Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. VII. The First Part of Justice; or Those Universal Duties, due from All to All in Common. And first of Love.

[unspec 1] LOVE is a Pure, a Holy, and a Generous Fire, * 1.1 kindled in our Breasts by Nature; Its Primitive and Original Warmths were first discern'd in the mutual Affection of Hus∣band and Wife, Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters: But then, cooling by degrees as it dilated it self, Art and Human Invention found means to blow it up again, and supply fresh Fewel, by the Institution of Alliances, Societies, Fraternities, Colleges, and other Incorporations by which the parts of Mankind are cemented and united. Now in re∣gard

that These Artificial Flames underwent the same Fate with those Natural; and burnt more feeble and dim, as they were expanded and subdivided; as also, that their Heat is much allay'd, by the Mixture of Profit, Conveni∣ence, Delight, and such other Selfish Considerations; there∣fore to cherish and recruit this Fire again, Choice hath contriv'd to unite its scatter'd Forces, and contract them into the narrowest compass that can be, by the ferventest and tenderest of all Affections, that between true Friends. And This indeed is Love in Perfection; as much more ardent, and endearing, and refin'd than any other, as the Vital Heat in the Heart is more intense than than of the Li∣ver, or the Blood in the Veins.

[unspec 2] Love is the very Life and Soul of the World; more ne∣cessary to its Subsistence and Well-being (say the Philoso∣phers) than those two Servants which we cannot want, Fire and Water. The Latins therefore have given a good Inti∣mation of This, in terming Friendship Necessitudo, and Friends Necessarii: This is the Sun, the Staff, the Salt of Life; all is dark and comfortless without the Light of this cheering Fire; all seeble and tottering without this firm Support; all flat and insipid, till this Seasons and gives it a grateful Relish.* 1.2 To this purpose that Wise Man, * A Faithful Friend is a strong Defence, the Medicine of Lise; and He that findeth him, sindeth a great Treasure.

[unspec 3] Nor may we suppose this Virtue serviceable and necessa∣ry to private Persons only; * 1.3 or that the Pleasures and Charms of it are confin'd to small Numbers, and secret Retirements; Its Joys and its Beauties are equally, nay more ravishing and delightful, more useful and seasonable to larger Bodies, and publick Communities of Men. For This is the true Mother, the Bearer and Breeder up of Human Society; and all States and Politick Constitutions are maintain'd and preserv'd by virtue of her Influence. None but Tyrants and Monsters are jealous of, or have a dislike to it; not but that even They adore this Virtue in their Hearts, and have a secret Esteem for it; but because they themselves cannot come within the Verge and Benefit of it, therefore they bid it open Defiance. Love is powerful enough of it self to keep the World in order, without the Addition of any other Helps: And were it suffer'd to have free Course, and operate every where with its utmost Vigour, the ne∣cessity of all Laws would be quite superseded. For Laws were only a Resuge taken in to help at a dead List, and

as the best Remedy that cou'd then be found, to supply the Defect and Decays of Love; and the very End and Aim of these is to bring Men by Authority and Compul∣sion, to do That almost whether they will or no, which they ought to have done freely and out of Inclination, upon a Principle of Kindness. But still Laws fall far short of This in Point of Efficacy and Extent: For These can only take cognizance of Overt-Acts, and pretend not to restrain or make Provision against any other: Whereas Love goes to the Bottom, regulates the Heart as well as the Tongue and the Hands; purifies the Will and directs its Operati∣ons; thus sweetning the very Spring, whence all our Acti∣ons flow. Upon this Account Aristotle seems to have said, That Wise and Good Lawgivers have a greater regard to Love, than to Justice. And because in this wretched De∣generacy of Mankind, both the One and the Other of these are but too often slighted and defeated, therefore a Third Remedy hath been thought of, but That still less effectual in its Operations, and less valuable in it self, than either of the Former; which is Force of Arms; than which nothing can be more directly contrary to that first Princi∣ple of Love. And thus you have a short Scheme laid be∣fore you of Politick Institutions and Government; and by what Steps they grew, or rather indeed fell and sunk down into that Condition we now see them in. But still the first and single Principle of Amity is worth All, incompa∣rably above all the rest; as indeed it usually happens in other Cases, that the Second and Subsidiary Remedies ne∣ver come up to the First and Principal; for These are the Effects of Choice, and taken for their own Sakes; but Those the last Shifts of necessitated Men, who in their Ex∣tremity lay hold on any thing that comes next, and must be content to take what they can get.

