An Answer to a paper written by Count d'Avaux, the French king's ambassador in Sweden concerning the proposals of peace made by France to the confederates.

AN ANSWER TO A PAPER written by the Count d' AVAUX, concerning the Proposals of PEACE made to the Allies by FRANCE.

I.

ONE shall hardly meet with a more specious and subtle Paper, than that by which the Count d' Avaux, the French King's Ambassador in Sueden, has support∣ed the Offers and Conditions of Peace made by his Master. Every thing there seems plausible; and if one only considers the beautiful and lively Colours which he so artificially makes use of, one would think that all the Reason and Justice lay on the French King's, as all the Wrong on the Confederates side; and this too in an Affair of the highest nature, since 'tis to put an end to an almost General War amongst Christians in all the parts of the World, and to reestablish a Peace which is to decide either the Liberty or the Dependancy of all the Princes and States in Christendom.

But whereas in Affairs of this Importance, instead of being drawn in by outward appearances we ought to sound the bottom, let us nar∣rowly enquire into his manner of Reasoning, without any Passion or Prejudice, which are as blind Guides as they are deprav'd Counsellors.

The matter in hand deserves it; and if ever there was required a true Touchstone in State-Affairs, we stand now in need of it.

II.

The Count d' Avaux endeavours strait to remove the Fears of the Confederates; who considering the great Eagerness the French King shows to enter upon a Treaty of Peace, have a shrewd guess, That his on∣ly Design in doing so, is to seperate and disunite them. In order to which he alledges, That the King his Master has offered advantageous Terms to all (not excepting any of) his Enemies.

III.

Now to judge whether these Fears are well or ill grounded, we ought to remember what has been done in this Affair in particular, with the Duke of Savoy, the Emperor, the Elector of Bavaria, and even to the King of Spain, by the Holy Father's Mediation.

Again, we ought to consider what pains have been taken to make this War pass for a War of Religion, with the zealous Roman-Catholicks. The Emergency of the Affairs of England, and the late King James's Misfortunes, have furnish'd France with some specious Pretences for it. With the Protestant Princes other Engines have been set at work, and a show has been made of some other Pretences, which the Northern Crowns can prove with a witness. Neither ought we to forget the famous Negotiation of the Treaty at Nimeguen, which was no sooner set on foot, but France obtain'd her Ends, viz. To seperate the then Allies. An unhappy Seperation which plung'd them into all those Misfortunes they have been forc'd to undergo since that time; and which no man can give a better account of, than Monsieur d'Avaux himself. 'Tis then this sad Experience that has made them more wise, and 'tis also the only and true Reason that has oblig'd the French King to make Proposals and Terms of Peace to every one of them, as having lost all hopes of disuniting them by Seperate Treaties.

IV.

But, says one, what means this wavering? Would it not be better to enter strait upon the matter? Does it not seem strange that the Allies have not thought fit as yet to make the least Declaration about the Terms proposed by France? That they do not name the Place of Assem∣bly? Nay, that they will not so much as hearken to the Preliminaries of a Treaty? And has not France reason to cry out against this Con∣duct

of theirs, and to accuse them that they will have no Peace; but that on the contrary they are resolved to continue the War, for ends sinistrous and prejudicial to the Tranquility and common good of all Christendom?

V.

To which the Confederates will perhaps answer; First, That they do not like that Haughty Air of Superiority which France assumes in making the Proposals, as if it was her due to give Peace to her Enemies, when and on what Terms she pleases. It was in this manner they were treated at the Peace of Nimeguen; a thing never before heard of amongst Independant and Sovereign Princes. Neither have they forgotten as yet what Statues were erected in the Place des Victoires, and in the Court of the Townhouse at Paris; what Representations and Inscriptions were made there; what Panegyricks, what Speeches, and what Verses were composed; the most outragious and most ignomi∣nious to the other Sovereigns, that ever were heard of; even with∣out sparing the most Generous and Faithful Friend and Ally France had then, I mean the Brave King of Sweden, who after he had in those times hazarded his Kingdom together with his dearest Interest in favour of the French King, had no other Reward but the Injurious Reproaches of his having reestablish'd him on his Throne. These are the fine and immortal Monuments, which as they strike a just Horror into the Confederates, so they make them cautious not to be treated so a second time.

Secondly, It may be alledged by the Allies, That they find no Secu∣rity for themselves in the Proposals made by France. They know but too well, and by sad Experience, That France acknowledges no other Limits to her Treaties, than what agree with her Designs. 'Tis this which the Pyrenean Treaty, that of Aix la Chapelle, of Nimeguen, and the Truce of Twenty Years, the most solemn, and the most advantageous to France that ever were made, lay continually before her eyes, and of which they are yet more convinc'd by the Maxims of the French Writers, who maintain, That their King can alienate nothing of what once has been incorporated into that Crown; nay, That he cannot re∣nounce upon Oath his Rights, whether true or but pretended, so as to bind his Successors by it. Who will then assure us, That the Treaty that is now to be made, will last, I will not say for ever, but any longer than those that have been made already, and which have been bro∣ken as soon as ever a fallacious Peace has first seperated, and then dis∣arm'd the Confederates?

VI.

But, says another, at this rate we shall have here an everlasting War, since this last reason will always hold, and be ready to be made use of by the Confederates on all occasions.

To which I answer, No; this is not in the least their intention. They desire a Peace as much as France, but it must be a sure, an ho∣nourable, and a general one: And to obtain such an one, they believe there are no other means but to reduce her to such Terms, as will make it her interest to live hereafter in Peace with her Neighbours, notwithstanding her dangerous Maxims. This is also without doubt the reason, why the Confederates have not as yet returned any Answer to the Proposals of France; since there is some time required to agree amongst them∣selves about an Answer proper to obtain these ends, and which at the same time may be approved of by every one of them.

VII.

Monsieur d' Avaux maintains further, That one cannot wish for more advantageous Terms than the King, his Master, has offered the Confederates. This is a thing worth our enquiry.

VIII.

He begins with those offered to the States-General, and that he may not leave undecided that question, Who is the Author of this War, and consequently the Aggressor? Since 'tis of great weight in this mat∣ter; he charges the States General of having been the Cause of it, by lending their Assistance to the Prince of Orange, that he might make himself Master of England. A mighty Point which it concerns us to enquire into.

