Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

The Second BOOK.

Containing General Rules and In∣structions for the Study and At∣tainment of Wisdom.

CHAP. I. The first Disposition to Wisdom, Exemption from the Errors and Vices of the World, and from one's own Passions.

THE first step towards the Knowledge of any thing being a distinct and adequate Idea and Comprehension of the Subject to be Treated of, I should, according to this Rule, lay down for the first Rudiment of Wis∣dom, the Knowledge of a Man's Self in particular, and of the Condition of Human Nature in gene∣ral. But This, having been the Subject of the entire First Book, I have Reason to hope is sufficiently

provided for already. All therefore which I think necessary to repeat upon this occasion, is, That every Person who makes Wisdom his Aim and End, ought in the first place to be throughly well ac∣quainted with Himself, and with Mankind. The true Knowledge whereof is a very important and bene∣ficial Study, of wonderful Efficacy and Advantage. For Man is the Subject proper for the Philosophers Consideration; none but the Wise understand it, and every man that does really understand it, is Wise. But at the same time it is a matter of great Intricacy and Difficulty; for Man is extremely addicted to fallacy and disguise; so full of it, as to impose very often, not only upon other People, but upon Him∣self too. Every one takes a pleasure in cheating himself, is industrious to flatter his own Conscience, solicitous to hide and extenuate his own Failings, and diligent to magnify his few commendable Acti∣ons and Qualities; shutting his Eyes, and fearful to see the worst of himself; and therefore, since Sin∣cerity, even at home, is so very little regarded, we cannot reasonably think it strange, that Wisdom is so very rarely to be met with. For how can we expect it should be otherwise, when so very few are perfect, so few indeed give any attention to the ve∣ry first Lesson in this Science, and Men are so far from undertaking to Instruct others, that they are wretchedly Ignorant and take no care of informing themselves! How many profess'd Masters, how ma∣ny zealous Learners do we see in other matters, which are foreign, and of little or no moment, while every body neglects the business which most nearly concerns him; and while he is taken up with other matters abroad, is absolutely in the dark at home! What an Unhappiness! What an exquisite Folly is this! How great a Reproach to the Genera∣lity of Mankind!

Now in order to the being competently skill'd in this point, we should get acquainted with all sorts of Men, Those of the most distant Countries and Cli∣mats, the most differing Tempers and Ages, Con∣ditions and Professions; (in which History and Travelling are very considerable Helps) we should observe their Motions, their Inclinations, and their several Dealings and Behaviour, not only in publick, (for these are full of Artifice, and consequently less improving) but their most secret and reserved Actions, the most natural and freest from Con∣straint, such as may let us into the dark and myste∣rious part of Human Nature, and discover some of the hidden Springs by which Men are moved. And particularly, great regard should be had to those Pas∣sages wherein Mens Interests, or particular Hu∣mours come to be nearly touch'd; because there the Man will be sure to shew himself in his own true Colours.

When these Remarks are made, a man must draw them together, and form some general Notions and judicious Reflections from them. But particularly one must be very careful to descend into Himself, to try and found his own Breast to the bottom; that no lurking Deceit escape him there; but every Thought, and Word, and Action, be justly and nicely weighed.

The Result of such Observations would certainly be, a sad but serious Sense, how miserable and weak, how defective and poor a Creature Man is, on the one hand; and yet how vain and arrogant, how proud and presumptuous, how bloated and big with Air and Wind, what a mere Tumour, a Bladder, a Bubble he is, on the other. The former of these Representations will move our Compassion; the lat∣ter will raise our Horrour and Indignation. Now the former Book hath done him right in all these respects, by taking him to pieces, and examining every part

and feature by it self; viewing him in all the diffe∣rent Lights, and taking every Prospect the Picture was capable of being drawn in. So that I shall trouble my Reader no further with any account of this nature at present: But hope he make a good Pro∣ficiency in the business of this Second Book, by the Assistances given him in the First. And in order to it, we will proceed to warn him of the chief Ob∣structions in his way to Wisdom, as They, who build, must first clear the Ground, and remove the Rubbish out of the way.

[unspec 1] The Man, who desires to become Wise, must at the very first entrance into this design, seriously set about, and stedfastly resolve upon delivering, preser∣ving, and guarding himself effectually, from two Evils; which are directly opposite, and irreconcila∣ble Enemies to Wisdom; and such absolute impedi∣ments to our progress in the studies of it, that till They be got over, or taken out of the way, no Ad∣vances can possibly be made. One of these is Exter∣nal, consisting of the Vices, and the Opinions in common Vogue, which, by the advantage of being Popular, spread, and propagate Folly, like a conta∣gious Disease; the other Internal, and consists of a man's own Passions; so that in short, the Two great Adversaries we have to fear, and are most concerned to defend our selves against, are the World, and our Selves. And after such an Advertisement, there needs no more be said to shew, how hard this under∣taking is: What course shall we take to get quit of these two, or how shall we run away from them? Wisdom indeed is difficult and rare; but it is upon this account chiefly, that it is so; This is the trouble∣some part of it; This in a manner the sole Conflict, we have to fear; when once This Combat is won, all the rest is easy, and the Day our own. For the first thing, that can fit, or put us into any Capacity for

Wisdom, must be to get clear of that Evil, which obstructs our whole Design, and will not admit Wisdom to dwell with, or grow near it. Now this is the Benefit my Reader is expected to reap from the First Book, which, as I said, may furnish him with sufficient Instructions for the getting throughly ac∣quainted with the World and Himself; and this Knowledge will possess him with so just a Character of Both, as cannot but assist and lead him on, to Consideration and Care, and teach him to stand upon his guard, and diligently beware of both. Thus there is a strict and natural Connection between the two parts of this Treatise; for the Beginning and First Step of the Second Book, is the End and Fruit of the Former.

[unspec 2] Let us first then say somewhat to that Hindrance, which is External.* 1.1 Now we have heretofore given a large and lively Description of the Temper of the Common People; the strange unaccountable Hu∣mours of That,* 1.2 which is by much the most numerous part of Mankind; and it can be no hard matter to make a Judgment from thence, what monstrous ef∣fects those humours must in all reason be expected to produce. For since the Vulgar are so bewitched with the love of Vanity, since they abound with Envy and Malice; since they are so totally void of Justice, and Judgment, and Discretion; since they are perfectly strangers to Moderation and good Tem∣per; and what sort of Deliberations, and Opinions, and Judgments, and Resolutions, can we suppose them taken up with? How indeed is it possible that they should think, or speak, or act, according to Truth, and good Sense? We have likewise before,* 1.3 in that Chapter which undertook to represent the Misery of Human Nature, given several remarkable, and but too notorious instances of the Faults and Failings, which the generality of the World are guilty of, both in point of Judgment and Choice;

how miserably their Understandings are darken'd, and their Wills depraved; which may very easily convince us, how fix'd, and deeply rooted they are in Error and Vice. To this purpose are those Sayings common among Wise men, That the Greater part is always the worse part of Mankind; There is not one of a Thousand Good: That the Number of Fools is infinite. And that there is very great Danger of Infection in the Croud.

[unspec 3] Upon these accounts their Advice is not only to keep one's self Clear and Free, and have nothing at all to do with such Opinions, and Designs, and Af∣fections, as are popular and in vogue; but, as if all this Restraint were too little, not so much as to ven∣ture your person among the Mob, to decline all manner of Conversation and Familiarity with the Vulgar; since it is impossible ever to approach that diseased part of Mankind, without some taint, some pestilential vapours, such as will certainly bring dan∣ger and detriment to our own Health. So contagi∣ous is the very Breath and Company of the People; so little ought even the wisest and persons best esta∣blished in Virtue and Wisdom, to trust themselves among them. For who indeed is strong enough to sustain the Attack of Vices, when they march up in form of Battel, and charge by whole Troops at once? We see what a world of Mischief one single Example of Avarice or Luxury does; The Conver∣sation of One Effeminate Man softens by degrees and enervates the Minds of them that live with him; One Rich Neighbour kindles our Desires of Wealth; One Lewd Companion strikes as it were his Extra∣vagance and Debauchery into us so forcibly, that we may even feel the Impression; it eats like a Can∣ker, and nothing is so solid, so clean, to be free from the Rust of it. And if this be the Case of par∣ticular Instances, what do we think must the Condi∣tion and the Power be, of those Vices and Disposi∣tions

that are become General, and such as all the world run into with full Cry, and wild Career?

[unspec 4] And yet after all, as necessary as this keeping aloof off from Infection is, the thing is exceeding difficult, and but seldom put in practice. For to follow the beaten Track is something very plausible, and carries a great Appearance of Justice and Goodness, Humi∣lity and Condescension in it. The Road is plain and large, and Travellers are easily seduced into it. Singularity is a By-path, and none but fanciful or conceited men are thought to take it. We go on after our Leaders, like Beasts in a Herd: The Rea∣sonableness, and Worth, and Justice of a thing is rarely examined; but Example and Custom are the moving Arguments; and thus we hurry on, and stumble at the same Stones, and fall upon one ano∣ther in heaps; we press and push forward, and draw whole multitudes upon the same Precipice; and there we fall and perish, merely upon the Credit of those that go before us. Now the Man that would be wise indeed, must take quite contrary Measures. He must receive nothing upon Content and Example on∣ly; but be very jealous and considerate, and suspect every thing which he finds the generality of Man∣kind agreed in, and fond of; and instead of count∣ing Numbers, and practising by the Poll, he must weigh the Goodness of the thing; not suffering him∣self to be deluded with fair Appearances, with gene∣ral Approbations, or common use, or doing as the rest of the world do, but nicely examine the real intrinsick worth of Things and Actions, and resolve to stand alone, where this will not justify his Com∣pliance. Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil, is a ju∣st, a prudent, a necessary Precept; and a most vicious and mistaken Modesty That is, which pre∣vails with us to disobey it. When therefore any one would cut us short, and thinks to knock all our Arguments on the head, by saying, All the world is

of this Opinion, or all the world does thus, a considerate Man will answer to himself at least, I like it so much the worse for that; this is but a very scurvy Caution, for their Approbation makes me suspect it the more. Thus the Wise Phocion, when he saw the whole Auditory highly applaud something he had spoken, turned about, and asked his Friends that stood by, What was the matter; whether he had let fall somewhat which ought not to have been said, or been guilty of some egregious Impertinence, that all the People were so mightily pleased with him. The wisest me∣thod then, is to decline, as much as possibly we can, any Familiarity or frequent Conversation with the People, who are generally foolish, ignorant, and a very odd Medley of Men: But, if our affairs will not permit that, yet at least it must be our constant Care to avoid their received opinions, not to be born down with their Judgments, nor conform our selves to their Temper and Complexion, nor be corrupted by their vicious Dispositions and Practices: But at the same time we live in the world, we must not be of the world. And This indeed is the Reason why Solitude is so much and so earnestly recommended by Philosophers and Wise men; a Solitude, that con∣sists in setting the Soul free, and discarding all popu∣lar Opinions, and reigning Vices; delivering the Mind from the Bondage and Confusion, which Cu∣stom, and Example, and the Common Cry subject it to; that so itmay have leisure to retire into it self, and take its full Range without Interruption or Restraint.

[unspec 5] The other Inconvenience, and fatal Obstruction of Wisdom,* 1.4 is Internal; and as such threatens more imminent Danger, and requires a greater portion of our Care. And This is that Slavery and Perplexity which our own Passions and disorderly Affections put us into. And against These there ought to be a strict and strong guard, to prevent their Tumults

and Insurrections; or rather indeed we ought, if that were possible, to dispossess them quite, that so our Mind might be clean, and open, and unsullied, like a Blank Paper, ready to receive any In∣scription, any Tincture of Wisdom, against which the Passions are formal and declared Enemies, by the Stains and Prejudices they leave upon it. This gave occasion for that Saying of some Wise Hea∣thens, That it was not possible, even for Jupiter himself to be in Love, or to be angry, or affected strongly with any other Passion, and yet to be Wise at the same time. And accordingly both Reason and Revelation in the Ideas they teach us to form of God, represent him void of all Passions, Body, or Bodily Affections; as Infirmities by no means con∣sistent with the Excellencies of an Absolutely Good and Perfect Being. Wisdom is a regular conduct of the Soul; it proceeds in number, and weight, and measure; it is an evenness and smoothness, a sweet and pleasing Harmony of our Judgments and Wills, and well-proportioned Dispositions. A constant health and soundness of the Mind; whereas the Pas∣sions quite contrary, are the Ague-sits of a distem∣pered Soul, the Boundings and Reboundings of Fol∣ly; the wild Skips, and wanton Sallies, and impe∣tuous Emotions, and rash unguided Flights of the Man, without any Aim, or Order, or Measure.

[unspec 6] The Colours, in which the former Book painted our Passions are so black and hideous,* 1.5 that they can∣not but shew us their Deformity, and may create in us a just horror and detestation of them. The Re∣medies and Means for subduing each of these in par∣ticular, will come in more properly in the Third Book, under the Topicks of Fortitude and Temperance. But of those which are general, and our present Bu∣siness, there are several, and of different kinds, some Good, and some Evil. I do not here reckon that Happiness of Constitution and Natural Blessedness,

which renders the Man so well tempered, as to pre∣serve him calm and serene; not subject to any strong Passions, or violent Emotions of Soul; and keeps him in a constant, smooth, even, uniform compo∣sure of Spirit, harden'd and impenetrable, and proof against all Attacks. This indeed is an uncommon Excellency; but it is not so properly a Remedy against Evil, as an Exemption from it; it is not a Medicine or an Instrument of Recovery, but it is an effectual Prevention of Sickness, and the State of Health it self. This therefore falls not within the compass of our Subject and Design in this place, which is to prescribe Remedies truly so called; and of Them I shall propose Four to the Reader's Observation.

[unspec 7] The First, which in truth is not at all advisable, nor hath any real Goodness to recommend it,* 1.6 is a sort of Stupidity or Insensibility of Mind, which does not feel, nor apprehend at all. A Brutish Apa∣thy, incident to mean Souls, such as are either per∣fectly seared and dead, or have their Apprehensions in great measure blunted and dulled; a sort of Cal∣lousness and Crust upon the Sensitive parts; a Spi∣ritual Lethargy, and constant Heaviness, which though it have some Air of Health and Ease, yet what we think so is in effect its Disease. For there can be no such thing as Wisdom and Constancy, where there is no Knowledge, no Sense, no Activity at all. And therefore this does not cure the Distem∣per, but only render the Patient insensible of his Illness. But yet This, as bad as it is, is better, and much rather to be chosen, than the knowing, and feeling, and suffering ones self to be vanquished and preyed upon by the painful Impression: What Ho∣race says of his Writings, is thus far applicable to the Affections and Follies of Mankind;

* 1.7—I had rather be a little Wit, So my dull Verse my own dear Self delight, Than know my Faults, be vex'd, and dye with Spight. Creech.

[unspec 8] The Second Remedy is very little or nothing better than the Disease it self, and yet it is more used, * 1.8 and oftner applied, than any other. This is, when a man vanquishes one Passion, and stifles it by the more prevailing Force of another. For the Passions are never equally poized, but one or other of them will always cast the Scales. Now we are frequently guilty of a great Error, in attributing things to Virtue and Wisdom, in which They never had the least hand or concern, but they are purely the Effects of Passion. And it happens very well for Persons under these Circumstances, when those which ride highest, and have got the Dominion in their Souls, are not of the worst sort of Passions.

[unspec 9] The Third, which is indeed a Good Remedy, though not the very Best,* 1.9 is a matter of Prudence and Artifice, by which a Man steals out of the way, runs, hides himself, and keeps at a distance from the Occasions and Accidents, which he knows, or hath found by Experience, apt to provoke and put him out of Temper; such as wake the sleeping Lion, and give Fire to his Passions. This is a Study, and a Knack men have of putting themselves upon a posture of Defence; or rather of keeping good Out∣guards: upon the alarming whereof they may have leisure to retreat, or so to secure the Passes and Ave∣nues, that the Approach of Evils may be intercepted

and prevented. Of this kind is that common Story of a Prince, who immediately broke a Rich Cup that was presented to him, for fear it should provoke his Anger, if by Chance or Negligence it should happen to be broken by another hand. The proper and constant Prayer of these men is, Lead us not into Temptation. Thus it is, that Men resolve against Ga∣ming, who feel themselves unable to command their Temper, and cannot play without Passion. And thus Men of nice Honour, and prone to Anger, de∣cline Disputes in Company, and crush the very first motions to Strife in the birth. For when a man is once engaged, it is difficult to make a good Retreat; and the After-Game of Wisdom and Discretion is very hard and hazardous to play. In the Begin∣ning we manage things as we please, and have them at our mercy; but when once the fire is kindled, and we are grown warm, they manage and carry Us how and whither they will. It is certainly much easier wholly to decline a Passion, than to keep it within just bounds and measures; and that which few can moderate, almost any body may prevent. And the Reason is plainly this; Because all things in their infancy and at first, are small and feeble, flexible and tender. But the misfortune is, that while they are weak we are not sensible of the Dan∣ger; and when they are grown stubborn and strong, we are not capable of a Remedy. This any man may observe in common Conversation. How ma∣ny instances could every one of my Readers recol∣lect of persons, who upon every slight occasion fall into Quarrels, commence Law-suits, engage in Di∣sputes and Controversies, and are at last forced to give out with Disgrace; come to shameful and dis∣honourable Accommodations; take Sanctuary in mean and equivocating Interpretations; belye and contradict themselves; betray their want of Ho∣nesty; go against their own Sense; palliate, and

disguise, and colour over matters of Fact; which are all of them miserable Refuges, and Remedies ten thousand times worse, than the Disease they would cure? In all these cases it were much better not to begin at all, than to bring matters to such a Conclusion. For, for want of timely Prudence and good Conduct, they fall into want of Integrity and Good Sense. And so in all their Proceedings they run directly counter to that wise Advice of Bias, which is to set out and undertake things coolly and considerately; but, when we are well satisfied of the Justice and Reasonableness of our Enterprize, then to prosecute it warmly and vigorously. It is in this manner, that those foolish Men expose them∣selves, who out of a vicious Easiness and Complai∣sance, are ashamed to deny any request made to them; but after this mighty Liberality in promising, are every whit as apt and easy to break their word again, and prostitute that Honour vilely, which was engaged with so much Levity. And therefore in all our Affairs, in all our dealings and Conversation with men, nothing is more requisite, than to look before us, to make true steps at first, and be well advised, before we begin.

[unspec 10] The Fourth, and infinitely the Best Remedy of all is a stanch and Vigorous Virtue;* 1.10 a Resolution and Firmness of Mind, by which a man is qualified to look any Accidents in the Face; to meet and come up close to them, without Starting, or Disorder, or Confusion; to enter into the Lists, and encounter them gallantly. This is a brave, a noble, a glori∣ous Impassibility indeed; which sets the Mind above Trouble, directly contrary to the first of these Re∣medies, which consisted in an impenetrable Tem∣per, a heavy, sottish, sensless Stupidity. And there is nothing will Contribute more to the working us up into this generous Gallantry of Spirit, than the furnishing and forming our Judgments with good

Instructions; digesting them thoroughly, and ap∣plying them Seasonably; but especially the fortify∣ing our selves with Thought and Deliberation, that so we never fall under the Terrors of Surprize; but be prepared to defend our Post, whenever they at∣tack us. For Reasoning and Discourse masters the Passions, and Premeditation is the thing, which har∣dens the Soul, and renders it proof, against all the Evils that would soften and subdue it. And one great help towards the preserving us impregnable, will be a serious Reflection upon what hath already been delivered in the foregoing parts of this Book; For the proper method of calming and sweetning the Passions, is to get well acquainted with the na∣ture of them; to examine them nicely, and know exactly, what Influence they have upon Us, and what Command we have over them. But especially we should guard our selves against too easy a Credu∣lity, and not suffer any rash Surmise or Opinion, to foment or inflame our Passions; for Falshood, and Folly, and Uncertainty, transport Fools only; a Wise Man will weigh things calmly, and coolly, and suffer himself to be carried no farther than ma∣ture Judgment, and measured Truth lead him: For Reason is his only Guide, and every Impression is brought to this Standard, and strictly examined by it. But of This, besides the light given us already, we shall be more fully and particularly qualified to make a Judgment, both from what follows in this Second Book, and from the Instructions to be added in the Third, when we come to enlarge there upon the Virtues of Fortitude and Temperance.

