Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

Of the Policy fit for a Sovereign Prince in the Admini∣stration of Government.

The Preface.

THE Instructions I am bere about to give, are design'd it be useful to Sovereign Princes, and Governors of States. Their Transactions and Methods are indeed in their own Na∣ture Ʋncertain, Ʋnlimited, Difficult to be known and practised, and the Rules necessary for their high Station, next to impossi∣ble

to be cast into any certain Form, or prescribed and deter∣mined in particular Precepts. But however, we must try, if we can a little clear this matter, and make it in any degree more easie and practicable. What is proper to be said upon this Sub∣ject may be reduc'd to two General Heads, wherein the two Great Duties of a Sovereign consist. The First comprehends under it all those principal Pillars, by which the State is support∣ed, and treats of Parts of Governments: so essential to the Publick, that they are the very Nerves and Bones of this Body Politick; its Sense, its Motion, its Form is lost with, and pre∣served by them; and these the Prince is in a special manner concerned to take care, that Himself and the State be constantly well furnished with. The Chief of them, I think, are these Seven: 1. A true Ʋnderstanding of his Government, the People, and their Constitution. 2. Personal Virtue. 3. Behaviour and Address. 4. Counsellors. 5. Publick Treasures. 6. Men and Arms. And 7. Alliances. The Three first are in his own Person; the Next in himself and those near his Person; and the Three last are more at a distance from him. The Second General Head consists in Action; in carefully employing, and making the best Advantage of the fore∣mention'd Means; that is, in one Word, but that a very compre∣hensive one, in Governing well, and keeping up his Honour and Authority; yet so, as at the same time to secure the Affection and good Ʋnderstanding both of his own Subjects and strangers. But to speak more distinctly and particularly, this Part is Twofold, Civil and Military. Thus you have in a very summary and general way the whole Scheme of Government laid before you at once; Thus is the Work cut out, and the first rude Lines drawn, of what the following Chapters must attempt to finish and fill up. For the better Convenience then of the Reader and my self, I will according to what hath been here propos'd, divide this Subject of Policy, or Prudence in Government into Two parts. The First shal be the Provisionary Part, or the Care of being furnish'd with these seven Necessary Advantages; The Second, and That which presupposes the former already to be done, shall be the Administration, or Management of the Prince. This Subject hath indeed had great Right done to it by Lipsius al∣ready; who wrote an excellent Treatise, in a method peculiar to himself, but the Substance of it you will find all transplanted hither. I have not at all bound my self to his Order, as ap∣pears by this general Division already laid down, and will more plainly be seen in the following parts of this Discourse; nor have I taken the whole of him; but have left part of what was his behind, and added to it what I thought fit besides.

CHAP. II. The First Branch of Policy, or Prudence in Government, which is the Provisionary Part.

[unspec 1] THE First thing requisite upon this occasion, * 1.1 and That which must lead the way to all the rest, is a due Know∣ledge of the State or Government: For in all manner of Prudence, the leading Rule is Knowledge; and he, who is defective in this Qualification, is thereby rendred utterly in∣capable of all besides, as hath already been intimated in the Second Book. For, whoever undertakes any sort of Action or Management, must begin with informing himself, what his Business is, and with whom it lies. And therefore this Prudence, which undertakes to order and dispose whole Na∣tions and Kingdoms; and whose peculiar Excellence and Commendation lies in the dexterity and skill of Governing and Administring the Affairs of the Publick to the best ad∣vantage, is manifestly a Relative Virtue; and the Terms of this Relation, whose Concern in this case is reciprocal, are the Sovereign and his Subjects: The first step then toward discharging this Duty, is a right understanding of the Parties; that is, of the People and their Subjection on the one hand; and the Supreme Authority of the Prince on the other; for both these I include in the Knowledge of the Govern∣ment.

First then, A Man in that elevated Post should apply him∣self to Study and understand the Humour and Complexion of the People. For this Knowledge will be a very great direction, and model the Person, to whose Governance they are committed. What the Disposition of the Common Peo∣ple is in general, hath been at large explain'd in the First Book, and their Picture drawn at full length. There we observ'd that their Reigning Qualities are, Fickleness and Inconstancy; A Spirit of Faction and Discontent; of Im∣pertinence and Folly; Love of Vanity and Change; Inso∣lence and insupportable Pride in Prosperity; Cowardice and Dejection of Mind in Adversity. But besides these Chara∣cters, which are common to Persons of that Condition every where, a Man must be still more particularly instructed in the Temper and Complexion of that Country, and those

Subjects, where himself is concern'd. For the Dispositions of Men differ extremely, and are almost as various as the Towns wherein they dwell, or the Persons that inhabit them. Some Nations are in a peculiar and distinguishing manner, Passionate or Cholerick, Bold and Warlike, Cowardly or Luxurious, addicted to Extravagance, to Wine, to Women; Laborious or Slothful; Frugal or Expensive. And of those, who agree in these Qualities, there is a difference in the measure; in Some they are more, and in Others less pre∣dominant. So necessary is that Rule,* 1.2 That The Common People must be Studied, first to know what they are, and then what is the best method of dealing with them. And in this Sense it is, that we are to understand the Old Philosophers; when they pronounce Subjection and Obedience a necessa∣ry preparation to the Art of Ruling;† 1.3 No Man (says Seneca) ever Governs well, who hathnot first liv'd under Government, and known what it is to be Commanded himself. Not that we are to infer from hence any Necessity, or indeed so much as a Possibility, that all Princes ought to be rais'd to that Dignity from an Inferior Condition; for several of them are born Princes; and a Great many Governments pass on in a Line, and come by Succession, and Proximity in Blood: But the true Importance of that Maxim is, That whoever is desirous to be a good Governor, must inform himself of the Humors and Inclinations of his Subjects, and understand, which are the reigning Qualities inthem, as perfectly well, as if He had been one of the same Rank himself, and had felt and been acted by them in his own Person.

But then it is no less necessary, that the Condition of the Government should be likewise thoroughly understood; and that not only What Sovereignty and Power is in general, ac∣cording to the description formerly given of it in the First Part of this Treatise; but the Frame and Temper of that Government and that State in particular, where this Person himself presides, what the Form and Constitution of it is, how it was six'd and adjusted, and what Extent of Power is vested in him; Whether it be an Old or Later Establish∣ment; whether it descend by Inheritance, or whether it be conferred by Election; whether it were obtain'd by Re∣gular

and Legal Methods, or whether acquired by Force of Arms; how far his Jurisdiction reaches; what Neighbours are about him; what Strength and what Conveniences he is provided with. For according to these, and a great many other Circumstances, too tedious to be specificed here, a different sort of Conduct will be found necessary. The Scepter must be swayed, as such Considerations shall dictate; One and the same Method will not serve all alike; but the Rules and the Administration must be suited to the Temper of the Beast, and as this proves to be harder or softer mouth'd, so the Rider must take care to keep a slacker or a stiffer Rein. [unspec 2]

After this Knowledge of the State and Government,* 1.4 which as I said, is in the Nature of a Preface, or Indroduction to all the following Heads, the next both in Order and Dignity is Virtue. And no Man can wonder that so ho∣nourable a Place is assign'd to This, among the necessa∣ry Qualifications of a Governour, who at all considers, how absolutely and indispensably needful it is to a Prince, and that, both upon his own Account, and for the Bene∣fit of the Publick. First of all, it is highly reasonable, as Cyrus well observes, That he, who is above all the rest in Honour and Authority, should be so in Goodness too; This is no more, than what such a Great and Elevated Sta∣tion may justly seem to require of him. Then his own Re∣putation is nearly concerned in it; For Common Fame makes it one great part of its Business to pick up and dis∣perse every thing that our Governours do or say: The Prince stands exposed to the publick View; every Eye is upon him, and he is curiously watched. There is no such thing in Nature, as Privacy for Princes; They can no more be conceal'd, than the Sun in the Firmament. They are the constant Subject of Discourse in every Company; and so are sure to have a great deal of Good, or a great deal of Ill said of them. And it is of exceeding great Con∣sequence to any Governour; both with regard to his Perso∣nal, and the Common Interest and safety, what Opinion the World have of him. Nor is it enough, that the Supreme Governour be Virtuous in his own Temper and Conversati∣on, but he is likewise oblig'd to take good care, that his Subjects be like him in Goodness. And how deeply This concerns him, I appeal to the Universal Consent of all Good and Learned Men, who with one Voice declare it impossi∣ble for that Kingdom, or Nation, that City or less

Society of Men to prosper, nay, so much as to subsist long, who have banished Virtue from among them. And those nauseous Flatterers prevaricated much too grossly, who pretend that it is for the Advantage and Security of Princes, that their Sub∣jects should be abandon'd to Wickedness and Vice: Because say they, This emasculates their Minds, and renders them more tame and servile intheir Dispositions; so Pliny in his Panegyrick, says,* 1.5 They are more patient under Slavery, who are fit for nothing but to be Slaves. For, quite contrary, we find by unquestionable Experience, that the more Vicious Men are, the more do they flinch, and grow unruly under the York: The Good and the Gentle, the Meek and Sweet-temper'd Men, these are much better qualified to live in Fear and Awe of Authority themselves; than to be an Awe or give occasion of Jealousie to their Governours.† 1.6 Every Man is more ungovernable, in proportion, as he is a worse Man, says Salust: Mutiny, and Discontent, and per∣petual Uneasiness, are the sure Attendants of a profligate Mind. On the other hand, Good Men are very easily kept in order; they give their Superiours little trouble, but had rather submit with Reverence and Fear, than be a Terror or Di∣sturbance to those above them. Now there cannot be a more powerful Motive, a more efficacious Mean of bringing o∣ver the People, and forming them into Virtue, than the Example of the Prince. For (as daily Experience shews,) e∣very one affects to be like Him; and the Court is the Standard of Manners, as well as of Fashions. The Rea∣son is, because Example is what Men are sooner moved, and more strongly wrought upon by, than Laws; for this is a Law in dumb Show, but hath more Credit and Au∣thority, than the Voice of the Law speaking in Commands.⁂ 1.7 We do not want Precepts so much as Patterns, and Example is the softest and least invidious way of Commanding; says Pli∣ny. Now, if all Example be a mighty Inducement, That of Great Persons must be so in a Degree proportionable to their Quality and Station: For all the Little Ones fix their Eyes and Hearts here, and take their Observations from those above them. They swallow all without chew∣ing;

admire and imitate at a venture; and conclude, that their Superiours would not be guilty of any Behaviour un∣becoming their Character; and if They do a thing, it must needs be excellent and good. And on the other hand, Go∣vernours are so sensible of the Force of this Motive too, that they think their Subjects indispensably obliged to those Rules which they are content to be governed by them∣selves; and that their own doing what they would have done by others, is singly a sufficient Inducement, to bring it into Practice and common Vogue, without the Forma∣lity of a Command to enforce it. From all which it is a∣bundantly manifest, that Virtue is exceeding necessary and advantageous to a Prince, both in point of Interest, and in point of Honour and Reputation.

[unspec 3] All Virtue is so in truth, without Exception, though not All equally neither; for there are four Species of it,* 1.8 which seem to have greater and more commanding Influence, than the rest; and those are Piety, Justice, Valour and Cle∣mency. These are more properly Princely Qualities, and shine brightest of all the Jewels that adorn a Crown; of the Excellencies, I mean, that even a Prince's Mind can be possibly endued with. This gave occasion to that most Il∣lustrious of all Princes, Augustus Caesar, to say, That Pie∣ty and Justice exalt Kings, and translate them into Gods: And Seneca observes, that Clemency is a Virtue more suita∣ble to the Character of a Prince, than to persons of any other Quality whatsoever.

Now the Piety of a Prince consists and must exert it self in the Care and Application, which he ought to use for the Preservation and Advancement of Religion, of which e∣very Sovereign ought to consider himself, as the Guardian and Protector. And thus indeed he should do for his own sake; for this Zeal and pious Care will contribute very much to his own Honour and Safety. For they that have any regard for God, will not dare to attempt, no not so much as to contrive or imagine, any Mischief against that Prince who is God's Image upon Earth; and who plainly ap∣proves himself to be such, by his zealous and tender Con∣cern for the Glory and the Institution of his great Ori∣ginal. And in effect, this tends no the Security of the People too, and the Quiet of the Government in gene∣ral. For, as Lactantius frequently urges, Religion is the common Band, that links Communities together; Society could not be supported without it. Take off this Re∣straint,

and the World would immediately be overrun with all manner of Wickedness, Barbarity and Brutality. So great an Interest hath every Government in Religion; so strong, so necessary a Curb is the Sense, and Fear, and Re∣verence of it to unruly Mankind. Thus on the other hand, even Cicero, who does not appear to have been any mighty Devote, makes it his Observation, That the Romans owed the Rise, and Growth, and flourishing Condition of their Commonwealth, to their Exemplary Respect for Reli∣gion, more than to any other Cause whatsoever. Upon this account, every Sovereign is very highly concerned, and strictly oblig'd to see, that Religion be preserv'd entire, and that no Breaches be made upon it: That it be encou∣rag'd and supported, according to the establish'd Laws, in all its Rights, Ceremonies, Usages, and Local Constituti∣ons: Great Diligence should be used to prevent Quarrels, Divisions, and Innovations; and severe Punishments inflicted upon all who go about to alter, or disturb, or infringe it. For, without all Controversie, every Injury done to Religion, and all rash and bold Alterations in it, draw af∣ter them a very considerable damage to the Civil State; weaken the Government,* 1.9 and have a general ill Influence upon Prince and People both; as Moecenas very excellently argues, in his Oration to Augustus.

[unspec 4] Next after Piety, Justice is of greatest Consequence and Necessity;* 1.10 without which Governments are but so many Sets of Banditi, Robbers, and Invaders of the Rights of their Brethren. This therefore a Prince ought by all means to preserve and maintain in due Honour and Regard; both in his own Person and Conversation, and in the Observance of those under his Jurisdiction.

1. It is necessary to be strictly observed by the Sove∣reign Himself: For nothing but Detestation and the ut∣most Abhorrence is due to those Barbarous and Tyranni∣cal Maxims, which pretend to set a Prince above all Laws; and to complement him with a Power of Dis∣pensing at Pleasure with Reason, and Equity, and all man∣ner of Obligation and Conscience; which tell Kings that they are not bound by any Engagements; and that their Will and Pleasure is the only Measure of their Duty; That Laws were made for common Men, and not for such as They; That every thing is Good and Just, which they find most practicable and convenient: In short, that their Equity is their Strength; and whatever they can do,

that they may do.* 1.11 No Man ever presumes to prescribe to Princes, or include them within the Verge of any Laws, but their own Inclinations. In the highest Post, Justice is always on the stronger side: That which is most profitable, can never be unlawful, Holiness and Piety, Faith and Truth, and com∣mon Honesty are the Virtues of private Men: Princes may take their own Course, and are above these vulgar Dispensations. So say Pliny and Tacitus. But against this false Doctrine, too apt to be liked by Persons in Power, I entreat my wise Prince, to oppose the really Excellent and Pious Sen∣tences and Directions of Grave and Good Philosophers.

They tell you, That the greater Power any Man is invested with, the more regular and modest he should be in the Exercise of it; That this is one of those Things which must always be used with a Reserve; and the more one could do, the less it will become him to do. That the more absolute and unbounded any Man's Authority is, the greater Check, and more effectual Restraint he hath upon him. That every Man's Ability should be measured by his Duty; and what he may not, that he cannot do.

† 1.12 He that can do what he will, must take care to will but a very lit∣tle. And Great Men should never think they have a Liberty of doing what ought not to be done.

The Prince then ought to lead the way, and be first and most eminent for Justice and Equity; and particularly he must be sure to be very punctual to his Word; and to keep his Faith and his Promise most inviolably; because Fide∣lity and Truth is the Foundation of all manner of Justice whatsoever; whether to all his Subjects in general, or to each Person in particular. How mean soever the Party, or how slight soever the Occasion be, still this Word must be Sacred. When he hath thus provided for his own Beha∣viour, his next Care is, to see that others are Just too. For This indeed is the Fundamental Article of all Government, the very End of its Institution, and the particular Trust put into the Hands of every Sovereign. He hath his Power committed to him for this very Purpose, To take care that

Justice be equally distributed, and Wrongs and Oppressions repress'd, by interposing his Arbitration and the Power of the Sword. Therefore he ought in Person, or in Authori∣ty and Deputation, to hear and decide Causes; to let eve∣ry one have a fair Tryal, to award to each Party what by the Letter of the Law, or by the equitable Construction of it, belongs to him; and all this without Delays, or Quirks, or Trickings; without Perplexing the Case, or Counte∣nancing Foul and Litigious Practice: And in order hereunto it were very well if that Way of Pleading now in use, could be eithr reformed, as it ought, or quite turn'd out of doors; which is at present become a most vile, most de∣structive Trade, a perfect Market,† 1.13 A Robbery and Picking of Pockets Countenanc'd by the Law, and upheld under the Pretence of a Learned and Honourable Profession. It will also be advisable, to avoid, as much as may be, Mul∣tiplicity of Laws and Decrees, which only breed Confusion, and are{inverted ⁂} 1.14 A Symptom of a sick and corrupt State, as sure as taking much Physick and wearing many Plaisters are Signs of gross Humours and ill Health. For unless some Care of this kind be taken, that which is established by Good and Wise Las, will be defeated and quite overturned again, by too many Laws.

One thing, by the way, ought not to be omitted upon this Occasion; which is, that the Justice, and Virtue, and Pro∣bity of a Prince is not in all Points ty'd up to the same Me∣thods, and manner of Proceeding with that of Persons in a private Capacity. It hath a larger Range, and freer Scope allow'd; and all this Latitude is Indulgence little enough; no more than is absolutely necessary for the Weighty and Hazardous Office our Governours are engag'd in, and the Infinite Unconceivable Difficulties that arise in their Admi∣nistration. This makes it reasonable for Them to go in a Way by Themselves; the common and direct Tract is too Narrow; they are oblig'd to shift, and dodge, and wheel about, and whatever Censures People, who understand not the Nature of the Case, may pass, as if every thing that is unusual and indirect, were presently Wicked and Unjust; yet those, who are capable of considering, and competent Judges of the Matter, must admit it to be lawful and al∣lowable,

as well as prudent and needful for them to do. For Prudence must be mix'd with Justice; some Feints and Stra∣tagems, and little Slights made use of; and (as they common∣ly express it) when the Lion's Skin is not big enough of it self, it must be eked out, by tacking a Fox-Skin to it.

Nor would I be so mistaken here neither,* 1.15 as to be thought a Justifier of these crafty Dealings at all times, and in all Cases indifferently. By no means, This is not a standing Rule of Action; But must be reserv'd for special Occasions; and particularly, there must be three Conditions to war∣rant it. The first is absolute Necessity, or at least, some e∣vident and very considerable Advantage to the Publick (that is, to the Prince and the State, who are to be look'd upon as One and the Same, and their Interests altogether inseparable) and this must by all means be consulted, and made the chief Aim. This is a natural, an indispensable Obligation: For the Publick Good is a Consideration Paramount to all o∣thers; and the Man that is procuring it, cannot but be do∣ing his Duty.

* 1.16The Safety of the People must be the Supreme Law.

The Second Qualification which these Methods must have to recommend them, nay indeed to acquit them of Blame, is, That they be used Defensively, only and not Offensively; with a Design to preserve a Prince or a State, but not to aggrandize Them, and oppress Others. For this Reason they should seldom or never be begun with, but only re∣turned back again; and then are they in proper time and Place, when employ'd to save the Publick from Snares and Subtle Designs, and not to contrive, but to discover and defear mischievous and sicked Practices. For one Trick may be answered with another; and it is reasonable to play the Fox with a Fox. The World is exceeding full of Ma∣lice and Cunning: And Aristotle's Observation is most true, That the Subversion of States and Kingdoms is usually ow∣ing to Treachery and Deceit. What then should hinder? what forbid? Nay, in such Exigencies, what can excuse the Conservators of the Publick Safety, from preventing and disappointing such Calamities and Villainous Intentions by countermining? Why may not the State save it self

by the same Methods that were practis'd to ruine it, and retort the Artifice of Factions and Wicked Male-contents back upon their own Heads? For a Man to be too Squeamish in these Cases; to play constantly above-board and upon the square; and deal with these Men accord∣ing to the Rules of that Rigorous Equity and Plain-deal∣ing, which Reason and Conscience require from us in private Affairs, is inconsistent with the Nature and the Measures, nay, with the very End of all Government; and the Event would often be the betraying and losing all, and Sacrificing the Publick to an Unreasonable Scruple.

The Third Qualification is, That these Methods be used moderately and discreetly; As they are not fit for all Times, nor all Occasions; so neither are all Persons sit to be trusted with them. For they are capable of great Abuses: And if abused, will prove of ill Example and ill Consequence by ministring Occasion to ill Men, to practise and justifie their Frauds and indirect Dealings, and so giving Counte∣nance to Wickedness and Injustice, even in private Commerce and Transactions: For a Man is never at Liberty to forsake Virtue and Honesty, to follow Vice and Injustice; These things are so far from indifferent, that there is no Possibility of reconciling those distant Extremes, no Satisfaction capable of being made for so ill a Choice. And therefore away with all Injustice and Infidelity, all Treacherous and Illegal Pro∣ceedings; and cursed be the Principles and the Politicks of those Men, who (as I instanc'd before) would possess Sove∣reign Commanders with a Belief that all things are lawful, if they be but expedient for them. There is a vast diffe∣rence between such an Arbitrary Notion of Right and Wrong, and the Rules and Limitations I have here laid down. Reasons of State may sometimes make it necessary to tem∣per Honesty with Profit, and try if these two can be so min∣gled together as to make a good Composition. But, tho' we may try to compound and soften the Matter, yet we must never act in opposition to Justice. We may, nay, we must sometimes use Artifice and Subtilty; we may sometimes wheel off a little, and fetch a Compass about it; but we must never lose Sight of it, much less turn our Backs upon it, and cast all Regard for so Sacred a Thing behind us. For there is a Cunning very consistent with Virtue and strict Honour, such as St. Basil the Great calls a Great and Com∣mendable Cunning, (Magna & laud tbilis Astutia) such as tends to Good; and may be used, as Mothers and Physicians deal

by their Children and their Patients, when they tell them fine Stories to amuse and entertain them, and by degrees cheat them into Health. In short, many things may be transacted secretly and in the dark, which are not sit for publick View, and will not bear an opener Process; Pru∣dence and Stratagem may be added to Courage and Strength. Art and Wit may supply the Defects of Nature and Force, in cases which these are not sufficient to manage: A Gover∣nour may, nay, he ought to be, as Pindar calls it, a Lion in the Field, and a Fox at the Council-Table; or, as that Divine Saviour, who was Truth it self, hath exprest himself upon another occasion; He may be a subtle Serpent, but still a harmless Dove.

[unspec 6] To say somewhat of this Matter more particularly, and give the Reader a distinct Notion,* 1.17 what sort of Subtlety I mean. I say that Distrust, and the keeping himself much upon the Reserve, is highly requisite in a Prince; and this is to be done, without abandoning Virtue and Equity. Di∣strust, which is the former of these two Qualifications, is absolutely necessary; as indeed its contrary, Credulity, and Easiness, and rash Confidence, is a very great Fault, and of most dangerous Consequence to a Prince: For his Station obliges him to Vigilance; he is accountable for the whole Community, and therefore no Faults of his own can be light and inconsiderable; and where every Action hath so mighty effect, such universal Influence, great Care should be taken, and every thing done advisedly. If he be of a confiding Temper, he discovers his Intentions, and lays himself open to Shame and Reproach, and a world of Dangers;* 1.18 He lays himself in the way of being ill used; nay, he even in∣vites and tempts treacherous and deceitful People to pra∣ctise upon him; and gives them a power to do a World of Mischief, with very little danger, and great Opportuni∣ties of Advantage to themselves. Knaves have always the Inclination to be false; and trusting them gives them Abi∣lity of gratifying that Inclination to our Prejudice. A Prince should always retreat behind this Shield of Diffidence; as some of the Philosophers have stiled it, who represent it as a very considerable Branch of practical Wisdom, the very Nerves and Sinews, that impart Strength and Motion: That

Diffidence, I mean, which consists in keeping ones Eyes open, ones Mind in suspence, suspecting and providing against every thing. And for all this, he will not need any more convincing Reason, any stronger Inducement, than barely the reflections upon the Temper and Condition of the World would give him. To observe, how all Mankind are made up of Falshood and Deceit, of Tricks and Lies; how Unfaithful and Dangerous, how full of Disguise and Design all Conversation is at present become, but especi∣ally, how much more it abounds near his own Per∣son, and how manifestly Hypocrisie and Dissimulation are the reigning Qualities of Prince's Courts, and Great Men's Families, above any other places whatsoever. A King therefore must be sure to trust but Few, but very Few; and those should always be such, as long Acquaint∣ance, and many Tryals have given him a perfect Under∣standing, and good Assurance of. And even these most intimate Confidents must be consulted with so discreetly, that he never commit himself entirely, and without any re∣serve to them; he must not give them all the Rope, but constantly keep one End in his own Hand; and how long a Range soever he think sit to allow them, yet it will be very necessary to have an Eye always upon their Motions. But yet at the same time, this very Distrust must be concealed, and dissembled too; and in the very midst of his Reserves, a Prince must put on the Air of Openness and Friendship, and appear to repose a mighty Confidence in those about him. For nothing is more provoking and offensive, than plainly to see one s self suspected; and this Distance and Jealousie is sometimes as strong a Temptation to Treachery and soul Play, as too supine and free a Confidence.* 1.19 Ma∣ny Persons, says Seneca, have put it into People's Heads to deceive them, who would never have harbour'd any such Thought, if their own Fears of being deceived, had not given the first Hint. And thus it is sometimes in the other Extreme too; A very great Frankness and declar'd Reliance, oftentimes takes off the Inclination to betray a Secret, and wrong the good Opinion and Confidence you have of them: And many People have been brought over to strict Loyalty and Fidelity, and hearty Affection, by seeing themselves free∣ly

dealt with. For* 1.20 Every body naturally loves to be trusted; and the reposing a more than ordinary Confidence, sometimes sixes a Man in Your Interests, and engages him to be Secret and Faithful. So much Ingenuity still remains in the most degenerate Minds, that they see the Odiousness of Trea∣chery and Fal••hood; and tho' Gain put toomany upon doing the thing, yet not one of all those can bear the Im∣putation, or be reconciled to the Character of Falsifying a Trust.

[unspec 7] From that Distruct springs Dissimulation; which is a Branch of the same Stock:* 1.21 For were there no such thing as Diffidence and Reserve, but Frankness and Fidelity, and Good Assurance every-where, there would be no place left for Dissembling; whose Business it is to open the Face, but cover the Heart; and while one's outward Air seems to unlock all, to keep the Thoughts and Intentions close and unseen. Now the same Dissimulation, which in Persons of private Condition would be vicious and abominable, is in Princes highly commendable; there is no discharging their weighty Affairs without it; and the very thing which ruins common Conversation, is the best Security, and necessary support of Government. Feints and Pretences are absolute∣ly requisite, not in Military Conduct only, and time of War, to amuse Enemies and Strangers, but even in Peace and Civil Administration towards one's own Subjects; tho' upon such Occasions, I confess, they ought to be practised more sparingly and nicely. The plain, and free, and open, such as we commonly say carry their Heart in their Fa∣ces, are by no means cut out for the Business of Govern∣ing; they often ruine and betray both themselves and their People. And yet, as was observed in the former Para∣graph, so here again, this Dissimulation requires some Dex∣terity and Skill. It is not every one whose Temper will let him dissemble, that is Master of this Art; for unless the Part be play'd well, it is absolutely spoil'd; and there∣fore care must be taken of Over-doing, and Unseasona∣bleness, and aukward improper Carriage: For This is easily seen through, and then you lose your End. For to what purpose do you hide and disguise your self, if the Mask be so plain, that every Body can distinguish, and see you put it

on? And how vain are all Pretences and little Artifices, when the Secret is once out, and the Design hath taken Air? Their very Nature then is changed, and they cease from thenceforward to be Artifices any more. It is there∣fore fit for a Prince to pretend to Simplicity and Sincerity, the better to cover his Address of this kind; and conveni∣ent for him to court, and caress, and commend Men of o∣pen Tempers and free Carriage, and all that profess them∣selves Enemies to Dissimulation; nay, it is expedient for him, in matters of less Consequence, to act so, and gain the Reputation of such a one himself, that so he may be more at liberty to use Art and Reserve in Affairs of greater Mo∣ment, and be safe from Jealousie when he does so; under the shelter of a contrary Character.