All the World knows, That in the year 1688, there was no War in Europe, but that with the Turks, which of all the Princes and States that are now in Confederacy against France, the Emperor bore alone the weight of; all the rest liv'd in a profound Peace; when France on a sudden, being puffed up with her Fortune and Gran∣deur, and bent to improve the opportunity of securing to her self for ever, what she did but enjoy for twenty years, made that bloody In∣vasion into the Empire, that did so little expect it, as thinking it self secure under the shelter of a dear-bought Truce. She attack'd and took Philippsburg, and possess'd her self of all the Rhine, save only Coblentz, Rhinfelt, and Cologne; and 'tis to be noted, That this In∣vasion

which was resolv'd upon in the Councel of France, as soon as Belgrade was taken by the Emperor from the Turks, was executed im∣mediately after, to wit, at the beginning of September, and consequent∣ly two Months before the then Prince of Orange came over into England. What relation then has this War with the Assistance given by the States-General to that Prince? Since notwithstanding there was then a defensive Treaty between the Emperor and the States-General still in be∣ing; yet their Alliance was not renewed till May 1689. by a defensive and offensive Treaty, being grounded on the rupture of France. This was not done till a year after the taking of Philipsburg, Heidelberg, Man∣heim, Frankendal and Mayence; and, in fine, after a general devasta∣tion of the Palatinat and the Circles of the Upper Rhine, of Suabia and Franconia.

France, as all the world knows, and as the nature of so vast and unbounded designs did require it, had taken her measures to enslave the Rhine, before the Prince of Orange's passing the Sea was ever thought of, either in England or Holland.

'Tis true, some time before its being put in execution, they be∣gan to suspect a design of the Prince, by the fitting out a Fleet in Hol∣land, and afterwards by an agreement made with some Princes of the Empire about some Troops of theirs, but 'tis no less true, that in France this Design was look'd upon as Chimerical, and those as Blockheads that gave a hint in their Letters that it was laid against England. Howsoever they flattered themselves, that they should have done soon enough with Germany, to be able to bridle after∣wards the Prince of Orange and the States-General; and behold here one of the greatest effects of the Divine Providence that ever was! For 'tis certain that if the French King instead of inva∣ding the Empire, had sent a good Army towards the Frontiers of the Netherlands, though it had been only to threaten them with a War; never could the Prince of Orange have been able to come over into England. The Emperor, the Empire, the King of Spain, had still been in Peace with France; England had been Enslaved by King James; and the rest of Europe by the French King.

Besides, we have still place for another Reflection, which is, that at the bottom France has put the Late King James out of, and set the Prince of Orange on the Thrones of Great Britain. 'Tis long since that France looks on the Power and Greatness of England with jealous eyes, as the only Kingdom capable of prescribing Limits to her unbounded Designs. For which reason she has held for a State-Maxime, to de∣stroy

England by its own Forces, by Domestick Troubles, and Intestine Wars. She began to put it in practice in the Reigns of the Two Charles's, the First and the Second; and thinking she was just upon the point of obtaining her Ends, when James the Second, with whom she had had a long and strict Alliance, and whose Bigottry and Ambi∣tion she but too well knew, mounted on the Throne, she did not fail to improve that opportunity, and the Passions of that Prince, to push him on to a Despotick and Arbitrary Government, and the bringing in of Popery against the Fundamental Laws of the Realm, of which the Eng∣lish are more jealous than any Nation in the World besides is of theirs.

This is a Truth the Late King James could not be ignorant of; and consequently he might easily judge, that without a powerful As∣sistance from abroad, it would be impossible for him to compass so vast and so monstrous a Design; and who was likelier to lend it him but the French King, puissant and dreadful to all the World? In short, the thing was as readily granted as desired; but at the same time it was whispered in the Late King's ear, that all would be in vain except the States General were overturn'd, as being the only in the World that might oppose his Designs; and that would infallibly do it by reason of the great Interest, which together with the Prince of Orange, their Stadtholder, they had in this Affair. Wherefore a Secret League was concluded between the two Kings in order to a total de∣struction of the Ʋnited Provinces, which was to be put in execution on the first opportunity; and France, who had a mind to strike the Iron whilst it was hot, was not willing to put it off, till after she had finisht her Conquest of the Rhine, and forc'd the Emperor and the Empire to confirm her in the possession of it by a shameful Peace, whilst the Late King James, by the means of his Army, was to render himself Master of all at home, to the Subversion of the Government and Reli∣gion establish'd by Law in the Three Kingdoms. This is the true cause of all King James's Undertakings in England, Scotland and Ire∣land, against his true Interest, which was to govern his People ac∣cording to Law, and to oppose the pernicious Designs of France. But his having been drawn in by her, has cost him very dear; for the English being resolv'd not to outlive the loss of their Laws, their Re∣ligion, their Liberties and Properties, call'd secretly to their assistance the then Prince of Orange, who was oblig'd to it by a thousand Rea∣sons. But the Prince being wise and cautious, and knowing per∣fectly the consequence of so great an Enterprize, suffer'd himself long to

be solicited; and did not hearken at last, but to the Threatnings that were made him from England, to abandon entirely his, and that In∣comparable Princess his Wife's Interest, and to give way to some despe∣rate Action, would have cost them Rivers of Blood. Nevertheless, it was not till August 1688. that the States-General were acquainted with this great Affair; and they did not grant the Prince their Assi∣stance, till the very time the French King's Armies were on their march to invade the Empire, and to attack Philipsbourg, and then they were not like to refuse it, since otherwise they would only have had the advantage of being swallowed up last.

Now this being well consider'd must not one have a strong Fore∣head to affirm that the States-General are the cause of this War? But besides, in granting the Prince of Orange's Request, did they do the least thing against France? or did they infringe the least Article of the Treaty that was then in being with her? There is no man of sense can aver it; and Monsieur d' Avaux himself, in his thundring and threatning Speeches, he made then at the Hague, could alledge no∣thing, but that his Master found himself oblig'd to assist his Allie. Was it then requisite that the States-General should have tamely waited for the mortal Stroke that was prepared for them? and being perfectly acquainted with the League of both Kings that had sworn their ruin, should they have let slip the only means to save them, and which in∣deed secured them effectually from the Attempts of France, who was going to build on their Ruin her vast Designs of an Ʋniversal Soveraignty over all the States in Europe.

IX.

And now to come to the point; 'tis evident by what has been said, that the great Interest the States-General have to observe by a re∣establishment of Peace, is the securing themselves effectually for the future by Sea and by Land, without which, all they have to expect will be a suspension only of their total Ruin, so much the more in∣evitable, the less hopes they can have ever to meet with so fair an op∣portunity as they have now at this present, to secure their State, their Commerce, and their Tranquility for the future. The fatal Conse∣quences of the precipitated Peace of Nimmeguen are yet too fresh to be forgotten; and the boasted of Barriere, France offers to restore, will no more establish their quiet for the future, than it has done for the

time past. Besides, France does not offer to restore the entire Barriere, since she pretends to keep Luxenburgh, of which more hereafter.

