Christian prudence, or, Directions for the guidance and conduct of our selves in the case of judging one another being several discourses on Math. 7, 1 / by G. Bright.

CHAP. V. We have dispatcht the Fourth General Head, the Causes of prohibited Judg∣ment.

Sect. I.

THe Fifth is the mischievous Effects or Consequences, which are so many Reasons, and should be so many Motives to beware and to abstain there∣from. We shall observe some of these in each particular prohibited Judgment distinctly.

I. Of too great a proneness to judg others in general, the ill effects are these:

1. The first is, That too great a Proneness, and Practice accordingly, to observe and judg others, causeth us to neglect our own Affairs. The more our Eyes are abroad, the less at home; for they cannot be in two places. We

cannot mind two things at once so different and distant. And it is every where by Experience seen, that those who little take notice of what others are and do, are usually more attentive to their own Business, and what imme∣diately belongs to themselves. The time that is spent in Reflection upon others Actions and Principles, would otherwise most-what (if we are not very dull for want of Variety) have been converted to the observation of our own. Such shamefully neglect oft∣times to purpose, or set apart their own Actions, what they will, what they will not do; and their own Principles, out of what End, and for what Reason, and the execution of their purposed Actions, that they even forget to do what they themselves had purposed and designed, because they are busie and employed in gazing at others. Wisdom is before him that hath understanding, but the eyes of a Fool are in the ends of the Earth, Prov. 17. 24. The sense may be, That a Man of understanding re∣gards and looks at more often his own

wisdome, to see where he acts wisely, out of foresight of, and in order to good Ends; but a Fool's thoughts are ro∣ving, and employed about things far from him, the most remote and imper∣tinent; that is, of Persons and Acti∣ons (among others) which he can lit∣tle make use of in comparison. As the Man that looks at his own next steps, employs himself generally to better Purpose, than he that gazes at the Horizon, or bounds of the Heavens. Now the further ill Consequences of thus doing, is this, that we transfer our Observation and Judgment there, where we can make less good Use, if any; and from thence, where we could have used it to much better purpose for the most part.

For, 1. Thou canst not so well know that, concerning which thou judgest in another Man, as in thy self, thy Judg∣ment will be the less certain, and con∣sequently the Effects of it less certainly good. All our Judgments concerning others, are concerning their Qualities or Actions, and of their Actions some∣times

whether they have been at all, sometimes out of what Principle, some∣times to what effect or good purpose, whether they should have been done. Now, no Man can tell so well what Qualities are in another Man, as what are in himself: No man can so well tell the Principles of another Mans acti∣ons, his end, intention, and design, as those of himself; every Man may know his own Heart better than ano∣ther Mans. No Man can be so sure of what is done by any Man, as the Per∣son himself. And lastly, It is but rare that any Man of these great Talkers or Judgers, know the Circumstances of any Mans condition, and consequently what can or ought to be done by such a Person, so well as he himself; and surely he doth or may (unless it is be∣cause he is an idle Busie-body, or worse) know the circumstances of his own Acti∣ons, better than he can those of another Man, and consequently what is fittest to be done in his owne Case, better than in another Mans. Why then doth he not busie himself there? viz. At Home.

(I speak not universally, but for the most part:) For sometimes in some Cases a Man may know other Mens Affairs better than they themselves, and than their own Affairs, and give their Judgment with Modesty, and out of Friendship. Yet how frequent is it for Men, and the most Ignorant and Sottish, most peremptorily and confi∣dently to judg what others who are tru∣ly Wise ought to do, what would be fittest and of best effect for them to do, to direct or find fault; where it is apparent they know little of the Cir∣cumstances of their Condition or Af∣fairs, and these cannot reasonably be thought to be such strangers to their own Business and Affairs as not to know more, and to know better what they have to do, and ought to do; yea, and are as good to do it too. But that's an∣other Consideration.

