The second part of the Defence of the Reformed Catholicke VVherein the religion established in our Church of England (for the points here handled) is apparently iustified by authoritie of Scripture, and testimonie of the auncient Church, against the vaine cauillations collected by Doctor Bishop seminary priest, as out of other popish writers, so especially out of Bellarmine, and published vnder the name of The marrow and pith of many large volumes, for the oppugning thereof. By Robert Abbot Doctor of Diuinitie.

CHAPTER. 1. OF FREE WILL.

1. W. BISHOP.

THat I be not thought captious, but willing to admit any thing that M. Perkins hath sayd agreeable to the truth, I will let his whole text in places indifferent, passe, paring off onely superfluous words, with adding some annotations where it shall be needfull, and rest onely vpon the points in controuersie. First then concerning Free will, wherewith he beginneth, thus he saith: Free will both by them and vs, is taken for a mixt power in the mind and will of man, where∣by discerning what is good, and what is euill, he doth according∣ly chuse or refuse the same.

Annot. If we would speake formally, it is not a mixt power in the mind and will, but is a free facultie of the mind and will onely, whereby we chuse or refuse, supposing in the vnderstanding, a knowledge of the same before. But let this definition passe as more popular.

M. Perkins. 1. Conclusion. Man must be considered in a foure∣fold estate, as he was created, as he was corrupted, as he is renued, as he shall be glorified. In the first state we ascribe vnto mans will libertie of nature, in which he could will or will either good or euill; note that this libertie proceeded not from his owne nature, but of originall Iu∣stice, in which he was created. In the third libertie of grace, in the last libertie of glorie.

Annot. Cary this in mind, that here he granteth man in the state of grace to haue Free will.

R. ABBOT.

MAister Bishop here dealeth as iuglers are wont to do, who make shew of faire play, when they vse nothing but leger∣demaine. He will not be thought captious, and yet for two whole pages here in the beginning, is nothing but captious. His ••••••ing the text of M. Perkins his booke to passe whole in places indifferent, is

nothing but a dismembring and mangling of the text. His paring off onely of superfluous words, is the paring off of such arguments and authorities as he knew not how to answer. His adding of annota∣tions, the sophisticating of his reader with idle and friuolous cor∣rections. His resting onely vpon points of controuersie, the wresting of those things to controuersie whereof there is no controuersie at all. M. Perkins defineth Freewill to be a mixt power of the minde and will of man, whereby esteeming what is good and what is euill, he doth accordingly chuse or refuse the same. A little to please himselfe hee giueth a snatch at this definition of Free will, as not formal enough, onely to shew himselfe more formall then wise, the definition be∣ing more fitly expressed then that which he hath put in place of it, and he honestly is content because it is more popular, to let it passe. Whereas M. Perkins in his first conclusion, affirmeth in the first estate of man as he was created, a libertie of nature, M. Bishop gi∣ueth thereof this learned note: that this libertie preceeded not from mans owne nature, but from originall iustice wherein he was created, as if he should say, that the shining of the Sunne proceedeth not from the nature of the Sunne, but from the light of it; whereas the light is a part of the nature of the Sunne, as was originall iustice a part of the nature of man, being thea 1.1 image and likenesse of God, in which and according to which he was created. And to say that Free will did proceed from originall iustice, is wholy against himselfe, be∣cause it must thereof follow, that in the fall of originall iustice, must needs be implied the losse of Free wil, which cannot stand without that from which it doth proceed, so that man in his fall must neces∣sarily be sayd to haue lost his Free will. But he should rather haue sayd, that God gaue vnto man Free will, as the steward and dispo∣ser of originall iustice and righteousnesse, and asb 1.2 the ballance to turne either to or fro, the benefit that God had put into the hands and power of man.

