Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. X. Prudent Management of Business.

THIS Particular does in strictness belong to the Virtue of Prudence; of which our intended Method hath not as yet led us to treat, but reserved that to the following Book. And there indeed is the proper place, for insisting severally upon the ma∣ny Rules and Admonitions, which answer to the several Kinds and Branches of Prudence; and pro∣vice against that infinite variety of Occurrences, which call for the exercise of it in Human Life. But in the mean while, I will so far enter into that Sub∣ject at present, as to lay down some of the princi∣pal Points of Prudence, which may serve for com∣mon and general Topicks; Thus to instruct my Schol∣lar in the Gross, how to behave himself well and wisely in the common Correspondence and Com∣merce of the World; and to make him a Master of his Business. For the due Management whereof, I would recommend these Eight Directions that follow.

[unspec 1] The First of these is, That he would be sure to get good Information,* 1.1 and a competent Knowledge of Men and Things. For the Men he hath to deal with, it is requisite he be well acquainted with their particular Humour and Disposition, their Under∣standing and Capacity, their Inclination, and go∣verning Passions; their Intention and Design, and the Methods by which they move. The Things, or particular Business, in which a man is engaged, or which he proposes to undertake, ought likewise to be well understood; Whereby I mean, not such a

slender and superficial Knowledge, as considers the Appearances only, but a thorough Examination to the very bottom: Such a Disquisition, as does not only consider the Things themselves in their own Nature, but enlarges and extends it self, to the Ac∣cidents which they in any probability may be incum∣bred with, and the several Consequences they are like to draw after them. Now, in order to attain∣ing this Knowledge, it is necessary to take a close and particular view of our Affairs; to turn them all manner of ways, eye them in all the different Pro∣spects they are capable of, and nicely scan all the Forms, and Circumstances of them, which our own Imagination can represent them under. For there are a great many Attempts, which have a fair and beautiful side, full of Invitation and large Pro∣mises; and yet if you turn the other side, look horrid and forbidding, and shew nothing but Defor∣mity and Danger. Now there is no occasion to prove the Necessity of such a Knowledge as This; because it is so very evident, that This is the very Compass Men must steer by; For no Man doubts, but that the different Tempers of Men, and conditions of Things bring us under an absolute Necessity of chan∣ging our Measures, and making all our Scheme suit∣able to them. A Man in this case should be as vigi∣lant, and as dextrous, as the Seamen are; who im∣mediately gibe their Sails, and ply their Oars diffe∣rently; as the Wind shifts, or their Course they run, brings them upon different Roads and Shores. And as They could never make their Ports by steering al∣ways the same Course, no more could a Man, who always governs himself alike in Business, expect any other effect at last, than that his Affairs should be ruined and come to nothing, and that all the World should despise and laugh at his Folly. Now, if we do but reflect a very little, how intricate the Affairs of the World are, and how much more intricate

and full of Disguise Human Nature is; The Per∣plexity will appear so great, as to convince us, that the Knowledge I have here been advising, is no such easy matter; but that we must be content to come at it slowly and painfully; for it requires much At∣tention, long Study, and repeated Consideration; a Judgment clear and strong, and a Mind unpreju∣diced and free from Passion.

[unspec 2] The next Lesson to be learnt upon this occasion, is That of knowing how to make a just Estimate of Things,* 1.2 so as to give each that real Value, and pro∣per Place in our Opinion, which of Right belongs to it. And this is a certain Effect of Prudence and Sufficiency. It is indeed a very high pitch of Phi∣losophy, to be able to do this; and such as a Man shall never rise up to, except he first get clear of his own deceitful Passions, and the Common received Errors of the World. There are some six or seven Qualities, that strangely captivate Vulgar Minds; and seduce them into very mistaken Valuations of a Thing, which Wise Men will take good Care not to be deluded by. These are, The Novelty, The Ra∣rity, The Strangeness, The Difficulty, The Artisicial Composure, The Quaintness of the Invention, The Absence or present Want, The losing or being refu∣sed; it; but especially, and above all the rest, the Noise, and Show, and Pomp it creates in the World. Thus the generality of People look upon all things to be little better than despicable, which are not ex∣alted by Art, and Study, and Human Skill; they must have them raised and resined, to recommend them. Those that are plain and simple, and have nothing but their own Native Excellencies to set them off, (let those Excellencies in reality be never so valuable) are so far from being had in any re∣gard, that they are scarce taken notice of at all. They pass off in the common Crowd, unobserv'd and unseen; or, if they are seen, yet do they not