2. But then, Secondly, If thy Judg∣ment be as certain, and if another did indeed such a bad Action, or out of such a bad Principle, or hath any bad Quality; it may be you can contribute

little to the preventing the like for the future, or to his amendment or help, it may be none at all, if distant, though thou would'st, he is out of thy reach, thou canst not let him know thy Judg∣ment, or he'll not care for it if he do; but in thy self thou mayst do much, prevent the next time, otherwise dis∣pose thy self, nor do, nor be so any more, mind thy own Faults or Infirmi∣ties. Thou art without Comparison, more in thine own power to direct, alter, or change thy self, than ano∣ther Man is, and yet thou art very busie about him, and negligent of thy self. Which is like as if one should be very sollicitous concerning another Travel∣ling-ma•• ••way, and diligently observe whether he went right, or in a bad way (it may be to direct him too if he went wrong, it may be only to gratifie Curiosity, or to laugh at him) when he could not, or would not come at him to direct him; and in the mean time he never minded his own, and so perchance falls into a Slough, or Ditch, or wanders into a wrong one: Or as

if thou shouldst be careful of another Mans Health, or Legs, or Eyes, which it is little in thy power to use when they are never so perfect, and neglect thy own which thou canst use at thy pleasure, and it may be have more need of being looked after, and are worse than thy Neighbours. Or to use part of our Saviours own Comparison here, to be peering into thy Neighbours Eye, and taking notice of a Mote there, when thy own Eye hath the same, if not a Beam: When (as our Saviour al∣so Himself intimates here) if thou pul∣ledst out thy own mote or beam first, thou might'st use thy own sight to help thy Neighbour; but if thou should'st pull out that of thy Neig••••••urs, it may be thou canst not assure he shall so well use his clearness.

2. Another evil consequence of too great a Proneness, and too frequent Judgment of others, (or it then is so) is most-what an Usurpation of anothers right, (or of that which for another to have, would do most good) a taking from another what is his due, it is a

piece of Injustice. For generally those who give Judgment concerning others, would oblige them both to judg as they judg, and do so too, to do accordingly. They are apt to impose their Judg∣ments; and this by all the power they have, and therefore will Inflict what evil lies in their power if they do not; which may be at least Ill-opinion, disgrace, or Ill-speaking-of, even in the meanest Person. They are seldom content themselves to pass their Judgment, but they would have Persons of whom they judg, to Judg as they do, and do as they would have them, or think sit they should; and are Angry, or Ill∣pleased if they do not: And here they would take away their Liberty of judg∣ing in their own Affairs, in acting accord∣ing to their own Judgment; they would deprive them of making use of their own Examination and Prudence, and then of determining themselves. But is not this every Mans Right in respect of private Persons? Is it not better the Judgment and Determination of a Man's own Actions for Example should

rest in himself? It is true, I may give my Judgment when desired, or asked, or where the defect of Ignorance or In∣firmity is manifest out of Friendship; but then with deferrence to the Persons own Judgment and Determination at last. And this not carelesly and as be∣ing displeased, because he follows not me; but with an acknowledgment of his Right, and an Acquiescence there∣in. Every Man is a Prince and su∣pream Moderatour to himself under God, in abundance of his Actions, most of his External, such as Dome∣stick ones, and Personal especially; and of his Internal, as his willing, designing, Intentions, Opinions, and Judgments; and it is most for the Publick, or Uni∣versal good, it should be so. And Men should be left to the exercise and use of their own Prudence and Liberty in many things, though they should not so well use it altogether as they might: The one may be a greater good, than the other an evil. Besides, It is most likely, every Person should best know the Circumstances of his own, especi∣ally

more private Actions, and conse∣quently what's fittest to be done, or not done: Or if any did better know some∣times, and were better and more virtu∣ous to direct; yet, How should it be known when? And who would not pre∣tend to it? So that there would be no∣thing but Confusion, and every one would be every ones Lord and Master. And yet, I dare say, it is to be ob∣serv'd, a most frequent piece of Inju∣stice and Tyranny, and running through all sorts of Men, and lodged even in the Beggars brest. Men are not con∣tent Men should be Judges in any of their own affairs, even Private and Per∣sonal; but they will be judging, di∣recting, reproving, urging, and for∣cing as much as they can, them to be, and do as they would have them, lord∣ing and domineering over others; not seasonably, modestly, and friendly ad∣vising only. This gratifies and increa∣seth Pride in us also, and this is that in part which the Apostle reproves, in Rom. 14. 4. Who art thou that judgest another Man's servant? Why wouldst

thou be Governour of another Man, and needs have and force him, compel him to judg and do as thou judgest; or else would'st hate him, despise and blame him in words too, (I suppose) if he did not, when-as in this case, he is only subject to God?

