CHAP. XXX. Of Enunciation Affirming, Denying, Finite and Infinite, and
Ax. 1. IN Regard of Quality, it is, that an E∣nunciation is divided in this manner; and first, into Affirming and Denying, and then True and False.
Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.
About this Item
- Title
- Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.
- Author
- Burgersdijck, Franco, 1590-1635.
- Publication
- London :: Printed for Ric. Cumberland ...,
- 1697.
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- Subject terms
- Logic -- Early works to 1800.
- Cite this Item
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"Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A30233.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 29, 2024.
Pages
Page 118
Ax. 2. Affirming is that which conjoyns, Denying, that divides the Parts.
Ax. 3. Affirming is that which conjoyns, Denying, that divides the Parts.
COMMENTARY.
1. §. For Example: Enunciations Affirming are such as these, viz. Every thing that lives is nourish'd. If there be a God, then the World is rul'd by a Providence. It is necessary that the Fire should be hot. Whose Ne∣gatives are these: Every Living Creature is not nou∣rished. If there be a God, the World is yet not rul'd by a Providence. It is not necessary the Fire should be hot, &c.
Ax. 4. Both these, that is, both Negative and Affirmative Propositions are divided into Finite and Infinite.
Ax. 5. Finite, is that which consists either of a Subject or Predicate Finite.
Ax. 6. Infinite, which either of one or both In∣finite.
1. §. Finite are such as these, viz. Every body is in a Place. None can be at the same time in two Places. Infinite these; as, A Nonentity is excluded from Cate∣gories. Some Man is not Unlearned. Some, tho' not so Rich, are not so Sordid, &c.
I omit the 7th and 8th Rules, here about the Note of Negation in a simple Enunciation; because I think 'em not so true in the English as they are in the Latin.
Ax. 9. A Compos'd Enunciation is then esteem'd to be Denying, when the Negation coheres with the Ligament by which the simple Enunciations are ty'd toge∣ther.
1. §. As thus, we may take an Example out of every Species: As, Socrates was both a Wise Man and an Honest. If you become Surety, you must be a Debtor: Either it is Peace, or it is War. Such as the Father is, such is the Son, &c. These are thus denyed; Socrates was not both a Wise Man and an Honest. If you become Sure∣ty, you will not yet become a Debtor. It is not either
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Peace or War. Such as the Father is, such need not be the Son, &c. But it is to be observed that Adversa∣tive Enunciations do not receive Affirmation or Ne∣gation on the Account of their Vinculum or Ligament, but only their singular Parts; as this, He is not learned but honest: For this Enunciation is so to be denyed, viz. He is learned, but he is not honest, &c.
Ax. 10. Exclusive and Restrictive Enunciations, are then said to be Negatives, when a Note of Negati∣on is placed, before the Exclusive Particles.
1. §. As, Man is not alone an Animal; Cicero was not only an Orator: Christ is not as to his Humane Nature everywhere, &c. And this brings us to the next Axiom, viz. That.
Ax. 11. Affirmation is before Negation and more known, &c.
1. §. Before it must be, because to be, is before not to be: More known, because a Negative Enunciation becomes Known by an Affirmative: For I therefore know a Man not to be a Stone, because I know him to be another thing from a Stone, &c.