Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

The Fifth and Last Difference be∣tween Some Men and Others; taken from the Advantages and Disadvantages, by which Na∣ture or Fortune hath distinguish∣ed them.

PREFACE.

THis Last Distinction is abundantly notorious, and visible to every Eye; It hath indeed several Branches and Considerations included under it; but all I think may be conveniently enough reduced to Two General Heads; which, according to the vulgar way of Expression, may be termed, Happiness and Unhappiness; being High or Low in the World. To that of Happiness or Greatness, belong Health, Beauty, and other Qualifica∣tions and Advantages of Body and Person, Liberty, No∣bility, Honour, Authority, Learning, Riches, Reputation, Friends. In Unhappiness or Meanness of Condition are comprehended the Contraries of all These, which, without naming particularly, we easily understand to be the privati∣on or want of the foremention'd Advantages. Now these Particulars are the occasion of infinite variety in Men's Circumstances and Conditions of Life; for a Man may be happy in the Enjoyment of One, or Two, or Three of these Qualities, and yet not so in the rest; and even in

Those he hath, he may be happy in a greater or less De∣gree; and those Degrees are capable of being so many, that it is not easie, if at all possible, to express or conceive them. But upon the whole Matter, in the Distribution and Disposal of our Fortunes and Affairs, Providence hath so ordered it, that Few or None should be either hap∣py or unhappy in every one of these Respects. He then that partakes of most, and particularly those Three Ad∣vantages, of Nobility, Dignity or Authority, and Riches, is esteem'd Great; and he that hath none of those Three is reckoned among the mean Men. But several Persons have only One or Two of the Three; and so they stand in a sort of middle Capacity, between the two Extremes, and are neither High nor Low. We will speak very briefly to each of them.

As for Health and Beauty,* 1.1 and other Advantages that relate to the Body and Persons of Men, enough hath been said of them already; and so likewise of Sickness and Pain, which are Disadvantages contra∣ry to them.

CHAP. LVIII. Of Liberty and Servitude.

LIberty passes in the Esteem of many for a most eminent Advantage, and Servitude for a very grievous Evil; so exceeding great, that some have rather chosen to Die, and that after a very barba∣rous and painful manner, than to be made Slaves or Captives; nay, rather than come into any dan∣ger of seeing their own, or their Countrey's Free∣dom and Properties infringed, or usurp'd upon. But as in all Other Cases of the like Nature, so in This also, there may be a very Criminal Excess of

Partiality, and a fanciful Fondness of what we de∣servedly have a high esteem for. There is in truth a Twofold Liberty: The true and proper sort is That of the Mind; for This is in every Man's own Keeping and Disposal, no body can wrest it out of our Hands, nothing can impair or encroach upon it, not even the Tyranny of Fortune it self. On the other side, The Bondage of the Mind is the hea∣viest, and most wretched of all others; to live a Slave to one's Appetites and Lusts; to lie down in our Chains, and let our Passions prey upon us; to be led by the Nose by Prejudice, and Error, and Superstition: Oh This! This is a miserable Captivity indeed. The Liberty of one's Person is really valuable, but still that lies at the Mercy of For∣tune. And as valuable as it is, yet (unless it be attended with some very uncommon Circumstance to enhance its Worth) there can never be Justice or Reason in giving it the Preference above Life it self; as some of the Ancients have done, who chose to suffer, nay, to inflict Death, and make it the Work of their Own Hands upon Them∣selves, rather than not die free: And even of this (to me seeming) Extravagance we find large Com∣mendations, as if it were a more exalted Virtue than ordinary, so very dreadful Notions had they then of Slavery.* 1.2 It is (says One of them) the Obedience of an enfeebl'd and despicable Soul, that hath parted with its own Will. And yet as vile as they re∣present this State, very great and very Wise Men have liv'd in it; as Regulus, Valerian, Plato, Epicte∣tus; and have had the Misfortune too of very wick∣ed, unjust, and barbarous Masters; and yet they have never brought any dishonourable Reflections upon their Virtues, or thought Themselves one

whit the worse for it, because in truth and very deed, they still continu'd Free, and at their own Disposal; much more so than the Masters, who pretended to Dominion over them.

CHAP. LIX. Of Nobility.

[unspec 1] NObility is a Quality or Distinction receiv'd and valu'd in all parts of the World: It is a Mark and an Attractive of Honour and Respect, institu∣ted and brought into Use for very good Reasons, and much to the Benefit of the Publick.