Sect. II.

II. The evil Consequences of too much Proneness to judg on the worst side, (I speak as to the effect only, though the Principle be not bad).

1. That it leads a Man to false Judg∣ments, and to judg Persons worse than they are.

2. That it consequently disposeth a Man to Contemn, Undervalue; nay, Hate a Person more than he deserves. Whence,

3. It begets Suspicions, and belief in others, that this his Judgment comes from the worst principles, of Self-love, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Con∣tempt, &c. when it really may not be so. Whence

4. It disposeth and gives occasion, and is but too often an effectual temp∣tation, both in those whom he thus judgeth and others, to contempt, ha∣tred, and revenge toward him, and that by observing and marking, ma∣king known and publishing his Faults and Infirmities too, which really are so; which otherwise they neither would nor should have done; nay, by adding thereto, increasing their number and greatness, and judging him worse than he is, as the former had done by his Neighbour; whence further hatred and contempt reciprocally from them to him, and more than he deserves too; hence again, it may be Hatred and Re∣venge stirred up in him again, against them. So that now, behold what a crowd and heap of Mischief there is on all hands, instead of mutual Cha∣rity and Beneficence. Part of this is the Motive, our Saviour Himself here subjoyns to His Command, to abstain from Judging, viz. With what Judg∣ment ye judg, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be

measured to you again. That is, If you judg Men otherwise than you ought, they'll do so by you again, they'll pay you in your own Coyn; Men do not use to be behind with one another in these requitals: I conceive, That ye be not judged, is meant of Men; and so in the next Verse, [Ye shall be judged,] and not of God. For God will not judg Men otherwise than is Right, and as ought to be; and therefore not as Men, who judg one another otherwise than they ought. By the way, this Reason of our Saviours, was an Adage or Wise-saying among the Jews. So in the Jerusalem Targum, or Chaldee Para∣phrase, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 With the same measure a Man mea∣sures, shall it be measured to him again whether good or bad, Gen. 38. 24. And again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. Measure for measure. So they feign Judah to have spoken to himself, when Thamar his Daughter being condemned by him to be burnt, for playing the Harlot, she produced the Signet, Brace∣lets

and Staff, which he had given her, and bid him discern whose those were, as a punishment for him, who had frau∣dulently asked his Father Jacob the same question concerning Josephs Coat, whom he with his Brethren had thrown into the Pit, and made his Father be∣lieve he was torn with wild Beasts. This by the bye.

Sect. III.

III. The ill-Consequences of rash Judgment, especially of Censure, are:

1. That it disposeth, useth, and ha∣bituateth a Man thereto, both in his Judgment concerning Persons, and eve∣ry where else.

2. It renders a Mans Testimony very inconsiderable. For who will much heed what that Man judgeth, who is known to judg any-how, without any regard to Reason for what he judgeth, and consequently any sign of truth. It is time ill spent to give such inconsi∣derate, and rash, slight precipitate Per∣sons but the hearing only.

3. It gives occasion to Men, of An∣ger, Wrath, Hatred, Contempt; they always suspecting such unreasonable Judgments to come from worse Princi∣ples than meer Vanity and Wilfulness, viz. from Malice or Envy against them; at least concluding, and truly, that there wanted the Care and Love to their Neighbours they should have had: For Men so well affected one to ano∣ther, will rarely judg without Reason, to each others disadvantage. Besides, what ever the Principle be, the very ill effect will make Men ordinarily angry enough.

Sect. IV.

IV. The ill Consequences of false Judgment, are,

1. A Man's own Discredit and Dis∣reputation, for carelessness, preju∣dice, inability and weakness, to judg right and true; whence also a Man in∣validates his Testimony and Witness, and even then when he may judg well and true. He that more often judgeth

false than true, gives reason to any Man never to believe him meerly upon the account of his Testimony; and therefore not even then when he may judg true. For it is more probable (considering meerly the Persons Testi∣mony) that he that hath more often judged falsly than truly before, doth judg amiss now.

