Of wisdom three books / written originally in French by the Sieur de Charron ; with an account of the author, made English by George Stanhope ...

CHAP. XXXIV. The Second Way of considering Man; which is, by stating the Comparison between Him, and other Animals.

[unspec 1] HItherto we have consider'd Man entire, and with regard to Himself alone:* 1.1 The next Step, by which we propose to advance in the Knowledge of him, is by stating a Comparison between Him and other Animals; and This is a very excellent help toward making a right Judg∣ment in the Case. Now this Comparison is of large extent; it consists of many Branches, re∣quires great Skill, and wou'd prove of mighty Be∣nefit and Consequence, if well and truly made: But the Question is, Who must make it? Shall Man? He is a Party in the Cause, and liable to very just Exception; for it is much to be fear'd, when the Issue is his own Concern, the Verdict will not be honest. And accordingly we see, how partial and unfair he is in all he says of Himself; for he knows no Mean, he proceeds with no Moderation, but is eternally in Extremes. Some∣times he is big, and pleas'd with Himself; looks down upon the lower World with Disdain; and calls himself the Lord of all the Creatures; divides their Morsels among them, and cuts out for each Species, such a Proportion of Faculties, and natural Power, as His Lordship, vouchsafes to allow them: At Other times, instead of all this Gayety and Pride, you find him full of black Discontent, and then he debases himself as much, murmurs and frets, grum∣bles

and complains, gives Providence hard Words, and calls Nature a cruel Step-mother, that hath made him the Refuse of the World, the most wretched of all her Productions; and dealt to Him the least and lowest Portion of all her Chil∣dren. Now in truth, both the One and the Other of these Opinions are equally false, unreasonable, and extravagant. But what can we expect better from him? or how is it to be thought, he shou'd carry himself evenly and fairly, and act justly with other Creatures, when he is, as we shall shortly see, so infinitely out of all measure, in his Notions towards God, his Superiour; and Man, who is his Equal? But, besides this Byass upon his Judgment, there is another Difficulty upon his Understanding: For which way shall he get a com∣petent Knowledge of the inward Powers, and un∣seen Motions of other Animals? So that if he were inclin'd to be Just, and to hear the Evidence impartially, yet he must needs be an improper Judge, to whom the most material part upon which the Sentence ought to be grounded, can∣not be given in Evidence. And such are those inward Operations of Brutes, which we can have no certain or competent perception of. How∣ever, we will try at present to state this Com∣parison, as evenly, and calmly, as we can pos∣sibly.

[unspec 2] Now first, we are to consider, that the Order and Constitution of the Universe is not vastly unequal; There are no great Irregularities, nor large void Spaces in it; nor such Unlikeness and wide Disproportion between the several Parts that go into this Composition, as some People may imagine. The Excellencies of the several Species rise and fall gradually; And those, whom Na∣ture hath placed near, or close to one another, have all of them a mutual Resemblance; tho'

some have more, and some have less of it. And thus we may observe a near Neighbourhood, and close Affinity between Mankind and other Ani∣mals. They are a-kin in many things, and seve∣ral Properties are alike, and common to both. Se∣veral things indeed there are, wherein they dif∣fer; but these are not so vastly disproportionate and distant, but that they still are next adjoyning Links, twisted within one another, in the great Chain of the Universe. So that Man is neither in all respects superiour, nor inferiour in all. For that which befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beasts; even one thing befalleth them both; says the Wisdom of God himself. (Eccles. iii. 19.)

[unspec 3] We will begin with those things which are com∣mon to both, and very near the Matter of being alike in both; such as, Generation, Nutrition, Motion, Acti∣on, Life and Death. For (says the same Divine Wisdom) As the one dieth, so doth the other; so that a Man (in this respect) hath no Pre-eminence above a Beast. And This is a Confutation of those fool∣ish repining People, and all their melancholy Com∣plaints, that represent Man, as the only Creature, whom Nature hath discountenanc'd and disgrac'd, abandon'd and forsaken; turn'd naked into the wide World, and cast upon the bare Ground; without any Covering, without any Natural Wea∣pons to shelter or defend him; bound up, and swaddel••d; and utterly ignorant and unfurnish'd of what is fit for him: Whereas to all Others she hath been much more bountiful; Clothed them with Shells, or Hair, or Wool, or Shag, or Fea∣thers, or Scales; Armed them with Tusks, or Horns, with Bills, or Claws, or Talons, to act offensively or defensively, as occasion requires; qualify'd them, without any help of Art or Industry, for Swimming, Running, Flying, Singing, Looking out for Food, and Sustaining themselves. But Man, poor

neglected Man, (they tell you) is Taught to Go, Taught to Speak; nay, requires Help and Teach∣ing for the very Feeding and Supporting himself, and attains to nothing without Time and Trou∣ble, and serving an Apprenticeship. In short; He is perfect in no other Instance of Nature's teach∣ing, except that of Crying: This is all we bring into the World along with us; and a very fit Em∣blem it is of our Fortune and Condition. Now all these melancholy Complaints, which make dis∣advantageous Reflections upon the Original Com∣position of Mankind, and that which is truly the State of Nature; are altogether unjust and false. For first, Our Skin is sufficiently fortify'd against all the Injuries of Weather;* 1.2 and so Na∣kedness is no Argument of our being less Nature's Care, than any other Creature. Several Nations, (as I have observ'd heretofore) never yet so much as knew what Clothes are; and even We that do, can go bare in any Parts, even the ten∣derest and most sensible; when Inclination, or Custom, or some particular Fashion, dispose us to it. For where of all our Body is the Sense quick∣er, than in the Face, the Hands, the Stomach? And yet what Lady, even the nicest and tender∣est of her Sex, scruples to expose her Neck and Breasts, (when the Mode requires that Dress) even in the Extremity of Winter?* 1.3 Swathes and Rollers may be convenient, but tis plain they are not necessary in Children; for the Lucedaemonians heretofore made no use of them; nor do the Swisses and Germans that dwell in cold Countries; nor Biscans, nor those Vagabonds and Common Cheats, that go by the Name of Gypsies, use them at this Day.* 1.4 Weeping is by no means peculiar to Mankind; Beasts have likewise their Share in it: Some of them shed Tears; and much the greatest part of them Cry, and Complain, and Bemoan