[unspec 2] It is not every where the same; but differently reputed, and taken in divers Senses,* 1.3 according to the different Judgments of Men, and the Customs of the Countries where they live. From hence we find several Sorts or Species of it pretended to; but according to the common and most general No∣tion of the thing, it is the Quality of a Man's Fa∣mily. Aristotle calls it, the Antiquity of the Family, and the long Continuance of an Estate in it. Plutarch terms it the Virtue of the Family; meaning by this, some certain Character, and particular good Qua∣lity, for which our Ancestors were eminent, and which hath been propagated in Succession, and is continu'd in the several Descendents of that House. Now what this Quality is in particular, which should merit such a Distinction, hath not been agreed on all hands. Some, and indeed the greater part, will have it to be Atchievements in War; others add, or equal to this, Politick and Civil Prudence; whereby Men become necessary to the State by their Counsels, as the former do in

the Field: To These have likewise been added Eminence in Learning, and particular Offices in the Courts of Princes, as Accomplishments thought fit and sufficient to distinguish a Man's Family, and deriv•• Honour down upon Those that descend from him. But I think it must be acknowledg'd by all considering Persons, that the Military Honours have the Advantage, and deserve a Preference above all the rest, both because the Qualities of this kind are most serviceable to the State in its greatest Exigen∣cies and Distresses; and because it is the most pain∣ful and laborious, and exposes Men's Persons to the greatest and most apparent Dangers. From whence it is, that a particular Veneration and Re∣spect, a louder Applause and Commendation is allowed universally to Them; and that These by way of Eminence and Privilege, have attain'd to that distinguishing Character of Valour or Worth. Now according to this Opinion, Two things are necessary, and must both contribute as Ingredients to the Composition of that which is the True and Perfect Nobility. First, There must be the Professi∣on and Appearance of this Virtue or good Quality serviceable to the Publick, and this is as it were the Form; and then there must be the Family, in which, as in the Matter or proper Subject, this Quality is inherent; that is, there is requir'd a long uninterrupted Continuation of it, thro' several De∣scents, and Time out of mind. Hence, according to the vulgar Jargon, they are stiled Gentlemen, that is, Persons who are Branches and Descendents of the same Blood, and House; Bearing the same Name, and the same Profession of this distinguish∣ing Quality, for several Generations. That Person then is truly, properly, and entirely Noble, who makes singular Profession of some Publick Virtue; that renders himself useful and remarkable in the Service of his Prince and his Country; and is

sprung from Relations and Ancestors, who have done the same before him, in the respective Ages when they liv'd.

[unspec 3] Some, it is true, have separated these two Qua∣lifications, and consider'd them apart;* 1.4 as being of Opinion, that One of these singly, that is, Personal Virtue and Worth, without any Advantages of Birth, is sufficient to entitle a Man to this Honour. They think it hard that Men should be excluded, merely upon consideration of their Ancestors want∣ing the Excellencies, which they have rendred Them∣selves conspi••uous for. Now This is a Personal and Acquir'd Nobility; and very valuable it is; but yet the Vogue and Custom of the World hath so far obtain'd, that They think it very hard too, for the Son of a Cobler, a Butcher, or a Plough Man, to start up Noble, and be rank'd among the most Anci∣ent Honours, let his Service to the Publick have been never so great and valuable. But yet this O∣pinion hath got good booting in several Nations, and particularly among the ••urks. For they have no regard at all to a Man's ••lood, the Nobility of his Ancestors, or the Antiquity of his Descent; They look upon These Considerations to be full of unreasonable Partiality, Ch••cks and Discou∣ragements to Men's bravery; and therefore, to cherish the In••••••nations of doing ••••••••ously, they lay the whole Stress upon Personal Performances and Accomplishments; and particularly upon Actu∣al Courage, and those Excellencies that are purely Military. The other pare of this Distinction, is That which consists in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a Man's Fa∣mily only, where the Pre••••en••••••••s to Nobility are merely upon the account of his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with∣out any Profession of such a Quality as w•••• before mention'd and explain'd; and this is a Nobility which runs in the Blood, and is purely Natural.

[unspec 4] If we would state the Comparison between These Two Sorts thus divided, and each imperfect,* 1.5 when single and by it self, That which is purely Natu∣ral cannot but appear to any Man of sound Judg∣ment, the less worth and more defective of the Two, tho' a great many People think, or at least ex∣press themselves, otherwise upon the Matter: But it is the effect of most egregious Folly, or insuffe∣rable Vanity so to do. The Natural is an Accom∣plishment entirely anothers, and not in any Degree one's own.

* 1.6For Ancestors Divine Original, And Deed not done by Us, we Ours miscall. Sandys.