2. The distribution of the Good or Evil that are in ones power, reward, or punishment, (those of private Men I mean) such as are Praise or Dispraise, charity of Alms, or Chastisement, good or bad Word, taking or commending to any Employment or Office gainful or creditable, or refusing or discom∣mending. I say, the distribution of these to ill purpose, viz. Good things to the Bad, or less deserving and neglectful, or Bad to the Good and Well-deserving.

Sect. V.

V. The ill Consequences or mischie∣vous Effects of too much proneness, or rashness, in declaring ones Judg∣ment

unseasonably, or doing it when it ought not, Are,

1. It renders a Man contemptible, or some-what distastful; Either because he hath not Discretion to distinguish be∣tween times, and to discern when it is seasonable and of good effect, and when not, and it is better to refrain, to hold ones tongue: Or, because he cannot govern himself, he cannot contain his inclinations, whether from meer Tal∣kativeness and Busie-bodiness, or from some other worse Principle, he is Im∣potent: Or, lastly, Because he will not, but out of hatred, Revenge, Wrath, or Envy, or Flattery, or the like, he chuseth▪ to do it, and readily takes all such occasions of mischieving another, by possessing others with an ill or mean Opinion, and by stirring up the same passions and affections in them against the Person, which were in himself.

2. Drawing others from their own Affairs or Business, whether it be the Persons concerned in the Judgment, or others. Such Tatlers are like idle Per∣sons, who will not work themselves, not

mind their own Business, nor let others mind theirs: But with their stories con∣cerning others wantonly divert them, or concerning themselves fright them or accuse them, and force them to neg∣lect their work to answer them, defend themselves, or get them away.

3. Therefore mutual suspicion, di∣strust, hatred, animosities, slightings, envyings, contempts, or foolish esteem, vain trust, (if the Judgment be on the Advantageous side) too great and too general one of another: Nothing more ordinary than for Men upon the Whis∣per, or Report of some ill quality, a∣ction, imperfection or infirmity of ano∣ther, to conceive presently too bad an opinion in general of him, and too be too wrathfully, contemptuously, or envi∣ously in general affected towards him. And it were far better generally, that Men were ignorant of one anothers faults and defects, than upon the occa∣sion of their discovery, to be so un∣charitable and unjust, as they usually are. Besides, these hasty Tatlers give no time for a Persons Amendment usu∣ally,

if he hath been faulty once. But this effect is more certain, when that which is reported concerning any one, particularly respects him to whom it is told: As when it is said, I believe he is so or so ill affected towards you, or hath done this or that against you, to your prejudice. For Men here are pre∣sently more Passionate, and sooner in∣flam'd, as being in their own case, they are more sensible and fond of their own good; and this too much and beyond Reason, what ought to be, otherwise the Effect would not be bad.

There are few who have so much Charity and Humility, as to acknow∣ledg their fault or infirmity, when tru∣ly and out of good intent, or at least with no bad one, it hath been observed, spoken of, and mention'd by another; or heartily to forgive, when it hath falsly, foolishly, or maliciously been done. It is better therefore generally (and these things are but so to be taken) to give Persons no such occasions of an∣ger, hatred, contempt and envy, by especially the declaration of a Mans

Judgment, or of what he knows of o∣thers to their disadvantage, but to be very sparing in so doing; and in gene∣ral never to do it out of any worse Prin∣ciple, than a general Charity to Men, and consequently love to what is just and right; out of no selfishness, no ha∣tred or contempt of the Person in ge∣neral, but of love rather to him; out of hatred or contempt of the particular Vice, or Imperfection only; and one would be glad it were otherwise. And then as to our Prudence never to do it, but when seeing the necessity thereof, we are in Wisdom as well as Charity, obliged to it. Be not a Witness against thy Neighbour without cause, i. e. With∣out some foreseen so good an effect, as ought to be a cause thereof, Prov. 24. 28. And, ver. 17. Rejoyce not when thine Enemy falleth: Nor let thy Heart be glad when he stumbleth. And hither∣to is referr'd the telling stories to one Person, of what another Person hath said of him, or done towards him be∣hind his back, and again to the latter, what the former hath said of him. If

this be frequent, it is usually out of Talkativeness, Busibodiness, Hatred, or Flattery, either to do a Person an ill turn, by ill disposing his Neighbour towards him, setting him against him; or to do ones self a good turn, by get∣ting the favour of the Person to whom we report, as seeming so much con∣cern'd for his Credit and good Reputa∣tion, or other Good. Though this may be done too sometimes out of a hearty sincere Charity and Prudence, without any ultimate Self-end.