In the third estate of man, as he is renewed, M. Perkins affirmeth libertie of grace. Carry this in minde, saith M. Bishop, that here he granteth man in the state of grace to haue Free will. As though either he, or any of vs had made question thereof, who all acknowledge by the Gospell that it is the worke of Christc 1.3 to make vs free,d 1.4 free from sinne,e 1.5 free from the bondage of corruption, that in holinesse wee may bee seruants vnto God. Nay that the reader may the more

cleerly conceiue the truth of this whole matter, we deny not Free will in any estate of man. For it is true which S. Austin saith,f 1.6 that whatsoeuer we will, we will the same by Free will, because the will is not subiect to compulsion, but willeth alwayes freely, and of it owne accord, or else looseth the nature and name of will. Which freedome of will, by originall institution stood indifferent either to good or euill; yet was not to continue so, but vpon election once made to be free onely in that whereto of it selfe it should betake it selfe: free onely in euill, if it should apply it selfe to euill: free only in good, if it should make choise to continue therein. Therefore the Angels which kept their originall habitation and estate, haue theirg 1.7 Free wil by Gods election and grace stablished in goodnes, so that it is not inclineable to any thing that is euill. But the Angels which sinned and abode not in the truth, haue their Free will by it selfe, and of it selfeh 1.8 obdured and hardened in that that is euill, so that it is not at all appliable to any thing that is good. Man there∣fore by sinne hath not lost Free will, for byi 1.9 Free wil it is that now he sinneth, yea and can nothing but sinne. But this Free will that is thus free in sinne, hath no freedome at all, as S. Austin in sundry places expresseth, to righteousnesse and to the seruice of God, vntill it be rectified and made free by Iesus Christ; no freedome or power at all, but what is newly and meerelyk 1.10 the grace and gift of God. Ther∣fore hauing affirmed the freedome of the will to sinne, he addeth thatl 1.11 to righteousnesse, but as it is made free and helped of God, it auai∣leth nothing.m 1.12 What tellest thou me of Free will, saith he, which to the doing of righteousnesse shall not be free, except thou become a sheepe of Gods? he then who of men maketh his sheepe, euen he maketh the wils of men Free to the obedience of godlinesse.n 1.13 We lost free will to loue God by the greatnesse of the first sinne, saith he, but by grace our will is made free to decline from euill and do good. So then we do not deny Free will to be righteousnesse, but yet we haue regard to that cau∣tion which S. Austin giueth against Pelagians and Papists,o 1.14 if wee will defend Free will aright, not to oppugne that whence it is made free. Whatp 1.15 doth a man denie Free will, saith he, because he attributeth it

wholy to God that we liue well:q 1.16 without freedome of will we cannot liue well; (for how should a man do well without his will?) but yet this Free wil to liue wel isr 1.17 a will not free (meerly & of it selfe) but made free by the grace of God. For then iss 1.18 the will of man free indeed, when it is free from sinne: and such a free will God gaue to man in the beginning, but he lost it by his owne default, and being lost it cannot be restored, but by him that was able first to giue it. In Christ therefore it is restored vnto vs, who by hist 1.19 free spirit giuethu 1.20 libertie to the captiues, and openeth the prison to them that are bound, andx 1.21 deliue∣reth vs from the power of darknesse, and maketh vsy 1.22 free-men vnto him. But yet so, as that hauing receiued buta 1.23 the first fruits of the spirit, by whom this freedome is wrought, according to the words of the Apostle,b 1.24 Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is libertie, the same is yet but begun in vs, so thatc 1.25 there is partly freedome, and partly bondage, not yet whole and pure and perfect freedome. For no further is the will freed then it is renewed; and it is renewed as yet but in part, continuing stilld 1.26 in part in the old estate. Therefore it is so made free, as that in some part we haue cause still to com∣plaine with the Apostle,e 1.27 I am carnall, sold vnder sinne, and to pray with the Prophet Dauid:f 1.28 Bring my soule out of prison, that I may giue thankes vnto thy name. Hence is that heauinesse and dul∣nesse, that waywardnesse and vntowardnesse, that retention and holding backe, that still we find in vs in the applying of our selues to spirituall and heauenly things. And as touching that where∣in we are renewed and made free, it is not sufficient to vphold vs and keepe vs in the right way, but we haue still neede of the grace of God, to be assistant and helpefull vnto vs.g 1.29 It is not enough that God hath once giuen, sayth Hierome, except he still giue: I pray to receiue, and when I haue receiued, I pray againe. Therefore the ancient church required of Pelagius to confesse, thath 1.30 the grace of God is giuen vs to euerie act that we do.i 1.31 He preuenteth vs to make vs willing, & followeth vs when we are willing, that we do not wil in vaine. And if his hand do not hold vs and vphold vs, it commeth to passe by the burden of corruptible flesh, that we are still relapsing to our