move us, but are look'd upon as low, flat, and insi∣pid: Than which we cannot have a plainer Proof of the Vanity and Weakness of Mankind, who thus take up with Air and Emptiness, and are content to accept Base Metal, and Counterfeit Coin in Pay∣ment, rather than True Standard and Current Mo∣ney. Hence it is, that Art is so much preferr'd be∣fore Nature; Acquired Excellencies to Those that are Innate; Things difficult and elaborate, before Those that are easy; sudden Gushes, and Flights, and impetuous Sallies, before the Constancy and Calm∣ness of Habit and Temper; Things extraordinary, above Those that are ordinary and usual; Ostentati∣on and Pomp, above intrinsick and private real Worth; Things that are Another's, above our Own; Foreign above Domestick, Borrowed before Natu∣ral. And how egregiously foolish now is all This? This, I say, is the Folly of the Vulgar and the Un∣discerning; but Wise Men observe other Measures. They take care not to be thus imposed upon, nor carried away with fantastical Notions; but to pass a severe and critical Enquiry; and judge of Things, first by their True, Substantial, and Natural Good∣ness, which many times is internal, and lies far out of sight; And then by the Advantages they are ca∣pable of bringing. These are solid Foundations of Esteem, all the rest is mere Cheat and Delusion.

Now, it must be confess'd, the being able to make these Distinctions judiciously, is exceeding difficult; for the World is full of Sophistry and Disguise; Things have a Thousand False Faces; and it often happens, that Those which are really Counterfeit and worth nothing, look fairer, more gay, more inviting; than Those that are truly valuable and good. (Nay, Aristotle hath ventured to say, That in Mat∣ters of Speculation, there are a great many Falsities, which carry more shew of Probability, and bid fair∣er at first sight for engaging our Assent, than several

Truths do:) But then, for our Encouragement, we ought to remember, that as This is a very difficult and laborious, so is it likewise an incomparably No∣ble and most Divine Attainment; and withal, that it is of infinite Use, and Absolute Necessity.* 1.3 How necessary is it (saith Seneca) to set a true rate upon things? And so without question it must needs be. For, to what purpose does a Man inform himself in the Rules and Directions for living well, till he be first rightly instructed, what account he ought to hold those several Objects in, which his Desires and Actions are conversant about? Riches, for instance, and Health, and Beauty, and Quality, and Learn∣ing, what degrees of Good these can pretend to, and what Evil he is to expect, or can suffer from their Contraries. It is a great Instance of Skill in Moral Heraldry, to know the Places of all these, and what Precedences are due to them respectively; and espe∣cially, when several of them meet together, it is not easy to proportion our Respects, because the Number confounds us; and indeed all People are not, nor ever will be agreed as to their Quality, which of them is most honourable. The Tastes and Judgments of particular Persons differ exceedingly; And it is very well they do, for if all Mankind were fond of the same thing, they would constantly be interfering, and hindring one another.

For an Instance of what I have said; let us take these Eight Principal Sources of all the Happiness, we can propose to our selves in this World; whether of Body or Mind. I shall pair them together by mentioning Four of each sort; And they are Pro∣bity and Health; Wisdom and Beauty; Good Parts and Quality; Learning and Riches. These Terms I understand here in the common and received

Sense, and do not confine them to a Philosophical Nicety. By Wisdom I mean a Prudence and Discre∣tion in the Government of our Selves, and in all our conversation and Deportment with Others: By Good Parts, that Capacity, and those Abilities for Business, which such Persons are known to be pre∣pared and provided with, above others, to whom Na∣ture hath been less bountiful. And by Learning, that Knowledge of Things, which is acquired by Books and Study. The Rest are so perspicuous, that they need no Explanation.

Now what a prodigious Difference do we find in the Opinions of Men, in adjusting the Place and Precedence, which is pretended to belong to these Eight Things? What infinite and irreconcilable Competitions are there among them? I, for my own part, have delivered my own Judgment freely already in this Treatise; I have here mingled them together, and tacked them to one another in such order, that each Advantage of the Mind hath one belonging to the Body, joined; and so joined as to be correspondent, to it; for as Nature hath united Body and Soul together, so she seems to have given each of them Accomplishments extremely agreeable, and alike. Thus Health is to the Body, what Pro∣bity is to the Mind; it is the Probity or good Dispo∣sition of the Body, as Probity is the Health of the Soul. These should be the Sum of our Wishes.

