render'd one small piece of Money, not equal only, but far superiour to all the large Donations of the Rich Contributors. And thus Heathen Authors have likewise concurr'd in their Estimate of good Works.* 1.11 In every Be∣nefit, say they, we are to have a more than ordinary respect to that, which a Man by relieving his Neighbour, streightens him∣self in; and for the sake of another's Convenience and Advan∣tage, postpones and forgets his own. On the other Hand, where the Gift it self is large, the Obligation may be very small; and indeed, in great Gifts there are some Circum∣stances, which most commonly make it so. For such are bestow'd frequently with Unwillingness and Reluctancy: They expect to be much intreated, and long attended for them, and take time to consider, whether they shall bestow them or not: Now This hath too much of Pomp and For∣mality in it; such a Man is desirous to magnifie his own Bounty; and after all, he gives more to gratifie his own Vanity and Ambition, than to supply the Necessities of them that want; and so Himself is the Giver and Recei∣ver both. But that which gives another very just Prefe∣rence in the Case before us, is. That the External Benefit may

be presently wrested from us again; or if not by Fraud and Force, yet it may be spent, or lost; it may decay upon our Hands, and in process of time vanish quite; but the inward Disposition, with which it was conferred, is permanent and firm. The Liberty, or the Health, the Wealth, or Honour, or Preferment bestow'd upon us, may by some fresh Acci∣dent be lost in an instant; but still the Kindness and the Ob∣ligation remains entire.

[unspec 4] Now the Directions, by which a Man may do well to govern himself in the exercise of this excellent Virtue, * 1.12 are such as follow.

First, With regard to the Persons; who are the proper Objects of our Liberality, and whether it be fit to extend it to All, as their Wants, and our own Abilities furnish Op∣portunities for it. This is a very reasonable Enquiry, and highly necessary to be resolv'd; because, by doing good to wicked Men, and such as do not deserve our Kindness, a Man may seem to be guilty of a great many Faults at once. This derives Censure and an ill Name upon the Do∣nor, and exposes his Bounty to very vile Interpretations; It hardens and supports such People in their Wickedness and Extravagance; breeds Envy and malicious Thoughts; takes away all Distinctions between the Good and the Bad, by allowing the same Countenance and Encourage∣ment to Vice, which is due to Virtue and Desert. For certainly those Assistances, which depend upon our own free Choice, and are the Effect of Grace, and not any Debt by virtue of Obligation and Duty, Worth and Goodness have the best Title to; but yet extreme Necessity, and the ge∣neral Good of Mankind lay all in common. In these two Cases none are excluded, but even the Wicked and the In∣grateful have Right to come in for a Share, if their Ne∣cessities are urgent; and if they be so mingl'd and inter∣spers'd with the Good, that One cannot enjoy the Benefit, without the Other partaking of it too. And undoubtedly it is much better to do good to those who do not deserve it for the sake of them that do; than to with-hold our Assi∣stance from those that do deserve, in revenge, and for the discouragement of Them who do not. Accordingly we see, that God sets us a daily example of Universal Beneficence, He causeth his Sun to rise on the Evil and on the Good; and gi∣veth Rain to the Just and to the Ʋnjust. These are the Ef∣fects of a general Providence: But then he bestows, over and above these, some special Blessings, which are the Ef∣fects

of a distinguishing Providence; There he makes choice of his own Faithful and Beloved ones; and that Rule mention'd by our Blessed Lord takes place; It is not meet to take the Children's Bread, and to cast it unto Dogs.* 1.13 There is a vast deal of difference (says the Philosopher) between not exclu∣ding a Man, and making him your Choice. In Cases of Ex∣tremity, when Affliction and Necessity cry aloud for present Redress and Assistance, we should extend our Charity with∣out Distinction of Merit, and it will not serve us to say, that Men are unworthy.† 1.14 Nature calls upon us to be ser∣viceable to all without exception; and the Consideration of his being a Man is sufficient to excite our Compassion, when Opportunities of doing Good offer themselves to us. Humanity bids us bear a tender regard, and lend our En∣deavours to those that seek, and stretch out their Hands to implore our help; not to pursue them, who turn their Backs upon us: And our Kindness is much more due, much bet∣ter bestow'd, where we are able to do good, than where They who receive it are capable of doing good to Us. It is an Act of Generosity to take the weaker Side, to sup∣port those that are sinking, to heal a broken Fortune, and support a drooping Spirit, and to rob the Conqueror of his Pride and Triumph, by snatching the Spoils, and rescuing the vanquish'd Prey out of his Hand. Thus Chelomis is said to have done. She was both the Wife and Daughter of a King. These two Princes had a Dispute with one ano∣ther; in which, while her Husband had the Advantage, she shewed her self a dutiful Daughter, and follow'd her Father's Fortunes, never forsaking him in his greatest Di∣stress; but when the Chance of War turn'd, and cast the Scale on the other side, then She turn'd too, and left her Father to enjoy his Prosperity; and thought This a pro∣per Season to exert the Affection and Fidelity of a Wife, by sticking close to her Husband in his Calamitous Con∣dition.