[unspec 4] There is, it must be confest, * 1.4 great Ambiguity in this Term of Love, and many Distinctions have accordingly been made, which were but needful to give Us a true Idea of the Variety of Passions proceeding from it. The Ancients were wont to divide it into Four sorts, Natural, Social, Hospitable, and Venereal. But this Division so far as I can apprehend, does not do the Business; and therefore we will try another Method, and distinguish it these Three fol∣lowing ways.

First with regard to the Causes that create it; and They are Four. Nature, Virtue, Profit, and Pleasure; and these sometimes advance all together in a Body; sometimes Two or Three of them; and very often One of them appears single. But of all these, Virtue is the noblest Cause, and the most powerful; for This is pure and refin'd, and hath it's Residence in the Heart, the Seat of Love it self. Na∣ture runs in the Blood, Profit lies in the Purse, and Pleasure is consin'd to some particular Part, and works but upon the Senses of the Body, except at a distance, and by Reflection only. Accordingly Virtue is more free, and open, and pure, and firm in its Affection; for all the other Causes, when destitute of this, are sordid and mean, fickle, and of short Continuance. He that loves upon the Account of Virtue, can never be weary, because there are always fresh Charms to attract and entertain him; and if such a Friendship hap∣pen to break off, he hath no reason to complain, because the Breach could not have been, if all that was worth his Love had not fail'd. He that Loves for Profit, if a Breach happen there, is full of immoderate Complaints; but expo∣sed to very just Reproach, for having spared no Pains, and yet gaining nothing by all his Trouble. He that Loves for Pleasure, when the Satisfaction ceases, the Passion ceases too; and he takes leave of the Object, without murmuring or complaint.

[unspec 5] The Second Distinction relates to the Parties concern'd in this Affection; * 1.5 and of These there are Three sorts remark∣able. One proceeds in a direct Line between Superi∣oural, as between Parents and Children, Uncles and Ne∣phews; or Legal and Political, as between a Prince and his Subjects, a Lord and his Vassals, a Master and his Servants, a Turor and his Pupil; a Prelate, or Preacher, or Magistrate, and the People under his Care. Now, if one would speak properly, and go to the Nicety of the thing, This is not true Love; by reason of the Distance and great Disparity between the Circumstances of the Parties, which hinders that Easiness and Privacy, that Familiarity and entire Commu∣nication, which is the Principal Fruit and Consequence of Love; as also, upon the Account of that Obligation there ••es upon them, which leaves such Persons very little at their own Disposal in this Matter, and so takes off from that Free∣dom supposed in this Virtue, making the Affection rather an Effect of Duty and Necessity, than of Choice. And in

consideration of This it is, that we call it by other Names more suitable to those Engagements. Thus Inferiours, we say, owe Honour, and Respect, and Obedience to those above them; and Superiours owe Care, and Protection, and Vigilance, and kind Condescension to those beneath them.

The Second sort of Love, with regard to the Parties, pro∣ceeds in a Collateral Line; and This is between such as are either almost or altogether Equals. This again is Two∣fold, either Natural, or Voluntary. The Natural first, as between Brothers, Sisters, Cousins, and the like; which is more properly call'd Love than the Former, because there is less Disparity in their Condition, and so more room for Familiarity and free Converse; But then here is an Obli∣gation from Nature too, and that such a one as loosens or slackens that Knot in one respect, which it ties and binds us by in another. For many Quarrels and Misunderstandings commonly arise between these Relations, upon the Account of Portion, Inheritance, and that variety of Business and Interests, wherein they are mutually concern'd. Besides, that very frequently there wants that Similitude and exact Agreement of Humours and Inclinations, which is the very Life and Essence of true and entire Affection. I must con∣fess, he is an ill Man, or a Fool, but he is my Brother, or my Relation, are Complaints exceeding common in the Mouths of such Persons: But then there is likewise a free and vo∣luntary Love between Equals, such as that of intimate Ac∣quaintance, and Friends; which hath no other Band of Union but Affection only; and This is what in the strict and proper Signification of the Word, we call Amity or Love.