[unspec 8] What hath hit herto been exemplify'd, is chiefly on the Omitting side;* 1.22 and the Exercise of it consists not so much in Action, as in forbearing, and seeming not to act. But some Occasions require a great deal more; and therefore a Prince must be qualify'd for bolder Strokes, and advance to actual Deceit; of which there are Two sorts necessary to be under∣stood, and sometimes to be practised.

The First is That of setling a private Correspondence, and getting Intelligence underhand: The engaging the Affe∣ctions and Services of Officers, Attendants, Counsellors, and Confidents to Foreign Princes; or, if occasion be, contriving to have secret Information, not only how one's Enemies, or Brother-Kings, but even one's own Subjects behave them∣selves; and what Designs are brewing. This is a sort of Subtlety much in request, and every where made use of, between one Prince and another; and Tully recommends it as a very considerable Point of Prudence. Sometimes this is effected by the power of Persuasion only; but, generally speaking, there aremore sensible and moving Arguments made use of, than bare Words can pretend to; Presents, I mean, and Pensions; whose Force is so irresistible, that not only Secretaries of State, Presidents of Councils, parti∣cular Friends, and intimate Favourites, have by this means been prevailed upon to communicate, and so prevent and defeat the Designs of the Master, whose Bread they eat, and to whose Countenance and Bounty they owe all their Great∣ness; not only Commanders have assisted their Enemies in time of Action; but, which is still more prodigious, and proves the Almighty Power of Bribery, to the Eternal Re∣proach of treacherous corrupt Nature, even Wives them∣selves

have been hired to discover the Secrets, and betray the safety of their own Husbands. Now this corrupting the Confidents of others, is what a great many make ••o scruple of approving: and indeed, if it be practised either against a declared Enemy, or a Subject of ou••'s own, who hath ministred just Grounds of Suspicion; or if it be against any Stranger in general, with whom we are under no particular Engagements of Alliance or Friendship, or mutual Trusts, there seems to be no great difficulty in al∣lowing it to Princes: But certainly it can never be justi∣fy'd against Confederates and Friends; for where any such Obligations intervene, these very Attempts to debauch those upon whose Secrecy and Advice they rely, is a piece of Trea∣chery never to be indulged them.

The other sort of necessary Deceit, is the Address of gai∣ing Advantages, and compassing one's Design by cunning and unseen Methods; by equivocating and ambiguous Terms; by refin'd Subtleties, and deep Intrig••••s; by good Words, fair Promises, Complements and Congratulations, the Formalities of Embassies and Letters; by these out∣wardly fair Pretences, and amusing Stratagems, bringing Matters about, and securing Advantages, which the want of Time, or Opportunity, or the Difficulty and Perplexity of a Prince's Affairs had cut him out from effecting any other way: And so he must work like a Mole, under-ground, and do that unseen and behind the Curtain, which will not bear the open Stage. There have been several great and wise Men of Opinion,* 1.23 that these Proceedings are lawful as well as expedient.* 1.24 Governours ought to make no scruple of having frequent recourse to Lies and Tricks, when the Advantage of their Subjects is concerned, (says one). And another, That it is a Part of Prudence to deceive, as occasion and the present pro∣sture of Affairs shall require. I must confess for my own part, These seem to me very bold Assertions; and I think the pronouncing such Practices generally and in themselves lawful, savours of too much Positiveness, or too great La∣titude. The furthest I dare stretch in favour of them, and that possibly one might venture to say, is, That where the Case is almost desperate, and the Necessity exceeding ur∣gent,

when it is a Season of Perplexity, and Confusion, and general Disorder; when the End proposed to be attained by it, is notonly the promoting the Interest or Greatness of a Commonwealth, but the averting and shifting off some very great and threatning Mischiefs; and when the Per∣sons, against whom we take these Advantages, are profli∣gate, and ofno Principles themselves; I say, all these Cir∣cumstances concurring, a Man perhaps might venture to say that such Tricks of State are either no Faults; or if they, be, very moderate and pardonable Faults.

[unspec 10] * 1.25But there are other Instances still behind of much greater difficulty; such as minister very just ground of Doubt, whe∣ther they are allowable upon Reasons of State, or not, be∣cause they have a strong Tincture of Injustice,* 1.26 and border hard upon Oppression. I say they have a strong Tincture, because they are not totally unjust; for there is a Mixture of Justice 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the same time, to temper and allay the Inju∣stice that is in them. For wre there not so, there could be no scruple. That which is altogether unjust, and manifest∣ly so, all Men agree 〈◊〉〈◊〉 condemning; even the vilest Wretches alive have not yet put off all Distinctions of Right and Wrong, all Sense of Guilt and Shame: But what they al∣low themselves in the practice of, even that they disallow in Profession and Pretence. But the Case is otherwise in mixt Actions; there are Arguments and Appearances of Reason at least, Examples and Authorities on both sides; and a Man, that enters into the Disquisition, does not find it easie what Resolutions to take. At least he finds some∣what to give Countenance to what his Convenience per∣suades; and that which hath divided Men's Judgments, and made it a moot Point, he thinks will be sufficient for his Vindication. Abundance of Cases of this nature might be specify'd; but at present I shall content my self with a few,

that now occur to me, and leave it to the Reader, to put o∣thers like, or parallel to these, as he sees fit.

What shall we say first to the ridding ones Hands of a troublesome pestilent Fellow, that propagates Faction and

Disorder, and is eternally breaking the publick Peace, by getting him taken off secretly, without any legal Process? This Man, take notice, is supposed to deserve Death, but the Circumstances of the Offender, and of the Prince, are such, that without manifest Danger to the State, he cannot be brought to Justice, nor made an Example in the common way. Here is, they tell you, no material Injustice in all This; the Offender hath but his Due; and, as Matters stand, the Publick is better served by his having it in this way, than it could be, by punishing him after the man∣ner of other Offenders of the like Nature. So that the most you can make of this, is a Breach of the Forms and Methods prescribed by Law; and surely, they tell you, the Sovereign Prince is above Forms.

The next is Clipping the Wings, and giving a Check to the Wealth and Power of some Great Man, who is growing Popular, and strengthening his Interest; and both from his A∣bility and Inclination to do Mischief, becomes formidable to his Prince. The Question here is, whether a Prince may not lower and cut such a potent Subject short in time, without staying so long for a fair Provocation, that he stall be grown too big to be dealt with; and if any Attempts be made, either against the publick Peace in general, or the Life of the Prince in particular, it will not then be possible to prevent or to punish them, though we would never so fain.

Another is, In an extreme Exigence, and when no other Sup∣plies are to be had, seizing upon private Stocks, and so com∣pelling soe of the wealthiest Subjects to furnish the Pub∣lick Necessities, when the Nation is not able by all its Pub∣lick Funds to support it self.

A Fourth is Infringing and Vacating some of the Rights and Privileges which some of the Subjects enjoy, when the Authority of the Prince is prejudiced and diminish∣ed, and his Grandeur eclipsed by the Continuance of them.

The Last is, a Point of Prevention, when a Fort, or a Town, or a Province very commodious to the Government is seiz'd, and got into a Prince's Hands by interposing first; and to keep it out of the Possession of some other powerful and very formidable Neighbour; who by making himself Master of this Pass, would have been in a Condition of

doing great Injury, and giving perpetual Disturbance to this Prince and his Country, who are now the first Occupiers.

All these things, I know, sound harsh, and are hardly, if at all, to be reconciled with the common Notions of Ju∣stice. Matters of State are neither fit nor safe for me to give a Judgment in; thus much only, I think, may not misbecome this place to say, That, as on the one hand the indulging and having frequent recourse to such Actions is very dangerous, gives just matter of Jealousie to the Sub∣ject, and will be apt to degenerate into Tyranny and Ex∣orbitant use of Power; so on the other, it is plain, Sub∣jects ought to be modest and very spring in censuring the Actions of their Prince, and the Steps he makes for the publick Safety, however bold they may seem, and beyond the Lengths which are commonly gone. And this suspend∣ing at least of our Judgments in matters of another and very distant Sphere, will appear the more reasonable, when I have shewed you that very eminent Men, Persons of ac∣knowledged Virtue as well as vast Learning and Wisdom, have approved all those Practises already mention'd, and think them not amiss, provided the Success be good, and answer their Intentions. And to this purpose I will quote you here some of those Sentences and Remarks which they have left us upon such Occasions.

In order to preserve Justice in greater and more important Matters, there is sometimes a necessity (says Plutarch) of de∣viating from it in those of less Moment. And in order to doing Right to the generality, and in the gross it is allowa∣ble to put some Hardships, and be guilty of some Wrong to particular Persons.* 1.27 Commonly speaking, (says Tacitus) the bravest Exploits, and most celebrated Examples, carry some∣what of Injustice in them: But in this Case, what Private Men suffer is abundantly compensated by the Benefit which the Publick receives from it.† 1.28 A Prudent Prince, says Plu∣tarch again, must not only know how to govern according to Law; But if a necessary occasion require it, he must learn to govern even the Laws themselves; When they fall short of their End, and cannot do what they would, he must stretch and correct, and give a new Power to the Laws where they hap∣pen

to be defective; that is, if they are not willing he should do what is fitting in that Juncture, he must make them wil∣ling.⁂ 1.29 When the State is in Confusion, and things brought to a Plunge, the Prince (says Curtius) must not think himself obliged to follow that which will look or sound best to the World, but that which the present Extremity calls for. And again,* 1.30 Necessity, (says Seneca) That great Refuge and Excuse for Humane Frailty, breaks thro' all Laws; and he is not to be ac∣counted in fault, whose Crime is not the Effect of Choice, but Force. Aristotle's Rule is, If a Prince cannot be good in every part of his Government, 'tis enough that he be so in the greater, or at least an equal part; but let him be sure not to be bad in every part. And Democritus, That it is impossible for the best Princes in the World not to be guilty of some Injustice.

Thus much however, I presume to add, that let these Actions of theirs find never so favourable Interpretations, never so just Allowances; yet for their own Justification, and the softening asmuch as may be, the Odium of such irregular Proceedings: There is not only a Necessity that they should be reserved for the last Extremities, but that when Princes are perfectly driven to make use of them, they should go about it with a real unwillingness and great Regret. They should look upon This necessity to which they are reduced, as a very particular Misfortune, and Mark of an angry Providence; and all their Behaviour and Resentments upon such Occasions, must be like those of tender Parents, when, sore against their Will, a beloved Child is to have a Limb sear'd, or cut off; Methods which nothing but the hope of saving his Life by this only Re∣medy, could ever prevail with them to submit to; or as a Man in extremity of Pain goes about the draw∣ing a Tooth, when nothing else will ease or asswage the Anguish. And now I have related the Opinions of very eminent Philosophers and Politicians, and observed what Abatements they are content to make for Cases of necessity; I must once more solemnly avow, that as for any Passages, or Politick Maxims, which pretend to greater Li∣berties, such as set a Prince above all Consideration of Law or Justice, that make Profit and Greatness the only End worthy

his prosecuting; and either place Advantage upon the Level with Honesty, or set it higher, every Good Man must abo∣minate them; and every good Governour will be so far from taking his measures according to this Standard, that he will reject them with Detestation and Disdain.

I have insisted so much the longer upon this Branch of a Prince's Virtue; because of the many Difficulties and Doubts, which arise upon this Point of Justice; the regular Exercise and Administration whereof must needs be very much interrupted and perplexed by the infinite Emergencies, the sudden and extraordinary Changes, and the Necessities that the publick happens to be involv'd in. And these often∣times are so very intricate and pressing, that they may ve∣ry well be allowed to puzzle the Wisest, and to stagger the bravest, and most resolute Commanders.

[unspec 11] After Justice follows Valour; by which I mean particu∣larly that Virtue which is Military; The Courage, the Con∣duct, the Caacity,* 1.31 which go to the making a Compleat General. For this is a Qualification absolutely necessary for a Prince, for the Defence and Security of his own Person, and the Publick both. The Welfare of his Subjects, the Peace and Quiet of the Kingdom, the Rights and Liberties of a Nation, All lie at His Charge; He is their Conserva∣tor, and they depend upon his Ability, to assert, and pro∣tect, and maintain them. All which Valour only can enable him to do; and by the very little said already upon it, That appears to be so essential a part of the Royal Character, that a Man who hath it not, scarce deserves the Name of a Prince.

[unspec 12] Let us now proceed to the Fourth Princely Virtue, which is Clemency.* 1.32 By which I mean such a Habit and Disposition of Mind, as inclines the Prince to Mildness and Gentleness; to Gracious Allowances, and large Abatements from the Ri∣gour of the Law, and Extremity of Justice; and all this temper'd with Judgment and Discretion. This moderates, manages, and sweetens all; it spurs the Guilty, relieves the Poor an dejected, and rescues those that are ready to perish. Clemency in the Ruler answers to Humanity in common Men; it is contrary to Cruelty and excess of Rigour, but not to Justice; for with this it is very reconcilable, and all its Care is to soften, and to moderate its Determinations. Nothing can be more necessary, more seasonable, consider∣ing the many Infirmities of Humane Nature; how great a part of Mankind offend wilfully, and do what they should not; and how often do even the best intending Men, fall short

of what they should? Extreme Rigour, and* 1.33 severe Usage, without any intermission, any Abatement, spoils all; it har∣dens Mens Tempers, and brings Authority into Contempt. Punishments lose their Force, and their End, when made common, and executed every Day; they provoke Mens In∣dignation and Malice, (for indeed Men are often Wicked out of mere Rage and Spight,) and many Rebellions have been rais'd by the Thirst of Revenge. There is something in Fear, which is even destructive of Duty, if it be not tempered, and kept within Bounds by Lenity and good Na∣ture; and if turn'd into Horrour by sharp Usage, and too strong Impressions, it grows Furious and Desperate, Malici∣ous and Bloody. Thus the Author hath observ'd very truly,⁂ 1.34 That Fear which secures Peace and good Order, must be mo∣derate; if once it become continual and extreme, it spurs Men en to Mutiny and Revenge. Clemency is likewise of great Advantage, both to the Prince and the Publick, as it gains the Good-will of the Subjects, and binds them in the strait∣est and the surest Ties to the Government; even those of Affection and Kindness, for these are always the strongest and most lasting Security; and† 1.35 A Prince never sits so fast, as when his Subjects are easie, and take a pleasure in their Obedience, as I shall have Occasion to shew hereafter. For in such a Case the People will look upon their Gover∣nour, as a sort of Deity Incarnate; They will honour and adore him as such; they will respect and love him as their Guardian, their Common Father, their Friend; and instead of any uneasie Fear of Him, they will be in perpe∣tual Fear for Him; tender of his Life and his Person; and in mighty Pain and Solicitude, lest any Ill should happen to either; consequently they will be Zealous in his Defence, firm to all his Interests, averse and implacable to his Ene∣mies. This then is the Lesson, in which all Princes should be perfect; To get themselves well inform'd of all that is done; Not to prosecute every Crime they know; Nay, ma∣ny times to act, and manage themselves, as if they knew it not; To be better satisfied with the Character of having found their Subjects made Good to their Hands, than that of having reform'd and made them so by any Rigours of

their own; Readily to extend their Grace to small Faults, and where such easiness may be inconvenient, to render heinous Offenders very exemplary, and make them smart severely for their Insolence and bold Contempt of the Laws. To consider, that frequent Executions are an Aspersion to their Government; and bring as great a Scandal upon their Reign, as the Death of many Patients doth to the Practice of a Physician; and therefore not to be fond of taking Men off upon every Provocation, but to content themselves oftentimes with a Malefactor's Repentance; and esteem the Sense of his Guilt, his Shame, and Remorse, and Self-con∣demnation a Punishment sufficient.

† 1.36Relenting Misery inclines the Brave; Conquerours are most triumphant, when they save; Justice and Mercy may suspend their Strife, He suffers for his Crime, who yields to beg his Life.

Nor is there any just Ground of that Apprehension, which some People very inconsiderately pretend, upon these Occa∣sions; that such Mercy will be taken for Tameness or Im∣potence; that it makes a Prince despicable in the Eyes of his People; gives his Enemies Advantage, provokes turbu∣lent Spirits to insult, and loosens the Nerves of Govern∣ment: For the Effect is really quite contrary. Such Mildness is a mighty strengthening to a Prince; adds Vigour and Efficacy to his Commands, and wonderfully rai∣ses his Reputation. A Prince, that is well belov'd, shall be able to do more with the Hearts of his Subjects, than all the Awe and Terror in the World; This may put Men in∣to trembling and astonishment, but it gives them no true Principle of Obedience; and as Salust argued in his Oration to Caesar, such Governments are never Stable and of long Con∣tinuance because they are built upon an ill bottom. Whoever he be, that is feared by a great many, hath a great many whom he hath reason to be afraid of too. The Fear, which he sheds down upon all about him, dashes back again upon his own Head. Such a sort of Life is full of Anxieties and Misgivings; and a Man is surrounded with Dangers, that threaten him continually from every Quarter. It is true indeed, this Clemency ought not to be extended without

any Distinction; Judgment, as was said in the beginning of the Paragraph, must direct and determine it. For, as it is a Virtue, and that which attracts the profoundest Venerati∣on, when judiciously managed; so is it a Vice of most per∣nicious Consequence, when degenerating into soft and easie Tameness.

[unspec 13] After these Four Principal Virtues, which are the brightest Jewels in a Prince's Diadem, * 1.37 there follow some others of a Second Form; and these, though inferiour to the former in Lustre, have yet their just Value, and are necessary and useful, though not so absolutely, and in so high a degree. Liberality for instance, which is so much more suitable to a Prince's Character, as it is a greater Reflection upon him to be vanquish'd by Bounty and Magnificence, than to be worsted in the Field. But here too, there is great need of Discretion; for, where That is wanting, this Quality will be apt to do more Hurt than Good.

There are two Kinds of Liberality. The one consists in Sumptuousness and Shew; and this is to very little purpose.* 1.38 It is certainly a very idle and vain Imagination, for Prin∣ces to think of raising their Character, and setting them∣selves off by August, and Splendid, and expensive Appear∣ances: especially too among their own Subjects, where they can do what they please, and are sure to have no Rival of their Grandeur. This seems rather a Mark of a little Soul; an Argument, that they want a due Sense of what they really are, and is both beneath Them to do, and very un∣acceptable to their People to see. For, however for the present Subjects may gaze at their Pomps with Delight, yet assoon as the Entertainment is over, they presently be∣gin to reflect, that Their Princes are thus enrich'd and adorn'd with Their Spoils; that This is no better than being sumptuously feasted at Their Cost; and that the Money, which now feeds their Sight with Triumphs and Gaudy Greatness, is pinch'd from more necessary Occasions, and wou'd have been much better sav'd to feed their Bellies. And besides all this; a Prince should be so far from Lavish and Profuse, that he should make great Conscience of Frugali∣ty; for indeed he should think nothing he enjoys strictly his own; since engag'd in a Trust, that requires his All, his very Life and Person to be devoted to the Good of others.

The Second sort of Liberality is that which consists in distributing Gifts, and making Presents: Of This indeed there is considerable Use, and a just Commendation due to

it. But then this must be discreetly manag'd too; and good Care should always be taken, To what Persons, in what Proportions, and after what Manner this is done. As to the Persons. They ought to be well chosen, such whose Merits recommend them to their Bounty; such as have been serviceable to the Publick; such as have hazarded their Fortunes and their Persons, and run thro' the Dangers and Fa∣tigues of War. These are such Persons, as none but the Un∣thinking or the very Ill-natur'd can grudg any thing to, or envy the Favour, so as to represent the Prince as Partial or Undistinguishing in his Liberality. Whereas, quite otherwise, great Gratuities distributed without any regard to Merit, and where there really is none, derive Shame and Odium upon the Receiver; and are entertain'd without those due Acknowledgments, and that grateful Sense, which the Fa∣vours of a Prince ought to find. Some Tyrants have been sacrific'd and given up to the Rage and Spite of an incens'd Rabble, by those very Servants whom they had rais'd from Nothing; while these Creatures of theirs have been as much diverted with their Masters Misfortunes, as any of their Enemies, and have taken this Course to ingratiate them∣selves with the Mobb, and for securing their own Fortunes, by giving Demonstrations of the Hatred and Contempt to the Person, from whom those Fortunes were entirely deriv'd.

Nor is it less necessary, that the Proportion of a Prince's Liberality should be strictly regarded; for otherwise this may run out into such Squandering and Excess, That both the Giver and the Government may be impoverish'd and brought to Ruine by it. For, to give to every body, and upon every Occasion, is to play with a losing Hand, and till all's gone. Private Men are for making their Fortunes, and it is not possible to satisfie them; they will soon grow extravagant in their Requests, if they find their Prince to be so in his Favours; and the Rule they Measure by, is not Reason, but Example; not how much is fit to be granted to Them, but how much hath already been granted to Others. However, by this Means the Publick Treasures will be exhausted; and a King be necessitated to seize other Peoples Rights, that* 1.39 so Injustice and Oppression may heal and reimburse these Wants, which Ambition and Prodigality have created. Now, it were insinitely better to give nothing

at all, than to take away from one to give to another. For after all our Kindness, the Gratitude and Affection of those that are obliged by us, never makes so deep Impressions, nor sticks half so close, as the Resentments of them, that have been injur'd and plunder'd. Besides, This Profuseness is its own Destruction, for the Spring cannot run always; if you draw too fast, it will soon be drain'd dry.* 1.40 By being Liberal. says St. Jerom, Man makes it impossible to be so. For a farther Prevention whereof, as well as upon, other very good Considerations, it will be convenient to spin out ones Liberality; to let it come gently and by degrees, rather than to give all we intend at once. For that which is done on the sudden, and at a heat, be the thing never so consi∣derable in it self, yet passes off, as it were insensibly, and is quickly forgotten. All things that have a grateful Re∣lish should be contriv'd to be as slow and leisurely in the Passage, as can be; that so the Palate may have time to tast them: but, on the contrary, all those Dispensations that are harsh and severe, (when Occasions call for any such) should be dispatch'd with all possible Convenience, that so, like bitter Potions, they may be swallow'd at once. Thus you see, that the Giving as becomes one, is an Act of Prudence, and the Exercise of Liberality to the best Ad∣vantage, requires great Address and Skill. To which pur∣pose Tacitus hath this notable Remark.† 1.41 Those Persons (says he) are under a mighty Errour, who know not how to distin∣guish between Liberality and Luxury; abundance of Men know how to squander, that do not know how to give. And to speak the very Truth, Liberality is not a Virtue peculiar to King's and milder Governments only, but very consistent even with Tyranny it self. And surely the Tutors and Gover∣nors of young Princes are much in the wrong, when they labour to possess their Minds with such strong and early Impressions of Giving; of refusing nothing that is ask'd of them; of thinking nothing so well employ'd, as what they give to their Friends. This is the Jargon usual in such Ca∣ses. But either This seems to proceed from some Advan∣tage these Instructors design to make of such a Principle hereafter, or for want of due regard to the Person they ad∣dress

themselves to. For a too governing Notion of Libera∣lity is of very ill Consequence, in a Person, whose For∣tunes are so plentiful, as to supply the Expences of others, at what rate himself shall think fit. And of the Two Ex∣tremes, though either of them are very far from Good, yet a Prodigal or a Giving Prince, he that spends upon his own Vanities, or he that seeds those of his Servants and Favourites, without Discretion and due Measure, is a great deal worse than a Stingy One, that keeps his Hand shut to all. And, whereas these frequent Boons are pretended of Use to make Friends, and secure the Service and Af∣fection of those who are obliged by them: There is very little or nothing of Substance in this Argument; For im∣moderate and undistinguishing Liberality encourages every body to ask and to expect, and so for One Friend, makes Ten Enemies, in Proportion as the Repulses must needs be more frequent, than the Grants. But indeed, if it be wisely and well regulated, it is undoubtedly, as I said before, ex∣ceeding Graceful and Commendable in a Prince, and may prove of Excellent Advantage, both to Himself and to the State.

[unspec 14] Another very becoming Virtue is Magnanimity. That I mean more peculiarly, * 1.42 which consists in a Greatness of Spirit not easily to be provoked, such as despises and can pass over Injuries and Indecencies, and moderate his An∣ger when it begins to fly out.* 1.43 A Great Fortune and Dig∣nity should have a Noble Mind; such as can look down upon Wrongs and Provocations, as Matters a great way below it, and not worth its Notice; and Majesty should consider that there are not many Offences which will justifie a Prince's being angry. Besides, to fret and be concerned, is often interpreted for Consciousness of Guilt; and that which a Man makes slight of, blows quickly over, and seldom sticks long. So says the wise Roman,† 1.44 If Reproaches put you in a Passion, the World will look upon this as a sort of Confession: But if you disregard them, they vanish and die without doing any manner of Preju∣dice. But then, if any Provocation be given, which mini∣sters just and sufficient Cause to be angry, let those Re∣sentments be express'd openly without labouring to conceal

or to dissemble them; that the People about him may have no reason to suspect any thing of a Secret Grudge, or a Mischievous Design in him. For these are Qualities for the meanest and basest sort of People, and Symptoms of a Malicious, Devilish and Incurable Dispesition.⁂ 1.45 Pitiful Fellows and Ʋnreclaimable Wretches keep Malice in their Hearts (says Tacitus) and to feed upon a Grudge is an evident Mark of Baseness and Barbarity. Of the two, the giving Offence and doing an Ill thing is less disagreeable to the Character of a Great Man, than the Hating and Maligning of others for doing so to Him. And thus I have done with the Head of Virtue; the other Branches of it in general being not so properly distinguishing Properties and peculiar Ornaments of the Royal Dignity, as Excellencies lying in common be∣tween Princes and the rest of Mankind.

[unspec 15] The next thing that comes under our Consideration after the Prince's Virtue, is what they call his Manner, that is, * 1.46 his Behaviour and Way of Living; the Mien, the Port, the Address, that sute with the Majesty of a Prince; and all those profound Respects so necessary to be kept up. Upon this I shall not insist at all, only, by the way as it were, touch upon it. Now though Nature contribute a great deal to this in the Form, and Temper, and Person, yet all that Nature does is capable of Amendment and Im∣provement both, by the additional Helps of Industry and Art. Under the Head we are now upon, may be reckoned the Air of his Face, the Composure of his Countenance, his Fashion and Behaviour, his Gate, his Tone, and man∣ner of Speech, his Clothes and Dressing. The general Rule to be observed in all these Particulars, is such a Mixture of Sweetness and Moderation, of Stayedness and Gravity, as may win upon Mens Minds, and move their Affections plea∣singly; such as may keep the middle Way between Familiarity and Fear, engage their Love, and yet command their Ho∣nour and Respect. His Court and Conversation are likewise worth taking notice of. For the former, it is convenient that it should be very publick, that the Palace he dwells in should be Noble and Magnificent, sit for Resort and Correspondence; and if that can be well contriv'd, not far from the Middle of his Country, or, at least, the

most significant Part of it; that so his Eye may com∣mand all the Quarters; and like the Sun in the midst of the Firmament, pierce, enlighten and warm all round about him, with the Influence of his Beams. For when a Prince resides in some very remote Corner of his Dominions, this Distance emboldens those in the contrary Extremity to behave themselves insolently, and grow Tumultuous and Unruly. As for••h's Conversation, That should be very re∣served, his Considents and familiar Friends but few, his Progresses and other Appearances in publick but seldom; that the People may always be eager and glad to see him: For the shewing himself often, and giving too easie Access to his Person, will mightily lessen the Majesty of his Character.* 1.47 The being always admitted to the Sight and Presence of Great Persons, does mightily impair and diminish our Respect, by Glutting our Curiesity, says one of the Roman Historians: And another to this purpose:† 1.48 Majesty is always most reverenc'd at a distance: for Nature forms all our I∣dea's bigger than the Life; and what we are not acquainted with, is always fancy'd to be very Great and Stately.