[unspec 5] A Second Rule for the Exercise of this Virtue is to do it frankly and cheerfully; Not grudgingly, or of necessity, says St. Paul; for God loveth a cheerful giver. And⁂ 1.15 The Kind∣ness you do is doubly welcome, when what is seasonable and

necessary comes of its own accord, without staying to be ask'd, or press'd to it. For so much of Entreaty and Attendance às it costs, so much of the Value and Satisfaction is abated. And* 1.16 No Man takes any great Joy in being beholding to a Man for that which he did not so properly receive, as extort. That which is gotten by Importunity is dear bought: He that obtains by dint of asking, ought not to esteem his Supply a Gift; for Attendance, and Address, and earnest Supplications are a very high Price, and pay well for the Purchase. He that asks, humbles and debases himself; he acknowledges himself inferiour; is ashamed and out of Coun∣tenance; pays mighty Deference and Respect to the Party apply'd to; and the true English of all his Behaviour is that beggerly Form, Your Petitioner, as in Duty bound, &c. This is the very Ground of what I observ'd of Caesar; it was the Pride of his Heart that made him say, after the Defeat of Pompey, That He never took so much Delight in any thing, as in being supplicated and sought to; and, to gratifie his own Vanity in this particular, he gave All, even his Enemies, some Hopes of obtaining their Requests in time, that so he might drill them on to repeat and conti∣nue their Applications to him. And what can we make of This? It was not out of any good Intentions to others, but meerly to please himself, that he shew'd himself exora∣ble, and easie of Access. For Kindness comes easie; and therefore as an Emblem of its doing so, the Graces of old were described and painted, with loose, transparent Gar∣ments; not girt close about their Bodies, but flowing and free; to shew, that Favours should have nothing of Trick or Design, nothing strait-lac'd, or of Constraint in them.

[unspec 6] A Third Qualification necessary to recommend any Fa∣vour, is the conferring it readily, and out of Hand; This indeed seems to have some Connexion and Dependence upon the former. For all Kindnesses are to be rated by the Good-Will and Disposition of the Donor; And† 1.17 He who delays his Relief, was so long in a State of Unwil∣lingness to give it. And as that Loathness is a very great Rebate, so the speedy Complyance and Alacrity of the

Mind is a great Enhancement, and doubles the Gift. That cold Indifferency, and those trifling Put-off's, commonly practised upon such Occasions, are approv'd by no Body but Men of Insolence, who make it their Diversion to ban∣ter and abuse People: For Diligence and Dispatch are commendable in all Cases, and in none more requisite than in This now before us. There are Five different Methods of proceeding in it; Three of which are liable to Censure, and the other Two as worthy of Commendation. A Man may deny, but he may keep one in suspense and Expecta∣tion a great while first; This is a double Injury. He may refuse immediately, or he may grant at last; and both these amount much to one, when the Matter comes to be fairly computed; at least,⁂ 1.18 He that is soon said Nay, is less deceiv'd. The Fourth is to grant speedily; and This is very well: But the Best of all is, To prevent a Re∣quest; to foresee Men's Wants and Wishes, and never put them to the Expence of asking at all.

A Fourth Commendation is the Giving without any prospect of a Requital; and indeed This is the very thing, wherein the Virtue of Beneficence chiefly consists; for when once you make it mercenary, it ceases to be a Virtue.* 1.19 There is a great deal less Kindness where there are Ex∣pectations cherish'd of the Benefit reflecting back again up∣on the first Mover. But when there is no Opportunity, no Possibility of a Return; nay, when Matters are carry'd so privately, that the Party oblig'd does not so much as know his Benefactor, then the Benefit shines in its full Lustre. If a Man study the Point of Retaliation, he will give but slow∣ly, and by Peace-meals; because this is the thrifty way of being as little out of Pocket as he can. Now it were much better to renounce all Thoughts of being paid again, than to be slack in doing good; because by coveting this Re∣turn, which is accidental only, and foreign to the purpose, he loses that which is the true and natural Recompence, the inward Complacency of Mind, and the ravishing Satisfacti∣ons which result from a Sense of doing good. A Man should not need to be twice intreated for the same thing. For, as the being guilty of Injustice is of it self abominable and base, and there needs no other Consideration, than the Dis∣honour and Obliquity of the Thing to defer us from it; so

