ANIMADVERSIONS on a Postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock, against the Calm Discourse of the Sober Enquirer: As also on the Letter to a Friend concerning that Postscript.
BEFORE I begin them, I shall take a little notice of the several Characters which seem to distin∣guish each Author.
THe Doctor, or Dean, or Defender, (no matter which I name, for they Three are One) wants nothing to make him a good Writer, but a good Cause, and says as much for a bad, as any Man can; nay, and when the Nature of the Cause will bear no more, he makes it good with Magisterial Grace and big Assurance. He has always Logick enough by him, to prove a Trinity of Faculties, Relati∣ons, Modes, to be only a Trinity of Names; and a Trinity of Essences or Natures, to be a Trinity of Gods. All that can be said of him is, that he takes no care of himself, but sacri∣fices his own Hypothesis, to make sure work with that of his Adversary.
His Adversary the Enquirer, steps forth from the Press, at his first Appearance in the Cause, with all the winning Civility, and good Nature in the World. He will not be so rude as to say, that his Hypothesis is the certain Truth of the Matter; only he hopes that his gentle Reader will be so courteous, as to grant it possible.
The Dean would do the Enquirer a singu∣lar Favour, to let him be now and then of his Opinion; but that being not granted, put him a little out of temper; yet he quickly recovers himself, and when he has cut the Dean with a bitter Sarcasm, p. 42. he gives him in a healing Parenthesis, an Anonydi∣nous Contradistinction.
In short, this is the Case between the Dean and the Enquirer: The one deals rude and heavy Blows; the other neatly offers dange∣rous Thrusts. You may fancy them engaging like AEneas and Mezentius in Virgil, who main∣tain the Fight,
In the first Page of the Postscript, I meet with these words, — I do not intend to exa∣mine the Book, nor approve or disprove it; and yet he examin'd the Book, and that not carelesly neither. I have again and again con∣sider'd those Words, and perhaps at last have spelt the just Sense and Meaning of 'em, and yet but part of 'em; for why he should dis∣own intending to examine the Book, that I can't account for, nor perhaps himself. When he avows he did not intend to approve the Book, he avows that which is Grammatical∣ly Page 2and Literaily true; it never came into his Head, to set his Seal to any thing of Mr. H—w's drawing up. And when he says, he did not intend to disapprove it, that is Rheto∣rically and Figuratively true: for by the Fi∣gure call'd Apophasis, a Man denies to do or say that which he says most emphati∣cally, and does most industriously. Having now said thus much, why may not I be al∣low'd to guess at the Reason, why the Dean profess'd, that he intended not to approve or disapprove Mr. H's Book: possibly it might be this; He can patiently endure any Hypo∣thesis, to make good the Trinunity, except it be such a sawcy one, as sets it self up in competition with his, and would impudent∣ly take place of it. Now better the Article be lost, than that the Man, who slights the Dean's Undertaking, should save it, or that the Church should be beholden for preserving her Faith entire, to the Wit and Learning of a pitiful Dissenter.
The Postscript affirms, that thô the En∣quirer does not in every particular say, what the Dean says, yet he says what will justify the Dean against the heavy Charge of Tritheism. The Post∣seript makes good this Affirmation thus, —What the Dean says of Three distinct, eternal, infinite Minds, that Mr. H. says as plainly, and in more obnoxious Terms. What a lamentable Argument is this? Will Mr. H's broad Tri∣theistical Discourse evince that Mr. Dean has not made just such another? Will Clodius's Lewdness absolve all the wild Gallants in Rome? He that sets up three Gods, and there∣by shews what little Reverence he has for the one true God, though he may chance to find others, who preach and print as perversly as himself, is nevertheless a Tritheist; their running into the same wicked Error, will not at all excuse him. Again, it is to be noted, that the Dean in charging Mr. H. to have used more obnoxious Terms than him∣self, [he means more liable to be under∣stood, as implying three Gods] does grant that he himself has used obnoxious Terms; Terms implying three Gods; then is he more to be blamed than Mr. H—w: be∣cause, though he be an unlucky Tritheist, yet does not seem to know it; but the Dean professes to know the bad Consequence of his obnoxious Terms, and yet is not asha∣med to use them.