* 1.4Forgive the Gods the rest, and stand confin'd To Health of Body, and a Virtuous Mind. Says the Poet.

Beauty is commensurate to Wisdom; the Just Mea∣sure, exact Proportion, and Comeliness, is the Wis∣dom

of the Body; and Wisdom is the Regularity, the Decency, the Beauty of the Soul. Quality and Good Birth is a wonderful Capacity, a mighty Disposition to Virtue; and these Spiritual Abilities again, and Good Parts, are the Nobility of the Mind. Learning is the Wealth of the Soul, and Riches the acquired Advantage of the Body. Others, I know, will differ from me in the Method and Order of ranging these Qualifications; for some put all the Advantages of the Mind first; and are of opinion, that the least of These is more valuable, than the best and highest of Those that belong to the Body; and others, who go not so far, yet may not agree in the Preference due to each Particular. Every Man in this Case follows his own Sense, and from that we cannot but expect great Variety of Judgments will ensue.

[unspec 3] In the next place, succeeds a Third Qualification, which indeed naturally springs out of the former; For,* 1.5 from the Sufficiency of passing a just Estimate upon things, is derived an Ability of making a Wise Choice; and this is, not only a matter of Duty and Conscience, but very often an Eminent Instance of Wisdom and good Conduct. There are indeed some Cases extremely plain and easy; as when Dif∣ficulty and Vice, Honesty and Profit, Duty and In∣rest stand in competition; For the Preeminence in this Comparison is so visible and so vast, on one side above the other, that whenever these things encoun∣ter each other, the Advantage lies, and the Balance should always fall, to the side of Duty, though at∣tended with never so great Difficulty and Inconve∣nience. In the Case of Private Persons, I mean, for possibly there may sometimes be room for an Exception; but then this does not often happen, and if it do, 'tis generally in the Administration of Pub∣lick Affairs; and then too, it must be managed with great Tenderness and Circumspection. But of This

I shall have a more proper season to speak, when my Third Book brings us to treat of Prudence in particular. But sometimes there is such a Con∣juncture of Circumstances, that a Man is driven to a very hard Choice: As for Instance, When we stand inclos'd, as it were, with Two Vices, and there is no getting clear of both. Thus History describes that Eminent Father Origen, who had it left to him, Whether he would commit Idolatry, or suffer his Body to be carnally abused by a Moor: The first was the Thing he chose, and some say he chose amiss. Now, when we are unhappily involved in such Per∣plexities, and at a loss which way we should incline, in the choice of Matters not morally evil; the best Rule we can be guided by, is to go over to that side, where there is the greatest Appearance of Ju∣stice and Honesty. For, though every thing should not afterwards succeed according to our Wish or Expectation, yet there will result so pleasing an Ap∣plause, such Glory, and Self-gratulations from with∣in, for our having taken the better Part, as will make us ample Compensation for our Misfortunes, and abundantly support us under them: And besides all this, If the Worse, but seemingly Safer Side, had been chosen, what Security can we have, that the Event would have proved more favourable? and why may we not reasonably suppose, that the Governour and Lord of Us, and all our Fortunes, would have been provoked to punish, and disappoint us that way too? When Matters seem to be so equal, that we cannot distinguish, which is the better, and shorter course, we should take that which is the plainest and straightest. And in Things manifestly Immoral (of which properly speaking there cannot be any Choice) we must avoid that which is most detestable, and hath more of Villany and Horror in it. For this indeed is a Point of Conscience, and is more truly a part of Probity than of Prudence. But it is very

often exceeding hard to satisfy one's self, which of Two things of the same kind is the more agreeable to Justice, or to Decency, or which is preferable in point of Advantage: And so likewise of Two Ill Things, which is the more Unjust, more Indecent and Dishonest, or attended with worse Consequen∣ces. Upon the whole matter then, though the Act of chusing is an Act of Probity and Conscience; yet the Ability of making this Choice aright is a part of Prudence and sound Judgment. I am apt to believe, that in such Straights as these, the best and safest way will be to follow Nature; and to deter∣mine, that those Things which are most agreeable to Nature, are the more just and becoming; and that what is most distant from, or contrary to Na∣ture, is more especially to be avoided and abhorred by us. This agrees well with what was formerly delivered in our description of Probity, That we ought to be Good Men, by the Dictates and Im∣pulse of Nature.