[unspec 11] But above all other Passions, That of Self-Love, and Presumption, and inordinate Fondness of our own Imaginations, Opinions, and Actions, requires a strict and watchful Eye, and the strongest guard we can pos∣sibly set over it. For this is the very Pest of Man∣kind; the most mortal and irreconcilable Enemy to

Wisdom; the very Corruption and Gangrene of the Soul, by which it mortifies, and grows absolutely incurable. This swells us with vain Conceits, and false Satisfactions and Confidences; we make undue estimates of our selves, and are marvellously pleased with our own supposed Sufficiency; nay we perfect∣ly Idolize, fall down and worship our Selves, and neither believe, nor hear, any body but our Selves. Now indeed we can never be in worse hands than our own, and that Prayer of the Spaniards is a very significant and sensible one, O God preserve me from my self. Such Presumption and foolish Self-Love proceeds from mistake; and Ignorance, is not so truly the Mother of any Devotion, as of this. Were men but duly sensible, how weak and wretched, how impotent and little, how full of Infirmities and Er∣rors, Human Nature is in general; and were each Man duly so of his own personal Defects and Frailties in particular,* 1.11 that Divine Counsel of not being wise in our own Conceits, would be much better obeyed: And obeyed it is necessary it should be; for till we are free of this Vanity, we can never arrive at true and sound Wisdom. It stops our Ears against all Advice and Instruction, and suffers us not to see our own Wants, nor the Abilities of others to direct and improve us. Honesty and Integrity, Modesty and Diligence, a meek and teachable Temper, a serious, and hearty, and humble acknowledgment of our Deficiency; These are not only the first and surest Steps to Virtue, but the greatest Evidence of a solid Judgment, a clear Understanding, a rightly-disposed Will, and unbiassed Affections; and consequently, a most hopeful and promising, as well as it is an indispensably Requisite Preparation, to the Study and Attainment of Wisdom and Goodness.

CHAP. II. An entire Liberty of the Mind; The Se∣cond Predisposition, requisite in order to Wisdom.

[unspec 1] THE other Disposition to Wisdom, which is in truth a natural Consequence and Improve∣ment of the former, is (after we have delivered our selves from the Bondage and Captivity of Popu∣lar Opinions from without, and our own Passions from within) to attain to a full, entire, and gene∣rous Liberty of Mind; and this is of two sorts, ac∣cording to the two great Faculties concerned in the Pursuit of Wisdom, implying First, a Liberty of Judgment, and then a Liberty of the Will.

The Former of these, which regards the Judg∣ment, consists in considering, judging, and exami∣ning all things; yet not Tying ones self up to any, but remaining still free, and at ones own disposal; of a large universal Spirit, open and ready to hear any thing that shall be offered. This is the highest pitch of Soul, the most peculiar and distinguishing Priviledge of a truly Great and Wise Man; but such a one I confess it is, as all People are not ca∣pable of understanding, and much less still of at∣taining to it. Upon which account I think my self obliged to establish this Point, against the Objecti∣ons of those Vulgar Souls, which are not of Capa∣city large enough for true Wisdom.

And first of all, to prevent all Mistakes and un∣reasonable Cavils upon Words, I will explain the Terms made use of here, and give the true meaning

of them. Now this Description consists of Three things, which mutually Produce, and Support one another. And these are, Judging every thing, being Wedded or tied up to Nothing, and preserving a Largeness of Soul, and being ready to hearken to any thing that shall be offered.

By Judging in the first of these Particulars, it is plain I cannot mean Resolving, Determining, or Po∣sitively Affirming; because this would imply a di∣rect Contradiction to the Second Branch of the De∣scription. And therefore no more can possibly be understood by it, than Examining and Weighing all matters that come before us; putting the Argu∣ments for either Side of the Question into the Ba∣lance, to see which Scale Preponderates, and where the Merits of the Cause lie; that by this means the Truth may, after long and diligent Disquisition, at last be clearly made out.

Then again, By not espousing, or being bound up to any thing, I do not intend stopping short of the Truth, affecting Uncertainty, and floating in the Air; sometimes talking and acting one way, and sometimes the direct contrary; and so never proceed∣ing or resolving any thing after such Deliberations as are requisite for a Man of Constancy and Prudence, nor venturing to Act, because he cannot be positive, that his Judgment is right; For I would have my Philosopher conform to the Customs of the World, and in all the external and common Passages of Human Life, act like other Men. The Rules pre∣scribed here have nothing at all to do with any Man's Commerce or outward Behaviour; their Bu∣siness is only to regulate the Mind; and to set the Thoughts and Judgment right within. Nay, and even in this Inward Regulation too, I am content, that Men should readily assent to probable Evidence; That they should stick to that side, where they find the greatest Appearance, of Honesty and Justice,

of Convenience and Advantage. But still that This should be done with some sort of Modesty and Re∣serve; avoiding all Positiveness, and Stiffness; all indecent Censures and Contemptuous Usage of those who think otherwise: Treating the Contrary Opi∣nions, be they never so distant, be they New, or Old, with Candour and Caution; disdaining no∣thing that can be offered, but ready and content to hear the Arguments of those that oppose us. Nay, not only content, but desirous, that they should op∣pose us, and alledge whatever they have to say against our Notions; Because This will put us upon a more Accurate Exercise of the First of these Qua∣lifications, and oblige us to consider and weigh things more cautiously.

Now these Three Qualities I affirm to preserve, and mutually to support each other; For He that examines things carefully and without Passion, will find somewhat of Reason and Probability on every side; so much at least as will preserve him, not only from Rashness and Precipitation, but from Perem∣ptoriness and Obstinacy; and this puts the Mind in that State of Ingenuity, and Indifference, which I mean by Openness, and Universality of Soul. Whereas on the contrary, the Man who fixes abso∣lutely, hath cut himself out from farther Examina∣tion, he is fasten'd down to the Notions already en∣tertained by him; and makes himself of a Party, resolved to maintain his Opinion, in despight of all Sense and Reason to the Contrary.

Simple and Credulous and Foolish Men are de∣fective in the First of these Qualifications; Opinia∣ters, and Dogmatical Arguers are faulty in the Se∣cond Point; and both the one and the other Sort, when they turn factious, and espouse a Party, offend against the Third. But a Philosopher indeed, whose only aim is Truth, and whose Pursuits of it are re∣gular and discreet, is Wise, and Modest, and Mo∣derate,

and so an exact Observer of all these Rules.

It is farther necessary, for the giving a true State of the Matter I am now upon, to add, that by the All things to be nicely examined, and the No one thing to be resolutely espoused, I mean such Objects only, as are merely humane, and Matters proper for a Philosophical Enquiry. So that This Direction must by no means be thought to concern Revealed and Divine Truths. For These we are obliged, not in Duty only, but by the strictest Reason too, to re∣ceive, with an entire submission and most profound humility. These are not Matters for Discussion and Controversy; we have nothing to do here, but to bow down the Head and Worship; to restrain the Insolence of Reason, when it would sawcily pry into the Ark; to check and captivate our Minds, and resign our Understandings to the Obedience of Faith. But, these Religious and Sacred Objects ex∣cepted, none of the rest need disdain to come within those Conditions, and ought not to be received up∣on easier terms.

This short Exaplanation of the Terms might per∣haps suffice for Men of Equity and Good Sense, and save me the Trouble of any farther Enlargement; but because I see plainly that there are a Party of Men in the world, of a positive, fierce and domi∣neering Spirit, who are for leading all Mankind after them in a very Magisterial manner; and, ha∣ving first inviolably engaged in some particular Prin∣ciples and Opinions themselves, take the Confidence to expect, that every Body else should come in up∣on Their Authority; and for that reason will not endure any thing that looks like asserting Liberty of Thinking; In opposition to these stiff, assuming Gentlemen; and to prevent, or at least to defeat their Outcries upon this Occasion, I think my self under some necessity to prove, and confirm what

hath been here advanced; and will therefore consi∣der each Branch of this Proposition distinctly, as the parts lye before us.

[unspec 2] The First of These is Judging every thing; which is the peculiar Character of the Wisest and most ex∣alted Understandings, The proper Office of a Man; the most natural, most becoming employment of a Rational Soul. To what purpose, I would fain know, were those Noble Faculties of Discourse gi∣ven us; why have we that penetrating Wit, that Discerning and Acute Spirit? Is it to build Castles in the Air with, and feed our selves with Extrava∣gant Fancies, or to lavish it away upon useless Vani∣ties, and Trifles, as the greatest part of Mankind do? Eyes certainly were made to take Advantage of the Light; and these Powers to exert themselves in that Judicial Authority, which this Superinten∣dant of the lower world, hath over the Works of Nature and Providence. To entrench upon this Prerogative, were to maim his very Essence; to unman, and to degrade him into Beast. And to exercise this Right is the Property of a Man, and to do it in an Eminent and Uncommon Manner, is the very Mark and Distinction of a Wise Man. If then the Neglect of this Power be so great a Viola∣tion of the Nature and Privileges of Mankind in general, the giving up an Original Right, which ought not by any means to be parted with; how much more inexcusable is it in a Wise-man, who is so much better qualified for it, and hath stronger pretensions to that Authority, than those of meaner Abilities can have? It is therefore, in my Appre∣hension, a most amazing thing, that so many per∣sons, even among those, who either have, or at least set up for Learning and Good Sense, should of their own accord give up so just a Right, and tamely submit to what comes next; nay, approve whatso∣ever hath the least Colour of a Probability; or per∣haps

nothing but Custom and common Credit to keep it in Countenance; without ever going about to call the Cause, and examine whether there be any Merits in it or no. Nay, not only to submit, but to think themselves bound to do so; and that they are not at liberty to satisfy their own Reason. What a Horrible Indignity, what a Degradation of Humane Nature is This? In other Cases we find them bold and assuming, extremely jealous of their Honour, and tenacious of their Privileges: But here they are despicably tame, and poor-spirited, which is the justest, the most indisputable, the most inherent Property of any that belongs to them.

'Tis certain, that there can be but One Truth, but Falshood is infinite: A Thousand differing Judg∣ments upon the same Thing, and but One of all these in the right; and shall I in the midst of all this Doubt and Confusion, be forbidden to use the Means God hath put into my hands, for the finding out which That is? Shall it be thought Taking more upon me than becomes me, if I endeavour to disco∣ver the best Appearance of Truth, or Equity, or Profit, or Convenience, for a Rule and Measure to my own Actions? Is it possible to suppose, that a∣mong the many disagreeing, nay opposite Laws and Customs of the World, none but Ours should be good for any thing? Are all Mankind out of their Senses, and hath every other Nation taken wrong Measures? Who can have the Confidence to assert this? Or who makes any Question, but other Coun∣tries are even with us, and think every whit as mean∣ly of Our Constitutions, as we do of Theirs Nay, there is no dispute, but this very Person, whoever he be, that is so blindly fond of his Native Man∣ners, would have had the same partial Liking for those of any other place, where it had been his For∣tune to have been born and bred: He would have been as warm in preferring Those, above such as

he now thinks best, for no other reason 'tis plain, but because he hath been used to them.

If any Man shall venture to assert the Contrary, I must beg leave at least to answer him; that This Liberty of Judging is a good Rule however for all Foreigners to make Use of; that so They by the Practice of it may convince themselves, how much Our methods of Living excel Theirs. This he must grant me sure; and if he do, it will follow, that a Wise Man will think it advisable to do this upon All Occasions; and pass Sentence upon nothing, till he have allowed it a fair hearing, and weighed the Matter impartially. To be led thus like Oxen, and follow the Herd, is fit for none but Brutes, or Men but one Remove above them. I would by all means have a man behave and express himself, and make his Figure in compliance with the rest of the World; but I would not have him conform his Judgment to Theirs, nay I would have him even sit in Judgment upon Theirs. What Privilege do you leave the greatest Philosopher above the most ignorant Clown, if the noblest part of him, his Mind, shall be en∣slaved to common Vogue? Methinks the World should be very well satisfied with a Man's Compli∣ance in outward Behaviour: But all Within is my Own; And what hath the World to do with my Thoughts? They shall give Rules if they please to my Tongue, and my Hand; but my Mind, by their good Leave, is out of their Jurisdiction, and is ac∣countable to another Master. The Liberty of the Mind is what no body can actually take away; and if any Attempt it, they are of all Tyrants and Usurpers, the most unreasonable, the most insupportable. Every Wise Man will be sure to be tender of it, and offend in neither Extreme, for he will neither endure to part with his own Freedom, nor offer to invade any other Man's.

[unspec 3] Now I own, that while a Wise Man asserts this Liberty to himself, it cannot be expected, that he should be always of a piece: For at this rate his Hand and his Opinion, his Body and his Mind will be frequently put upon contradictions to one ano∣ther; and there is no avoiding it: because Prudence governs his outward Actions, and private Judgment the Sentiments of his Soul. So that here are two different Characters to be maintained, and he must play both, or be unjust either to the World, or to himself. The Common Remark, that all Mankind act a part upon this Stage of the World, is as strictly true of the Wisest Men, as of any others whatso∣ever: for they are quite other sort of persons within than they appear to the Spectators; and if they should not play thus, but shew themselves without any manner of disguise, the difference would never be endured, all their Behaviour would be so particu∣lar: And yet at the same time were their real Opi∣nions in agreement with their Practice, this would involve them in so many Errors and Corruptions, that they would not be able to endure themselves. Many Compliances must be indulged out of Respect to the Opinion of the World, and the Laws and Cu∣stoms, which prevail abroad; and particularly, in the places where we dwell: But then a man owes it to himself too, not to make These the Standard of his Opinions, but form Them upon the Dictates of Nature, and the Rules of Universal Equity and Reason. And he who does thus, must content him∣self with many things which he does not strictly ap∣prove; and while he lives among Men, must act as They do, but with this Reserve to himself, that these things are not done by him, in the Quality of a Wise Man, but merely under the general Character of a Man, and a Member of Society. Thus He in his Actions, will be like Cicero in his Expressions; who declared he referred the Usage of Words to the Peo∣ple,

but the proper meaning of them he reserved the right of judging in to himself.

To instance now in a few particulars; and those some of them very frivolous, and of little or no Consequence. I make no Scruple to pull off my Hat in Civility and Deference to a Man of Quality, because this part of the World express their Respect that way; but at the same time I am free to think, the Eastern Custom better, who express their Reve∣rence by laying their hand upon their Breast; and never hazard their health, nor expose themselves to any of the other Inconveniences incident to frequent Uncovering of the Head. So again, were I an In∣habitant of the Oriental parts of the World, I would eat my Meals upon the ground, or leaning, or ly∣ing along, as they do, and as great part of the World did heretofore, particularly the Jews, as we find by the Description of our Lord's last Supper; but still I could not forbear in my own private judg∣ment, preferring the sitting upright at Table, as our present manner is, for the much more commodious way of Eating. Again, to mention a Matter of somewhat greater Importance, I am satisfied, that the Dead Bodies of my Friends should be interred, and given as a Prey to the Worms; but still I can∣not but think the old way of burning, and preserving their Ashes in Urns, much more cleanly, and more noble; that Fire is more respectful than Putrefaction and Stench; an Element, which even Religion hath given some Countenance to, by commanding the Remainders of the Paschal Lamb heretofore to be burnt: But what can we do worse than to cast our Friends to rot in the ground, and be eaten by Ver∣mine and Insects; an Indignity, which to Me seems fit to be offered, only to those Scandalous Wretches, who dye by the Hands of Common Executioners; but the Remains of Persons of Honour and Virtue (in my poor Apprehension) should be otherwise treat∣ed.

For of the five several ways by which dead Bodies are capable of being disposed of, (the com∣mitting them to the mercy of the four several Ele∣ments, or suffering them to be devoured by Beasts;) that of Burning seems to me much the most eligible.

Once more. I am well enough pleased to have the Wise Man of my forming look out of Countenance, and take care to decline and conceal every thing that passes for Immodest in the Esteem of the World; and must have a very ill Opinion of him, should he do otherwise: But then I desire he should be satisfied, that this is due from him in regard to the Customs and common Sentiments of other people; not to any shame in the Nature of the Things them∣selves. For Nature, that is, the God of Nature, never made any thing which was reproachful, and these Ignominies are purely accidental; the product of Sin, which is the Greatest Enemy and Corrupter of Nature. Even Religion it self, which is much more Chaste and Reserv'd than Philosophy, assures us, that while Man continued in his Original Inno∣cence and Perfection, there was no such thing as Shame; but That and Guilt entred the World at once.

I comply with the Mode of my own Countrey, in point of Cloaths and Dress; and so I would have gone Naked too, if my Lot had cast me in a Coun∣trey where it is usual to do so. But to Me both these Fashions appear so inconvenient, that, were I left to my own Choice entirely, I should do neither. The manner of those Nations, which use some One slight Garment, plain and light, without Constraint, or Ceremony, or Great Expence, is much the best in my apprehension. For the multitude of Cloaths, and the different Sorts of them, but espe∣cially the Vanity and abominable Extravagance the World is guilty of in them, is a thousand times worse than going Naked. These Instances I content

my self with the mention of at present; my Reader may multiply them to himself at pleasure, upon Oc∣casion of the infinite Variety of Laws and Customs, and Modes, and Matters of Fact; and the as great Variety in Opinions too, and contests in Matter of Right, and what is fit to be done, as well as what is actually done.

[unspec 4] If any shall suppose me in the wrong, as to the foregoing Instances, or object against this Liberty in general, as an Indulgence of dangerous Conse∣quence; That by this means mens minds will never settle, but they will be eternally lost in a Wood, and fill their heads with idle and phantastical Notions: I answer, as to the former part, which relates more immediately to my self; that it is very possible I may lye under a mistake in some or all of those Cases; but then it argues great Confidence thus to charge any man with being in the wrong; for such a one does in effect assume to himself the knowledge of Exact Truth, and seems to say, that He is Ma∣ster of it, though others be not. Nor should I much be mortified, though the Charge were true: for the not hitting upon the Right, is no certain Argument, that a man judges amiss. For This con∣sists in not giving Arguments their due weight, not confronting them fairly, nor holding the Scales even; not measuring by the Level and Standard of Uni∣versal Reason, and Nature in her primitive Per∣fection. Now a man may discharge the examining part very faithfully and diligently, and yet he may not attain to the Truth notwithstanding. But, to deal plainly, I give no Credit to any thing till it be proved to me. If the Objector brings me stronger and more weighty Reasons against my Opinion, than any I have to urge in defence of it, I bid him heartily welcome; and shall thank him for the op∣portunity which his Contradiction gives me, to exer∣cise this Judicial Authority with so much greater

accuracy. I only take up with my present Thoughts, till better Information give me Cause to change them; and therefore they are only upon good li∣king; ready to be dismissed, when more rational ones may succeed in their stead.

But, as to the more general part of the Objecti∣on, which regards the dangerous Consequences and pernicious Effects of such a Liberty; besides what hath been urged already, and will be more at large hereafter, (That the Rule, by which our Judgments are to be directed, is Nature and Universal Reason, which so long as we keep close to, we are secure from Error:) the Second Branch of this Judicious Liberty, will provide us with Remedies against this supposed Mischief; and That is what I shall now apply my self to treat of particularly and fully.