X.

Monsieur d' Avaux passes but slightly over the Terms which the King of Great Britain is to have; and it seems he fancies forsooth, His Majesty wants nothing but to remain in possession of his Three Kingdoms, and that on that score he'll not scruple to restore what England has taken from France in the West-Indies. But in this Monsieur d' Avaux is so much out of the road, that we have reason to doubt whether Their Majesties will ever permit that it be inserted as a Condition into a Treaty of Peace, that France is to acknowledge Their Dignity and Title, which is sufficiently establish'd by the right of Blood, and by the Offer the Representatives of both Nations have made Their Majesties of the Three Crowns after the Late King Jame's Abdication, and his Retreat into France. Besides, all Potentates of Europe having acknowledged the Title of, and congratulated Their Majesties, there is no doubt but France will be forced to make use of the same Language, in case she has a mind the King should ever enter with her on Articles of Peace. But do they think us tame enough to rest satisfied with that? or rather, do they not imagine we shall ask for somewhat more, some small Terms for our Safety, being acquainted, as we are, with the dangerous Maxims and Designs of France that tend to our destru∣ction? Is it probable the King will abandon his Principality of Orange, and his other Lands by Inheritance, taken from him, and confiscated against all manner of Justice, a long time before the beginning of this War, and in the midst of Peace?

XI.

And what are the Terms propos'd to Spain? Monsieur d' Avaux talks very high and makes a mighty noise about them. Five fine Places taken in Flanders and Catalonia, which the King, his Master, offers to restore, are no Sugar-Plumbs, and his desisting from his pre∣tensions to all the Spanish Netherlands in favour of the Elector of Bava∣ria, carries so mighty a weight with it, that Spain cannot but chuse to embrace these Proposals with both hands. But has not the Catho∣lick King already rejected them with scorn, and declared rather to die, and to carry on the War all alone, then to accept them? Which if it be done with reason, we are now to consider.

The King of Spain knows well that the Places France offers to restore, especially those in Flanders, will be no longer his, than du∣ring the French King's pleasure; and that their distance from him, and their Situation, in regard to his Crown, will make them fall again sooner or later with the remainder of the Spanish Low Countries into the French King's hands, at least if it be not prevented by the King of England's Assistance, and that of the States-General. Neither will a Resignation, in favour of the Elector, contribute more to the fixing of that Turbulent Humour of the French, than that which was formerly pass'd in favour of the Arch-Duke Albert and the Arch-Dutchess Isabella. The King of Spain therefore will think perhaps fit, to demand some greater and more real Pledges of his Safety, by a Bar∣riere that may effectually cover the rest of his Netherlands; and 'tis left to every ones judgment, Whether he has not reason to demand them, after the frequent Infractions of the Pyrenean Treaty, that of Aix la Chapelle, of Nimeguen, and the last Truce, on the French King's side.

In the second place, France has a mind to keep for ever the Fortress and Dutchy of Luxemburgh, and the rather, because the States-General have consented to the leaving of them in her hands during the space of Twenty Years, and that this Fortress is without the Barriere. But is there no difference between a forc'd Resignation, and that only for some years, and a voluntary one, and that for ever? Besides, we ought to consider, that the City and Province of Luxemburg is of greater Im∣portance to the King of Spain, than one half of his Low-Countries; not so much by reason of its Extent and Revenue, as by its commo∣dious Situation, which opens and shuts the Gates to the Succors which he that is in Possession of the Netherlands may expect and re∣ceive from the Emperor and the Empire; and that it is a Bulwark of those Provinces against France.

XII.

But there remains yet another Point to be cleared, of a far greater, nay, of the highest nature; which is, That the French King in desist∣ing in favour of the Elector of Bavaria from his Pretensions to the Low-Countries, does still reserve to himself his Pretensions to the Succession of the King of Spain, in case he should happen to dye without Issue. Which is in plain English, That in case a Peace should be concluded to day, and the King of Spain happen to dye without Issue to morrow, we should then have a new and as fierce a War as ever, in the old world as well as in the new one. Monsieur d' Avaux indeed calls this a very

Malicious Interpretation, and charges the Emperor with it, as being the nearest concerned therein. But he is not aware that he does himself esta∣blish and confirm it more than any body besides. For to maintain, as he does in his Paper, That the Renunciation made, not by the French Queen only, as he does insinuate, but also by the King her Husband, for himself and for his Successors; I say, that this Renunciation made upon Oath, and the most solemn one that ever was pass'd amongst Sovereigns, is null and void of it self; and to propose to the King of Sueden the Arbitration of that great Succession, What does it mean else, but that the French King pretends to it more than ever? Otherwise he should have spoke out, That the King his Master scorn'd to do it, as being resolv'd religiously to observe the Laws he has dictated to himself by this Renunciation. But by the way, Mon∣sieur d' Avaux flatters himself, that by making these Proposals to the King of Sueden, he has hit the Point in Politicks, that will ef∣fectually engage that Prince into the French King's Interest; and he boasts of it as an Honour that was never conferr'd on any Prince within the memory of men. Indeed to see one self an establish'd Arbiter of a Difference that concerns no less than the greatest and rich∣est part of the New World, and so many Kingdoms and Provinces in the Old one, is a thing capable of flattering a mind, tho possest with the highest Ambition; and yet the King of Sueden is too Generous to be drawn in by it. If it was a difference of an intricate and dubi∣ous nature, something might be said for it; but since it is about the most frivolous and unjust Pretension that ever was, I think the King of Sueden has not much Honour done him by being made an Arbiter of what undoubtedly belongs to another. All Sovereigns are en∣gag'd not to suffer an Example of such ill consequence, otherwise farewell all Right and Possession, since none would be the better for 'em. Would not the King of Sueden think it a great Injury, and a piece of the highest Injustice, in case it should be propos'd to him to submit his Kingdom and Dominions that undoubtedly belong to him, to the Decision of a Third Person, tho his Brother or his dearest Friend? And save this consideration, the highest that ever was, the Emperor and the King of Spain do confide so much in the King of Sue∣den's Justice, Candour, and Generosity, that they would gladly re∣ceive him as an Arbiter in any other Difference but this: In this they'll undoubtedly stick to the French King's sworn Renunciation, which excludes him from all Pretensions to the Dominions of the King of Spain, and the effect of which will never be removed, for

all either Monsieur d'Avaux can say, or the mercenary Pens of France, on which he grounds himself, can write; at least as long as any Con∣tract and Obligation amongst Sovereigns does subsist, and Laws Di∣vine and Human are in force.

XIII.