The Third sort, with respect to the Persons concern'd, is a Mixture and Compund of the two Former; from whence it follows, that each Ingredient having its due Force, this Composition ought to be much stronger than either of the other can possibly be alone. And such is the Conjugal Af∣fection between Husband and Wife. This hath somewhat of the direct and descending Line, by reason of the Supe∣riority of the Husband, and the Subjection of the Wife; and it hath a great deal of the Collateral Line too, upon the account that This is a Society instituted for Familiarity and mutual Comfort. An Intimation whereof Almighty God himself seems to have given us, in the first Creation of Woman, by taking her out of the Substance of Man, yet

not out of his Head, nor his Feet, but his Side. And thus married Persons do, and are oblig'd to exercise these two sorts of Affection in their Behaviour to each other; but each of them so, as may be most seasonable and becoming. In Publick, the Duties of the direct Line take place; for a Wise Woman will always be sure to treat her Husband be∣fore Company with Submission and Respect; but in private and alone, the Familiarities of the Collateral Line, and all imaginable Freedoms are to be practis'd. This Conjugal Affection is likewise twofold; and of a compounded Nature in another Respect. For it is both Spiritual and Corporeal; an Union of Bodies as well as Souls; which is a Qualifica∣tion peculiar to This alone, and such as no other kind of Love can pretend to, except That which is abusively and most injuriously styl'd so, and such as not only all wholsom Laws, but even Reason and Nature it self have always disallow'd and condemn'd. Upon these several Accounts then this Affection of a marry'd State is fitted to be ex∣ceeding great and strong, powerful and endearing. But yet there are two or three Rubs in the way, that check and cool it, and very seldom suffer it to rise up to all the Per∣fections of a just Friendship. One is, That no part here is left to their own Liberty, but the first Entrance upon it. When once they are in, they must even make their best on't, for there is no getting out again. The persisting and conti∣nuance in this Soceity is irreversibly bound upon them; and this Constraint is the universal Condition of all the best and most Religious, that is of all Christian Marriages; For in other Persuasions Men are left more to their Liberty, by the allowing Divorces, sinal Separations, and Nullities of this Obligation. Another (if the Ladies will give us leave to say so) is the Weakness of the Sex; whose Strength of Mind is not sufficient to keep up, and hold pace in a per∣fect Conference, and unreserv'd Communication of all a Man's Thoughts; and the Contemplations of a penetrating and judicious Mind. So that here is quite another Turn of Soul; it wants Substance and Solidity to keep the Knot right; and this Conjunction is like the fastening of one thing which is stubborn and inflexible, to another that is slender, and limber, and yielding; which for want of Strength to bear up against it, buckles under, and slips away from it. A Third Impediment to that entire Affection in a Conjugal State, may be imputed to the great Intricacy of Business that attends it; the Children, the Relations on both sides;

and a great many other Uneasinesses and Perplexities, which, tho' but an Accidental Inconvenience, and not constant and unavoidable, as the two former are, yet is frequent and considerable enough to deserve a Remark here, and too of∣ten disturbs the Happiness and Quiet, and cools the vigour of that Affection, which is the Blessing and Ornament of that State.

[unspec 6] The Third Distinction of Love concerns the Strength and Intenseness, or the Weakness and Remissness of it.* 1.6 With regard to This Consideration it is again Twofold. One Common and Imperfect, which indeed ought rather to be term'd Benevolence or Well-wishing, Familiarity, Particular Acquaintance: And this varies exceedingly, and may differ almost infinitely in the degrees of it, each of which may be more or less close, and intimate, and strong than other: The Other is Perfect; and this is a sort of Phoenix, few, if any one Instance of it to be seen in the World; so far from being practised by Mankind, that they can scarce form a tolerable Idea of it to themselves; or reach up to the Force and Excellencies of the thing, by all the Strength of mere Imagination.