[unspec 5] The Other branch then of this Absolute Liberty of Soul, consists in a sort of Indifference, and a Suspending one's Judgment and Final Resolution. By This the Wise Man preserves his Temper; his Affections are not engaged, and so he can consider every thing without Heat or Passion: He is not at all provoked by Opposition, not staked down to any one Notion; but keeps an Ear always open for the Contrary Party, and is ready to receive either the Truth, or that which seems to make a nearer Ap∣proach, and carry greater Resemblance to it, than the Ideas he hath entertain'd already. When he seems most determined, his secret Sense goes no far∣ther, than This is my present Opinion; and I have reason to embrace it above any other: but still he can hear it contradicted without any Disorder, and satisfy him∣self to know all that can be said against it; and if what is offered preponderates, he makes no scruple to change his Mind; and constantly, even of That Opinion which stuck last by him, he goes no farther in vindication, than that possibly there may be some other better grounded, but this is the Best that he

hath met with. Now this Suspension and Indiffe∣rence I speak of, is built upon several famous Maxims entertained and propagated by the Greatest Philo∣sophers, and likewise upon the Freedom they used in their Writings and Behaviour. For this Quality must be confess'd to have been the concurrent Practice, and avowed Principle of Wise Men in all Ages; the Most, and most conspicuous among them have made no scruple openly to confess their Ignorance, and their Doubts; saying, That all Nature was full of Dif∣ficulties and Dilemma's; That nothing was more certain than Uncertainty; That there was scarce any thing so plain, but an Ingenious Man might bring plausible and al∣most equal Arguments for Either side of the Question; and a thousand other such Sayings; by which they remarkably argued a distrust of their own Judgments. The rest of them, though upon some occasions they have proceeded somewhat dogmatically, and deli∣vered their Minds boldly and positively; yet seem rather to have dissembled their Doubts, than not to have had any; and to put the best face they could upon the matter, that the World might see how far their Wit would carry them, in the Search of Truth; a Thing* 1.12 which Learned Men seem rather to have fra∣med an Idea of to themselves, than to have known her as she is. For after all their boasts of attaining her, their Courage fails them at last, and the Things ut∣tered by them they dare not venture to bestow any more honourable Titles upon, than that of Proba∣bilities, and Appearances of Truth; and while they represent them variously, sometimes in one prospect, and form; and sometimes in another; by Questions, and Problems, and Ambiguous Disputes; as if their design was rather to enquire, than to teach; and that they sought Information themselves, while they

pretend to give it to others; from all this I say, and the whole current of their Style, we may reasonably gather, that they wrote and spoke, not so much with a design to establish a Notion, or render it un∣questionable, as for Diversion, and to Exercise their Wits; as one says, We cannot be sure what their opinions were, or that they really believed their own Writings, for indeed* 1.13 they seem not to have designed we should gather their Sense of things, so much as that we should observe and admire their Parts and Skill, by those Trials, which the nicety and difficulty of their Subject put them upon. And who can ever persuade himself, that Plato intended his Republick and fanciful Ideas should ever pass for Current Doctrine; or that Pytha∣goras in advancing his Numbers, and Epicurus his Atoms, spoke their own real Opinions, and such as they thought were weighed and measured Truths? They pleased and entertained their own Minds with these nice Speculations, but† 1.14 the Notions were owing more to the Fruitfulness of their own Inventions, than to any strength of Proof, or force of Knowledge. And in∣deed they may seem sometimes to have gone out of the common road on purpose, and with great Indu∣stry to have sought somewhat of Difficulty, the bet∣ter to amuse the world, by thus concealing the Vanity of the Subjects they were upon, and to furnish mat∣ter for the gratifying their Reader's Curiosity. How wretchedly is Aristotle the very Idol of these Dogma∣tists confounded and at a loss? How inconsistent with himself, and forced sometimes to confess the Impotence of Human Nature, and how short the most inquistive come of the Truth?

[unspec 6] Those, that afterwards signalized themselves by a

more positive and magisterial way of Writing, and from thence got the Title of Dogmatists, were Men of a Pedantick, and presumptuous Temper. They, it is true, condemn and detest this Rule of Wisdom; and were fonder of a Hot-headed peremptory Fellow, though contrary to their own Party and Judgment; than of a peaceable, sedate. and modest Man, who contents himself with Doubting, and declines the pronouncing any thing definitively; that is, in plain English, they esteem a rash Fool, more than a Cau∣tious Wise Man. (Like Women, who take it ill not to be contradicted, and had rather be answered rude∣ly, than not at all. Because they think the Cold∣ness and Indifference of Silence argues greater Con∣tempt and Disdain, than it is possible for the most injurious Language to express.) In which they be∣tray great perverseness and injustice. For what rea∣son can be given, why a Man should not be allowed to suspend his Judgment, and still to deliberate upon things as Doubtful, without venturing to affirm on either side; when They at the same time take a pri∣vilege of determining as They see fit? Is not there the same Equity at least, the same Right for the one, as for the other? and what mighty Crime is it frankly to confess one's self Ignorant, when he is really so; and to say nothing, when he cannot speak with good Assurance, and full Satisfaction?

It is certain, that all Philosophers are agreed so much to our disadvantage, as to pronounce, that we are Ignorant of a great deal more than we know; nay, that our Knowledge is not comparable, not fit to be mentioned in competition with our Igno∣rance. The Causes of which are infinite; for we may be mistaken in the Objects of our Enquiry, by reason of their being too near or too distant; too great or too small; of too long, or too short dura∣tion; and in perpetual Flux and Uncertainty. These Causes of Error proceed from the Object,

but then there are infinite Others owing to our Selves, and our Manner of Perception; which in truth is not yet universally agreed upon, nor perfect∣ly well understood. What we think our selves sure of we do not really know, nor can we be secure of continuing in our present Opinion any time. For how often do we see fresh Arguments extort it from us? or, if our Obstinacy will hold it fast, in despight of all Reasons to the Contrary; yet at least they raise a dust, and disturb us in the Possessi∣on of it. Now I would be glad to know, which way a man shall ever be capable of improving his Judgment, if he fasten himself down to some cer∣tain notions; resolving to look and examine no far∣ther, nor enduring to hear any thing offered in pre∣judice of an Opinion, which he fancieth himself abundantly satisfied in already. The plain Truth is; Men are asham'd of this Suspense I am treating of, because they have a wrong Notion of it. They look upon it as a Sign of Want of Judgment; whereas in reality the Greatest and most judicious Philosophers that ever lived, were the most frank in this Point. The Idea of Positiveness and Presumpti∣on hath taken such fast hold of them, and they think Dogmaticalness and Learning so inseparable, that they are out of Countenance in any case to own their Ignorance, lest This should be thought a Reflection upon their Parts and Attainments. There is no persuading them, that there is a sort of Igno∣rance and Doubt, more Learned, more Generous; and consistent with better Assurance, and more ac∣curate Knowledge, than all Their boasted Science and Certainty. This gave that great renown to So∣crates, and entitled him to the Character of the Wi∣sest Man of his Age: This is the Fruit of Study, and deep enquiry; it is a modest, candid, innocent, and hearty acknowledgement, of the sublime mysterious Nature of Truth; and the Defects and Poverty of

our own Understanding; so weak within, so beset with Mists and Darkness without, and from Both so uncertain, and unsteady in its Resolutions. The Lord knoweth the Thoughts of Man, that they are but vain, says the Psalmist: And another Author, that,* 1.15 The thoughts of Mortal Men are full of Fears and Mis∣givings; their Inventions uncertain, and all their Fore∣casts Dark and Confused. And I, for my own part am so fully possess'd of this Truth, that I have order'd this Motto, I know not: Je ne scay; to be engraved over the Gate of my little House which I built at Condom.

Now there are a sort of Persons, who take it ill, that Men should not submit themselves absolutely, and fix on some certain Principles; which ought, they tell you, never to be examined or controverted at all. Now I allow, that if These be such as mani∣fest themselves to a Man's Reason, they ought to be received; but that merely upon the account of their Reasonableness, and not for the pompous Name of Principles. To impose any thing unconditionally, is Tyranny and Usurpation; and though upon due Consideration, and the Approbation of my own Judgment, I allow them, yet if they will not admit me to try whether they be Sterling or Counterfeit, be∣fore I take them for current Coin; this is a Condition full of Hardship and such as I can never yield to. For who, I would fain know, hath power to give Law to our Thoughts, to enslave our Minds, and set up Principles, which it shall not be lawful to enquire into; or admit any manner of doubt concerning them? I can own no such Power in any but God; and He hath it upon the account of his being Truth it self; the Supreme Spirit, and the only Principle

and Source of all things: which makes it as reasona∣ble to believe Him upon his bare word, as it is, not to believe other people barely upon Theirs. For this Foundation of our Belief being One of his Incom∣municable Perfections, it will unavoidably follow, that no other thing is injured or disparaged, by out refusing the same entire Resignation to it, and chal∣lenging our Right of Examining, before we yield our Assent.

If a Man requires my Belief to what are com∣monly stiled by the Name of Principles, my Answer shall be the same with that of a late Prince to the se∣veral Sects in his Kingdom, Agree among your selves first, and then I will give my Consent too. Now the Controversies are really as great about these Princi∣ples, as they are concerning the Conclusions advanced upon them; as many doubts upon the Generals as the Particulars; so that in the midst of so many contending Parties, there is no coming in to any One, without giving offence, and proclaiming War upon all the rest.

They tell us farther, that it is a horrid uneasy state of Mind, to be always thus upon the Float; and ne∣ver coming to any setled Resolution, to live in Eternal Doubt and Perplexity of Thought; nay, that it is not only painful, but very difficult, and al∣most impracticable, to continue long in such Un∣certainty. They speak this, I suppose, from their own Experience; and tell us what they feel them∣selves: But this is an Uneasiness peculiar to foolish and weak people. To the Former, because Fools are presumptuous, and passionate, and Violent espousers of Parties and Opinions; full of Prejudices, and strong Possessions; fierce Condemners of all that differ from them; never yielding the Cause, nor giving out the Dispute, though they be really con∣vinced; and supplying the want of Reason by Heat and Anger, instead of ingenuous Acknowledgments

of their Error. If they find themselves obliged to change their Opinion, you have them then as peremptory and furious in their new Choice, as ever they were in their first Principles; in short, They know not what it is to maintain an Argument, without Passi∣on; and when they dispute, it is not for the sake of Truth or Improvement, but purely for Contra∣diction, and the Last Word, and to assert their own Notions. These Men I make no Scruple to call Fools; for in truth they know nothing; not so much as what it is to know; so exceeding pert and confident are they; and insult as if they carried Truth about in their Pockets, and it was their own incommunicable Property.

As for Men of Weak Judgments, and such as are not able to stand upon their own Legs; it is very necessary they should not be left alone, but seek a Support from persons of better and more discerning Abilities: But These are not concerned in my pre∣sent Rule; it is their Misfortune to be born to Sla∣very, and out of all Capacity to enjoy the Freedom I am treating of.

But as for Wise Men, who are qualified for it, Men of Modesty and Reserve, and prudent Candor, It is the most composed State of Mind that can be; and puts us into a Condition of Firmness, and Free∣dom, of Stable and Uninterrupted Happiness.* 1.16 We are so much less under Constraint than other Men, by how much more our Minds enlarge themselves, and the Liberty of judging is preserved entire. This is a safe course to steer, and keeps us off from many dangerous Rocks and Shelves; which Warmth, and Rashness, and a Positive conceited Humour Drives Men upon. It delivers us from the vain prepossessions of Fancy,

and Popular Mistakes; from the Precipitation of thinking wrong at first, and the Shame of retract∣ing when we come to think better afterwards; from Quarrels and Disputes, and engaging in, or be∣coming offensive to Parties: For, take which side you please, you are sure to have a great many against you; And a Zealous Espouser of any Cause must unavoidably live in a constant State of Wrangling and War. In a Word, This Suspension of the Judg∣ment keeps us snug and under a Covert, where the Inconveniences and Calamities which affect the Pub∣lick will seldom sensibly affect, and scarce can ever involve us; At a distance from those Vices and vehe∣ment Agitations, which ruffle and discompose first Men's own Minds, and then Human Society in ge∣neral. For this Fierceness and Peremptoriness, is at once the Spawn, and the Parent of Pride and In∣solence; Ambition and Vainglory, and Immode∣rate Desires; Presumption and Disdain; Love of Novelty and Change; Rebellion and Disobedience in the State; Heresy and Schism in the Church; Faction, and Hatred, and Contention in Both. These are all of the same lineage and descent. These are begun, fomented, inflamed by your Hot, and Positive, and Opinionative Men; not by the Mo∣dest and Doubting Men, who are cautious and ten∣der, never Over-confident of themselves, and con∣tent to believe, that others are at least in a possibility of being in the right; all which are but so many other Names for Wife, and well-temper'd Men.

[unspec 5] I will advance yet one Step farther, and venture to affirm, that the Temper of Mind I am now re∣commending, is so far from having any ill Influence upon Piety, and Religion, that it is extremely well calculated to serve and promote it; whether we re∣gard the first Propagation among Unbelievers, or Preserving a due Reverence of it, where it is already received. Divinity, and especially that part of it

which is Mysterious and Revealed, tells us plainly, that the Mind must be cleansed and purified, in order to receive those Heavenly Truths, and the Impressi∣ons of the Holy Spirit. That God will not inhabit our Souls, till all Corrupt Opinions as well as Af∣fections are cast out; for, with regard to both, we shall do well to understand those Commands of Pur∣ging away the old Leaven, and putting off the Old Man. From whence we may collect, that the most com∣pendious and successful method of planting the Chri∣stian Religion among Infidels, would be first to esta∣blish them in the Belief of these following Proposi∣tions.

That all the Knowledge of this World hath a large embasement of Vanity and Falshood at∣tending it: That the Generality of Mankind are deluded with fantastical Notions, the Forgeries of their own Brain: That God created Man to the End he might acquaint himself with the Divine Nature and Dispensations, and employ his Soul, and sind his Happiness in these noble Contempla∣tions: But that, in this decayed and declining State, Man is not capable of discovering Truth by his own Strength: That there is consequently a Ne∣cessity of God (who is Truth) manifesting it to him: That God hath in much Mercy vouchsafed to do this by particular Revelations: That it is He who inspires Men with a Desire of Truth, as well as he provides for the Gratifying that Desire: That in order to dispose and qualify our selves for being instructed in the Divine Revelations, we must abandon all worldly and carnal Opinions, and as it were, bring our Minds, a pure blank for God to write his Will in.

When these Points are gain∣ed, and Men are in such preparation to resign themselves to Truth, then it will be time to lay the foundations, and instil some of the first and plainest Principles of Christianity: To shew them,

That these Doctrines came down from Heaven: That

the Person, who vouchsafed to bring them was a faithful Ambassador, and entire Confident of God: One who knew his whole Will exactly: That his Authority was abundantly confirmed, by infinite Testimonies, such as were miraculous, su∣pernatural, and so authentick proofs, because capa∣ble of coming from no other Hand but God's on∣ly.

Thus this Innocent and candid Suspense and Unresolvedness of Mind, would prove a happy In∣strument toward the creating, and first begetting a Knowledge and Belief of the Truth where it is not: Nor would the Essicacy of it be less in preserving it, where it is planted, and hath taken root already. For such a Modest Caution and Deference would undoubtedly prevent all manner of Singularity, and Daring Extravagance in Opinions; but to be sure, it would absolutely put a Stop to Heresies and Pub∣lick Divisions. You will answer me perhaps, that the Temper I am describing, As it is too full of In∣difference to make any Hereticks, So is it too, to make any good Catholicks; and that the Danger of it is, At last degenerating into Scepticism, and want of Zeal for all Religions. Were the Condition of Religion the same in all points with That of other Notions, and Philosophy in general, I allow there would be force in this Objection. But as it is, this is not to argue from my Rules, but to pervert them. I have already said, That Religion stands upon a firm undoubted bottom of its own. That God in this differs from all his Creatures; that what∣ever He says is exempted from the Common Rules of Enquiry; and there can but one Question lye before us, which is, Whether he hath said it or no: When once this appears to us, there is no room for suspending our Judgments any longer; no pretence for Neutrality, or Liberty of Thought, nor a que∣stioning How these things can be? God cannot lye, and we cannot err in believing Him; but for all things

else, the more cautious and curious, and the more loose and disengaged we keep our Mind with regard to Them, the Safer and Easier we shall be. I have made a sort of Digression here, in Honour of the Rule I am recommending, that those who profess themselves Enemies to it may find their great Ob∣jection obviated. In which, if I have trespassed up∣on my Reader's Patience, I ask his pardon: And now to our Business again.

[unspec 7] After these two Qualities, of Judging all things, and fixing our Minds obstinately upon Nothing, fol∣lows the Third Qualification, which is, a Largeness, or Universality of Soul. By Virtue of This the Wise Man casts his Eyes, expands and stretches out his Thoughts over all this vast Universe; with Socra∣tes becomes a Citizen of the World, and takes in all Mankind for his Neighbours and Countrey-men. Looks down, like the Sun, with an equal, steady, and indifferent Eye, upon the Changes and Vicissi∣tudes here below, as things that cannot reach, nor have the power to change Him. This is the Security, the Privilege of a Wise Man, That which resembles him to the Powers above, and renders him a sort of God upon Earth.* 1.17 The Mind of Man (says Seneca) is a great and generous Being, and is bounded no other∣wise than the Divinity it self. The Wise Man is not con∣fined to the same narrow compass with the rest of the World. No Age, no Time, no Place limit his thoughts, but he penetrates and passes beyond them all. How agree∣able is it to Nature for a Man to stretch his Mind infi∣nitely?

For Nature hath formed him to this very purpose, that he should emulate the Gods, and like Them fill his own Infinite Space. This I confess is a sort of Stoical Rant: But thus much is strictly true; That the Bravest, and most capacious Souls are always most of this Universal Temper; as on the Contrary, the meanest and most incapable, are most cramped, have the narrowest Notions; and are always particular in their Judgments of Men and Things, aptest to be positive themselves, and to condemn all that dissent from them. It is in Truth great Folly and Weak∣ness, to imagine that all Nations are bound to think and act just as we do; and, that none live as they ought, who do not comply, and agree in every point with what obtains in our own little Village or our Native Countrey: to think, that the Accidents which happen to Us, are general and in common, and must needs affect and extend to the whole World equally. This Sensless Wretch, when you tell him of Opinions, and Customs, and Laws, directly oppo∣site to those he hath been bred up in; without more ado, condemns and expresses the greatest Detestation of them imaginable, and rails at the people, as Rude and Uncivilized; or else he gives no credit to these accounts, but looks upon them, as the Romantick Tales of Travellers, who take liberties of represent∣ing Foreigners very oddly to those that cannot dis∣prove them; so absolutely enslaved are his Judgment and Assections to his own Municipal Constitutions; so impossible is it, as he thinks, that any but These should be true, or agreeable to Nature; and there∣fore he is verily persuaded they must needs, or at least should be Universal too. It is exceeding com∣mon to traduce every thing with the Reproachful name of Barbarism, that we do not fancy, or see frequently practised at home; and to depend upon the Example and the Ideas of the Persons, with whom we converse, the Notions and the Usage of

our own Countrey, for the Test to distinguish Truth and Reason by. Now This is a mean and brutish de∣basement of the Soul, which we ought to get above; and to enlarge it, by looking no longer upon this Picture of Nature in Little; but take a view of her, as she is drawn at length, and in all her full propor∣tions. The just Idea of Nature is to consider her, as the Common Mother of us all; an Universal Queen, whose Authority and Dominion hath the same limits with the World, (nay, extends to more Worlds, if (as some eminent persons have thought) more Worlds there be). This would inspire us with becoming and Great Apprehensions of her Majesty, and Beauty; There we should behold, as in an ex∣quisite painting, a constant and endless variety of Things, and the longer we gazed, the more our Entertainment and our wonder would be. Infinite Difference in Humours, disagreeing Judgments, Opinions, Customs and Laws; Innumerable Disor∣ders, Commotions, and Alterations in States and Kingdoms; surprizing turns of Fortune in the Af∣fairs of private Men; a World of Victories and Triumphs buried and lost in the Rubbish of Time; many Noble Entries and Processions, Pomps, and Grandeurs utterly vanished; and as if the Courts and Princes celebrated by them had never been at all. And by taking such a prospect as this, and ob∣serving how such different Things and Events, like Colours well mingled, conspire to make up a gene∣ral Portraicture of the World; we shall learn our own littleness, and be surprized at nothing; nor esteem things at all new or incredible; nor be over∣tenacious and positive in vindicating our own, and condemning the Practice of others; since it is not necessary, or at all Essential to Beauty, that all who pretend to it, should be of Our Complexion. And that the Darkness and Difference of other Nations, like the Shades in drawing, make a more grateful

Variety; and are all agreeable and useful, for setting forth the Skill, of the Great, the Divine Artificer, whose Workmanship the Orginal, and the Life is.