Neither does Monsieur d'Avaux prove better the pretended Nul∣lity of this Renunciation, by reason that the Spaniards (as he pre∣tends) have not discharged the Sums they were to pay in a limited time: For in the first place it ought to be prov'd that it has been the fault of the Spaniards that the Portion of the late French Queen has not been paid, and that they have had no reason to imagine, that the Arrears of the Portion of Elizabeth of France, Queen of Spain, and Mother to the late French Queen, might well account for it. But in the second place suppose the Spaniards had been backward in this point, the Contract of Marriage of the French Queen does not say, That in case her Portion should not be paid within the time prescribed, the Renunciation made so solemnly to the Succession of Spain, was to be null and void. By which it appears, That all the French King had to do, was to oblige Spain to perform the Contract, the Renun∣ciation remaining howsoever entire, as having a Motive and Object far greater, more important, and more glorious than the Five hundred thousand Crowns of the promis'd Portion can come to, that is to say, (to give it in their own terms), To secure for ever the Publick Peace of Christendom, and to procure the Common Good of the Kingdoms and Subjects of both Crowns. The King of Spain and the French King being at that very time willing to prevent the Conjunction of both Crowns, as being too big to be united into one. After which can it be said with the least colour of Reason or Justice, That the French King has the least pretence to annul this Renunciation.

XIV.

As to what relates to the Terms offered to the House of Lorrain, 'tis a Jest to pretend that the Empire has no Right left to meddle with what regards that Dutchy, since the late Duke did not accept of what was stipulated for him at the Treaty of Nimeguen. The Empire says with far more justice, That France having broke that Treaty, can draw no advantage from it, and consequently none neither in regard to Lorrain. 'Tis notorious moreover, that the late Duke of Trium∣phant Memory, did never accept of what Offers were made him at

that Treaty; for which reason the French King has no Right neither to the Four Highways in Lorrain, of the breadth of half a mile, that were granted him on that score. But France, according to her cele∣brated custom, boasts of Treaties as far as they can be stretch'd to her Advantage; whilst on the other hand, that part which does not serve her purpose, is most scornfully rejected. Besides, we ought to observe here, That it is the French King's way to take away with one hand what he gives with another. He'll desist forsooth from his Pre∣tensions to the Four Highways, but he'll retain in exchange Four of the most important Places of that Dutchy, viz. Sarlewis, Bintche, Hom∣bourgh, and Longivy, reserving over and above to himself a Passage for his Troops through Lorrain, which alone would keep the Duke and his Country in a perpetual Slavery. But according to all appear∣ance, the present Duke of Lorrain will find it as hard to persuade him∣self to the resigning of these Four Places, as his Father did when he was to grant the four Highways; at least, he will not think him∣self to be very much beholden to the French King for it. In short, if the French King will make us believe that he has a real design to restore to the House of Lorrain what belongs to it by an undoubted Right, why does he retrench from it so considerable a Branch? Is it perhaps because he still grounds himself on some ridiculous Treaties made with the old Duke of Lorrain, Charles the IIId. possess'd in those times with an implacable hatred against his nearest Relations, and blinded by a foolish Love? And does he pretend that they are obli∣gatory to the present Duke, who having had no hand in them, claims with a Just Right what belong'd to his Ancestors, and what by the same Right is now his own.

XV.

After this, Monsieur d' Avaux examines the Proposals made by his Master to the Empire, on which he dwells the rather, because the King of Sweden is particularly concern'd therein. Let us follow him step by step.

He supposes before all things, That the Treaties of Westphaly and Nimeguen are to remain in their full force and vigour. To which we may reply by the by, That although the French King has rendred himself unworthy of what has been decided there in his favour, yet there will hardly be any dispute about them on the Empire's side, especially about the Treaties of Westphalia; but the question is, Whether the Proposals made by France are capable of restoring those Trea∣ties

to their full force and vigour? To which every reasonable and un∣biassed man will be obliged to answer in the Negative, and that we are to prove hereafter.

Besides, the old difficulty holds here still, to wit, How we shall be assured that the French King will better keep those Treaties for the future, than he has done for the time past? 'Ts notorious, That that of Nimeguen was no sooner executed, but he rais'd in the year 1680. a quarrel about his dependencies and his frivolous Reunions; by the means of which, though grounded only on some whimsical Titles and Pretences, and pleaded before his own Courts, where he was him∣self both Judge and Party; several Princes and States of the Empire were dispossess'd of their Countries, there being found out a way to father always on the nearest places a dependency from those had been last taken. A goodly way indeed that would have Reunited at last the whole Empire to France!

In the year 1681, he Surpris'd and possess'd himself of Strasburg. The violences and outrages that were committed there, and since that time, are of a fresh date, and ought to be abhor'd by all true Germans, as long as they have a drop of blood in their Veins.

Monsieur d' Avaux pretends also, that the Truce of twenty years con∣cluded at Ratisbonne, should be converted into a definitive Treaty of Peace. But why would not the Emperor and the Empire consent to it, when that Treaty was made, or since, before the new Invasion by France? They would have prevented by it, what they have suffered from the barbarous Ravages and Desolations that have been carried during this War, into the best part of Germany, but they had but too much reason to refuse it. Wherefore to soften that Proposition, which was from that time rejected, Monsieur d' Avaux thinks to have mended the matter by making some Alterations in it, which he cries up for so many convincing proofs, that the King, his Master, has no thoughts of making the least Conquests in the Empire. These Altera∣tions are as follow, viz. Instead that heretofore, and since the Truce, France demanded that all should remain in Statu quo, that is to say, that she was to keep by a Peace all Places and Provinces she Usurped in the Empire, the Possession of which was not secured to her but during the twenty years of the Truce; She offers now to surrender some of those Places demolish'd, viz. Mount-Royal, Trarbach, and the Works of Fort-Lewis and Hunninguen, which Works being in regard to France on that side of the Rhine, the meaning of it is in plain English, That she'll raze indeed the Forts built on the German side,

cover the Bridges of Fort-Lewis and Hunninguen, but as to the body of those Places, Situated in regard to her on this side the Rhine, She'll keep them: She offers besides to surrender Philipsbourg and Frybourg fortified, as they are now at present: She offers moreover to restore the Palatinat and the Dutchy of Deux-ponts; and besides all this, shell submit the Affair of the Reunions made for the time past, to the deci∣sion of some Commissaries to be named on both sides, or to the Ar∣bitration of the Republick of Venice. Now according to these fair Pro∣posals, If we'll believe Monsieur d' Avaux, the French King retains no∣thing, but only the City of Strasbourg, with the Forts belonging thereunto, which indeed by way of Compensation, he'll keep for him∣self and his Successors for ever.

XVI.