selues, and still readie with thek 1.32 Israelits to yeeld our selues to be∣come bond againe.l 1.33 Our soule, saith Bernard, is no other but as a wind that passeth and returneth not againe, if it be left vnto it selfe. Now M. Bishop do you carry this in mind, thus expressed by the phrases and speeches of the ancient Church, and leaue to calum∣niate our doctrine, who affirme Free will as farre as they affirmed it, and deny it no otherwise but as they denied it against the Pela∣gian heretikes. But you will hardly leaue your wont, because you see well enough, that if you take our doctrine as we deli∣uer it, you can deuise nothing plausibly or colourably to speake against it.

2. W. BISHOP.

M. Per. 2. Conclusion. The matters whereabout Free will is occupied, are principally the actions of men, which be of three sorts, Naturall, Humane, Spirituall. Naturall actions are such, as are common to men and beasts, as to eate, sleepe, &c. In all which we ioyne with the Papists, and hold that man hath free will euen since the fall of Adam.

M. Per. 3. Conclusion. Humane actions are such, as are common to all men, good and bad, as to speake, to practise any kind of art, to per∣forme any kind of ciuill dutie, to preach, to administer Sacraments, &c. And hither we may referre the outward actions of ciuill vertues, as namely Iustice, Temperance, Gentlenesse, and Liberalitie, and in these also we ioyne with the Church of Rome, and say (as experience tea∣cheth) that men haue a naturall freedome of will, to put them, or not to put them in execution. S. Paul saith, The Gentiles that haue not the law,* 1.34 do the things of the law by nature, that is, by naturall strength: And he saith of himselfe,* 1.35 that before his conuersion touching the righteousnesse of the law, he was vnblameable. And for the externall obedience, naturall men receiue reward in temporall things. And yet here some caueats must be remembred.

First, that in humane actions (he should say morall) mans will is weake, and his vnderstanding dimme, thereupon he often failes in them. This caueat is no caueat of the Protestants, but taken out of S. Thomas of Aquines.* 1.36 And in all such actions with S. Augustine (you might haue quoted the place) I vnderstand the will of man, to be onely woun∣ded

or halfe dead.

2. That the will of man, is vnder the will of God, and therefore to be ordered by it: Who knowes not this?

R. ABBOT.

Here M. Bishop giueth vs some more of his learned notes, and telleth vs, that M. Perkins for humane should haue said morall, wher∣as the name of morall actions doth not so properly comprehend all those which he meant to import by humane actions. As touching the first caueat giuen to the third conclusion, that in humane actions mans will is weake, and his vnderstanding dimme, &c. he noteth that this ca∣ueat is no caueat of the Protestants, but taken out of S. Thomas of A∣quines. He was desirous it seemeth to haue it thought, that he had looked into Thomas Aquinas, but he was willing withall to shew that he did not well vnderstand what he read there: for he that loo∣keth intoa 1.37 the places which he quoteth, shall easily see, that there was little cause for him to say, that that is a caueat taken out of Tho∣mas Aquinas, there being nothing directly tending to the matter of the caueat expressed by M. Perkins. But the Protestants might wel learne that caueat out of their owne experience, and if we had not obserued it of our selues, we could haue learned it of Philosophers, and Poets, & Historians, to say nothing of eccelesiasticall Writers, so that we need not to seeke to Thomas Aquinas to borrow it from him. But what is that to the purpose, seeing we professe our selues well content legere Margaritas ea coeno, to gather Pearles euen out the dirt, and from M. Bishop himself to take knowledge of any thing worthy our learning, if any thing worthy our learning had bin writ∣tē by him. M. Perkins saith, that in humane or moral actions, with Au∣stin he vnderstandeth the wil of man only wounded or half dead. M. Bi∣shop saith, he should haue quoted the place: the place to which M. Perkins alludeth, I take it to be Hypognost. lib. 3. where Austine saith that man was wounded and halfe dead,b 1.38 because his Free will had still vitall motion, but he was wounded in the ornaments of morall actions, and lost the benefite of the possibilitie of Free will, to returne vnto euer∣lasting life. To the other caueat, that the will of man is vnder the will of God, and therefore to be ordered by it, M. Bishop saith, Who knowes not this? As if men in deliuering precepts and rules of any kind of