Before I go off from this Point of Choice, give me leave to say one word or two for the resolving a Doubt, which some People have started, with re∣gard to the Determination of our Wills in these Ca∣ses. The Question is, When Two Things are pro∣posed so Equal and Indifferent, that we can give no reason, why One should be valued more than the Other; what it is that disposes the Soul to take the One, and leave the Other? The Stoicks pretend, that it is a rash Operation of the Soul, somewhat Fo∣reign, and Extraordinary, and beside its proper course. But let Them say what they will, We may be bold to affirm, That there is no g round for the Question; and that no Two Things ever do, or can present themselves to our Consideration, so as to be perfectly Equal and Indifferent to us: It fre∣quently happens indeed, that the Difference is very small and inconsiderable; but still some difference

there is; something we apprehend in One, and not in the Other, which casts the Scale, and draws us on to a Choice; though the Motion be so gentle, that we scarce feel it; and the Motive so slender, that we know not how to express, and can very hardly give our selves any account of it. But still certain it is, that were a Man evenly poized between Two Desires, he would never chuse at all: For all Choice implies Inclination of the Mind, and all In∣clination supposes Inequality.

[unspec 4] Another very necessary Direction in this Matter, is, That of consulting with our Friends,* 1.6 and taking good Advice. For there is great danger in acting upon our own heads, and depending entirely upon our selves; Others will see further, and judge better of our Affairs, than Partiality and Concern will suffer Us to do. Now in this Point of Consulting, there are Two Cautions very necessary to be obser∣ved for the prudent management of our selves, and the making this method turn to account with us.

The First regards the Choice of fit Persons to Advise with: For Many are much better let along than applied to, and a Man is as highly concerned to be upon his Guard, and conceal his Designs from Some sort of People, as he is to communicate them, and address for Counsel to Others. Those then, who are proper for such purposes, must First of all be Men of Integrity and Fidelity, that is, fit to be trusted; and then they must be Men of sound Sense, Sober and Discreet, Wise and Experienced; otherwise they will not be fit to Direct. Honesty and Sufficiency are the Two Indispensable qualifica∣tions of good Counsellers; and indeed, to These we may add a Third Consideration which ought to weigh with us very much in our Choice; and This is, That neither They themselves, nor any of their Relations, or particular Friends, be at all concerned in the matter we consult about. For, though you

may possibly Reply to this, That I have sufficiently prevented any Mischiefs of that kind, by providing already, that they should be Persons of Integrity, and whoever is so, will not be biassed by his own, or his Friend's Interest; yet to that I must rejoin, in justification of this Advice; First, That Honesty so stanch, and firm, and Philosophical, as shall be Proof against all the Impressions of Advantage, is to be met with in very few. It is indeed what ought to be; but as the World goes, it is rather to be wish'd for, than found and practised. And Se∣condly, Allowing the Party we Consult, to have at∣tained this Perfection of unmovable Sincerity; yet it is neither Wisdom, nor Kindness, nor good Man∣ners, to drive him to such Difficulties, and such Anxieties of heart, as the asking his Advice in such Circumstances must needs involve him in. This is what we call putting him in between the Milstones, where he must either crush himself, or us.

The other part of Caution, requisite upon these occasions, regards the receiving Advice, when our Counsellers are chosen. And this must be sure to have a patient Hearing, and kind and gratefull En∣tertainment allowed it; we should follow and put it in practice betimes, and not delay, till we are re∣duced to Extremities; we should consider and pro∣ceed upon it with Judgment and Candour, and be well pleased that our Friends should speak their Minds freely, and declare the Truth, though it hap∣pen to be severe and unpalatable to us. When we have taken our Measures according to it, in full considence of the Prudence and Friendship with which it was given, we must not afterwards repine, or be sorry that we have been guided by it, though the Event fall short, or prove contrary to our Ex∣pectations. For it is a very common thing for good Counsel to be very unsuccessful. But a Wise Man ought to take greater Satisfaction in proper Measures,

and prudent Conduct, though the Consequence be calamitous; than in the greatest good fortune ima∣ginable, when his Measures were false and ill-ad∣justed; When as the Historian observes of Marius;* 1.7 The Rashness of the General was corrected by the Event, and his fault received Honour and Commendation. It is below a Man of Sense, and agreeable to the Cha∣racter of Vulgar and Ignorant Souls only, to sit down and wish they had done otherwise; and, af∣ter the maturest Deliberation, and the best choice their case will admit, to fancy they took a wrong Course: For such People in their Crosses and Dis∣appointments, only weigh the Reasons for the con∣trary Methods, without having Greatness or Presence of Mind to counterbalance These, with Those other, once more forcible Arguments, which induced them to act as they did. Thus much was not amiss, I thought, to be hinted briefly for the use of those who want, and ask Advice; but as for the Persons address'd to, the Rules fit to be observ'd by Them in giving of it, shall be specified at large under the Head of Prudence. For indeed Counsel is a very considerable and extensive Branch of that Virtue.