[unspec 16] After the Three Things already treated of, * 1.49 The Know∣lege of his People and Government, the Virtues of his Mind, and the Fashion and Address of the Prince; all which are inseparable from his own Person; The next things we are led to consider, are such as are near and about his Person. And therefore in the fourth place, let us say somewhat concerning his Counsel, which, in truth, is the main Point of all this Head, which relates to his Politicks, and of Consequence so vast, that it is in a manner All in All. For Counsel is the Soul of any Go∣vernment; the Spirit that insuses Life and Motion, Energy and Vigour into all the rest. And upon the Account of This it is, that the Management of Affairs consists in Prudence; be∣cause Hand, are of no Significance at all, till the Heads have cut them out their Work, and prescrib'd their Me∣thods. It were indeed to be wish'd, That a Prince were enrich'd with so great a Stock of Prudence and Conside∣ration, as to be able himself to govern, and dispose, and

contrive every thing, without calling in Help from abroad; This is such a Sufficiency, as the first Chapter of this Book observed to be the Noblest Perfection, and highest Degree of Wisdom; and no Question can be made, but that Matters would be better order'd, and more successfully dispatch'd if it could be so. But this is an Accomplishment meerly ima∣ginary, no Instance of it is to be found in Nature; whether it be, that Princes want the Advantage of Good Temper, or Good Instruction. And indeed, let Nature be never so boun∣tiful, and Education never so proper, yet it is scarce possi∣ble to suppose That all the Parts, and all the Improve∣ments in the World could ever qualifie one single Head for the Comprehending and Direction of such infinite Variety of Business.* 1.50 No Prince, says Tacitus, can have a Reach so great, as to be Master of all his Concerns: no one Mind is strong enough to carry so great a Burden, A single Man hears and sees but very little in Comparison; But Kings have need of abundance of Eyes and Ears to assist and give In∣telligence. Great Weights and great Undertakings can on∣ly be made light by a Multitude of Hands. And therefore it is absolutely necessary for a Prince to provide himself with good Advice, and with Persons every way capable of giving it; for as the Case stands, and the Intrigues of Government are perplex'd, he that will take upon him to do all of his own Head, shall much sooner six upon him∣self the Character of Pride and Conceitedness, than gain the Reputation of Wisdom. A Prince then, of all Men, hath most need of faithful Friends,* 1.51 and diligent Servants who may assist him in his Difficulties, and ease him of part of his Cares. These are the real, the most valuable Trea∣sures of a King,* 1.52 and the most useful Instruments to the Pub∣lick: And therefore the first and great Care must be, to make a wise Choice of Assistants, and employ the utmost Ap∣plication,* 1.53 and bend all one's Judgment to have such as are excellent and proper for a Post of such vast Importance. Now of these Assistants, there are two sorts; One that contribute their Advice, and Project only;* 1.54 and these employ their Wit, and their Tongue; and are in strict propriety of Speech, Counsellors; the Other are concern'd in the exe∣cutive part, they lend us their Hands, and their Pains, and

these are more properly styled Officers. Of these the for∣mer sort are in much the more Honourable Character: For thus the two great Philosophers have declared their O∣pinion,* 1.55 that it is a most Sacred and Divine Accomplish∣ment, to consider judiciously, and be able to advise well.

[unspec 17] Now in Persons thus to be chosen and employed, * 1.56 several Qualifications are necessary: As, first of all, It is ne∣cessary to choose such as are Faithful, and fit to be trusted; that is, in one Word, Men of Virtue and good Principles.* 1.57 I take for granted, (says Pliny) that the better Man any one is, the more stanch and true be is, and more safe to be de∣pended upon. Secondly, They must be Persons of Ability, and proper for this Office, not only in regard of their Know∣ledge and Learning in general, but upon the Account of their Skill in Politicks, and that express Form of Govern∣ment in particular; such as have been used, and try'd be∣fore, and have come off with Honour and Success, versed in Business, and accustom••d to Difficulties: For Hardships and Adversities are the most useful and improving Lessons.† 1.58 Fortune, says one, in the room of many Advantages which she hath torn frem me, hath given me the Faculty of Advice and Posuasion. And in one Word, They must be wise and discreet, moderately quick, not too sprightly and sharp; for such Men will be always projecting. And⁂ 1.59 Mon of Fire are more for Change, than steady Management. Now in order to these Qualifications, it is necessary that they should be Men of ripe Years, to give them Stayediness, Experience, and Consideration; nay, I may add, to inspire them with Caution too; for it is one of the many Unhappinesses attending Youth, that Persons then are easily imposed up∣on; of which the Tenderness and Softness of their Brain may perhaps be one reason, as that may dispose them the more easily to receive any Impression, and consequently to Credulity and Easiness of Temper. It is for the Conveni∣ence of a Prince to have notable Men of all sorts about him; both those who are called so upon the account of their Wisdom, and those that excel in Subtlety and Cun∣ning.

The former indeed ought to be more numerous, and are more especially requisite, because they are more for the Honour of their Master, and of more constant use; for these are the Managers of all regular and ordinary Proceedings. The Men of Art are for Cases of necessity and extraordinary Emergencies, to help at a Pinch, and to coun∣termine a Danger.

A Third Qualification necessary for Counsellors, is Open∣ness, and Freedom, and Courage in all their Behaviour, when consulted with. They must use their utmost Care, that all their Proposals be for the Honour and Advantage of their Prince; and, when once they have secured this Point, that the Advice be wise and good, all Flattery and Disguise should be laid aside; all Equivocatings, and Re∣servations, and Craftiness of Expression detested and despi∣sed, by which they may seem to aim at ingratiating them∣selves, or to contrive that what they say may be accepta∣ble to their Master. These are the Men Tacitus describes, who accommodate all their I anguage as they see occasion, and do* 1.60 not so properly d••s••curse with their Prince, as with his present Inclinations and Cncumstances. They consider him as a Great Man, as one able to make their Fortunes; they observe what he would do, not what is best and fit∣test for him to do. Whereas indeed all these Regards ought to be utterly banished their Thoughts; they should have a constant Eye upon the Sacredness of their Office, and the Importance of the Trust reposed in them; and looking no farther than the Reason, and Justice, and Cenvenience of the thing, speak the Truth and spare not: For howe∣ver harsh and distasteful this Liberty, and Openness, and honest Blunt-dealing may be at the present to those Per∣sons, whose Opinion and Inclinations it happens to cross; yet there will soon come a time, when it will obtain Re∣spect and Esteem.† 1.61 Opposition is offensive just at the In∣stant; but upon cooler Thoughts, the very Persons you opposed, will commend and admire your plain-dealing. A Man should likewise take care to be consistent with himself, firm to his Principle, without veering and wheeling about perpetually,

as oft as other People's Humours shift into a fresh Quarter. But as he must not be changable and obsequious in a base compliance with the Passions or Pleasures of others, so neither must he be stiff and peremptory in his own Opi∣nions. There is always a Decency to be observed, and great Difference to be made, between Constancy and Con∣tradiction. For Opiniatrety and Fierceness confounds all manner of Deliberation; and therefore I am far from de∣siring my good Counsellor to be inflexible; as knowing very well, that hearkening to other Men's Reasons, and changing our own Opinions upon them, is so far from de∣serving the Reproach of Rashness or Inconstancy, that it ought rather to be looked upon as a Testimony of Mode∣sty and Ingenuity, and great Prudence: For* 1.62 although the wise Man always walk in the same Way, and by the same Rule, yet he does not always go the same Pace, nor tread in the same Steps; Change he does not then, so properly as accom∣modate and mend himself; Like the skilful Sailor, who plies to every Wind, and whose Excellency lies in trimming the Sails that way that the Gale blows freshest. Thus a Man must oftentimes go about to make the Port he designs, when there is no coming at it by a streight Course. And it shews the Dexterity and Address of a Counsellor, to be able to change his Methods, when those which were first chosen are either disapproved, or by some Accident rendred useless and ineffectual.

Another necessary Accomplishment for this Post, is the making a Conscience of Revealing any Debates he shall be privy to. For Silence and Secresie are exceeding ne∣cessary in the management of all Publick Assairs: Inso∣much that a great Author hath pronounced it impossible for that Man to manage any matter of Consequence, who is not so much Master of himself as to keep his own Coun∣sel.† 1.63 For how should he support the weight of Publick Business, to whom even Silence is a Burden? But upon this Occasion the concealing what one knows is not sufficient, I must likewise caution him against knowing too much. A Curious and Inquisitive Temper, which loves to be bu∣sie, and inform it self of other Peoples Actions and Con∣terns, is no commendable Quality in any case; but to pry

into the Affairs of Princes, and value one's self upon know∣ing Their Secrets, is as dangerous as it is unmannerly: And as Tacitus hath well observed,* 1.64 Nothing is more hazar∣dous, nothing more unfit for us, than officiously to dive, and be bold with their retired Thoughts and Intentions. And therefore, whatever a Man knows of this kind should come freely and without his seeking; nay, I make no difficulty to affirm, that it is commendable in a Man to de∣cline the Opportunities of having such things imparted to him, and to know as little of them as possibly he can. This argues Reverence and Modesty, prevents all Jea∣lousie, and sutes the distance between a Prince and his Subjects.

Thus I have given my Reader a short Account of those good Conditions which seem necessary for the qualifying Men to be Counsellors of State. And by these he will be able to tell himself, what are those ill Qualities, which meapacitate a Man for such a Trust. That a Prince in making his Choice, should be sure to reject all such as are of Confident, Assuming, Presumptuous Tempers; because these Vices make Men hot, and arrogant in Debates, posi∣tive and bold in their own Sense: And a Wise Man, quite contrary, will be content to allow Second and Third Thoughts; to examine every thing over and over. It is the Character of such a one to suspect himself, to be jea∣lous of the Consequence, searful in advising and resolving, that so he may afterwards be more vigorous and assured, when he comes to execution.† 1.65 For the Mind that knoweth how to be afraid, and undertakes warily, will act more secure∣ly, and go upon surer Grounds. Fools, quire contrary, are eager and assured, blind and bold in Debate; but when they come to Action, cowardly and tame.⁂ 1.66 Advice given with Heat and Confidence looks fair and gay at first sight; but the execution of it is hard and desperate, and the Event full of Grief and Disappointment. Next to this presumptuous Vanity and Heat, Passion is improper for such Ministers of State; All Anger and Envy, Hatred and Spight, Avarice and Ambicion, all Selfish Narrowness of Spirit, and private

Interest; for these are all of them Corrupters of the best Sense, the very Bane of all sound Judgment; Integrity, and faithful Discharge of a publick Character cannot dwell in the same Breast, with these personal Piques, and private Af∣fections.* 1.67 Private Advantage ever did, and ever will ob∣struct and confound publick Counsels; and each single Man's Profit, is that which Poisons all good Sense, and kind Inclina∣tion to the Common Good.

One Thing more remains absolutely Necessary to be a∣voided, and that is Precipitation; An irreconcilable Ene∣my to Prudence and good Counsel; and fit for nothing but to put Men upon doing amiss, and then being all amed and unfortunate upon that Account. And thus much shall suffice at Present for a Description of those Qualities, which ought to concur, and the Vices and Defects which must be de∣clin'd in order to the accomplishing Men for Counsellors of State.

[unspec 17] Now, such as these it is the Prince's Business to employ; and those are the Rules, by which his Choice ought to be directed. For his own Personal Knowledge of Persons so qualified will be the greatest Security he can have; but if he be not capable of making the Distinction himself, nor can with Safety rely upon his own Judgment in the Case, then Reputation and common Fame is what he must be contented with. And upon such Occasions a general Character seldom leads us into great Mistakes; for which Reason one desir'd his Prince, That he would look upon him and his Brethren in Office to be such, as the World esieem'd them. For Hypocri∣sie is but a parricular Thing, and of a very limited extent,† 1.68 Single Men may deceive and be deceiv'd, but never did any Man deceive all the World we was ever any Man mistaken in all the World. Great Care should be taken upon this Occasion, that a Prince do not trust himself with Flatterers and sawn∣ing Parasites, with particular Favourites. Court-Officers, and mercenary Wretches, whose Confidence is a Reproach to their Master; and will be his Ruine, when they can have a good Price for betraying him. For after all: the Cabal, and the Cabinet is the Foundation of most Monarch's un∣doing:

We see it not, till it comes upon the open Stage; but there it begun, and from thence it moves and works under Ground, long before the World can discern it. Now, when a Prince hath made this Choice, and sound Persons for his Purpose, the next thing incumbent upon him is to make a Wise Use of them. And That is to be done, by consulting them early and in a Season proper for Delibera∣tion; not driving all off, till the very Instant of Action, when the Time is too short for debate, and cool Considera∣tion; nor, on the other Hand, Trifling and losing Time in hearing their tedious Disputes, when his Affairs require a speedy Resolution. Again, This Advice of theirs must be attended to with a Judicious Reserve; he must not give himself blindly up to it, and follow their Determinations Right or Wrong, as that very weak Emperor Claudius is said to have done: And he must likewise temper this Di∣scretion with Moderation and Gentleness, without being too stiff and inflexible in his own Sense: Since, generally speak∣ing, that Remark of the wise Marcus Antoninus holds good, who says it is better for one Man to come over, and to comply with the Advice of a great many good Friends, than that all their Opinions should be set aside, and they forced to truckle to his single Arbitrary Pleasure. I cannot but appre∣hend it of great Advantage in this Case, to keep a Man's self pretty loose, and use ones Counsellors, with a sort of Authority mix'd with Indifference. My Meaning is, Not immediately to reward Men for their good Counsel; be∣cause such present Pay will be a Temptation to ill Men to thrust themselves forward in advising; and so that which is really bad, will be put upon him in hopes of a Reward; Nor on the other Hand to discountenance or use Men roughly for counselling amiss; Because this will create a Shyness in all about him; and no body will dare to advise freely if the delivering their Opinion shall expose them to Danger and Disgrace. And besides, The Judgment of good and bad Counsel is very uncertain, because it usually pro∣ceeds upon the Issue. Whereas the most injudicious Coun∣sels have often succeeded as well or better than the Wisest, by a strange over-ruling Power of Providence, thus assert∣ing its Government of us, and all our Affairs here below. And again, It ought to be remembred, that They, who give the best, that is, the safest and most prosperous Coun∣sel, are not upon that Account to be concluded our faithful∣lest Friends, nor best affected to our Interest; for many

times They who love us best, may be mistaken in their Measures; and they who wish us no Good, may yet put us in the way of a great deal. Nor ought a Prince to resent Freedom and Plainness upon these Occasions. For This in all Reason ought rather to be acceptable; and a wise Man will keep a Jealous Eye upon Flattering and Timorous Fellows, such as make it their Business to sooth his Hu∣mors, and had rather see him perish by false Measures, than disgust him to his own Advantage. And sure if there be a Miserable Creature upon Earth, it is that Prince, to whom no Body about him dares tell the Truth; he that must live by the help of other Peoples Senses, and yet all who see and hear for him, are under a necessity of dis∣sembling and disguising in their own Defence, and dare shew him nothing as it really is. A Man* 1.69 whose Ears, as Tacitus expresses it, are so oddly contriv'd, that all Sounds are harsh and grating, which tell profitable Truths; and they never think themselves entertain'd, but with such pleasing Words as are sure to do Mischief. The last Caution necessary for the making a good Use of Proper Counsellors, is, To con∣ceal his own Opinion, and not determine Publickly what he approves most, or what he resolves to do; for when all is done, Secrecy is the very Life and Soul of Counsel; and† 1.70 That Advice is always best, which your Enemy knows nothing of, till the Execution declar'd what it was.

[unspec 19] As for the Officers, * 1.71 which come now to be next consi∣dered; by These I mean such as serve the Prince, and the Government, in some publick Trust. And They ought to be made Choice of with great Discretion; Persons of Ho∣nour and Virtue, well-descended, and whose Families are of Quality and Reputation in the World. It is reasonable to believe, that Men of this Character will approve them∣selves best in their respective Stations; and That of Birth par∣ticularly is so considerable a Qualification, that it is by no Means for the Honour of a Prince, or the Decency of his Court, that People of mean Extract should be admit∣ted near his Person, and commissioned to preside over others, except some very great and remarkable Merit, give them

a just and visible preference, and make amends for the want of Quality and Descent. But Men of Infamous Lives, False and Base; Men of no Principles, or of such as are Dangerous and Worse than none; in short, Men under Cir∣cumstances, which either fix an odious Character, such as the World have reason to hate, or to despise, to be asham'd of, or to suspect, should not upon any Terms be admit∣ted to any Office or Trust. After these Conditions, as to their Morals, we must not forget, that as great a Regard is due to their Understandings. And that, not only to see, that they be Men of Parts and Judgment in general, but that each Person be dispos'd of to such an Employment, as best agrees with his own Genius and Attainments in Par∣ticular. For some are Naturally fittest for Military, and others for Civil Trusts. Some have thought it a general good Rule for Officers of all sorts, to choose Men of a mild and gentle Disposition, and moderate Character; for your violent and topping Spirits, that are full of themselves, and cannot be prevail'd upon to yield to any, or quit the least Punctilio, commonly speaking, are not at all fit for Business.* 1.72 Let the Persons you employ be therefore a Match for their Business, and able to deal with it; but not too much above, and able to play with it; Men that know how to give and take their Due, but not such as will sacrifice the Publick to a Nice Point of Honour, and their own Unseasonable Vanity.

[unspec 22] Next after Counsel, we may very well be allowed to place Treasures; * 1.73 for certainly these must be confest a ve∣ry great Point; a useful, necessary, and powerful Provisi∣on. If Advice be the Head that sees and directs, Money is the Nerves, the Hands, the Feet of the State, by which it moves, and acts, and is strongly knit together. For when all is done, there is no Sword cuts deep, not makes its own way through, like that with a Silver Edge. No Master is so Absolute in his Commands, so readily o∣bey'd; No Orator so Eloquent, so Persuasive, so Winning upon the Wills and Affections of Men; no Conquerour so Successful, or so great a Gainer by Storms, and Sieges, and force of Arms, as a good Purse. This is serv'd with Zeal, and obeyed without Grudging; this gets Possession of Hearts, and draws the World after it; this takes Towns and Ca∣stles, without the Expence of Blood, or Time, or Hazard.

And therefore a Wise Prince will always think himself oblig'd to take care, that his Treasury be in good Conditi∣on; and that he never be disabled in this so very necessary, so vital a Part of his Government. Now, the Art and the Care of effecting and securing this, consists in Three Particu∣lars. The First whereof concerns the providing good Funds; The Second in employing the Money arising from them to the best Advantage; and the Third in keeping a constant Reserve, that he may never be destitute of a necessary Sup∣ply, upon any sudden Accident, or pressing Occasion. And in all these Cases, there are Two things, which the Prince must by all means look upon himself bound to avoid; which are Injustice, and sordid Frugality; for how Neces∣sary and Advantagious soever the Observation of these Rules may be, yet he must never purchase this Conveni∣ence at so dear a Rate, as the Invasion of other Men's Rights, or the loss of his own Honour.

[unspec 21] For the First of these, which relates to laying the Foun∣dation as it were, and amassing together a sufficient Trea∣sure, there are several Methods of doing it. Many Springs, which, like so many little Streams, contribute to the filling up this common Cistern;* 1.74 but, though all of them pour in some, yet they do not all supply the same Proportion, nor are they all perpetual, or equally to be depended upon. For In∣stance. One Fund is the Crown Lands,* 1.75 and Demesnes, and o∣ther standing Revenues appointed to the Use of the Prince, for the Support of his Grandeur and Government. And these ought to be husbanded to the best Advantage, and kept up to their old Rents, and put into good Hands: They should by no means be alienated without some very urgent Exigen∣cy require it; but look'd upon as things Sacred, and such as in their own Nature are not transferrable to any other Owner.* 1.76 Another is, the Conquests made upon Enemies, which should be so ordered, as to turn to good Account; and not squandered, and prodigally wasted, because they are a sort of additional Wealth, and when they are gone, the Prince is but where he was before. The Power of old Rome is in great Measure owing to their good Manage∣ment in this Point: They always took Care to bring in vast Summs, not only to pay the Charge of the War, but to enrich and swell their Exchequers with the Wealth trans∣ferred thither from the Towns they took, and the Coun∣tries they vanquished. This their Historian Livy tells us, was the Practice of their Bravest and most Renown'd Ge∣nerals,

Camillus, Flaminius, Aemilius Paulus, the Scipios, Lucullus, and Caesar: and not only so, but after this first drawing over their present Treasures, they constantly im∣posed a Yearly Stipend to be paid; either by the Natives left upon their own Soil, under these and certain other Con∣ditions; or by those Colonies of Romans, whom they trans∣planted thither. But still every Conquest brought some sub∣stantial Advantage to the Common-Wealth, and was more than an empty Name, and the meer Glory of the Thing. The Presents, Free-Gifts, Pensions, Donations, and Grants,* 1.77 Tributes, Taxes, arising either from Friends, or Allies, or Subjects; Legacies and Bequests of the Dead, Deeds of Gift from Owners yet surviving, or any other manner of Conveyance: Tolls, and Imposts,* 1.78 Customs upon Goods imported or exported, Commodities Foreign or Domestick, Duties upon Docks, and Havens, Ports and Rivers; which hath been a general and very ancient Method of raising Mo∣ney, as well upon Strangers as Natives; and a very just, lawful, and beneficial Method no doubt it is, when limited with these Conditions; That no Provisions or Other Goods, that are Necessaries of Life, shall be transported, so as to im∣poverish the Country, and reduce the Subject to Streights; nor any raw Wares; but that Materials of home-growth should be likewise wrought up and finish'd at Home; to find the Subjects Employment, and keep the poor and la∣bouring People at Work, upon their own Manufacture; that so the Profit and Wages, as well as the Stuff might centre and circulate among Natives; and the Growth of one Nation not be transferr'd to the enriching of ano∣ther. But now, when these Commodities are wrought and dress'd, there is good Reason for carrying them to foreign Mar∣kets; as it is likewise Policy to import all the raw and unwrought Commodities they can, and to prohibit all fo∣reign and finish'd Manufactures; because in all these Cases there is greater Encouragement, and Opportunity given for Labour. And it is also highly reasonable in all Matters of Traffick, that a heavier Imposition should be laid upon Strangers who trade among us, than the natural Subjects of the same Country. For all foreign Impositions bring large Summs into the Treasury, and are a great Ease to the Sub∣ject, which is a Consideration always to be regarded; and for that Reason the Customs which are laid upon all such Necessaries of Life, as are imported from abroad, should be moderated, and brought as low, as possibly they can.

These Four Methods already mention'd, are not only al∣lowable, and convenient, but strictly Just, and Equitable; Honourable and Fair. The Fifth, which, I consess, is not altogether so agreable to Decency,* 1.79 and the Dignity of a Prince, is That of Trade, which is carried on for the Pro∣fit of the Sovereign by means of his Factors, and hath several Methods of turning to Account, which are some less, and some more liable to Scandal; but the most Infa∣mous and the most Destructive of all, is the setting to sale Offices, and Honours, Preferments and Places of Trust. There is indeed a Course not yet mention'd, which I think will come within the Notion of Trade; and therefore I choose to name it under this Head, for the sake of the Resemblance it bears to the Subject now in Hand. This hath no great Matter of Indecency in it, and hath the Ex∣ample of several very wise and eminent Princes to give it Countenance; It is the letting out the publick Money in Bank, upon a moderate Interest, (as Five in the Hundred Prosit for instance) and securing the Principal, either by an Equivalent in Pawns, or Mortgages, or else such Personal Security, as is sufficient and of unquestionable Credit. And these Loans are of great Advantage in Three Respects: For First, They add greatly to the Wealth of any Go∣vernment, by taking Care, that it shall always turn to fresh Account, and no part of it ever lie dead. Then Se∣condly, It is a mighty Convenience to private Men, who by this means are sure of a Fund to trade upon; and can∣not sail of being furnished in any Proportion which their Occasions shall require, or which they can find such Secu∣rity as is fit to be accepted for. But the Third and greatest Senefit of all is, That it keeps this Money out of the ••aws of Sharpers, and saves that to the publick Use, which would otherwise become a Prize to the Importuni∣ty, and nauseous Flattery of hungry Courtiers, and be thus extorted from the good Nature of a King wearied into gaving. And upon this last Consideration singly, to save the Trouble of being importuned, and the Difficulties of denying; some Princes have found it advisable to lend out their ready Cash without any Interest to be paid upon at •••• purely for the sake of securing the Prime Summ, which they took Care to do, by binding the Debtor in a Penalty of paying double, if he were not Punctual to his Day.* 1.80 The Sixth and Last Method is That of Loans and Subsides extraordinary levied upon the Subject; and this

shou'd be a Reserve for times of Necessity, a Remedy al∣ways to be made use of with Reluctancy, and such as is properly applyed, when other stated Methods fall short, and the Exigence of Affairs calls for a larger Supply, than the former Particulars can furnish out. In the Circum∣stances of this Kind, no doubt can be made of the Justice of the Thing: But then to make this still more easie and gentle to the Subject, it is not only requisite, that the Ne∣cessity of such Supplies be evident, and the Publick Safety highly concern'd in them, but these following Conditions should likewise concur to the sofining them. First:* 1.81 That whatever Moneys are advanc'd upon Loans for the serving a present Occasion, should be afterwards punctually and ho∣nestly paid back again, as soon as the Difficulty is over, and the Occasion serv'd. This we find practised by the Common-Wealth of Rome, when driven to Extremities by Hannibal. And at this Rate the Prince will never want Money; for while the Exchequer keeps Touch and Credit, private Men will be pleas'd, nay proud to lend; not on∣ly because they think their Cash deposited in safe Hands, and can depend upon their own again with Advantage; but for the Honour and Reputation of having assisted the Publick, and serv'd their Prince in a time of Distress. And this to generous Men is a Valuable, and will always be a Powerful Consideration, where the Hazard and Fears of a Loss do not check it. But Secondly,* 1.82 If the Publick Stock be drawn so low, that the Debt cannot be satisfied from thence, and some fresh extraordinary Imposition be neces∣sary, this should by all Means be adjusted and charged, with the Consent of the Subjects, who are to contribute toward it; The present Defects of the Treasury fairly stated, the Occasion that exhausted it fully represented, and the People made truly sensible of the necessity they are under; so pressing upon them that Passage of the Blessed Saviour, the Gracious King of Kings, The Lord hath need of them; for thus He in marvelous Condescen∣sion was pleas'd to express himself. And in such Circum∣stances, if the Case require it, and the Satisfaction of the People can be effectually consulted upon those Terms, it may be very advisable to lay an Account of the Re∣ceits and Expences before them. Persuasion and fair Means are always best employed in Matters of this Nature; and to be driven to use Power and Constraint, is the last Unhap∣piness that can happen to a Governor. Themistocles was cer∣tainly

in the right, when he thought it more for the Ho∣nour of a Ruler* 1.83 to gain his Point by Request and Expo∣stulation, than by Commands. And, though it be true, that every Word of a King is full of Power and Force; and what he asks, his Character makes in effect a Command; yet still it is more for the Advantage of the Publick, and the Continuance of a mutual Affection and Good Understanding between Prince and People, that this kind of Supply should run in the form of a free Gift; that the Subjects should express their Sense of the Publick Necessities; and desire the Prince to accept what Relief they are capable of contributing toward it; at least, it is fit, that these extraordinary Taxes should be limited to a certain Term, that they do not pass into constant Payments, things of Course and Continuance, and that the Subjects never be prescribed to in these Ca∣ses, [unspec III] without their own Approbation and Consent. A Third Course to qualifie these Impositions, would be, to lay them not upon Persons, but Estates; that Men may pay for what they have, and not for what they are. For a Poll∣tax hath every where been looked upon as the most odi∣ous of any; it being indeed by no means just, that all should be levelled, where Fortune hath made so vast a difference; and while the Men of Wealth, and Honour, and Noble birth pay little or nothing, that the greatest part of the Duty should rise upon poor Country People, who work hard for their Living. [unspec IV] But especially should all possible care be taken in the Fourth place, that such Sub∣sidies should be levy'd fairly and equally. For the being rack't and screw'd above one's proportion, is a very grating and intolerable thing, and breeds more murmuring and Contention, than the Charge it self. Now in order to bring every body in, to bear a part in this common Bur∣den, it will be convenient, to tax such Provisions with it, as all Mankind have occasion for, and must make use of: Such as Salt, and Drink, and the like; for thus the Excise will be universal; and every Member of the Publick Body will be inexcusably obliged to contribute something to the Pub∣lick Necessity. Besides these indeed there may, and it is but reasonable there should, be constant and heavy In∣cumbrances laid upon such Commodities, whether Foreign or Domestick, as are vicious in their use, and tend only to

debauch the Subject; and thus all those things manifestly do, which serve only for Luxury and vain Pomp; such as are purchased at dear Rates, merely out of extravagant Humour, or useless Curiosity; all superfluous State in Diet, Clothes, Equipage, the Instruments of Pleasure, Corrupters of Manners, and whatever contributes to a Licentious way of Living. And the loading such things with such Impo∣sitions as shall make them yet more expensive, may pos∣sibly prove the best Method to discourage the use of them. For Men in the midst of Luxury, will sometimes be con∣tent to save their Purses, and abstain upon a Consideration of Tenderness in that respect; when their Consciences would be so far from being restrain'd by Laws, that a positive Pro∣hibition would rather set a sharper Edge upon their Ap∣petite, and make them but so much more impatient and ea∣ger, to come at these things.