Where no Wood is (saith the Wise∣man) there the Fire goeth out: So where there is no Tale-bearer, the strife ceaseth, Prov. 26. 20. As Wood is usually conceived the cause of Fire, so such Stories or Reports, whether true or false of one to another, are the cause of Strife and Contention. And, ver. 22. The words of a Tale-bearer are as Wounds, and go down into the innermost parts of the Belly. That is, Usually the stories of such Persons affect deeply their Minds to whom they are told, with keen, smart, violent, and piercing

Passions of Vexation, Anger, Revenge. And, Prov. 16. 28. A froward Man sendeth forth strife, and a Whisperer se∣parateth chief Friends. Such a Person by his frequent stories, if he be belie∣ved, puts Enmity not only between Strangers, but Friends; not Friends only, but chief Friends; for so proba∣bly the Hebrew word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 may there signifie, it otherwise signifying Excel∣lency and Superiority. A great many sayings you have in the Proverbs of the like nature.

Sect. VI.

VI. The ill Consequences of judg∣ing out of Hatred, Revenge, Pride, En∣vy, Anger, Contempt, &c. Are,

1. The increase of these Passions, and their Principles in our selves by use, and in others by our example, which in the degree, or so far forth as they habitually possess our Souls, ren∣der us unworthy of Life or Beeing. For so far forth we do as much Mis∣chief as in us lies; and surely as far as

we see, 'twere better than in that re∣spect that we were out of the World. And although Self-love and Fear, may oft-times restrain and hinder us from being the Authors of such Mischief to our Neighbour, whereby we may be Obnoxious to humane Laws; yet there may be as much of these in our Hearts, as may render us detestable to God, whose Knowledg and Punishment we can neither conceal our selves from, nor escape. But there are infinite Mis∣chiefs which we are capable of doing one to another, which humane Laws cannot take notice of: In so much that a Place, Company, or Society, may be weary of us, and yet cannot tell how to be rid of us. These dispositi∣ons make us like Dragons and Basilisks, that where ever we come, we kill, and and do mischief with our very Breaths and Eyes. These are the Frenzie, the Plague of our Souls, which make every Body very reasonably shun and run away from us. Finally, some make themselves hereby Enemies both to God and Men, and fit company only

for the Infernal Spirits, whom we are most like; and by their being as bad as our selves, their company will be a ve∣ry sutable punishment for us. Further, one of the worst mischiefs of such Prin∣ciples and Tempers is, that by our ex∣ample we infect others, and make others like our selves; we make to our selves company of the like nature to us, and to one another: We propagate it, we give occasion to, and stir up the same Lusts and wicked Inclinations in others; we help to make them more common and ordinary, and therefore the less shameful, and the less suspected and be∣lieved, to be so bad as they are.

2. It exposeth us to the Hatred, An∣ger, Revenge, and Contempt of others. If these Qualities in us when but suspe∣cted (as in our Judgment sometimes of the worst side) were the occasion there∣of, how much more when they but too evidently appear to be the principles of our Judgments? All prejudices of Judgment concerning others from ulti∣mate Self-love, render us generally con∣temned or hated more or•• less, accord∣ing

to the degree thereof that appears; at least pitied by the Best and Wisest. No∣thing generally more hated than Hatred it self, Ill-nature, Malignity, Pride, of which unreasonable and unjust Con∣tempt is one sort. I say, it exposeth to their hatred and contempt sometimes justly, when they judg truly of us, most-what unjustly and more than we deserve. Men seldom observe due mea∣sures in these Passions, sometimes by way of Justice, most what by way of Imitation, or mixture of both: And now when we are thus affected to Men our selves, and they by our Example, and out of Justice, or Ill-nature, or both, are so affected to us again, and to one another: How innumerable are the Mischiefs which are consequent? viz. Just all that we see in the World, Men are properly the Causes and Au∣thors of one to another. All Mens mischievous Wills and Intentions one towards another, proceed from want of Charity, from Hatred in themselves, or from the same ill Qualities in others really, or supposed and presumed;

either because Men hate one another when it is not deservedly, or when it is.