[unspec 5] The Fifth Thing, which I apprehend advisable for the prudent Management of Affairs,* 1.8 is a Steadi∣ness of Temper; consisting in a middle state, be∣tween the Extremes of Confidence and Distrust; Assurance and Fearfulness. And this is necessary to be well Moderated, both with regard to our Selves, and Others.

To repose too great Confidence in a Friend, and reckon our selves absolutely sure of him, is very often Prejudicial to our Affairs; and to distrust his Ability, or his Inclination to do us Service, is offensive to Him; Insomuch, that where we enter∣tain

Suspicious, though never so just in themselves, yet it is not prudent to give any Demonstrations of our Jealousy. For no Man loves to be Distrusted, (because every Man loves to be thought to have Power and Sincerity) and therefore to betray our Distrust is sure to Displease; nay, likely to Provoke, and turn a Friend into an Enemy. But then, on the other hand we must be careful too, not to be so entirely depending, so lazy and secure in our Confi∣dences, as not to be very much upon our Guard, except it be with some very choice and tried Friends: A Man never Rides safe without the Reins in his own Hand; only, the Skill of the Horseman must be shown, in neither letting them hang too slack, nor drawing them too stiff. A Man should never dis∣close all his Thoughts, and Intentions; but, so far as he thinks convenient to communicate his Mind, he should do it with Truth and Sincerity; he must by no means Deceive or Ensnare his Friend, and therefore let him tell True; but he must take heed too, that he be not Deceived or Abused Himself, and therefore he should take care not to tell All. He should follow that excellent Advice of our Blessed Master; to Marry the Serpent with the Dove; tem∣pering and qualifying that Innocence and Simplicity which restrains a Man from hurting Others, with that Wisdom and Subtlety, which keeps him from injuring Himself; so standing upon one's Guard, and Defending one's Self against the Cunning In∣sinuations, and Treacherous Designs, and unseen Ambushments of our pretending Friends. For Po∣licy and Stratagem is as commendable a Weapon, when used Defensively, as it is Dishonourable and Base, when Offensive. And therefore every Motion should be wary and well-advised; and in our Ad∣vances of Familiarity and Confidence, we must ne∣ver engage so far, as not to secure a Retreat to our Selves, whenever our Inclination shall dispose, or

the Necessity of our Affairs oblige us to it: Nay not only so, It is not enough, that our Retreat be possi∣ble, but it must be safe and easy, without any great Reluctancy in our Selves, or any Damage from Those, in whom we Consided.

On the other hand, we should not so far be con∣sident of our Selves, as to let this grow into Security and Presumption. If we have Friends, though they do not bear our whole Weight, yet it is not convenient to let go our Hold; nor for any Opinion, either of our own Abilities, or the prosperous Con∣dition of our Affairs, to disdain Another's Help, or grow negligent and remiss in our Own Care. And yet this is oftentimes the Case of Men, who think no body so Wise as themselves, or have that Opini∣on of their own Power and Address, to imagine every thing will bow before, and truckle under them; that no body will dare to attempt any thing to their Prejudice or dissatisfaction; and from These fond Possessions, come to abate of their Pains, to despise all Care; and so at last are abominably over∣reached, surprized into Mischief and Ruin, and be∣come a Jest and publick Scorn.