The Dean has briefly and fairly recount∣ed what Manner of Representation Mr. H. has given of a Trinity in the Godhead, which may be yet more briefly set down thus; —
Now is Mr. Dean, in the Malice of his Heart, for sending Mr. H—w to Dr. S—th, to know of him if this be not Tritheism: But for my part, if I were to die for't, I could find no Difference between them. Three distinct Minds or Spirits, and Three distinct Essences or Natures, with all the Perfections of the Godhead in all and every of them, can be no less than three Gods. Yet the Dean is pleased to say [looking upon Mr. H. as a convicted Tritheist, without a word to offer for his Hypothesis] that the Animadverter charges him (the Dean) with Tritheism only by consequence. Bless us! how would he be charged? He has had the Luck hitherto, and I hope will have the Wit hereafter, to forbear the asserting in plain Terms, that there be Three Gods; but his Hypothesis plainly implies it, and Mr. H—w's does no more: and Dr. S—th has proved his Charge against the Former. No, no, says the Dean, for three distinct Minds are not three distinct Substances or Essences. Page 3No! What are they then? Why, they are three distinct thinking Beings: Defence of Dr. Sher. Notion, p. 86. This Dean may advance what Notions he pleases, and never stand in fear of any Arguments which can be brought against him; for as Mr. Bays in the Rehearsal, out-wrote all his envious Brethren, by the help of a Drama Common-place-Book, so he with the help of an Ecclesiastical-Polity Common-place-Book, when he has advanced foolish and inconsistent Notions, shall easily reconcile himself to himself, and make good that Conclusion which best sutes his present Purpose; or when the worst comes to the worst, puzzle the Cause, save his Honour, [which is all he cares for] and hide his Nonsense.
The Rules of that wonderful Book, are said to be these.
The first Regula fiduciae, or the Rule of Assurance. This Rule directs him, first, in causa simplici, as thus: If the Importunity of Hereticks forces us to find Names for that, to which nothing in Nature answers, if they will not give us leave, we must take leave to use such Names as we can find: Def. p. 14. 2dly; It impowers him to cut off the dan∣gerous Horns of a merciless Dilemma, with a Fore-stroak the one, with a Back-stroak the other; as thus: If a sawcy Adversary charges him with Self-contradiction, he tells him, that it is impossible to know what a Contradiction is: and when himself charges a Transubstantiating Blockhead with Self-contradiction, then it is possible to know what a Contradiction is. Vindic. of Trin. p. 4.
His Second Rule is Regula consortii, or the Rule of Company; it may be call'd Regula recriminationis: this Rule may have two In∣tentions; both which he follows with this one Resolution, not to be damn'd alone, give him Company and it's another thing: Hence you have him frequently returning Railing for Railing, and he can hardly forbear in open-words the base Language of grinning-Dog to Dr. S—th; Def. p. 39. He does give it him by Rhetorical Insinuation; and when he has made his Adversaries Opinion appear as absurd as his own, he thinks him∣self safe; for why may not he have the luck to be thought in the Right, when they that oppose him cannot mend the Matter? Thus when Dr. S—th tells him, that Three di∣stinct Minds are Three distinct Substances: he replies, that according to the received Definition of a Person, [which is, Substantia individua naturae rationatis] Three Persons are Three distinct Substances; and let the Doctor bring off Three Persons, he will do as much for Three Minds: Def. p. 89. And thus he disputes, and is too hard for all that own the Athanasian-Creed, and explain the Mystery otherwise than he does: If (saith he) every distinct Person in the Trinity, be not a distinct infinite eternal Mind, there's an end of the Dean's Notion; but then there will be an end of a Trinity of Divine Persons also, and we shall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes, Postures, Names. Def. p. 8.
