Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.

CHAP. XXVII. Of Sophisms, or Fallacies in Things.

Ax. 1. OF the Sophisms in Things, there are seven Places, viz. Accident, a Word simply spoken and according to something, Ignorance of the E∣lench, Consequent, Begging of the Question, Not Cause for the Cause, and manifold Interrogation.

Ax. 2. Accident, is then, when we collect that to agree to the Subject which was said of the Predi∣cate.

Ax. 3. And this is solv'd, by shewing that that which is gathered of the Subject, is only said of the Predicate by Accident; or that the Predicate it self, is Accidentally said of the Sub∣ject.

1. §. And thus a Catch of the Accident is laid for us two manner of Ways; And first when any thing's said of the Attribute by Accident, as this; Man is a Species; Socrates is a Man: And therefore he's a Species. This Fallacy consists in this, viz. in that to be a Species is said of Man by Ac∣cident; But To be a Man, of Socrates by himself. The other is, when the Attribute it self, is said of the Subject by Accident; As here; The Mouse gnaws

Cheese; Mouse is a Syllable: And therefore a Syllable gnaws Cheese. This Fallacy is, because to gnaw Cheese, is said of the Mouse by it self; to be a Syllable, by Accident, and Cause of its Name. Both Ways the Fallacy arises, out of the Acceptation of the Word chang'd, or Genus of Supposition, as the Schoolmen call it. For Man in the Major is taken in a Simple; Minor, a Concrete Acceptation; and Mouse in the Major, is taken Formally, or for the thing signify'd; and in the Minor, Materially, or for the Word only.

Ax. 4. That from the Thing simply said, is then, when from something that is simply true, we collect another that is true only in some respect, or according to something. On the Contrary, That, in some Respect, is, then, when from that which is partially true, or, according to some respect, we collect that any thing is simply so.

Ax. 5. This is solv'd by shewing the Difference between that which is spoken simply, and that in some Respect.

1. §. A simply said is that, whose Predicate a∣grees with the Subject in every Respect, Part, Time and Place without any Limitation. That according to something, in some Respect, Part, Time, Place only, &c. Examples of the first kind are these, viz. The Right-Hand is not to be cut off: And there∣fore not then, when it is invaded by a Gangrene. The Man is Mortal; And therefore so as to his Soul. The Pledge ought to be restored to its Owner when he requires it; And therefore a Sword, altho' he be Mad when he requires it, &c. From that according to some Relation these, viz. Man's Soul is Im∣mortal: And therefore the Man. Wine hurts a Man in a Fever: And therefore in general. Mycillus is a good Shoemaker; And therefore he is good, &c.

Ax. 6. Sophism from the Ignorance of the E∣lench, is that, when the Conclusion seems to contra∣tradict the Proof of the Respondent, and yet does

not contradict it, by reason of some Condition's being Wanting.

Ax. 7. And this is solved by shewing what Con∣dition is omitted.

1. §. We have Cap. 25. affirmed an Elench to be a Syllogism with a Contradiction, and Cap. 22. of the First Book we entreated of the Conditions of Contradiction. But altho' every Sophism offends by Ignorance of the Elench (for every Sophism seems to be an Elench, and yet is not so) yet here that especially is so called in which the Con∣clusion is opposed to another's Assertion, and yet some Condition or other is wanting that be∣longs to a legitimate Contradiction. For Exam∣ple; If one going about to prove, that Christ was not David's Lord, should conclude that he was his Son, he mistakes by an Ignorance of the Elench; that is, an Ignorance of the Case and the true Sense wherein the Respondent were to be taken, and Laws of Op∣position: For Lord and Son are Opposites, if they are attribted to any One in the same Respect. But these are not attributed to Christ in the same Respect, but in a Diverse. For he was David's Lord as to his Divine, and Son, as to his Humane Na∣ture, &c.

Ax. 8. Sophism of Consequent is then, when One Enunciation is inferr'd from another, from the which it does not follow.

Ax. 9. And this is solv'd by citing of the Rule against which such Inference does of∣fend.

1. §. There are Four Rules which are to be observed in the Inferring of a Consequent from an Antecedent, of which if we break but One, the Consequent will be Null; and if such an In∣ference be admitted, there will be then a Caption or Fallacy of the Consequent. And the first of these is, The Universal Affirming must never be simply converted: And therefore if any Man

should conclude thus, viz. Because every Flatterer is Complaisant; Therefore every Complaisant is a Flat∣terer; he would be deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Conse∣quent. And the second Rule is, that from a Uni∣versal Affirming a Universal Denying, can't be con∣cluded otherwise than by Contraposition. And there∣fore if any one should conclude thus, viz. Whatso∣ever is begotten, has a Beginning: And therefore what∣soever is not, has not; as the Humane Soul, the World, &c. One should commit a Fallacy of the Consequent: For thus one should have inferr'd, viz. That that which has not a Beginning is not begot∣ten; and so it is a Conversion by Contraposition. The Third is, The Minor must not be denyed in the first Fi∣gure; Or, which returns to the same Account, viz. From the Remotion of the Antecedent can't be inferr'd that of the Consequent, as we observ'd Chapter the 12th in that Part relating to Hypothetical Syllo∣gism. The Fourth is, That One of the Premisses must be denyed in the Second Figure; Or, which is the same thing, the Position of the Antecedent ought not to be concluded from that of the Consequent, as we have ob∣serv'd again in the same Chapter; And therefore these sorts of Syllogisms will be Paralogisms, viz. Every Man is an Animal; A Horse is not a Man: And therefore not an Animal. Or thus, If a Horse be a Man, he is an Animal: But a Horse is not a Man; And therefore not an Animal, &c. Likewise E∣very Flatterer is Complaisant; Such an One is Complai∣sant: And therefore such an One is a Flatterer. Or thus, If Crispus be a Flatterer, he is Complaisant; But he is Complaisant; And therefore a Flatterer, &c. If any one be deceiv'd by these sorts of Argumen∣tations, either from himself or others; as it often hap∣pens; he is then deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Con∣sequent.