themselves continually, for some time after their coming into the World.* 1.5 As for Weapons, Nature hath not been wanting in her Provision for Us too; and she hath given us besides, greater Op∣portunities of using them; For the Muscles and Motions of our Limbs are more in Number, and of a more useful Variety; and These too we are capable of receiving greater Service from, with∣out any Instruction at all, than any other Ani∣mal whatsoever: Or if some few are better pro∣vided in this respect, we have the Advantage of many others. Nor do we need any Teaching in point of Eating;* 1.6 We and They are equally fit∣ted, equally dextrous and ready at it by Nature: Who makes any Question, but a Child wou'd look out sharp for Meat, assoon as he is strong enough to feed himself? And Meat the Earth produces for our purpose; there wants neither Quantity, nor Variety, to supply our Necessities, whether we improve it by Art and Labour, or not: Of which several Nations are a Proof, who live in great Plenty, without contributing any Tillage, or Care, or Industry of their own, toward their Subsistence.* 1.7 As for Speaking, allow∣ing That to be the effect of Art, and not of Na∣ture; yet it is certain too, that if it be not Na∣tural, it is not necessary neither. But yet This may be reckon'd among those things that are given in common to Men and Bests both: For what other Name but Speaking can we give to that Faculty of expressing themselves, which we see they have upon all occasions; those Significations of Pain, and Grief, and Joy; the Methods of Sum∣moning one another together, and asking mutual Succours; their Arts of Courtship and Flattery, and making Love? And as We sometimes speak by some particular Gestures, the Motions of our Eyes, or Head, or Hands, or Shoulders; (Arts

in which Dumb People are exquisitely perfect, and practise even to Astonishment) so do Beasts likewise converse with one another; And even Those of them that have no Voice at all, main∣tain an intercourse of Good Offices, and ask and return them, as occasion serves. As Beasts under∣stand Us in some degree, so do We in part un∣derstand Them: They flatter and sooth us; they threaten and give us warning; they call, intreat, and express their want of our Help: We speak to Them, and They to Us after Their manner; and if we understand but imperfectly, whose fault is it? Theirs or Ours? This is what none of us can certainly tell, and somewhat may be said for either Side. They, for ought we know, may think as meanly of Us upon this Account, as We commonly do of them.* 1.8 But in This howe∣ver they are a Reproach to us, that in the pre∣sent Condition of Humane Nature, we do not understand one another. Our almost next Neigh∣bours, remoter Provinces in the very same Coun∣try, have Dialects so different, that they do not comprehend each other at all; Whereas They are all perfectly well acquainted with the Idioms,

not only of their own Kind all the World over; but (which is a great deal more) with those of Kinds different from their own. The Horse knows how to distinguish the Barkings of a Dog; That One sort of Tone imports Mischief, and Dan∣ger, and a malicious Design; and that Another is innocent, and safe, and intends him no hurt at all.* 1.10 Nay, I add, that they do not only maintain a Correspondence among Themselves, but with Us also. In Wars and Engagements, Elephants, Dogs, Horses, understand, as well as We: They conform all their Motions to the Word of Com∣mand; They Run, or they Stand still; they March, or they Halt; they Pursue, or they Flee; they Charge, or they Retreat, as we wou'd have them; They receive Pay and Subsistence; they have a part in the Victory, and a Share in the Rooty; as we see particularly they had in the late Conquests of the Indies. And thus much may suffice to be observ'd concerning those things which Nature hath distributed both to Men and Beasts in common; and that with so even a Hand, that there is no Great Disparity on either side.

[unspec 4] The Particulars, wherein these two differ, and have the Advantage of one another,* 1.11 come next under our Observation. Now Some there are, in which Man does manifestly excel, and no Animals whatsoever can pretend to equal, or to be like them; and Others again there are, in which Beasts have the upper hand of Us. The Divine Wisdom so ordering the Matter, that the several Parts of the Creation should be so nicely interwoven, so closely connected, that Each should have some Pre-eminence peculiar to it self; and from All to∣gether, shou'd result the perfect Harmony, and uninterrupted Order, of One most compact and beautiful Whole.* 1.12 The plain and indisputable Privileges of Man, are the noble Faculties of his

Soul; The Penetration, Sprightliness, and Com∣prehension of his Mind, exerted in the Fruitfulness of his Invention; the Subtilty and Solidity of his Judgment; the Deliberate Determination of his Choice; Speech to communicate his Thoughts free∣ly, to make known his Wants, to ask and to offer Assistance; The Hand, a ready Instrument to exe∣cute whatever his own Invention shall suggest, or the Instructions of others shall dictate, or their Per∣formances prescribe for his Imitation; The Maje∣stick Form of his Body; the great Variety of Movements he is qualify'd for; from whence it comes to pass, that his Body, and the several Parts of it, are much more serviceable to Him, than those of any Creatures else can be to Them.

[unspec 5] But still Beasts have Their Advantages too, as evident and unquestionable as Ours;* 1.13 and of Those some are General, and others Particular: The Ge∣neral are these; Health, which in Them is much more confirm'd, and less interrupted, than it ever is in Men; their Constitutions more robust; their Natural Defects and Imperfections very rarely to be observ'd. Whereas Men are weak and tender, easily diseased; Blind, and Lame, and Deaf often∣times from the Birth. The Open Air never does Them injury; They are subject to no Rheums, or dangerous Colds, with which most of our a∣cutest Distempers begin, and many of them have no other Cause: Moderation in their Desires and Actions, which are bounded by Convenience, Innocence, and Security; perfect Ease and Tran∣quillity; for this must needs attend a Life void of all Fear and Guilt; Full Liberty and Confidence in Matters that are Natural and Lawful, without any Restraints of Shame, or Fear of Discovery; A total Exemption from infinite Vices and Ex∣orbitances; no Superstition to enslave them; no

Ambition, or Avarice, or Envy, to disturb, to torment them; no uneasie Fancies, and affright∣ing Dreams to afflict and confound them: These are the Portion of all Animals in common.

Of Those that are Particular to some sorts only,* 1.14 we may reckon the pure, [unspec I] clear, wholsome, lofty, delightful Dwelling, which the Birds enjoy, by having the Regions of the Air assign'd them. [unspec II] The wonderful Perfection they attain to in some Arts: For what Art or Labour, even of the most celebrated and accomplish'd Masters, cou'd ever pretend to compare with the Swallows, and some other Birds, in Building; or with the Spider in Spinning and Weaving; or with the Nightingale in Musick; [unspec III] or with some other Creatures in Knowledge of Plants and Physick? Some asto∣nishing Effects, and peculiar Properties, that are inimitable, unaccountable, nay incredible: Such as That of the Fish call'd Remora, because, tho' small it self in Comparison, yet it stops the largest Ships in their Course: Instances of which Hi∣story gives us, in the Vessel that rode Admiral of Mark Anthony's and Caligula's Fleet: That of the Cramp-Fish, which benumbs People's Limbs at some distance, and tho' they never touch him: That of the Hedg-Hog, which hath a Fore-knowledge of the Winds: And That of the Cameleon and Po∣lypus, in changing Colours, and taking a fresh Tincture, according to the Things they rest upon. [unspec IV] Their strange Prognostications; of Birds, for In∣stance, in their leaving one Country, and going into another, according as the Weather, and Sea∣sons of the Year change: That of all Beasts that are Dams, in knowing which of all their Young will prove the best; for when they are driven to Straits, and put upon preserving them from Dan∣ger, they constantly save the Best first. In all these Respects Man is much inferiour to Beasts;

and in some he is so far from being Equal, or near, that he is in no Degree like them. To all which might be added, That other Advantage, which consists in the Length of their Lives; The Term of some Animals, in the ordinary Course of Nature, extending to a Number of Years, Seven or Bight Times as much as that of Man.