His Third Rule is Regula personae, or the Rule of Disguise: By this Rule he winds and turns things as he pleases; shows how things are true, and how false; and how neither true nor false. For example; when he had never a good material Image of the Trini∣ty, nothing but a faint Resemblance or two of it; he says that the proper and natural Signification of Words cannot reach the My∣stery; a Theological Use of words perhaps may represent it; Def. p. 13. and to prove the Trinity, they must be forc'd to use im∣proper Words in unnatural Significations: for, says he, the Names of Distinction in or∣dinary use, not only distinguish, but divide and separate their Subjects; but in the Tri∣nity, the word Person is us'd in the Sense of Distinction, and not of Separation, i. e. in a sensless Sense, in a Sense whereof we have no Idea, in an impossible Sense, or to speak fully, in the Dean's Sense. A Trinunity, in the proper Signification of Words, is a Figment; in the improper, an Article of Faith. But Page 4now for un' coup Maltre to disguise all, perhaps 'tis nor Figment, nor Article of Faith; for in his Vindicat. of the Trinit. p. 4. he confes∣ses, that he neither understands, nor com∣prehends the thing whereof he speaks: and if he don't, no Body else does, that's cer∣tain; so then 'tis to no purpose to dispute the Controversy, but 'tis direct madness to fault his Explication.
His Fourth Rule, is Regula Meiosios, or the Rule of Extenuation, and lessening the Matter, when it looks gross, and like an overgrown Monster. Thus he pleads, that his new Divinity may not disgust his Reader: Custom indeed has not made the Form of his Expressions Orthodox, but they have no Heretical Sense in them. Again, Tho the living Image is the same Man with the Pro∣totype; yet 'tis no mortal Sin against Logic, and common Sense, to say that a Man, and his living Image, are two distinct Men. Def. p. 31.
His Fifth Rule, is Regula Suppositorum, or the Rule of putting Cases; not such as the Gentlemen of the Timple put, which have happen'd, and may do so again, but of put∣ting Cases which never did, never can hap∣pen. This is a singular Rule, and of infi∣nite use: for let him coin a Notion, like which there is nothing in all Nature, such as the natural Unity of mutual Consciousness; why, 'tis but supposing an impossible Case, and the airy Notion is as easily convey'd to your Mind as you could wish. Def. p. 33. O the wonderful Virtue of an impossible Case suppos'd, to convey the true meaning of an incomprehensible Mystery to the Mind of a Man! Again thus, He supposes a Man, with a living substantial perfect Image of himself; which living substantial perfect Image of himself, is but the very same Man as himself; tho sometimes perhaps they may be two Men, i. e. when they don't a∣gree. Dif. p. 31. Once more, He supposes a Beast to be a Person; not that he thought the Expression proper, but only by way of Allusion, and Accommodation, the better to represent the Union of Two Natures into One Person, which are Two Persons, or something as like Two Persons, as their Na∣tures will permit them, when they subsist a∣part. Def. p. 46. What if I should put an idle Case, Had I this Man's Deanery, could not I talk as wisely?
His Sixth Rule, is Regula Tenebrarum, or the Rule of darkning the Matter. Thus having often granted, that the whole Divine Essence was in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost; to prevent the Consequence, that then there are Three Divine Essences, he carefully distinguishes and tells his Reader, that the whole Divine Essence subsists thrice, not by multiplying, but by repeating it self. There's a Vail thrown over the Matter now; and where's the Man that has that Eagle's, or Epidauri∣an Serpent's Eye as to pierce through it? But after all, I could wish, that he had for∣bore this Distinction, for hence may arise a knotty Question, which may give Posterity much trouble, viz. Whether a Sinner that repeats his Injustice, Intemperance, and Lying, may be said to multiply his Iniqui∣ties? or whether all is but one Fault, sub∣sisting often by frequent repetition?