the doing Good is a generous and becoming Act, and it is a Fault to want any other Motive, more than its Native Beauty and Excellence; the staying till we are argu'd and importun'd into Matters of this Nature, betrays either much Ignorance, or great Indifference. In a Word,† 1.20 To keep one's Eye upon the Return, and the Account our Kindness is like to turn to, is not properly doing good with our Sub∣stance, but turning the Penny, and putting it out to Inte∣rest; These are Methods too distant to be reconcil'd, and confounded together; and⁂ 1.21 we should always distinguish between Giving, and driving such a Trade. Such Men are right enough serv'd, when their Expectations are disappoint∣ed. As That Woman must not pretend to Honour and Virtue, who denies her Lover, only to inflame his Passion the more, and in hopes that he will renew his Courtship; so That Man must not think to pass for Liberal and Gene∣rous, who sends away his Petitioner to Day, that he may see him again to morrow, or expends that which he hopes will shortly come home to him. For this Reason Hesiod, and the old Poets, describ'd the Graces in a State of Vir∣ginity; that no Man when he does good Offices, should have regard to multiplying and increase. And especially this falls infinitely short of a Christian's Virtue, whose Ma∣ster hath positively commanded him, upon these Occasions, to hope for nothing again, to look at no other Recompence than that distant and future one, reserv'd for him by his Paymaster in Heaven; and hath describ'd the very Hea∣thens and Publicans, the most ignorant and most scandalous sort of Men by this Character, that even They will give and lend to those, from whom they have any hopes of re∣ceiving as much again.

[unspec 8] Another Rule is, To oblige Men in their own way, so as may be most to the satisfaction of the Receiver; for this convinces him, that what we do of this kind, is entirely for his Sake and Service. And here we shall do well to take notice, that there are two sorts of good Offices. Some are such, as derive Credit and Honour upon the Receiver, and these should be contriv'd in as publick a manner as possible; Others tend to his Profit only; they supply his Wants, or support his Weakness, or cover his Shame, or assist him in

some other Necessity or Distress. And these should be car∣ry'd with all the Privacy imaginable; so much that, if it be possible, none but the Person himself should know it: Nay, if that can any way serve his Interest, or be more acceptable to him, it will be very fit and prudent to keep Him in Ignorance too; to let the Kindness drop into his Mouth, and convey it to him under-hand. For many times a Man's Circumstances require a Relief, which he is out of Countenance to accept; and there is a Tenderness due to the Modesty of Persons reduc'd by Afflictions and Casualties, who cannot change their Souls with their Fortunes. Be∣sides, that all divulging of Kindness is perfectly useless to one that does it upon a true Principle; for a Man's own Conscience cannot possibly be ignorant of his Merit, and this single Witness is as good as Ten thousand others.

[unspec 9] It must likewise be done without the Detriment or just Offence of any other Person whatsoever; but especially without the least Violation of Equity and Justice. For a Man can∣not with any tolerable Sense be said to do good, when he does ill at the same time; Those that want our Relief ought to have it; but we must not relieve Them at other People's Expence. What the Wise Man says of the Hypocrite's Piety is every whit as true of his Liberality and Charity,* 1.22 He that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten, his Offering is ri∣diculous, and He is as one that killeth the Son before his Fa∣ther's Eyes.

[unspec 10] A Seventh Qualification is, To do it prudently and con∣siderately. A Man is sometimes very hard put to it to an∣swer People's Requests, and at a loss, either how to grant, or how to refuse them. This is a Difficulty owing to a very ill Disposition common to most Men, but most pre∣dominant in those that make the Requests; which inclines them to resent a Denial, tho' never so reasonable in its self, and never so tenderly exprest. Some by this means are driven to a very poor, and indeed a very dishonest Refuge; which is, To promise every thing to every Body, tho' they are sensible oftentimes, that it is not in their power; and, which is still worse, conscious to themselves, that it never was in their Intention to make it good; but, all this notwithstand∣ing, they shift off the Difficulty, till it comes to the very Point of Performance; and trust to some Accident or other, to bring them off, by making such an Alteration in their Affairs, that the Obligation shall cease: Or else, if it be still expected, that they should stand by their Engagements,

