The works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq., epitomiz'd by Richard Boulton ... ; illustrated with copper plates.

About this Item

Title
The works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq., epitomiz'd by Richard Boulton ... ; illustrated with copper plates.
Author
Boyle, Robert, 1627-1691.
Publication
London :: Printed for J. Phillips ... and J. Taylor ...,
1699-1700.
Rights/Permissions

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. Searching, reading, printing, or downloading EEBO-TCP texts is reserved for the authorized users of these project partner institutions. Permission must be granted for subsequent distribution, in print or electronically, of this text, in whole or in part. Please contact project staff at eebotcp-info@umich.edu for further information or permissions.

Subject terms
Physics -- Early works to 1800.
Chemistry -- Early works to 1800.
Medicine -- 15th-18th centuries.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A28936.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq., epitomiz'd by Richard Boulton ... ; illustrated with copper plates." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A28936.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 1, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. III. Of the Origin of Forms.

THE Origin of Forms, Pyrophylies, is one of the most Noble, yet most Obstruse En∣quiries in Natural Philosophy; so that the Wi∣sest of the Peripateticks, have either confessed their Inability, or given Explanations of them very insatisfactory. But not to examine all their Various Opinions on this Point, I shall only here briefly consider the Opinion of the Mo∣dern Aristotelians, having already in our Hy∣pothesis laid down in the foregoing Chapter, our Thoughts on this Subject.

* 1.1The Controversie betwixt us and the Schools is this, Whether the Forms of Natural Bodies be eduted out of the Power of the Matter, and whe∣ther they be substantial Entities distinct from Mat∣ter? That they are not, appears from what is contained in the foregoing Chapters; and there∣fore what I shall here insist on is, that the Doctrin of the Peripateticks is to me Incomprehensible; for tho' the Schoolmen make use of an Obscure Distinction, viz. That in producing Forms, the Power of Matter is partly Eductive, and partly Receptive; yet since they deny Forms, to exist in Matter; it is hard to conceive how they

Page 30

should be educed, before existent: And since the Receptive Power, only enables Matter to receive a Form, how can it help to produce it, when the Form must be produced before the Receptive Power can lodge it?

It is manifest, that the Body hath a Recep∣tive Power in Relation to the Soul,* 1.2 which ne∣vertheless they allow to have a Substantial Form, yet not educed out of the Power of Matter. It's true, were the Form of a Body a more subtile Portion of Matter, as Spirit is of Wine, the Eductive Power might be considerable; and sig∣nifie the same, as if it were granted, that the Form is but a Modification of Matter; which would amount to this, viz. That by proper A∣gents, Matter may be so disposed, as to pro∣duce a Body of this or that denomination: As the Form of a Sphaere may be conce•…•… o exist potentially in a Piece of Brass; because that Me∣tal is capable of being put into such a Form: But this they disallow, because, if it were granted, Forms would be but Accidents. And as for the other way of educing Forms out of Matter, as Spirit out of Wine, that cannot be granted by them; because, then Matter and Form would be the same Substantial Principle diversified by Accidents.

But they tell us strange things of the Efficacy of the Agent, which works upon the Matter out of which Forms are to be educed: To which it may be briefly answered, That the Agent can only act as a Physical Agent; and if the Form produced by it's Operation, be a Substance not preexistent in that Matter it works upon, and which constitutes the Body, the Form must ei∣ther

Page 31

be made of some Parts of that Matter, or created de novo; if they allow the former, then the Form is not a Substance distinct from Mat∣ter; but if they will not allow it to be made of Matter, it must be de novo, i. e. out of nothing; which being granted, Natural Bodies must be produced by Creation and Generation, and not by the latter only; and it's strange if they allow that a Physical Agent can effect that, which Antient Philosophers thought too great to be ascribed to God himself.

* 1.3And as for these Reasons, what they say of the Origin of Forms, is to me Incomprehensible; so, that what they deliver concerning Substan∣tial Forms is irreconcilable to Reason: For though they allow these Forms to be Substances, yet they teach, that they depend upon Matter, both in fieri and in esse: i. e. they cannot exist out of the Matter which supports them; which is to give them the Name of Substances, but the Nature of Accidents. Nay, these imaginary Forms as much invalidate the Doctrin of Cor∣ruption, as that of Generation; for if a Form be a Substance distinct from Matter, it must exist of it self, as the Soul of Man does, when the Body is dissolved: But they assert, that in Cor∣ruption the Form ceaseth to exist; by which means they make it an Accident, and likewise contradict what they commonly hold, viz. That upon Corruption Bodies are resolved into their first Principles; since if what they assert of Forms be true, Bodies are but partly dissolved into their first Matter, and partly annihilated or restored to the common Stock of Forms; which, notwithstanding any thing to the con∣trary, must be immortal.

Page 32

* 1.4But to examine some of the most Plausible Ar∣guments brought by the Schools to evince their Doctrin of Forms: First, they argue thus, Om∣ne compositum substantiale requirit materiam & for∣mam substantialem ex quibus componatur: Omne Corpus Naturale est compositum Substantiale, Er∣go, &c. In which, Syllogism for Brevity sake I shall deny the Minor, because nothing in Na∣ture is composed of Matter and a distinct Sub∣stance, but Man.

The Second Argument they bring, is, that if Substantial Forms were deny'd, all Bodies must be Entia per Accidens; to which it may be an∣swered, that there is no such Necessity, since Matter, Figure, Texture and Motion, ordinantur per se & intrinsice, to make up natural Bo∣dies.

Another Argument which they alledge is, That if there were no Substantial Forms, there could be no Substantial Definitions; which comes to no more, than that if we don't grant some things which are not in Nature, we shall want a Foundation for our Definitions: And indeed if we must define Natural Bodies by Imaginary Forms, which we know not, it is better to exchange Substantial for Essential Definitions, grounded on the Essential Differences of Natural Bodies themselves.