No other Person hath lived for our Honour; nor ought that to be reputed Ours, which was, long before we had a Be∣ing; And what can be more senseless, than for a Man to look big, and to value Himself upon a thing which is none of His? This is what may hap∣pen to the most vicious and profligate, the most trisling and insignificant Wretch alive; it may be the Portion of Fools, and Knaves, and Villains. Nor is it of any manner of Use or Advantage to Others; It is not capable of being communicated to the profit of those with whom we have any Dealings or Conversation; It contributes nothing of Pleasure or Satisfaction in Society, as Learning, and Justice, and Goodness, and Beauty, and Ri∣ches do, but is perfectly idle and fruitless. Those who have nothing else to recommend Them to the Respect of Others, but only This Nobility of Flesh and Blood, cry it up at a great rate, and have their

Mouths perpetually full of it. They swell, and vapour, and you are sure to hear of their Families and great Relations every third Word. And in∣deed they do wisely, and as becomes them; for This is making the best of their last and only Stake. And by this Mark they commonly distin∣guish Themselves; for you may depend upon it, there is no good Bottom, nothing of true Worth of their own, when they insist so much, and rest their Credit upon that of other Men. But alas! this is all Vanity and Shadow, and their Glory will be as fleeting and frail, as that which the Prophet re∣proaches Ephraim with, when it arises from such mean and wretched Instruments, as from the Earth,* 1.7 and from the Womb, and from the Conception; and lies all bury'd in Dust and Rubbish, underneath the Monuments of their Ancestors. These Men are like Criminals when they are hard pursu'd, that take sanctuary at the Altars and Sepulchres of the Dead; and in some former Ages, laid hold on the Statues of the Emperours for Refuge; so when they are beaten out from all Pretensions to true Merit and Honour, from any Qualifications properly their Own, they retreat behind the Banners and Atchieve∣ments of their Fore-fathers, and make their last Recourse to Monuments, and Pedigrees, and Coats of Arms. But what Advantage can it be to a Blind-Man, that his Parents had good Eyes? Or how does it help the Infirmities of a Stammerer, that his Grandfather had a smooth and voluble Tongue? Does the former of These see one whit the better? or is the latter ever the more eloquent or intelligi∣ble for This? And yet they are the Men of Infir∣mities and great Defects, that are commonly your vain Boasters, haughty in their Deportment, inso∣lent in Conversation, and treating with Contempt Men better than Themselves, because some body who is long since rotten in their Grave, was good

in his Generation: So extremely absurd, and con∣trary to all the Rules of Equity and Common Sense, is this extravagant Notion of Nobility by Descent only. A Father by his Frugality and Prudence raised the Family; and therefore the Prodigal Son, who squanders all away, and beggars the Family, values himself upon the Prudence of his Father. A brave General deserv'd the first and best Promo∣tion, and therefore his Great-Grandson, though a rank Coward, shall not only inherit his Titles and Estate, (in which there may be reason, because Men esteem Themselves rewarded by the Conti∣nuance of those external Forms and Honours to their Posterity) but this Coward, shall really think himself a better Man than another brave Fellow with whom he converses, because his Great-Grand∣father was brave. And yet, as extravagant as this Folly is in it self, it will be, and always hath been Epidemical. For Salust observ'd even in his Time,* 1.8 That Pride and a Disdainful Temper, was an Evil that usually went along with Quality and good Birth.

[unspec 5] As for that other kind of Nobility, which is Per∣sonal and Acquired,* 1.9 the Condition of it is the very Reverse of the Former. It hath very excellent Qualities and Effects; It is peculiar to the Possessor; he hath a full and indisputable Title, and Merit hath made it all his Own: It cannot be dispensed promiseuously, nor fall upon a Man that will be a Dishonour to it; and it is of infinite Benefit and Advantage to all who converse, or can any way come to be concerned with it. Nay, if we examine the Matter, it will be found that This hath the Advantage, even in the darling and so much-boa••ied Point of Antiquity too; and we are very fare, by sad Experience, that it is much

more rare and uncommon than the Natural. For from This it was, that the Natural first took its beginning; the so much celebrated Ancestors got their Nobility this way; and their degenerate Off∣spring are beholding to it in the Persons of Them, for all the Subject of their Vanity ever since. In short; This is real and substantial, it consists in Virtue, and Usefulness, and good Consequences to all Mankind; not empty, and dry, and a gay Idea; a Dream, and Creature of a deluded Ima∣gination only: This proceeds from the Mind and the very Man, not from the Blood and Body; and Minds are the same; every whit as ge∣nerous and great, and by Improvement and Indu∣stry frequently rendred more so in Others; tho' the Blood may differ, and not be Noble.* 1.10 Who (says S••n••ca) is a Gentl••man? The Man, whom Na∣ture hath disposed, and as it were out out sor Virtue; this Man is well born indeed: For the Man wants no∣thing else to make him Noble, who hath a Mind so generous, that be can rise above, and triumph over Fortune, let his Condition of Life be what it will.

[unspec 6] But these Two kinds dwell most amieably to∣gether, and often meet in the same Person,* 1.11 (as indeed there seems a great Aptitude and Dispositi∣on for them to do) and when they center thus in one Person, then the Nobility is perfect and com∣plete. The Natural is an Introduction, an Occa∣tion, a Spur to the Personal; for all things have a strong tendency, and very easily revere to their first and natural Principle. And as the Natural first took its Origine and Existence from the Personal, so it inclines and leads the Persons so descended to imitate, nay, to emulate the Glories of their Noble

Progenitors. The Seeds of Virtue and Honour are in them already.