The Advantages, [unspec 6] which Man lays claim to a∣bove Brutes, but which will admit of some Di∣spute,* 1.15 and perhaps, upon a stricter Examination, would tempt an Impartial Judge, to give it on the other side, are several. First, [unspec I] The Reasonable and Intellectual Faculties of his Mind; the Power of com∣paring,* 1.16 considering, arguing, collecting; Learning, and Improvement; Judgment and Conduct. Now Two Objections may be offered in Bar to this Claim; the One Relating to the Thing it self; the Other to the real Worth, and Benefits of it. First, It is not out of all Dispute, whether the Matter of Fact, set forth in this Claim, be True; that is, whether Men have these Excellencies pe∣culiar to themselves. It hath ever been, and ever will be, a Point in Controversy, whether Brutes have none of these Spiritual Powers; and that Opi∣nion, which holds the Affirmative, and maintains they have, is supported with greatest Authorities, and seems to carry a greater Appearance of Truth. The most Celebrated and Learned Philosophers have declared for it; No less than Aristotle, and Galen, and Porphyry, and Plutarch, Democritus and Anaxagoras. The Reason, upon which they ground that Asserti∣on, is this; That, the Brain is the Particular Organ, the part of the Body, employed by the Soul, in the Acts of Ratiocination; and that The Composition of the Brain, is exactly the same in Brutes, as it is in Men; and from hence they conclude, that the Instrument of Reason, is as apt and capable in one of these Creatures, as it is in the other. The Dif∣ficulty

then will be, whether the Souls be equal∣ly Capable, of using this Instrument to such Pur∣poses; and for This, they offer Experience; That Brutes conclude Universals from Singulars; as, from the Sight and Form of One Man, to know the same Humane Form in All Men; That they are able to compound, and to divide Idea's, by assent∣ing and refusing; and that they exercise a Power of Choice, and make very Subtile Distincti∣ons between Good and Evil, in such Cases as con∣cern the Life, the Liberty, and Preservation of Themselves, and their Young. Nay, they pretend, that any Man, who observes with Attention, may read and discover several Strokes and Foot-steps of Reason, more Bold, more Judicious, more Nice, more Ingenious and Cunning, than the common Sort of Men are used to give us Proof of. Some of the most memorable Actions, from whence this Conclusion hath been made, I will briefly recite. The Fox designing to pass over a River, when it is frozen, lays his Ear close to the Ice, to hearken if there be any Noise, and whether the Water run underneath; that from thence he may form a Judg∣ment, whether it be Safe to proceed, or Necessa∣ry to retire. And this Expedient the Thracians are said to make use of, when they have any Fro∣zen Rivers to pass. The Hound, in Doubt which Way his Master, or the Game he is in chase of, went, at a Place where Three Paths meet, takes this Course of making out his Loss; He scents the several Paths, one after another, and when he finds that in Two of these Ways, no Scent hath lain; he never troubles himself to lay his Nose to the Third; but springs forward, and takes That with∣out farther Enquiry. Thales the Philosopher's Mule, when heavy loaden with a Sack of Salt, and being to go over a Brook, stoop'd down to dissolve his Salt, and so make his Burthen lighter; because

he had found once before, that the Salt was lighter, when it fell into the Water by chance: But when loaden with Wooll, he did the direct contrary, and strove to keep it dry; because the like Experiment had taught him, that Wooll grows heavier by being wetted. Plutarch says, That once on board a Ship, he saw a Dog casting Stones into a Great Jar, that so he might make the Oyl in it rise higher; which before was too low, and out of his reach: And the like is reported of the Crows in Barbary, when the Water is too low for them, to drink at. Thus Elephants, when one of them is set fast in a Bog, are said to bring great Stones, and pieces of Timber, to help their Fellows out. The Oxen in the King's Gardens at Suza, which have been long practised to turn a Wheel a Hun∣dred Times Round, (the Depth of the Well re∣quiring just so much, from whence Water is drawn, for the Use of the Gardens) cannot be made to exceed that Number of Rounds; and when left to themselves, never come One turn Short. Now what Way are all these things possible to be done, without Reasoning and Discourse; Composition and Division, which are the Operations proper to a Rational Soul? Must not a Man be thought to want Reason himself, who thinks it hath nothing to do in such Actions? So again. The Marvellous dexterity of drawing Darts and Spears out of wounded Bodies, with very little Pain to the Pa∣tient, for which Elephants are Famous. The Dog mentioned by Plutarch, that at a Publick Entertain∣ment, lay upon a Scaffold, and countefeited him∣self dead; fainting away by degrees, breathing short, trembling, stretching himself out, and let∣ting them drag him about as quite dead; then by Degrees coming to himself again, lifting up his Head, as if he had just been brought to Life; and in a Word, the many Strange, Apish Tricks

that Jugglers and Strowlers teach their Dogs, and Dancing-Horses. The many Doubles, and cunning Contrivances, that Beasts of several kinds have, to secure themselves from the Attempts we make upon them; The great Forecast, and wise Management of the Ants, in drawing out their Grains of Corn to sweeten in the Air, and dry by the Sun, which would otherwise corrupt, and grow Musty: The nibbling off the End of every Grain, which would else be grown, and run to Seed: The Order of the Bees, in their Republick; the Method of their Combs; the vast variety of Offices and Duties ap∣propriated to such and such respectively; and the constant Regularity and Uniformity of all their Proceedings, will not suffer us to think, that these are no more than animated Clock-Work; but seem in many Things to equal, and in some even to reproach the Conduct of Mankind.

[unspec 7] In Order to overthrow all This, some have been very Ill-natur'd to these Brutes,* 1.17 and take Sanctua∣ry in Natural Instinct, as a sufficient Solution, and Cause of all these wondrous Effects; And This they describe by an Inclination in Nature, which is under as perpetual Necessity, Slavery, and Constraint; as That by which the Stone falls, or the Flame ascends. Now First, This is so far from Truth, that one would wonder, how it could ever enter into any Man's Head: For the fore∣mentioned Acts, plainly infer reckoning and sum∣ming up Particulars, comparing of Things toge∣ther, and reasoning by Composition and Division of Ideas, and by Consequences drawn from thence. But these are such Operations as can never be per∣formed by such a Natural Inclination, and Ne∣cessary Instinct, which are only the Refuge of Men, who want something to say. But then it must be observ'd withal, that this Objection re∣turns back again, upon them that make it. For

it is, without doubt, more Noble, more for the Honour of any Creature, and a nearer Resemblance to God himself,* 1.18 to do Well by a Happy and Unal∣terable Determination of one's Nature; than to do so by Art and Industry, long Time, and much Learning; To be led by the Unerring Hand of God, than left to our own imprudent Conduct; and to act Regularly, by an Habitual, and Con∣stant, and Necessary Impulse; than by such a Choice and Liberty, as is Subject to Hazard and Rashness. Besides, by this Notion of Natural In∣stinct, they take away from Brutes all manner of Instruction, and Improvement, as well that which they receive from others, as that which they impart to others; but This is abundantly contradi∣cted and confuted by Experience. For it is plain, They learn what they knew not before, and grow more Perfect by Degrees, and Imitation, and Cu∣stom; as Magpyes, for Instance, Parrots, Jack-Daws, and Dogs; and it is as plain, that they teach one a∣nother too, from the Examples of Nightingales and especially of Elephants, who of all Animals are the aptest to learn, and seem to exceed the rest by far, both in Largeness of Capacity, and Quick∣ness of Apprehension.