The Second Branch of this Science, [unspec 22] relating to the Pub∣lick Treasures, [unspec II] is the taking good Care that they be well employ'd.* 1.84 And to this Purpose I will here lay down a short account of the several Heads of Expence, upon which a Prince must necessarily, and ought in Duty to make use of them. Such are, There Subsistence and honourable Sala∣ries of the Houshold, the Pay of the Soldiers, the Wages of Officers of all sorts, the just Rewards of such, as by their good Services have merited of the Publick; The Pensions and charitable Relief extended to those who come well recommended, and are proper Objects of his Royal Bounty and Compassion. These Five are constant and un∣avoidable Occasions. But then there are others too, very useful and fitting, tho' not so absolutely and always neces∣sary, such as the Reparation of old decay'd Towns, strength∣ening the Frontiers of his Country, amending the High∣ways, and making Roads as direct and convenient as the Condition of the Place will bear; keeping up Bridges, and all other necessary Accommodations for Travellers; found∣ing Colleges for the study and improvement of Learning, and Religion, and Virtue; Building and Endowing Hos∣pitals for distressed and disabled People, and erecting Pub∣lick Halls, and other Structures, that are for the Honour and Service of the State. These sorts of Repairs, and Fortifications, and Foundations, are of excellent use and advantage, besides the Profit which immediately redounds to the State in general by their means: For by promoting such Designs, Art is encouraged and improved, Workmen

are kept in Employment, the People are highly contented and pleased, and a great part of that Grudging and Re∣pining usual to the Commonalty, is prevented and cured, when they see their Taxes converted to so good uses, and The Benefit comes back to them again: But especially these two great Banes of any Commonwealth are by this means utterly banished, the Plague of Idleness, and the Scandal of Poverty and Beggery. Whereas on the contrary, the consuming the Publick Wealth in extravagant Gifts to some particular Favourites, in stately but unnecessary Buildings, or in other vain Expences, for which there is no need, and whereof there can be no use, draws a general Odium and Indig∣nation. For the Subjects cannot bear to think that so many Thousand should be stripped to clothe and make one Man sine; that another should strut and look big with their Money; and that the great Houses should be built with their Blood, and the Sweat of their Brows: For such as these are the grumbling Terms, in which the Vulgar, when provoked to discontent, murmur out their Resentments; and nothing touches them so near as Money, and a Notion of Extravagance and Wastfulness in the Disposal of their Taxes.

[unspec 23] The Third and Last Part of this Advice consists in ta∣king care to have a good Supply in reserve for any ex∣traordinary Exigence that may happen: * 1.85 That so, in Ca∣ses of necessity, a Prince may not be driven to sudden and unjust Remedies, nor use Violence upon others to help him∣self. This Store thus laid up, and frugally managed for the Prince to draw out as he sees sit, is the common No∣tion of the Exchequer. Now in the management of this Article, there are two Extremes which must be both a∣voided, because each of them is of very dangerous Con∣sequence to the Person that falls into it. The One is, That of immoderate Greediness in amassing prodigious Summs; for such Treasures, tho' got by Methods never so just and honourable, are not always the most for a Prince's Securi∣ty, when they are out of measure. They really very often involve him in Wars, either by putting him upon Oppres∣sing and invading his weaker Neighbours, in confidence of hisown Strength, and tha the longest Purse will be sure to carry it at last; or else they are a Bait to some Enemy to fall upon Him. And threfore it is much more for the Safety and Advantage, as well as for the Honour of a King, to convert them to such uses as have been already mentioned, than to let them grow exorbitantly great upon

hishands, and so either tempt the Owner to Insolence, or expose him for a Prey to those who want such Prize. The Other Extreme is spending all, and keeping nothing to help at a Pinch; and This is worse than the Former; for such a Governour stands naked and defenceless, and like a foolish Gamester, plays away his last Stake. And therefore all wise Governours take care not to fall into this desperate Condition. The greatest Treasures that History informs us of in any Monarchy heretofore, were th••••e of Darius the last King of Persia, in whose Exchequer Alexander the Great at the Conquest of his Country, is laid to have sound Four∣score Millions of Gold. That of Tileri•••• amounted to Sixty Seven Millions. Trajan had Five and Fifty Millions laid up in Egypt. But that of David exceeds all the rest; for (which is a thing almost incredible in so small, and, in comparison, despicable, a Dominion as that of Jud••••)* 1.86 the Holy Scripture it self takes notice, that he had amassed toge∣ther a Hundred and Twenty Millions.

Now the Method in use heretofore, for preserving these great Treasures from being spent and squander'd away pro∣fusely, or being stoln, and secretly broke in upon, was to melt them down into large massy Ingots or Balls, as the Persians and Romans were wont to do; or else to lay them up in the Temples of their Gods, as the securest and most sacred Repository, as the Grecians frequently did in the Temple of Apollo. Though this did not always suc∣ceed to their Expectation; for Covetousness often broke through the most superstitious Reverence for their Deities,

and plunder'd their very Gods themselves, in despight and defiance of all their imaginary Thunder. Thus also the Romans held their Office of Exchequer in the Temple of Saturn. But that, which of all others seems to be not on∣ly the safest, but the most gainful Course, is what Imen∣tioned before, of lending out these Summs to Private Men at a moderate Interest, upon good Pawns, or sufficient Se∣curity, Real or Personal. Again, Another advisable Expe∣dient for preserving the Publick Treasures from Encroach∣ment and Dishonesty, is to take good care in disposing of the Offices concerned about them. For sure the Manage∣ment of such a Trust is of too great importance to be set to sale; and no Fidelity can be expected, where Men are out of Pocket, and must reimburse themselves at the Pub∣lick Expence: Nor should Men of mean Quality, vulgar and Mechanick People, be admitted to purchase them; but they ought in all reason to be put into the Hands of Men of Birth and Fortunes, such as may be supposed to act upon Principles of Honour, and whose Circumstances set them above any violent Temptations of sordid or foul Dealing: And in this particular the old Romans set us a good Pattern, who entred the young Gentlemen of their best Families in Rome in this kind of Business: They lookt up∣on it as the noblest Education; and from this first setting out, their greatest Men were raised by degrees to the high∣est Honours, and most important Offices in the Common∣wealth.

[unspec 24] His Army, I think may very fitly be placed after the Counsel,* 1.87 and the Treasury of a Prince; for Nature it self hath put that Precedence out of dispute, by making it im∣possible for Forces, either to be well raised, or well order∣ed, and used successfully, and to good purpose; or indeed so much as to subsist, when they are raised without the Sup∣port and Direction of those two former Provisions. Now a Military Force is absolutely necessary for a Prince, to be a Terrour to his Enemies, a Guard and Security to his Per∣son and Government: And for any Man in a Throne to think of sitting quiet there any considerable time, without some Number of Forces, is the fondest Imagination in the World. There is never any perfect Security between the Weak and the Strong; and no State was never yet so com∣posed, as to be quite void of turbulent Spirits, and free from Dangers and Disturbances, both at Home and A∣broad. Now this Power is either a constant determinate

number, such as are always in Pay, the Ordinary Standing Force; or else it is Additional and Extraordinary, levied in time of War, and of no longer continuance than the Occa∣sion of raising it. The Ordinary standing Forces are con∣fin'd to Persons and Places. The Persons are of Two sorts. There are the King's Guards, such as always attend his Person, and are of use, not only as they contribute to the Safety and Preservation of his Royal Life; but likewise as they add to his Pomp and Grandeur, in making all his Appearances more august and venerable, and every way be∣coming so sublime a Character. For that so mightily cele∣brated Saying of Agesilau••, That a Prince might always be safe without any Guard at all, provided he commanded as he ought, and used his Subject as an affectionate and wise Father would deal by his Children. This Aphorism, I say, is far from being alays true; and He were a Mad-man, who at this time of Day would venture to make the Ex∣periment, and depend upon the best nd gentlest Treatment for his Security. For alas! the Wickedness of the World is not so easily won upon; and Men are too ill-natur'd to be charmed into Gratitude, and Returns of Duty, by all the Tenderness, and Affection, and Desert in the World.

Besides these Guards, it is necessary there should be stand∣ing Troops kept in constant Pay, and perfectly well-disci∣plin'd, which may be ready upon any sudden Accident that shall require their Use and Assistance; For it would be extremely improvident to have no Preparations of this kind, and drive off the raising of Men, and qualifying them for Service, till the very instant that Necessity calls for them.

As for the Places, in which such Forces are disposed, they are properly the Forts and Castles upon the Frontiers, which ought constantly to be well Mann'd, and provided with Arms and Ammunition, to prevent Surprize, and In∣cursions from abroad: Instead of which, the Ancients here∣tofore, and some at this Day, choose rather to transplant the Foreigners and former Inhabitants, and to people all such Towns with new and populous Colonies of their own, as they enlarge their Borders by fresh Conquests.

The Extraordinary Forces consist of formed Armies, which a Prince finds himself obliged to raise, and make a plentiful Provision of in time of War. Now, what Methods he ought to govern himself by in this respect; for the un∣dertaking any Military Enterprize, is a Consideration rela∣ting

to the Second Branch of this Politick Prudence, That of Action, I mean, which will be treated of in the fol∣lowing Chapter; and falls not within this First, which is only the Provisionary part, and such as is requisite by way of a Preparatory tothe other. All therefore that I shall say upon this Subject at present, is only, That a wise Prince will always take care, besides his own Guards, to have a competent number of Men in actual Pay, perfect∣ly discisplined and experienc'd in the Busness of their Pro∣fession. And that this number ought to be greater or less, in proportion to the Extent of his Dominions, and the Condition of the Government, to secure Obedience and good Order, and immediately to suppress any Seditious Practices and Commotions, which give Disturbance, and Threaten any Danger, either from sactious Subjects, or busie designing Enemies. Reserving still to himself the Power and Opportunity of making new and greater Le∣vies, when he shall be forced into a formal War, and to take the Field in good earnest; whether that War shall happen to oblige him in acting Offensively or Defen∣sively. And in the mean while, that his Arsenals and Ma∣gazines be constantly well stored with all manner of of∣fensive and desensive Weapons, that so both Horse and Foot may be sufficiently furnished, and compleatly equipped with∣out Difficulty or Delay. In which Provision I likewise in∣clude Ammunition and Provision of all kinds, Engines and Utens••••s of War, whether for a Camp or a Siege. Such Preparations are not only necessary in order to making War and sustaining our selves, when Acts of Hostility are com∣mitted upon us, and consequently such as every State ought to be beforehand with, because they require a great deal of Time and Expence to have them in readiness for use; but they are excelent Preventions too, and many times put a stop to the Designs of levying War upon us. For few Enemies will tempt a Danger, or venture upon a Go∣vernment, which is always in Condition to receive, and revenge their Attempts. Surprize, and Advantage, and the being an Over-match, are the Considerations that animate Strangers abroad, or Parties at home, to injure and at∣tack us. The best Security, when all is done, will be for a Prince to render himself formidable; and Men are most likely to be quiet, when they dare not be otherwise for their town sakes. So infallible, so eternal a Maxim is it

in Politicks, That* 1.88 the Prince who would establish a firm Peace, must be sure to be well provided for War; and treat with the Sword in his Hand.

[unspec 25] After all these necessary and essential Provisions already mentioned, I add in the last place. That of Alliances; * 1.89 which is by no means an inconsiderable Point, but a mighty strengthening and support to any Government. But then the greatest part of this Advantage is owing to pru∣dent Choice, and good Conduct; and therefore good care must be taken with Whom those Alliances are made, and upon what sort of Terms they are established.

The Persons most proper for the Friendship and Alliance of a Prince, are Neighbours, and Persons of Power and Interest. For if they be either weak or remote, what As∣sistance are they in any Capacity of giving? The only Cir∣cumstance that can render such necessary, and engage us in their Interests, is, the being attack'd by a powerful Ene∣my, so as that by ruining Them, he gains an Opportuni∣ty to destroy Us; and so the succouring Them, is the pre∣serving Our selves. In such a Case, let the Allie be other∣wise never so unworthy our regard, we ought to join Forces and defend him with our utmost Might. And, if the do∣ing this openly may be a means of involving us in dan∣ger, then there must be a good Understanding and Assi∣stance given under-hand; for it is a Master-piece in Poli∣ticks, to manage a Confederacy with one Prince bare-sac'd, and in the Eye of all the World; and to be well with an∣other all the while, by an Agreement behind the Curtain, and unsuspected. But still my meaning is, that such Secre∣sie should be free from all Treachery, and Baseness, and soul Dealing: For Wickedness and Falshood are never al∣lowable; but Prudence and good Management are highly to be commended; tho' even These, when they run into Intrigue and Doubling, are more especially to be reserved for acting the Defensive part, and securing the Government from some imminent Danger; Cases that admit a much greater Latitude than acting Offensively, and where there is no urgent Necessity, will bear one out in.

But it ought to be farther observed, that there are seve∣ral Sorts and Degrees of Alliance. The lowest and most simple of all, is That which extends only to an Agreement for mutual Trading and Commerce between the Countries

concerned; but the more usual kind is that which obliges to Friendship, and reciprocal Kindness; and this is either Defensive only; or else Offensive and Defensive both: And that again, by a League either limited, and with an Exce∣ption of some particular Princes and States reserved out of the Treaty; or else general, and without any Restraint or Exception at all. The closest and most perfect Confedera∣cy is that which is Offensive and Desensive, for and against all Persons whatsoever; this is an Engagement to succour and be a Friend to all Their Friends; and to oppose and be an Enemy to all Their Enemies. And this Agreement is of great Convenience to be made with Princes of Pow∣er and great Influence, and upon an equal Foot; so that each side engage upon the same Terms. Again, Alliances may differ in Point of Time; Some are prescribed and limited to a certain Term; Others are perpetual. The more com∣mon way is to make them without any fixt Term men∣tion'd in the Treaty, and these are call'd Perpetual: But the better and safer Course is to limit it to a number of Years expresly. Because then the Renewal gives liberty for second Thoughts. Some Articles may be added, and o∣ther; left out. In a Word, Any alterations may then be made, as the Circumstances or Inclinations of the Parties happen to vary: Or if occasion be, either of them is freely and entirely at his own Disposal, to break off, and be ab∣solutely disengag'd for the future. Nay, tho' the Condition of these Treaties, and the Princes concerned in them, be such as one would wish to perpetuate them; yet even thus it is more convenient to repeat the Engagements, and enter into fresh Covenants upon fresh Consideration, than to enter into a perpetual League at once. (Provided always, that in such Cases the Treaty be concluded, and all made fast again, before the utter Expiration of the former Term.) For all Compacts of this kind naturally languish and cool in pro∣cess of Time; and He that finds it for his Convenience to be off, will be more apt to violate his Faith, if the Alli∣ance be perpetual, and give him no prospect of Redress; than if it be limited, and so he can see to the End of his Grievance. For in this Case he will be render of his Ho∣nour, and wait with Patience till he be absolved of Course, and can come off without any Blemish. And thus you have seen what those Seven Heads are, which I thought necessary for the Provisionary part of Civil Prudence.

CHAP. III. The Second Part of Policy, or Prudence in Government, which consists in the Administration and good Conduct of the Prince.

[unspec 1] HAving thus insisted at large upon the Provision a Prince ought to make, and instructed him, what Ornaments and Furniture, what Defence and what Securities, (if I may so term them) are necessary for the Honour and Safe∣ty of his Person and his Government; and not only so, but likewise what Courses are proper to be taken for the acquiring and furnishing out such Suplies: Let us now proceed to Action, and observe, after what manner these things ought to be made use of, and employ'd to be best Advantage. But, before we come to treat of this Matter distinctly, and with reference to the several Branches of the former Division respectively, we may venture to say in general, That This whole Matter consists in governing well; and again, That a good Administration with regard both to the Welfare and Obedience of the Subject, and the Security of the Prince, will depend chiefly upon such a sort of Conduct as shall acquire him Two things, hearty Good-Will I mean, and Authority. The Former is That Affectionate Concern and Kindness which Subjects should retain for their Sovereign and his Government. The Latter is a good and great Opinion, an honourable Esteem of Him and his Government. With respect to the Former of These it is, that a Prince is belov'd, and by virtue of the Latter he is fear'd and stood in awe of. Now These two Affections of Love and Fear, tho' they be very distant, yet are they by no means contrary to, or destructive of one another; and consequently neither are those Regards so, which in the present Case flow from, and are the Re∣sult of those Passions. Both of them are likewise of gene∣ral Extent in the Matter before us; and both Subjects and Strangers are concerned in each. Tho' indeed, if we look strictly into the Thing, and speak more properly, the Good-Will seems to be the Quality of Subjects, and the Authority that which hath the Principal Influence upon

Strangers. And accordingly Tacitus distinguishes them, when he advises Persons in this Eminent Post, to order Matters so,* 1.90 that their own Country-Men may be sure to love, and Foreigners and Enemies may be sure to fear them. And if we would deliver our Judgment freely and fully upon the Matter, though both are of great Efficacy, yet it must be acknowledged, that Authority is the stronger and more vi∣gorous Principle of the Two; the more Venerable and of longer Continuance. But, when there is a just Temper, and exact Harmony of both together, this Matter is then brought to its utmost Perfection. A thing not always pra∣cticable, because the different Constitutions of Government, and yet more different Humors and Dispositions of Peo∣ple, according to their several Climates, or Countries, or Complexions make a mighty Difference in the acquiring these; and incline Some to the One of those Afflictions of the Mind, and Others to the other. So that some are easily brought to Love, and are scarce susceptible of Fear; Others as easily awed into Respect, but not without infinite Difficul∣ty to be won over to Kindness and Love for their Prince. What Methods are most Proper and Advisable for the ac∣quiring both these Advantages, we have already been in∣form'd; for the several Heads of Provision so largely ex∣plain'd, are but so many Means for the compassing this End: though of Them the most effectual and insinuating seem to be Those comprehnded under the Heads, which touch upon the Virtues, and the Manners or Deportment of a Prince. But however, it may not be amiss, now we are fallen upon the Matter more directly, to say one Word or two more with regard to each of these powerful Advanta∣ges expresly.

[unspec 2] This Good-Will and Hearty Affection is of infinite and excellent Use; * 1.91 it is in a manner absolutely necessary; in so much, that This by its own single Strength is able to do a great deal, and gives amighty Security; but all the rest without this is very seeble and unsafe. The Methods of obtaining it are principally Three. First, Moderation and Gentleness; not in Words, and Actions, soft Language, and courteous Behaviour only, but also in the very Tem∣per of the Commands issued out, and the whole Administra∣tion. For the generality of Mankind are of such a Dispo∣sition, as will neither endure to have their Hands ty'd behind

them, nor absolutely loose, and at their own disposal.* 1.92 They are impatient (says Tacitus) of an Arbitrary Yoke, and perfect Slavery, and yet at the same time every whit as unable to bear perfect and uncontrouled Liberty. They make a shift to obey well enough, and are contended to live in the Qual∣ty of Subjects; but the Chains and Captivity of Slaves they can never away with; and therefore he says of them, that they are tamed and† 1.93

subdued not to serve, but to obey.

And the very Truth is⁂ 1.94 Every Man finds himself more inclin'd to comply with a Superiour who uses his Power tenderly; And the greater the Command, the readier and more hear∣ty is commonly the Observance paid to it. He that will be well carried must take care not to ride with too stiff a Rein. Caesar, who was very expert, and a perfect Master in Matters of this kind, used to say, that Power, when mode∣rately exercised, kept all safe and tight; but when a Man once came to let himself loose, and commanded things with∣out any regard to the Reasonableness or the Decency; when he was set upon making himself absolute, and resolv'd to be obey'd Right or Wrong; such a One could never be belov'd by his Subjects, nor did he sit fast in his Throne. In the mean while, give me leave to add, that by this Gentleness and Moderation, I do not mean such a tame and easie, Negligent and Effeminate Softness, as lets the Reins of Government perfectly loose; For This will expose a Prince to Reproach and Contempt, and degenerate into an Extreme, Ten thousand times worse than that of Fear. In all these Cases therefore a Commander must observe, how far he can go Decently,* 1.95 and what Indulgences are consistent with his Honour. And the proper Province as well as the Excellence and Commendation of Prudence in Mat∣ters of this Nature will be, to make so just a Mixture of Justice and Gentleness, that a Prince may neither seek to be Fear'd by methods of Rigour and Extremity, and rendering himself a publick Terror to the World; nor study to ingratiate himself, and become Popular and Be∣lov'd, by Methods so mean and unworthy, as should make him Despicable, and a Jest and Scorn of the World.

[unspec 3] The Second Expedient, which I think advisable for gain∣ing the Affections of the World,* 1.96 is Beneficence: I mean so general and unbounded a Disposition to do Good, as shall by no means be confin'd to those of the first Quality, or near the Princes Person; but shed it self all over, upon all Sorts and Conditions of Men, that even the lowest and most distant, the meanest of the People, may tast and rejoice in it. One excellent way of doing this, is by good Management, and provident Care; contriving sufficient Pro∣visions and setting moderate Prices upon Commodities; see∣ing that the Markets be well furnished, and Corn and o∣ther Necessaries for the support of Life, sold at reasonable Rates; that if it be possible, there may always be Plenty, and whatever Nature cannot subsist without, may be cheap; for nothing is so snesible a Grievance as Scarcity, and extravagant Rates; and the Blame of all will be sure to be laid at the Governour's Door. The Common People have no other Notion of publick Good, but what they are sustain'd by; nor can you make them believe that any o∣ther, either Duty or Benefit, is incumbent upon, or to be expected from those that sit at Helm, comparable to That of seeding the Subject; as if Socity and Government were instituted for no other Purpose, than to see that the vulgar, and poorer sort of Men should never want a full Belly.* 1.97 And accordingly Tacitus hath observed, That the only Motive which can fasten their Affections to the State is the Convenience of being maintain'd at the publick Care.

[unspec 4] The Third Attractive of Peoples Affections is Liberality, which is in Truth a more particular Sort of Beneficence;* 1.98 This is a Bait, nay, a Charm rather; for it does not only allure and invite, but draws, bewitches, captivates Mens Hearts, almost whether they will or no. So Pleasant and Sweet it is to be on the Receiving, so Honourable and Winning to be on the Giving Hand: Insomuch that a very wise Man laid it down for a Maxim, That a Government is better secured by Kindness, and Obligations, than by Strength and Force of Arms. This is an Expedition useful at all Times, but more especially so, at the first entrance upon Government; when there hath been either some late Succes∣sion, or some new Establishment. What Persons are the Pro∣per Objects of this Liberality, in what Proportions it ought to be extended, and what Address ought to be observed in

the manner of giving, are Particulars, which have been largely examin'd and resolv'd already. I only add, that Augustus hath given us in his own Person, an eminent In∣stance, both of the Practice of these Methods for attaining the Love and Esteeem of Mankind, and of the Success of such Measures† 1.99 For he (says Tacitus) won upon the Army by Lar∣gesses; the Common People by Plenty of Corn; and all Degrees of Men by the Sweets of Rest and Ʋniversal Peace.

[unspec 5] Authority is the other Pillar, that supports any Govern∣ment; for,⁂ 1.100 The Majesty of the Royal Character is its Safe∣ty and Defence. This is that impregnable Fort,* 1.101 that keeps the lower and naked World in Aw; by Virtue whereof the Prince can demand, and force Satisfaction, form any who shall presume to contemn his Orders, or behave them∣selves insolently to him. Upon the Account of This it is, that the Discontents of People end in Murmurs, that the enraged Mobile dares not storm the Palace, but all desire to be in good Grace with their Great Master. Now, this Authority is a compounded thing, and the Two Ingre∣dients that make it up, are Fear and Respect. By These two the Prince and his Government become formidable, spread a sort of Awe upon all who behold and consider them, and are secured from Attempts by this Protection. Now, to the acquiting this Authority, besides that all the Heads of Provision insisted upon in the last Chapter must concur, there are Three other Things absolutely necessary to be observed, in the Admistration, and manner of Go∣verning it iself.

The First of These is Severity; which, commonly speak∣ing,* 1.102 is much more for the Safety, and Advantage of a Go∣vernour, and a better and more durable Defence from Enemies and Dangers, than Easiness and Clemency; be∣cause these are so very seldom tempered with Discre∣tion; and a great Softness and Gentleness of Disposition is exceeding apt to degenerate, and, as was hinted before, to produce very mischievous Effects. Of This several good Accounts may be given; As First, the Natural Humor of the People, which, as Aristotle very truly observed, is not cast in so good a Mould, as to be tractable; nor will they be contained in their Duty by any Principles so generous,

as Love or Shame; nothing less, nothing better will do it than Force and Fear, Extremity, and a Dread at least of Punishment. A Second Reason is the General Corruption of Manners, and that Extravagance and Debauchery, which like a Contagious Distemper, haith tainted and overspread all the World; and this by being general, takes Courage, grows Insolent and Presumptuous; and is so far from any possibility of being reform'd by fair Means, that such Gen∣tleness only inflames the Disease, and makes Vice more Bold and Triumphant. It begets Contempt of Superiours, and strengthens the Wicked with Hopes of Impunity, which is the Plague and Bane of all Law, and all Government. For as Ciccro says* 1.103 The most Pewerful Temptation to offend arises from the Hope of Impunity. And most certain it is, that Rigor upon particular Notorious Offenders, is the greatest Mer∣cy that can possibly be shewn to the Publick, and the whole Body of Subjects in general. There is sometimes a necessity of making signal and solemn Examples, thus at the Expence of private Sufferings to teach other People Wis∣dom, and to prevent the exorbitant Growth of Villany by cutting it short betimes. The Body Politick is in this Re∣spect subject to the same Dangers, and must submit to the same Methods of Cure, with our Natural Body; where a Fin∣ger is many times taken off out of a mere Principle of Ten∣derness; that by this seeming Barbarity, a Mortification may be prevented from seizing the whole Arm first, and then the Vitals. And thus that King of Thrace made no ill An∣swer, to one that reproach'd him, with playing the Part, not of a King, but a Mad-Man; Aye, Sir, says he, but this Madness of mine keeps my Subjects in their Senses; and they grow Wiser by that which you think my Folly. Severity keeps Officers and Magistrates strictly to their Duty, and promotes a faithful Execution of their respective Trusts; it discountenances Flatterers, and turns Parasites out of Doors; the Wicked and Dissolute, the impudent Beggars, and little Tyrants of the Court are not able to stand before it. Whereas on the contrary, Easiness and Excessive Mild∣ness of Temper opens the Gate Wide, and admits all these infamous Wretches; by whose Importunity and Un∣reasonableness the publick Treasures are exhausted, and squan∣dered away; All manner of Vice is encouraged, The King∣dom is impoverished; all which, and a great many other

Miseries, like Colds and Catarrhes, in a Rheumatick and distempered Body, break the Constitution; and fall and set∣tle like the Humours, upon the weakest Parts. The Good-Nature of Pertinax, and the Licentiousness of Heliogabalus had like to have lost All, and were very near ruining the Roman Empire; and then the strict Discipline of Seve∣rus first, and afterwards of Alexander restor'd, and made all whole again.

But still Extreams must be avoided; and the Severity I recommended should be exercised with prudent Reserve, and just Distinction: It must not be a thing of constant practice, but now and then, upon justifiable and impor∣tant Occasions; and when it may be seasonable and effectual. For the End of this Dispensation must always direct the Use of the Means; and the Design of all Rigour in the Admi∣ministration of Justice is plainly This,* 1.104 That the Sufferings of a few, may work Terror and Amendment in the rest, Thus the Almighty Law-Giver himself, renders an account of several exemplary and capital Punishments among the Israelites;* 1.105 That all Israel may hear, and fear, and do no more wickedly. Now, such Executions, when grown daily and familiar, lose their Efficacy; and therefore that ancient Author was cer∣tainly in the Right, who affirmed, that some few publick Examples contribute more to the Reformation of the Peo∣ple, than frequent Punishments, which come thick upon one another can possibly do. The Reason of which is, that the more Surprising and New any Impressions of this kind are, the more Strong, and Terrible and Awakening they are. But then all this is to be understood of common Cases; for if Vice gather Strength, if the Proselytes and Practisers of it grow Numerous, and Resolute, and Bold, In such a Case Compassion is the greatest Cruelty, Fire and Sword are then the only Remedies, and it is necessary to go thro' with the Cure. And whatever Imputations of a Bloody and Barbarous Temper may in such Circumstances be cast upon a Prince, they are but the Effects of Ignorance and Unjust Censure; for here again it is in the State, as in these private Bodies of ours, where the† 1.106 Extremity of a Disease and the ungovernableness of the Patient, forces the Physician to be cruel; and he would betray his Skill,

and be false to his Profession, should he relent, and be otherwise.