* 1.12In Sons Their Father's Virtues shine, And Souls as well as Faces keep the Line.

This one Advantage is observable in being Nobly born, that it makes Men sensible they are ally'd to Virtue, and lays strong Obligations upon them not to degenerate from the Excellencies of their Ancestors. And sure there cannot be a more forcible Motive to spur and quick∣en Men in the pursuit of Glory, and the attem∣pting Great and Noble Actions, than the being conscious to Themselves, that they are come out of the Loins of those very Persons, who have be∣haved themselves gallantly, served their King and Country, and been eminent and useful in their Generations. Is it possible Men can please Them∣selves with these Reflections to feed their Vanity, as it is manifest they do, and not think at the same time how vile and reproachful it is in Them, to bastardize and bely their Race, to serve only as a Foil to their Forefather's Virtues, and cast back Darkness and Disgrace upon the Lustre of their Memories?

Nobility granted by the particular Patent, and partial Favour of a Prince, without any Merit to give a Title to it, and neither personal Accom∣plishments, nor an Antient Family to support and set it off, is rather a Blemish and Mark of Shame, than of Honour. It is a poor, pitiful, Parch∣ment-Nobility; bought to supply a needy King, or to feed a hungry Courtier; the Price of Silver and Gold, or the effect of Countenance and Ac∣cess; not the purchase of Blood and Sweat, as such Honours ought to be. But if it be granted

for any singular Desert, and signal good Services, then it falls not within the compass of this Notion; but is to be reputed personal and acquired, and hath a Right to all those Privileges and Com∣mendations, which were said to belong to that sort of Nobility before.

CHAP. LX. Of Honour.

IT is the Notion of some, but a very mistaken Notion sure it is, That Honour is the proper Price and Recompense of Virtue. Others have a little corrected this Notion, by calling it, the Ac∣knowledgment of Virtue in the Persons to whom we pay it, or the Prerogative of a good Opinion first, and then of those outward Respects, whereby we te∣stisie that good Opinion; for it is most certainly a Pri∣vilege that derives its Essence and Nature Principally from Virtue. Others call it Virtue's Shadow, which fol∣lows, or goes before it; as the Shadow does the Sub∣stance and Body from whence it is reflected. But, to speak more properly, it is the Splendor or Fame of brave and virtuous Actions, darted out from the Soul upon the Eyes of the World, and then rebound∣ing back again upon our selves, by that Demon∣stration it gives of what others think of us, and the mighty Satisfaction of the Mind resulting from this Sense of their Good Esteem.

Now, Honour is so very highly esteemed, so ve∣ry eagerly sought, that we generally balk no Dif∣ficulty to come at it. We endure any thing for its sake, despise every thing in Comparison of it; even Life it self is not thought a Purchase too

Dear to compass it. And yet after All, This is but a thin, airy Business, uncertain and sickle; foreign and at some distance from the Person receiving it, and the things for which it is paid. It is not only not Essential to him, not any part or Appurte∣nance of his Person, and Substance, but it searce ever comes home to him. For generally speaking, this Deference is given to Persons either Absent or Dead; and if Living, it is not accounted good Manners to praise them to their Faces; so that it waits without, and belongs to a Man's Name only; which bears all his Commendations and Disgraces, his Scandal, and his Respects; from whence one is said to bear a Good or Wicked Name.

Now, the Name is no part of the Nature of the Thing, but only the Image which gives us a Re∣presentation of it. A Mark of Distinction, to know it from other Things by: In a Word, some∣what that goes between the Essence of the Thing, and the Honour or Dishonour belonging to it. For it is applied to the Substance, and whatever is said of it, Good, or Fad, falls upon This; and is born by it. Now Honour, before it rests upon the Name fetches a kind of Circular Flight; and makes some stay upon the Action, the Heart and the Tongue. Whatever gallant, commendable Action is Atchieved, is, as it were, the Root, the Source, the Parent which gives birth and Being to Honour; for i•• truth, Honour is nothing else, but the Lustre and Resplendence of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 G••rious, or Benesi∣cial, or otherwise, Noble Expl••••t. Whatever Per∣fection a Thing hath in it self, with Regard to its own Intrinsick Worth; yet if it do not pro∣duce some Effect, which is Excellent, it is not ca∣pable of Honour; but, to all Intents and Purposes of this kind, as if it had never been at all. The next Advance is made into the Mind, where it first begins to live, and is form'd into good Opinions,

and Venerable Esteem. Then it comes abroad in the last Place, and rides Triumphant upon Men's Tongues and Pens; and so reflects and returns back again, upon the Name of the Person, who did that Celebrated Action, from whence it first set out (As the Sun returns Daily to the Point from whence his Motion began,) and when it hath finish'd this Course, it from thenceforch car∣ries the Name of Honour, Praise, Glory, Renown, or the like.