learning, did not set downe euen triuiall and common things, be∣cause howsoeuer they be common yet they be necessarie to make a perfect worke, and alwaies necessarie for learners, when the whole workes are needlesse to them that are alreadie learned. And why might not M. Perkins bring in this caueat in a writing against the Papists, as well as Hierome did against the Pelagians?c 1.39 That we may know, saith he, that all things depend, not vpon vs, but vpon the discre∣tion and will of God, the Apostle saith, I will come vnto you speedily, if the Lord will. When he saith, I will come vnto you, he sheweth his good wil, he declareth his desire, he promiseth his coming. But yet to speake with a caueat, he saith, If the Lord will. For if any man thinke he knoweth any thing, he knoweth not yet as he ought to know. Yea and S. Austine also thought this point worth the noting against the same Pelagi∣ans, thatd 1.40 the wils of men not onely for spirituall and eternall life, but as they concerne the preseruing of the creature of the world, are in the power of God, so as that he causeth them to incline whither he will, and when he will, either for benefite to some, or for punishment to othersome. And he thought it not vnfit to exemplifie this matter out of thee 1.41 bookes of Iosuah, of the Kings and Chronicles, how God orde∣reth the wils of men, for the constituting of earthly kingdomes, and maketh profitable vse and application thereof, that it should be ab∣surdf 1.42 to think that God frameth the wils of men for the setling of earth∣ly kingdomes, and that men frame their owne wils for the obtaining of the kingdome of heauen. And will M. Bishop now turne off Austine and Hierome, as he doth M. Perkins, with Who knowes not this? But his notes yet are but to whet his wit: when he is well awaked out of his sleepe, haply we shall haue some wiser stuffe.

W. BISHOP.

M. P. 4. Conclusion. The third kind of actions are spirituall more nearely, and these be twofold: good, or bad. In sinnes we ioyne with the Papist, and teach that in sinnes man hath freedome of will. Some perhaps will say, that we sinne necessarily, because he that sinneth, cannot but sin, and that Free wil and necessitie, cannot stand together. Indeed the neces∣sitie of compulsion and Free will, cannot stand together, but there is ano∣ther kind of necessitie (or rather infallibilitie) which may stand with Free will: for some things may be done necessarily, and also freely.

Annot. The example of a close prisoner is not to the purpose, for it puts necessitie in one thing, and libertie in another. The solution is, that necessarily must be taken for certainely, not that a man is at any time compelled to sinne, but his weaknesse and the craft of the diuell are such, that he is very often ouerreached by the diuell, and induced to sinne, but with free consent of his owne will.

R. ABBOT.

The comparison of a prison vsed by M. Perkins, is most preg∣nant and fit. A man walketh vp and down in close prison, and free∣ly moueth and stirreth himselfe; yet he hath no power to get out of prison, but for ought he can do for himselfe is necessarily there. E∣uen so, man is free in sinne, and freely willeth whatsoeuer he wil∣leth thereto: but sinne is his prison, and he cannot free himselfe therefrom; nay because the will it selfe is imprisoned, he hath no will to be free, and therefore of necessitie remaineth still a prisoner to sinne, till God do change his will to make him free. But M. Bi∣shop disliketh the comparison, because it puts necessitie in one thing, and libertie in another, whereas to that purpose it was vsed, and to that purpose most fitly is applyed, and therein nothing contained, but what is agreable to the truth. For whereas he taketh vpon him to correct that terme of necessitie, and will haue it to be called infal∣libilitie and certaintie, he malapertly taketh vpon him to teach them that are more learned then himselfe. It is a word which S. Austin often vseth vpon the like occasion, both against the Pelagians and Manichees.b 1.43 Man sinned by his will, saith he, and thereupon followed a cruell necessitie of hauing sinne.c 1.44 A cruell necessitie (of sinne) grew v∣pon our nature by the desert of the first sinne.d 1.45 Not by creation, but by corruption of nature, there is a certaine necessitie of committing sinne.e 1.46 After that Adam sinned by free will, we were throwne headlong into a necessitie (of sinne) all that haue descended of his race. And that this necessitie doth well stand with libertie, S. Bernard sheweth, in cal∣ling itf 1.47 a voluntarie and mis-free necessitie, wherein neither can neces∣sitie excuse the will, because it is voluntarie, nor the will exclude neces∣sitie, because it is entangled with delight therein; wherein will taketh frō him all matter of defence, and necessitie bereaueth him of possibilitie of amendment, and in a word, the will it selfe in strange wise causeth this