[unspec 6] This large, brave, open, and universal Disposition of Mind is indeed scarce to be found, and hard to be compassed; and it is not every common Man, that can aspire to it. Nature hath not cut out all her Children for such an Excellence; no more than she hath qualified them all for that Wisdom and Per∣fection it leads to. But yet there are several Consi∣derations, that may be serviceable in helping us to∣ward it. Such is, First, what you find already insist∣ed upon in the foregoing part of this Treatise, con∣cerning the wonderful Variety,* 1.18 and vast difference observable in men; according to those qualities of Body and Mind, which Nature hath distributed so very unequally among them. Secondly, Those Dif∣ferences Men have made among themselves, by the disagreeing Laws, and Customs, which obtain in se∣veral Nations, and Constitutions. To both which may be added the Strange Variety of Opinions which we find the Ancients received, and delivered down to Posterity, concerning the Age, the Condi∣tion, and the Changes of the World; which yet to Us seem to be very Romantick and Extravagant.* 1.19 The Egyptian Priests told Herodotus, that since the Reign of their first King (from which they reckon∣ed down above Eleven thousand years, and shewed the Statues of Him, and all his Successors, in the draughts taken from the Life) the Sun had changed his course four several times. The Chaldaeans in Dio∣dorus his time, as He and Cicero both say, kept a Re∣gister and Annals, comprehending the Space of Four

hundred thousand years. Plato tells us, that the Ci∣tizens of Sais had Memorials in Manuscript of Eight thousand years standing; and yet they owned, that the City of Athens was built a thousand years before that of Sais. Aristotle, and Pliny, and others, pretend that Zoroaster lived Six thousand years, before Plato was born: Some have advanced a Notion of the World's Existing from all Eternity, that it hath been destroyed and revived again several times, and hath, and will for ever hereafter, go through many such Vicissitudes. Others and Those some of the most renowned Philosophers, have held the World to be a God; but yet of so inferior a Quality, as to de∣rive its Form and present Being from another, and much greater God; or else, as Plato, and some others have been induced by the Motions of it, to affirm, with some degree of Confidence, that it is certainly an Animal, consisting of Body and Spirit: That the Soul or Spirit is lodged in the Centre of the Universe; but though its chief Residence be there, yet it expands it self all over, to the very utmost parts of the Circumference, and that its Influences are conveyed and communicated in Musical Num∣bers: That the several parts of it too, thus animated and directed, as the Heaven and the Stars for in∣stance, are made up of a Body and Soul; and these, though Mortal in respect of their compounded Na∣ture, are yet Immortal by the determination of their Almighty Creator. Plato says, That the World puts on quite another face; that the whole Scene is shift∣ed; that the Heaven and Stars vary so much in their motions, as quite to change sides; so that Be∣fore shall be Behind, and the Point which is East at one time, comes to be the West at another. There hath also been an Opinion of great Authority, much countenanced and promoted by the most eminent Philosophers, suitable to the Power and Majesty of God; and grounded upon fair and probable Rea∣sons,

that there is a Plurality of Worlds; for we see no other thing single or solitary but This, if This be so; All Species are multiplied in numbers, and therefore it is not unlikely, that God hath not left this part of his Workmanship quite desolate and alone; nor exhausted his whole power and skill in the forming of an Individual. Nay, even Divinity assures us, that God can make as many Worlds as he pleases; for upon a Supposition of the Contrary, we must affirm his Power to be but finite, because this World is so. And That were a Notion contra∣dictory to the absolute Perfection of his Nature. Let it also be considered, how much we have learnt toward the Rectifying our Notions of this kind, by the Improvement of Navigation, and the Discove∣ries lately made of a New World in the East and West-Indies. For by this we are plainly convinced, that all the Ancients were in a gross Error, when they imagined that they knew the utmost Extremi∣ties of the Habitable World; and had comprehend∣ed and delineated the whole Extent of the Earth in their Maps and Books of Cosmography, except only some few scattered remote Islands. And that they were perfectly in the dark about the Antipodes; For here, all on a sudden, starts up a New World just like our own Old one, placed upon a large Conti∣nent; inhabited, peopled, governed by Laws, and Civil Constitutions; canton'd out into Provinces, and Kingdoms, and Empires; adorned and beauti∣fied with noble Cities and Towns; larger, more magnificent, more delightful, more wealthy, than any that Asia, Africa, or Europe can shew; and such they have been some thousands of Years. And have we not reason from hence to presume, that Time will hereafter make fresh discoveries of other Lands yet unknown? If P••olomy, and the Ancient Writers were mistaken in their accounts heretofore, I would be very glad to know, what better Security any

Man can have of being in the right, who pretends that all is found out, and fully discovered now? If any man shall take the Confidence to be positive in this point, I shall take my liberty in believing him. Secondly, We find the Zones, which were look'd on as uninhabitable, are very plentifully peo∣pled. Thirdly, We find by experience, that the things which we profess to value our selves most up∣on, and pretend to have had the earliest Intelligence of, have been received and practised in these lately-discovered Countries for a long time, and perhaps as soon and as long as we our selves have observed, or had notice of them. I do not pretend to deter∣mine whence they had it. And that, whether we regard Religious Matters, and such as come to us by Revelation from Heaven; as for Instance, the Be∣lief of One Single Man at first, the Universal Pro∣genitor of all Mankind; the Universal Deluge; of a God that lived in human flesh, and took the Sub∣stance of a pure and holy Virgin; of a Day of Ge∣neral Judgment; of the Resurrection of the Dead; the Observation of Solemn Fasts; the Ornaments of those that minister in Holy things; the Surplice and the Mitre particularly; the Respect paid to the Cross; Circumcision like that of the Jews and Ma∣hometans; and Counter-Circumcision, which makes it a point of Religion, to prevent all appearance of any such thing upon their Bodies: Or, whether we regard Civil Constitutions; as That of the Eldest Son inheriting his Father's Estate; Patent Honours taking new Names, and Titles, and laying down that of their Families; Subsidies to Princes; Armo∣ries, and Fortifications: Diversions of Players and Mountebanks; Musical Instruments, and all kinds of Diversion, in use in these parts of the World; Artillery, and Printing. From all which it is very natural to deduce these following Inferences. That this huge Body, which we call the World, is very

different from the common Apprehensions of Men concerning it. That it is not at all times, and in all places the same; but hath its Tides, its Ebbings and Flowings in perpetual Succession: That there is no∣thing so confidently asserted and believed in one place, but is as generally received, as peremptorily maintained, nay, as fiercely contradicted and con∣demned in another. And that the Original of all this, whether Agreement, or Difference, is to be re∣solve at last into the Nature of Man's Mind, which is susceptible of Ideas of all sorts: And that the World being in perpetual Motion, is sometimes at greater, and sometimes in less Agreement with it self, in the several parts of it. That all things are comprehended within the general Course of Nature, and subject to the Great Director of Universal Na∣ture; and that they spring up, are alter'd, decay, and are abolished, according as He in his Wisdom thinks fit to vary them, by the Change put upon Sea∣sons and Ages, Countries and Places, the Air, the Climate, the Soil, in which Men are born, and bred, and dwell. And lastly, That, as our Predecessors were but Men, so We are no more; and since the Errors in Their Judgment of Things are manifest, this should teach Us to distrust and suspect our own. And when These Inferences are justly made, the Re∣sult of them must needs be, to be inseparably wed∣ded to no Opinion, to espouse none of our Argu∣ments and Speculations too eagerly; to be astonished at nothing, though never so unusual; not to lose our Temper upon any Accident; But whatever happens, or how violent soever the Storm may be, to six upon this Resolution, and satisfy our selves in it; That it is but according to the Course of Na∣ture; and that He who governs the World works as he pleases; and proceeds by the Rules of his own Wisdom; and therefore all we have to do, is to take a prudent Care, that nothing may hurt us

through our own Weakness, or Inconsideration, or Dejection of Spirit.

Thus much I thought sufficient and indeed neces∣sary to be said upon this perfect Liberty of Judg∣ment, consisting of the Three Particulars so largely insisted on. And indeed so largely, by reason I am sensible, it is not suited to the Palate of the World; but denounces War against Pedants, and positive Pretenders; which are all of them Enemies to true Wisdom, as well as to this Principle of Mine. The Advantages whereof have been sufficiently re∣presented already, the Mischiefs it prevents, and the Tranquillity it brings. This was the particular Cha∣racter of Socrates, that Father and Chief of the Philosophers, and universally acknowledged as such: By This, (as Plutarch says,) though he had no Off-spring of his own, yet he managed others so, as to make Them fruitful, and Midwif'd their Producti∣ons into the World. This Temper is in some sense like that Ataraxie, which Pyrrho's Sceptical Followers called the Supreme Happiness of Man: But if that resemblance be a little over-strained, yet it may ve∣ry well bear being compared to the Neutrality and Indifference, which the Sect of the Academicks pro∣fessed. And the Natural Effect of such a Temper is to be discomposed or astonished at nothing; which Pythagoras thought the Sovereign Good, and Aristotle called the True Greatness of Soul. So Horace;

* 1.20Not to Admire, as most are wont to do, It is the only Method that I know, To make Men happy, and to keep them so. Creech.

And is it not a most amazing perverseness that Men cannot be prevailed with to make the Experiment; nay, that they should not bear to have it so much as recommended or mentioned; but prefer Slavery and Dependance, before living upon their own Stock, getting above Fortune, and making them∣selves easy and Masters at all times, and places, and upon all Accidents alike? May we not most justly cry out with Tiberius, more justly indeed than He did, (O Wretches, born to be Slaves!) How absurd is it, that we, who are such Patrons, and Sticklers for Li∣berty in the Case of our Bodies, Estates, and all other Properties, should not bear to have our Mind free, which after all is the only Free-born thing, that belongs to any of us? We seek and employ con∣veniences fetch'd from all parts of the World, count no expence too great, for the Health, the Service, the Ornament of the Body; but grudge every thing for the improvement and enriching of the Mind. In short, We are so partial, as to take all possible pains, that the Body may be at large, while the Soul is fettered, and coop'd up in Prison.

[unspec 7] The other Branch of this Liberty, in which the Will is concerned, is of yet greater value, in which the Wills is concerned, is of yet greater value,* 1.21 and ought to be more endeavour'd after by a Wise Man, as indeed it is more serviceable to him, than the for∣mer. Now here I think it necessary to admonish my Reader, that the Matter under our present Con∣sideration, is not that Faculty and Privilege of Hu∣man Nature, which Philosophers and Divines com∣monly stile Free-Will, nor shall we treat of it in the same Method with Them: But my meaning is, That a Wise Man ought to preserve his own Ease and Quiet, to keep his Will and Affections free and disengaged; and to lay them out upon very few ob∣jects; and those such as may justify his Choice; (For indeed the things that deserve our Choice and challenge our Affections, if nicely examined, will

be found but very few.) But this is not all; For even Those, that deserve them best, will not justify our Vehemence, and Eagerness, and immoderate Fond∣ness of them. And here I find my self under some necessity of encountring two very popular and plau∣sible Opinions. The One is That which teaches us to be always forward to serve other people; to lay aside all thoughts of one's self, for the sake of our Neighbours; and especially, when the Publick Good is concerned, pretends that no private Interest ought to come in Competition with it; And the Other prompts us to espouse such Matters with all possible Zeal, and to the very utmost of our power. He that declines the Former, is accused of wanting Good nature, and a publick Spirit; and He that is remiss in the Latter, is suspected of Coldness and In∣difference; want of Generosity, and the Zeal that is required of a Good Man, and in short, reputed incapable of making a Friend. Now whatever there may really be at the bottom of these Opinions, yet it is plain, the World have overloaded the Founda∣tion, and built such Notions upon it, as exceed all Reason and Measure; and nothing can be more Romantick and Extravagant, than what we sind de∣livered upon these Occasions. For our Governors, who feel the Advantage of them, oftentimes infuse Principles into us, not according to the true merits of the Cause, but in proportion as they perceive they may prove serviceable and beneficial: And it fre∣quently falls out, that those Opinions, which are in themselves most reasonable and true, are not most convenient to be generally entertained. And besides this, Observing how natural the Love of our Selves and our own private Advantage is, and what Partia∣lities and unreasonable Excesses it is apt to carry us into, they thought it necessary to divert and draw us off as far from This as possibly; and so took the Common Course of bending the Crooked Stick the

Contrary way, that it might at last stand strait by being forced toward the other Extreme.

1 These Opinions, when misunderstood, [unspec 8] and misapplied, (which is commonly the Fate of most Opinions, when they fall into the hands of a Mul∣titude) occasion great Injustice, and Disorder, ma∣ny Difficulties, and grievous Mischiefs. As we may plainly observe in those persons, that snap at every bait of this kind; let themselves out to hire as it were; and devote all their Time and Pains to the service of other people. These men do not only suffer themselves to be managed, and taken abso∣lute Possession of by their Friends; but they thrust themselves forward of their own accord, and will have an Oar in every Boat: It is indifferent to Them, whether the Matter concerns them, or not; whether it be of greater consequence, or of none at all; still they Interess themselves in all alike; for in∣deed they often do it merely to keep themselves in Motion and Employment; It stirs their Spirits, put their Soul into a pleasing sort of Agitation; and thus* 1.22 they are busy purely because they love to be so. They cannot bear the having nothing to do; nor can they confine their Thoughts to their own Affairs; but ei∣ther do not see, or carelesly overlook them: and so seek Employment abroad, and meddle and turn un∣dertakers in things that are foreign and distant, as if they had nothing at all to do at home; no con∣cerns that are essential and necessary to be followed; no personal, no domestick Cares, that lye upon their hands; such as ought to be first dispatched; and which, if duly attended to, would leave no room for Sloth, nor leisure so great, as should prove a Temptation to us, to turn Managers for other peo∣ple, that we may keep our selves in Action. Many

of these persons are good husbands of their purse, and careful not to part with a Penny of Money, but upon valuable considerations; but they are un∣reasonably prodigal of their Soul, their Life; squan∣der away their Time and their Pains, their Affecti∣ons and their Will, most profusely and unaccounta∣bly; dedicate Themselves and all their Powers, to any occasions that calls for their Assistance; And yet when all is done, These are the valuable Trea∣sures, of which we ought to be exceeding choice and sparing; and in such Instances it is chiefly, that Frugality and good Management are commendable. But alas! the Persons we speak of are so far from this, that they glory in their Extravagance; act all with such Violence, and Passion, that they are lost to Reason and common Sense; and never think they do enough, till they have engaged as deep as is pos∣sible; and given up their Persons, and their Wits both, to the Cause they espouse. Great Men make their Advantage of such Tempers as these; Men that will be eager, and angry, and expose, nay lose their lives upon pretences of Friendship, and Pun∣ctilio's of Honour and Respect, are special Tools for Their purpose. And they are not wanting to countenance and caress them, throw out large Pro∣mises, and use a thousand little Stratagems to draw them in, and six them to their Party; But though Fools believe and are caught by them, yet Wise Men know this is all Trick and Design; that there is Deceit in the Bait, and Death upon the Hook; and that all their fair Carriage and large Promises are designed not at all to serve Us, but to serve themselves of us.

[unspec 9] Now, First of all, This Temper we have been describing, puts all into confusion, exposes the Mind to perpetual uneasiness, and brings it into a State of absolute Slavery. It argues Ignorance of that, which every one ought to know, and that is, how much

he owes to himself, and what the Obligations are, and the Offices arising from them, which are first and strictly due at home. All which these persons violate; for while they are so mighty officious, and liberal in the service of other people, they injure and defraud themselves; and spend that Stock of Ease and Comfort, which is their own due, and ought to be preserved. Besides; if we desire Busi∣ness, Providence hath cut us out enough of our own; let us but look at home, and discharge the Duty of our respective Stations diligently; but espe∣cially, let us but look within; and we shall be far from finding any occasion to ask for work of our Neighbours: The difficulty will then be to dispatch that which they ask of Us; and instead of laying our selves out upon every bodies business besides, we shall then find our hands Full, and a necessity of keeping close to our own. He that takes care to live as becomes his Virtue and his Honour; so as may preserve his health, and give him a contented and cheerful Enjoyment of the World, hath enough to do; and He that neglects or impairs any of these, merely to do another service, is ill advised; and un∣der colour of Good-nature to his Friend, is guilty of great Injustice and Ill-nature to himself. To oblige and assist others, so far as may be consistent with the securing these things to our selves, is sufficient; but to go beyond that, is to break our Duty in one par∣ticular, while we supererogate in another. He is an unreasonable Man, that expects one should sacri∣fice his Virtue, or his Happiness to him; and He is a very foolish Man, that will do it, if it be expect∣ed. And therefore I repeat again a Direction given just now, That a Man ought to espouse and devote himself to but very few things; and to take care that these be such, as will justify the setting his heart upon them; and They, to be sure, can be but very few.

[unspec 10] Secondly, This Eagerness of Intention and vehe∣ment concern is not only unfit and unjust in other respects, but it is also an Inconvenience to it self. For it puts Men beside their measures, and proves the greatest hindrance and perplexity that can be, to that very Undertaking, which we are so impatient to accomplish, and have set our hearts so much upon. As, when we strive to go exceeding fast, our legs sink under us, or step awry, or interfere, and stop one another.* 1.23 The very Swiftness of the Pace confounds it self, so that even Hast breeds delay. And he that begins too fast is slowest in finishing. Thus it is likewise with the Mind of a Man, when Intoxicated with this forward and furious vehemence of Intention; he confounds and hampers himself; betrays himself to Indiscretion and Injustice in his proceedings; ren∣ders himself suspected, and hardly thought of, gives offence and ground of Resentment to others; and puts his own Mind upon a perpetual Fret and Fer∣ment; as oft as any thing happens, that either de∣feats or delays the Success he is labouring after.† 1.24 Heat and Violence never manage any thing well. We may observe it daily, what Advantages men lose, and how great an Injury they do to themselves, their Business, the Cause and Party they espouse, by this want of Temper; even to the ruin of the fairest and most promising Expectations, in matters of the greatest Importance. And the thing is no less evident too, in the most common and insignifi∣cant cases. In a matter so frivolous as Play, for in∣stance, where He that is eagerest and most intent upon Winning, breaks the rules and proper methods, overlooks the advantages of the Game, and contri∣butes

to his own Loss. Whereas an Adversary that plays calmly and sedately, hath always his Eyes and his Wits about him; his Passion never transports his Reason; but he makes the best of every Chance, and does not only enjoy the Diversion, but bid fair∣est for the Success. He makes his Feints, and Dou∣bles; and lays hold on every favourable occasion; if he fail of his design, he bears it with Moderation, and makes it up another time; is always ready to observe and to improve every Change of Fortune; and by jogging on leisurely, and keeping the Reins in his own hand, comes soonest and safest to his Journey's End.

[unspec 11] This leads us to a Third Remark of very great Consequence, which is, that this vehement and ea∣ger Zeal infects the Mind, and corrupts the Judg∣ment. For while Men are addicted to one Person or Party, and wholly set upon promoting Their Ad∣vantage, they go furiously to work, and strain eve∣ry thing beyond its due pitch. They extol their Fa∣vourites and Partners in the same Cause with unde∣served Commendations; and load their Adversaries with odious Characters, and false Accusations; turn Superstitious to the last degree; and interpret every Event as ominous, and a Prognostication of Good in favour of themselves and Friends; and a plain de∣claration of Providence, against those that are enga∣ged in opposition to them. Nay, they carry this Folly so far, as not to see or allow any Virtue or Good quality in their Adversaries; represent them as Vi∣cious and Villains, and would have us believe, that all who think, and act, and design otherwise, than They themselves do, must be either Knave••, or Fools, and Madmen; and those who are more just and moderate in their Sentiments, that observe any real Virtues, and give due Praises to those that disser from them, are presently suspected to be of the same Party and Principle; merely for their Charity in

vindicating or excusing, and not running into the same Excesse of Partiality and Prejudice, the same unreasonable Censures and Condemnations, with these hot-headed Zealots. Whereas indeed nothing can be more extravagant, than to imagine that a Man who is not one of Us cannot possibly be a Good Man; and that he may not, for the main, or at least in some cases where the Point in difference is no way concerned, be very honest and commen∣dable, though it be his unhappiness, to be under a wrong persuasion, and in some particulars embarqued in the Interest or Opinions of those who are very naughty Men. That Passion should commit a vio∣lence upon the Will, is but too much; but that it should debauch and blind the Judgment, and destroy Charity and common Sense, is abominable, and not to be endured. And Men should by all means think themselves obliged to proceed with Equity and Candor; to see and to acknowledge Goodness, whereever it is to be found, though in the worst and most mistaken Enemies; and not to palliate, or overlook, much less to defend and applaud the Vices and Follies of our Friends and Followers; but to lay aside all private Considerations, and frankly to express our Detestation of these things, let the per∣sons guilty of them be who, or what they will. The contrary wicked practice (for a very wicked one it is) seems to proceed in great measure from want to considering and distinguishing aright, what the Points in difference are, and how far they ex∣tend. For it is most certain, that where the Con∣troversy is no way concerned, we ought to behave our selves with all manner of Indifference; and pass fair and equitable Judgments, as we would do, supposing no Dispute or Disagreement at all. And Resentments should never be carried beyond that particular Subject which provokes them; nor An∣ger, of all Passions, suffered to grow general and

unlimited. And These are some of the many Evils, which too great Eagerness and Intention of Mind naturally brings upon Men, let the Matter we set our hearts so much upon, be what it will; for this Disposition is capable of Excess, and liable to In∣conveniences, when fixed upon the very best Ob∣ject; and a Man may suffer by being too vehement and hot, in the pursuit even of Goodness and Wis∣dom it self.