But to what Sorts of Performances this Recom∣pence is due, hath been a Question much disputed. Some Persons have delivered their Opinion, that Honour does not only, nor properly consist in a Man's behaving himself well, where great and diffi∣cult Posts are to be filled and managed by him (for every Man's Circumstances will not furnish him with Opportunities of weighty Administrai∣ons) but in the faithful Discharge of the Duties of each Person's particular Profession, be the Ca∣pacity of the Man what it will. For all Com∣mendation is the Effect and Reward of a Man's performing commendably, that which is his pro∣per Business to do. Thus we find Reason and Com∣mon Sense, determine us in publick Theatres, which are but so many Images in little of this Great Theatre of the Universe. The Condition and Splendor of the Character is not enquired in∣to, nor weighs at all with our Judgments; but He, who upon the Stage, plays the Part of a Servant or Bussoon, if he do it well, and to the Life, meets with as much Applause, as if he had repre∣sented a General, or an Emperour. And he that cannot work in Gold, if he shew the Perfection of his Art, and carve the Postures and Proportions well, in Copper, or in Plaister, is reputed a good Statuary; because this Excellence depends not up∣on the Fineness or Value of the Materials, but in

the Skill shewed upon them. But yet it seems more reasonable to think, that Honour is an Ad∣vantage for something more Noble and Sublime than Ordinary; and that no Actions, but such on∣ly, which have Difficulty or Danger in them, can make just Pretensions to it. Those that are but just what they ought to be, such as our re∣spective Stations require, and proceeding from a Sense of Obligation and Duty, cannot aspire to so great Worth, nor put in for so ample a Reward; a Reward which is disparaged by being made Com∣mon or Ordinary, and not suited to all Degrees of Persons and Performances. Thus every vir∣tuous and chaste Wife, and every Man of Inte∣grity and good Conduct, is not therefore a Per∣son of Honour. For there must go more than Probity to the denominating them so; there must be Pains, and Difficulty, and Danger; nay, and, some will tell you, there must be somewhat of general Good, and Advantage to the Publick, to justifie that Chara∣cter in its full and true Extent. Let a Man's Actions be never so Good, never so Useful, if they be private and the Advantage redound to himself alone, another sort of Payment belongs to them. They will have the Approbation of his own Conscience; they will procure the Love, and Favour, and good Word of his Neighbours and Acquaintance; they will ensure his Safety, and put him under the Protection of the Law; but except the Influence and Advan∣tage of them be large and diffusive, they cannot come up to Honour; for Honour is a publick Thing, and implyes more of Dignity; and comprehends Splendor and Noise, Admiration, and Common Fame in the Nature and Notion of it. Others add farther, that an Honourable Action must not be a part of our Duty, but perfectly free and su∣pererogating; for if Men were obliged to it, all ••retension to Honour is lost.

[unspec 3] The Desire of Honour, and Glory, and a Sol∣licitous seeking the Approbation and good Opini∣on of Others, is a very vicious, violent and pow∣erful Passion. The Inordinacy whereof hath been sufficiently explained and proved already in the Cha∣pter concerning Ambition.* 1.13 But as Bad as it is in it self, it does great Service to the Publick. For it restrains Mens Extravangancies, and keeps them within the Bounds of Decency and Duty; it awa∣kens their sleeping Powers, shakes off Sloth, and kindles in them generous Desires, inspires great Thoughts, and Glorious Actions. Not that it is much for their Credit to be acted and invigora∣ted by so corrupt a Principle; but rather a Testi∣mony and strong Evidence of the Weakness and Poverty of our Nature and Condition; who are thus forced to use and accept clipt and counter∣feit Money in Payment, when Standard and true Sterling cannot be had. But for the Determining precisely in what Cases, and how far this Passion is excusable, and where it is to blame, and must be rejected and disallow'd; and for the making it ma∣nifest,* 1.14 that Honour is not the proper Recompence of Virtue, I must refer you to those Distinctions and Discourses upon it, which will occur here∣after.

Of the Marks of Honour there is great Variety; but the most desirable and charming, are Those, where there are no Mixtures of private Gain and Interest; such as nothing can be drawn out of, nor any Share lie in Common, for the Advantage of a Vicious Man; or of such low and inferiour People, as shall pretend to serve the Publick by mean and dishonourable Offices. The less of Ad∣vantage they bring with them, the more Valuable they are. And accordingly we find the Ancients infinitely fond of, and with all their Industry and Pains, aspiring after those, which had nothing else

to recommend them, but purely their being Marks of Distinction, and Characteristical Notes of Ho∣nour and Virtue. Of this Nature in the several Republicks of old, were the Garlands of Laurel and Oaken-Leaves, (and so are the particular

Bearings in Coats of Arms at this Day, added to the former Charges of the Field, upon some special piece of Service) distinct Habits,

and Robes; the Prerogative of some Sirname, as Afri∣canus to Scipio, and the like: Precedence and Place in publick Assemblies, and Orders of Knighthood. It may also fall out, that, when a Man's Deserts are Notorious and Celebrated, it shall be more for his Honour, not to have these Ensigns and Marks, than to have them. And therefore Cato said well, that it would make more for the Glory of his Name and Virtues, that People should ask why the City had not erected a Statue to his Memory in the Forum, than that they should enquire, why they had done it.