some paltry Evasions are laid hold of in their Excuse: But still the Evil Day is put far from them; and the Suitor's Mouth is stopp'd for the present. Now All this is quite wrong, and a miserable Instance of Human Frailty; for no Man ought to promise, or encourage the Expectation of any thing which he either is not able, or may not lawfully, or does not really and sincerely design, to make good to the uttermost. And when he finds himself at a Bay, enclos'd between these two Difficulties, of making a Promise, which is either unjust, or inexpedient, or dishonourable and unbecoming his Character to fulfil; or else of giving a De∣nial, which is sure to be ill taken, and breed Mischief and Discontent; the best Course to extricate himself, is to break, to evade the Blow; either by declining a positive Answer, or else by wording his Promise so cautiously, and in gene∣ral Expressions of Civility and good Inclination, that the Person may have nothing of a punctual Engagement to fa∣sten upon. There is, I confess, somewhat of Management and Cunning in doing so, which may make this Advice seem strange and inconsistent, with that Frankess of Tem∣per, and Sincerity in Conversation, which I have been lately recommending; but we are to consider this as a Case of Necessity, that when Men will be unreasonable, we must deal with them as we can; and that they deserve at least to be thus treated.

[unspec 11] An Eighth necessary Ingredient is, That all Things of this Kind be done with a true Spirit of Humanity, and sincere Affection; for such a Temper will be very sensibly concern'd for the Benefit of all Mankind; but more particularly it will bear a very tender regard to the Miseries of the Indi∣gent and Afflicted; which is a Virtue more particularly di∣stinguish'd by the Name of Mercy and Pity. Those who want these Bowels, are Irregularities and Deviations from Nature, and so distant from Grace and Goodness, that the Apostle reckons This, as one of the Characters of the last and worst Times. But then the Compassion I mean here, is a Brave, and Masculine, and Generous Quality; not a Softness and Effeminacy of Soul, which melts into Tears, and creates Perplexity and Disorder of Thought. For This is a faulty Passion, such as weak and wicked People are capable of falling under; concerning which I have already made some Remarks in its proper Place; and demonstrated, that there is a criminal and foolish Pity, as well as a wise, well-govern'd, and commendable one. We ought in∣deed

to succour the Afflicted; but we must not afflict our selves for them, nor make their Miseries our own. This were unprofitable to Them, and greatly prejudicial to Us; nor may we strain a Point of Decency or Duty upon their Account; for Charity cannot dispense with Justice, nor set aside our other Obligations. God himself hath positively forbidden us to favour a Poor Man in his Cause. And God Himself and the Saints are said to be Pitiful and Com∣passienate; but yet not so, as to give any Disturbance to the Perfection of their own Happiness; any more than to impair the Perfection of their Holiness; in the Me∣thods made use of for the succour of those they do pity.

[unspec 12] A Ninth Rule is, to avoid Boasting of our Kindness, and all manner of unnecessary Publication of it. This is a sort of Upbraiding and Reproach; it cancels the Obligation quite, and is the most invidious way of making Men our Enemies; by turning our Favours into Provocations; and therefore it is very well observ'd to this purpose, That he who receives a good Turn, should never forget it; but he who does one, should never remember it.

[unspec 13] A Tenth is, To proceed, and not be weary of well∣doing, but keep our old Favours always fresh, by the Ad∣dition of new one's. This will be a powerful Charm to at∣tract the Affection of all the World, and make Men ambitious of our Friendship. Nor should a Man ever repent of his past Obligations, tho' sensible, that he hath had the Misfor∣tune to scatter his Seed in a barren and ungrateful Soil.* 1.23 Let even the Miscarriage of your Kindness give you Satisfacti∣on, (says the Philosopher) and let not any such Expression es∣cape you, as, I wish I had never done so; For indeed there can be no just Foundation for grudging our Kindness. The Un∣thankful Wretch injures no Body but himself; and the Fa∣vour, that was misplaced, is not utterly lost or thrown away, it is devoted to a Holy and Excellent use, and cannot be destroy'd or profan'd by the Receiver's Fault. If another will needs be wicked, and act otherwise than becomes him, this can never justifie my ceasing to be good. But further, The generous and noble Spirit distinguishes it self by Per∣severance; and triumphs in the Conquest of Ingratitude and Ill-nature, when invincible Beneficence hath heaped Coals

of Fire upon their Heads, melted them down, and softned them into good Temper, and a better Sense of Things. So says the Moralist,* 1.24 A Great Soul bears the ingrateful Man so long, till at last he makes him grateful; for obstinate and reso∣lute Goodness will conquer the worst of Men.