'Tis indeed a rare show, to see what pains Monsieur d' Avaux takes to make the Germans relish these Proposals, which with an Assurance peculiar to a certain Nation, he would have them look upon as a Fa∣vour his Master has a mind to bestow on them. Add to this the cunning he employs to diminish the Importance of the City of Strasbourg, and it's passage, as also what he alledges to justifie his Master's keeping of it. Insomuch, that the first thoughts that come into one's head, on the account of so injurious Proposals made to the Emperor, and the Empire, are, that according to the ridiculous ditty, or rather impertinent Satyr of his Country, he takes them for Allemands, or to speak more intelligibly, for Irishmen, That do not know so much as the bogs of their own Country. But let us see how the matter stands.

In case the Places France offers to restore to the Empire, as an Equi∣valent for Strasbourg, were either part of the Kingdom of France, or got by that Crown by a just Title, 'tis agreed that they might heark∣en to the Places proposed. But can they name one that does not belong to the Empire, except Frybourg, which was resign'd to France by the Treaty of Nimeguen? On what score then can the French King dispose of Places that are not his own, and offer them as an Equiva∣lent to the Emperor, to whom they undoubtedly belong? But, says Monsieur d' Avaux, the King, my Master, is in Possession of them by Right of Conquest, and the Emperor is not like to retake them. To which I answer, 'Tis agreed that in case it were lawful amongst Christians, to Invade without either Reason or Justice, the Countries of their Neighbours when they least think on it, and imagine them∣selves

secure under the shelter of Treaties of Peace, or when they are em∣ploy'd some where else, as the Emperor, and the Empire were by a War with the Infidels, rais'd by the tricks and cunning of the Most Chri∣stian King, and Fomented by his Treaties, and by his Supplies of Officers, Engineers, and Money; I say, if there was no more to be done but to take Possession of another Prince's Country, and then offer to restore him one part of it, on condition to leave that which is the most considerable in the lurch; then, and then only would there be some sense in Monsieur d' Avaux's reasoning. But what right, either Divine, or Human, did ever Authorize so unjust a Title of acqui∣sition? And what security could there be henceforward expected in the World, if this Practice once came to be allowed? Every Socie∣ty would then be but a band of Robbers, where Force, Violence, and Tyranny, would take place of Right and Justice. 'Tis left to every one's Judgment, Whether it be not the Interests of all Princes to oppose with all their might such pernicious Maxims. In effect, in such cases all Alliances are at an end, and none can be bound by them to Assist so inhuman and barbarous an Aggressor. It has been said heretofore, how France Attack'd and Ravag'd the Empire in 1688. with the greatest Injustice, and without the least shadow of reason, by Monsieur d'Avaux's own tacit acknowledgment, for it is a point he has not thought fit to meddle with; and consequently, if Divine and Human Rights are allowed to take place, the French King, far from getting any advantage by it, or keeping the least foot of ground after so crying an Usurpation, is bound to make Reparation, and the Offended Parties have just grounds to demand Damages of him for what he has caus'd them to suffer. But, good God! What Da∣mages may there not be ask'd? Entire Provinces utterly destroyed; Cities that opened their Gates, relying on the Faith of Capitulati∣on made with the French Dauphin, Raz'd to the very ground; Acti∣ons innumerable of Cruelty and Barbarity unparallel'd in all Histo∣ries; what Reparation, I beseech you, is there to be made for all this? Yes, to weigh all things rightly, a good part of France it self would not suffice. Nevertheless, to make the measure full, instead of thinking to give the least satisfaction, the French King sets a price on his Cruelties; for these are the bloody Titles by which he pretends to keep what he has got by them. But, God be thanked, the Em∣peror and the Empire are not reduc'd to acquiesce in them, at least they will not think themselves much beholden to him for the offer he makes them to restore some of the places he Usurps in the Empire, in lieu of the City of Strasbourg.

XVII.

'Tis this City which sticks closest to the Count d'Avaux's heart; for he leaves no stone unturn'd to inveigle the Empire to abandon it. At one time he endeavours to prove that such a Resignation is not contrary to the Treaties of Westphaly, since the Emperor, if you'l believe him, has infring'd them in regard to Sueden as well as France; and that in the Empire it self Instances are to be found of divers Altera∣tions made since those Treaties. At another time he makes bold to maintain, That the City of Strasburgh has surrendred it self willing∣ly to its Master; that it is its Interest to remain under his Protection; that this City is of little or no importance to the Empire; and that un∣less it be resign'd, there will be no quiet for it, nor any assur'd Peace between the Empire and France; and in fine, that at all hazards the blame of it can never be laid at his Master's door, since he has offer∣ed for it a more than sufficient Equivalent.

All this fine Gibberish needs no Refutation. Neither do I think fit to meddle with that Question, Whether an Alteration may be lawful∣ly made in the Empire, against and after the Treaties of Westphaly; since it would be no more to the purpose, than the Instances Mon∣sieur d'Avaux gives of it. All I have to say as to that Point is, That no part of the Empire ought to be dismember'd from it, nor any Al∣teration made, except in Cases of the highest Necessity, and when there are some great and visible Advantages to be got by it. But what good will it do the Germans to abandon the City of Strasburgh? Or rather, What hurt will it not prove to them? Since this Place is both the only Key to, and the sole Bulwark of the Empire against the Invasi∣ons of France.

XVIII.

As to what regards the Accusation of the Emperor, as if he had infring'd the Treaties of Westphaly, in the Wars of Poland and Den∣mark, Monsieur d'Avaux makes use of it as an Argument that strikes home: But 'tis not fair to unravel things that have been buried in Oblivion by a Solemn Treaty in 1660. Animosities between Princes are not to be look'd upon as Eternal, since they are not only obliterated by Time, but the Interest of their Country often changes them into a sincere Friendship; as indeed since that time we have seen strict Alliance made and kept, and a perfect Correspondency reign between the Emperor and the King of Sueden, to their mutual Advantage and Sa∣tisfaction.

On the contrary, the strongest Ties are broken, when that In∣terest which made them, happens to cease: Witness Sueden and France after the Peace of Nimeguen; the latter having treated the first with great Haughtiness, and all imaginable Scorn.

Yet suppose there had been some Infraction on the Emperor's side, which yet the Imperial Court has formerly denied, alledging the De∣fensive Alliance was then in being between the Emperor and Poland, that was the Party invaded; that Difference has been made up by the Treaties of Peace, and does not authorise the French King to do as much after the Peace was made. 'Tis so plain a Point that we need not en∣large upon it. Let us rather consider what regards the City of Stras∣burgh in particular.

XIX.