2. But because the Fault of a false Consequence is easily discernible, in these sorts of Syllogisms, Sophisters usually conceal it, either by suppressing

one of the Premisses; As, Crispus is Complaisant; And therefore a Flatterer: Walks by Night; And there∣fore a Thief. Or else by Circumlocution; As, he that says you are an Animal, says true: He that says you are an Ass, says you are an Animal: And therefore he that says you are an Ass, says true. For this Ar∣gumentation is just as if one should lay down this Position, viz. You are an Animal: An Ass is an Animal: And therefore you are an Ass. Which is an Argumentation contrary to Rule, Of two Affirmatives in the second Figure.

Ax. 11. Which is solv'd by shewing that the Me∣dium is not diverse from the Question, or at least more known than it.

Ax. 10. The Sophism of Begging the Que∣stion, is then, when any thing is proved, either by it self or something that is equally unknown with it self.

1. §. This is call'd a Begging of the Principle because it is, a Begging of that which in the Be∣ginning was sought for. These Sort of Catches may be two ways laid: And First, when the same thing is prov'd by it self. Secondly, when one unknown thing is proved by another that is equally unknown with it self. The same thing is said to be prov'd by it self; when the Subject or Predicate of the Question, the Name being chang'd, is brought in for a Medium, to prove the Question; As, if any one should prove the Soul of Man to be ex Traduce, English, of the Seed of the Parent, because begotten by the Seed of the Parent. I say, the Subject or Predicate, changing the Name: For, if the Name were not changed, the Argu∣mentation would be mere Child's Play. And yet for all this, every Argumentation in which the Medi∣um is the same with the Subject or Predicate of the Question is not to be rejected as a Sophism, but only that whose Medium is not only in it self and of its own Nature the same with the Question; but also

as to us; as, in that which we proposed above. But if the Medium be of its own Nature, the same as the Question, but not also as to us; or our Manner of Concetpion, the Argumentation is not to be rejected: Unless you can suppose all the Arguments which are fetch'd from Essential Places; As, Genus, Species, Definition, Whole and Part, to make Captious Argumenta∣tions, &c.

2. Secondly, The second Way is when the Medi∣um's as much unknown as the Question it self; As, if one should prove Vision to be made by Emission, because not by Reception. Now this Sophism tends to this; Partly, that the Sophister may seem to abound with Arguments; partly, that changing the Forms of the Words, he may conciliate a Shew of Probability to his Declarations.

Ax. 11. Sophism of not Cause for the Cause is then, when that which is not the Cause, or by Accident is obtruded for the true Cause, and that by it self.

Ax. 12. And this Sophism is solv'd by the De∣signation of the true Cause upon which the Effect by it self depends.

1. §. The Caption of not Cause for the Cause ei∣ther lies in a Syllogism that leads to Inconvenience or direct. In a Syllogism that leads to Inconveni∣ence; when the Falsity of the Conclusion brought, is imputed to one of the Premisses, which is not the Cause of it; As, if one designing to prove the Hu∣mane Soul Mortal, should thus argue: Every Immortal is Eternal; The Soul of Man is Immortal: And there∣fore the Soul of Man is Eternal. But this Conclusion is false, and the Occasion of it was in the Minor, which was that the Soul of Man was Immortal; And therefore Mortal. For this Argumentation is a So∣phism of the not Cause for the Cause. For he says, that this Proposition, The Soul is Immortal, is the Cause of a false Conclusion; when it was that, viz. That every Immortal is Eternal. In a Syllogism di∣rect,

when that which is attributed to the Cause by Accident, happens not, but to the Causes by them∣selves; As, Religion excites Civil Wars. From the Reading of the Sacred Scriptures spring Hresies. Wine is heady and intoxicates, &c. And therefore Religion, Reading of the Sacred Scriptures, and Wine are not to be tolerated in any Common-Wealth, &c.

Ax. 13. The Sophism of many Interrogations, is then, when two or more Questions are so proposed, as that they shew only but as One.

Ax. 14. And these sorts of Sophisms are brought about two manner of Ways: And first, when two Sub∣jects or two Predicates, or perhaps more, are pro∣pounded under so many distinct sort of Names; as, is the World, Eternal and Perfect, &c. This is a Capti∣ous Interrogation: For if you answer Affirmatively, the Sophister will set upon you as if you had grant∣ted that the World was Eternal; and if otherwise, he excepts against you; as if you deny'd that the World was perfect. And, secondly, you may make a Falla∣cy of many Interrogations in one Word; As, Desi∣stine, &c. Have you left off to commit Adultery? Have you lost your Horns, &c. But enough of this is said in the Place of Homonymy.

And thus much may suffice for Syllogism. The Last of the Four Instruments is that which now demands our Attendance; And that is Me∣thod. Of which we shall entreat in the following Chapter.