[unspec 8] As for that Power of the Reasoning Soul, which Man Values himself so very Highly upon; That of considering Corporeal Things abstractedly, representing what is absent to himself, and devest∣ing things of what Circumstances he thinks fit, to conceive them after his own Pleasure; (for ac∣cording to the Jargon of the Schools,* 1.19 the Ob∣ject understood, is in the Subject understanding, according to the manner in which the Understander represents it to himself,) there is some Appearance, that Beasts do

all this too. A Horse, that has been us'd to Charge, when he lies asleep, in his Litter, shall shiver, and snort, as if he were in an Action; and plainly forms to himself, the Sounds of Drums and Trum∣pets, and the Images of an Army, and a Battle. The Grey-Hound, in his Dream, pants and blows, sets up his Stern, shakes his Legs, and conceives a Spiritual Hare before him. Mastiffs, and House-Dogs, growl in their Sleep, and sometimes open, and bark out-right, imagining that some Stranger is coming in. The fairest Conclusion of this first Point seems to me then, to be thus; That the Brutes have Reason; That They compare, discourse, and judge, but in a much lower Degree, and no∣thing comparable, to that Perfection, in which Man does. They have a much less Share, but they are not Totally excluded. We excell Them vastly, and so we do one another; and, indeed, the several Kinds of Beasts, excel each other too. Nay, I know not, whether it may not be said, That the difference among Men, is Greatest; and that some Men, excell some other Men in Reason∣ing, more than some Men excel Beasts.

Aristotle, 'tis true, pronounces of some Men, that they are so extremely Ignorant and Stupid, that they differ in nothing, but Shape, from Brutes. But all this notwithstanding, to argue, that they have equal Share, and stand upon the Level with Man∣kind; that their Souls are equally Immortal with Ours, or Ours equally Mortal with theirs, are ve∣ry Malicious and unfair Inferences. For, besides that Man excells most Conspicuously, in the Ope∣rations of Reason, there are several other more No∣ble Faculties and Prerogatives, such as are entirely Spiritual, which justify the Character, of his being the Likeness and Image of God; and render him ca∣pable of Immortal Bliss; all which the Brutes par∣take not of, in any the least Degree. And these are

all implyed in the Notion of Intellect, which de∣notes something more Sublime, than mere Ratio∣cination.

[unspec 9] The Other Argument, upon this Occasion, con∣cerns the Worth and Benefit of this Pre-eminence. For, Allowing the Matter of Fact alledged, to be True, that Man hath Reason, and Brutes have it not, yet, What does he get by it? Are not the Noblest Faculties paid very Dear for, and do they not do him more Hurt than Good? Are not These the principal Cause and Source of the Miseries that load him? The Vices, the Passions, the In∣ward Distempers, All that Irresolution, and Trou∣ble, and Despair, which embitter and cast a Ble∣mish upon our Lives? And these the Beasts have none of, because they have none of those Pow∣ers, which are the Seat and the Source of them. Witness the Story of Pyrrho's Hog, that eat con∣tentedly on Shipboard, in a Storm, at a time when the Passengers and Seamen, were almost dead with Fear.

I confess, as we manage the Matter, the generality of People have but a very indifferent Bargain of This. And some who consider Things Superficially, and look at what the World is, not what it might be,

are tempted to think that these more exalted and larger Endowments of the Soul, have been wholly deny'd, or at least much diminished, and impaired to Beasts, for their mighty Ease and Benefit; and given to Man in their full Strength, for his mighty torment: Since it is by the Interposition and Assistance of these, that he teazes and perplexes himself; resents and sadly keeps alive the Past; is distracted with Anxi∣ety and Amazement for the Future; nay, forms to his own Mind, and then is scared out of his Wits with, the gastly Images of Evils, that are not yet, nor are ever like to be. Now in other Ani∣mals, the Sense and the Apprehension of Evil have

both the same Date; Till it comes, they know no∣thing of it; and when it hath done, they have done with it; and from the Moment of its Cessa∣tion, are in perfect Ease, and Tranquillity. And thus you see, how Man is rendred (rather indeed, how by his Mismanagement, he renders Himself) the worse for his Advantages; that the Happiness and Privilege of his Nature, is become the Instru∣ment and Occasion of all his Misery. And were it not better to have been born naked, than to be provided with* 1.20 Weapons, and to sheath them thus, [unspec 10] in our own Bowels?

Another Advantage over Brutes,* 1.21 which Man makes Pretensions to, is that of Dominion, and Power to Command them, which he imagines to be vested in him. But, (not to take notice at present, that This is but an improper Plea, since Men also mutually Command, and are Comman∣ded by one another) the Thing in Fact is not true: For where does our Practice and Experience shew this universal Command in Man, and as universal Subjection and Obedience in other Crea∣tures?

'Tis plain in the present State of Things, that this is a mere Fancy; and that Men are much more in fear of Beasts, than stood in fear of by them. It is not to be doubted, but this was once the Case; and an ample Commission That was, which the Great Lord of the Universe issued at the Creation,* 1.22 Let him have Dominion over the Fowls of the Air, and over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Cattel, and over all the Earth. And admirably sitted he is to execute this Commission, by reason of the Majesty of his Person, an erect and beautiful Form, and the Greatness and Wisdom of his Mind. But alas! the Face of Affairs is changed; the actual Exercise of this Prerogative lost. And all that remains, is only what these Advantages of his Body and Mind give him; and it may much more properly be said, That Man is made sit to Command, and Brutes to Obey, than that He does actually Command, and They Obey.

[unspec 11] Another Advantage bordering upon the former, is perfect Liberty. This Man pretends to,* 1.23 and up∣braids Brutes with Captivity, Slavery, and Drudge∣ry; but This I think is full as unreasonable and foreign as the other. Men themselves lie infi∣nitely more open to Reproaches of that kind: To This let the Inhabitants of Guinea speak; else what mean the Slaves that are made by Kidnapping and Force, and not only their Persons enslavd, but all their Posterity too? Nay, what mean those Wil∣ling Slaves, who sell their Liberty for Summs of Money, or who part with it gladly and freely, or that Truck it away for some Conveniency? For was not all this done by the Ancient Gladi∣ators? And is it not now done daily, by Women to their Ladies, and Soldiers to their Commanders? But Beasts know nothing like this; they serve not one another; they neither enslave, nor are ensla∣ved by one another; but are in all respects

more free, and at their own disposal, than Men are.