Whether that City has voluntarily surrendred it self, or not, is left to be decided by Matter of Fact, which is of so late a date, that we cannot but remember the Circumstances of it. Three or four Villains in the Senate, Traitors to their Country, corrupted by French Money, and blinded by their ambition, (one of which was soon after* 1.1 paid off by the French King himself) did the business; and the poor Inhabitants resolv'd to defend themselves, were intimidated by the approach of a French Army ready to Attack them in the midst of Peace. They saw themselves with∣out hopes of Relief from abroad, and with∣out Advice from within by the Treachery of their Chiefs, and consequently were forc'd to open their Gates. This is the consent Count d' Avaux does so much brag of. The French King would undoubtedly look on such Magistrates of his Towns as great Traitors, that should act as those of Strasbourg have done, and he would do it with as much reason, as there is but little now, to call those of Strasbourg, The best and soundest part of the Inhabitants.

XX.

What Monsieur d' Avaux says of this City, viz. That it is it's Interest and Advantage to remain part of the Dominions of France, is of the same piece. 'Tis certain that it has found it self well under the Pro∣tection of the Empire during several Ages, at least that it has enjoyed a

full and entire Liberty in Matters Ecclesiastical and Civil; when on the contrary, it is now subjected to the Tyrannical Government of the French King, who alledges no other reason for his innumerable Edicts, Declarations, and Ordonnances, but what we always read at the end of them, Car tel est Notre Plaisir. For that is Our Plea∣sure.

XXI.

But for what a Conjurer would Monsieur d' Avaux pass, and what a Master would he seem to be of the Art of Perswading, if he could make the Germans believe, that this City is of little or no importance to the Empire, and that unless it be resign'd, there would be no quiet for it, nor any Peace assured between the Empire and France.

To show Monsieur d' Avaux that the Empire knows perfectly well the value and importance of that Place, and far better than he; be it known to him,, if he be ignorant of it, that upon this City depends the Preservation or loss of three Circles of the Empire, viz. of Suabia, Franconia, and the Ʋpper Rhine, that is to say, a third part of Germa∣ny, that Strasbourg being under the Protection of the Empire, serves in∣stead of a Wall to these three Circles; but that being in the possession of France, it serves her by the rule of contra∣ries as an† 1.2 Inroad (as its name imports) as a Key, and as a Place of Arms, to invade, to ravage, and to enslave these three Circles; that this Place being in French hands cuts Germany off from Switzerland on the side of the Ʋpper Rhine, and renders them Masters of that great and important River, from Basle on to the very Gates of Philipsbourg, which France offers to surrend∣er: And there needs no other proof of it, but a remembrance of the business of the Reunions and Dependancies which after the taking of Strasbourg, was carried on with more boldness and violence than ever. In short, 'tis the most sensible breach of the Treaties of West∣phaly that France can make, to desire the keeping of Strasbourg by way of advance. Such a demand has no coherence with the foundations, the Count d' Avaux himself has but just now laid of the Peace that is to be, viz. That the Treaties of Westphaly and Nimeguen, are to remain in their full force and vigour. One might enumerate a hundred other Advantages that Strasbourg yields to the Empire, but we have said enough to convince every reasonable man of the great importance of that place to the Germans.

Again, to say that Philipsbourg is a greater Inroad into the Empire, and that consequently 'tis of as great, if not greater, importance than Strasbourg, is still to take them for Irishmen; for to speak soberly, What comparison can there be made between such an inconsiderable Place as Philipsbourg, unwholsome by its Situation, block'd up with∣in the Territories of the Empire, and which cannot contain but a Garrison of 3 or 4000 men at the most; and Strasbourg, which with the Provinces that surround it, may contain an Army of Fifty thousand men? Besides by what has been said, Philipsbourg, as well as Strasbourg, ought to be restored to the Empire.

XXII.

To answer also to the Objection that has been made, That as long as Strasbourg remains part of the Empire, there can be no assured peace and quiet between it and France; we need but turn the Tables, and say with more reason, that on the contrary, as long as Strasbourg is in the French King's Hands, all Peace, and all Treaties of Peace, will be in vain: For with what Patience can that great Nation behold in the Power os France, a place that has belong'd to them during so many Ages? that has been so Treacherously stole from them, that threatens them incessantly with a terrible Storm, ready to break out upon them on the first opportunity, and that in fine is the Capital of that beautiful and great Province of Alsace, in which France by the Treaty of Westphaly is only entituled to the City of Brisac, the Land∣graviat of the Lower and Ʋpper Alsace, in the same manner the House of Austria did possess it, the Suntgau and the Provinoial Mayery of the Ten Cities? Nevertheless Count d' Avaux passes over this great and delicate morsel in silence, and pretends to swallow it up without so much as speaking of it. There are no instances, at least for several Ages, That the Empire has Invaded its Neighbours. An Offensive War does not at all agree with its Constitution, since to resolve upon it, more than 200 Voices are requisite, of Princes and States that are of a different, not to say opposite, Interests: When on the contra∣ry all Europe smarts by the frequent Invasions and Insults of France: All Ages furnish us with Instances of that kind, and the present more than all the rest; And how can we expect better for the future from that unruly and turbulent Nation.

XXIII.

As to the Count's maintaining, That the King, his Master, offers the Empire a more than sufficient Equivalent for the City of Strasbourg; we have already Answered, that the Surrender of whatever the French King has Possess'd himself of during this unjust War, is so far from being a Compensation for that Place, that on the contrary he is holden to make the Empire Restitution of it with Cost and Da∣mages.

XXIV.

And indeed 'tis matter of wonder to see, That Monsieur d' Avaux, who is, and Writ in Sweden, dares not only advance, that more than Two thirds of the Palatinat, belong uncontrovertedly to the Dutchess of Orleans; but that also he takes upon him to offer and to dispose as an equivalent of the Palatinat, and the Dutchy of Deux-Ponts, the latter of which belongs as undoubtedly to the King of Sweden, as he has Right of Succession to the first. This is a Point indeed of the highest consequence, but 'tis left to the decision of that Prince, who as he is most concerned therein, so he'll know without doubt, how to maintain his Interest. We shall only al∣ledge here, the Memorial presented in the year 1685 to the Diet of Ratisbonne, by the Minister of the Prince Palatine, in which it has been made out, that according to the Constitutions and Customs of the House Palatine, which the Duke and Dutchess of Orleans have acknow∣ledged by their Contract of Marriage, and by a solemn Acquittance de∣livered on the Payment of her Portion, the present Dutchess of Orleans has no manner of pretensions, no more than the rest of the Princesses Palatin, either to the Territories of that House, or to what depends from them, as long as there are Princes Palatine and Dukes of Bavaria alive, who altogether descend in a direct Line from Stephen Count Pa∣latine their Common Father, and Author, and Founder of this Constitu∣tion, which since that time has been acknowledged by so many so∣lemn Renunciations of all the Princesses Palatine, and more particularly by that of the present Dutchess of Orleans. We'll content our selves also with admiring the boldness, to say no more, of Monsieur d' Avaux in offering to restore the Dutchy of Deux-Ponts in the Condition it was in when his Master seiz'd it; For what will become of the use and re∣venues of that Dutchy, he has enjoy'd during his Ʋsurpation? Accord∣ing to all Laws they ought to be made good at least, to the King of Sweden.