[unspec 12] Now in order to moderate this Affectionate Ear∣nestness, and reduce the Mind to due Temper; eve∣ry Man ought to remember, that the most impor∣tant thing given us in charge by God and Nature, that to which we have the strongest Obligations, and consequently such as ought to be first satisfied, is, That Every Man should look well to his con∣duct: This good management of our selves is the very business upon which we were sent into the World at first, and are continued in it still. And this Duty we do by no means discharge faithfully, except the Peace, and Tranquility, and Liberty of our Minds be consulted and preserved. And preser∣ved these cannot be, unless we make it our Princi∣ple and Rule, to Lend our selves to a Friend, but to Give our selves up to none but our selves; to take business in hand, but not to lay it to heart; to bear it as a burden, and be content with sustaining the weight of it upon our shoulders, but not to incor∣porate and unite with it, by making it inseparable and a part of our selves; to bestow all possible Di∣ligence, but not to misplace and throw away our Affections, upon it; to fasten eagerly upon very few things, and to stick to them only so, as still to continue at our own pleasure. This is the true, the so∣vereign Remedy, against all the Inconveniences and Uneasinesses formerly mentioned; and this is not any such selfish or narrow-spirited advice, as some

may imagine. It does not condemn or exclude any of those Duties or good Offices required from us; it does not prejudice to the Publick, our Friends, or our Neighbours; so far from That, that it is most certain We are bound by all the Tyes of Honour and Religion, to be courteous and kind, assisting and serviceable to one another; to comply with the Customs and Occasions of the World, and apply our selves to the observance of the one, and the Supply of the other, as our Circumstances will per∣mit; and in order hereunto, every man is obliged to contribute to the Common Good; and conscienti∣ously to perform all those Duties and mutual Offices, which any way concern him, as a Member of the Body Politick, and may conduce to the Benefit of Human Society.* 1.25 He that is a Friend to himself, is a Friend to all Mankind; for the Love and Care of one's self is so far from engrossing, and confining all we can do to our own single persons; that it im∣plies, and puts us upon the being as universally be∣neficial, and dissusing our Powers, as far and wide as we can. But still, I must insist upon it, that the most generous Inclinations and Endeavours of this kind ought to be tempered with Moderation and Prudence; and no Man is publick-spirited as he should be, unless he be discreet withal; and That in these Two respects particularly. First, Not to ap∣ply, or lay himself out upon every occasion that offers indifferently; but first to sit down, and con∣sider well the Justice, the Reasonableness, and the Necessity of the thing; whether it will answer his design, and be worth his pains. And if this were done, a world of trouble might be spared. Then Secondly, That even those occasions, which have the best Title to his Application, may be followed

without Violence and Vexation of Mind. A Man should contract his Desires, and bring them within as small a Compass as he can; The Little he does desire, should be pursued with Temper, and be de∣sired moderately; His application should be free from Anxiety, and Distraction: And in any the most Important Matters that we undertake, we may be allowed to employ our Hands, our Feet, our Tongue, the Attention of our Thoughts, the Sweat of our Brows, all proper means in order to the effecting them, nay, to spend our Blood, and hazard our Lives, if the occasion require it; but still all this is to be done with a Reserve; calmly and considerate∣ly, without Passion and Torment; without Fret∣fulness and Impatience. A Man must always pre∣serve the Government and Command of himself; the Health of his Body, the Soundness of his Mind, the Tranquility, and Ease of both, so far as is pos∣sible. For Success does by no means depend upon Heat, and Forwardness, and an Impetuous Eager∣ness of the Will; but is much oftner and better at∣tained without it; and the Cooler our proceedings are, the greater Expectations we may entertain from them. It is a vulgar and a very gross Mistake, that no Affair is undertaken heartily and to purpose, without a great deal of Noise, and Hurry, and Bustle. For, as I have already shewed, these only disorder and perplex the Cause; put Men beside their Byass, and are so many fresh Obstructions. How common a thing is it to observe vast numbers of Men, who venture their persons in the Wars, and are in daily, hourly peril of their Lives; with∣out any anxious Concern at all; they march up to the Cannon's mouth when their Post requires it, and push on to Action, and yet neither the Hazard, nor the Loss of the Battels they fight, ever breaks them one Night's rest; They consider, This is their Duty, and upon that Consideration they discharge

it chearfully. And yet at the same time that you see the Camp and the Field so easy, and void of Care; a Splenetick Politician, who never had the Courage to look Danger in the Face, shall sit you at home, and teaze and afflict himself with the Event of this Engagement; and be a thousand times more perplexed and mortified with any ill Success, than those very Soldiers, who spend their Blood, and stake down their Lives, in the Service.

[unspec 13] In a word; We must learn to understand our selves, and our Condition; and distinguish aright, between our private and personal, and our publick Capacities. For every one of us is under a double Character, and hath two parts to play. The one external, and visible, but somewhat foreign and di∣stant; the other domestick, and proper, and essen∣tial to us. Now though our Shirt be next to our Skin, yet according to the Proverb, we should al∣ways remember, that how near soever our Shirt may be, our Skin is still nearer to us. A Judicious per∣son will discharge his Duty to the Publick, and fill an Office well; and yet at the same time will discern the Folly, and Wickedness, and Cheat, which a Publick Station exposes him to the practice of. He will not decline the thing; because it is agreeable to the Custom and Constitution of his Countrey; it is necessary and useful to the Publick, and perhaps advantagious to himself: He will submit in many things to do as the World does, because the Rest of Mankind live at the same rate; and since he cannot mend the World, it is to no purpose to disturb it, by being singular. But still he will look upon this, as a matter somewhat foreign, and consider this Character as adventitious and accidental, not natu∣ral to him; it is what he is obliged to put on, and appear in; but he was not born with it, nor is it a part of him. And therefore he will always exercise it with all due Limitations and Reservations; and

not so embark in Business, as to be quite swallowed up in it: but manage Matters so, that he may still enjoy himself; and be free and easy with a parti∣cular Friend; or at least, within his own Breast; not so serve the World, as to neglect, and be out of a Condition to serve himself; nor endeavour the Be∣nefit of others, at the Expence or Loss of a Good, that is truly and properly his own.

CHAP. III. True and Substantial Integrity of Mind, the first and fundamental part of Wisdom.

[unspec 1] THE Directions laid down in the two foregoing Chapters, being such Preparations, as were thought necessary for disposing aright, the person who aspires after Wisdom, and qualifying him to make successful progress in it; That is, By remo∣ving the Obstructions, and cleaning his Mind of Pre∣judices; and setting it at large from the Slavery and Confinement of Popular Opinions, and private Pas∣sions: and also by advancing to that noble and happy Freedom of Thought and Will already descri∣bed; that from hence, as from some advantagious rising ground, he may take a full prospect, and arrive at a clear and distinct Knowledge, and attain to an absolute Mastery, over all the Objects and Things that occur to him here below; (which is the peculiar Character and Privilege of an exalted and resined Soul;) It may now be seasonable to ad∣vance in the Method proposed at our Entrance into this Book; by giving some fit Instructions and gene∣ral Rules of Wisdom. The Two First whereof, are

still in the nature of Prefaces to the Main Work; necessary to be laid in the Quality of Foundations, upon which to raise this Glorious Superstructure. And the Former and Principal of these two, design∣ed for the Subject of This Chapter, is Probity, and Sincerity.

That true Honesty and Integrity of Heart and Life is the First, the Chief, the Fundamental Point of True Wisdom, is an Assertion, which it may per∣haps be thought needless for me to give my self any great trouble in proving. For in truth, all Mankind agree in highly extolling, and zealously pretending to it; (though it is but too manifest, that what some do in this kind seriously, and out of Conscientious regard to their Duty, and the real Worth of this Vir∣tue; others put on only, to set the best face upon the matter; and are compelled to dissemble from Shame, and Fear, and the Ill-consequences of avowing the contrary.) Thus far then the whole World is agreed; that Honesty is recommended, and respected, and at least complimented; every Man professes to be passionately in love with it, and subscribes himself its most Faithful, most Affectionate, and most Devo∣ted Servant. So that I may spare my self the pains of arguing in behalf of the Thing in general; but I am afraid notwithstanding, it will prove no such easy matter to make Men agree with the Notions of that, which in my esteem is the True and Essential Honesty, and to persuade the as universal Love, but especially the universal practice of That, which I think necessary upon this occasion. For as to That, which is in common vogue, and usually reputed such; though the World I know are generally satis∣fied, and trouble themselves so little about under∣standing or attaining to any thing better, that (ex∣cept a very few Wise Men,) they have no Ideas, no Wishes beyond this; yet I make no difficulty to af∣firm, that it is all but a spurious and counterfeit

Virtue; Sham and Trick; and the product of Art and Study, Falshood and Disguise.

[unspec 2] Now first of all, We cannot but be sensible, * 1.26 that Men are very often drawn on, and pusht forward to good Actions by several sorts of Motives. Some∣times such as are by no means commendable; As Natural Defects, and Infirmities, Passion and Fancy, nay sometimes by Vice, and Things in their own Nature Sinful. Thus Chastity, and Sobriety, and Temperance of all sorts, may be, and often are, owing to a weak Body, and tender Constitution, which cannot support Excess. Contempt of Death, to Peevishness and Discontent; Patience under Mis∣fortunes, Resolution and Presence of Thought in Dangers, to Want of Apprehension and Judgment, and a due sense, how great or imminent the Dan∣ger is. Valour, and Liberality, and Justice, are often inspired and practised by Ambition and Vain∣glory; the Effects of good Conduct, discreet Ma∣nagement, of Fear, and Shame, and Avarice. And what a World of renowned and noble Exploits have been owing to Presumption and Foolhardiness; Rashness and Inconsideration? Thus, what we com∣monly call Actions and Instances of Virtue, are in reality no better than Masks, and counterfeit Ap∣pearances of it: They have the Air and the Com∣plexion, but by no means the Substance of it. So much resemblance there is, that the Vulgar, who are no Criticks in Faces, may easily mistake the one for the other; and so much of good there is in the Effects and Consequences of such Actions, that other people may be allowed to call them Virtuous; but it is impossible the person himself who does them, should esteem them such; or that any consi∣dering Man can either allow them this Character, when nicely examined; or think one jot the bet∣ter of the Man that does them. For Interest, or Honour, or Reputation, or Custom and Compliance,

or some other Causes altogether foreign to Virtue, will be found at the bottom; and however beautiful the Front may be, the Foundation is rotten and stark naught. Sometimes very great and surprizing things are the Result of nothing better, than mere Stupidity and Brutishness; which gave occasion for that Reflection, That Wisdom and Insensibility met together in the same Point, and both of them felt and hardened themselves alike under Accidents and Misfortunes. From all which, and a great deal more, that might be said, it appears, how exceeding dangerous and uncertain a method those men take, who look no further than the outward Face of things, and from the actions, as we see them, form a peremptory Judgment of the Probity, or the Disingenuity of the Person. Whereas, for a right understanding of this matter, we ought to take a distinct view of the In∣side; examine the whole Movement; and mark well what Springs they are, that set it on going. For it often happens, that very ill men do very good, and commendable, and beneficial Actions: And both Good and Bad men restrain themselves, and avoid Evil; but though both abstain alike, yet they do it out of very different Principles, as Horace hath observed pertinently enough to this purpose,

* 1.27So Crafty Foxes dread the secret snare; The Kite and Hawk, although the Bait be fair, Yet never Stoop, where they Suspect a Gin. The Good for Virtue's Sake abhor a Sin; 'Tis fear of Pumshment restrains Thy Will. Give leave; How eagerly wouldst Thou be ill? Horace by Creech.

To make a just discovery of the Man, and inform our selves, what is Honesty and Sincerity indeed, the Actions are too weak an Evidence, and he that goes no farther, can know nothing. These are on∣ly the gross Substance, a Copy of his Countenance, and the Counterfeit Lustre of a False Stone; The Jewels cannot be distinguished with so superficial a view; it is not enough to hear the Sound, we must judge the Harmony, and know what Hand it is, that moves the Strings. For the Motive and Cause is the Life, and Soul of all, and gives both Being and Denomination to the whole Action. This is the only Mark we have to judge by; and every Man is chiefly concerned to take care that This be pure, and good, and in every regard what it ought to be. All which depends upon the Uprightness of the Intention, and Unblemish'd Honesty of the Heart; and that is the very Quality we are now looking after.

[unspec 3] That Integrity, which passes in common Estima∣tion for the True,* 1.28 and is generally recommended and extolled,a nd which indeed is all, that those who have the Character and Commendation of Just, and Honest, and Fair-dealing men pretend to, is at the best but a mean, and formal, and pedantick Virtue: Such as is a Slave to Laws, and takes its Measures from thence; is check'd and kept under by Hope and Fear; is acquired, learned, produced and practiced upon the account of, and in submissi∣on to the Religion we profess, the Government we live under, the Customs of our Country, the Com∣mands of our Superiors, the Examples of Them we converse with, bound up in Forms, and limited by the Letter of the Law; an effeminate, poor-spirited Honesty, perplexed with Doubts, and Scruples, and Terrors of Conscience. For some People never think themselves innocent, and as they should be; when their Minds are quiet, and easy, and void of

Fear. Now such an Honesty as this, must not only be mutable and manifold in several parts of the World, and vary as the Religion, and Laws, and Examples, and Forms and Modes of the Countries, where men happen to converse, shall vary; (For where the Springs of Action change, the whole Movement must needs change proportionably). But, which is yet more to its disparagement, it must needs be irregular, and unequal; inconsistent with it self; floating and unsettled; full of Ebbings and Flowings, Intervals of Heat and Cold; inconstant and precarious; depending on the Events and Suc∣cesses of Affairs; the Offering of Occasions, and Interposition of sudden Emergencies; the Diffe∣rence of Persons and Circumstances; and a thou∣sand other unforeseen Accidents, which move this Man and his Virtue, as a Boat is moved by Sails and Oars, by sudden strokes and spurts; and gusts and pusss of Wind. In a word, These Men are good purely by Chance, by fits and starts; by ex∣ternal and very distant motives; and not in reality, and by virtue of a fix'd and governing Principle. This Defect of theirs is what not only standers by, but even themselves are insensible of; they never observe, nor discover their own imperfections, but it were easy to shew them to themselves, and make the thing plain to them, by holding a stiff Rein, observing them more nicely and distinctly; and quickning their attention a little. And indeed no∣thing would be a more effectual Conviction of their Deficiency, than the mighty inequality of their Actions and Tempers, and their own Disagree∣ment with themselves. For in one and the same case, you shall find them coming to quite different resolutions and determinations; and acting in direct contradiction, to what they have done before. Sometimes they are so heavy and dull, that neither Whip nor Spur can get them forward; and presently

upon the full speed, that no Bit can stop them. Now this prodigious unevenness and difference of Behaviour is occasioned by the difference of those external Motives, by which they are governed and managed; And as These sometimes agitate and heat them violently, swell, and multiply; or grow lukewarm and cold, and flag and droop again; so must Their Virtue and Zeal needs increase and abate accordingly; and thus it distinguishes it self from Real and Substantial Virtue, by that Property natu∣ral to all Accidents; which is, the being capable of Augmentation and Diminution; and so of no bet∣ter Extract, than all those Qualities, whose disho∣nour it is, according to the Terms of the Schools, Recipere magis & minus.

[unspec 4] Now That True and Substantial Integrity, which I insist upon at present as a necessary qualification,* 1.29 in order to Wisdom, is free, and easy; void of Affe∣ctation and Constraint; masculine and generous; pleasant and chearful; equal and uniform; constant and steady; magnanimous and brave; keeping on its own course, and never looking to the right hand, or to the left; never standing still, or slackning, or quickning its pace; upon the account of Wind or Weather; Accidents and Occasions may change, but This continues always the same. It is not in the power of any thing to alter or shake it; my mean∣ing is, that the Man's Judgment and Will are fixed and immutable; and the Soul, where this Integrity hath taken up its Residence, is never to be corrupted, or diverted to dishonest purposes. For the Sincerity of the Heart is the Virtue we are treating of; There it is lodged, by That we must judge; for External Actions, and those especially that are of a publick Capacity and Importance, are of a Nature and Con∣sideration very different from this; as I shall have oc∣casion to shew hereafter, when my Method brings me to treat of them distinctly.

[unspec 5] Of this I shall give my Reader some description, when I have first desired him to recollect what was said in the Preface; and that in agreement to the design of this Treatise, I speak of Probity and Wis∣dom at present, as Virtues purely Human, such as entitle a Man to the Character of an Honest or a prudent Man with regard to Civil Affairs, and com∣mon Conversation; without any respect at all to the Christian and more exalted sense of the thing. Of which nevertheless, though Foreign to the gene∣ral Intent of my Book, I shall take occasion to say some little matter, before I leave this Subject.

The true Spring and Source of this Probity is Na∣ture; which obliges a man to be such as he ought to be; that is, to conform, and govern himself ac∣cording to her Dictates and Directions. For Nature maintains a twofold Character, and is at once a Mistress to Command, and a Law to teach, and set us out our Duty. With regard to the former of these Capacities, there is an Internal, Universal, that is, a natural Obligation incumbent upon every Man, to be an honest, sincere Man, and so to an∣swer the End of his Creation. And This is an Ob∣ligation so strong, an Inducement so weighty, that no one need look for any greater, any additional Motives; nor indeed is it possible, to find any that deserve greater Deference and Regard; any antece∣dent to it, since its Validity is of the same date with our Selves, and both It and We came into the World together. Every Man ought to make it his business and care to be a good Man, upon this very account, because he is a Man; for he who is regardless of this point, is a Monster, renounces himself, reproaches his Nature, and in effect ceases to be, what he ap∣pears, and usurps a Form, which of Right belongs not to him. This Probity must also be of its own growth, without Cultivating or Constraint; that is, It must proceed from an Internal Principle, which

God hath wrought into our Nature and Constitu∣tion; and not be the effect of Accident, or any foreign Inducement. No Man, whose Will is un∣corrupt, would chuse a thing in its declension, as debased and fallen from its natural Perfection; It is a Contradiction to pretend a Man desires a thing, and that he is indifferent at the same time, whether it be what it ought, and have all the Commendable Qualities of right belonging to it. A Man is solici∣tous to have all his parts in their true Perfection; his Head, his Eyes, his Judgment, his Memory, his whole Body; nay, the very Conveniences and Ac∣coutrements belonging to that Body; and shall his Will and his Conscience be the only neglected things about him? Shall it be no part of his Care whether These have their due Integrity or not? I would have a Man resolute in Goodness, though it were but purely upon his own account, and in regard to his Character as he is a Man; sensible, that to Act other∣wise, is, as much as in him lies, to abandon and destroy himself; and thus Probity will be an Inter∣nal Principle, as essential to, and of a piece with him, as He is with himself. No external Cause is capable of being a sufficient Foundation for it, be∣cause all such are foreign and accidental; and as such are liable to Changes and Decays; and when∣ever the Foundation sinks, the Superstructure must of necessity tumble with it: If a Man be virtuous and just for the sake of his Reputation, or any other Advantage, What Obligation will this be to his Re∣tirements, to his Solitary Actions? Take off the Hopes of his Virtue being known, and you either take off the whole thing, or cool, and check his vigour in the practice of it. If fear of Laws and Punish∣ments restrain him; put him but in a way to elude the Laws, and escape publick Discovery; and what shall secure his Honesty then? So poor, so precari∣ous; so uncertain a thing is this Occasional Virtue:

And yet This is the Virtue in vogue, and what very few rise beyond. As the World goes, 'tis very well if all these Considerations will prevail upon Men to do what becomes them; nay if their Actions be com∣mendable or blameless, whatever their secret Dispo∣sitions are. Now I expect, in the person whom this Treatise undertakes to form, a Probity that will stand upon its own bottom; so firmly rooted, that you can no more separate it from the Man, than you can his very human Nature it self. I expect he should never yield to do an Ill thing, though he could be assured it will never be known. For is it possible to conceal it from himself? And if his own Con∣science be privy to it, what need any farther Wit∣nesses? This One is more than all the World besides. By the same reason he must be as obstinately good, notwithstanding any Recompence which would bribe him to be otherwise; for it is impossible he should receive a valuable Consideration in this Case; and nothing can be so near to him, as his own Es∣sence, which Wickedness impairs and corrupts. To yield upon such Temptations, is like the being con∣tent with a very ill Horse, provided a Man have an embroider'd Saddle. I must therefore insist upon it, that being a Man, and taking care to live as becomes one, that is, taking care to be a sincere good Man, should always go together, and be above the power of all the World to separate them. This particular I think is sufficiently urged, let us now proceed to the next.