[unspec 14] The Last Direction I shall lay down upon this Occasion is, That when a thing is given, we should let a Man use and enjoy it quietly, and not be troublesome and unseason∣able with him; like some, who when they have put one into any Office or Preferment, will needs be thrusting in their Oar, and execute it for him: Or else procure a Man some considerable Advantage, and then make over what proportion of the Profits they see sit, to themselves. Re∣ceivers in such Cases ought not to endure the being thus im∣posed upon; and any Resentments or Refusals made upon this Account, are by no means the Marks of Ingratitude, but a preservation of their own Rights. And whatever the Benefactor may have contributed to our Preferment, he wipes out the whole Score, and acquits us of all our Obligations, by these imperious and busie Interpositions. The Story is not amiss concerning one of the Popes, who being press'd hard by one of the Cardinals to do somewhat inconvenient, or perhaps unjust, in his Favour; and (as a Motive, which was thought irresistible, or at least a Resentment which he look'd upon as reasonable in case of refusal) the Cardinal re-minding him that His Interest had been formerly at his Service, and his Popedom was owing to it; His Holiness very pertinently reply'd, If You made me Pope, pray let me be so, and do not take back again the Authority you gave me.

[unspec 15] After these several Rules for the directing Men in the Ex∣ercise of Beneficence, it may be seasonable to observe, * 1.25 that there are Benefits of several sorts; some of them much more acceptable than others, and thus some more, and others less engaging. Those are most welcome that come from the Hand of a Friend, and one whom we are strongly dispos'd to love, without any such Inducement: As, on the contra∣ry, it is very grievous and grating to be oblig'd by one, of whom we have no Opinion, and desire of all things not to be indebted to. Those are likewise so, which proceed from a Person whom we have formerly oblig'd our selves;

because This is not so much Gratuity, as Justice and Pay∣ment of Arrears, and so draws very little or no new Debt upon us. Such again are those done in a time of Necessi∣ty, and when our Occasions were very urgent: These have a mighty Influence; they utterly deface all past Injuries and Misunderstandings, if any such there were; and leave a strong Tie upon a Man's Honour; as, on the other Hand, the denying our Assistance in Cases of Extremity, is extremely unkind, and wipes out all Remembrances of any former Benefits. Such, once more, are Those, that can be easily acknowledged, and admit of a suitable Return; as, on the contrary, such as the Receiver is out of all Ca∣pacity to requite, commonly breed Hatred, and a secret Dislike: For there is a Pride in most Men, that makes them uneasie to be always behind-hand; and hence he who is sensible, that he can never make amends for all he hath receiv'd, every time that he sees his Benefactor, fancies himself dogg'd by a Creditor, upbraided by a living Wit∣ness of his Insufficiency or Ingratitude; and these secret Re∣proaches of his own Mind, give great Uneasiness and Dis∣content; for no Bankrupt can bear being twitted with his Poverty. Some again there are, which the more free and honourable, and respectful they are, the more burdensom and weighty they are; provided the Receiver be a Per∣son of Honour and Principle: Such, I mean, as bind the Consciences and the Wills of Men; for they tie a Man up faster, keep him more tight, and render him more cau∣tious and fearful of failing, or forgetfulness. A Man is Ten times more a Prisoner, when confin'd by his own Word, than if he were under Lock and Key. It is easier to be bound by Legal and publick Restraints, and Forms of En∣gagements, than by the Laws of Honour and Conscience; and Two Notaries in this Case are better than One. When a Man says, I desire nothing but your Word, I de∣pend upon your Honesty; such a one indeed shews greater respect: But if he be sure of his Man, he puts him upon a stricter Obligation, and himself upon better Security than Bonds and Judgments. A Man who engages nothing but his Word, is always in Fear and Constraint, and upon his Guard, lest he should forfeit or forget it. Your Mort∣gagee, and he that is under the power of Legal Forms, is deliver'd from that Anxiety, and depends upon his Cre∣ditor's Instruments, which will not sail to refresh his Me∣mory, when the Bonds become due. Where there is any

external Force, the Will is always less intent; and where the Constraint is less, there in proportion the Application of the Will is greater.* 1.26 What the Law compels me to, is ve∣ry ha••dly my own Choice; for I do not properly choose, but sub∣mit to it.