For the clearer and more distinct Understanding of this Difference, it may be of some Service to us to give a De∣scription of each, and to confront them with one another; as for Example:

• 1. The Common may be conciliated, and come to its utmost Pitch in a very little while; but long Time, and great Deliberation must go to the Finishing a perfect Amity. Such Persons, according to the Proverb, must eat at least a Bushel of Salt together, before they can be qualify'd to con∣tract an entire Friendship.
• 2. That which is Common may be contracted and car∣ry'd on by an infinite variety of Accidents, which contribute to our Profit and Delight; whereupon a Wise Man prescri∣bed these two Rules for the attaining to it; That a Man should be entertaining in his Discourse, and obliging and serviceable in his Actions; for if the One of these do but furnish out Pleasure, and the other promote the Interest of the Persons with whom we converse, all that a Common Friendship pretends to, is done effectually: But now, That which I call a Perfect Friendship is never built upon such mean Considerations. Nothing less than the Contemplation and mutual Experience of an unfeign'd and vigorous Virtue can be Foundation strong enough for so noble a Super∣structure.

• 3. The Common Friendships may extend themselves to a great Number of Persons: But the true entire Friendship admits but of One Partner; and this is to all Intents and Purposes a Second Self: so that altho' the Persons are Two, yet their Hearts and Affections are One and the Same. And the necessity of confining such Friendships to Two on∣ly, is very evident from the Nature of the thing. For to suppose more, destroys the Notion, and obstructs all the Offices and Operations of it. For instance, To succour and assist a Friend in his Distress, is an indispensable Obligati∣on; but if we put the Case of Two such standing in need of our Help at the same time; and not only so, but de∣siring Kindnesses which are inconsistent and contrary to one another, Which way shall I turn my self; or how can I discharge my Obligations, when one of these is favour'd and relieved to the Prejudice and Neglect of the other? Again, My Friend imparts a Secret to me, What Distraction is here? If I reveal it, This is a Breach of Trust and Friendship, which obliges me to be Faithful in keeping what is thus de∣posted with me: But then, if I do not communicate it to my other Friend, this is Unfaithfulness too; for it is ano∣ther Law of true and entire Friendship, to unbosom themselves freely, and to have no Reserves from each other. Thus you see the Confusion and Perplexity, the Impracticableness and utter Impossibility indeed of more Friends than One, in the highest and most genuine Acceptation of the Word. And, no doubt, Multiplication of Parts, and Division, is, gene∣rally speaking, an Enemy to Perfection, as Union is a natu∣ral and inseparable Property of it.
• 4. The Common Friendship admits of Diminution, and Increase; it is subject to Exceptions, Limitations, different Modifications and Forms; it grows warmer and colder; and comes and goes by Fits, like an intermitting Fever; according as the Person is Absent or Present; as his Merits are more or less; and the Kindnesses he does more or less frequent and engaging; and many other Considerations there are, capable of making an Alteration in our Affections of this kind. But now, That Friendship, which is perfect and entire, is much otherwise; firm and constant to it self, even and steady: Its Warmths are healthful, its Temper regular, and all its Motions vigorous and uniform.
• 5. The Common Friendship admits and stands in need of several Rules for its Direction; several Wise Cautions con∣triv'd by considerate Persons for the regulating and restrain∣ing

• it, and preventing any future Inconveniences, which may happen to arise from Unwariness, and an unguarded Con∣versation. One of these is, To love our Friend so far as may be consistent with the Preservation of our Piety, and Truth, and Virtue. For even that old Expression of Ami∣cus usque ad Aras, implies this Restriction. Another is to love him so, as if you were sure one Day to hate him; and to hate a Man so, as if you were hereafter to love him; that is, To be prudent and reserv'd in your Passions and Affections, and not abandon one's self so entirely, or be so violent in either Extreme, that a Man should have just oc∣casion to repent, and condemn his former Behaviour, if, at any time hereafter there should happen to be a Breach, or any Coldness grow betwixt them. A Third is, To come into our Friend's Assistance of our own accord, and without being call'd. For it puts a Friend out of Countenance to demand his Right; and he buys a Kindness dear, when forc'd to ask what he looks upon as his just Due, and that which he conceives he ought to be prevented in. Therefore these Obligations are never fully satisfy'd, except we be always ready and early in our Courtesies, and, if that be possible, beforehand with his very Wishes. A Fourth is not to be troublesome to our Friends, by entertaining them with dis∣mal Stories of our own Misfortunes, and being always in the complaining Strain. Like Women, that make it their whole Business to move Pity, and are constantly magnifying their own Hardships and Sufferings. Now all these are very useful and seasonable Directions, fit to be observ'd in common Friendships: But in That more sublime and perfect one, there is no occasion at all for these; This disdains all Forms, and is above the Pedantick Niceties of Ceremony and Reserve.

