Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.

CHAP. XIII. Of Property, and Accident.

Ax. 1. PRoper is that which declares not what a thing is, and yet is only in it, and reciprocated with it.

COMMENTARY.

1. §. A Thing is said by Porphyrie to be proper four Ways: First, that which agrees and convenes to one only Species, and not to all its Individuals: So it agrees to Man to be musical. Secondly, that which convenes to all the Individuals of any one Species, but not to it only; and so it agrees to Man to be Two-footed. Third∣ly, that which agrees to one only Species and all its Individuals, but not always: So it agrees to Man to laugh Fourthly, that which belongs only to one Species and all its Individuals, and always; and so it agrees to Man to be risible, or a laughing Creature.

2. §. The Fourth of these Properties Porphy∣rie calls properly proper: For the rest, says he, are only proper in some Respect, and for some time.

3. §. This Definition of Property is extant in the first Book of the Topicks, Cap. 5. Properties, says he, do not declare, What a thing is; that is, they are not contained in the Essence of the Subject, but follow it, re∣ciprocated with that in which alone they are; that is, with the first and proximate Subject; not those contain∣ed under that proximate Subject: For of Properties some are of Genus's, others Species's: The Proper∣ties of Genus's with Genus's, not Species's; and

those of Species's with Species's, not Individuals, are to be conferred and reciprocated. So to be of Quantity is reciprocated with Natural Body and not the Heaven, or Element, or Stone. And Risibility is to be reciprocated with Man, not Socrates or Plato. When the Property then of the Genus is predicated of the Species; as, when the Heaven is said to be of Quantity; or the Property of the Species with the Individual; as when Plato is said to be risible. The Predication is not of the Accident of the Subject, nor yet the Property: For the Number of Predicable arises from a Compa∣rison of the Predicate with the Proximate Subject. For those compared with the remote are not of this Place; as have been beforesaid.

Ax. 2. Properties either flow from the Essence of the Subject, or from External Cause.

1. §. Propers either flow immediately from the Es∣sence of the Subject; as Risibility from the rational Soul, Quantity from the Essence of Natural Bodies: Or, by the Mediation of some other Property. So to be in a Place, flows from the Essence of a Body, by reason of its Quantity: But now an Eclipse, which is the Property of the Moon, flows not from the Essence of the Moon, but from an External Cause, to wit, the In∣terposition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon. These are not absolutely proper, but only from Supposition of some External Cause; which Cause yet being in being, they are no less necessarily in their Subject, than the others.

Ax. 3. Properties which flow from the Essence of the Subject are so necessarily in it that they cannot be separate from it, so much as in Thought.

1. §. So that he would be guilty of a Contradiction that should say or think that the Property was absent from it: For whosoever says or thinks a Body is not Quantity, or that the Fire is not hot, says or thinks as much as if he should say or think, a Body is not a Body, or a Fire a Fire.

Ax. 4. Properties cannot be communicated to Subjects of different Species's.

1. §. Let no body call that a Property, says Ari∣stotle, Book 4. of the Topicks Cap. 5. which may be in another: For since Properties flow from the Es∣sence of the Subject; if Properties should be com∣municated, of necessity also the Essence would be communicated: For if Risibility or Rationability could be communicated to an Horse, a Horse would be a Man; if Quantity to a Spirit, a Spirit would be a Body; and if to be every where to a Creature, a Creature would be God, &c.

Ax. 5. As Properties which flow from the Es∣sence of the Subject are to their absolute Subjects, so are Properties also which flow from an External Cause, to theirs, the Cause being put.

1. §. So altho' the Moon does not always suffer an Eclipse, yet when the Earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon, it is as necessary it should suffer an Eclipse, as that a Body should be a Quantity, or that the Fire should be hot, &c.

Ax. 6. An Accident is that which in any One and the same thing may be, and not be.

Ax. 7. Or thus: An Accident is that which is either present or absent, without the Ruine of the Subject.

1. §. That which is present or absent, that is, may be present or absent at divers times without a Contradiction: for one Part of a Contradiction we know destroys another. The Sense therefore of that Axiom is no more than this. An Accident is that which without a Contradiction may be affirmed or denied of its Subject.

Ax. 8. Of Acidents some are separable, some in∣separable.

Ax. 9. A Separable is that which may be in Reality separated from its Subject; as, to stand, to sit.

Ax. 10. An Inseparable that which cannot; as Blackness from the Crow.

1. §. All Accidents may be separated from their Subject in Thought, without a Contradiction. And herein they differ from Properties which cannot. For he who thinks a Crow not to be black, altho' he thinks false, yet he does not think a Crow not to be a Crow, or any thing from which it may follow a Crow is not a Crow. But he who conceives that the Fire is not hot, conceives that, from whence it must follow, that the Fire is not a Fire, &c.

2 §. That Accident therefore is said to be sepa∣rable, which in Reality may be separated, and not only thought; or without which the Subject may naturally exist; Inseparable not: For God also may separate inseparable Accidents from their Subjects; because he can do all things, which evert not one another, and imply not a Contradiction.