[unspec 16] Benefits produce Obligations, * 1.27 and from Obligations again fresh Benefits spring up: So that Beneficence is recipro∣cally the Child and the Parent, the Effect and the Cause; and there is a twofold Obligation, which we may distin∣guish by an Active and a Passive Obligation. Parents, and Princes, and all Superiours are bound in Duty, and by virtue of their Station, to procure the Benefit and Ad∣vantage of Those, whom either the Laws and Order of Nature, or the political Constitutions of Government, or any other Law relating to their Post, have committed to their Inspection and Care. And not only so, but All in general, whether their Character be Publick or not, if they have Wealth and Power, are by the Law of Nature oblig'd to extend their Help and Bounty towards the Ne∣cessitous and Distress'd. And this is the first sort of Obli∣gation. But then from good Offices thus done, whether they be in some regard owing to us, as flowing from the Duty incumbent upon the Benefactor, by virtue of this former Engagement: Or whether they be the effect of pure Choice, entirely Grace, and nothing of Debt, there arises the Second sort of Obligation, whereby the Recei∣vers are bound to acknowledge the Kindness, and to be thankful for it. All this mutual Exchange, and propaga∣tion of Engagements and good Turns, Hesiod hath intima∣ted to us by his Description of the Graces, when he paints them Three in Number, and all joyning Hands.

[unspec 17] The First, or Original Obligation is satisfy'd by the due Performance of those particular Offices, * 1.28 which each Per∣son's respective Station requires from him. And what these are, we shall very shortly take occasion to explain at large, when the Special Duties, which make up the other Branch of Justice to our Neighbour, come to be consider'd. In the mean while, I desire my Reader to observe, that the Primitive Engagement we are treating of at present, tho' it cannot be utterly dissolv'd, yet it may be tied fa∣ster and closer, or slacken and sit more loose upon us, by several accidental Circumstances; and particularly, it may

be mightily strengthened, or diminished, by the Conditions and Behaviour of those we have to deal with. If the very Relation of a Subject or a Child bind us to them, the Affectionate and Dutiful Carriage of good Subjects, and good Children, enforce the Obligations of Kindness yet more. And so again; Their Misdemeanours, their Ingra∣titude, their Insolence and Unworthy Behaviour, do in a great Measure discharge us of that Tenderness and Care, which they have otherwise a Right to expect from us. And I cannot tell, whether this Observation may not hold in some Degree, with Regard to Natural Defects also. A Man may; perhaps indeed he cannot but, have less Affe∣ction for a Child, or a Kinsman, or a Servant, not only if he be Ill-tempered and Perverse; but if he be deformed, or crooked, or unfortunate in his Person. For God, who made Beauty an attractive Excellence, seems himself to have lowered the Natural Value such Persons are to be rated at. But then, whatever Influence this Consideration may have upon our Minds and Inclinations, it must have none at all upon the outward Administration of our Of∣fice. These unhappy Persons have the same Title to our Justice and Charity; their Necessities put in the same common Claim to our Assistance and Relief; and all the Good we are engaged to upon any publick and general Account, is still to be Punctually performed towards them; and indeed the less to be neglected, because, those Natu∣ral Defects are their Misfortunes only, not their Faults; and as such should excite our Pity to supply the Place of Inclination.

[unspec 18] But that Obligation, * 1.29 which lies before us at present, is the Second Sort; such as arises from Benefits received: And for our better Direction in this Matter, we shall do well to observe.

First of all; That the Laws of Acknowledgment and grateful Returns are Natural and Universal; They are not confined to Humanity alone, but even Brutes them∣selves have a Sense of, and share in them. Nay, and those too, not only tame, and manageable, and Domestick Ani∣mals, which might tempt us to think this Disposition the Effect of Art or Custom; but even the Wildest and most Savage Creatures: For in them we meet with several no∣table Instances of Gratitude; One Example whereof I have formerly mention'd, in the Behaviour of a Lyon, to that

Roman Slave,* 1.30 who was exposed in the Theatre to be de∣voured by him.

Secondly. It is a Virtuous Act, and a certain Indication of a good Mind; for which Reason it is really more va∣luable, than Beneficence it self: For Liberality often pro∣ceeds from Plenty, or Power; Regard to one's own In∣terest or Reputation, and not very often from pure Vir∣tue; But Gratitude cannot spring from any other Cause than an ingenuous Disposition. And therefore, though the doing of good Offices may be the more desirable, yet the grateful Acknowledgment, and studying to requite them, when they are done, is the more Commendable of the Two.