CHAP. LXI. Of Learning.

LEarning is, without all Dispute, a Noble and Beautiful Ornament; an Instrument of ex∣ceeding use, when in the Hands of one, that hath the Skill to use it aright. But what Place and Pro∣portion it deserves in our Esteem, is a Matter not so generally agreed upon. And here, as in all Cases of the like Nature, Men fall into Extremes, and are to blame in both; Some in overvalu∣ing, and Others in disparaging and under∣valuing it. Some run it up to that Extravagant

Height, that they will not allow any other Ad∣vantage to come near, or be thought comparable to it; They look upon it, as the Supreme Happiness; a Ray and Efflux of the Divinity; they hunt after it with Eagerness and insatiable Appetite; with vast expence, and indefatigable Labour and Pains; and are content to part with Ease, and Health, and every Thing in exchange for it. Others as much diminish and despise it; treat Those with Scorn who make it their Business and Profession. And when we have observed this of either side, I sup∣pose my Reader will make no Difficulty to allow, that a Moderation between both is best, most safe, most just and reasonable. I, for my own part, were I to execute the Herald's Office in this Di∣spute, should think that Place is without all que∣stion due to Integrity and Prudence, to Health and Wisdom, and Virtue, nay,* 1.15 I should not scru∣ple to give precedence to Skill and Dexterity in Business: But then for Dignity, and Noble De∣scent, and Military Valour, I should think they might go together Hand in Hand, or leave them to dispute the Priority out among Themselves: But if I were press'd, and must deliver my Sense freely and particularly, sure it is equal in Honour to These, or at least the very next after them.

Now, as Sciences differ from each other ac∣cording to the Subjects of which they treat, and the Matters they are employed about; and also in the Manner of acquiring, and attaining to a Mastery in them; so do they likewise in the Use∣fulness, the Reputableness, the Necessity, the De∣cency, the Fame, and the Gain of them. Some are purely Speculative, and aim at nothing far∣ther, than merely Contemplation, the entertain∣ing, informing, improving, brightening our Intel∣lectual Faculties. Others are Practical, and lead us directly on to Action. Some again are Real,

and Conversant in Things; they bring us acquaint∣ed with Matters that are without us, either Natu∣ral or Supernatural Objects; Others are Nominal, They concern Discourse only, teach us Languages, explain Terms of Arts, help us to express our selves properly, and to reason regularly and closely. Now, from this short Account, we may boldly say, That upon a Review of the foregoing Distinctions, Those Sciences, which are most Manly and Reputable, most Useful, most Necessary, and have least of Glory, and Vanity, and sordid mercenary Profit attending them, are infinitely Preferable to the rest. By the same reason then it follows beyond all Con∣tradiction, that the Practical Sciences are of all others the most excellent; such as propose the Good and Happiness of Man for their End, and direct all their Instructions thither; that teach us to live, and to die well; to command and go∣vern, to submit and obey as becomes us; and there∣fore These are worthy our most Serious Applica∣tion: Who ever pretends to Wisdom, must lay out his Study and his Time here; and of such, this Book is design'd to be a Compendious Summary and Abridgment: that is, of Morals, Oeconomicks, and Politicks; the First for governing our Selves well; the Second for mannaging our domestick Af∣fairs, and presiding over our Families well; and the Third for discharging our publick Offices well, if we be call'd to any part in the Administration of the Government; or if we be private and sub∣ordinate only in both the last Capacities, then to consider and make good the Duties incumbent up∣on any the meanest and most inferior Character. Next to these Practical Sciences, the Natural are to be regarded and esteemed, which let us into the Knowledge of this System, and Fabrick of the Universe, and the infinite Variety of Creatures con∣tained

in it; and that, both for our own Use and Benefit, so far as they can be serviceable to us, and also to excite our Wonder, and Praise, and most Humble Adoration of His incomprehensible Majesty, and Goodness, and Wisdom, and Power, who is the Great Master-Builder, the constant Pre∣server and Governour of All, and every Part of it. As for all the rest, they are empty and frothy Things in Comparison; and though we may call in upon them by the by, and for a little while, yet ought we not to set up our Rest there, nor make them the Business of our Lives; because the Use and Effect of them is of no great Con∣sideration, and they contribute nothing at all towards the making us one whit better Men. To what purpose then is all that Time, and Trouble, and Expence, and how can we think it otherwise than lost, or misemploy'd, which we see Studious Men sometimes lay out so liberally upon them? It is true, they may serve to get Money, or to raise something of a Reputation among the Peo∣ple, but it is where Men are Ignorant or ill-govern∣ed only: For otherwise they will seek and encou∣rage such Studies, as bring solid Comforts and Ad∣vantages, and are built upon a firm Bottom.