Man, it is confess'd, makes these his Diversion and his Entertainment; they furnish his Sports and his Table: But if He Hunt, and take, and kill, and eat Them; They do the same by Him, as Op∣portunities offer: And That, in a manner more brave and great than His; not by Toils, and Nets, and Cunning; but by honest downright Force. Nay, He is not murder'd and devour'd thus by Beasts only, but (which is infinitely more) by another Man, his Equal, his Companion, his Bro∣ther. No Beasts ever assemble themselves in Troops, to destroy, and ravage, and lead Captive another Troop of the same Kind; but Men, to their E∣ternal Reproach, not only do the thing, but glo∣ry in it, and triumph in the destruction of their own Species.

[unspec 4] The Fourth and great Advantage Men pretend to above Brutes, * 1.24 consists in their Virtue; but if by this, Moral Virtue be meant, and if we may be allowed to judge of Virtue by the commen∣dable Actions, and outward Appearances of it; (This Claim will admit of some Dispute too: Tho' Moral Virtue taken formally, and with re∣gard to the Will, Beasts cannot have:) For Grati∣tude, and Friendship, and Readiness to be Service∣able, Fidelity, Magnanimity, and several other good Qualities useful in Society and Conversation, have been observed to express themselves after a more lively, more surprizing manner, and with more Constancy, in Brutes, than is usually seen in the generality of Mankind. Lysimachus had a Dog call'd Hireanus, which lay perpetually upon the Bed with his dead Master, and wou'd not be got from thence to eat or drink, but continu'd thus watching and fasting, till the Corpse came to be burnt, and then leaped eagerly into the

Fire, and burnt himself with it. The same is re∣lated of another Dog, that beionged to one Pyr∣rhus. That of the wise Hesiod detected the Russi∣ans that murder'd his Master: And another did the like before King Pyrrhus, and his whole Ar∣my. Plutarch tells us of another, that hunted a∣bout from City to City, and never relied 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he had brought the Robber of the Temple at A••••ens, to Justice for his Sacrilege.* 1.25 The Story of A••••ro∣dus is very well known, who had lived and eat with a Lyon for some Years, after curing him of a painful Wound; and afterwards, when con∣demn'd at Rome to the Wild Beasts, this Lyon wou'd not touch the Slave that had been his Guest, and his Surgeon, but approach'd him with all the Demonstrations of Thankfulness and Love; all which, Appian declares himself to have been an Eye-Witness of at Rome. An Elephant, that in heat of Passion had kill'd his Keeper. would neither eat nor drink, but pined himself to Death, by way of Penance. But now on the other hand, Is there in the World any Creature that can compare with Man, for Injustice and Ingratitude, Churlishness and Ill-Nature, Treache∣ry and Baseness, Lying and Dissimulation? Be∣sides, allowing Virtue to consist in moderating the Appetite, and curbing one's Pleasures, Beasts are then a great deal more regular than We, and keep themselves more duly within the Bounds of Nature and Convenience. As for those De∣sires that are superfluous, extravagant, and un∣natural, they never have any Inclination of that Kind: And consequently are exempted from one great and common Species of Humane Vice, which is, The enlarging our Desires beyond Measure, and multiplying, nay inventing fresh Objects to our selves; and employing Artifice, and Industry to heighten and create new Inclinations. In those which

Nature prompts them to, as Eating, and Drink∣ing, and other Bodily Satisfactions, they out-do us much, in Temperance and Reservedness. But if we would in good earnest be satisfy'd, whe∣ther Man or Brutes be the more Vicious or Vir∣tuous; that is indeed, if we would put Man out of Countenance effectually, and silence all the Pretensions to this Excellency quite; Let us put the Issue upon that single Virtue, which is therefore call'd Humanity, because lookt upon to be the most proper and inseparable Quality of our Nature; as on the Contrary, That of Cruelty is esteem'd the most foreign, most disagreea∣ble, and that which we abandon, as sit for wild Beasts only, by giving it the Denomination of Ferity. But alas! in this very Instance they re∣proach, and put us to the Blush; particularly up∣on the following Accounts. [unspec I] They never, or but seldom fall foul, or do any great Mischief upon those of their own Kind. It is a lamentable and scandalous Observation, but hath too much of Truth in it, That Dens and Desarts are more peaceful Habitations, than Towns and Cities; and even* 1.26 Dragons and Beasts of Prey, agree better together than Men do. [unspec II] But These, when they do fall out, quarrel upon just, and weighty, and necessa∣ry Occasions; Provocations that touch them near∣ly, and to defend that, which needs and deserves their utmost Endeavours to defend it; Their Life, Their Liberty, [unspec III] their Young. Again; They en∣gage and assault each other with such Arms only as Nature hath provided for them; they come to fair and open Combat, use no Methods of Ho∣stility, [unspec IV] but plain Strength and Courage; encoun∣ter single, One against One: No general Rendez∣vous

of vast Herds and Troops on each side: [unspec V] Nor do they act with Stratagem and Design. [unspec VI] Their Engagements are also very short, [unspec VII] and pre∣sently decided; for as soon as one of them is wounded, or gives out, the Fray is over; and, which is yet more considerable, assoon as the A∣ction is ended, the whole Quarrel, the Hatred, and all the Resentment is at an end too. But Man is the very Reverse of all This; [unspec I] He is so far from not quarrelling with his own Kind, that he quarrels with none besides. [unspec II] The Grounds of these Quarrels are frequently trifling and fri∣volous, and of no Consideration; nay, which is worse, they are sometimes unjust, they proceed from Falshood and Misrepresentation; and if the Matter be examin'd to the bottom, the Quarrels have no real Ground at all. The Arms he uses, [unspec III] are the Work of Industry; such as are treache∣rous, and kill without warning, and contriv'd to be as much so, as is possible. The Method of ma∣king War is by Deceit and Cunning, [unspec IV] which we colour over with the specious Name of Conduct; and this is seen in Stratagem and Surprize, Feints and Ambuscades. [unspec V] This again is transacted by vast Numbers of Men met together by solemn En∣gagement, and particular Appointments, to Stand and Fall by one another. [unspec VI] These Wars are vastly long too; none lay down their Arms upon the first Dis∣advantage; but still either Side pushes on its For∣tune; the One to recover their Losses, the Other to pursue and perfect their Conquests; and the usual End put to these Controversies, is by the Death of the Principals. Lastly, In these Quar∣rels, when Men want the Power, [unspec VII] they still re∣tain the Will to do Mischief; and tho' Acts of Hostility may cease, yet the Hatred and Resent∣ment seldom or never cease.