He has many darkning Dictinctions, some in common with his Trinitarian Friends and Enemies, such as Creation, Generation, Pro∣cession; other peculiar to himself, such as 'tis one thing to consider a Person distinctly and by himself, another to consider him se∣parately and apart: but for a thick cloudy one, you shall not meet with one more ser∣viceable than this, The Divine Nature is one individual Nature, but not one single Nature. Def. p. 18.
I come now to his last Rule, which indeed and in truth, is no Rule; but he uses it so frequently, one might imagine it was his main Rule: consider it separately, and apart Page 5from the rest, and it is plain that it is no Rule of his; but consider it distinctly, and you'l find that it is a Rule to him, ay, and that more proper words could not have been thought on to represent it, for it is call'd Regula obliviscentiae, or the Rule of For∣getfulness. By this Rule, without blushing, he tells Dr. S—th, that three distinct Minds, are three distinct thinking Beings, not three distinct Substances; Def. p. 89. tho p. 19. he had disputed against the Being of but one single Divine Nature in the Godhead, quoted and consented with Victorinus Aser, that 'tis not lawful to say there is but one Substance. Thus also, p. 26. he says, that he does pro∣fessedly teach, that each of the three Per∣sons has entirely all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, Divine Wisdom, Power and Goodness; and therefore each of them is an eternal infinite Mind, distinct from each other: tho he had said, p. 26. that neither the Son, nor Holy Ghost, was an absolute, compleat, independent God; and yet one would think, the Person that has all the Per∣fections of the Godhead, should be a perfect God. 'Twere easy to give more Instances of his practice of the Rule of Forgetfulness; but I will not forestal Dr. S—th, I only take leave to observe, that it is a very shameful Practice, and not to be indur'd in any Man but the Dean; but in him it may be indur'd, because he can shade it by the Rule of Dark∣ness, Rule the Sixth; or alter the Looks of it, by the Rule of Disguise, Rule the Third; or throw the disgrace of it upon his Ad∣versaries, by the Rule of Company, or Re∣crimination, Rule the Second; or prove it no shameful Practice, by the Rule of putting Cases, Rule the Fifth; or take off from the Odiousness of it, by the Rule of Extenuati∣on, Rule the Fourth: and if none of all these help him in his Distress, he has his first Rule, the Rule of Assurance, which is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; by which he will outface the Matter, in re malâ, animo si utare bono, juvat, ut nihil suprà. But after all these helpful Rules of his Ecclesiastical-Polity Common∣place-Book, as a Friend, I would advise him to consider, whether he be concern'd in that of St. Paul to Timothy; If any Man teach o∣therwise, and consent not to wholesom Words, even the Words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the Doctrine which is according to Godliness: He is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about Questions and strifes of Words, whereof cometh Envy, Strife, Railings, evil Surmisings. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Upon the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Strife of Words, E∣rasmus notes, quod Interpres Graecus dixerit 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which, but for the tried and known Loyalty and Orthodoxy of the Dean, I would render seditious Reasonings.
To return from this long Digression, if such it be; for though it is off from the Postscript, yet not altogether beside the Matter. The Dean justly and truly ob∣serves, that Mr. H—w's Three Spirits, and Essences, and Individual Natures, which make up the Unity of the Godhead, as he has represented it, do not seem to be Infi∣nite: for, that which Three become by be∣ing united, not any one of them can be sup∣pos'd to be, consider'd by himself: If each cannot be consider'd by himself, then the Three cannot be distinguish'd; if each can be consider'd by himself, each must be con∣sider'd as not wholly the same with all the Three in Union. But the Dean forgetfully, and untruly says, that he allows but One Di∣vine Essence, and One individual Nature; for, [not to take notice of that pitiful Non∣sense, One Divine Nature repeated in Three Persons without Multiplication] P. 91. of his Self-Defence, he has these express words, The Dean knows no Divine Substance, or Essence, distinct from the three Divine Persons, but that the Essence makes the Person. What he means by the Essence makes the Person, I do not well know; but 'tis most manifest, that if a Divine Essence, and a Divine Person, be Page 6the same without distinction, that then there are as many Essences as Persons, and Per∣sons as Essences, nor more nor less. In my mind, Three Divine Essences, are too ma∣ny by two; he had better lose two Persons, than be overstor'd with Divine Essences; for one Divine Essence, and one Divine Person, is enough for any truly honest and religious Man.