[unspec 7] The Second Expedient for establishing and preserving a Princes Authority, * 1.107 is Constancy. A Firmness, and Resolv'd Temper of Mind, by which he keeps to his own Methods, treads the same Steps, and without any Fickle∣ness or wanton Love of change, advances still on, gets Ground upon his Subjects; and enforces a due Obser∣vance of establish'd Laws, and ancient Customs. To be continually Altering and Reviewing, Abolishing Old, and Enacting New, besides, that it argues a weak and unsettled Mind, which never knows when things are well, nor where to fix; it does unavoidably lessen a Prince in the Eye of the World, and derive a very mean Opinion, both upon his Person, and his Laws; nay, it exposes both to publick Scorn and Contempt. Upon This Account wise Men have ever shew'd themselves averse to Change, and that to such a Degree, as to dissuade and forbid Alterati∣ons in Laws and received Customs, even though they were to be chang'd for the better. For (besides the Uncertainty and the Danger of such Courses, and that we know the worst of what is practised now, but cannot foresee the Consequences of what was never yet try'd;) Take the Matter abstractedly and by it self, and it is certain, that Al∣teration of an old Law is always more inconvenient, and does greater Mischief, than the Novelty of a thing intro∣duc'd in its Room can posibly do Good. Upon this Ac∣count (as I have intimated in a former Part of this Trea∣tise) Busie Fellows and Reformers have all along been look'd upon as very suspicious and dangerous People, and by all means to be discountenanced. And in truth nothing less than either evidence or absolute necessity; or else as evident and very considerable Advantage to the Publick; and This a certain, and not merely a possible, or likely Consequence of the Change can ever be Argument Strong and Substan∣tial enough, for breaking in upon ancient Constitutions, and altering the Measures of any Government. And when such cogent Motives as these are offer'd to persuade it, yet e∣ven then there is mighty Caution and Diligence to be used; the Proceedings ought to be exceeding well advised; eve∣ry Step taken warily and with Deliberation. All must not be done at a Push; but the Old laid aside with decency and by degrees, and the New introduced as gently and insensi∣bly,

as is possible. For in this above any other conjun∣cture of Affairs is that Proverb of* 1.108 Fair and Softly a ne∣cessary Rule in Politicks.

[unspec 8] The Third Expedient for this purpose is to steer this Vessel himself, and not trust the Helmof Govern∣ment in any other Hand. My Meaning is, that the Honour and Power of issuing out Orders, and giving Commands, should be reserv'd to the Prince in Person; and no other act as Superintendent under him; That he should give the last Determinations, and his Will be the Dire∣ction, without referring all to his Counsel, and suffer∣ing Them to act and order, as they think fit. For this will draw the Eyes, and the Respects of all his Subjects, and make them sensible, that all depends upon his Disposal and good Pleasure. The Sovereign, who gives away, tho' it be never so little of his Authority, is in Danger of losing All; and will quickly grow insignificant and despicable. For this Reason a Prudent King will be sure never to raise any Subject too high, or make him extravagantly Great, or Wealthy above the Rest.† 1.109 The common Safeguard of the Government and Royal State, is to take Care, that no one Sub∣ject be made too big by the Favour of his Prince, says Ari∣stotle. And if it happen that he find such a one already made to his Hands, it is a Maxim in Politicks, to lessen and lower him: But then that must be done slily and smoothly, by some Stratagem not easily seen through, and in the most gentle, inoffensive, insensible Way that can be. Another Rule is, not to give Places of great Dignity and Importance, for Life; much less suffer them to be heredi∣tary and descend in the same Family; nay, it is dangerous indeed to continue These for any long Term of Years, lest Men by this Means should strengthen their Party, and at last become a Match for their Master. And whoever shall consult Histories, both Ancient and Modern, and there ex∣amine the Causes of Powerful Factions, and the most sur∣prising and fatal Revolutions of States and Empires, will find the greatest part of them owing to the Exorbitant Riches and Power of some over-grown Subject; or the Influence and Interest of some old and important Officer:

So that Seneca had good Reason to say,* 1.110 Nothing is so con∣venient and advantageous to the State, as the frequent Change of high Offices; no Trust, no Power, which is Great, ought to be continued long in the same Hand.

[unspec 9] These are fair, * 1.111 and honest Means, agreable to Justice, becoming the Character of a Prince, and fit for him to use for the acquiring and supporting himself, bothin the Good Affections of the World, and in a Venerable Authority with them. Upon these Terms he may be loved and seared both; and so it is necessary he should be. For though a convenient Mixture of these Two be desirable and excellent; yet either of them singly, and destitute of the other, is nei∣ther Reasonable in its self, nor any Security to the Govern∣ment. Upon which Account it is, that we detest and ab∣hor a Tyrannical Authority, a Fear absolutely repugnant to, and destructive of Affection and Love, such as reners the Person an Object of all Men's Hatred at the same time.† 1.112 Let them hate me, so they fear me, is a brutish and savage Declaration; no one that is really a Man, would be content with Power and Greatness at that Rate; and this Authority, if it be sit to allow it so honourable a Name, is such as Barbarous, and Arbitrary, and Wicked Men pro∣cure to themselves; not by the Exercise, but by the Abuse of their Power. The Qualities and Character of a good Prince and a Tyrant, have no manner of Resemblance to one another. The Distance is so vast, the Disparity so no∣torious, that it is scarce possible for a Man not to distin∣guish between them. In short, they all turn at last upon these Two Points; One is, The observing the Laws of God and Nature, with a Religious Strictness, or the trampling both under Foot, with the greatest Insolence and Contempt. The other, making the publick Good and true Interest of one's Subjects the End and Measure of all one's Actions; or the making every Thing truckle to his own Will, and by every Action and Design serving and aiming at nothing else, but private Profit and Pleasure. Now the Prince, who will answer his Character, and be what so glorious a Sta∣tion requires, must constantly remember, that as it is the peculiar Happiness and Prerogative of Power to do what∣ever he hath a Mind to: So it is also the true Prerogative of the Will, and the most certain Mark of real Greatness, to

have a Mind to such things only as are Just, and Lawful, and becoming.* 1.113 Caesar (says Pliny) hath less in his Power than Common Men, upon this very account, that every thing is in his Power. For as it is a Happiness to be able to do what you please, so it is true Greatness to will only such things as you can do; or rather, indeed, to desire and will no more than you ought to do; for in strict speaking, a Man can do no more than lawfully hemay do. The greatest Misfortune that any Prince is capable of, is the being possessed with an Opi∣nion, that his Will is his Rule; and that all that is possible, is lawful for him. As soon as ever he hath given way to this vile Imagination, his whole Temper and Manners pre∣sently grow corrupt, and from a good Man he is transfor∣med into a wicked Wretch, and a Monster. Now this O∣pinion commonly insinuates it self by Sycophants and Para∣sites: Flattery infuses and blows it up; for Persons of that Dignity never want enough and too many, to preach up to them the Greatness of their Power, because this is a pleasing Doctrine, and tickles the Ear; but the Obligations of Duty carry a harsh and grating Sound; and there are few, but very few Servants so hardy in their Fidelity, as to entertain their Master upon this necessary Subject. But of all sorts of Flattery. That is the most dangerous, when a Man flatters Himself. In other Cases, a Man may stop his Ears against the treacherous Insinuation; he may enjoyn Si∣lence, forbid all Discourse of that kind, avoid the Presence and Company of the nauseous Wretches that use and hope to ingratiate themselves by it: But when the Person who gives, and he who receives the Flattery, are one and the same, What shall he do, or whether shall he run from such destructive Conversation? And therefore a Prince above all other People, is highly concern'd to deal honestly by himself; to decline and despise the fulsom and base Soothings of o∣ther People, who hope to make their court this way; and especially to be a severe Inquisitor and Judge of his own A∣ctions, and not to cajole himself into Ruine.

After all that hath been said, (and too much cannot be said against Tyranny and Arbitrary Administration) it is necessary to add, that sometimes such critical Junctures of Affairs will happen, such Intricacies and Perplexities in Pub∣lick

Business, with regard to Time, Person, Places, Occasi∣ons, or some accidental Circumstances; that a Prince will be driven to a necessity of doing some things, which at first view may look like Tyranny: As for instance; When the Matter depending before him, is the suppressing of an∣other Tyranny; the Licentiousness, I mean, of a head∣strong, hair-brain'd People, whose ungovernable Fury is the most absolute, most destructive Tyranny in the World; Or when he is to break some close Cabal, or powerful Faction of the Nobility, and Persons of Wealth and Fi∣gure in their Country; Or when the publick Treasures are reduced and wasted, the King driven to extreme Wants, and knows not where to furnish himself with needful Sup∣plies, and so is compelled for the Relief of the State in its present Exigency, to raise Moneys irregularly, and borrow from the Rich, by such Loans as they are not perfectly con∣tented with. Of these Extremities, and the Methods and Remedies proper for them, I have spoken formerly; and the only design of renewing the mention of them here, is to persuade People to give the best and most favourable Interpretation to Cases of necessity; and not immediately clamour against them, and represent them in their worst and most odious Colours, but make all the Allowances they can bear. Much less ought we to misconstrue Severity upon particular Offenders, or esteem the number of his Guards, or the Strength of his Forts, or the Majesty, and Style-Imperial of his Commands to be Tyranny. For all these things are not only useful in a very high degree, but in some Circumstances indispensably necessary. And such Authoritative Methods in Kings, are much better, and more desirable, than the softest Entreaties, and kindest Caresses of Tyrants.

And thus I have represented the Two firm Supports of a Prince, and a State; and happy is it for Them, who know how to acquire, and to continue these Advantages to themselves; and by so doing, effectually prevent the Two Contraries, which are the very Murderers and cer∣tain Undoers of a Prince and Government, Hatred, I mean, and Contempt: Concerning which I beg the Readers Pa∣tience to say one Word, because a brief Consideration of them may be of some Service towards the preventing or de∣fending our selves from them.

[unspec 10] Hatred then, which is the direct Contrary to Love and Good-will,* 1.114 is an obstinate, wicked, perverse Affection of the Mind, whereby the Subjects are violently prejudiced, and bitterly set against the Prince and his Government. This commonly springs either from some Apprehension of future Mischiefs, or from a Desire of revenging some past Injury; or else from a Resentment compounded of both these together. When this Hatred is very rank and fierce, and when it spreads and grows Epidemical, the Danger is extremely great, and the Consequence commonly fatal; and very seldom it is, that a Prince is able to stemm, or get over it.* 1.115 No Power (says Tully) is so great as to be a match for a general Hatred; The Multitude have many Hands, and the Prince hath but one Head. This is it they thirst after, This what they want, to put an End to their Rage; and he is but a Man equal in this regard to any one of his Enemies, but expos'd to the Attempts of them All. You see then, how important, how necessary it is for a Prince to preserve himself from such a dangerous, such an irresi∣stible Mischief; and the most likely Course that can be taken for this purpose, will be to avoid the two Extremes of Cruelty and Avarice, so directly opposite to that Gen∣tleness and Liberality, which were observ'd before to be the powerful Instruments, and most powerful Motives to gain the Kindness and good Affection of any People.

[unspec 11] First, he must by all means keep himself clear and un∣tainted from any base and barbarous Cruelty,* 1.116 such as is a Blemish to his Character, scandalous, and abominable, and unbecoming his Grandeur: On the other Hand, let his Mind be strongly armed by Clemency, the Reasons and Necessity whereof have been shewn already, when we treated of the Virtues more peculiar to a Prince. But still, in regard Publick Punishments are necessary and un∣avoidable; and these, even when most just, even when most necessary, carry some face and appearance of Cruelty, it concerns a Governour to carry himself very prudently in the management of this Matter; and perhaps there are not many Cases which require more Dexterity and Ad∣dress. And therefore I will presume to venture at a little particular Advice upon this Occasion. As first, Let him by no means be too eager and hasty in laying his Hand

upon the Sword of Justice; but shew, that he draws it meerly in his own Defence; and by his slowness to be pro∣vok'd, and loathness to revenge, convince the World, that what he does of this kind, is the effect of meer Necessi∣ty, and sore against his Inclination.† 1.117 He that passes Sen∣tence speedily, does it willingly, and with a Glee; whereas there is a Tenderness due, and a King ought to be very sa∣ving even of the worst and vilest Blood. Secondly, Let the Principle upon which he proceeds, be the Prospect of the Publick Good; and let the making their Faults exem∣plary, and preventing the spreading and growth of it in o∣thers, and a Relapse of the Sufferer himself, be the Mo∣tives of Punishment, rather than any thirst of Vengeance, or a desire to torment the guilty Person. Thirdly, What∣ever of this kind is necessary to be done, let it be put in execution with all possible Calmness and Temper. A King should be like his Laws, cool and sedare, void of all man∣ner of Passion; and therefore Anger, and Joy, and any other Emotion of the Soul is highly unbeseeming; but if any Passion may be allowed, That of Pity is the only one, that can shew it self with a good Grace upon these Oc∣casions. Fourthly, Let the Execution be only what is usu∣al, and according to the Laws and Customs of the Coun∣try in such Cases; for the aggravating of the Pain, and in∣venting new and more exquisite Methods of Torment, are so many certain Marks of a cruel and remorseless Mind. Fifthly, Let not the Prince have any hand in inflicting the Punishment, nor so much as be present at the Execution; for this looks like insulling, and taking satisfaction in the Sufferings of the Criminal. Lastly, if there be a necessity of Punishing a great many, let it be done with all conve∣nient speed, upon all together, that it may be over and forgotten, as soon as possible. For the prolonging their Execution, and repeating these Tragical Sights One by One, looks as if a Man play'd the Epicure in Blood. For we naturally contrive, that those things may be lengthen∣ed out, or often renewed to us, which give us Enter∣tainment and Delight. And every Body hastens to make an End of That, which is disagreeable, and raises his Aversion.

[unspec 12] The next thing which he ought to keep himself free from, * 1.118 is Avarice, than which no Vice whatsoever can pos∣sibly be more misbecoming a great Man Now this may discover it self two Ways; either in Extortion, and ex∣acting more than is fit; or in Niggardliness, and in gi∣ving less than is fit. The former of These will be sure to disgust the Common People, who are all of them na∣turally covetous, and esteem their Pocket the tenderest Part; for Money is their Blood, their Life, their very Soul. And therefore nothing gives them so sensible an Affliction, or raises their Indignation, like the Exactions that rob them of it. The Second discontents all that have served the State, who have any Pretensions to Merit, and have spent their Time and Pains, their Strength and Blood, upon the Publick, and therefore think some proportionable Gratuity their due. Now we have already taken Occasi∣on in the last Chapter, to discourse the matter of the Publick Treasure at large, how the Prince ought to ma∣nage himself in this whole Point; what Methods are pro∣per for the raising of Funds; what Taxes fit to be impo∣sed, for the putting his Exchequer into Stock; what Pru∣dence is requisite in the laying out such Moneys; and what Frugality necessary for the reserving a convenient Supply for extraordinary Exigencies. And therefore all I shall need to add here, is only thus much, That the Prince ought very diligently to beware of Three Things. The First, That he bear no manner of Resemblance to those Tyrannical and Extravagant Impositions, the insupportable Burden whereof have rather made the Leviers of them Devourers of their Country, and common Plunderers, than Fathers and Defenders of it. Such as God describes by the Mouth of his Psalmist,* 1.119 that⁂ 1.120 Eat up the People as they would eat Bread; Woose Treasuries are enrich'd with the Spoils of their Subjects, and made the common Receptacle of Blood and Rapine. For these Oppressions weary out all Patience, and provoke Tumults and Insurrections; as infi∣nite Examples of Revenge, and Sedition, and other despe∣rate Calamities prove to us. The Second Thing to be de∣clined, is Sordidness, and that first in the gathering part;

(* 1.121 Following the Scent of Gain every where, and balking no occasion, tho' never so vile and unbeseeming his Character; or as the common Proverb says, Robbing the very Spittle) for which reason it will be highly advisable in him, to be very spa∣ring in taking the Advantage of Accusations and Attainders, Confiscations and Forfeitures, and other Spoils, which have an Air of Hardship, even when they are clear of Injustice. The other Branch of Sordidness is in being close-handed, giving nothing, or giving in little and sneaking Proporti∣ons; making his Favours mercenary, or being slow and difficult in granting; so that whatever is obtain'd shall be dear bought, by importunate Requests, and long Atten∣dance; and is not so properly the effect of Generosity, or a Sense of Merit in the Receiver, as extorted by dunning, and wrested out of his Hands by tiring and vanquishing his Patience. The Third is, Methods of Violence, and un∣reasonable Exaction in the levying of Taxes; when the manner of bringing it in, looks more like forraging, or going to plunder an Enemy, than to make a Demand up∣on a Subject. This Caution, I confess, is chiefly aim'd at the Insolence of Collectors and Receivers, who by their base Extortions, and grinding the Faces of the Poor, ex∣pose the Prince to Hatred and Disrepute, and breed angry Resentments, and ill Blood in the People. For his Honour suffers for the Misdemeanors of his Under-Officers. These Monsters of Foxes and Wolves, who as one describes them, have Six Hands, and Three Heads apiece. And, as in o∣ther Matters, so particularly in that of making Seisures, are barbarous and remorseless; especially such Goods as are Necessaries of a Man's Life, the Tools of his Trade, or Instruments of Husbandry; a Method to be declin'd in common Prudence, as exceeding odious, and what nothing less than Extremity, or very just Provocation ought to put them upon. It is therefore of mighty consequence to a Prince, what sort of People are employ'd in these Offices; for it is highly requisite they should be Men both of In∣tegrity and Prudence: Nor is it less Necessary for his Ho∣nour, to turn them out with Disgrace when they misbe∣have themselves: A severe exemplary Punishment, a swing∣ing Fine, to make them disgorge all their ill-gotten Gains, is what he owes to himself, and his own Defence: For

these State-Sponges should be used accordingly, and squeez'd in their Turn too, till they have given back every Drop of that Blood and Sweat, which they most mercilesly suckt up, by draining and squeezing the poor Country People before.

[unspec 13] Let us now proceed to consider that other, and, if it be possible, still worse Enemy of a Prince and his Govern∣ment,* 1.122 which is Contempt, arising from an ill and mean Opinion both of the One and the Other. What is it that can possibly support one single Man, and that some∣times one of great Years and Infirmities, in a Station so much above many Millions of his Brethren, except it be Authority, and a high Esteem? When once This is lost, and sinks into Contempt, all the rest is lost with it, and both Prince and Government fall to the Ground. And therefore, as in this respect, according to what was urged before, Authority is of greater Strength and Efficacy, and carries more Pomp and Majesty with it, than the good Affection of a People; so likewise Contempt is more dan∣gerous and formidable, than even Hatred it self. For Ha∣tred is Modest and Timorous, it is restrain'd by Fear, and dares attempt nothing, till Contempt let it loose; but this shakes off that Yoke, animates and arms it for the most desperate Undertakings. It is true indeed, Contempt sel∣dom rises very high, especially under the Government of a Rightful Prince, unless he be perfectly insignificant, and degrade and prostitute himself and his Honour to that de∣gree, as only to be* 1.123 a King of Clouts. But still, since there is a possibility of its happening, we shall do well to observe what are the Occasions most likely to produce it. Now This, as it is in its own Nature the very Re∣verse to Authority, so does it derive it self from Causes directly contrary to Those, by virtue whereof a Prince's Authority is procured and preserved: As for Instance, those Three that follow.

[unspec I] First, as to his manner of Government; a loose, effemi∣nate softness, supineness, and negligence in Business; a tame, heedless, unthinking Temper; or else Fickleness in his Resolution, and perpetual Change and Uncertainty in his Opinions and Methods: For when there is no Atten∣tion, no Steadiness, no Spirit or Vigor, this is the mere empty Name of a Government, without the Thing. Sub∣jects

under such Princes grow insolent, and bold, and en∣croaching: They think they may do what they will, and that He will never regard, or reckon with them for it:† 1.124 It is a great Calamity to have a Prince, under whom no Man enjoys any Liberty at all; but it is still greater to have one, under whom none are subject to any Check or Restraint at all.

[unspec II] Secondly, This is frequently the Effect of his Misfor∣tunes, either with regard to his Affairs when they succeed ill; Or in respect of his Family, when there is no certain prospect of Succession, either of his own Issue, or else by a fixt Settlement; for Children are a mighty strengthen∣ing to a Prince's Interest; and the not knowing what will become of the Crown when the present Possessor fails, is such a Diminution and Unhappiness, that we find even Alexander himself, in the midst of Glory and Conquest, complaining bitterly of it;⁂ 1.125 My want of Heirs, says he, is despised, because I have no Children to succeed Me. For the Children of a Prince are the Honour and the Strength of the Court.

[unspec III] Thirdly, Princes often draw Contempt upon themselves by their Manners, and way of Living, particularly, if they be dissolute and debauch'd, sensual and effeminate; Slaves to Vice, and abandon'd to Luxury and Pleasure; especially to Sottishness, and Drinking, and Gluttony, the lowest and most despicable of all Pleasures: Also their Behaviour ex∣poses them to it, if this be churlish and morose; their Dis∣course, when childish and impertinent; their Persons, when nauscous and notoriously deform'd.

And thus we are got to the End of what I thought con∣venient to be premised, with relation to the Active part, or Administration of a Prince in general. We proceed now to handle it more distinctly and particularly. But in or∣der hereunto, it must be remembred, that this (as was ob∣serv'd in the beginning of this Chapter) consists of Two parts, the One Civil, or that which concerns a State of Peace and publick Tranquillity. The Other Military, and proper for a State of War: For by the former I understand the common and ordinary Methods of Goverment, which are of constant

and daily use, whether in a time of Peace or War. By the Latter I mean those Methods which are proper to Martial Discipline, and the practice whereof is peculiar to the Time of War only.

[unspec 14] The peaceful and ordinary Administration of a Govern∣ment is a Province of such vast Comprehension, * 1.126 and the Acci∣dents and Occurrences of it so various and unforeseen, that it is impossible to reduce it to any general Rules. And be∣sides, The Prudence of it consists oftentimes as much in for∣bearing to act, as at other times in acting. But however, I will venture to lay down here some few Heads of Ad∣vice, which are necessary to be consider'd, and may be of some Advantage perhaps, when the Duties they prescribe are observ'd duly, and improv'd, by applying the Substance of those general Intimations to particular Actions and Cir∣cumstances. First then, the Prince is concern'd above all things, to take care, that he be faithfully and diligently in∣form'd of all Matters which any way concern him to know. The Matters I mean here may be comprehended under Two Heads; and consequently the Informations themselves, and the Persons made use of in them, are of two different Qualities. And to render those of each sort what they ought to be, these Qualifications are absolutely necessary, and in common to both; Sincerity and Confi∣dence, Secresie and Prudence. But tho' these be requisite to both kinds, yet they are not so to both equally: For the One have occasion for much greater Liberty, and O∣penness, and Plain-dealing, than the Other. The One of these are the Persons whose business it is to put him in Mind of his Duty, what he is obliged to, and what be∣comes his Character; and not only so, but to make him duly sensible of his Faults and Failings, and to speak bold Truths to him concerning himself. There are no sort of Men in the World, who stand in so great need of such Friends, as Princes do; For they have no Senses of their own, nor any other Direction, but what is receiv'd from seeing with other People's Eyes, and hearing with other People's Ears. They sustain a publick Character, and have a World of People to satisfie; so that every Word and Action of Theirs is the Matter of Censure or Com∣mendation, and expos'd to the critical Malice of all Man∣kind. And, as they have in this respect more Humours to please, so are they less capable of doing it than common Men, because they are industriously kept in the Dark; and

very little of what concerns them is suffer'd to come to their Knowledge. And thus for want of better Instruction, they do things which prove inconvenient and disgusting; and so, with all the undesigning Innocence imaginable, expose themselves to the Hatred and Resentments of their Subjects. All which had certainly been prevented, or very easily re∣medy'd, had they been fairly and freely dealt with in time. But then it must be said, on the other hand, that they are in some degree destin'd to this Ignorance, or accountable for it Themselves; because Matters are so order'd, that Frankness of Humour, and Home-Truths by way of Ad∣monition or Reproof, (tho' the best Offices, and surest Marks of Friendship and Affection) are yet seldom well taken; and especially to Princes they are not only unac∣ceptable, but sometimes extremely dangerous to the Per∣son, who hath Courage and Houesty enough to venture at them. And yet this cannot in reason but appear a very criminal Nicety, and an Argument of great Weakness; when such Persons cannot bear having their Ears grated, and made to glow a little, for their Good: For this Harsh∣ness of the Sound is all they can endure; They are above Compulsion or Restraint; and have the whole Manage∣ment of themselves left still entirely in their own Disposal.

The Other sort of Informers are such as are employ'd to bring what we properly call Intelligence; by representing all the considerable Actions and Occurrences, not only with∣in the Compass of his Dominions, and by his own Sub∣jects; but by discovering the Projects and Intrigues of neighbouring Courts: I say of All that is doing at Home or Abroad, wherein either his Own, or his Allies, or Borderer's Government is either immediately, or but re∣motely concern'd. These Two distinct kinds of Correspon∣dents do in some degree answer the Character of those two Friends to Alexander, Hephestion and Craterus. One of which is said to have loved the King, and the other Alex∣ander; That is, One of them was fond of his Person, the Other of his Government; One regarded him in his Pri∣vate, the Other in his Publick Capacity;* 1.127 but the tende∣rer Friend dealt most freely with him.

[unspec 15] In the Second place, The Prince should always have by him a private Book of Memorandums, consisting principal∣ly of Three Heads. First, An Abridgement of all Mat∣ters of Publick Concern then depending: That by recourse to This, he may imform himself at one View, what is fit to be done in the present Juncture of Affairs; what Mat∣ters are already in Motion, and want to be compleated; that so every thing may be attended to in its proper Sea∣son, and nothing done out of time, or by halves. The Se∣cond is a List of Persons Names, whose Merits may re∣commend them to his Favour, either upon the Account of past Services, which call for Rewards and Gratifications; or of extraordinary Abilities, which qualifie them for Pre∣ferments and Places of Trust. The Third, A Memorial of Gifts and Grants already conferred, to whom, and up∣on what Considerations: For without a distinct and parti∣cular account of these Three things, it is scarce possible to avoid the being frequently at a loss, and making a great many false Steps. And accordingly we find, that Princes of the justest Renown, and most celebrated in Story for their Wisdom and Policy, have constantly taken this Me∣thod, and felt the Convenience of it; as Augustus and Ti∣berius, (for instance) Vespasian and Trajan, Adrian, and the Antonines.

[unspec 16] A Third Rule may be This; That in regard One of the most material Parts of the Royal Character consists in di∣stinguishing the deserts of Men, and assigning Rewards and Punishments accordingly; and in consideration, That the One of these is extraordinary graceful, and recommends him to their Affection; The Other naturally disgusting, and what will be sure to draw a great Odium upon the Instru∣ment of it: Therefore the Distribution of Rewards thou'd be reserved to himself. Honours and Estates, Offices and Preferments, Privileges and Pensions, Exemptions and Im∣munities, Restitutions and Pardons; and, in a word, every thing of Grace and Favour should come immediately from his own Hand: But every thing that is grievous and gra∣ting, should be turn'd over to some other Hand: And therefore inferior Officers are more properly made use of, for pronouncing Sentences of Condemnation, imposing Fines, levying of Forfeitures, making Distresses, and exe∣cuting all manner of Penalties: For tho' it be true, that all Matters of this Nature depend upon the same Autho∣rity, and it is virtually the Prince that does them; yet

it is certain from Experience, and the common Sense of Mankind, that This is not so duly consider'd, but that it leaves a particular Grudge behind, and creates angry Re∣sentments against that very Person, who is the next and im∣mediate Actor, tho' he be in reality never so passive in the thing.