Thirdly, Gratitude is likewise an easie and a pleasant Du∣ty; and yet such as no body can be excused from, upon the Pretence of Disability, or Want of Opportunity; be∣cause it is always in our own Disposal, always present with us. Now, nothing is so easie, as to obey and follow the Dictates of Nature; and nothing so Pleasant and Sa∣tisfactory, as for a Man to acquit himself of Obligations, to come out of Debt, and set himself Free, and upon the Level with his Neighbours.

[unspec 19] From all that hath been said upon this Subject, we cannot but discern, how much of Baseness, and Meanness of Spirit, the Vices of Ingratitude and Neglect carry with them; how deservedly Odious they are to all the World.* 1.31 To call a Man Ingrateful, is the worst and blackest Accusa∣tion you can lay to his Charge. It is an Offence against Na∣ture, and a certain Indication of an ill Temper; a scanda∣lous and reproachful Vice; such as is not to be endured, because it breaks all Society and good Correspondence. The Revenge, which follows upon an Injury, and the In∣gratitude which follows a Kindness, are both Bad and Blameable, but not equally so. Revenge is indeed the stronger and more violent Passion; but it hath less of De∣formity and Degeneracy of Soul, than Ingratitude. The Evils and Diseases of our Minds are like those incident to our Bodies; where those that are most Dangerous and Mor∣tal are not always the most Painful and Acute. And there∣fore Revenge may disorder a Man more, but Ingratitude corrupts his Virtue more. In the Former there is some

Appearance of Justice, Men are not ashamed to pursue and own that publickly; but the latter is all over Infamy and Baseness, and no Man was ever yet so abandoned or har∣dy, to confess or glory in it.

[unspec 20] Now, Gratitude, to render it compleat, and in all Points what it ought to be, must have these following Qualifi∣cations.

First, A Man must receive the Kindnesses done to him, cheerfully and friendly; he must look, and express himself well pleased with them.† 1.32 He that gives a Favour kind Entertainment, hath made the first Payment already. Second∣ly. He must never forget, or be unmindful of it.⁂ 1.33 He that forgets his Benefactor, is of all others the farthest from Gratitude; for how is it possible a Man should discharge this Duty, who hath suffered the Foundation of it to slip quite from under him? Thirdly. He must not be sparing to own and publish it,* 1.34 It is an argument of Ingenuity and becom∣ing Modesty, frankly to confess who we have been the better for; and this is a Reward due to the Maker of our For∣tunes. As we have found by comfortable Experience, the Hearts and Hands of our Friends open to our Advantage, so it is fit they should find our Mouths open too, and our Tongues liberal in the Declarations of their Readiness to assist us. And that our Memory upon this occasion may never want Refreshing, it will be Decent to mention the Advantage we have receiv'd, by the Title of his Gifts, who conferred it upon us. The Fourth and Last is, to make a Return, and Restitution, wherein we may govern our selves according to these Four Rules.

• First, That This be not done too hastily; We should not be extremely Eager and Anxious in the Thing; for this hath a very ill Savour: It looks like Pride, as if we were loath, and scorned to be obliged; and for that Rea∣son were impatient to get out of their Debt. This mini∣sters a very just cause of Jealousie to our Benefactor, that his Kindness was not well taken, when we shew our selves

• so very uneasie under the Engagements it lays upon us. A convenient time therefore is necessary to be taken, and a favourable Opportunity waited for Though this ought not to be very distant neither, nor be put off to too long a Day. For the Graces are painted Young, to hint, that Favours should not grow old upon our Hands. I add farther, that this Opportunity should be one that offers it self of its own Accord; or if of Our seeking, yet so contrived, that it may be void of all Suspicion of Vanity and Osten∣tation.
• Secondly, We should pay back with Interest, and exceed the Proportion of what we receive; like a good Soil, which cannot maintain the Character, if it only produce the Seed again; So a grateful Man* 1.35 will forfeit that Title, if he restore no more than the Principal. But the least we must do, is to return as much as we received; and that with all possible Demonstrations, that we thought our selves un∣der an Obligation, and wished it in our Power, to do more. That what we have done in the mean while, is not look'd upon as full Satisfaction, but only as an Acknow∣ledgment of the Debt, and a Testimony of our Sincerity, and Respect.
• Thirdly, That these Returns be made willingly and chear∣fully; for† 1.36 he is not Grateful, whom Fear, or Force, make desirous to appear so. Especially too, if the Kindness was done Frankly and generously; For we should pay back in the same Coin, and with all the commendable Qualities the Favour brought along to recommend it; And that Man is much to blame who is more ready and cheerful when he is to receive a Kindness, than when it is expected he should requite one.
• Fourthly. If a Man's Circumstances be such, as render him Incapable of actual Restitution, at least he ought to take Care, that he be not wanting in Will, and this Grateful Disposition is the First and Principal Part of the Thing; the very Life and Soul both of the Benefit, and of the Acknowledgment in return for it. This indeed, can have no Witness but it self to testifie for it. But, as the