When the Dean declares, that to own Three Esserces, and Three individual Na∣tures in the Godhead, without making Three Gods, seems to have some Difficul∣ty: methinks he seems to fear, Difficul∣ty: methinks he seems to fear, that the same may be said of his Three Minds. But as I have above noted, Three single Essen∣ces he can admit of, and they will go for Three individual Essences, with any Man that has a thinking Mind, and no mysterious By-cause to serve.
Mr. H—w having said, in his Sober Enquiry, that the Dean's Hypothesis left out the very Nexus, that should unite the Three Persons, and that mutual Consciousness between Two or Three Spirits, will not constitute them one Thing. The Dean answers him with studied Respect to his Rule of Disguise; Mu∣tual Consciousness (says he) is not a Mutual Inspection, or Insight into one another, but a feeling each other in themselves. But for my part, I hate a Disguise; and therefore I will make as bold with him, as he with the Unitarians; and if he will not give me leave, I will take leave to pull it off.
Mutual Consciousness (says he) is not a Mutual Perspection, or Insight into another, but a Feeling each other in themselves. Now I will prove, that it is both a Seeing, and Feeling, nay, and a knowing too each other in themselves. Def. p. 73.
Mutual Consciousness, is really nothing but a shamesul Instance of the Dean's Fa∣culty in putting impossible Cases, which it were not difficult to expose; but his way is, to ease his Adversary of that Labour, and do it himself. His Self-Consciousness refutes his Mutual Consciousness, i.e. if he has de∣sin'd them aright; for how should he, that by Self-Consciousness feels himself to be himself, by Mutual-Consciousness, feel him∣self to be some Body else? It is true, an intelligible Sense of these words may be gi∣ven: As thus, I am conscious to my self of what I think, say, or do; and what is known to me and my Friend, of that we two are mutually conscious: But the Dean never understands words in their proper and na∣tural signification, is never contented, till Page 7he has made them signify, what no Body can understand, nor he declare without talk∣ing backward and forward, so shamefully, that were it not for fear of his Vindictive Spirit, every Man would do as Dr. S—th has done, i. e. show him his Picture, I had al∣most said, his living and substantial Image.
But he is sure that Mr. H—w can never form any Notion of the Union of Spiritual Essences, without Mutual Consciousness. It must be his Prejudice then that hinders him, for Spiritual Essences may be united by Consent; but that's not the Union he intends, he intends an Essential Union, and that's an Essential Contradiction, and Sub∣stantial Nonsense.
The Dean fairly recounts, that Mr. H—w represents the Unity of the Godhead, by the Union of Soul and Body, which make one Man; and by the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature, which are said to make one Christ. Now he criticises, and affirms these to be Personal Unions, [meaning Uni∣ons of divers things, which make one Per∣son] but cannot be the Unity of the God∣head, in which there is a Trinity of di∣stinct Persons. I know no inconvenience of allowing according to common Acceptation, that Soul and Body make up one thing, call'd Man; nor know I what Mr. H—w can get by it, for neither of the two singly is Man; or if each of them singly is so, together they must make up a double Man: Which was the Fancy of the silly Indian in John Dreyden's Play.
But the Dean rejects these Unions, (he says) because they are not the Unions of distinct Persons. But that is not fair, for he himself has confess'd, once and again, that there is nothing in Nature like Three Per∣sons in One Godhead: And I must take leave to tell him, that if there were, Mr. H—w is as like to find it as he: But since there is not, they must e'en both be content with such faint Resemblances as they can get. As for the Union of two Natures, I have a bet∣ter Reason for rejecting than the Dean by much, it is building Mystery upon Mystery, and proving one Dream by the help of ano∣ther.