[unspec 17] In the Distribution of Rewards and Gratuities, and other Marks of Favour of the like Nature, this farther Intimati∣on may not be unseasonable. That a Prince, upon such Occasions, should shew himself forward and free; he should if it be possible, even prevent the Receiver's Expectati∣ons, and give unasked; and not defer the matter so long, till he bring himself under a necessity of denying any Applications made to him for them: He should likewise give in Person, when that can be done conveniently; or order them to be given in his Presence, and with some particular Expressions of his Favour and Esteem. For all these Circum∣stances are wonderfully engaging; they add to the intrinsick value of the Gift; make it more welcome, and more ef∣fectual to all the purposes it can be capable of serving. Besides, that in observing this Method, Two mighty In∣conveniences will be avoided, which do really diminish in a great measure, if not quite, defeat absolutely the Acknowledgments due to Persons of Honour and Desert; One is that of a tedious Attendance; the Difficulty and intollerable Expence they are forced to be at, in obtain∣ing the Advantages which are really intended them, and thought to be very justly conferred; and This to Men of Eminence and Spirit, is a great Grievance, and grates very hard. The Other is, That after the Prince hath actually bestowed the Gift, and declared his Pleasure in it, the Forms of the Grant, and the Delays and indirect Dealings of the Officers, thro' whose Hands it must pass, do so inflame the Reckoning, that before a Man can be dispatched, and come into actual Possession of his own, it costs him at least half what the thing is worth; nay, sometimes the full value, or more; and when all Charges come to be computed, he hath the Name only, but receives nothing; or something he had better have been without, than have spent his Interest, and Money, and Time, for that which turns to so ve∣ry poor Account.

We come now to that part of the Administration, which is Military: and This every Man easily sees to be necessa∣ry for the Defence and support both of Prince and People, and preserving the Order and Honour of any Government. And therefore I shall treat of it with all the Brevity that the Subject will bear. Now, the whole of what is Pro∣per to be said upon it, may be reduc'd to Three Heads; The engaging in a War at first, the Carrying it on when be∣gun, and the Putting an End to it.

1. For the engaging in a War, [unspec 18] Two Preliminaries are Necessary,* 1.128 Justice and Prudence, and consequently the Two Vices opposite to These by all Means to be avoided, which are Injustice and Rashness. First of all, It is necessary that the War be Just; for Justice ought to march in the Head, and lead Courage on to Actions; as Counsel and Deliberation ought to go before the Execution of the De∣sign. And therefore such Maxims as these, though com∣mon in every Bodies Mouth, are yet most Wicked and Abominable; That Right is always on the strongest Side; That the Success will determine the Cause; That the long∣est Sword will carry it. For certainly the Goodness of any Cause is not to be measur'd by the Event, but by the Equity and the Reasonableness, that is at the Bottom of it. And though War be a Thing of Violence and Force, and the Decisions of it very distant from the Method of deter∣mining civil Controversies; yet even War it self is not ut∣terly Lawless, but hath its Rules and Measures to be ob∣served; as well as Peace. Almighty God, who calls him∣self the Lord of Hosts, and God of Battles, does favour just Wars in a peculiar Manner; it is He, who disposes of Victories, and casts the Scale, as he in his infinite Wis∣dom sees fit. But it is the Duty of every Prince to qua∣lifie himself for that Favour; and, as much as may be, to engage Providence on his Side; and the first of those Qualifications, is the Justice of the Undertaking. To pick Quarrels therefore, and* 1.129 commence a War upon every Occasion, is what can never be answered. The Itch of Honour and Triumph will bear no Monarch out in it. And therefore such ought to take good Heed, that Ambition, and Ava∣rice, and Passion, be not too busie upon these Occasions; which yet, if a Man may be allowed to speak the Truth freely are, it is to be feared, the great Incendiaries of the

World, and generally at the Bottom of such Undertakings.† 1.130 One, and that indeed the unusual and ancient Cause of War is the insatiable Thirst of Riches and Dominion; That Abyss of Avarice and Ambition, which measures the Greatness of a Prince's Glory by the Extent of his Territories, and Enlarge∣ment of his Conquest. The Raging Desire of Gain, and the Rash Heat of Anger are the Disturbers of Peace, and Violaters of Leagues and Treaties.

[unspec 19] Now, to make a War just, and in all Points what it ought to be,* 1.131 Three Things must concur: The First, That it be denounced, and undertaken, why a Person, who hath the Power of making and proclaiming it; which can only be the Sovereign himself; or in Common-Wealths, those who are invested with the Suprme Authority, and whom the Law in that respect looks upon, but as one single Person.

[unspec 20] The Second is, That the Cause, upon which it is so denounc'd be just; and such without all Dispute, is the Case of a Defensive War; the Light of Reason clearly and constantly pronounced in Favour of such a War in the Judgment of all the Wise and civiliz'd Part of Mankind; and Necessity supply'd the Place of Argument and Thought, and moved the Barbarous and Ignorant, to agree in the Justification of it too; Custom hath made this Opinion and Practice universal among Men; and Nature her self hath infus'd this Principle into Brutes. But then by De∣fensive, I mean, That which is truly and properly so; when Life, or Liberty, one's Relations, or one's Country are assaulted. Nay, not only so, but a War is really de∣fensive, when begun in behalf of our Confederates and Allies, or to chastise Breach of Faith and former Trea∣tise, or for the Protection and Redress of those that are oppressed Grievously, and injuriously treated. For, it is the great Roman Orator's Judgment, That* 1.132 He who does not defend the Injured, and as much as in him lies, prevent and ward off the Wrong, is as much in Blame as if he de∣serted Country or Kindred, Parents or Friends. So that In∣jury it self, without the Addition of any other Motive, is,

and ought to be esteem'd Engagement Sufficient for the em∣ploying our best Endeavours, to right and assist the Per∣sons labouring under it. And accordingly we find St. Am∣brose comprehending all these three Kinds of Defence un∣der the Character of Justice.† 1.133 That Fortitude (says he) is highly Just and Commendable, which by Force of Arms defends our Country from the Invisions of Enemies and Bar∣barians; or protects the Weak and Suffering, from those that are too mighty for them; or saves our Friends and Allies from Plunder, and Robbers. Another⁂ 1.134 Author brings the Matter into a narrower Compass still, and reduces it to these two Particulars, of Faith and Safety. No War (says he) is undertaken by a Righteous and Good Government, ex∣cept either Breach of Covenant, or the Prospect of their own Danger provoke it.

Offensive War must likewise have Two Conditions to render it justifiable; The One is, that there be really some Offence given, and Damage sustain'd, upon which the Quarrel can fairly be grounded; as in the Cases of Violence, and Outrage, and Usurpation: The Second That Satisfaction and Restitution be first demanded, in the usu∣al Manner and Solemnities; in which among the Romans a* 1.135 Herald was the proper Minister: For Force is the last Remedy, and ought never to be made use of, till the rest have been tried to no Purpose. And Justice cannot be duly sought this Way, till it hath been sought in softer and more amicable Methods, and deny'd. If the Aggressor will hearken to calm Reason, and submit to such Terms as are agreeable to it, there ought to be an End of the Controversie; but if he will be obstinate, and refuse to do this, then indeed War is Just and Allowable, because it be∣comes necessary, and the only possible Method left for re∣dressing such Grievances, and preserving our own Rights. For† 1.136 that is a just War, which cannot be avoided; and those are righteous Arms, which are taken up by Men who have nothing less to trust to.

[unspec 21] The Third necessary Qualification for making a War just, is that it be undertaken for a good End; and such is no other than the Peace and Security of a Nation.† 1.137 Wise Men (says my Author) wage War for the sake of Peace; and are centent to sustain great Labour and Pains for the Pro∣spect of Ease and Leisure, that so they may live quietly and secure themselves from Wrong.

[unspec 22] After once the Justice of the Cause is taken care of, then and not before,* 1.138 it is seasonable to consider of the Pru∣dence of the Undertaking. And this Consideration consists in Mature Deliberation, that a Prince may not run gid∣dily on, and engage in Attempts which have no probable Prospect of Success: And therefore to prevent Heat and Rashness, it will be very convenient that these following Particulars should be very seriously weighed.

• First, the Strength, and Conveniences on both sides; what the Aggressor, and what his Enemy is capable of.
• Secondly, The Hazard and doubtful Chance of Wars the mighty and surprising Revolutions of Humane Affairs; Particularly the unaccountable Events of Engagements and Stratagems, which we see happen daily; and wherein, when the nicest Policy hath done its utmost, Providence hath still the chief Hand, and gives the finishing Stroke; For it is obvious to every Man's Observation, that what the World calls Fortune, cannot pretend to so absolute a Dominion in any one Instance, as in the Decisions of the Field. And accordingly we often see, that One Hour there turns the whole Face of Affairs, and exalts or re∣duces a Prince to the very Reverse of what he was an Hour ago. And therefore Livy hath observ'd very truly, that⁂ 1.139 the Glories and Laurels which have been the Acquisition, or the Expectation of a whole Life, are all blasted and withered by the Fortune of a single Hour; and he who thought him∣self sure of All, and stood actually possest of a great deal, the next Moment hath not so much as the Hope of any thing lest to sustain him.

The Third Consideration necessary upon this Occasion is, That of the horrible Grievances and Hardships, the Cala∣mities and Miseries, which War (supposing the very best of the Event and sinal Determination) does unavoidably draw both upon the Publick in general, and private Per∣sons in particular. And these indeed, when duly reflected upon, are such, that the very Thought alone is Dismal and full of Discouragement and Horror.

A Fourth Reslection will concern the Slanders and Ca∣lumnies, the Reproaches and Curses, which are sure to light upon the Authors and first Beginners of any War. For the Misfortunes and Losses, which cannot but happen, will be sure to alienate the Affections, and provoke the Resent∣ments, of those who suffer under them; and they, when thus incensed, will not fail to express those Resentments, in a very plentiful and bitter Manner: For, from what hath been said already, we may easily be convinced, that, no∣thing lies more exposed to the Tongues and Censures of the World, than War. And whoever is the Immediate Actor of the Mischief, the main Burden will be sure to fall up∣on the Principla.* 1.140 This, says Tacitus, is the particular Hard∣ship of War, that Men always make an unjust Division of Events; all that succeeds well, every Man arrogates to himself; but all the Miscarriages and Losses, every one Shifts off from himself, and all agree to lay the Load at the Principal Com∣manders Door only. Those that fail in Execution, blaim them whose Business it is to give Orders; and they who issue Orders, lay the Blame upon Negligence and Failure in the Execution; and, at the last Rebound, the Whole rests up∣on the Prince himself. Upon all these Accounts the very justest War, as St. Augustine says, is odious and detestable; and a Prince does very ill, and Acts imprudently, when he engages in it, without extremely urgent Necessity. Ac∣cording to that Remark made upon Augustus Caesar: And therefore Kings must not suffer themselves to be won over to it, by those busie Incendiaries that set the World on Fire, and desire to incense their Master with groundless Jealousies, or allure him with imaginary Conquest, mere∣ly to gratifie some particular Passion of their own.

* 1.141 Men, who (as one describes them) think Peace a Burden, and to live at Ease, a perfect Slavery; of such Dispositions, that Nature seems to have cut them out for publick Disturbers; for they will neither be quiet themselves, nor content to let other People be so. And yet these very Persons are com∣monly the most backward and dispirited, when once they come to Action; They talk Big; and take Towns, and beat whole Armies, and entertain themselves and others with the Pleasures and Advantages of a Camp, and the Love they have for Fighting; but at last the old Proverb Proves its own Truth, That† 1.142 War is pleasant to none, but those who have never tryed it. Now, a Wise Prince will take the best Care he can, to keep, and to promote the Peace of his Country; he will not be afraid of War on the one Hand; for this is mean and beneath his Courage; but then he will not provoke, nor draw it upon himself on the other Hand; for That is every whit as much unwor∣thy of his Wisdom, the Effect of Heat and Inconsideration. For how rash, how unreasonable is it, to put his own, or another Government into needless Combustions; to give so many Persons the uneasiness of a long and anxious Suspence between Hope and Fear; and to drive things to that de∣sperate Push, that He must at last, either ruine other Peo∣ple, or be ruined himself?

[unspec 23] The Second Branch of this Military Dispensation, I said, is carrying on the War.* 1.143 And for This, Three things are necessary; Provision and Ammunition; Men; and Conduct, or Skill in the Rules of War. The First is Provision of things useful and necessary for the War, and that ought to be done early and in good time. For it would be an in∣tolerable Weakness and Reproach, to put off the Supplies which ought constantly to be in readiness, till the very instant, that our Occasions call for the using of them. He that is to seek then, hath lost himself; for a⁂ 1.144 Long Prepa∣ration is the surest Expedient to procure a speedy Victory. Now, as for the Provisions requisite for the Honour and Safety of a Prince and his Government, in the usual and ordinary State of Affairs, there hath been enough said al∣ready, in the former Part of this Chapter; and that be∣longs

entirely to the Matter now before us. The Prin∣cipal Provisions and Strengthenings for War are Three: First, Money; which is the very Life and Spirits, the Nerves and Sinews of War; as hath been already shewed at large. Secondly, Arms Offensive and Defensive, which have also been spoken to before: These two are of com∣mon Use, and what a Prince should always have plenty of in Reserve. The Third is Victuals; without which an Army can neither conquer, nor sight, nor live; if This be wanting, Engagements are needless, for your Men are cut off without ever a Blow struck; and the Soldiers grow wild and unruly, and cannot possibly be kept under Go∣vernment.* 1.145 A hungry Army observes no Rules; and Men ready to starve cannot be expected to perish in obedience to Discipline. 'Tis true. I mention'd a Provision of Necessaries before; but that which I am now upon is a different thing, and laid in on purpose for this Extraordinary Occasion. One therefore of the earliest and most important Prepara∣tions for War, is, upon the first Thoughts or Motions towards any such thing, to see that there be large and con∣venient Magazines, stor'd with all manner of Victual, Corn, Salt-Meats, and other proper Sustenance, not only for the Army, which takes the Field, but for the Garrisons upon the Frontiers; so much as may enable them to hold out a Siege, if the Enemy should find it for his purpose to sit down before them, and so intercept any Supplies which should come to them from abroad.

[unspec 24] The Second Thing requisite for carrying on a War, is a Competent Number of Hands, Men fit to make,* 1.146 or to receive an Assault. And here we shall be obliged to distin∣guish between them. As first of all, between Private Soldiers, or those who are commonly said to carry Arms; and Of∣ficers, or Persons in Commission. The Private Soldiers are the Body, the Officers the Head, or Life of the Army; That which inspires and directs every Motion, and by Vir∣tue whereof they act. Now here, we will first of all con∣sider the common Soldiers, who make the Bulk and main Substance of the Army. Of these there be several sorts, some Foot, and others Horse; some Natives, others Foreign∣ers; some the standing proper Force of the Government, others Auxiliary Troops, or such as are levied upon a par∣ticular Emergency. We shall do well to take a transient view

of every one of these, and bestow the Pains of comparing them a little together; that so we may be satisfied which are best and most eligible: And then we will proceed far∣ther to observe, what Methods are to be made use of for the directing and governing our Choice; and what last∣ly for the ordering and well-disposing them, when thus levied, and got together.

[unspec 25] Now, the Judgments of Men have been very different in the first Branch of this Comparison.* 1.147 For some, and e∣specially the Barbarous and Undiciplined Nations are much more for Horle than Foot; but others are generally of the quite contrary Opinion. Indeed it may with great rea∣son be affirmed, that if both are considered simply, and absolutely without any regard to particular Exigences and Qualifications, Foot are much the better of the Two, For they are of Service all along, and run through the whole Course of the War; no place excludes them, no Action is atchieved without them. Whereas the Horse are often useless; for in Mountainous and rough Countries, and where the Defiles are very straight, and in the be∣sieging and taking of Towns, they stand a General in ve∣ry little stead. Foot are also more ready at Hand upon all occasions; they cannot lie far out of Call; and, as their Attendance and Service is more, so the Expence of raising and maintaining them, is considerably less. The Subsi∣stence and Equipage of Horse is extremely Chargeable; and even for That Action, where they are of most Advan∣tage, Flanking and Galling the Enemy in a Battle, if the Foot be well appointed, armed Substantially, and Skilful in their Business, they will stand the Shock, and maintain their Post very well. And accordingly, Those who set up for Masters in this Art, usually give them the Preference. The Horse indeed are of greater use in a pitch'd Battle, and for making quick Work.* 1.148 For this (says one) is the Quality of Horse, that they soon get, and soon lose the Day. The Foot, it is plain, cannot be so good at dispatch; nor can it be expected they should. But then they make a∣mends another way, and as they are the slower, so they are a great deal the surer of the Two.

[unspec 26] Nor do we find an entire Agreement of Opinions, con∣cerning the next Article; * 1.149 Whether Natives or Strangers are sittest to be made use of; tho' to me the Odds appear

so very great, that I make no manner of difficulty to give it on the Native's side. For certainly, we may expect bet∣ter Principles, and greater Fidelity from Home-born Sub∣jects, than we can from Strangers, who are Soldiers of Fortune, and only fight for their Pay. They will en∣dure more, be better contented, submit more quietly to Or∣ders, carry themselves with more Respect to their Officers, use more Civility in Quarters, will think their Honour more concerned; and when they come to Action, shew more Courage in the Engagement, as they cannot but have a more affectionate and tender Regard to their own Coun∣try, for the defence whereof they are engaged. Besides, the Publick saves more by them; they cost a great deal less; and are more ready at hand than Auxiliaries from Abroad. For Foreigners are very often mutinous and grumbling; and that sometimes, just when there is occasion to make use of them: They commonly keep a great blustering, but have more of Insolence and Vanity, than of real Service in them: They are generally Troublesome, and a Burden to the Publick; cruel and oppressive to poor Country People, and fancy themselves licensed to plunder, as if it were an Enemy's Country, because it is none of their own. Then the Expence of Transporting them backward and forward, the Voyages by Sea, or long Marches by Land, are a pro∣digious Charge. And, which is worst of all, their Moti∣ons are frequently so tedious, and their Delays so many, that Opportunities are lost, incredible Damage sustained, and the Season of Action quite spent, before they come up. This, I say, is very often the Case, and therefore where Natives are equally qualify'd in other respects, and there is no want of Hands, these are certainly sittest to be employed. But still This hinders not but that there may be occasions, in which a Foreigner's Aid is advisable, and therefore this staring of the Comparison is not to be lookt upon as a conclusive Rule, nor of any force against Cases of Necessity, or particular Convenience. But even then, it will be for the safety of a Prince, to take heed that the Strangers do not exceed those of his own Subjects; for though they may constitute a Part or Limb of the Army, yet they must by no means make up the main Body of it: For when once they feel themselves superiour, or but an equal Match for the Natives, there is danger of their ma∣king use of such an Advantage, to subdue and make a Prey of their Masters that hired them. And History takes no∣tice

of this Trick being play'd so often, that no prudent Governour would run the risque of it, or put such a Game into Strangers Hands. And a fair Game to be sure it is; for He that is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Field, may be Master of all the Kingdom whenever he pleases. Again; If there be a ne∣••••••sry for the Assistance of Strangers, let them be borrow∣ed from our Allies and Confederates, whose Interests are interwoven with our own; and so whatever Damage one sustains, will affect both. Upon which account we have reason to repose greater Confidence in their Fidelity, and to expect better Service, and more Zeal from them, than we can from mere Strangers, who have no concern at all either with, or for us. To make such then, not one's Re∣fuge, but one's Choice, and to multiply them to the Dan∣ger and Terror of one's own Subjects, is a Course fit for none but Tyrants; who, because they use their Subjects ill, are afraid of them. They treat them as Enemies, and are sensible, Low general a Hatred they have incurred; and therefore they dare not trust them, for fear they should have the Inclination to take it when they are put into a Condition of Revenage; and turn those Swords upon their Master, which he taught them to use for His defence, but hath provoked them to use for their Own.

[unspec 27] As for the Ordinary and auxiliary Forces, a Prince will sind occasion for both sorts.* 1.150 Now the Difference betwixt these two is, That the Former are but very few, they are constantly in Pay, and upon Duty, as well in times of Peace as of War. And of These therefore all that was ne∣cessity hath been delivered urder the Provisionary Part of Civil Prudence. These are People entirely destined to War, This is their whole Trade, and therefore they ought to be perfect Marters of is dexterous in all manner of Exercise, and reselute as well as skilful in handling their Arms. This is what the Moder•••• call the Standing-Forces of a King∣dom: the Princes Honour in Peace, his main Protection in War, and much of the Nature with that Institution of the Old R••man 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Now it will he convenient that there thould be cont••••'d out by Regiments in time of Peace, and quarterd in very small Bod••es, remote from one ano∣ther, to preve•••• any Co••••binations among them, or the giving Disturbence to the Publick. The Auxiliaries or Extraord••••ary F••ce, are much more numerous indeed; but then they an not perpetnal, nor devoted to War, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 else. They have other Professions to subsist upon;

And These they follow, till the Service and Necessities of their Country draw them off: When this happens, and there is occasion for their Assistance, they are called in by Beat of Drum, listed and muster'd, led on, and taught their Mi∣litary Exercises. And when the Service is over, Their Bu∣siness is so too; they are dismist again, return to their Trades, and work to maintain their Families at home.

[unspec 28] You have now heard the Differences and Distinctions be∣tween Men of Arms; the next thing that requires good Ad∣vice and Direction,* 1.151 is the Choice of them. And this in truth is of mighty consequence, and will ask great Prudence and Care. It signifies but very little to draw together so many thousand Men; for Armies are not to be valu'd by Tale; nor does Victory attend upon the greatest Numbers, but the bravest Fellows. And commonly, That part which turns the Day, and is in the Hottest of the Action, consists but of a sew Squadrons in comparison. A wild tumultuous Rout does more hurt than good.* 1.152 It is not a strengthening, but a Burden; and deserves rather to be called the heavy Bag∣gage that retard a Prince's March, than a Relief or Protection to him. So perfectly insignificant are Multitudes void of Courage; and† 1.153 The Goodness of the Hearts and Hands is a better Security than the exorbitant length of a Muster-Roll. And thus you see, how great, and how fatal an Error it is, for Commanders to press or pick up the next Men they meet, or hire them at so much a Month, without any distinction. Whereas they ought to be rather nice and curious in making this Collection. And, as it is always the Reproach, so it sometimes proves the Destruction of a Nation, to have an Army composed of the next Chance-Comers, perfectly ig∣norant of the thing they undertake; the Sweepings of Goals, the Scumm of the Nation, Lewd and Vicious to the last Degree; Bullies and Braggadochio's; bold in Plunder, and when no Enemy is in sight, but timorous and swift of Foot assoon as Danger makes its Appearance. Or if you please, take that ancient Description,⁂ 1.154 Men trained up to no part of War but the Rapine and Robbery of it; Insolent and Big;

Hares in Armour; the Dirt and Dregs of the Town; Rakehells whom Want and Wickedness hath brought intimately acquaint∣ed with Debauchery, and made exquisite in Impudence and Vil∣lany of every kind.

[unspec 29] Now in order to making a good Choice, the Ends they are to serve ought to be duly consider'd; which will re∣quire some Judgment and Application of Mind. And to do this effectually and with Address, Five things ought to be ta∣ken into our regard.

First, The place of their Nativity and Dwelling, and the manner of their Education suitable to it: For they should be taken principally out of the Country, from mountainous, barren, and rugged Situations, or else from Sea-Coasts; in all which places People are usually brought up to all sorts of Labour and hard Fare. So says Vegetius,* 1.155 The Levies ought chiefly to be made out of the Country; for such Men will be a Strength indeed: They are fitter to bear Arms, after be∣ing accustomed to endure all manner of Weather, and to live by Drudgery. Their very Soil and Climate hardens and gives them Courage. And the less easie and delightful any Man's Life hath been, the less he will be afraid to die. But now your People in Cities and great Towns are more nice and tender; they run to cool and artificial Shades, and know not what it is to endure either a scorching Sun, or a cold Winter Blast. Pro∣fit and Pleasure are all They are intent upon; and this makes them soft, and idle, and effeminate.† 1.156 Bred up by their own Fireside, and good for nothing; used to Delicacy and Luxury; Slothful, and incapable of any laborious Ʋndertaking, or hardy Ʋsage.

Secondly, The Age of the Men is of great consequence; for the best Season of taking them is in their Youth; about Eighteen or Twenty Years old, when they have not only Vigour and Strength, but are teachable and pliant, fit to learn, as well as able to perform their Duty. For Vice and Stubbornness grows upon them with Years: There is scarce any reforming old Fellows; the bad Habits of their former Days stick by them; and besides, they are so Head∣strong and Self-conceited, that it is next to impossible to bend them to Instruction and Discipline.

A Third Consideration is their Body; which, according to the Opinion of some, ought to be very tall; and thus Marius and Pyrrhus particularly desired their Soldiers. But the Stature does not seem to be of that mighty importance; for a moderate Size will do very well, provided the Body be dry and sirm, vigorous and strong: So says Tacitus,⁂ 1.157 Their Bodies should be clean, and well set, their Limbs tight, their Countenance stern; for these are good Indications of a Qualification most requisite of all, a brisk and couragious Mind. Your huge, over-grown, fat, flabby Fellows, with loose and washy Bodies, are good for nothing at all.

In the Fourth place, They should look out for Men of lively Tempers, brave and resolute Spirits, bold and daring, and valuing themselves upon their Abilities; such as are greedy of Praise; impatient to be out-done, and afraid of nothing so much as Dishonour and Reproach.

Lastly, Their Condition is likewise of very great Conse∣quence: For those that are the very Lees and Dregs of the People, of a scandalous Character, or brought up in Lewd∣ness or Infamy; or such as have follow'd lazy and seden∣tary Trades, or never knew any Business but following Plea∣sures and Women: In a Word, All manner of sauntring and disgraceful Prosessions, render a Man extremely unfit for This, which must engage him in Activity, and all manner of Hardship.

[unspec 30] The next thing after the making a good Choice of pro∣per Men for our purpose, * 1.158 is to qualifie them for Service by good Discipline. For it is by no means enough, that Persons capable of making good Soldiers are procurd of that Capaci∣ty be not improv'd, and they actually made such; and to as little effect is it, that they are once made so, except they be kept so by habitual Practice afterwards. There are but very few Men in the World, who are valiant merely from Nature and Disposition; for, generally speaking, Courage is owing to Instruction and Art, to Custom and Discipline. And these things are of so exceeding great importance in War, that the Uses and Advantage of them are never to be express'd. Good Discipline is really All in All. It is to This, that old Rome was indebted for all her Glories; This secur'd and enlarg'd her Conquests, and made her Mistress of the World; all which that People were so sensible of,

that no one Virtue whatsoever, not even natural Affection to their own Children, was reputed more necessary, or had in higher Esteem. Now the main Point of Discipline is Obedience; and that old Rule expresses this Matter very truly and well, which says, That a Soldier ought always to be more afraid of his Officer than his Enemy.

[unspec 31] Now ther are two great Ends, * 1.159 which this Discipline should aim at, which are, making good Soldiers, and good Men; and consequently, it must needs consist of two parts; one of which respects the Valour, the other the Virtue or Manners of the Persons concern'd to be kept under it. For the promoting of Valour, and perfecting them in the Business of their Profession, Three Things are expe∣dient.

First, Constant Exercising them in the handling of their Arms, which ought to be the repeated Work of every Day, and never intermitted at all. And this is so essential to the very Being of an Army, that the Latin Tongue calls it by a Name which signifies Exercise.* 1.160 Now this is properly in∣structing them how to handle their Arms, and be expert in the use of them upon all occasions; to prepare for, and by just degrees advance to Action; to shoot and draw regular∣ly upon their Enemy; to make the best of any defensive Weapons they are provided with for themselves; to shew them distinctly every thing that is likely to happen in the midst of an Engagement; to bring them acquainted with Tryals of that kind; and train them as in form and heat of Bat∣tel: And lastly, to propose Rewards and Honour for Them that excell, and are most dextrous; by that means to quick∣en their Diligence, and warm their Ambition.

Secondly, Hard Labour, which is of great benefit for inu∣ring them to Pain, and Toil, and Sweat, and Dust: For† 1.161 An Army improves and grows m••••e vigorous by Labour, but languishes and decays by Sloth and want of Employment. It also does good Service toward the Security of the Army, the Fortisying of their Camp, and Dispatch of Intrench∣ments. And therefore they should be taught to break Ground, and cast up well; to plant regular Pallisadoes, to raise stout Barricadoes; to run, and setch, and carry heavy Bur∣dens; for all these things are highly necessary, both to co∣ver their own Lines, and defend themselves; and likewise for the pressing upon, and enclosing an Enemy.