[unspec 6] Another, and That indeed a very important piece of Advice, is,* 1.9 To take every thing in its proper Time, while it is seasonable, and Occasion serves. And in order hereunto, we must be sure to avoid Precipitation, which is a mortal Enemy to Wisdom, the bane and confounder of all good Designs: And a Vice very usual, and much to be seared, among People in heat of Youth, and all others of a warm and sanguine Complexion. And in truth, the knowing how to take every thing in the Nick; to lay hold on every Opportunity and Advantage, and make the best of all times, and all means of Action, is one of the masterly Perfections of a Wise and Dextrous Manager. For we are to consider, that every thing hath its Season, and even the best things,

as we may order them, may be irregular, and out of due Time. Now Hast and Hurry is the most contrary to that good Quality, that can possibly be imagined; for This disorders, and confounds All; and so at last spoils All. You know the common Proverb,* 1.10 Hasty Bitches bring blind Whelps. This Precipitation is usually the Effect of some Passion, which spurs us on too fast, and will not endure to wait till Matters are ripe for Execution;† 1.11 The im∣patience of desire puts us upon hastening, and Hast disor∣ders and undoes all; so that This is always improvident and blind; Hastiness and Anger are the Two things in the World most distant from a Sober and Judicious Mind. Such is the account generally to be given of it; though it cannot be denied, but these Hasty pro∣ceedings are frequently owing to Weakness, and want of Judgment. Now the contrary Vice of Heaviness, and Sloth, and Negligence in our Af∣fairs, which is sometimes mistaken for Solidity, and Thought, and wise Caution, is no less dangerous, and destructive to our Affairs, especially then, when all Preliminaries are adjusted, all Resolutions taken, and nothing remains but the Executive part. For it is well observed, That in Deliberation and Consul∣tation a Man is allowed to spend a great deal of Time, because then every Particular is to be nicely weighed, every Advice canvassed, and out of All compared together, the Best to be pitched upon; but when we come to Action, the case is much other∣wise, for the Mind is then supposed to be settled, and all Doubt over; upon which account it is, that we are commanded by the Masters of Wisdom, to to be Slow in Counsel, and Swift in Execution; to

deliberate at leisure, but to sinish apace. It is true indeed, this Rule is not so universally efficacious, but that sometimes we see Events contrary to it. A Man stumbles upon Success, though he run headlong upon it; and proves as Fortunate in the Event, though the Time he took to consider, was very short; and the Resolves he made, as rash and imprudent, as they were hasty; But this is very seldome seen; and the few Instances we have of it are owing purely to Chance; And Chance is somewhat so di∣stant from the ordinary course of Affairs, that a Man can never depend upon it, or govern himself by such Events. On the contrary, He should take great care, That these lucky Hits, like a winning hand, do not tempt us to run too great a Risque, and venture upon them boldly. For, commonly speaking, Gamesters give out Losers; and all they have to shew for their daring Hastiness, is only That Proverb, Of Resolving in Hast, and Repenting at Lei∣sure; Ruin and a fruitless Remorse being commonly the End of such inconsiderate Undertakings.

These then are the Two Extremes, which like Rocks must be avoided, and with equal care too; for if we Split upon Either, our Affairs will be shipwrack'd and lost. It is as great a Fault to antici∣pate a fair occasion, and snatch it, while it is Green and Crude; as it would be to let it Wither and Rot in our Hands. The Former is a Defect most inci∣dent to Young Men; whose Spirits move briskly, and their Blood boils in their Veins; and whose De∣sires are so eager and impetuous, that they want Pa∣tience, and cannot be content to let Time and Pro∣vidence bring things to Maturity, and work for them; and so these sprightly Men, by starting too quick, run, and catch nothing; The Latter is more proper to Stupid Men, the Cowardly and Irresolute; the Lazy and Unactive. For there is need of a Sprightly and Vigilant Soul to discern and to lay

hold on favourable Junctures; but then at the same time that the Soul must be awake, we must see, that it be not Restless and Impatient. A Man must look before him; descry Opportunities at a distance; keep his Eye constantly upon them; observe all the motions they make towards him; make himself ready for their approach; and, lying thus up∣on the catch, when he sees his time, lay fast hold, and not let go again, till he hath done his Bu∣siness.

[unspec 7] The Seventh Direction I would give at present, * 1.12 is for a Man to govern himself well, and do his Duty to the Two great Disposers, and Superintendants of all Human Affairs; Industry I mean, or which in this place comes to the same thing, Virtue, and For∣tune. It hath long been matter of Controversy, which of These carries the greatest Sway; and the Question never was or will be decided to the Satis∣faction of all People; for some have a greater re∣spect for One, and some for the Other. Thus much at least is past all doubt; that both the One and the Other do a great deal; both have Power and Credit; and both have a Title indisputable to shew for it; for nothing can be more palpably false, than that either of these Two does All, and the other Nothing. Perhaps indeed Matters would go better, if it were not thus; and Men have reason to wish, That the whole Authority were vested in one of them singly. For then we should know what to trust to. Then our Task would be easy, because all our Thought and Diligence would be fixed, and de∣termined to one Object; whereas now we float be∣tween both, the Distraction of the Mind renders our Attempts infinitely laborious and full of hazard; and we can very hardly attend to both, and bring them friendly to conspire together. Daily Experi∣ence proves this Truth to us; for usually those who are very much taken up with the One, disregard