[unspec 8] This is what we shall attain to a more just and distinct Notion of, * 1.7 by giving the Reader a Draught and Descri∣ption of Friendship in Perfection: Which is no other, in short, than a free, full, and entire Mingling of Souls through∣out, and in every part and point. To explain this now in Three Particulars. I say First, It must be a Mingling and (if I may so express it) an Incorporating, and not a Con∣junction of Souls only. For this gives us a Resemblance of Solid Bodies, which, how strongly and artificially soever they may be tack'd together in one part, yet do not touch in all; And not only so, but that very Ligament which joins them together, may be dissolv'd, or cut asunder, and each of these Bodies may subsist, and remain, and feel it self entire, after

Separation. But now in these perfect Friendships, the Souls of Men are entirely absorpt in each other; so confounded, as never to be distinguish'd, never to be parted again; like Liquors well mix'd, which can never be drawn off from each other. And That is the perfect, the universal Com∣munion of Minds, that entire Agreement of Judgments and Inclinations, which I rather chose to express by mingling of Souls, as a Phrase that gives us a stronger Idea of this U∣nion, than any Resemblance taken from Solids could possi∣bly do. Secondly, It is free, and purely the Work of Choice, a generous and spontaneous Act of the Will, without any Obligation, or distant Inducement, foreign to the Worth and Agreeableness of the Parties. For nothing is more vo∣luntary than Love; and so much of Constraint as you put upon it, so much you weaken the Affection, and take off from the true Nature and Commendation of the Virtue. Thirdly, It is universal, and without Exception; no Reser∣vation of any thing, nothing that can be call'd ours in bar to our Friend's Title and Pretensions. Estate, Honours, Preferments, Judgments, Thoughts, Wills, all laid open and in common; nay, even Life it self is what both have equal Right in. From This so universal and entire Com∣munication it is, that that those Maxims have taken place, of Friendship finding or making all equal; of Friends having no Property; and the like; such can no longer lend or bor∣row; they cannot give or receive; there is no such thing as Beneficence and Obligation, Acknowledgments or Returns, or any such Offices of Kindness or Gratitude practicable or in force for Their Condition. These indeed are the Arts and Methods by which ordinary Friendships are cherish'd and maintain'd; but at the same time that they are Te∣stimonies of Affection, they are Marks of Distinction too. Whereas, in this Case, it is as with one's own Self; and as a Man cannot be oblig'd to himself for any Service done to his own Person, nor owe any Gratitude upon the Ac∣count of that Kindness and Readiness to relieve his own Wants, which he feels in his Breast, no more can one true Friend be indebted to another upon any the like Occasions. Nay, even Marriage, tho' it give us the best, yet is even That but a distant and feeble Resemblance of the Divine Union we are now treating of. The Laws allow no such thing as Distinct Properties, and Donations betwixt Man and Wife. And therefore in Friendship could there be any such thing as giving and receiving, the Benefactor would be

That Person who made use of his Friend's Kindness, and so put it in his Power to do what became him. For the prin∣cipal Design, and eagerest Wish of each Party, being to snatch every occasion of mutual Assistance and Benefit; He who surnishes the Opportunity, and gratifies this Desire, is properly the Donor. Since it is to his Bounty that the o∣ther ows his greatest Happiness; for such is the Satisfaction of compassing his Desires, and effecting that which is incom∣parably more pleasant and dear to him, than all the Advan∣tages and Enjoyments in the World besides.