The Third thing they are to be instructed in, and accustom'd to, is exact Order; which as it is of infinite use, so is it likewise of different sorts, according to the different posture of Affairs, and Exigencies of War. First it may be consi∣der'd with regard to the ranging and distributing the Troops, cantoning them out either into Battalions, or Regiments, or Standards, or Companies. Secondly, In the Disposition of the Camp; that due Distances and Proportions be observ'd in the several Quarters; that its Avenues, Outlets, and Lodgments be conveniently order'd for Horse and Foot; so that it shall be easie for every one to sind his own Quar∣ters, and proper Post. Thirdly, In Motions and Marches, whether only from Place to Place thro' the Country, or to front an Enemy; and here they are to be taught to keep their Ranks, to move equally, and at just Distances from each other, so as neither to go loose and too far off, nor too close and crowded together. All this Order is highly necessary, and is of great use in several respects. It adds much to the Beauty of an Army; is entertaining and marvellous delightful to all that see and observe it; it cheers our Friends, and animates them strangely; confounds our Enemies, emboldens and inspires the Soldiers themselves with Security, and exceedingly sacilitates all their Motions; and the obeying any Orders that shall be given by their Generals. For by this means the Word is no sooner given, but, without any Noise or Confusion in the World, it is convey'd from one to another, and the meanest most private Man present∣ly understands the Mind of his supreme Officer.† 1.162 All the Forces receive their Leader's Command at once, and in an in∣stant with all the Order and Composedness imaginable attend and execute the least Significations of his Pleasine. In a word, When Orders are well observ'd, they almost make an Ar∣my invincible. And on the other hand, a great many In∣stances have happen'd, of Armies much superiour in Num∣ber and Strength, and all other Advantages, which have been entirely routed, and cut to pieces, merely for want of Discipline, and knowing how to transmit, and obey Or∣ders readily.

[unspec 32] The Second Part of Military Discipline concerns the Re∣gulation of Manners; which naturally, * 1.163 and for the most part are scandalously dissolute and extravagant, and to the

Reformation of which a Camp brings greater Obstructions, than any other Place or Condition of Humane Life:⁂ 1.164 It is not easie for Men that are engag'd every Day in Blows and Blood, to keep a just Temper, and strict Virtue. But yet how diffi∣cult soever the bringing them to this be, it is necessary to be attempted, and ought to be taken Pains in; and especi∣ally all possible diligence must be us'd to establish Three Vir∣tues among them.

The First is Continence, in the larger and more com∣prehensive sense of the Word, as it is opposed to Excesses and Sensualities of all sorts; Gluttony, Drunkenness, De∣bauchery with Women, and every other kind of Pleasure, that is lewd and scandalous: All which are most unfit for Men of this Profession; because such Practices do so mani∣festly debase the Courage, and enfeeble both the Body and Mind of the Soldier.* 1.165 For Men of Arms (says Tacitus) presently degenerate from their primitive Vigour, and grow soft and tame, by abandoning themselves to Pleasure. And Hanni∣bal stands upon Record a scandalous Monument of a Gene∣ral, whom one Winter's Luxury perfectly melted down into Effeminacy, and made that great Man, who conquer'd all before him, and was invincible by Arms, a Captive and Conquest to his own Vices.

A Second necessary Virtue is Modesty. In Conversation first, and Words; free from Vanity and Boasting, and big blustering Talk. For Courage exercises the Hands, and not the Tongue; and seeks its Praise, not from fine Speeches, but brave Actions.† 1.166 Men that are disposed for War are great in Deeds, but unskill'd in Disputes of Words; For indeed these Engagements are of very different kinds: A Stout and truly Brave Man is not forward to come to Action, but eager and violent in Action; calm and compos'd till he come to it. On the other Hand, your great Talkers are good for nothing, and are only valiant in Words, as one hath very truly represented them. Now the Tongue is the Instrument of Counsels, as the Hand is of Action.

But then there is a Modesty in Deeds and Behaviour too, by which I mean a ready and entire Obedience, without any trifling, or delaying, or disputing the Commands of his Su∣periours, and pretending to be wiser than They. For⁂ 1.167 These, (says one) are the Properties of good Soldiers, to be ready and willing, respectful and obedient.

The Third Virtue is Abstinence: By which Soldiers would learn Honesty and Contentedness, and keep their Hands clean from all manner of Rapine and Violence; and not (as too frequently happens) turn Robbers and common Rava∣gers, and make every thing a Prey that comes within their reach. This in short is the Substance of Military Discipline, to which a General must give Force and Authority, by Largesses and Rewards bountifully scatter'd among those that are tractable and valiant, and deserving; and by se∣vere and exemplary Punishments inflicted upon the Refra∣ctory, and Idle, and Negligent. For Indulgence in an Ar∣my is the Ruine of the Soldiery.

[unspec 33] What hath been said already may suffice for private Sol∣diers; * 1.168 and therefore the little I shall add more Concerns the Officers; who are of so great Consequence, that their Soldiers can do nothing without them. For it is then no longer an Army but a Rabble; a Body without a Soul; a Ship with Sails indeed to move, but no Helm to steer, no Pilot to di∣rect it. Of These there are two sorts. The General, who is the Supreme, and then the Subalterns; such as Lieute∣nant, and Major-Generals, Brigadiers, Colonels, and so down. But the General is All in All; and He can be but One, upon Peril of Confusion, and losing All. Hence it is, that we commonly say, an Army is considerable in propor∣tion as the General is so;* 1.169 That he is worth all the rest: more account to be made, more depending upon him; more Hope or more Distrust and Fear upon his Account, than the whole Body under his Direction. Now this General is either the Prince in Person, or some Person of Eminence for Prowess and Conduct, chosen and commission'd by him. The Presence of the Prince himself is of mighty Mo∣ment and Efficacy toward the obtaining a Victory; for it provokes the Emulation, and inflames the Courage of his Subjects; and indeed, when the Preservation of the Government, or any part of his Dominions, is the

Occasion of the War, his Personal Appearance seems highly expedient and necessary. In Disputes of less Consequence it may well enough be dispensed with: For so Tacitus ad∣vises, That* 1.170 Monarchs would not ordinarily expose their Per∣sons to the common Hazards of War; but reserve themselves for the more important Concerns of the Government; and stay till Extremity calls them into the Field.

But be the General who, or of what Character he will, a good one he cannot be, without the following Qualifications. First, Knowledge and Experience in the Art of War; one that hath seen and felt the different Events of War;† 1.171 ac∣quainted with Conquest and Defeat, the Successes and the doubtful Chances of the Field; and neither to be exalted with the One, nor dejected and dispirited with the Other. Secondly, Caution and provident Care; and consequently a Man of sound substantial Sense, cool and strong Thought, weighed and steady Resolution, free from Heat, and Rash∣ness, and eager Haste; which is not only an Argument of Folly, but the Cause of infinite Misfortunes, and irrepara∣ble Calamities. For False Steps in War are hard to be reco∣vered; and a Man may not have the⁂ 1.172 opportunity of playing the Fool twice. For which reason we commonly say a Ge∣neral should rather look behind him than before him; and be more s••llicitous to sccme what he hath already, than eager of getting more to it, at the hazard of the whole. A Third is Vi∣gilance and Activity, winning upon the Soldiers by impo∣sing Labour and Hardship upon himself, and by his own Example going before, and leading them on to every thing he would have Them do. A Fourth is good Success. Men indeed are not, cannot be fortunate, as they please; This is a peculiar and immediate Gift of Heaven; but yet the Divine Providence does usually give Success to probable Means and Endeavours; and where the Three former good Qualities meet, this very seldom wanting to crown them. In the mean while, it ought not to seem strange, that I give This a place here among the other Accomplishments; tho' it be not so directly within a Man's own Power to

acquire it. For every Body knows what prodigious Ef∣fects the Persuasion of a lucky Commander produces; and how much more bold, and daring, and assured those Men are, who have a Confidence in the Fortune of their Ge∣neral, and fight under one who hath been accustomed to conquer.

[unspec 34] Having now done with those Considerations, * 1.173 which re∣late to necessary Provision of Ammunition and Men; we will proceed to the Rules and Directions proper to be ob∣served in the making use of both these. This Third Point is of infinite Consequence; and the only thing that can render either of the former so; for Strength and Numbers, Arms and Men, are but empty and imaginary Things with∣out it. There must be Art and Address, and not only In∣struments, but Skill to work with them. For* 1.174 Counsel and Wisdom atchieves more and greater Explelli than Force. But it must be confessed,† 1.175 that to lay down such Rules as shall be standing, and eternally suitable to every Case and Cir∣cumstance, is absolutely impossible, Because These depend upon a vast variety of Accidents and Occurrences; all which must be taken into consideration; and the Person will be oblig'd to comply with, and accommodate himself to them. And upon this Account it was ingeniously observ'd. That Men did not so properly guide their Affairs by Counsels, as their Affairs guide and determine the 〈◊〉〈◊〉. That a Man must make War by his Eye; that is, the must deserve and act upon Discretion; and the wisest 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that over sat, cannot be so proper Judges at a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, of what is to be done, as He who sees, and must take his Measures upon the Spot. For there are a Thousand, unforeseen 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gen∣••ies, which change the whole Scene, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 put a new su••••rizing Face upon the Matter 〈…〉〈…〉 re∣quire, that a•• Man should steer a 〈…〉〈…〉 and go∣vern himself accordingly. But 〈…〉〈…〉 not be so particular, and full, but 〈…〉〈…〉 Reserves must be made for discretionary Proce〈…〉〈…〉, yet there are some Methods so general, and so fixe, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 up Man can be mi∣staken in observing them; nor can any con••••••erate Author, who treats of this Subject, overlook them. Some few of these I shall briefly represent to my Reader here, and leave

it to him from his own Observation or Experience, to add more, as he shall see occasion. Now of these there are two sorts: Some of constant use throughout the whole Course of the War: Others accidental and occasio∣nal only, as Times, or Places, or other Circumstances shall happen to make them seasonable. I begin with the Former sort.

[unspec I] The first of these is Watching all Opportunities with the utmost Diligence and Circumspection; securing all that offer, that none slip by unprofitably; and at the same time preventing and countermining the Enemy, that he shall have no benefit by those that are put into His Hands. For Op∣portunity hath a huge Run, a mighty Stroke in all Affairs of Human Life, and more especially in War; where one lucky Hit does more sometimes, than all the Hands and Heads of a Kingdom put together.

[unspec II] The Second is, Making his Advantage of Reports; for be they true or false, they are capable of doing great Ser∣vice, and especially while they are fresh and warm.* 1.176 Com∣mon Fame begins, continues, ends Wars; exalts Men's Minds with assured Hopes, dejects them with pannick Fears. They fight as the News goes; and many a Field hath been lost and won, by virtue of a current Rumor; which, tho' so powerful in its Effects, had yet perhaps little or no Founda∣tion to, stand upon it self. This last Advice chiefly regards a Man as yet unsetled in his Measures: But when the Scheme is laid, and he is not only determin'd so much as in those Circumstances one can, but hath entred upon his Designs.

[unspec III] Then my Third Direction is, not to trouble himself about any such Rumours. He will do well indeed to get well inform'd, and to consider of them carefully; but still to proceed in his own Methods. To do what he is able, and what in Duty and Decency he is obliged to; what Reason prescribes, and there to fest; and expect the Event, as a wise and a brave Man should do.

[unspec IV] But above all, let him in the Fourth place, take heed of being too consident and secure; for this will lead him in∣to infinite Mistakes and Inconveniences, perhaps never to be retriev'd. A Man thinks meanly of his Enemy, as if he were despicable, and not worth his Care; and this betrays

him to Negligence, and Thoughtlessness, and Sloth. Now This is the most dangerous and destructive Condition that a State of War is capable of. For whoever despises his Enemy, does most cerrainly expose and betray himself; and give that so despised Enemy an Advantage, which is no other Consideration did, would singly render him ex∣tremely formidable.* 1.177 Security is usually the Forerunner and Occasion of great Distress. No Body is so quickly defeated, as the Man that is under no Apprehensions of Danger. Nothing in an Enemy can be despised with safety; for even that Care∣lessness, which naturally springs from Contempt, gives him more power to do you Mischief. These Reflections are true in their most general Sense; but in War nothing ought to be de∣spised; because There nothing is, or can be frivolous e∣nough to justifie or deserve it; for it, often happens, that what we look upon to be very small and inconsiderable in it self, is yet fruitful in great variety of Consequences, and even prodigous Effects.† 1.178 Small Motions are often fol∣lowed by monstrous Events; and therefore as nothing of this kind ought to perplex us with anxious Fears of it, so neither ought any thing to lull us asleep with the slight of it, as not worth our Notice and Care.

[unspec V] Fifthly, He ought to be extremely curious, and inquisi∣tive into the Condition of his Enemy, and the posture of his Affairs; particularly he should be sure to get certain Information of the following Points. The Temper and Com∣plexion, the Inclination and Designs of the Commander in chief; the Temper of the People and Army under him; what their Manners are, and in what way they live; the Situation of the Places, and Condition of the Country all round about his Camp; and where either the Scene of Action, or any Motions of his Army may probably be. And this was Hannibal's peculiar Excellence.

As for Engagement and Action it self, [unspec 35] several things must be taken into Consideration; the Time, the Place, [unspec VI] * 1.179 the Per∣sons against whom, the Manner how, a Man engages. O∣therwise it may be as unsuccessful as it is an ill-advis'd At∣tempt. A Battel ought never to be hazarded, but upon

great Deliberation, and very pressing Reasons to per∣suade it. Any other Method less hazardous is rather to be chosen; He should try to break and tire out his Ene∣my; to harrass him with long Marches; to batter him with tedious Encampments; with incommodious Places; with want of Provision, and other Conveniences. In short; To beat him any other way, rather than by Dint of Sword.* 1.180 For the Chance of War is extremely dangerous and uncer∣tain: One Moment turns the Scales, routs and overthrows the Victorious in the midst of Joy and Plunder, and carries the just-before beaten and despairing, triumphant out of the Field.

[unspec VIII] A General then must never let Matters come to this Ex∣tremity, * 1.181 except it be very seldom: That is to say, when absolute necessity compels, or some great Occasion persuades him to it. The Cases of Necessity are such as these; when you feel Difficulties grow upon you daily; when you are reduced to want of Provision; when Money runs low, and no Supplies can be had; when your Soldiers grow dis∣contented, and desert apace. In such Circumstances there is no subsisting long; and therefore A desperate Disease must have a desperate Cure; for you can but perish either way. For the Occasions which may render it advisable, I rec∣kon the manifest Odds of Strength on your side, either in Numbers, or in other Qualifications superiour to the E∣nemy; when Victory seems to invite, and stretch out her hand on purpose to be receiv'd and embrac'd; when the Enemy is at present considerably weakned by some De∣tachment, or otherwise; or not yet fully joyn'd; but ex∣pects in a very short time to be compleated or reinforc'd, and will then bid you Battel: When you have it in your Power to surpr•••••• them, and they imagine that you are at a Distance, and incapable of reaching them; When he is harass'd, or taking Refreshment: When he is divided, and Parties out Petrolling, or upon Booty; busie in Victualling their Camp, or their Horses forc'd to be Stabl'd up at a distance; and feed upon dry Meat, for want of Forage near their Camp.

[unspec IX] The Place of Engagement deserves also to be very dili∣gently consider'd; * 1.182 this being of very great Importance in

Action. One may venture to say in general, That it is by no means prudent to wait for the Enemy in your own Country; his Entrance thither should, if possible, be pre∣vented; and you ought either to advance and meet him, so as to make his Territories the Seat of War; or else to secure your own Passes, and stop him at his approach. But if he have already vanquished that Difficulty, and got Footing; it is by no means advisable to run the Risque of a Battle, except you have another Army in reserve to su∣stain and recruit you speedily. For this would be to play a desperate Game, and to stake All upon one single Throw. But when Matters draw toward an Engagement, the Ground ought to be well viewed, and prudently chosen; and as you find it for your own, or your Enemies Conve∣nience, you must manage your self accordingly: For the Ground it self is a very great, and sometimes almost an insuperable Advantage. Now a plain open Country is most convenient for the Horse, because this gives them Room to wheel and Scour in; but your narrow Defiles, and Places full of Boggs, Morasses, Ditches and Trees, are most Fa∣vourable to the Foot, because These give no Opportunity to the Cavalry to break in and Flank them.

[unspec X] A General must also be Careful with whom he engages, * 1.183 and never venture a Battle with an Enemy stronger than himself. Now, this Strength is not always to be measured by Numbers; but by the Courage and Resolution of the Men. And nothing makes Men so Valiant as Necessity; because this is almost an invincible Enemy; and therefore the Stress of it awakens all our Powers to make Opposi∣tion. Upon this Account it is a good Rule, never to fight with Men reduced to desperate Circumstances, but rather to put an Opportunity into their Hands of being upon bet∣ter Terms with you. And this agrees exactly with the Counsel given in the former Paragraph, of not Ha∣zarding an Engagement in one's own Countrey; because the Enemy must then be forc'd to make a Desperate and Bloody Business of it; as being sensible, that if he happen to be worsted, there is no avoiding of utter Ruine. No Fort to protect, no Retreat to receive, no fresh Succours to relieve and sustain them, and so nothing in Prospect but certain Victory, or certain Death.* 1.184

As for the Manner of engaging,* 1.185 That is certainly the best, which is most Advantageous, and likely to succeed; whe∣ther Surprise, or Stratagem, or making a Feint; pretend∣ing to retreat for Fear, to draw the Enemy out of a good Post, or into an Ambuscade, and take them in a Trap. Thus† 1.186 the Expectation of Victory is the very Instrument made use of to work their Overthrow; Watching all their Motions narrowly, taking Advantages of every false Step; and charging them when and where they are least in a Condition to receive the Attack.

[unspec 36] For the due Management of a formal and ranged Bat∣tel, * 1.187 these following things are very expedient. The First and indeed the Principal, is a regular Disposition of one's Men, and Marshalling every part of the Army in their pro∣per Place and Order. A Reinforcement, Secondly, con∣stantly ready; so near at Hand, that they may pour in up∣on the least notice; and yet so much under Covert, that the Enemy may not discern, or be at all aware of any such Thing, 'till they are actually upon them. And tho' this Reserve be not very considerable in it self, yet the Effects of it will be so; for in a Hurry there is nothing so Ridi∣culous or despicable, but it is able to create or increase our Confusion. And* 1.188 in all Engagements, the Conquest is first gain'd upon the Eyes and Ears; for when once their Senses are struck, and make a Report full of Terror, the Heart falls, the Hands grow faint and seeble, and all is our own. A Third useful Direction is, To be first in the Field, and stand ready in Form of Battel. This gains time, and gives a Commander Leisure to do what he sees fit, with Deli∣beration and Ease; it likewise animates our own Men, and discourages the Enemy, who measure our Assurance by out Forwardness. Besides, This is to make our selves the Ag∣gressors, and the First Blow is commonly given with more Spirit and Resolution, than it is received. A Fourth Expe∣dient is, a Becoming, Bold, Brave, and resolute Aspect in the General and the rest of the Commanders; when their Countenances do not only speak their own Courage, but inspire and animate those that want it. The Fifth and Last, is a seasonable and pertinent Exhortation to the Soldiers; encouraging them to do well, representing to them, the Glo∣ry, the Advantages, nay, the Safety of behaving themselves

Gallantly; That Infamy and Reproach, Danger and Death, are the certain Portion and Fate of Cowards. For⁂ 1.189 the less Fear, the less Danger always: Courage is its own Defence; and the readiest way to escape Death, is boldly to face, and generously to despise it. He that runs, hastens to his own Destruction; and for one that falls in the Heart of Action, there are Ten cut to Pieces in the Flight.

[unspec 37] When once the Armies are engaged, * 1.190 the General is to ob∣serve on which side the Advantage inclines; and if he find his own Party give Ground, he is then to act the Part of a Firm Undaunted Mind; to do all that can be expected from a Resolure Officer, and a Gallant Soldier. To rally them again; lead them on in Person; bring them out of their Confusion; stop them in their Retreat; throw him∣self into the midst of them; hearten and encourage them to a Second Shock, by all manner of means; and in his whole Behaviour to give evident Demonstration, both to the Enemy and his own Soldiers, of his own Bravery, and Presence of Mind; that his Head, his Hands, his Tongue are free from Fear and Confusion, and serve him for pro∣per Orders, and vigorous Action, with all Imaginable Rea∣diness, and Address.

If his own Side be Superiour, and the Fortune of the Field rest there, his Duty is to repress, and Check their Eagerness; to prevent their Scartering and Disorder, by too fierce and obstinate a Pursuit. For in this Case, he ought to be Apprehensive of a Turn, which hath often happened; that the vanquished may take Heart again when they feel themselves hard press'd; and by making a desperate Push, rally upon, and rout their Conquerors. For Necessity is a furious Mistress, and puts Men upon very violent Me∣thods.* 1.191 When Men are surrounded with Death, Despair emboldens them; and after Hope is lost, Cowards turn Stout, and Fear it self takes up Arms. Rather therefore let him open a Passage, and facilitate their Flight; but least of all must he sufter his Men to fall upon the Booty, and while they are employed in rifling, and all in Disorder, endanger the being made a Prey themselves. Victory, when obtain'd, must be used with Moderation and Prudence; for Victory it self is

not always Safe; if it be stained with Barbarity and bru∣tish Usage, and put the Enemy out of all Hope, it may turn to very ill Account, and add to our Danger. For† 1.192 Necessity and Ill Treatment give an edge to the dullest Soul; even Despair sometimes produces Hope; and no Bite is so Keen, as That, when Extremity is provoked and makes her Teeth meet. On the other Hand, as it is more Humane, so it is really more Advisable and Safe, to use beaten Foe gently; to leave Room for Hope, and encourage Overtures of Peace; not to ravage his Country, nor make Havock and Desolation, wheresoever we come. For Rage and Fury are very sierce and dangerous wild Beasts; and therefore we should take care not to let them loose. A Wise Ge∣neral will likewise behave himself with Temper and Mo∣desty, upon his Successes; for Insolence is most unbecoming a Man conversant in War; most absurd in one, who can∣not but have been upon that Account acquainted with the Inconstancy of Fortune; and ought to remember its Eb∣bings and Flowings, how quickly it rolls over to another Shoar; how strange those Revolutions are, by which Pros∣perity sometimes takes its Rise out of extreme Adversity; and on the Contrary final Ruine begins at Great, Good For∣tune. That some Men are drown'd with Two Foot of Water, and lost when they esteem themselves most safe. That more die of Surfeits, than of Hunger; and some have⁂ 1.193 not Stomachs strong enough to digest a plentiful Meal of Happi∣ness. That Fortune is Perfect Glass, and aptest to be broken when it is clearest and finest. And therefore all Confidence in it is Faithless and Ʋnsafe; and the Conquerour frequently taken Captive in the midst of Security and Triumph.

If you are beaten, it is an Instance of Wisdom to know it; to examine well your Circumstances, and consider what your Loss is. And never think to stifle your Misfortune, or Fancy, that This is nothing, All will be well again, and no body know it; for such Hopes are trifling and vain; and the Contrivance of suppressing the News of your Defeat is Childish and Ridiculous. 'Tis only to commit the carrying of it to uncertain Rumours, which represent nothing truly,

and will make the Matter Ten times worse. You must therefore apply your self to a full and serious Consideration of the Case; for how will you ever be able to find out a Cure, if you do not first search to the bottom of your Disease? After this, It will become his Courage to enter∣tain better Hopes, to refresh his Forces with all imagina∣ble Diligence; to call in fresh Succours, and make new Levies; and put good sufficient Garrisons into all his Places of Strength. And after all, if Providence be still contra∣ry, as indeed sometimes it is so far from seeing fit to prosper, that one would almost imagine it perfectly sets it self a∣gainst the justest Arms, and most commendable Under∣takings, there is always one Remedy left; for no Man can be denyed the Privilege of lying down in the Bed of Honour: And sure a Decent and Reputable Death is much rather to be chosen, than a Life of Contempt and Reproach.

[unspec 38] And thus we have gone through the Second Head of this Subject, concerning Military Matters, excepting only, that there is One Objection arising upon it, which some scrupulous People may think necessary to be resolved. And That is, whether Subtilty and Deceit, Feints and Strata∣gems are lawful Methods, and how far they may be used. Some are absolutely against them, and decry them in all Cases whatsoever. They tell you no Circumstances can justifie a Practice so contrary to Virtue and Truth, and unworthy Men of Honour and Conscience; and there∣fore that Remark of Virgil's will by no Means go down with them.

* 1.194Courage and Cunning both, the Laurels claim, A Foe is Priviledg'd; that very Name Protects Deceit and Stratagem from Shame.

We find Alexander the Great so exceeding nice in this Puncti∣lio, that he would not so much as take the Advantage of a dark Night, but declared, he scorn'd a stollen Victory.† 1.195 I had rather have occasion to be sorry for my ill Fortune, than to be ashamed for my good Success. Of the same generous Tem∣per were the old Romans; They sent back the Schoolmaster of the Falisci, who proffered to betray them; and the Trea∣cherous

Physician to Pyrrhus, who was ready to poyson him. They always pretended to Virtue and down-right Honesty, dealt fairly and above-board, disclaim'd and discountenan∣ced all their own Country-men, who gave themselves a Li∣berty of doing otherwise; reproached the Greeks and Afri∣cans with breach of Faith; and turned their Craft and Cunning into a Taunt and a Proverb.* 1.196 They made it a Principle, That those only are Conquests indeed, which are gain'd by Dint of Courage, by honest and just Methods, and such as cast no Blemish upon the Conqueror's Honour: But as for those which are the Acquisition of Subtlety and Stratagem, they are neither generous, nor reputable, nor safe, nor lasting. For those who are beaten upon these Terms, do not look upon themselves to be fairly vanquish∣ed; and the effect of that is what the Historian observes:† 1.197 They impute their Defeat to a Chance, to the Subtlety of the General, who took his Advantage, and dealt indirectly: And this they do not think a Victory, but a Trick and a Cheat. And again, He scorn'd to revenge himself by foul play and Sur∣prize, but took up Arms fairly, and came into the Field open∣ly, and carv'd out his Vengeance with his Sword.

Now these Reflections, I must own, are very just, but then they must not be extended too far. There are in∣deed Two Cases, wherein such Rules are obligatory; That I mean of Personal Quatrels, and Disputes between pri∣vate Men; and that of National Controversies too, where the Matter in question concerns some former Engagements, or when there have been mutual Alliances and Compacts treated formerly between them. But where neither of these is the Case; that is to say, in a formal and direct War, and where no Faith hath been given, and conse∣quently none can be broken, it is allowable to humble and defeat an Enemy any manner of Way: For the proclaim∣ing of War is like passing Sentence of Death; all against whom it is denounc'd, lie under Condemnation; and if that Sentence were just, it will be lawful to exterminate and bring them to Execution, by the snatching every Opportu∣nity and Advantage of doing it. This agrees with the Notion of very brave and deservedly renowned Generals,

who have been so far from disdaining or condemning a Vi∣ctory obtain'd by Subtlery and secret Stratagem, that they make no Scruple, even of preferring it before those that are acquir'd by Dint of Blows, and open Force. And ac∣cordingly they made Distinctions in their Sacrifices of Thanks upon these Occasions; ordering the most valuable, an Ox, to be offer'd up for the former sort; whereas a Cock was esteem'd Acknowledgment sufficient, and more suitable to the Advantage of the Latter. Nor is it Their Opinion only, but even the great Christian Doctor, St. Au∣gustin, thought it no way disagreeable to the Strictness even of Our Religion, to give this Determination of the Matter.* 1.198

When a righteous War is begun, whether Men fight by open Force, and formal Engagements, or by Subtlety and Stratagem, and secret Ambuscade, it makes no difference in the Justice of the Pro∣ceeding.

And indeed a State of War in the very Nature of the Thing hath some Priviledges reasonably allow'd to it, even against what Reason in other Matters wou'd think necessa∣ry or allowable. And surely in Time and Place conveni∣ent, a Man is not bound to refuse any Occasion; for why should it not be counted as fair to take the Advantage of an Enemies Indiscretion and Folly; as it is to make the best of their Weakness, or their Cowardice? And yet no Man, that I know of, ever pretended, that it was unbecoming a General to attack his Enemy, except both their Courage, or their Numbers were in all Points a Match, and equal to his own.

[unspec 39] Let us now Proceed in the last Place, * 1.199 to the Third Head of this Subject, which concerns Conduct in Military Mat∣ters; which, as it is the Shortest, so is it likewise the Joy∣fulest and most Desirable of all the rest; Putting an End, I mean, to the War by Peace. Peace! There is Musick in the very Sound, Delight and Advantage in the thing; it is Beautiful and Charming in any Dress, and infinitely Pro∣fitable for all Parties, both the Victors, and Vanquished.