[unspec 6] Now the Model and Pattern, the Spring and Source of this Integrity, is the Law of Nature; by which I mean Universal Equity and Reason, that Candle of our Maker lighted up in every breast, to guide, and shine in us perpetually. For This is the Dictate and Direction of God himself; He is the King, and This the Fundamental Law of the Uni∣verse, a Ray and Beam of the Divine Nature, that

flows from, and hath a necessary Connection and Dependence upon that Eternal and Immutable Law, which the Almighty prescribes to his own Actions. A Man that proceeds upon this Principle, is his own Rule; for he acts in agreement with the noblest and most valuable part of his Nature. This Man's Honesty is Essential to, and Inseparable from him; not precarious and uncertain, and owing merely to Chance and Occasion; For this Light and Law is born with, and bred in us; a piece of our Frame, and Original. Constitution; and from thence ob∣tains the Name of Nature, and the Law of Nature. Such a Man by consequence will be a good Man constantly, and at all times; his Virtue will be uni∣form and even; every Place, every Emergency will find him the same. For this Law of Nature is per∣petual; the Obligation of it is lasting and inviola∣ble; the Equity and Reason of it are Eternal; written in large and indelible Characters; no Acci∣dent can deface them, no length of time waste or wear them out; even Wickedness it self, by the Customary Habits whereof the positive and additio∣nal Improvements of this Law, are corrupted; yet cannot debauch, or exterminate these first and Na∣tural Notions; no Place, no Time can alter or dis∣guise them; but they continue every where the same. The Collections inferred from them differ infinitely, but these first Principles themselves, which are the Ground of all Moral Institutions, ad∣mit of no Change, no Increase, no Abatement; no Fits and Starts, no Ebbings and Flowings; but, as they are a part of our Substance, so do they agree with what the Schools say of all Substances in general,* 1.30 that it is contrary to their nature to be more or less than they are. Why then, Vain Man, dost

thou trouble thy self, to seek abroad for some Law and Rule to Mankind? What can Books or Masters tell thee, which thou mightest not tell thy self? What can Study or Travel shew, which at the ex∣pence of much less pains thou might'st not see at home, by descending into thy own Conscience, and hearkning attentively to its Admonitions? When Ignorance of this kind is pretended, the same Reply is fit for Thee, which would be given to a shuffling Debtor; who, when Payment is demanded, pro∣fesses not to know how the Money became due, when all the while he hath the Bill about him: For thou carriest the Bond, and the particulars of thy Debt in thy own Bosom; and what thou seekest In∣formation of from others, canst not but know, if thou consult thy Self.

To what purpose is all this Labour and Cost; the toilsome tumbling over of Codes, and Institutes; of Precedents, and Reports; of Statutes and Re∣cords, when all these are contained in one small portable Volume? The Two Tables of Moses, the Twelve Tables of the Greeks,* 1.31 the Law written in the hearts of Them who had no Law; and in short, all the Rules of Equity, and Good Laws, that have any where been enacted, and obtained in the World, are nothing else but Copies and Transcripts produ∣ced in open Court, and published from that Origi∣nal, which thou keepest close within thee, and yet all the while pretendest to know nothing of the matter; stifling and suppressing, as much as in thee lies, the Brightness of that Light, which shines with∣in; and so falling under the Condemnation of those mentioned by the Apostle,* 1.32 who hold, or detain the Truth of God in Unrighteousness. If This have not been sufficiently published, and promulged as loud, as clear, as intelligibly as other humane Laws, the only Reason is, that that Light which is really All-heavenly and Divine, hath been put under a Bushel,

that is, too much neglected, and industriously for∣gotten. All other Institutions are but so many Ri∣vulets and Streams derived from this common Source: And although they be more visible, and obvious, and express, yet is not the Water they carry so co∣pious, nor so lively and pure, as that of the unseen Spring within thy own Breast; if thy own Negli∣gence did not suffer it to waste and dry up. It is not, I say, so Copious; for as one well observes,* 1.33 What a world of Good Offices are there, which Prety, Humanity, Liberality, and Fidelity require from a Man, and yet no written or positive Law ever prescribed? Alas! how poor and scanty a thing is that Honesty of your Formal and Hypocritical Pretenders, who stick to the Letter of the Law, and think, when That is sa∣tisfied, they have fully discharged their Duty; whereas there are infinite Obligations incumbent up∣on a Man, which no human Law ever binds upon him.† 1.34 He that is honest only in the Eye of the Law, hath but a very slender sort of Innocence to boast; for the Measure of our Duty is of a much larger extent, than the Law can pretend to.

There are infinite Cases un∣foreseen; sudden Emergencies, and extraordinary Conjunctures; the Occasions and Circumstances whereof are too many and too intricate, for any human Wisdom to foresee; and much more im∣possible for it to make any competent Provision for; so that a Man must often be left to his own Judgment and Discretion; and, even where he is not, a Good Man will sometimes think the Rule too narrow; and disdain to consine or cramp up his Virtue within the Compass of that, which was

thought necessary to be imposed upon every Com∣mon Man.

And as this invisible Fountain with∣in is more exuberant and plenteous; so is it more lively, and pure, and strong, than any of those Streams derived from it. Of which we need but this single Testimony; That, whenever any Disputes arise about the Interpretation and right Execution of a positive Law, the constant and best Method of Understanding the Equity and true Intent of it, is by running it back to its first Head, and observing what is most agreeable to the Law of Nature in the Case; This is the Test and Touch, This the Level and the Truth, by which all the rest are to be judg∣ed. For, as we commonly say,* 1.35 Reason is the Soul and Life of the Law; here we find things clear and limpid in their Source, which when drawn out into Rivulets, grow foul and sullied, by all that Faction, and Interest, Ambition, and serving of Parties, which corrupt all human Sanctions and Establish∣ments.

And thus I have described to you a Real, Sub∣stantial, Radical, Fundamental Honesty; born with us; rooted in us; springing from the Seed of Uni∣versal Reason. This in the Soul, is like the Spring and Balance in a Clock, it regulates all its motions; like the Natural Warmth in the Body, which sustains and preserves it self, and is both its own Strength and Safety, and the Person's to whom it belongs. The Man that proceeds according to This, acts in conformity to the Will of God, in consistence and agreement with himself; in compliance with Nature; and obedience to those Rules, upon which all Go∣vernment and Civil Constitutions are founded; he proceeds smoothly, gently, silently; His Virtue draws little Observation perhaps, as it makes no

Noise; but slides on, and keeps its Course, like a Boat carried down by the Course of the Water in a Calm day: Whereas all other sorts of Virtue are the Products of Art and Accident, grafted into us by Discipline, and not of our own natural growth; fickle and out of Temper, like the Intermitting Heat and Cold of a Fever; they are acquired at first, and drawn out into exercise afterwards, by Chance and Occasion, practised upon foreign and distant Considerations; acting by sudden starts, and short spurts; with Clamour, and Noise, with Hurry and Clutter, with Ostentation and Vainglory.

[unspec 7] And from hence we are led to the true meaning of all those Glorious things, which Philosophers and Wise Men in all Ages have said of Nature: For what Doctrines are more common in the mouths of every one of them, than these,* 1.36 That the way for a Man to live well, is to live agreeably to Nature; That a perfect Conformity with Nature is the Supreme Good, the most exquisite Happiness Mankind are capable of; That if we make Nature our Mistress, and Guide, and constantly follow the Directions she gives, we shall never go amiss? By all which it is plain, that Nature is set to signify that Universal Reason and Equity, which is given for a Light to our Minds; and is both of that vast comprehension, as to contain under it the Seeds of all kind of Virtue, Probity, and Justice; The Com∣mon Parent, that gives Birth to all wholsome and good Laws, all just and Equitable Judgments, that ever were or will be given; and also of that Clearness and Perspicuity too, that Men of the meanest Ca∣pacity and Attainments, might determine themselves, and be conducted by it. Whatever scandalous or

disparaging Reflections some may asperse Nature with, or how great a part of them soever this Cor∣rupted State of it may deserve, yet there is no doubt to be made, if we look back to their Original, and primitive Constitution, but all things were created and disposed in the best Order and Condition they were capable of; and had their first Motions toward Good infused and interwoven with their Being, and strong Tendencies to the End they ought to aspire after. This was the Work and Wisdom of Nature; and from hence it is, that no Man who follows and obeys her Dictates, can ever fail of obtaining and en∣joying the End, and true Happiness proper to his Species. For after all; Men are naturally and origi∣nally Good; and when they follow Evil, they for∣sake Nature, and are seduced by the false Allure∣ments of Profit, or of Pleasure: And because These are the two governing Motives, and such as will be sure to bear a powerful Sway in the World; there∣fore the Makers of Laws have always found it ne∣cessary to propose two contrary Objects, that is, Re∣ward and Punishment, to the Persons whose Obe∣dience they would engage. And the Design of These is by no means to put a Violence upon their Wills, and so constrain them to act against natural Inclina∣tion, as some weakly imagine; but it is in truth, to* 1.37 reduce them to better sense, and bring them back to that, which is not only the best, but was the first and most natural Inclination of their Minds, till perverted by wicked and deceitful Appearances of Counterfeit Good.

Nature without all Controversy is a sufficient Guide, a gentle Mistress, capable of instructing

every one of us, in all the Branches of our Duty, provided we would but be as careful to hearken to its Admonitions; to exert, and keep it awake and active. There is no need for Us to beg or to bor∣row from Art and Learning, those Means, and Re∣medies, and Rules, which are necessary for the good Government of our selves; for each of us can subsist and live by himself; his own proper Stock is suffi∣cient to maintain him. A Happy, and a Contented Life is indeed what every one does and should aim at; but these are Blessings by no means entailed up∣on Learning, or Parts, or Greatness, or Honour; a Man may attain them, and never see the face of a Court, or a City. There is a Proportion common and natural to all, which is enough for this pur∣pose; and All beyond that, however valuable, as additional Advantages, are yet by no means necessa∣ry; we can do very well without them; and which is worse, we are so far from doing very well upon their account, that they do but increase our Trou∣bles and our Difficulties, and do us more Hurt than Good. How many plain, and ignorant, and mean Men do we see, that live with more sensible Plea∣sure and Satisfaction, more sedate and undisturbed both in their Minds and Fortunes; and upon occa∣sion can meet, and encounter Poverty or Pain, Dan∣ger or Death, with a better Grace, and greater Com∣posure, than the most Learned, and celebrated Phi∣losophers? And if one take the pains to observe it nicely, you will find more frequent Instances, more eminent Patterns of Patience, and Constancy, and Evenness of Temper, among plain Countrey Peo∣ple, and those of mean Condition, than all the Schools can boast of. These are simple and unaffect∣ed, they go on where Nature leads, are influenced by the Reasons she suggests, and the Impressions she makes, without creating new and imaginary Trou∣bles. They feel no more than is to be felt, and use

no Art and Industry to torment themselves; Their Passions are low, and quiet, and smooth, in com∣parison of Theirs who take pains to rufflle them; and esteem it a piece of Bravery to indulge and blow them up; and so they go on in all their Af∣fairs more calmly and considerately, without Heat, or Disorder; whereas others look big and bluster, do every thing with Pomp and Hurry; are in perpetual Agitation and Alarm, and keep themselves and all Mankind awake. One of the greatest Masters, and most exquisite Improvers of Nature was Socrates, as Aristotle was proportionably Eminent for Art and Learning. Each of these in their respective Province was wonderful; but it is observable, that Socrates took a plain, and natural way, insinuated himself by vulgar Arguments, familiar Similitudes, an easy Style; and, by talking as a downright Countrey Fellow, or a good discreet Woman would have done, did not only suit himself better to the Capacities of Men, but laid down such useful Precepts, and Rules of a Virtuous Life; such powerful Antidotes against all manner of Sufferings, and Accidents, that the Strength and Vigor of them was never yet improved, nor the Success, exceeded, shall I say? No, not so much as matched; or any thing like it invented by all the Study and Acquired Learning in the World.

[unspec 9] But alas! we are so far from trusting to the Gui∣dance of Nature, that we never so much as give it the Hearing. The Violence put upon it, and the intractable Temper of Vice and Extravagance, of unruly Appetites, perverse Dispositions, and depra∣ved Wills, which are eternally striving to choak, and suppress, nay quite to deface, and utterly to ex∣tinguish, as much as in them lies, the Light within; that mortify and kill the very seeds of Virtue; these are too gross to come within the present Account. My Complaint is, that whereas the Concurrent Advice of all Wise men hath been to follow Na∣ture,

the Generality of Mankind run away from it. We let it sleep, and rust upon our hands; play Tru∣ant, while we may learn at home; and chuse to beg our Improvement abroad, to have recourse to Study and Art, which are comparatively sordid and despi∣cable ways of attaining Knowledge, rather than content our selves with an Independent and noble Wisdom, which is generous, and of our own Growth. We have all of us a busy turbulent Spirit, that af∣fects to be ever managing, and governing, and will have a hand in every thing; this is variable and humorsome, perpetually bustling, and restless; fond of Novelty, and Disguise; inventing, adding, al∣tering; never pleased long with the same thing, nor ever content with pure Nature, and unaffected Simplicity; but a Contemner and Vilifier of Plain∣ness, as if it were not possible for any thing to be Good, which is void of Art, and Cunning, and nice Contrivance. Thus* 1.38 Virtue, which is genuine, in∣stead of the Frankness and Openness peculiar to it, is cor∣rupted and changed into dark and crafty Speculation. And besides all this, One Fault more we are tainted with; which is, The Disesteem of every thing in general, which is the product of our own Soil; What we can have for nothing is worth nothing; it must be far fetched and dear bought, to recommend it: Foreign things only can please; and in agree∣ment with this Whimsey it is, that we prefer Art be∣fore Nature; which is in effect, To shut out the Sun when shining in its Strength, and to light up Candles at Mid-day. All which Follies and Extra∣vagant humours are owing to One more; which is a Weakness in a manner entail'd upon the whole World; That, I mean, of estimating things, not ac∣cording

to their real and intrinsick Value, but on∣ly according to the Shew, and Figure, and Noise they make; which is to renounce our own Judgment and Experience, and in effect to give our selves up to be determined by the Common Opinion, of those, who are least qualified to know or judge at all.

Nor does this Folly stop here; but we proceed to yet higher degrees of Insolence; we even trample Nature under foot, disdain, despise, and are perfect∣ly ashamed of it; are nice in Positive and National Laws, and disregard those that are Natural and Uni∣versal. Nay, for the sake of bringing Ceremony and Form into Reputation, (which is a most horrible Indignity, and very Contemptuous Treatment); We cancel and condemn a Law of God's making, to advance Laws of Civility and Good Manners of our own forging. Thus Art carries away Nature; the Shadow is of greater Consideration with us than the Body; and the Air and Face of things, than the Solidity and Substance. We take great care to cover and conceal some things that are natural, that we may not give offence; we blush at the very sound of some words in modesty and good breeding; and yet we are under no Fears, no restraint of doing things unlawful, and unnatural. To keep us at as great a distance from some sorts of Sins as is possi∣ble, we are not allowed so much as to name the parts employed in them; and yet after all this scru∣pulous shyness, How many are there who never boggle in the least at abandoning themselves to all manner of Debauchery and Lasciviousness? It was an old Complaint of the Stoicks, that though some very natural and innocent Actions of Life were industriously concealed; yet Many others were named without a blush, which yet were in their own nature wicked and abominable; and what both Na∣ture and Reason detest; such as Perjury, Treachery, Cheating, Lying, Murther, and the like. We may

improve the Complaint, by adding, that in Our days Men pretend to more nicety in Conversation; but these really wicked things, they do not only menti∣on without Shame, but act without Fear. Nay, even in Treasons and Assassinations, those blackest of all Villains make pretensions to Ceremony, and think themselves obliged to Murther in point of Ho∣nour and Duty; and when this is done, that it be done with some sort of Decency. Prodigious Im∣pudence and Folly! That Injustice should complain of Incivility; and Malice think it self wronged by Indiscretion. Does not the Art of Ceremony then plainly prevail over Nature, and shew, that its In∣fluence is much stronger upon corrupt Mankind? Ceremony forbids us to express some things which Nature allows and justifies, and we submit contented∣ly; Nature and Reason would restrain us from wicked and mischievous actions, and no body obeys, or at all regards them. This is manifestly to Prosti∣tute our Consciences, and abandon all distinctions, all common sense of Good and Evil; and yet at the same time think our selves obliged to put on a modest Face, and look grave and demure. As if it mattered not, what we are within, so nothing appear amiss in our Countenance; and the setting our looks in Form, were of more consequence, than the Inno∣cence of our Souls. This Hypothesis is most Mon∣strous and Absurd, and Nature cannot furnish us with an Incongruity like it, in all the Creatures that ever God made. My meaning is not here, what some may maliciously represent it, to find fault with that Decency and Ceremony, which gives an Orna∣ment and Beauty to our Actions, and ought there∣fore to be strictly regarded. But my Complaint is like that of our Saviour to the Pharisees; Ye Hypo∣crites, ye make clean the outside of the Cup and Platter,* 1.39 These ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.

[unspec 10] One very sad effect of this so general Alteration, and Corruption of our first Notions and Principles, is, That we are now come to that miserable pass, as to have no Footsteps of pure Nature left discernible among us. Insomuch that we are wonderfully per∣plexed, and at a loss, What and How many those Laws are, which she prescribes to us. The peculiar Character, by which the Law of Nature used to be distinguished from all others, is that of Universal Approbation and Consent. For it must needs be supposed, that what this Common Mother and Mi∣stress of us All, had really enacted and appointed for our Rule, would be readily obeyed by all her Chil∣dren; that in This there would be, as it were, One Heart and One Soul; and not only every Nation and Countrey, but every private Man would come in, and live in perfect Agreement with it.

Now, if we come to examine matter of Fact in this Case, we shall scarce find any one thing in the world, which is not somewhere or other disapproved and contradicted; not by a few particular Persons only, nor by one single Nation, but in several entire Countries; And on the other hand, there is not any thing in Our Apprehension so prodigious and unnatu∣ral, but some Countries have entertained it, and gi∣ven it not only the Countenance of a favourable Opinion, but the Authority of Custom and Com∣mon practice too. Neglect of increasing their Fa∣milies, and Indifference in point of Posterity; the Murthering of their own Parents, of their own Children, nay of their own Selves; Marrying with the nearest Relations; Pilfering and Stealing; Commerce and publick Societies of Robbers; pub∣lick Bartering away one's Liberty, selling and letting out their Bodies, and that in Persons of both Sexes; These are things in the opinion of most People very monstrous and detestable; and yet there are several Nations, which do not only connive at and

allow, but use them so, as to make them the Custom of the Country.

[unspec 11] What course then can we take, or which way shall we turn our selves to find out Nature and its Origi∣nal Institutions? 'Tis plain, our own Species have little signs of it left; and if there be any Impressi∣ons of this kind still unworn out, we must expect to meet with them only in Brutes, who want the Mercury we have, and so have not debauched and corrupted their primitive Constitution, by a trou∣blesome and restless Spirit, by the pretended Im∣provements of Art, nor the Real Fopperies of Ce∣remony. All which we have indulged to so extrava∣gant a degree, that there is some reason to suspect, whether even Beasts are altogether so sound, as they should be in this point; and if the keeping so ill Company as Mankind have not in some degree drawn upon Them the Infection of our Follies. The rest of the Creation however follow Nature entirely; they are content to stick and abide by that First and Universal Order, and Rule, which the Great Author and Governor of all, thought sit to establish, and appoint. Man is the only factious and discontented Creature; he breaks in upon the Con∣dition and good Government of the World; and while he professes to mend and polish what Nature hath prescribed, he confounds all with his Freedom of Will, and Gallantry of Spirit; ceases to be regular upon pretence of being more resined; and destroys Nature, while he goes about to exalt and add to it.

[unspec 12] In a word then, True Honesty and Integrity, That which is the very Foundation and Support of Wisdom, consists in following Nature, that is, to say, acting in agreement with right Reason. The Happiness, the Aim, the End, That wherein all the Ease, the Liberty, the Contentment of the Mind is comprised; and to be short, the utmost perfection we are capable of in this World, is to govern our Lives

and Actions by the Rule; which Nature hath set us; and keeping the Order of our Creation. And that Or∣der consists in this, That the meaner and more gross Appetites should be kept in due Subjection, and that which is the most excellent part of our Nature, should controul and bear sway. That is, When Reason governs Sense, and Truth is preferred before false and empty Appearances. And as the Needle, when touch'd with the Load-stone, rests at no Point but the North; And by sixing there becomes a Guide to Sailors in their Course: So Man is never in his due Position, when his Eyes are not sixed upon this Primitive, this Divine, this Universal Law of Human Nature. For That is the proper Compass, to direct his Inclinations and Opinions by; and all the other helps he enjoys, are but so many fresh Lamps kind∣led at this Original Light.