• Thanks of the Heart, ought to be well accepted, where People are in no Condition to pay more; so the Desires and Offers of obliging us, either when our Friends could not compass their Desires, or when we had no need, or did not think fit to accept their Services, must be acknow∣ledged, as if we had actually received them. For here was the Will, though not the Deed; and this, as I said, is the Chief, and of it self a sufficient Ground of Obliga∣tion to Gratitude.

Notes

• † 1.1

  Gratia oneri est, Ultio in quaestu habetur. Altiùs Injuriae qàum merita descendunt.
• * 1.2

  Motive to Beneficence.
• * 1.3

  Nullà re propius ad Dei naturam accedimus, quam Benefi∣centia: Dei est mortalem succurrere mortali.
• † 1.4

  Nihil tam secundum Naturam, quam juvare consortem Naturae.
• ⁂ 1.5

  Liberalis etiam dandi causas quaerit.
• * 1.6

  Psal. l. 15.
• * 1.7

  Ars quaestuosissima, optima Negotiatio.
• * 1.8

  Hoc habeo quodcun{que} dedi.
• * 1.9

  Several sorts of it.
• * 1.10

  Internal and Exter∣nal.
• * 1.11

  In Benesieio Hoc suspieiendum, quod alteri dedit, ablaturus sibi, utilitatis suae oblitus.
• * 1.12

  Rules for Beneficence.
• * 1.13

  Multum refert, utrum aliquem non excludas, an eligas.
• † 1.14

  Hominibus prodesse Natura jubet ubicunque Homini bene∣ficio locus.
• ⁂ 1.15

  Bis est gratum, quod opus est, si ultro ofteras.
• * 1.16

  Nemo Iubenter debet, quod non accepit, sed expressit.

  Non tulit gratis, qui accepit rogans; imò nihil charius emitur, quàm quod Precibus.
• † 1.17

  Qui tardè fecit, diu noluit.
• ⁂ 1.18

  Minus decipitur, cui negatur celeriter.
• * 1.19

  Tunc est Virtus dare Beneficia non reditura.
• † 1.20

  Non est Beneficium quod in quaestum mittitur.
• ⁂ 1.21

  Demus Beneficium, non foeneremus. Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitavit, cum daret.
• * 1.22

  Ecclus. xxxiv. 18, 20.
• * 1.23

  Beneficii tui etiam infoelicitas placeat: nusquam hae•• vox' Vellem non fecisse.
• * 1.24

  Optimi & ingentis animi est tamdiu ferre ingratum, donec feceris gratum; vincit malos pertinax Bonitas.
• * 1.25

  Several sorts of Kindnesses.
• * 1.26

  Quod me Jus cogit, vix à Voluntate impetrem.
• * 1.27

  Of the Obligation.
• * 1.28

  The first Original Obligation.
• * 1.29

  The Second Eligation.
• * 1.30

  Book I. Chap. 8. Sect. 12.
• * 1.31

  Dixeris Maledicta cuncta, cum ingratum hominem dixeris. Ingratitudo grave vitium, intolerabile quod dissociat homines.
• † 1.32

  Qui gratù Beneficium accepit, primam ejus Pensionem solvit.
• ⁂ 1.33

  Ingratissimus omnium, qui oblitus; nusquam enim gratus fieri potest, cui totum Beneficium elapsum est.
• * 1.34

  Ingenui pudoris est fateri per quos profecerimus, & haec quasi merces Authoris.
• * 1.35

  Ingratus est, qui Beneficium reddit sine usurâ.
• † 1.36

  Ingratus est, qui metu gratus est—Eodem animo benefi∣cium debetur quo datur—Errat siquis Beneficium libentiùs acci∣pit quàm reddit.