CHAP. LXII. Of Riches and Poverty.

THese are the two Foundations and Beginnings, the Root and Source of all the Troubles and Calamities, the Disorders and Disturbances, that confound, and put the World out of Course: For excess of Plenty and Riches exalts and puffs up the Possessors, renders them haughty and insolent, swells them with Pride and Disdain, prompts them to, Luxury and Extravagance, to Sensuality and all manner of unlawful Pleasures; encourages them to use their Inferiours contemptuously, and to insult over their Wants and their Miseries; makes them bold and daring, and in con••idence of their Power, puts them upon seditious and dangerous Attempts. The extreme Poverty of Others subdues and dejects their Spirits, poysons them with Envy and restless Jea∣lousie, with Indignation and Spight, Discontent and Despair; and, since Matters, they think, cannot be worse, provokes them to try their Fortunes, and make a desperate Push, in hopes they may be bet∣ter. Plato calls the Poor the Bane and Fl••gne of a Commonwealth. So that both these sorts of Men are very dangerous; but whether of the Two is more so, Considering People have not agreed. Aristotle is of Opinion, that Abundance is more formidable to the Publick, than Want; for the State hath not much to fear from Them who desire no more than a bare Subsistence; but it hath reason to be jealous of Those, whose Wealth makes them Ambitious and Aspiring; and whose Interest and Authority,

upon the account of that Wealth, gives them Power and Opportunities to be very troublesome. Plato thinks Poverty the worse; for when Poor People are grown desperate, they are furious and terrible Creatures; when they are irritated and enrag'd with want of Bread, and cannot live upon their Work; when Trading is dead, and they are overburden'd with Taxe; then Necessity, (which is a great Mistress, and finds her Scholars very apt) teaches them That, which they would never have ventur'd upon in better and more easie Circumstances; and this makes them bold as Lions: For tho' each of them single can do little or no hurt, yet their Num∣bers are always great, and these give them Confidence. But whatever the Disease be, 'tis certain the Remedy is more ready at hand, and the Cure easier, for the Poor than for the Rich; this Mischief is quickly re∣strain'd, and may be timely prevented. For so long as they have Necessaries, so long as they can carry on their Trades, and maintain their Families by them, they are generally contented. And therefore it highly concerns all Governours to preserve and encourage Trade, because in so doing they are sure to keep good Order among the laborious, and hardy, and most ne∣cessitous; which to be sure are generally the most nu∣merous part of their Subjects. In the mean while, we may observe this very remarkable Difference between them, that the Rich have the Temptation within Themselves, and are formidable upon the account of their own Personal Vices, and the Circumstances they are in; but the Poor are not so from Themselves, nor their Condition, but if ever They min••ster just cause of Fear, it is commonly thro' the Indiscretion or the Cruelty of their Governours, who suffer them to be driven to the last Extremities; and when these pinch hard, and are no longer supportable, they are provok'd to play a desperate Game in their own Defence.

[unspec 2] Now several Lawgivers, and eminent Politicians have apply'd their Minds to contrive proper Methods for the keeping off, and securing the States they for∣med,

or presided over, from the Inconveniences atten∣ding each of these Extremes; and such as so vast a Disproportion of Estates and Fortunes will naturally expose the Publick to. They have been therefore de∣sirous to bring all nearer to a Level, to reduce the one, and raise the other; so that there should be a kind of universal Mediocrity, and pretty near an equal Scant∣ling: When Things stood upon this Foot, they pro∣mised Themselves a sure Foundation of Peace and A∣mity, and good Correspondence, by removing all the Grounds of Contempt on the one hand, and of En∣vy and Jealousie on the other, quite out of the way. Others have stretched this Project yet further; they are for introducing a common Stock, and leaving no peculiar Rights or Properties at all. But this is im∣practicable, and fantastical, and never can exist long any where, but in Men's own Brains and Imaginati∣ons. Nor is that other Design of Equality any more practicable, or indeed at all possible. For tho' Men's Income be alike, yet their Expences and Occasions will be far from being so. These may vary upon a Thousand Accidents; but it is enough that every body is able to see and instance in one, which is perfectly unanswerable; and that is the Number of Children, which we all know neither do, nor ever can increase in every Family alike. And therefore it must needs be insufficient, and the Design lost, where the Ne∣cessities are not, nor ever can be equal. All the At∣tempts that have been at any time made toward the putting in practice this Levelling Principle, have scarce ever been able to set it on Foot: It costs more than the Thing is worth to come to it; and if Men could arrive at it, yet it is highly inexpedient, and not at all to their Purpose. The End they aim at is never thus to be compassed; for after all, this is at last but to open another Door, and let the very Mischief in the back way, which we take so much Pains to keep out. For if Hatred and Contention be the Evils we are afraid of, where do we find These more frequent