[unspec 9] Some few Instances there are of this entire Friendship, * 1.8 and unreserv'd Communication of Souls in ancient Story. When Blosius was apprehended, upon the Account of a mighty Friendship known to be between Him and Tiberius Gracchus, who was already under Sentence of Condemnati∣on for Seditious Practices; upon Examination what he would have done for his sake, he reply'd, That he would have stuck at nothing to do him Service. The Judges pro∣ceeded further, and asked, Whether if Gracchus had defir'd him to set the Temples on Fire, he would have comply'd with so Sacrilegious a Request: He answer'd again, That Gracchus was not capable of desiring so wicked a Proof of his Friendship; but upon supposition that he could, he should not have refused it. Now This was a very bold and a dangerous Answer. The first part of it indeed, that Grac∣chus could not entertain a Thought so impious, was no more than he might well enough venture to say; because, ac∣cording to the Account we have already given of this Mat∣ter, every Friend in perfection is not only fully acquainted with the Disposition, and all the Thoughts of his Friend, which sufficiently qualifies him to be responsible for them all; but he is absolute Master of them, and so can dispose of them, as much as of his own. But that last Clause of doing so if Gracchus had requir'd it, was idle and impertinent; for it does not in any Degree take off from what he had affirm'd before, concerning his Assurance of Gracchus not en∣tertaining any such Desire, nor make the thing one Whit better or worse. Now this Instance shews us the perfect Harmony of Souls, with regard to the concurring Judgments and Inclinations of such Friends.

The Second Instance relates to their Fortunes. To which purpose we read of Three Friends, (This Number of Three I confess is a Contradiction to the Rules here proposed, and tempts us to think that this Friendship, tho' very ex∣traordinary,

had not yet attained to all the Degrees of just a Perfection) But Three however there were: Two of them in very plentiful, the other in as low Circumstances, who had a poor old Mother, and a young unmarry'd Daughter, both lying upon his Hands. This Person upon his Death∣bed makes a Will, and bequeaths to One of his Friends his poor feeble Mother to maintain; to the Other his Daugh∣ter, with a Charge to see her as well match'd as possibly he could; and in case either of these happen'd to fail, the whole Care of both was to devolve upon the Other. A notable Legacy you'll say; and so the World then thought it; for every Body made themselves extremely merry with so odd a Bequest. But, while the World ridicul'd this un∣usual piece of Executorship, the Heirs themselves took the Administration upon them with wonderful Satisfaction; and each was greedy to get his Legacy into his possession. Within a very few Days after, the Legatee to whose share the Mother fell, happen'd to die too; and then the surviving Coheir, succeeding into the whole Concern, took particu∣lar good Care of the Mother; and, assoon as conveniently he could, enquired out convenient Matches for both, mar∣ry'd his own only Daughter, and that of his deceas'd Friend, upon one and the same Day, and divided his whole Estate equally between them. Now, according to this Case thus stated, as you see, it hath been the constant Opinion of the Wisest Men, that He who dy'd first, gave greater Demon∣strations of his Friendship, and was a more bountiful Bene∣factor, than either of the Survivors; that he really be∣queath'd them the most valuable Inheritance, by putting in∣to their Hands such occasions of doing good; and allowing them the Satisfaction of laying themselves out in his Service, as became their Character, and the Necessities of his own Family requir'd.

The Third Example goes higher still, and reaches to Life it self. And here we may reflect upon that well-known Story of two Friends. That a Tyrant had condemn'd one of them to die, and had appointed the Day and Hour of his Execution; but he with great Importunity obtain'd Leave to go and take Care of his Affairs and Family, upon this Condition, that he should give Security, and find one to be bound Bo∣dy for Body, for his surrendring himself again at the Time prefix'd; and in case he fail'd, then his Bail to undergo the same Capital Punishment, which had been awarded to his

Principal. The Condition was readily accepted, and the Prisoner produces his Friend to be bound for him, who accordingly was imprison'd in the other's stead. The Day of Execution came, and this Bondsman prepar'd himself to die with all imaginable Cheerfulness. But, as he was going about it, the Condemn'd Person came in, releas'd his Security, and offer'd himself to the fatal Stroke. This strange Genero∣sity made such Impression upon the Tyrant, that, much out of Countenance, and full of Astonishment, he was con∣quer'd into Mercy; set them both at Liberty, and made it his Request, that these brave Men would accept of the Proffers he made of his Kindness and Affection, and do him the Honour to admit him into their Number, and reckon that they had now a Third sincere and generous Friend.

Notes

• * 1.1

  What it is.
• * 1.2

  Ecclus. vi. 14, 16.
• * 1.3

  Its Useful∣ness.
• * 1.4

  Distin∣guish'd as to Caulis
• * 1.5

  The Persons.
• * 1.6

  Degrees.
• * 1.7

  Perfect Friendship, what.
• * 1.8

  Examples of Friend∣ship.