Mr. H—w's Unity of the Godhead is such, and no other, than the Dean speaks it; such an Union of Three Spiritual Be∣ings, and Individual Natures, as together [which is fairly call'd, by Composition] constitute the Godhead. Against this No∣tion, he says some things weakly; those the Letter takes notice of, and perhaps I may also spend my Verdict on them there: other things he says well, and with sound Reason, but in them he is most unlucky; for instead of Three Spiritual Beings, Three Individual Natures, read Three Minds, or Persons; and his Arguments conclude equally against his own Hypothesis. In short, what he says well, comes to this; If all Three are but One God, then not any One by himself is that One God: and this he says Mr. H—w has own'd, p. 47. and I think his words come near it, which are these; When you predicate Godhead of any One of the Persons, you express an inadequate Conception of God. But to prove himself a sounder Trinitarian, he says that he owns, and that none are Or∣thodox Christians but they who own so too, that the Father has the whole entire Divini∣ty in himself, that the same subsists in the Son, the same in the Holy Ghost; that each by himself in the most proper adequate Conception, is true and perfect God, tho all Three are but One and the same God; which does plainly and undeniably prove, that the Dean, and all his Orthodox Christi∣ans do believe, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One and Three, in one and the same respect. For that Godhead, which by them is predicated of every of the Three separately, that very Godhead is predicated of the whole Three conjunctly.
The Dean says, that Mr. H—w's Notion of the Unity of the Godhead, is such, that neither the Scriptures, nor the Antient Page 8Church know any thing of it. I am of the Mind, that the Scriptures know as much of the Hypothesis of one of them, as of that of the other: and as for the Antient Church, who can tell what he means by it? the Fa∣thers beyond the acknowledg'd Rules of good Life, neither agree with one another, nor any one with himself; but I guess his Antient Church to be made up of those par∣ticular Doctors whom he judges to have talk'd his Way, though I won't sware but they may have drop'd a word or two in fa∣vour of Mr. H—w's Divine Composi∣tion.
Where any late Socinian Writers have de∣clar'd themselves willing to compound this Dispute of a Trinity of Divine Persons, for the Three Attributes of Power, Wisdom and Goodness, I know not. I beg the Dean's pardon if I wrong him, when I believe he wrongs them: for I observe that they have noted that there are other as essential Attributes of God, as the Three mention'd, viz. Truth, and Justice, and so the Mystery will consist of five Parts; and that is two more than it did, when it had two too-many. And then if any of the Trinitarians make but an Attribute of the H. Ghost, yet they all do and must allow Jesus Christ to be a Person, and they all do affirm him to be one, and the same God with the Father, which I am very sure the Soci∣nians will by no means agree to. Indeed when the Trinitarians explain the Trinity, by cal∣ling God as the Creator, Father; as the Re∣deemer, Son; as Sanctifier, the Holy Ghost; the Socinians say, for Peace sake they can en∣dure this; but then they also say, 'tis a harsh Way of speaking, and in my Judgment, off from the Question: for suppose that some Trinitarians could part with the personal Deity of the Holy Ghost, yet they are all per∣tinaciously zealous for this impossible Piece of the Mystery, that Jesus Christ is one and the same God with his eternal Father; and then, though they may perhaps sometimes think good to shelter themselves under the Prosession of One God, for various Reasons variously denominated, yet they cannot com∣pound the Controversy about Three Persons, for Three Attributes. Jesus Christ is a Person, and I think they all make him one in the Tri∣nity; and they may as well make three Per∣sons to be one God as two, and as well some other number as three.
The Dean egregiously mistakes one thing, viz. that the Socinians are afraid of the Hy∣pothesis of Three Divine Persons, each of which is God: but I will assure him 'tis no such thing; though they are asham'd of it, 'tis so infinitely absurd, and manifestly impos∣sible, they need not be afraid of it; for Rea∣son will never recommend it, only Persecu∣tion may fright them from examining it, who were bred up to it.