[unspec 12] The Sum then of this Comparison, as you have found it here stated,* 1.27 amounts to thus much; That Man hath no such mighty reason to magnifie Himself in the Advantages of his Nature, above That of Brutes: For, allowing Him some Endow∣ments and Accomplishments, which They have not; as the Sprightliness and Force of his Mind, and Intellectual Faculties, and all the other nobler Pow∣ers of the Soul; yet the Incumbrances upon these is very great and grievous; the Evils he is in∣volv'd in upon their account, infinite and insup∣portable: The Inconstancy and Irresolution, Su∣perstition and Sollicitude, sad Remembrances of the Past, and Anxious Concern for the Future; Ambition, and Avarice, and Envy, restless Cu∣riosity, busie Detraction, Lying and Deceit, a world of unruly Appetites and Passions, Troubles and Discontents. Thus this Mind, with the Thoughts and value whereof Man is so much exalted, is the Occasion of infinite Misfortunes; and of most of all then, when it exerts it self most: For in all vehement Agitations, it does not only hurt and disturb the Body, and render its Forces and Functions disordered, and broken, and quite tired down; but it hinders and confounds its own self: For what is it that throws Men into Folly and Madness, so much as the Acuteness, and Activity, and Strength of the Mind it self? The subtilest Follies, and most exquisite Phrensies proceed from the quickest, and sinest, and most vigorous Agitations of the Mind; as we may ob∣serve, that the bitterest Aversions, and most irre∣concileable Immities grow from the tenderest Pas∣sions, and most intimate Friendships; and the most virulent and mortal Diseses, from a strong Com∣plexion, and healthful Body. Melancholy Per∣sons are observ'd by Plato, to be best disposed for Learning and Wisdom; but they are equally dispo∣sed

for Folly too; much more than Persons of a different Temper. And to a Man of nice and just Observation, it will appear, that when the Soul acts freely, and gives her self a Loose, there is none of her Altitudes and Sallies without a Mix∣ture of Folly; and in good truth, these things dwell very close together;

—Wit to Madness nearly is ally'd, And thin Partitiens do their Beunds divide.

Once more; If we regard the living in agree∣ment with Nature, and in conformity with what she dictates and requires from us, Beasts seem to excel us in this respect, very much; for they lead a Life of more Freedom, more Ease and Security, more Moderation and Contentedness, than Men do. And That Man is deservedly reputed Wise, who makes them his Pattern, and his Lesson, and reaps Profit by their Example; by reforming and reducing himself to that Innocence, Simplicity, Liberty, Meekness, and Gentleness of Temper, which Nature had originally implante both in Us and Them: And, which in Brutes is still very conspicuous, but in Us is decay'd, chang'd, and utterly corrupted by our Industrious Wicked∣ness, and Artisicial Depravations; thus debauching and abusing the particular Prerogative we pretend to, and rendring our selves more vile than the Beasts, by means of that very Understanding and Judgment, which sets us so far above them. Hence sure it is, that God intending to shame us into Vertue, sends us to School in Scripture, and bids us grow wiser by the Example of these Creatures. The Crane, the Stork, and the Swallow; the Ser∣pent,* 1.28 and the Dove, the Ant, and the Ox, and the Ass, and sundry others, are recommended as Teachers to us. And after all, To take down

our Vanity upon this Occasion, we ought to re∣member, that there is some sort of Correspon∣dence, some mutual Relations and Duties arising from thence; if upon no other account, yet by reason of their being made by the same Hand, belonging to the same Master, and making a part of the same Family, with our selves. And this single Reflection ought to prevail with us, to use our Ad∣vantages over them modestly, tenderly. and con∣scientiously; and not to treat them with Cruelty and Contempt. For as Justice is a Debt from us to all Men; so Kindness, and Beneficence, and Mercy must needs be due to all Creatures whatsoever, that are in any Condition of receiving benefit by us.

ADVERTISEMENT.

OUR Author in the midst of his great Care to slate this Comparison so, as might be most mortifying to the Vanity of Mankind, hath yet found himself oblig'd to acknowledge, that the Reason of Men is so much brighte••, and more noble in its Operations and Effects, than any thing discoverable in the Brute part of the Creation, that I might have let this Chapter pass without any Censure, had it not been for two or three Sentences, which seem obnoxious to ve∣ry ill Construction: Such as a sort of Men are (in Our Age) but too fond of embracing, who at the same time, that they are vain e∣nough to imagine, that neither the Nature, nor the Revelations of God himself can have any thing in them above their Reason; are yet so sor∣did and degenerate, as to be content that Beasts should be thought endu'd with the same Souls, and to be mov'd with the same Principles of Rea∣son with themselves. An Opinion, which is the rather entertain'd, for the sake of a certain Con∣sequence

that recommends it, with regard to a Future State; for it seems they can be satisfy'd with the Portion of Brutes now, provided they may but partake in it hereafter. And what Fa∣vour this Notion might find from these Passages, That Brutes and Men both have the same Reason, tho' not in the same Degree; and that some Men excel others much more than some Men again excel Beasts; I was doubtful, and therefore look'd upon my self con∣cerned, (in pursuance of my Proposals at the Be∣ginning of this Book,) to offer these following Con∣siderations to my Reader.

First, That in the Operations of the Reasonable Soul, a great deal depends upon the Organs, and Disposition of that Body to which it is joyned; and (as hath been already explain'd at large) more especially upon the Brain: Now since Anatomists have not been able to observe any very remark∣able Differences between the Contexture of the Humane Brain, and that of Brutes; we are not to think it strange, if there appear some small Resemblances in some particular Actions of Men and Beasts, tho' these do not proceed from the same Principle of Motion; but owe their Simili∣tude to that of the Body and Medium put into those Motions.

Secondly, That the Impressions of external Ob∣jects have very strong Effects upon the Imagina∣tion and Memory; and these, assisted by Custom, and Imitation, and Example, will perform many wonderful things, which yet are not the Opera∣tions of Reason, properly so called. Of this kind it is easie to observe great Number of Instances, in Them, who either by means of their Infancy, have not yet attain'd to the use of Reason; or Them, who by some Natural Defects never have it at all; or Others, who by some accidental Di∣sturbance have lost it: In all which Cases, (not

during the lucid Intervals only, or when the Pow∣ers of the Mind seem a little to be awakened, but even in the most profound Ignorance, or most raging Madness) Those which are frequently di∣stinguished by the Sensitive Faculties of the Soul, put forth sometimes a marvellous Efficacy and Vigour. And that These are moved entirely by material and sensible Objects, and act as necessa∣rily as any other Parts of Matter whatsoever, hath been the Opinion of many new Philosophers; some of whom imagine, that all the Operations of this kind, are as capable of being resolved by Principles of Mechanism, (those Operations, I mean, of Imagination, and Memory, and Cu∣stom) as any other Affections and Motions of common Matter. How just this Conclusion is, I do not pretend to determine; for They them∣selves seem to confess it insufficient, when they call in to their Assistance, another Principle, which is,