* 1.200The sweetest Bliss that e'er indulgent Heav'n. To smooth the Storms of Humane Life hath given.

Repeated Pomps and Trophies of the Field, To the soft Triumphs of One Treaty yield: Those Laurels full of Blood and Blemish are; He only conquers, who concludes the War.

But the Advantages I confess, though universal, are not distributed in equal Proportions; the Losers, by the War have by much the greater and more sensible Share of them. And these, who are supposed to be enfeebled and reduced, must be advised, to keep themselves still in a posture of Defence, and preserve an Air at least and outward Ap∣pearance of Resolution, and Courage still unbroken, and Hope of a more favourable Change of Affairs: For (as hath been said before) He that is desirous of Peace in good Earnest must be always ready for War; and That Obser∣vation is most true, That the Best and Happiest Agreements are made in the Field, and treated with Sword in Hand. But though Peace be never so desirable and con∣venient for our present Circumstances, yet even a good thing may be bought too dear. We must not therefore be so immoderately Fond of it, as not to take Care, that it be Honourable, and upon fair and Reasonable Terms; For if this be not rightly adjusted, however that common No∣tion may prevail of a counterfeit and base Peace being better than a just and Creditable War; yet a Prince had better preserve his Liberty at the Price of his Life, and hazard all gloriously, than submit himself and his People to vile reproachful Terms, and live in Slavery and Infamy. A Peace then should not be patch'd up for a present Turn, and to Skin over a Sore; but it should be free and fair, without Trick, or Design, or deceitful Reservations; such as may entirely end the War, and not only suspend Acts of Hostility for a while, and so protract, and kindle War afresh. For* 1.201 Downright War is better than a suspected Peace. But, all This notwithstanding, when Matters are brought to an Extremity, a Man must comply whether he will or no, and make the best Terms he can. When the Pilot sees himself ready to be Shipwrackt, he lightens the Ship, and is content to save his Life with the Loss of his Lading; and thus it often happens, that the throwing all over-board in the Case before us; insisting upon no Demands, but com∣mitting our selves entirely to the Mercy of the Conqueror,

succeeds very happily. For⁂ 1.202

Prosperity hath a softening In∣fluence upon generous Adversaries, and they feel their Anger melted into Pity; and the more they have it in their Power, the less Inclination they find to take a Revenge.

The Prosperous and Triumphant must give me leave to advise them, that they would not be over-nice, and dif∣ficult to grant a Peace; for, tho' perhaps the vanquish'd get abundantly more by it than the Victors, yet still even These get a great deal. For, supposing the best Fortune, and the easiest Terms the thing will admit, yet the carry∣ing on of a War cannot but be a Matter of infinite Trou∣ble and Inconvenience. And Lycurgus had another Conside∣ration, for which he thought it always inexpedient to be often at War with one and the same Enemy, because this is training him up, as it were, and teaching him the Trade, till at last he grow as expert as his Masters; and learn not only to defend himself, but to attack us. The Teeth of Beasts in the Agonies of Death are exceeding venomous, and the Wounds made by them then, commonly prove mortal.

* 1.203 Valour's last Efforts bold and dangerous are, And double Fury rages in Despair.

And besides, the Contingencies of War are more than can possibly be foreseen; they are intricate, and dark, and the Issue always uncertain. One unlucky Action may blast all that went before; and therefore† 1.204 A good Peace, which se∣cures All, is much safer and more eligible, than an absolute Victory at distance, and in reversion only; because That is in the disposal of Providence, and may never be yours; but this in your own hand, and you have it actually in possession. So great a difference ought we to make between Things Pre∣sent, and those that are Future, and but in Prospect; if no other Argument concurs'd to balance our Choice. But it deserves to be remembred further, that the Sting lies usu∣ally in the Tail; That Fortune is always floating and in∣constant; and the longer she hath favour'd us already, the

greater reason we have to apprehend, that she will be shift∣ing shortly. And⁂ 1.205 No Man can with safety to himself tempt dangers, which must thicken upon him every day.

But, besides the making a saving Game while we may, we should do well to reflect, how honourable a way of proceeding this is. For when all is our own, and our Ene∣my lies at Mercy, then to hearken to Proposals, and readily accept a Peace, is truly Great and Glorious. This shews those Pretences to be true, which all Princes affect to make, that we are desirous to end the War, and fight only for the sake of Peace. And on the other side, The refusing good Terms, and suffering any Change of Fortune after∣wards, makes one fall unpity'd, and exposes him to the Scorn and Indignation of all Mankind. They tell you. That such a one is a Sacrifice to his own Vanity and Am∣bition. He disdain'd Peace, and grasp'd at Honour; and by refusing one when he might have had it, he hath now lost both. But, when we are so disposed to grant a Peace, we should be liberal in our Concessions, and give large and liberal Conditions, that so it may be firm and lasting. For if it be rigorous and hard, we must expect, that those who are opprest by us, will be sure to revolt, and break loose from their Covenants, as soon as ever they find it feasible and convenient. So says Livy in one of his Treaties,* 1.206 If you grant a good Peace, it will be durable and firm; but if the Terms be harsh, this can never bind so fast, but that the first. Opportunity of mending their Circumstances, will be sure to break thorough it. And it is an Argument of a great Soul, to be flexible and indulgent, and yielding to an Enemy, when he sues for Pity; as it is to be invincible, and keep one's Ground when he engages you in the Field. The Ancient Romans we find have set an excellent Pattern of this kind, and the good Account it turn'd to with Them, is a suf∣ficient Reason to recommend it to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Imitation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Posterity.

CHAP. IV. The Preface.

HAving dispatch'd, as you see, the several Directions necessary for that part of Civil Prudence, which is design'd to guide a Prince in the Administration of the Government, and the maintaining that Character which is altogether Publick: I design in the next place to allow that Prudence, which is personal, a distinct Consideration: That, I mean, which is necessary for the preserving himself under, or for applying proper Remedies to, the Difficulties, and Dangers, and Calamities that may happen. And this is the fitter to be spoken to apart, and by it self, be∣cause both the Rules themselves, and the Occasions which re∣quire the Practice of them, are agreeable to the Circumstan∣ces of all Conditions of Men, and sute both Prince and Subject; both them, in Publick, and those in Private Ca∣pacities.

Now the First thing to be done upon this Occasion, is the ob∣ser••ing and distinguishing duly that great Variety of Bu∣siness and Contingenties, which this Subject will engage us in the Consideration of: For they may be either Publick or Pri∣••••••. They may be Future, and such as threaten ••s at some ••••••ance; or they may be actual Hardships, and such as we la∣b•••• under at presons. They may be ••••••••cate and Ʋncertain; or they may be ovi•••••••• Dangerous and Difficult; and of great Concern to is too, 〈…〉〈…〉 of the Violence of the Pressure they put us under. And again, Those that are of the highest Consequence, and are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and encumbred with most per∣p••••xing Difficult 〈…〉〈…〉 Secret and Con••••••l'd, or Vist•••• and Open. Of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Sort 〈◊〉〈◊〉 may ••••kon T•••••• Close Conspiracies against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and lift of the Prince, or a∣gainst the Government in general, Or Treathery against any 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or, Town, 〈…〉〈…〉, or some particuliar Body 〈…〉〈…〉 The 〈…〉〈…〉 such as are Manifest and Open, are 〈…〉〈…〉 sor•• For either they want the Formalities of War, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••••tumultuous and disorderly; as Popular Commotions, 〈…〉〈…〉 Insurrections upon some slight Occasion of Offence; 〈…〉〈…〉 and 〈…〉〈…〉 into by some Subjects against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and the 〈…〉〈…〉 in these may be Numerous or Few, Great or 〈…〉〈…〉 Seditions or Mutinies against the

Prince or the 〈…〉〈…〉 the Authority, and 〈…〉〈…〉 self: Or else they are 〈…〉〈…〉 go by the 〈…〉〈…〉 and be of as many 〈…〉〈…〉 which are indeed 〈…〉〈…〉 and imperfect 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of such 〈…〉〈…〉 full Growth by 〈…〉〈…〉 every 〈◊〉〈◊〉 these, 〈…〉〈…〉 and to 〈…〉〈…〉 to Men's 〈…〉〈…〉 be 〈…〉〈…〉 〈…〉〈…〉 Those of the first 〈…〉〈…〉 those of 〈…〉〈…〉 〈…〉〈…〉 filent 〈…〉〈…〉 about him, without ever 〈…〉〈…〉 Blow. The Former of 〈…〉〈…〉 govern and order the 〈…〉〈…〉

Himself. The Former is the brisker Man, and plays a bolder; but the Latter is the surer, and plays a more saving Game. The Former is always in deep Anxiety and Suspense, agitated and toffed between Hope and Fear; the Latter puts himself under Covert, lies down upon the Ground, and satisfies himself with the Comfort that he can fall no lower. The Former takes pains to escape the Ca∣lamity; the Latter labours to endure and get through it; and it very often happens, That This Man hath the bet∣ter Bargain of it, and comes off with less Trouble and Loss We know Men are often at more Expence to de∣fend their Title by Law, than the whole thing they con∣tend for is worth: And thus it is very often in other Mat∣ters. The cheapest Course they can take is to fit down by the Loss; and many an Affliction is born with more Ease to the Sufferer, than it can be either avoided or strug∣gled with. The Covetous Wretch is a greater torment to himself, than He that is really Poor; and the Jealous Hus∣band feels more uneasiness, tho' his Jealousie be groundless and undeserv'd, than the Cuckold who hath been actually dishonour'd, but either knows it not, or regards it not. The peculiar Virtue of the Former, and that which is most ne∣cessary for his Circumstances is Prudence; for His is active Valour; That of the Latter is Temper, and Constancy, and Patience; for his part is purely passive. But indeed, why should a Man be confin'd to either of these singly? Wherefore should he not use and try both, in their Order and proper Season? For methinks Prudence and Vigilance should be the first Attempt; and when these are found in∣sufficient, then is the time for changing our Measures, and Patience should succeed in their Place. Thus much at least is certain and undoubted, that in all Publick Contingencies the Methods for Prevention and Remedy ought first to be try'd; Those that are in Trust and Office, and have it in their Power to serve and promote the Common Good, are indispensably obliged to it, and ought to stand in the Gap against all managable Difficulties and Misfortunes. In the Case of private Persons, I confess it is otherwise; there a Man hath none but himself to answer for; and it will be agreeable to Wisdom and Duty both, to consider the state of the Matter before him, and consult his own Abilities; and then to make a Choice of such Methods and Management, as appear most advantageous in the present Circumstances, and as he feels himself best qualify'd for.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Knowledge.
• * 1.2

  Noscenda Natura Vulgi, & quibus modis temperanter ha∣beatur.
• † 1.3

  Nemo bene imperat, nisi qui ante paruerit imperio.
• * 1.4

  The second Head. Virtue.
• * 1.5

  Patientiores servitutis, quos and decet nisi esse servos.
• † 1.6

  Pessimus quisque asperrime Rectorem patitur: Contrà. Facile Imperium in Bonos, qui Metuentes magis quam metuendi.
• ⁂ 1.7

  Nec tam Imperio nobis opus quam Exemplo; & mitius ju∣betur Exemplo.
• * 1.8

  Four Prin∣cipal Vir∣tues.
• * 1.9

  Dion.
• * 1.10

  Justice and Fide∣lity.
• * 1.11

  Principi Leges nemo scripsit. Licet, si libet. In summâ for∣tunà id requius quod validius; nihil injustum quod fructuosum. Sanctitas, ••ietas, Fides privata bona sunt; quà juv••t Reges eant.
• † 1.12

  Minimum decet libere, cui nimium licet. Non ••as potentes posse, sieri quod nefas.
• † 1.13

  Concessum Latrocinium. Columel.
• {inverted ⁂} 1.14

  Corruptissimae Reipub. plurimae leges.
• * 1.15

  Salus Populi Supreme Lex esto.
• * 1.16

  Salus Populi Supreme Lex esto.
• * 1.17

  Distrust∣ing others.
• * 1.18

  Opportunus Injuriae. Senec. Aditum nocendi Perfido prae∣stat Fides.
• * 1.19

  Multi fallere docuerunt timentes falli. Sen.
• * 1.20

  Vult quisque sibi credi, & habita sides ipsam plerunque obligat fidem.
• * 1.21

  Dissimula∣tion.
• * 1.22

  Secret Ser∣vice.
• * 1.23

  Plato. Pliny. Valer. Maxim.
• * 1.24

  Crebro mendacio & fraude uti Imperantes debent ad Commodum Subditorum. Decipere pro moribus temporum Prudentiae est.
• * 1.25

  The Reader is desired to observe how cautious and tender the Author is, at the End of these Cases, which is the more remarkable, because he lived under an Absolute and Arbitra∣ry Government, where many things were practised and al∣lowed, which can by no means hold, or be drawn into Pre∣cedents in limited Constitutions. And generally speaking, no doubt that Prince governs best, who brings his Measures near∣est to those of Common and Private Justice. The Readers will find an excellent Remark to this purpose, made by one who was himself an Emperor, in M. Antonin. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lib. ix. S. 24.
• * 1.26

  Injustice for the Publick Good.
• * 1.27

  Omne magnum Exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod adversus singulos utilitate publicâ rependitur.
• † 1.28

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. in fine Flamin.
• ⁂ 1.29

  Non speciosa dictu, sed usu necessaria in rebus adversis se∣quenda esse. Q. Curt. Lib. 5.
• * 1.30

  Necessitas magnum imbecillitatis humanae patrocinium, om∣nem Legem frangit; non est nocens, quicunque non sponte est nocens. Senec.
• * 1.31

  Valour.
• * 1.32

  Clemency.
• * 1.33

  Severitas amittit assiduitate Authoritatem.
• ⁂ 1.34

  Temperatus Timor est qui cohibet; Assiduus & acer in vin∣dictam excitat.
• † 1.35

  Firmissimum Imperium, quo obedientes gaudent. Tit. Liv.
• † 1.36

  —Ignoscere pulchrum, Jam misero, poenae{que} genus vidisse precantem.
• * 1.37

  Liberality.
• * 1.38

  Of two Kinds.
• * 1.39

  Quod Ambiticne exhaustum, per Scelera supplendum.
• * 1.40

  Liberalitate Liberalitas perit.
• † 1.41

  Falluntur, quibus Luxuria Specie Liberalitatis imponit, por∣dere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt.
• * 1.42

  Nagnani∣mity.
• * 1.43

  Magnam Fortunam magnus Animus decet.—Injurias & Offensiones superne despicere.—Indignus Caesaris irâ.
• † 1.44

  Convitia si irascere, agnita videntur; spreta exolescunt.
• ⁂ 1.45

  Obscuri & irrevocabiles reponunt odia. Saev••e Cogitationis indicium secreto suo satiari.
• * 1.46

  The third Head. Behaviour
• * 1.47

  Continun•• Aspectus minùs verendos magnos homines ipsa satietate facit. Liv.
• † 1.48

  Majestati major ex longinquo Reverentia; quia omne igno∣tum pro magnih co est.
• * 1.49

  The fourth Head. Counsel.
• * 1.50

  Nequit Princeps suâ scientià cuncta complecti; nee unius Mens tantae molis est capax.
• * 1.51

  Liv.
• * 1.52

  Tacit.
• * 1.53

  Plin.
• * 1.54

  Xenoph.
• * 1.55

  Plato. Aristot.
• * 1.56

  Qualifica∣tions of Counsellors.
• * 1.57

  Optimum quemque sidelissimum puto.
• † 1.58

  Mihi Fortuna multis rebus ereptis usum dedit bene suaden∣di. Mithr. in Salusi.
• ⁂ 1.59

  Novandis quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignea.
• * 1.60

  Ne cum Fortunâ potius Principis loquantur, quam cum ipso.
• † 1.61

  In praesentia quibus resistis, offendis: deinde illis suspicitur laudaturque.
• * 1.62

  Non semper it uno gradu, sed unâ viâ: non se mutat, sed aptat.
• † 1.63

  Res magnae sustinere nequeunt ab eo, cui tacere grave est.
• * 1.64

  Exquirere abditos Principis sensus illicitum & anceps. Tacit.
• † 1.65

  Nam Animus vereri qui scit, scit tuto aggredi.
• ⁂ 1.66

  Consilia calida & audacia primà specie laeta sunt, tractatu clara, eventu tristia.
• * 1.67

  Private res somper ofiecere officient{que} publicis consiliis; Ce••••umen•• •••••• affect••is & judicii venenum sua cui{que} Utilitas.
• † 1.68

  Ram singuh decip•• & de••••pi possunt; nemo omnes, ne∣tait•••••• 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.69

  Cujus Aures ita formatae sunt, ut aspera quae utilia; & nil nisi jucundum & laesurum recipiant.
• † 1.70

  Nulla meliora consilia, quam quae ignoraverit adversarius antequam fierent.
• * 1.71

  Officers.
• * 1.72

  Ut pares negotiis, neque suprà; sint recti, non erecti.
• * 1.73

  The Fifth Head Trea∣sure
• * 1.74

  Funds.
• * 1.75

  I.
• * 1.76

  II.
• * 1.77

  III.
• * 1.78

  IV.
• * 1.79

  V.
• * 1.80

  VI.
• * 1.81

  I.
• * 1.82

  II.
• * 1.83

  Impetrare melius est quam imper••re.
• * 1.84

  The using the Trea∣sure well.
• * 1.85

  Saving.
• * 1.86

  What publick Treasure for Civil Uses, this Author re∣fers to, I do not know, for want of his Marginal Quotati∣ons, in which he is frequently defective; but the Summ reserved for building the Temple, is yet infinitely more ama∣zing: That in the XXII. of 1 Chronic. v. 14. is said to be a Hundred Thousand Talents of Gold; which, at the rate of Four Pound an Ounce, would be valued among us at Seventy Five Millions Sterling; and a Thousand Thousand Talents in Silver, which at five Shillings per Ounce, comes to 187 Millions 500000 l. computing Seven Hundred and Fifty Ounces of Metal to each Talent. And besides all this, 'tis said the Brass and Iron were unmeasurably great, as also the Stores of Timber and Stone left Solomon to be∣gin with.
• * 1.87

  The Sixth Head Nilitary Force.
• * 1.88

  Qui cupit Pacem, paret Bellum.
• * 1.89

  The Se∣venth Head. Alliances.
• * 1.90

  Amorem apud Populares, Metum apud Hostes quaerat.
• * 1.91

  Good Will acquir'd by Gentleness.
• * 1.92

  Nec totam servitutem pati, nec totam libertatem.
• † 1.93

  Domiti ut pareant, non serviant.
• ⁂ 1.94

  Remissius imperanti melius paretur. Qui vult amari, lan∣guidà regnet manu.
• * 1.95

  Sed incorrupto Ducis honore. Tacit.
• * 1.96

  Beneficence.
• * 1.97

  Vulgo una ex Republicà Annonae cura.
• * 1.98

  Liberality.
• † 1.99

  Qui militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.
• ⁂ 1.100

  Majestas Imperii Salutis Tutela.
• * 1.101

  Authority.
• * 1.102

  Severity.
• * 1.103

  Illecebra peccandi maxima spes impunitatis.
• * 1.104

  Ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes.
• * 1.105

  Deut. xxi.
• † 1.106

  Crudelem Medicum, intemperans aeger facit.
• * 1.107

  Constancy.
• * 1.108

  Leniter & lente.
• † 1.109

  Communis custodia Principatûs, neminem unum magnum facere.
• * 1.110

  Nil tam utile, quam brevem potestatem esse, quae magna sit.
• * 1.111

  Against Tyranny.
• † 1.112

  Oderint dum metuant.
• * 1.113

  Caesari cum omnia licent, propter hoc minus licet. Ut foelici∣tatis est, posse quantum velis: Sic magnitudinis, velle quantum possis; vel potius quantum debeas.
• * 1.114

  Hatrod.
• * 1.115

  Multorum odiis nullae opes possunt resistere. Multae illis ma∣nus; Illi una cervix.
• * 1.116

  Cruelty.
• † 1.117

  Libenter damnat, qui cito: ergo illi parsimonia etiam vilissi∣mi Sanguinis.
• * 1.118

  Avarice.
• * 1.119

  Psalm liii.
• ⁂ 1.120

  Qui devorant Plebem sicut escam panis; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quo∣rum aerarium spoliarium Civium, cruentarumque praedarum re∣ceptaculum.
• * 1.121

  Indignum lucrum ex omni occasione odorari; & ut dicitur, etiam à mortuis auferre.
• * 1.122

  Contempt.
• * 1.123

  Ut videatur exire de imperio.
• † 1.124

  Malum, principem habere, sub quo nihil ulli licet; pejus, eum, sub quo omnia omnibus.
• ⁂ 1.125

  Orbitas mea, quod sine liberis sum, spernitur. Munimen Aulae Regii Liberi.
• * 1.126

  The Peace∣able Admi∣nistration.
• * 1.127

  The Description given of this personal Dearness betwixt Alexander and Hephestion, hath that among other Circum∣stances mention'd in it. Secretorum omnium arbiter; Li∣bertatis quoque in admonendo non alius jus habebat. Qu. Curt. Lib. III. 12.
• * 1.128

  Of Mili∣tary Af∣fairs.
• * 1.129

  Non ex omni occasione quaerere triumphum.
• † 1.130

  Una & ea vetus causa bellandi est profunda cupido Imperii & divitiarum; maximam gloriam in maximo Imperio putant. Rupere foedus impius lucri furor & ira praeceps.
• * 1.131

  A just War, what.
• * 1.132

  Qui non defendit, nec obsistit, si potest, injuriae, tam est in Vitio, quam si Parentes, aut Patriam, aut Socios deserat. Cic. Lib. I. de Offic.
• † 1.133

  Fortitudo, quae per bella tuetur à Barbaris Patriam; vel de∣fendit infirmos; vel à latronibus Socios, plena Justitiae est.
• ⁂ 1.134

  Nullum bellum à Civitate optimà suscipitur, nisi aut pro Fide, aut pro Salute. Salust.
• * 1.135

  Post Clarigatum. Plin. Nat. Hist. Lib. XXII. Cap. 2.
• † 1.136

  Justum Bellum quibus necessarum; pia Arma, quibus null•• nisi in armis relinquitur spes.
• † 1.137

  Sapientes pacis causà bellum gerunt; & laborem spe otii su∣stentant; ut in pace sine injurià vivant.
• * 1.138

  Prudence.
• ⁂ 1.139

  Simul parta ac sperata decora unius horae Fortuna ever∣tere potest.
• * 1.140

  Iniquissima Bellorum conditio haec est; Prospera omnes sibi vendicant, Adversa uni imputantur.
• * 1.141

  Quibus in Pace durius servitium est; in id nati, ut nec ipsi quiescant, neque alios sinant.
• † 1.142

  Dulce bellum inexpertis.
• * 1.143

  The Second Head. Car∣rying on the War.
• ⁂ 1.144

  Diu apparandum est, ut vincas celerius.
• * 1.145

  Disciplinam non servat jejunus Exercitus.
• * 1.146

  Men.
• * 1.147

  Foot.
• * 1.148

  Equestrium virium proprium est citò parare, citò cedere victoriam.
• * 1.149

  Natives.
• * 1.150

  Ord•••••••• and 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.151

  Choice of Men.
• * 1.152

  Non vires habed, sed pondus; potius impedimentum quam auxilium.
• † 1.153

  Manibus opus est bello, non nominibus.
• ⁂ 1.154

  Assueti latrociniis bellorum; insolentes; galeati Lepores; Purgamenta urbium, quibus ob egestatem & flagita maxima peceandi necessitudo.
• * 1.155

  Ex Agris supprendum praecipuè robur exercitûs; aptior Ar∣mis Rustica plebs, sub dio & in laboribus enutrita; ipso terrae suae solo & coelo acrius animantur.
• † 1.156

  Vernacula multitudo, lasciviae sueta, laborum intolerans.
• ⁂ 1.157

  Dura corpora, stricti artus, minax vultus, major animi vigor.
• * 1.158

  Discipline.
• * 1.159

  Two Parts.
• * 1.160

  Exercitus
• † 1.161

  Exercitus Labore prosicit, Otio conseneseit.
• † 1.162

  Imperium Ducis simul omnes Copiae sentiunt: & ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondent.
• * 1.163

  Ma••mers.
• ⁂ 1.164

  Assidue dimicantibus difficile Morum custodire mensu∣ram.
• * 1.165

  Degenerat à Robore ac virtute Miles assuetudine Volup∣tatum.
• † 1.166

  Viri nati Militiae Factis magni, ad Verborum Linguaeque certamina rudes. Diserimen ipsum certaminis differt. Viri fortes in opere acres, ante id placidi Verbis, Linguà fero∣ces. Plin.
• ⁂ 1.167

  Hoec sunt bonae Militiae, Velle, Vereri, Obedire.
• * 1.168

  Of the Comman∣ders.
• * 1.169

  Plus in Duce repones, quam in Exercitu. Tacit.
• * 1.170

  Dubiis Praeliorum exemptus, summae Rerum & Imperii seip∣sum reservet. Tacit.
• † 1.171

  Secundarum ambiguarumque rerum sciens, eoque inter∣••••••s. Tacit.
• ⁂ 1.172

  Non licet in Bello bis peccare—Ducem opertet potius Re∣•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 qu••m Perspicere.
• * 1.173

  Advice for Action.
• * 1.174

  Plura Consilio quam Vi perficiuntur.
• † 1.175

  Consilium in Atena.
• * 1.176

  Famâ bella constant, fama bellum conficit, in spem metumve impellit animos.
• * 1.177

  Frequentissimum initum Calamitatis, Securitas. Nemo ce∣lerius opprimitur, quam qui non timet. Nil tutò in hoste despicitur. Quem spreveris, valentiorem negligentià facies.
• † 1.178

  Seepe parvis momentis magni casus; ut nil timendi, sic ni∣hil contemnendi.
• * 1.179

  For Battels
• * 1.180

  Incerti Fxitus pugnarum. Mars communis, qui saep•• spoliantem & jam exultantem evertit, & perculit ab ab∣jecto.
• * 1.181

  The Time.
• * 1.182

  Place.
• * 1.183

  Persons.
• * 1.184

  Unde necessitas in loco, spes in virtute, s••lus ex Victoriâ.
• * 1.185

  XI. Manner.
• † 1.186

  Spe Victorie inducere, ut vincatur.
• * 1.187

  Form'd Battels.
• * 1.188

  Pumi in omnious P••••his vincuntur Oculi & Aures
• ⁂ 1.189

  Minus Timoris, minus Periculi; audaciam pro muro esse; Effugere mortem, qui eam contemnit.
• * 1.190

  In the A∣ction it self.
• * 1.191

  Clausis ex desperatione crescit Audacia; & cum Spei nihil est, sumit arma Formido.
• † 1.192

  Ignaviam Necessitas acuit; s••epe Desperatio spei causâ est. Gravissimi sunt morsus irritatae necessitatis.
• ⁂ 1.193

  Magnam Felicitatem concoquere non possunt. Fortuna vi∣trea est, tunc cum splendet, frangitur. O infidam Fiduciam•• & saepe Victor victus.
• * 1.194

  Dolus, an Virtus quis in hoste requirat?
• † 1.195

  Malo me Fortunae pigeat, quam Victoriae pudeat.
• * 1.196

  Quae salvâ Fide & Dignitate paratur.
• † 1.197

  Non Virtute, sed Occasione & Arte Ducis se victos rati: Ergo non Fraude, & Occultis, sed palam & armatum Hostes suos ulcisci.
• * 1.198

  Cum justum bellum suscipitur, ut apertè pugnet quis, aut ex insidiis, nihil ad justitiam interest.
• * 1.199

  The Third Head. Put∣ting an End to the War.
• * 1.200

  —Pax optima rerum, Quas homini novisse datum est; Pax una Triumphis Innumeris potior—
• * 1.201

  Pac•• suspectâ tutius Bellum.
• ⁂ 1.202

  Victores qui sunt alto animo, secundae res in miserationem ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ertunt.
• * 1.203

  ••ractis rebus violentior ultima virtus.
• † 1.204

  ••••••lior tutiorque Pax sperata Victoriâ. Illa in Tu••, Haec in Deorum mannuest.
• ⁂ 1.205

  Nemo se tutò diu 〈◊〉〈◊〉 potest.
• * 1.206

  Pacem, si bonam 〈…〉〈…〉; si 〈◊〉〈◊〉 haud diuturnam.