* 1.5These Arguments for Substantial Forms being examined, I shall briefly consider the Physical Arguments usually alledged for the proof of them.

The first is, the Spontaneous cooling of hot Water; an Action usually attributed to the Power of the Substantial Form; which might

Page 33

be plausible, were it not otherwise to be explain∣ed; for Bodies esteem'd cold, having their Parts in a less Agitation than the Natural Juices about the Sensory, cause that Sensation; but when the Parts of that Water, by the heat of the Fire, are put into a Violent Motion, stronger than that of the Parts of Matter about our Sensory, it becomes hot; which hot Water be∣ing removed from the Fire, and the Agitation of its Parts being diminished, it returns to its just Temperature: To effect which, a Substan∣tial Form is no more requisite, than when a Ship is put into a violent Motion in a Storm, there is required a Substantial Form to stop its Motion upon the ceasing of that Storm. And in opposition to Substantial Forms, it may be likewise considered, that Water in upper Rooms in hot Climates, will be kept warm, and in Nova Zembla, in the Form of Ice, meerly by the Temper of the Air, in spite of the Sub∣stantial Form.

Another Argument urged is, that Matter be∣ing indifferent to all Accidents, it wants a sub∣stantial Form to link the Accidents requisite to every Particular Body together. To which it is answered, that the World being now made and constituted, the Phaenomena of Nature de∣pend on one part of Matter acting on another; so that especially fluid Bodies frequently change their States, being altered by the several Sea∣sons of the Year, and Temperature of the Air, which is evident from the different Effects it hath on Weather-Glasses. So that the Accidents observable in most Bodies, depend on Agents and Efficient Causes, which produce in Matter

Page 34

what in the Precedent Chapter we call an Essen∣tial Form: And there is no need of a Substan∣tial Form to keep those Accidents together, since they will continue in the same state, till some other Agent works on them, which is strong enough to destroy and change the Tex∣ture and Form of that Matter; which Agent, the assistance of a Substantial Form being not able to resist, the Body in spite of the Peripa∣tetick Doctrin must be chang'd; an instance of which we have in Lead, which (tho' when melted, it returns to it's pristine state upon cooling) if it be long continued upon a Violent Fire, will be turned into a reddish brittle Glass, and lose all its former Qualities; and retains those new acquired ones, till some powerful Ex∣trinsick Agent, cause a fresh Change. On the contrary, Oranges, Tamarinds, Senna, and se∣veral other Bodies, retain the same Qualities, when gathered and removed from the Soul of the Tree, and without the influence of its Form, which they had before whilst growing: And the colour of Snow soon perisheth, notwith∣standing its Substantial Form, its Texture being altered by a Dissolution.

* 1.6But there is still another Argument general∣ly alledged in favour of Substantial Forms; which is, that without them, the various changes observable in Bodies, and the adhering of se∣veral Parts of Matter united into one Totum, would be unaccountable. As to the first Part of this Argument, it is easily answered, since Local Motion variously determined, is able to effect considerable and various Changes in Bo∣dies; an Instance of which (besides what hath

Page 35

been said in the first, and the preceding part of this Chapter) we have in Tallow, which by the Mechanical Effects of Fire, exchanges Heat for Coldness, Fludity for Firmness, and instead of Whiteness, puts on Transparency. And be∣sides the Changes which are caused by the Ac∣tion of one single Quality in an Agent, as Heat; the Operations of Bodies, proceeding from the Texture of the whole, are various, as appears by Factitious Vitriol, which is made of Iron and a Corrosive Menstruum, yet hath all the Quali∣ties of Natural Vitriol.

And as to the Second Part of the Argument, viz. That the Parts of a Body could not be u∣nited into one without a Sustantial Form; I answer, That a Connexion of Parts convenient∣ly figured is sufficient; as when a Pear is grafted on a White-thorn, or a Plum is inoculated on an Apricock; there is a Union of Two different Forms meerly by a Connexion of the Parts of Matter, and the Parts grafted or inoculated, receive Nourishment as naturally, as if they were supposed to be joined by a Substantial Form, to a Stock of the same Form and Tex∣ture with themselves. Another Instance of U∣nion by a Connexion of certain figured Parts, we have in Glass, where the Particles of Sand are linked together with the Saline ones, by the help of Colliquation, and the violent Action of the Fire.

But to conclude; I am not ignorant that it is alledged in favour of Substantial Forms, that they render Natural Philosophy much more per∣fect, and that it would be very imperfect with∣out them; which comes to no more, than that

Page 36

if we must not explain things difficult by things unknown, we must be imperfect; where I think the Imperfection is not at all remedied; for should it be ask'd why Jet attracts Straws, or why Rhabarb is a Cholagogue, and the An∣swer should be, by reason of their Substantial Forms; it would be all one as to say, by I know not what, because those Forms are unknown.

Being therefore in things purely appertaining to Natural Philosophy, unwilling to believe what is not intelligible, I shall leave the Doctrin of Substantial Forms, to those that have clearer Heads than my self, and shall rather proceed upon Intelligible Principles.

* 1.7I shall therefore briefly intimate what hath been delivered before concerning our Notion of Forms, viz. That the Form of a Body is its Essential Modification; and tho' Matter at the first Beginning of things, had both Form and Motion from the wise Creator of things; yet now the various Forms of Bodies depend on the Effects of Local Motion, which divides, and variously transposes, and so alters both the Textures and Forms of Natural Bodies, tho' I say, at the Creation, the Parts of Matter were guided by a Supream Power, so as to con∣vene into an orderly and well contrived Fa∣brick.

Notes

Do you have questions about this content? Need to report a problem? Please contact us.