3. But a more particular mischief of our judging others out of Hatred, is, their judging by way of Revenge untruly of us in general, of our Qua∣lities, Principles, or Actions: Whence our Example in any thing that is Good in us, is rendred ineffectual, all our Actions though never so good, are ei∣ther not taken notice of, neglected, or interpreted in the worse sense; that is, those that come from never so good Principles, and are very natural signs thereof, will be deemed Signs of bad, or meer Signs and Hypocritical. It is true, this will often happen thróugh Persons ill-nature, and aptness there∣fore to judg on the worst side, when there is no occasion or cause on our part given, and then we being not able to help it at all, or not without loss of time better spent, may do well to glance a little Pity, and so neglect and take no further notice: But when we our selves are the Cause, or give the

occasion by our uncharitable, or im∣prudent Judgments of others, we can∣not spend time better than by removing them, to take away the prejudice against the example of any thing that is Good in our selves.

Sect. VII.

And thus we have run through some of the most considerable mischievous Effects and Consequences, of these pro∣hibited Judgments by our Saviour; the avoiding of all which ought to be so many Motives to the practising of this Negative Duty: Nor ought the con∣trary good Effects of abstaining there∣from to do less, viz. The minding our own Affairs, the employing our selves about our own Business, the keeping at Home, and applying our selves to our own proper Works and Callings, the more accurate care of our own Princi∣ples and Prudence, Hearts and Actions which we can best know and direct, mind and make use of; and not only minding our own Affairs, but permit∣ting

others to mind theirs, and to be Masters of their own Principles and Actions, to examine, judg, and deter∣mine themselves, we only interposing our friendly Advice and neighbourly Counsel, when asked or desired; or when we see our Neighbour fails in his Prudence or Power in a matter of more considerable moment to him, than our time is to our selves or others; then in∣deed not to be too intent to our own Business, and through Surliness or Carelessness of our Neighbours con∣cern, to refuse, or not to mind, but to knock off a little from our own Business, and lend a helping-hand; like as all Men are so good natur'd, as to leave their Shops, and Trades, or Employ∣ments a while, to quench a Fire in ano∣ther Man's House, though there should be no danger to themselves, or to give a Lift to their Neighbours Horse or Ass.

But otherwise not to be busie in med∣dling, or tyrannical in imposing on other Men in their own Affairs, and usurping their Right. Moreover the

securing of our selves from a disadvan∣tageous false Judgment, and an unrea∣sonable contempt undervaluing, nay, it may be hatred of Persons, to which that disposeth us: However, from a be∣ing suspected guilty of the worst of Principles of our Judgments, and con∣sequently from giving occasion and temptation to others of dislike, Hatred, Contempt, Anger, or Revenge against us, and that by an unreasonable seve∣rity in their judging of us, observing and proclaiming of our Faults and In∣firmities; nay, and more and greater than we were ever so unhappy as to be guilty of, or overtaken with; which otherwise they would have taken no no∣tice of, conceal'd neighbourly, or ex∣cused. And then securing our selves from reciprocal Anger and Wrath in our selves, against their so unjust and ill principled Judgments, to which not∣withstanding we our selves gave a need∣less occasion, whence all manner of Mischief and mutual Injuries; Thy se∣curing therefore of the Innocencie and Peace, mutual Good-will and Benefi∣cence of each other.

Again; the prevention of foolish, blind, unreasonable, precipitate and rash Judgments. The preservation of the credit of our Testimony, and put∣ting our selves thereby in a capacity of, sometimes to the ease and conveniency of our Neighbours, determining or as∣sisting to determine the Controversies or Differences between them. The preservation at least of the Credit and Opinion of our unprejudiced Charity, and care of our Neighbours Credit and Reputation; of the want of which we give but too just Suspicion, by our rash and inconsiderate Judgments, when on the worst side. Further still, the pre∣vention of Discredit and Disreputation to our selves, for our Carelesness, Inabi∣lity, or Weakness to judg, or for our wilful prejudices by our false Judg∣ments; when we were able to judg bet∣ter, that is, truly; nay, when it is a thing always one of the most in our Power of any thing in the World. For who cannot judg, and say, that he knows not, if he be Ignorant, and hath no probability more on one, than to∣ther

side, or that it appears and seems to him, indeed, more probable? In which he needs never to be mistaken, al∣though the thing may prove contrary to what appeared to him?