and fierce than between Equals? How can we indeed reasonably expect it otherwise, where Men think Themselves a Match for one another, where there is no Distance or Respect to Temper, no Fear to curb and bind them to the Peace and their good Behaviour? If Envy and Jealousies arise against Superiours, so do they likewise among Equals; and this latter sort is the Seed of Disturbances and Confusions, Seditions and Civil Wars. Some Disproportion therefore is ab∣solutely necessary, but such as is moderate, and may keep the Balance even and steady. Order is like Har∣mony; if all Sounds wee the same, there could be no Musick; but yet it is necessary these different Notes should agree in general Cords, and retain some Proportion to make the Composition regular and sweet. But a perfect Level is like a continu'd Uni∣son; and nothing is more flat,* 1.16 nothing more unequal than an exact Equality.

[unspec 3] This so very great Disparity of Estates and Possessions prceeds from several very different Causes; but more especially from Two. The One is unjust Borrow∣ings, and hard Loans; when Men are forced and content to take up Money at any rate, and submit to all the unconscionable Interests that Griping Usurers put upon them; by which means those Unjust Cre∣ditors eat into their Estates, gnaw out their very Heart and Bowels, and by degrees swallow all, and so grow fat upon the Substance of other People. To such as These may that Complaint of the Psalmist not improperly be apply'd,* 1.17 They eat up my People as they would eat Bread. The Other is by Disposals of Estates, and that either by Men during their own Life-time, in A∣lienations, Dowries, and Portioning of Children when they Marry, or set up in the World; or else by last Will, and Bequest at the time of their Death. By all which Means, and by the Frugality and good Ma∣nagement of some, and the extravagant Profuseness

of Others, it comes to pass, that some Men's Fortunes are prodigiously increased, and others sunk and crum∣bled into nothing. A Prodigal Heir makes all fly, and his Posterity continue poor after him: A great Fortune marries with a vast Estate; and here one Heap is pil'd upon another: A rich Heiress carries off the Estate and Paternal Seat, incorporates it into another House, and so the Wealth and Name of her own Fa∣mily is either dreadfully maim'd and enfeebl'd, or cut off and quite extinct at once. These are plain and obvious Reasons, why some Men gain such mighty Advantages over Others; and shew us how some Fa∣milies are reduced to nothing, and others again flou∣rish as much, and are wonderfully strengthen'd and exalted. Now all these things should be taken into Consideration, and other Measures taken to regulate and reform the Mischiefs that grow from them. For tho' a perfect Equality be impracticable, yet a con∣venient Moderation is not: And if all be not Even, yet there is no necessity that all should be in Extremes; we may, and it is reasonable we should bring Matters nearer together, and make some tolerable Approaches towards such a Mediocrity as is reasonable. Such an one as is reasonable, I say; for an entire and tho∣rough one is neither reasonable, nor expedient, nor honest. This may be effected in some good Degree by private Persons, in the management and dispo∣sal of their Own Affairs: And it may be advanc'd higher by the wholsom Constitutions and Counsels of Those in a publick Capacity: And both are con∣cerned to have Regard to it. But of this we shall have some occasion to speak more at large, when the Virtue of Justice comes to be treated of.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Chap. VI Chap. X
• * 1.2

  Servitus obedientia est fracti & abjecti Animi, arbitrio ca∣rentis suo.
• * 1.3

  Description of it.
• * 1.4

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 guished.
• * 1.5

  Of Natural Nobility.
• * 1.6

  Genus & Proavos, & quae non fecimus ipsi, Vix ea nostra voco.

  Ovid.

  Nemo vixit in gloriam nostram; nec quod ante nos fuit, nostrum est.
• * 1.7

  Hosea ix. 11.
• * 1.8

  Contemptor animus & superbia commune nobilitatis malum.
• * 1.9

  Acquired and Perso∣nal
• * 1.10

  Quis generosus? Ad Virtutem à Naturà bene compositus, Animus facit nobilem, cui ex quàcunque conditione su∣pra fortunam liceat surgere.
• * 1.11

  Both toge∣ther.
• * 1.12

  Fortes creantur Fortibus & Bonis, &c.

  Horat. Ode 4. Lib. 4.
• * 1.13

  Chap. xxii.
• * 1.14

  Book III. In the Vir∣tue of Tem∣perance, Ch. XLII.
• * 1.15

  See Book III. ch. 14.
• * 1.16

  Nihil est aequalitate inaequalius.
• * 1.17

  Psal. liii. 5