XXV.

As to what regards the Reunions made for the time past, and the Proposals to submit the decision of them to some Commsssaries, or to the Arbitration of the Republick of Venice; 'tis of the same nature with the Succession of the King of Spain, which we have examined already. The name alone of Reunions, Barbarous and unknown to all other Languages, will be for ever detested by the Germans, so far are they from disputing about, and agreeing to an Arbitration of that kind. And would it not be a tacit acknowledgment, that France had had some reason to make them? For we ought never to enter upon the debate but of such Points, that are not, as this is, obvious, clear, and evident on the Empires side. What if the Arbiter should hap∣pen to decide in Favour of France, Would not that goodly work of Reunions go bravely on anew? And the French Writers, would not they have a fair play to maintain, that what had once been their King's Right, must be always so, in spight of what all future Trea∣ties might decide against it? Far be it therefore from the Germans to submit a certain and undoubted Right, to the chance of a doubtful decision. Besides, the French King pretends to remain in Possession of the Reunions till that decision be made. Now suppose those Commissa∣ries, or the Republick of Venice just and bold enough, to give these Re∣unions to the Germans, How shall they come at them but by the means of a New War?

XXVI.

And thus far have we followed Monsieur d' Avaux close in the En∣quiry of the Proposals he has made; and tho we have reason to be∣lieve that we have sufficiently demonstrated the Injustice and Unrea∣sonableness of them, yet this will be more conspicuous yet, if we consider that there is not one of the Allies on whom the French King by these Proposals does not endeavour to get ground; and that he treats every one of them, as a Conqueror would do his vanquish'd and pro∣strate Enemies; of which I am going to give an Account, but in a few words.

France demands of England what has been taken from her in the West-Indies; of the States-General, that they are to acquiesce in the renewing of the Treaties of Peace, and a Commerce with France, on the same foot as they were before the beginning of this War: Of Spain, the Dutchy and Fortress of Luxemburgh, with an Establishment of her

Pretensions to the Succession of that Prince: Of the Duke of Lorrain, Four important Places, with a Passage for his Troops, that are to pay for what they have: And of the Empire, the City of Strasburgh, will all its Forts; as also, That the Decision of the Reunions may be left to some Commissaries, or an Arbiter.

XXVII.

The King of Sueden was so sensible of the Extravagancy of these Proposals, that when his Ministers presented them to the Confederates, they declared in the Name of the King their Master, That it was by no means his Majesty's Intention to Persuade, much less to Force the Parties concerned, to acquiesce in them: And yet Monsieur d' Avaux has the bold∣ness (to say no more) to maintain to the King of Sueden's face, That it is his Interest as well as for his Honour, to press the Enemies of France to accept of the Proposals of Peace she has made them; and that whosoever talks to him otherwise, has no true Zeal for his Ser∣vice, nor a due unconcernedness towards all the other Princes of Eu∣rope. Good God! who could have expected such a Declaration from the French Ambassador in Sueden, who has so great a Reputation? We need not again but turn the Tables, and say with much more truth, That it is the King of Sueden's Interest, as well as for his Ho∣nour, to press France to grant the Allies more just and reasonable Terms; and that whosoever talks to him otherwise, has no true Zeal for his Service, nor a just unconcernedness towards the French King: I say, we might say all this; but we have too much Respect for that King, and too much Consideration for his Ministers, to re∣proach them with what they do not deserve.

XXVIII.

Nevertheless let us examine the Considerations Monsieur d'Avaux al∣ledges in order to support his Reasons, and to make the King of Sueden relish them: One regards his Interest, and the other engages his Honour.

By the first he pretends, That the House of Austria being the com∣mon Enemy of France and Sweden, as the two only Kingdoms capa∣ble of opposing its Designs of an Ʋniversal Monarchy, (which if you'll believe him, sticks close to its heart) and of protecting the Liber∣ties of the Princes of the Empire; that this House makes it its study to ravish from these Crowns the Territories they are in possession of in Germany; for which reason, says he, 'tis the Interest of both Kings to

maintain their Ancient Union; and that the King of Sueden is so much the more obliged thereunto, because in case it should happen that France notwithstanding all her Victories by Sea and Land, should lose a consider∣able Battel at last, he would hardly be able to raise the dejected Party. On the other hand, he maintains, That 'tis no less the Interest of the King of Sueden to prevent the French King's falling off at Sea, and to oppose the Tyranny which the English and Dutch endeavour to establish there.

XXIX.

To hear Monsieur d'Avaux reason at this rate, one would be apt to think he had quite forgot the Circumstance of Time. If his late Ʋncle had made this Harangue at the Treaty of Munster, it might have pass'd; but what Alterations have we not seen since that time in the Affairs and Interests of State? Has it been forgotten, that since the Peace of Munster, and especially during and after the Negotiation at Nimeguen, France has endeavour'd to mortify the King of Sueden a hundred ways, to create him Enemies, and to entangle him into Wars? That she has dispos'd of the Lands of that prince, as if he had been under her Guardianship, and of her Dependancy: That she has abus'd his Ministers: That she has made a League against him, and come to that height as to send her Squadrons against him into the Sound: That she has offered to hinder him from making Defensive and Harm∣less Alliances; witness the noise she made at Ratisbonne and in other places, against that was then made between the Emperor, the King of Sueden, some Electors, and several Princes of the Empire, in the very same year she made an end of her seizing the Dutchy of Deux-ponts; where she had no more regard for the King of Sueden, than she would have had for the least State of the Empire. On the other hand, Is it not visible, that at the present Juncture of time, the Emperor's and King of Sueden's Interests are absolutely the same? And that 'tis morally impossible to seperate them, since one cannot be sav'd without the other. And 'tis for this reason, that the Houses of Brandenburgh and Lunenburgh are in a strict Alliance with that King; and that far from thinking of getting ground upon him in the Territories he possesses in Germany, they are as ready, as they are oblig'd, to defend them against any body whatsoever.