Further, The securing us from the Breach of the material part, at least of the Ninth Commandment, viz. Of bear∣ing false Witness against our Neighbour.

Moreover, principally the Just and Beneficial disposing of our Kindnesses and Favours, and the with-holding them according to the degrees of each ones Merit or Demerit, the prudent and profitable dispensing our Praise or Dispraise, Good or Bad word, Re∣commendation or Refusal, Charity or Chastisement: Not to squander a∣way foolishly, nay, to ill purpose, what Good is in our power to bestow, and to with-hold it as unseasonably, when it would be to good Effect laid out.

Further still; the prevention of our own being slighted or contemned, for want of Discretion, or Self-govern∣ment in the use of our Tongue and Conversation, for unprofitable or hurt∣ful

Talkativeness and Busie-bodiness, and of being grudged at for worse Prin∣ciples (suspected or real) of our unsea∣sonable and lavish Declaration of our Judgments. But more considerable much is the prevention of mutual Ani∣mosities, Grudges, Ill-will, Discords, Contentions, Strifes between Men, usually arising from the suspicion, or certain knowledg of one anothers ill words, actions, affections, and dispo∣sitions to, and concerning each other. Which if they had been concealed, and not too hastily been told or discovered, might have been repented of, and the Persons of another mind, and so no need of giving warning thereof to the Persons concern'd, and Charity and Peace had been still preserv'd and main∣tain'd. The Humility and Forgiveness of the World, is too little to bear the know∣ledg of Mens few faults and miscarri∣ages one to another, and therefore they had not need be multiplied. The prevention therefore of all the mischiefs of Tale-bearing. Yet further, the not drawing of others from their better

Employments, by disturbing them with false, untrue, or at least useless and tri∣vial judgments and Reports concerning them; which although they are easily neglected, passed over, and slighted by those that are wiser and better, and well provided in the World; yet they very sensibly touch, and much affect those who are not so; of whose Good we ought, as good Neighbours and Christi∣ans, to be justly tender. Finally, and above all, the prevention of the Increase and Improvement in our selves (by using our selves to the wicked Principles of Judging, so often named) of those hellish, wicked, and base Dispositions in us, to name them now and no more, those of Hatred, Malice, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Contempt, Anger and Wrath, Flattery; which if we have any degree of wise Self-love, we shall more endeavour to secure our selves from, than from the most loathsome, tormenting, and killing Diseases of our Bodies. The prevention conse∣quently of exposing our selves to the Hatred and Contempt of others, but

too justly deserved, and of the loss of all the benefits of mutual Good-will, Friendship, and kind and loving Con∣versation. And lastly, The rendring our Example effectual; that if there be any thing Good in us, it might not be at all lost and do no Good; nay, our good Example be turned into a bad one by Mens unjust, (but by us occasioned and provoked) bad Interpretations of what we are, and do.

All these things and many more, which might be observed, of the like nature, those Mischiefs of doing con∣trary to our Duty, and the advantages and good Effects of the Practice of it in this particular of our Judgments concerning others, ought reasonably to make us careful of our Principles and Prudence therein, more than ordi∣nary, viz. That we be not too Prone to judg others; much less to Judg them on the worst side; to observe, accuse, and condemn them, even in our Hearts; not to judg rashly, and without all Rea∣son, but our Wills; not to be Inconsi∣derate; not to judg falsly, but always

when we judg, to do it exactly, ac∣cording to Truth as near as we can; not to babble out our Judgments at any rate, not to be too prone to do that, but to do it out of Charity always, and with Discretion and Prudence; never lastly to pass our Judgments out of the worst of Dispositions, Self-pleasing by Activity, Curiosity, Hatred, Pride, Revenge, Envy, affectation of Superi∣ority, Contempt, Anger, Flattery, &c.