Thirdly, That of Instinct; By which is meant, a strong Tendency, and Natural Impulse (discerni∣ble in these Creatures) to certain necessary and useful Actions. Something of a Principle implant∣ed in them by their wise Creator, to qualisie them for their own Preservation, and the answering the Ends of his good Providence in Making them. And this appears so early, as to be plainly ante∣cedent to either Memory or Fancy; and yet is so constant too, and always the same, in the same Circumstances and Occasions; as neither to de∣pend upon Causes so mutable as the Impressions of outward Objects, nor a Principle so caprici∣ous as the Choice of such a Mind perfectly free feels in its Deliberations. And, as Instruments put to∣gether by a skilful Hand, perform many Opera∣tions, so astonishing, that a Man unexperienc'd in the Art, cou'd not possibly imagine such Ma∣terials

capable of them; so these Philosophers conceive, that Almighty God, in his infinite Wis∣dom, hath so disposed the Sensitive Parts of the Soul, that They by their wonderful Structure shall be adapted to most amazing Effects, and posses∣sed with some Original Propensions and Impulses, independent from, and antecedent to the Impres∣sions of Matter, or the power of Institution and Custom; which in the needful and most profitable Actions of Life, serve these Animals for Funda∣mental Principles, and bear some kind of Affinity to the first common Notions, in the Rational and Intelligent Mind. And upon these Impulses joyn'd to those other Advantages mention'd before, the whole Oeconomy of Brutes, and even those Acti∣ons, which seem most exquisite and admirable in any of them, have by the Modern Mechanick Philosophers, been generally thought to depend. Concerning which, tho' almost every System treat in some measure, yet I believe my Reader (whe∣ther his Opinion incline to that Account or not) would at least think himself well entertain'd upon this Subject, by the perusal of our Learned and Ingeious Dr. Willis, in the Sixth and Seventh Chap∣ters of his Book De Animâ Brutorum.

Two things are fit to be added upon this Occa∣sion, with regard to what Monsieur Charron hath deliver'd concerning Instinct: The first is, That in regard we observe these Animals constantly going on in the same beaten Track, and keeping ever close to one Method; and even in those Instan∣ces, which have the greatest Appearance of Com∣parison and Choice, of Ten Thousand that make the same Experiment, or go about the same thing, not one varying from the common and received Way; This seems to be some Governing Principle in Nature, which gives a necessary Determination to them; and very different from that Liberty and

Consideration, which hath scarce any more con∣vincing, and demonstrative Proof of the Will be∣ing absolutely unconstrain'd in Mankind, than that Multiplicity of Opinions, and strange Variety of Proceedings, observable upon Occasions and Jun∣ctures, in themselves extremely alike.

The Other Remark, Proper upon this Occasion, is, that what our Author suggests here, is no Con∣sequence at all: as if too much Honour were done to these Creatures, and such a Happy and Unal∣terable Determination, to what is Profitable and Proper for them, were a Privilege, more than Humane; a nearer Approach to that unerring Wis∣dom, and unchangeable Goodness of the Divine Nature, than We our selves can boast of. For there is so very wide a Difference, between Li∣berty and Necessity of acting; the One is so Glo∣rious, so truly Noble; the Other so Mean, so Slavish a Principle, that no Comparison can be made between them. The most Glorious, most Beautiful, most Useful Parts of the Material Creati∣on, are in this Respect, infinitely beneath the mean∣est of the Sons of Men; and all their other Advan∣tages put together, cannot deserve to be laid into the Balance against this Single Dignity, of Free and Spontaneous Action. And though the Excel∣lency of the Divine Nature, be indefectible and unalterable Goodness; yet would not even This be an Excellence, if it were not the Effect of per∣fect Liberty. It is, indeed, Our Misfortune, that our Understandings are imposed upon, our Affe∣ctions perverted; and so the Choice we have the use of, often determines us to the wrong Side, and entangles us in Errour and Vice. But These Defects and Temptations are so many Clogs and Bars upon our Freedom; and therefore God, who is above any Possibility of such false Determinations, is still so much the more Free.

For Freedom, does not consist, in a Power of choo∣sing Evil as well as Good (which is a Power, in∣deed, that never was, or can be, strictly speaking) but in being Self-moved, and Self-acted; so as to be the Disposer of one's own Will, without any Compulsion or necessary Determination, from a foreign or external Principle; and only acting, as one is acted upon. If then this Instinct in Brutes, be a Matter of Force, and Necessary Determination, they are in no Degree, the Better or more Com∣mendable for it; but under a fatal Constraint, which is so far from resembling the Divine Per∣fection, that it admits of no Virtue, nor ought to be esteemed any Excellence, but the direct Con∣trary.

Fourthly, Let us observe, what mighty Difference there is, between the Perceptions of Brutes, and those of Men; so great, that in them we find no Foot∣steps of any, but such as are Material, and Single Objects; and what this Author advances, as Col∣lections, and Inferences from thence, are not impro∣bably assign'd by Others, to the Force of Imagi∣nation, or the Strength of Memory, or to those Natural Impressions, which commonly go by the Name of Instinct. To the latter of These we find very Learned Men, attributing that uniform Pro∣cess of Birds, and Bees, and Ants, in their Nu∣trition, Generation, Production, and the like. To the Former, that which Charron terms deducing an Universal from a Singular, and knowing by the having seen one Man, how to Distinguish the Hu∣mane Form, in any, or all Individuals of the same Species. But, supposing we should allow, that this proceeds from a distinguishing Faculty, and not meerly from the refreshing and awaking an Image, that lay dormant in the Memory, 'till revived by this fresh Object; yet what Proportion can even thus much bear, to all those Abstracted Idea's by

which Men distinguish the Natures and Proper∣ties of Things? If a Brute, from the Sight of a Man, could collect so much as should serve to di∣scriminate all other Men from Creatures of a Dif∣ferent Species; yet what is This in Comparison of that Penetration, which examines into the Abstruse Causes, and essential Differences of Things, and informs it self distinctly, wherein that very Cha∣racter of our Nature, which we call Humanity, con∣sists? And what account can there be given of a∣ny universal or abstracted Idea's in Beasts? of a∣ny of those, which we properly call Reasonable Actions? For as to these seeming Demurrs, and lit∣tle Comparisons, which we find instanced in here, and in other Places, it is usual to observe as much, in Children so little, and Naturals so wretchedly Stupid, as that there are but very Faint, if any Glimpses at all, of Understanding in them. I know, indeed,* 1.29 Monsieur Charron, hath provided a Reply to this Argument, by saying, That we cannot have any competent Knowledge of Their Internal Ope∣rations. But though we do not see all the hidden Movements of their Souls, nor can distinctly say, whether they are feeble Reasoners or Stupendous Machines; yet we may be very confident, they cannot dive into the Causes, and abstracted Idea's of Things; because there do not appear the least Foot-steps, or any of those Noble Effects, of such Knowledge, which Mankind have in all Ages been conspicuous for. For to these abstracted Notions it is, that all the amazing Inventions and Improve∣ments of Arts and Sciences; but especially the Wonders of Mechanism and Motion, by Numbers and Proportions Duly adjusted, owe their Birth and daily Growth. And since in the Distinction and Perception of Concrete Bodies, where Sensation is chiefly concern'd, the Brutes are acknowledged to equal, if not exceed Us, in Accuracy; it is not

to be conceived, that They who excel in a Facul∣ty, which is commensurate to a Sensitive Soul, should be able to give No Marks at all of their be∣ing endued with a Capacity of entertaining and feeding upon those Ideas, which are the Peculiar Prerogatives, and Glories, of a Rational one.