But how does this agree with the pretended Ʋnion of Interest which is imagin'd to subsist at present between France and Sueden? Is it not ridiculous to endeavour to move the King of Sueden to authorise and

to be the Guarantee (if one may say so) of the Superiority and the Conquests of the French King? since the latter has declared and made War against the Empire and its Allies, without acquainting him in the least with it; nay, rather against himself, in his Dutchy of Deux-Ponts, and by the Desolation of the Palatinate. Besides, France de∣mands this Guarantee, without being willing to let the King of Sue∣den share in the Conquests she has made, and that are directly against his Interest: For 'tis evident, that if the War with the Confederates, and the need the French King stands in of Sueden, had not brought him a little to reason, never would he have thought of restoring the Dutchy of Deux-Ponts to its right Owner: Nay, he would have pre∣tended also to retain the best part of the Palatinate, to the prejudice of the Ancient and Natural Rights of Succession of that King. Was there ever such a Confederacy, unless that of the Lion in the Fable?

XXX.

But what did Monsieur d'Avaux dream of, when he accus'd the House of Austria of aspiring to an Ʋniversal Monarchy? Does he think that all the world is either blind or out of their wits? For if a Philip II. in the last, or a Ferdinand II. in the present Age, have per∣haps conceived such a Design, being tempted to it by the Greatness of their Power, and encouraged by their Victories, it has been buried with them, and none but France has inherited it; she being in reality now, what the House of Austria was formerly. We have seen with our eyes, that since the Pyrenean Treaty France has not only affected an Arbitrary and Absolute Government over all the Princes and States in Europe, but that she has actually exercis'd it. We appeal to 'em all, whether one can say that he has been exempted from it. Those whom Nature has made their Neighbours, have been all either swallow'd up, or put out of a condition to resist; and those whom a kinder Heaven has remov'd from her, have felt her Insults and Threatnings. And without entring into Particulars, which would perhaps be tedious, 'tis enough to make the King of Sueden remember, as we have alrea∣dy said, how he has been us'd by France, especially when she sent a Squadron against him into the Sound, which till then had never been heard of. For 'tis worth our while to know, That France af∣fects no less a Sovereignty over the Seas, than she does over the Land; and 'tis for this Reason, and not that Monsieur d' Avaux al∣ledges, That England and Holland have united themselves against Her.

And now 'tis left to every one's judgment, Whether it be for the King of Sueden's Advantage, to assist the French King in the prosecu∣ting of these wicked ends, as he would do by procuring him such Advantageous Terms of Peace as he demands; and by which he can∣not but get more ground upon his Neighbours, and augment consi∣derably his Power: Or rather, Whether it be not his true Interest to oppose it with all his might, together with all other Princes con∣cerned therein, and to hinder that France may not get the better by this War, by obliging her to restore what she has so unjustly taken from her Neighbours. For, in fine, if she has committed so many Outrages before she was in Possession of Strasburgh, Luxemburgh, and so many other Places and Provinces, what will it be for the future, if she comes to keep 'em by a Peace? Two years of a good Harvest and Trade will make up all her Losses, and render her more powerful than ever, and put her in a condition to make all other Princes sen∣sible of the deplorable effects of her Turbulent Humour and Am∣bition. Now is the time to throw off that Yoke we have felt so hea∣vy. If we let it slip, never must we hope to see it again. For what appearance is there to expect such another Juncture, or to see again so many Means and Forces which a happy Destiny has now united, on purpose to de∣liver us from Slavery and Bondage? Or now, or Never.

Neither is it to be fear'd the thing should be stretch'd too far, and the Enemies of France grow too great, by Her becoming less; as yet Monsieur d' Avaux endeavours to insinuate, by a Confessien that un∣doubtedly has cost him very dear. Ah! how far are we yet from it, and how many things are there still required, to put the Scales into a Ba∣lance, which now entirely incline towards the French side? There are some Limits may be prescribed to make that Balance even; which will be done, if things be set in the same posture they were in im∣mediately after the Westphaly and Pyrenean Treaties; for 'tis from that time onwards, that France did extremely outweigh the Balance.

XXXI.

And now we are come to Monsieur d'Avaux's Second Consideration which he lays before the King of Sueden, in order to engage him to his Master's Interest, on account of his own Honour.

The King his Master, he says, has strait accepted of the King of Sueden's Mediation; and on the contrary, the Confederates, (if you'll believe him) have rejected it, as being unwilling to hearken to any Peace, for some particular Ends of the Emperor, and the King of

Great Britain; and from thence he concludes, that the King of Sueden is in Honour engag'd to make himself to be look'd upon as a Great Prince, such as he ought to be; that is to say, according to Monsieur d' Avaux, he should either procure Peace to Christendom, or side with one of the two Parties; it being the thing he advances at the beginning of his Paper.

Now tho we may very well admit of this Proposition, That the King of Sueden ought either to procure Peace to Christendom, or side with one of the two Parties, yet the Question is, To what Party his Ho∣nour, Glory, Reason, Justice, and own Interest ought to incline him; and we need but open our eyes to see that he ought to join with the Confederates, as we have already proved by all we have said in this Answer.

In the mean time, 'tis not true that the Confederates have rejected the King of Sueden's Mediation; they are, on the contrary, ready to embrace it, persuaded as they are, of his Majesty's Justice, Equity, Candor, and Generosity. 'Tis then the French King's fault alone, that the Mediation of Sueden has not as yet taken any effect in a Treaty of Peace; and this Obstacle will not be removed, as long as the French King sticks to his Proposals, which he calls his Ʋltimata; and the Confederates can never accept of, since instead of a sure and dura∣ble Peace, they would only obtain by them a delay of their Ruin and Misery; and that if they should take place, France would soon be in a condition to begin a New War and fiercer than ever; and that at the latest, in case Europe should have the misfortune to see the King of Spain die without Issue; in the mean time France under the sha∣dow of Peace, would be busie in endeavouring to embroil the Af∣fairs every where, especially in England and Holland, which as they are the two great Obstacles to her vast Designs, so are they also the Ob∣jects of her Hatred.

XXXII.

But let us make an end by remembring the King of Sweden once more, That the work of an honourable, sure, lasting, and general Peace, seems to be reserv'd in a great measure to his Glory: That he needs no more but desire it, by obliging France to restore all things in regard to the Empire, into the same condition they were in by the

Treaties of Westphaly; and in regard to Spain, if not exactly accord∣ing to the Pyrenean Treaty, yet the nearest to it, as Justice, and the security and welfare of the Catholick Countries and Europe requires; and finally, to let the other Confederates have also a just and rea∣sonable Satisfaction; which being done, there will be no more di∣spute about the Proposals of Peace that then will offer themselves.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  A Principal Person concerned in the betray∣ing the City of Strasbourg sent for to Paris, under pretence of Reward, by the French King's Order, Banish'd to one of the re∣motest parts of France.
• † 1.2

  An Inroad, or High∣way, is called in the Ger∣man Language, Strass.