[unspec 13] Now although This be a Power from which no Man is excluded, yet I cannot but acknowledge, that the putting it in practice, and bringing the Endea∣vours of this kind to good effect, is not in every Man's power equally. Some do it with much greater Ease and Success than others. There are a sort of Persons, who seem to be made for Virtue; their Complexion and whole Constitution disposes and sits them for it. Their Tempers are so well mixed, so naturally sweet and gentle, that they feel in themselves a strong Inclination, and an Original Propensity to Goodness and Integrity, without any pains to bend their Assections by Art, or to subdue and correct them by Discipline and Study. This happy Frame of Mind is what I conceive to be prin∣cipally owing to the first Formation of the Parts; the Proportions and Composition of the Spirits and Humours; and afterwards, to the proper and kindly Nourishment of a good Milk, and the Care and Management of their Infancy and first Beginnings of Education. And those, who are thus inclined

to follow and comply with Nature and Reason, who bear a secret Reverence to its Dictates, and find little or no difficulty in submitting, are the Persons proper∣ly meant, when we speak of the Happiness of good-tempered Men; and such as we say, Nature hath been kind, or partial to. This natural and sponta∣neous Honesty now, which comes as it were into the World with us, is properly called Good Dispositi∣on, the Quality of a Soul and Body well put toge∣ther, and of Humours duly moderated; It is a Sweetness, Easiness, and Gentleness of Temper. By which I would not be so mistaken, as to be thought to make no difference between this, and a Softness, which is indeed an effeminate, sottish, un∣concerned, and vitious Easiness of Mind; which is managed and led by the Nose; hath no Courage, no Choice of it's own; strives to carry fair and be∣come agreeable to every body, and above all things declines giving offence to any; that will not do an Act of Virtue and Justice, if it be likely to displease; nor dares refuse the wickedest and most unbecoming Compliances, when the Favour and Opinion of Men lye at stake: These Persons have no regard in the Earth for Equity or Reason, the Merits of the Cause, or the Service of the Publick; but all their Considerations are fixed upon the Consequences, as to their own private Interest, and they look no far∣ther, than who is like to be obliged or disobliged, by what they do. It is of such wretched, poor∣spirited, Complaisant Persons, that you hear People frequently give that false and most unjust Commen∣dation; Oh he is a wonderful good Man! for he is kind even to the worst and wickedest Men; where∣as indeed This Charge is much more deserved and true of them; that such a Man cannot be a Good Man, because he is not severe to ill Men, but encou∣rages their Villany by his Mildness, and false shew of Good nature. Such a Goodness as this is, should

rather be called Harmlessness, for it is just like that Quality of little Children, and Sheep, and such other Beasts, as we commonly call poor, innocent, simple Creatures. But the true Sincerity and Honesty I am speaking of, hath a very different Character; it is a masculine, brave, vigorous, and active Good∣ness of Mind; a strong constant Affection, an easy, ready Inclination, by which the Soul embraces, and stands always bent to that which is consonant to Reason and Nature; and Nature in this sense is but another word for Goodness, and Equity, and Justice.

Again: There are many Instances, on the other hand, of Persons so cross and ill contrived, that one would be tempted to think them Monsters in Human Form. They have a Disposition singular and by them∣selves, so very rough and unmanageable, as if some evil Genius had shuffled them up together, in perfect Contradiction, and despight of Nature. In such Circumstances there is great difficulty; This vitious Disposition must be cured and corrected; the Harsh∣ness of it sweetned; its wild and bruitish Rough∣ness tamed and made gentle; its crooked, and stiff, and irregular Humours bended and bowed down, and made flexible and complying with the streight Rule and Plan of Universal Nature; which is the true Level and Standard, Men should bring themselves to. And the properest Remedy for effecting this Cure is for such People to betake themselves to the Study of Philosophy (as Socrates did) and to the serious and resolute practice of severe Virtue; which is a con∣stant Combat with Perverseness of Temper; a pain∣ful and vigorous conflict with all manner of Vice; a laborious Study and Exercise of the Mind, that re∣quires a great deal of Time and Toil, indefatigable Diligence, and strict Discipline. Virtue is attended with Hardship, and employed upon a subject, that can ne∣ver be easy; Labour and Sweat wat••h perpetually at the Gate of Virtue, and no Entrance is to be attained but by their

means; say some of the Antients to this purpose. And again: The Gods have set a high price upon Virtue, and sold it dear to Mankind, at the expence of great la∣bour and trouble. Now the End of all this Severity and Pains, which I propose to Men of this unkind∣ly Composition, is not to graft in a fresh Fruit upon the Crab-stock, not to introduce, I mean, a new, foreign, or artificial Honesty, and consequently such a one, as (according to the account already given of this matter,) would at the best be but oc∣casional and accidental only, and so, far short of that substantial and perfect Integrity I am aiming at: But the Design and effect of this Study must be to clear the Rust and Rubbish, to take away Obstru∣ctions, not to create, but to awaken the Powers of Nature; to snuff and trim this Lamp within, which is foul, and burns dim; and to quicken all those ori∣ginal Seeds of Goodness, that have been long kept down, and almost quite choaked and killed, either by any vitious Habit in particular, or by some perso∣nal Indisposition, and natural Defect. For the Eyes of the Mind are like those of the Body; the visive Faculty is formed with them, and inherent from the Beginning; and therefore the way of helping the Sight, is not to add any thing new, but to remove the Films that grow over the Pupil; as a Man wipes away the Dust from a Looking-Glass, to make the Reflexion clear and strong.

[unspec 14] From this Representation of the Case we may per∣ceive, * 1.40 that True Integrity may be distinguished into two sorts; The One Natural, easy, gentle, and even, which is properly called a Good Temper; The Other is acquired, full of difficulty, attained by labour and much pain, and This is termed Virtue; to both which we may add a Third, which is a kind of Com∣pound of the Two former, and so there will be Three Degrees of Perfection in the Case before us. The First and Lowest is an Easiness of Temper, a

Mind so well disposed, as to have naturally and of its own accord, a disrelish and aversion to all man∣ner of Extravagance and Vice; and this we may call Goodness, or Innocence. The Second and next Stage, which we call Virtue, consists in the Art and Labour of Prevention, setting it self with all its Force and Vigour, to guard the Avenues, to hinder the Advances of Vice, and check the very first Mo∣tions of the Passions, when they grow mutinous; and if the Insurrection be actually begun, to muster and arm all a Man's Forces to stop, and quell, and reduce them. The Third and Highest degree of all is a Mixture of Noble Resolution, and a Happy Tem∣per; so that the Man from both these met together, is so excellently well disposed, as not only to conti∣nue impregnable, but to be free even from Attacks. Not so much as a Temptation rises to give him Trou∣ble; the very Seeds of Vice are quite rooted out. Virtue is the only, the Natural Growth of this prosperous Soil; and becomes not the Habit, so much as the Complexion and Constitution of the Man. This Last may justly be styled Perfection; This and the First kind do thus far resemble one ano∣ther, and are both very differing from the Second; That they are silent and still, without difficulty, and without struggle, the natural Air, and constant Course of the Man, a cheap and easy Virtue, that costs him little or nothing; whereas the Second is a perpetual Conflict, and dwells in the midst of Hur∣ry and Alarms, and Battels. The last and most per∣fect of these Degrees, is acquired by a long and painful Study, a serious and constant Exercise of the Rules of Philosophy, added to a Good, and Generous, and Noble Nature, largely and liberally furnished; and a Mind enriched with all manner of good Dispositions. For in this Case Both must con∣cur; Nature and Industry must each do their part; and it cannot be entirely the work of one of these,

not all infused, nor all acquired. This is the End, which all the old Philosophers proposed to their Studies; but above all the rest, the Stoick and Epicu∣rean Sect, (I make no scruple of saying the latter did it as well as the former, though this I confess might seem strange, had we not the Testimony of Seneca, and several other Ancient Writers in confir∣mation of it.) These gallant Men look'd upon Dis∣grace and Contempt, Want and Sickness, Pains, and Tortures, nay even Death it self, to be Toys and Trifles, fit for none but Fools and Children to be anxious or concerned about. They did not only despise them, and endure them with Patience and Constancy, and gain an absolute Conquest over all the Troubles and Difficulties of them, whenever they made the Assault; but they went out into the Field, they sought and provoked them, Rejoiced in, as well as Triumphed over them. They look'd up∣on these Encounters as necessary Breathings for their Virtue, to keep it in Exercise and Vigour; and by the frequency of such Engagements, did not only secure and establish that Virtue, and render it Firm, and Steady, and Severe, (as Cato and some other renowned Stoicks for instance did) but even Cheer∣ful and Gay; and if that be not an improper expressi∣on, wanton and full of play, by the perfect Mastery they had got over all external Accidents and Things.

[unspec 15] Upon the stating of the whole Case, and compa∣ring these Three together, some who have but im∣perfect apprehensions of the noble Height and true Excellence of the Third Degree, have been incli∣ned to think, that the Second was the most Honou∣rable, and to be valued above either of the Rest; by reason of the Difficulties and Dangers it contends with, and the many painful and laborious Struggle•• the Attainment of it costs. And, as Metellus said, that the Doing Evil was a despicable thing, because it was the Effect of Cowardice and Laziness; so

the Doing Well, where it is without the expence of Trouble and Hazard, is look'd upon by these per∣sons, as too vulgar and cheap a thing; but the at∣tempting and going through with it, in despight of Hazards and Troublesome Oppositions, and where these attack us in great number, and labour hard to obstruct, and deter us from our Duty; This is the Commendation of a Good, and a Virtuous Person indeed.* 1.41 Whatever is excellent is Difficult, was, we know, the usual Saying of the Noblest Philosopher. But to deal plainly, and speak the Truth of the mat∣ter, the Difficulty of obtaining any thing does by no means alter the nature, or add to the real and in∣trinsick value of the thing it self; nor is it, as I have taken occasion formerly to observe, any just and warrantable Cause for raising it in our Esteem. Nay it is beyond all Controversy certain on the other side, that Natural Excellencies are much more desirable, and better than those that are studied and acquired. That it is much more Brave, and Great, and Divine to act by the motions and spontaneous Perfections of Nature, than with the most exquisite Dexterity and nicest Improvements of Art; in an easy, free, equal, and uniform manner, than with laborious Efforts, uncertainly, and with Doubt, and Danger, and Perplexity of Thought. It is in the former of these two Senses, that we term Almighty God Good, His Excellencies are his Nature, Essen∣tial to him; and if They could cease, he must cease to Be. And therefore to call not Him only, but even the Blessed Angels, and the Spirits of Just Men made perfect, Virtuous; is a Diminution and Dispa∣ragement to them. Theirs is properly Goodness too, but Virtue is a Title too low for the Happiness of unsinning Perfection, a State of Indefectibility,

and above the reach of all Temptation. 'Tis true indeed, in the Condition we now live, where Dan∣gers surround, and threaten, and Frailties betray us perpetually; Virtue makes somewhat of noise and clutter, and is forced to act with some Vehemence; and this gives it the Preference before Smooth and Still Goodness. For the generality of people always measure the Excellence of a Thing by the Shew, and the Difficulty; and admire that most, which costs dearest; but this is a false method of judging; and we are not much to wonder, if They are wrong here, who indeed are generally so in all their Esti∣mations of Men and Things. For these great Swel∣ling Performances, that look so big, and seem to be all zeal and fire, are not subsantial, nor to the pur∣pose; They are no part of true Honesty, nor the Products of that fix'd Principle we are speaking of; but rather intemperate Heats, and Feverish Fits, very different from that Wisdom we are now in quest of, which is healthful and moderate, gentle and calm, equal and uniform.

Thus much may suffice to be said of Honesty or Sincerity in general; For as to the several parts of it, and the particular Duties resulting from thence, they will come under our Consideration in the Third Book, and particularly, when we shall treat of the Virtue of Justice.

[unspec 16] And here I find my self under an Obligation, of discharging my Promise,* 1.42 in the necessary Addition of what follows in this Paragraph. To silence (if it be possible) the unjust Malice, and disadvantagi∣ous Character cast upon me by some who find fault with my (as they think them) Extravagant Com∣mendations of Nature; as if This were able to do every thing, and no other Assistances were required. To these persons it might suffice to reply, that by Nature I understand (as was observed before) the God of Nature, and the Dictates of Eternal Rea∣son,

written and engraved in every Heart by His Almighty Hand. I might also alledge, that the Sub∣ject of this Book is only Natural, and Human; and that the Author is not obliged by his Design to concern himself with any Virtues properly Divine, or the Advantages above the power of Nature to confer. But waving all this, I readily acknowledge, that to render the Virtue and Integrity I have been describing compleat, and give it all the Perfections it is capable of, one thing more is necessary: The Grace of God I mean; which must animate and invigorate this Goodness and Probity; shew it in all its lustre; give the finishing stroke, refine and exalt it from a mere Moral to a Christian Virtue. This renders it accepted at the Throne of Heaven, approved of God, capable of an Eternal Recom∣pence; and so crowns it both with Perfection here, and a Reward hereafter. It is not easy to find Ap∣posite Resemblances for Things which cannot present themselves to us by any sensible Ideas: But if you will pardon the meanness of the Comparison, I should almost venture, to compare the Probity here insisted on, to a Skilful Master, who touches the Keys of an Organ, with absolute Accuracy and Art; but all to no purpose, the Instrument is dumb, till the Wind express the Excellence of his Hand, by gi∣ving Sound to the Instrument; and making that Melody, which all his Mastery in playing was not able to do without it. Thus Moral Virtue is but a sort of Speculative Perfection, till the Grace of God inspire, and enable us to put it in Practice, and pro∣duce the Fruits of it.

Now This is a Blessing, which does not consist in refined Thought, nice Notions, and long or learned Discourses; it is not to be acquired by Rule, or the methods of Human Industry and Art, nor can we attain to it by our own Labour and Toil; the utmost we can do is to prepare, and endeavour to

qualify our selves duly for the receiving it; for after All, Receive it we must; It is a Gift that comes down from on high, and the very Name of Grace is designed to represent to us the Good Will of the Donor, and that the Gift is entirely free. Our part is to ask, to seek, to implore it, with all imaginable Humility, and the most fervent Desires we are ca∣pable of. To prostrate our selves before the Throne of Grace, and with the utmost Contention of Heart and Voice to say,

Vouchsafe, O my God, in thy Infinite Goodness to look down with an Eye of Mercy and Pity upon thy poor Servant; Accept and grant my Desires, assist my weak En∣deavours, and crown those good Inclinations, which are originally derived from Thee: The Law by which I stand obliged, the Light by which I am instructed in my Duty, are of thy Or∣dering; thou hast stamped our Nature with these Impressions of Good and Evil, and shined in our hearts by thy Precepts; O give Success to thy own Institution, and finish the work thou hast be∣gun; that so the Glory and the Fruit may redound to the Planters use, and thou may'st be first and last in all my Actions and Designs, my Thoughts and my Desires. Water me abundantly with thy Grace, and take me for thy own, that I who am of my self miserable, and poor, and naked, and blind, and weak, may be able to do even all things, through Christ, who strengtheneth me.

These are proper Addresses upon such an occasion, but the properest and most probable method to ob∣tain them, that is, to incline the Compassion of God, and dispose him to gratify such Desires, will be strict Moral Honesty, and a Conscientious Obser∣vation of the Law of Nature to the best of our power. For this, though it be not an absolutely Meritorious Cause, is yet a Conditional one, and a good Preparation for the receiving Supernatural As∣sistances;

as Matter ready disposed is cloathed with the Form, and the Vegetative and Sensitive Soul deri∣ved from our Parents, lead the way, and put all things in readiness, for the Accession of the Ratio∣nal and Intellectual one, which proceeds from God. Thus Human Wisdom is the Introduction to Divine, Philosophy the Handmaid to Religion, the Natural and Moral Duties of a Man subservient and Instru∣mental to the Liberty of a Christian, the Light, and Favour of the Children of God. He who does his best in the matters of Reason, and Morality, gives God an occasion of exercising his Bounty, and be∣stowing larger and nobler Virtues upon him. It be∣ing an equitable Method, and such as our Blessed Saviour assures us, God himself proceeds by, to trust that Man with more and greater Talents, who hath approved himself diligent and faithful in the good management of less. To this purpose are all those Holy Aphorisms. Thou hast been faithful in a very little, be thou ruler over much. God giveth the Holy Spirit to all them that ask him. To Him that hath shall be given, and He shall have abundance. God denies no man Grace, who does his utmost. God is wanting to no Man in necessary Supplies; and the like.

On the other hand, To live in Contradiction and Defiance to Men's Natural Light, is to put one's self out of all Capacity of God's Favour, and, as much as in us lies, to make it impossible for Grace to be gi∣ven us. Since He, who gives it, hath expresly de∣clared upon what Conditions Men are allowed to ex∣pect it; and if He exceeds those Measures, and be∣stows it upon persons wholly unqualified, This is be∣side the Common Method, and an excepted Case from his regular Dispensations. This obstinacy and perverseness is expresly mentioned, as the Reason why our Saviour refused to preach in some particu∣lar places; and, since the Evangelists, St. Cyril, St. Chry oslem, St. Augustin, and other of the Fa∣thers

have largely discoursed upon that matter to this purpose.

By all which it appears evidently, that Grace and Nature are not contrary Principles; for (in the Sense I have all along used the Term in this Chap∣ter) Grace is so far from forcing or destroying Na∣ture, that it is a gentle and seasonable Relief to it; nay, it strengthens, and crowns, and perfects Na∣ture. We must not therefore set these two in oppo∣sition to each other, but join both together, and put on the One as the Ornament, the Fulness, and just Finishing of the Other. Both proceed from God, though after different manners; and therefore we must neither put them at variance, nor confound them for want of duly distinguishing them asunder; for each hath its proper Springs, and peculiar Moti∣ons. They neither set out together, nor operate alike; though both came from the same place; and lead to the same End at last.

Nature may be without Grace, and when duly followed hath its commendation even then, in re∣gard to those Circumstances which admitted of no more. Thus it was with the Philosophers and Great Men heretofore, Persons whose Proficiency under this First and General Law, and their Attainments in all sorts of Moral Virtue, may be allowed to ex∣cite our Wonder, as well as challenge our Praise. Such likewise is the Case of all Infidels at this day; because the Grace we speak of is a Gospel-Blessing, and They who are not under the Evangelical Cove∣nant, have no Title to it. But Grace cannot be without Nature; because This is the Matter for it to work upon; for the business of Grace is to reform and perfect; and therefore This as necessarily sup∣poses Nature, as the raising of a Roof supposes a Foundation to be laid, and Walls already car∣ried up. The Organist may exercise his Fingers, 'tis true, upon the dumb Keys, and make his Hand;

but the Harmony must come from the Breath; or if it could sound, yet would it be but like St. Paul's tinkling Cymbal, of no worth or significancy at all: But all the Air in the World will never make Mu∣sick of the Instrument, without a Hand to strike the Keys. In This I have been the more particular, and descended to familiar Comparisons, because Some I find have suffered themselves to be led into very gross Mistakes upon the matter. Persons, who have never conceived a right and worthy Notion of that true Probity and entirely Honest Principle we have been recommending; but are blown up with strange Romantick Conceits of Grace; which they doubt not to attain, and practise eminently well, without any regard to Morality; and by a Scheme of Pharisaical Accomplishments; some easy, lazy, sormal Performances, which carry a great appearance of Sanctity to the World; but as for the real Sub∣stance, and inward Power of Goodness and Inte∣grity, they give themselves no trouble at all about it. I see great store of these Men in the World every day; but alas! I can find but very few such as Aristides, Phocion, Cato, Regulus, Socrates; no Epa∣minonda's, no Scipio's, no Strict and Conscientious Professors, I mean, of stanch and solid Virtue; and Philosophical, or if you please, common Justice, and downright Moral Honesty. The Reproaches and Complaints so liberally bestowed by our Saviour upon the Pharisees, and Hypocrites, will never be out of season; for the persons obnoxious to these always abound; and even those who set up for the Great Censors of Manners, the Zealous Railers at Vice, and Grave Reformers of the World, are not all exempt from this Charge themselves. But enough of this. I have spoken largely of the Virtue it self; now before I close this Chapter, I must take leave to add one word, concerning the disposition of Mind contrary to it.

[unspec 17] Now Wickedness (or Evil Practices and Tem∣per) is against Nature, it is deformed, odious, * 1.43 and offensive; all that can judge and discern must needs detest and loath it; which gave occasion for some to say, That it is a monstrous Birth, the Product of Brutality and Ignorance. It does not only provoke the Dislike and Aversion of others, but raises the In∣dignation of a Man's own Mind, who is guilty of it; Repentance and Self-condemnation are its cer∣tain Consequences. It gnaws, and corrodes, and frets the Soul; like an Ulcer in the Flesh; makes one restless and uneasy; out of Countenance and out of Conceit with himself; and is ever busy in contri∣ving and inflicting fresh Torments, as if it were or∣dained to be its own Executioner. Hence those Ob∣servations;

* 1.44None quits himself; his own impartial Thought Will damn; and Conscience will record the Fault:

And again,

Not sharp Revenge, nor Hell it self can find A fiercer Torment, than a Guilty Mind.