Much more might be added upon this Occasion, with Regard both to the Objects themselves; and the particular Manner of Conception; and the in∣finite Disparities of the Humane Intellect, and that Faculty, which is affected in Brutes. But it is Prejudice sufficient against them, that so many ve∣ry Wise and Inquisitive Persons have found Cause, to do even something more than doubt, whether Brutes be better than a sort of Divine Clock-Work; and have any manner of Sense or Perception at all. This, at least, was never asserted of Man; nor the Powers and Operations of his Reasoning Soul disputed, (as to the Reality of them,) ex∣cept by such as set up for Universal Scepticism, and are for reducing all to a State of Confusion and Un∣certainty. And therefore if, because Brutes seem to act by a Faculty, which we cannot perfectly account for, we should allow, to these Brutes, some few dusky Glimmerings of Reason (which yet there is no absolute Necessity for, because they have some∣thing like it) yet no Impartial Considerer, can e∣ver admit, that it will bear a Question, whether They, or We, have the Better of this Point; or that Some Men, excel others, more than some again ex∣cel Beasts; for there is no Man, how mean and un∣taught soever, if provided with what we call Com∣mon Sense, but sinds an Ability in himself, nay, exercises that Ability every Day, (even when he does not know, or think of it) of considering, com∣paring, and determining in such a manner, as no good Arguments have ever yet been offered to shew that Beasts either do, or can do. They are justly

thought to do somewhat very extraordinary, when by long Custom, and severe Discipline, and daily Example and Instruction, brought to imitate some very common Actions of Men; But what Divine Heights do Men themselves ascend to, when they have proportionable Pains taken with Them? And here in Justice the Comparison ought to lie; be∣tween the Best of each Kind; not the Best of One, and the Lowest of the Other; the most unapt and neglected of Men, and the most teachable and im∣proved of Brutes: For the Advantages, or the Want of Art, cannot at all affect the Dispute, where the Gifts of Nature are the Matter in Que∣stion: And these are distributed with so very un∣even a Hand, in the Case before us; that He must be either very Stupid, or very Perverse, who does not see the mighty Disproportion.

As to the other Part of this Discourse, whether Reason be any Real Benefit, and we might not have been as well, or better without it; I shall only need to add, that the several Instances, produced here, are only such as are Sad and very Reproach∣ful Truths, in Regard of those Abuses of Reason, Men are Guilty of; and the wicked, or the mis∣chievous Purposes they pervert it to: But as to the Thing it self, they are no more a Reflection upon it, than the Surfeits and Bestiality of Gluttons, and Sots, are upon the common Refreshments of Life. What is said upon this Occasion, will do well indeed to be considered, by those vicious and indiscreet Men, who apply That as a Spur to their Wickedness, and Passion, which was intended for a Curb to both; And the World ought to be hum∣bled and reformed by a serious Reflection, how Accessory Men become to their own Miseries, and how obstinately fond they are of them, when their very Remedies are industriously turned into the worst of Diseases: But, All this Notwithstanding, Monsieur

Charron's Argument here, is abundantly refuted by himself, in the last Words of this whole Treatise, where he vindicates the Honour of Elo∣quence, from the mischievous Effects, which some ill-designing Men, apply it to, by this Parallel:

For (says he) even That Reason and Under∣standing, which is the Peculiar Prerogative of Hu∣mane Nature, and sets us above Brutes, is most miserably abus'd; turn'd against God, and our selves; and made the Occasion of our more in∣excusable Ruine. But, This is only an Acci∣dental Misfortune; far from the Natural Ten∣dency of so Noble a Privilege. And He, who would argue from hence, that Mankind had better want these Faculties, may justly seem to have degenerated into Brute; and to be quite forsaken of all that Reason, which he so Wildly and so rashly condemns.

So just Ground is there for reading this Treatise, with those Cautions to be laid down upon the XXXVIIth Chapter; and so truly does our Author, keep up his Character, of an Academick Philosopher.

Notes

• * 1.1

  A useful but diffi∣cult Com∣parison, such as Man is partial in.
• * 1.2

  1. Naked∣ness. Chap. XIV
• * 1.3

  2. Swalling Clothes.
• * 1.4

  3. Weeping.
• * 1.5

  4. Weapons.
• * 1.6

  5. Eating
• * 1.7

  6. Sp••t••.
• * 1.8

  Here we have just Occasion to make a Distinction which I shall shew to be necessary, Chap. XXXVII. between Defects Natural and Accidental: For of the Latter sort is That of Men's being unintelligible to each other; This Confusion of Languages having been no part of our Original Condition: For we have infallible Assurance, that the whole Earth was once of one Speech. So that what was inflicted as a Punishment for a Crime, (as This is expresly affirmed to be, Gen. XI.) cannot in any fair Reasoning, make a Branch of the Com∣parison, between the Nature of Man, and That of Brutes. Nor indeed even in this Condition, (thus debased and pu∣nished as we stand) will the exquisite Easiness of expressing Our Thoughts, and the wonderful Powers of Humane Voice, endure to be compared with the wild and inarticulate Sounds of any Brutes whatsoever, tho' most excellent in their kind.
• * 1.9

  S•• Chapter of Weak∣ness.
• * 1.10

  7. Mutual Correspon∣dence.
• * 1.11

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.12

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.13

  Advanta∣ges of Beasts. General.
• * 1.14

  Particular.
• * 1.15

  Advanta∣ges that may be di∣sputed.
• * 1.16

  Reasoning. Qu. Whe∣ther Brutes partake of it.
• * 1.17

  Natural Instinct, rejected.
• * 1.18

  See the Ad∣vertise∣ment.
• * 1.19

  Intellectum est in Intelligente, ad modum Intelligentis.
• * 1.20

  Did Nature, which furnished us with these Rich and Hea∣venly Accomplishments, bring us under a Necessity of convert∣ing them to our own Sorrow and Ruine; the Gift, indeed, had been Treacherous, and Providence cruelly kind. But since they are not the Appetites, and Passions, and Facuties them∣selves, but the Excesses and Indulgings of the One, and the Neglect or Abuse of the other, to which these Miseries are owing, Let us not complain of our Condition, nor charge God foolishly; but put all that we suffer of this kind, to the Account of our own Follies and Vices. For from hence it is, that Brutes can pretend to enter into the Comparison with us, even in the Esteem of those, whose Wish and In∣terest it is, to bring us down to their Level. And were not we by cherishing our restless Passions, so industrious to torment our selves, we should not see, as now we daily do, that the Dull and Insensible live most at their Ease, and come off Cheaper with the Sufferings of Humane Life, than Men ••eqof Wit, and Parts, and more refin'd Understanding.
• * 1.21

  Dominion and Com∣mand.
• * 1.22

  Gen 1.26.
• * 1.23

  Liberty and Servi∣tude.
• * 1.24

  〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.25

  See Gell. Li••. ••. Cap. 14.
• * 1.26

  Major Serpentum Ferarum{que} concordia quam Hominum.
• * 1.27

  The Cen∣clusion of this Second Considera∣tion.
• * 1.28

  Jer. viii. 7. Mat. x. 16. Prov vi. 6. Isa. i. 3.
• * 1.29

  S. 1.