and perfectly despise the Other. Thus the Young and Sanguine, the Forward and Daring Men keep Fortune in their Eye, and lay the main stress there, as you see plainly by their large Hopes, and the mighty Successes they promise themselves in every Undertaking: And Fortune often rewards this Re∣spect they pay her, and declares them her Favourites, by the many Prodigious and most Surprizing things wrought by them. On the Other hand, Men in Years, whose Blood is cold and heavy, and They consequently calm and slow, place all their Expecta∣tions in Industry: And it cannot be denied, but These act the more reasonably of the Two. If a Man were disposed to compare them both together, and observe what can be alledg'd to determine his Choice on either side; we may state the Matter very fairly Thus. He that depends upon Industry, takes the Safest Side, the more Virtuous, and the more Reputable: For admit, that Fortune run coun∣ter, and spightfully defeat all his Diligence; yet is there still this Satisfaction left, that he hath made no false Steps, that he suffered in his proper Post, doing his Duty; and that he hath acquitted himself, as became a Wife and an Honest Man. Those that take the other course, are in great danger of wait∣ing and hoping in vain: But if all should succeed to their hearts desire, yet still this is none of Their doing; nor is there really any Credit or Commen∣dation due to them for it. But indeed, Wisdom takes a middle Course; she advises no Man entirely to devote himself to either of these; and though One may be preferred, yet not to that degree, as to bring the Other into absolute Neglect and Contempt. For since Neither can be excluded from our Affairs, it is fit we should allow Both a place in our Regard; and indeed they are often beholding to one another; and an observing Man will easily discern a great deal of Mutual Assistance, and a very good Understand∣ing

between them. We must take care then to dis∣charge our part to Both, but Both do not challenge our Respects alike. For the Preference is abundant∣ly on the side of Industry; for according to that old Motto,* 1.13 Virtue should lead, and Fortune go along with us.

[unspec 8] There is yet one necessary Caution behind, which is, In all our Behaviour to act with Discretion. For This seasons every Action, and gives it an agreeable Relish. Now Discretion is not any One Particular Quality, but a Large and Comprehensive Virtue; that mingles with every part of our Duty. Indis∣cretion spoils all; and the very best Actions, if taint∣ed with it, lose all their Beauty, and Commenda∣tion. If a Man design an Act of Beneficence or Charity, This is necessary to direct it; for neither all Kindnesses are fit to be done; nor all sorts of Persons fit to receive them. If a Man would vindi∣cate or excuse himself, he must do it discreetly; for there are some ways of Apologizing, which in effect are Bills of Indictment against one's Self; and in∣crease the Suspicion, instead of clearing our Inno∣cence. If a Man would pay Civilities, and appear courteous and well-bred; he must distinguish and moderate himself here too; otherwise he will run into the Excess of Foppery and Affectation; or de∣generate into Clownish Rudeness; and the same may be said of Offering, or Accepting, or any other Instance of Courtesy and Conversation; or indeed of Virtue in general; for without this Prudence, and discreet Managery, even Virtue, and the best Intentions, can never recommend, nay, can scarce justify themselves to the Spectators.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Knowledge of Men and Things.
• * 1.2

  Just Valua∣tion of cm.
• * 1.3

  Quàm necessarium pretia rebus imponere?
• * 1.4

  —Mens sana in Corpore sano.
• * 1.5

  Wise Choice.
• * 1.6

  Consulta∣tion.
• * 1.7

  Sic correcta Marij temeritas gloriam ex culpâ invenit.
• * 1.8

  Moderation between Fear and Assurance.
• * 1.9

  Tge katubg gikd ib Oc∣casions.
• * 1.10

  Canis festinans caecos parit catulos.
• † 1.11

  Nam qui cupit, festinat; qui festinat evertit; unde festina∣tio improvida & caeca; duo adversissima rectae menti Celeritas & Ira.
• * 1.12

  Industry and Fortune.
• * 1.13

  Virtute duce, comite Fortunà.