Hence† 1.45 Wickedness is said to drink the greatest part of its own Poyson; the bitterness and the dregs fall to its own share. Evil Counsel turns most to the prejudice of the per∣son that gives it. As the Wasp, though she may hurt and occasion some smart to the person stung by her,

yet does it self the greatest harm; and suffers more by the loss of its Sting, and being disabled for ever after. It is true, Vice is attended with some Plea∣sure; for were there not this to recommend it, Wickedness would never find any entertainment in the World. No Man ever was, or can be vitious, merely for the sake, or satisfaction of being so. But still, when we have allowed this Advantage of a short and sensible Satisfaction; yet we must not forget what follows, and how poor a business this is, in comparison of that lasting Displeasure, and Dissatis∣faction, it begets afterwards. So that, as Plato says truly, The Punishment constantly follows the Sin; or rather indeed, as Hesiod yet more nicely observes, They are Twin-Children, and come into the World together. Now the Case of Virtue is just the Re∣verse of This; It gratifies, and sooths us; leaves sweet and pleasing Remembrances behind: Fills us with inward Complacencies, secret Congratulations of our own Happiness, and inexpressible Satisfaction, in having done what becomes us. This is the true Reward of a virtuous Mind, a Happiness inherent and Essential to it. And the Applauses, and Joys, and Transports of a Good Conscience, as they are sure to us, and cannot be withheld by any who en∣vy our Virtue, or our Fame; so are they likewise, so large, and full; so generous and noble, and suffi∣cient, as may very well encourage, and satisfy us, during our continuance in this present World.

[unspec 18] That Vice is, above all things in the world, to be hated,* 1.46 abominated, and avoided, no body, that I know of, ever pretended to dispute. But some Que∣stion may be made, whether we are obliged to be so general, and irreconcilable in our Hatred, that it should be impossible for any Pleasure or Advan∣tage so desirable to offer it self, for the prospect of which the committing of any Vice might not be al∣lowable, at least excusable in us. Many people in∣deed

are but too apt to think, that there are several such reserved Cases, wherein the common Rules of Morality may be very fairly dispensed with. And, if we allow the Advantage to be publick, the Wri∣ters of Politicks make no doubt of it, (provided the proceedings be so qualified, as I shall have occa∣sion to advise, when I come to treat of the Virtue of Prudence in point of Government.) But some have not been content to restrain this Liberty to the necessities of State; but have enlarged its bounds be∣yond their just extent; and given the same Allow∣ance to the Private Pleasure and Profit of single Men. Now This is a thing not possible to be de∣termined in favour of their Assertion, without the Case were stated in all its Circumstances; and both the Person, the Quality of the Fact, and the Nature of the Advantage proposed, particularly specified. But otherwise, while we treat of the Matter simply, and abstractedly, it is a general Rule, not only in Religion, but in mere Morality too, That the pro∣spect of no Advantage or Pleasure whatsoever, will justify a Man in doing any thing Ill in it self, or which is contrary to his Duty and Conscience.

[unspec 19] Again; It is past a doubt, * 1.47 that Sin and Wicked∣ness hath it not in its power to furnish out Pleasures and Satisfactions so solid and agreeable, as Virtue and the Consciousness of one's own Sincerity, is able and wont to do; nay, it is most certain, that Vices are their own Tormentors, and execute severe Vengeance upon the Authors. But yet this is not universally, and in all Cases true; and therefore it is necessary to make some distinction of Persons and Circumstances. Now Wickedness, and Wicked Men may be distributed into three sorts. Some, first, are perfectly incorporated with Evil, they Reason themselves into it; their Resolutions and the whole Bent of their Wills are fixed entirely in its Interests; or else long Custom hath got such a perfect Mastery

over them, that they cannot Disengage themselves. These miserable Wretches are utterly abandoned; their very Understanding is vitiated, sees, consents to, and approves the Evil: And This usually is the Case, when Vice and Debauchery meets with a Strong and Vigorous Mind, and hath taken such deep root in it, that it comes at last to be naturalized, and of a piece with it; all the Faculties are tinctu∣red, it is corrupted throughout, and Vice so closely interwoven, as to become a part of its Temper and Constitution. Others, secondly, have their Intervals of Folly only; They are wicked now and then by fits, just as any violent Gush of a Temptation di∣sturbs or puts them out of their Course; or some impetuous Passion drives them headlong upon the Rocks; so that these Men are surprized, and carried away forcibly, by a Current too strong for them to stem. The Third sort are betwixt these two Ex∣tremes: They have a right Notion of Vice, consi∣der'd in it self; and when they reflect upon their Fault abstractedly, do severely accuse and condemn themselves for it; and thus they differ from the First Sort, who are advanced even to the desperate degree of a good liking of Wickedness: But then they have not the violence or surprize of Passions or Temptations to qualify and extenuate their Crime; and in this respect they differ from the Second sort too. But these Men go to work in cold blood, and with great deliberation; they weigh Circumstances, and drive a Bargain as it were; observe well the Heinousness of the Sin; and then put the Pleasure or Profit it brings, into the contrary Scale; and thus they bar∣ter away their Souls, and are content to be wicked at a certain Price, and for such as they think a va∣luable Consideration. They lend themselves to the Devil, for so much Interest to be paid for the use of their Persons; and are so foolish to think, that there is a great deal to be said, in excuse for such a

Commerce as this. Of this kind we may reckon Extortion, and Oppression, and Covetousness for Gain; and the Excesses and Debaucheries of Wine and Women for the sake of Pleasure; and indeed several other Sins committed upon occasions, though they be not reigning and habitual; such as Men think, and consult upon, and at last resolve wrong; where the Will is manifestly concerned, or where the Com∣plexion of the Man is apt, against his Reason and better Sense, to determine him.

[unspec 20] Now the First of these Three sorts are past repent∣ing by ordinary Means, * 1.48 and nothing less than an unusual, and almost miraculous Impression from Heaven can be supposed to reclaim them. For they are (as the Apostle expresses it) past feeling, and commit evil even with Greediness. The Stings and Prickings of Wickedness are very sharp and piercing indeed, but these Men's Consciences are so tough and harden'd, that nothing can enter them. Be∣sides, The Understanding, as was observed, is brought over to an Approbation of the thing; and so all Sense of Remorse must be lost, which proceeds chiefly from acting against our better Judgment; The Soul is entirely corrupted, the Distinctions of Good and Evil obliterated and worn away; and consequently the Will can be under no sollicitude to restrain, or refuse. The Third sort of Men, though they may appear in some measure to repent, and condemn themselves, yet in reality, and properly speaking, they do not. Take the Fact by it self, as a matter unlawful and unbecoming, and so they dis∣allow it; but view it drest up in all its gay Attire, with all the Circumstances of Pleasure and Profit, that recommend, and set it off, and you shall find them of another Opinion. They think the Advan∣tage of their Sin, a sufficient Compensation for the Guilt; and cannot be said to repent of That, which had the full and free Consent of their Reason and

Conscience; and with which they are always ready to close, as often as it shall proffer it self upon the same Terms. So that in Truth the Second sort seem to be the only persons, that are seriously concerned to repent, and reform. And since we are now upon the mention of Repentance, I shall take this oppor∣tunity to say one word upon that Subject.

[unspec 21] Repentance, is a Disposition, or rather an Act of the Will,* 1.49 whereby the Man disclaims, and so far as in him lies, undoes again what he had done before. It is a Grief and Sadness of Heart, but differing in this one respect from all other Pains and Passions of that kind, arising from external Causes, That Rea∣son begets, and heightens This, whereas it mitigates and expels Those. Repentance is wholly internal; the Ground and Foundation of it is from within, and upon that account it is more violent than any other: As the Cold of Agues and Heat of Fevers is more fierce and insupportable to the Patient, than any, which is ever occasioned by Objects from with∣out. Repentance is the Physick of the Soul; the Death of Vice; the only Health of Wounded Con∣sciences, and Depraved Wills. But though all Man∣kind must agree in the Excellent Effects and Com∣mendations of the thing, yet many mistake it; and therefore good care should be taken to distinguish aright, and be perfectly informed in this matter. As First; There are some sorts of sin, of which Men very hardly, and seldom repent; as was ob∣served just now concerning old inveterate Vices, such as Custom hath made in a manner natural and necessary, and the Corruption of the Judgment hath given Authority to, by determining in their Favour. For while a Man continues under the power of such Habits, and the Blindness of such an erroneous Choice; the sense of his Mind is with him; and he feels no Check or Reluctancy at all; so that Repentance, which implies such Regret, is

(usually speaking) terminated in Accidental and Occasional Miscarriages; the sudden and surprizing Faults, where there is not leisure for Deliberation to interpose; or the Violent Sallies of Passion, where the Judgment is over-power'd, and under some Con∣straint to do amiss. Another sort of things there are, which a Man cannot be said with any Truth or Propriety of Speech to repent of; and those are, Such as are out of a Man's own Power: At these in∣deed we may conceive a Just Indignation, or be much concerned, and extremely sorry for them; but we cannot be said to Repent of them, because This im∣plies not only Sorrow, but the blaming and con∣demning our selves, and failing in what we might have done better. Nor does That displeasure of Mind deserve this Name, which proceeds from the disappointment of our Expectations, or Events con∣trary to our Wishes and Intentions. We laid, as we thought, a very wise Project, and had a very fair prospect of Success; but Matters have happen'd quite otherwise, than we imagined it likely or possi∣ble for them to do; and some unforeseen Accident steps in betwixt, and blasts the whole Design. Now pray, What is all this to the Matter in hand? or what ground can here possibly be for Repentance? The Design, and the Method, were well and justly contrived; every wise and good Man would have taken the same Course. You have done your Duty; but you have not succeeded in it. And is that any fault of Yours? You advised well, and proceeded regularly; and this is the utmost Man can do. For we can neither command Events, nor have any po∣sitive knowledge before-hand what they will be. The Uncertainty of the Issue is the foundation of all Prudence and good Conduct, for were This sixt and foreknown, no place could be left for Deliberation and Management; And therefore there is not a greater weakness, nor a more unreasonable pretence

in the world, either for tormenting our selves, or en∣tertaining meaner thoughts of others, than Want of Success. Advice, and Conduct are by no means to be judged by the Event; for there is an unseen, and an unaccountable Providence, that directs all the Chances, that sometimes defeats the wisest, and prospers the weakest and most unpromising Coun∣sels and Undertakings. Again; Repentance is not, as some fondly suppose, that Change of Mind, which proceeds from Old Age, Impotence, want of Opportunity, or want of Inclination, or any such Disrelish, as either Satiety and Excess, or a natural Alteration of Palate, brings upon us. For there is a mighty Disserence between forsaking Vice, and being forsaken of it; between denying our Appe∣tites when they are keen and eager; and gratifying them by a pleasing Abstinence from what they are cloyed with already. Besides, To like any thing the worse upon these accounts, is really a Corruption of, and a Reflection upon our Judgment. For the things are still the same; the same Approbation, or the same Dislike, was due to them heretofore, no less than now; All the Change is in our Selves only, and that too is a Change in no degree voluntary or chosen, but purely necessary or accidental, the effect of Age or Sickness. We speak most improperly, when we say that a Man is grown wiser or better in such cases; for all the Reformation, that proceeds from humour or discontent; from disrelish or dis∣ability; is Fear, and Phlegm, Coldness, and List∣lessness. There is oftentimes not the least of Real Conviction, or any Principle of Conscience in it. And sure a feeble Body is a very unfit Conveyance, to carry us to God, and drive us to Repentance and our Duty. For true Repentance is somewhat very different from all this; it is a particular Gift of God, by which we grow wise in good earnest; a Remorse, which checks our hottest Career, even in the midst

of Springhtliness and Courage; and this is what must be created and cherished in us, not by the want of opportunities, or of power to use them, not by the weakness of a Body broken, and worn out, and grown unserviceable to Vice any longer; but by the Strength of Reason and Thought, and the better consideration of a Resolute and Vigorous Mind. For nothing more argues Greatness of Soul, than the Correcting our former Follies, and Steadiness in a new Course of Life; notwithstanding all the Diffi∣culties and Discouragements of an entire Reformation.

[unspec 22] Now One fruit of true Repentance, is a frank, and conscientious Confession of one's Faults;* 1.50 This is usually the Sign, the Consequence, and in some Cases so necessary a Qualification, that all Professi∣ons of Penitence without it are Hypocritical and vain. It is with the Mind in these Respects, as with our Bodies. For, as in Bodily Distempers there are two sorts of Remedies made use of, One, that make a perfect Cure, by going to the very Root, and removing the Cause of the Disease; Another, which only sooth the Patient, consult his present Ease; and are properly termed Quieting Medicines; and, as in this case, that former Application is much more painful, but withal more powerful and ef∣fectual, and better for the person, than the latter; So likewise in the Wounds and Sicknesses of the Soul, the true Remedy is of a searching and a cleansing quality; and This is such an Acknowledg∣ment of our Faults, as is full of Seriousness and Shame; a being content to take the Scandal, and the Folly of them upon our selves. But there is ano∣ther deceitful Remedy, which only covers, and dis∣guises them; its design is not to heal, so much as to conceal the Disease; and this consists in Extenuati∣ons, and Excuses; from whence we commonly say, That Wickedness makes it self a Garment, to cover its own Shame. This is a Remedy invented by the Au∣thor

of Evil himself; and it answers the Malice of his Nature and his purposes, by rendring the Party so much the worse, and obstructing the Methods of his Recovery. Such were the Shifts, and Shufflings, such the Covering of their Nakedness, which the First Transgressors made; the Fig-leaves and the Excuses were both alike, and made the Matter but so much the worse, while they laboured to mend it.

We should therefore by all means learn to accuse our selves; and get that necessary Conquest over our Pride and Self-love, as frankly and fully to con∣fess the very worst of our Thoughts and Actions, and not allow our selves in any reserves of this kind. For, besides, that this would beget a brave and generous Openness of Soul; it would likewise be a wonderful Check, and effectual Preservative, against all such Actions and Thoughts, as are not fit to be publickly known, and what a Man would be ashamed of, if they were so. For He that obliges himself to tell all he does, will be sure to take care not to do any thing which shall need to be con∣cealed. But alas! the Common Practice of this naughty World is the direct contrary to the Advice I am giving. Every Man is discreet, and modest, and secret in the Confessing; but bold, and free from all restraint, in the Committing part. For as indeed the Confidence and Hardiness of the Crime, would be very much curbed and abated; so likewise would it be in some measure compensated, by an equal frankness and hardiness in the accusing of our Selves, and acknowledging what we have done amiss. For whatever Indecency there may be in do∣ing an ill thing, not to dare to confess our selves in the wrong, is ten thousand times more odious and base. To this purpose we may observe, that there are several Instances of Persons eminent for Piety, and Learning; such as St. Augustin, Origen, Hippo∣crates, and the like; who have taken pains to dis∣abuse

the World, and to publish Books, wherein they confess and retract their own Mistakes and erroneous Opinions; and well were it, if People could be brought to such a Degree of Sincerity, as to do the same in point of Morals, and Misbehaviour. Where∣as now, they oftentimes incur a greater Guilt, by endeavouring to hide and smother a less; for a publick premeditated Lye seems to Carry some Aggravations along with it, which render it more abominable and more Vicious, than some other Facts commit∣ted in secret; though these be such as in their own Nature, are apt to raise a greater Abhorrence and Detestation in us. All This does but inflame the Reckoning; it either makes the first Fault worse, or adds a fresh one to it; and in either case the Guilt of the Man is not abated, but increased; and whe∣ther we count this Increase by way of Addition, or of Multiplication, the Matter comes all to one.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Popular Error.
• * 1.2

  Book I. Ch LII.
• * 1.3

  Book I. Ch. xxxix.
• * 1.4

  Second Thing, Ex∣emption from Passi∣ons;
• * 1.5

  General Re∣medies a∣gainst them.
• * 1.6

  Stupidity.
• * 1.7

  Praetulerim Scriptor delirus inersque videri, Dum men delectent mala me, vel denique fallant, Quam sapere & ringi.

  Horat. Epist. 2. Lib. 2.
• * 1.8

  A Counter-Passion.
• * 1.9

  Prevention.
• * 1.10

  Virtue.
• * 1.11

  Rom. 12.16.
• * 1.12

  Quam Docti fingunt, magis quàm nôrunt.
• * 1.13

  No••••••••m id sensiffe quod dicerent, quàm exercere ingenia ma•••••••••• ••••••••cultate voluisse videntur.
• † 1.14

  〈…〉〈…〉 singuntur, non ex Scientiae vi.
• * 1.15

  Cogitationes mortalium timidae, incertae adinventiones nostrae & Providentiae.
• * 1.16

  Hoe liberiores & solutiores sumus, quia integra nobis judi∣candi potestas manet.
• * 1.17

  Magna & generosa res animus humanus, nullos Tibi poni, nisi communes & cum Deo terminos patitur: Non idem sapien∣tem qui caeteros terminus includit, omnia il••i saecula ut Deo ser∣viunt. Nulium Saeculum magnis ingeniis Cl••usum; nullum non cogitationi pervium tempus. Quam natutale in immensum mentem suam extendere? & hoc à Naturâ formatus homo ut pa∣ria Diis velit, ac se in spatium suum extend••t.
• * 1.18

  B. 1. Ch. 37, 38.
• * 1.19

  Concerning those Egyptian and Assyrian Calculations, see Bishop Pearson en the Creed, Art. 1. Page 58, 59. where he plainly refutes the Account, according to the common computation of years, from their own Authers.
• * 1.20

  Nil admirari prope res est una Numici, Solaque quae possit facere & servare beatum.

  Horat. Epist. 6. L. 1.
• * 1.21

  Liberty of the Will.
• * 1.22

  In Negotio sunt negotij causà.
• * 1.23

  Ipsa se velocitas implicat, unde Festinatio tarda est. Qui ni∣mium properat seriùs absolvit.
• † 1.24

  Male cuncta ministrat —mdash; mdash;Impetus.
• * 1.25

  Qui sibi amious est, hunc omnibus seito esse amicum.
• * 1.26

  False Ap∣pcarances of it.
• * 1.27

  Crutus enim metuit foveam Lupus Accipiterque Suspectos laqueos, & opertum Milvins hamum, Odernnt peccare Boni Virtuti•• amore, Tu nihil admitres in Te formidine poemae; Sit Spes failendi, miseobis Sacra profanis.

  Hor. Epist. xvi L. 1.
• * 1.28

  What noti∣ens the world have of it.
• * 1.29

  What it is in Truth.
• * 1.30

  Substantia non recipit magis & minùs.
• * 1.31

  Rom. 2.12.
• * 1.32

  Rom. 1.18.
• * 1.33

  Quàm multa Pietas, Humanitas, Liberalitas, Fides exigunt, quae extra Tabulas sunt?
• † 1.34

  Quàm angusta Innocentia ad Legem bonum esse; latiùs Of∣ficiorum quàm Juris patet Regula.
• * 1.35

  Anima Legis Ratio.
• * 1.36

  Naturam si sequaris Ducem, nusquam aberrabis. Bonum est quod secundùm Naturam. Omnia Vitia contra Naturam sunt.
• * 1.37

  Sapientia est in Naturam converti; & ea restitui unde publi∣cus Error expulerit. Ab illâ non deerrare, ad illius Legem Ex∣emplumque formari sapientia est.
• * 1.38

  Simplex illa & aperta Virtus in obscuram & solertem Scien∣tiam versa est.
• * 1.39

  Mat. xxiii.
• * 1.40

  Three De∣grees of Perfection.
• * 1.41

  Difficilia quae pulchra 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plato.
• * 1.42

  Of Grace.
• * 1.43

  Wickedness.
• * 1.44

  —Prima est haec ultio, quòd se Judice, nemo nocens absolvitur.

  Juv. Sat. xiii.

  Paena autem vehemens, ac multo saevior illis Quas aut Caeditius gravis invenit, aut Rhadamanthus Nocte dieque suum gestare in pectore testem.

  Ibid.
• † 1.45

  Malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit: Malum con∣silium consultori pessimum.
• * 1.46

  Whether it be ever al∣lowable to do a fault.
• * 1.47

  Whether all Sin beget Repentance.
• * 1.48

  These Thr comparea.
• * 1.49

  Repentance.
• * 1.50

  Of Confes∣sing and Excusing Faults.