necessitie to it selfe. Now then because the state of sinne is such, as that there is one way necessitie by the habit of corruption, and ano∣ther way libertie by the free motion of the will, very rightly did M. Perkins to expresse the same, vse the example of a prison, that puts necessitie in one thing, and libertie in another. And thus in righteous∣nesse also necessitie and libertie agree, and do not one exclude the other. For the Angels being by the grace and power of God con∣firmed in goodnesse, are thereby necessarily good,g 1.48 so and in such sort good, as that they cannot become euill, and yet they are freely and vo∣luntarily good, because it is the will it selfe that is established in goodnesse. The same shall be the state of eternall life to the elect and faithfull,h 1.49 Bene viuendi & nunquam peccandi, voluntaria foelix{que} necessitas: A voluntarie and happy necessitie of liuing wel, and neuer sin∣ning any more. Let M. Bishop take knowledge now of this manner of speech, and learne not to find fault when he hath no cause. But he noteth, that we must not vnderstand, that a man is at any time compelled to sinne: where I may answer him with his owne words before, Who knowes not this? And againe, that this is none of M. Bi∣shops caueat, but taken out of M. Perkins. M. Perkins had told him so much before hand, and therfore what needed this note? For this necessitie groweth not of any outward force, but from inward na∣ture, not by condition of the substance, but by accidentall corrup∣tion, which being supposed, there is a necessitie of sinne, as in the palsey a necessitie of shaking, in the hot feauer a necessitie of bur∣ning, in the broken legge a necessitie of halting, so continuing till the maladie and distemper be cured and done away. And whereas M. Bishop referreth this necessitie of sinne to the weaknesse of man, and to the craft of the diuell, he speaketh too short in the one, and impertinently in the other. For we are not to conceiue weaknesse onely, which may be onely a priuation, but a positiue euill habite and contagion of sinne, whereby a man sinneth euen without any furtherance of the diuels temptations, by the onely euill disposi∣tion of himselfe. Which euill disposition, because it is also in the will it selfe, therefore in the midst of that necessitie, a man sinneth no otherwise, but as M. Bishop requireth to haue it said, with free consent of his owne will.

W. BISHOP.

M. P. 5. Conclusion. The second kind of spirituall actions be good, as Repentance, Faith, Obedience, &c. In which we likewise in part ioyne with the Church of Rome, and say that in the first conuersion of a sinner, mans Free will concurreth with Gods grace, as a fellow or co-worker in some sort: for in the conuersion of a sinner, three things are required: the word, Gods spirit, and Mans will: for Mans will is not passiue in all and euery respect, but hath an action in the first conuersion and change of the soule: when any man is conuerted, this worke of God is not done by compulsion, but he is conuerted willingly, and at the very time when he is conuerted by Gods grace, he willeth his conuersion. To this end saith S. Augustine, He which made thee without thee,* 1.50 will not saue thee without thee. Againe, that it is certaine that our will is required in this, that we may do any thing well, (it is not onely then required in our first conuersion, if it be required to all good things which we do,) but we haue it not from our owne power, but God workes to will in vs. For looke at what time God giues grace, at the same time he giues a will to desire and will the same: as for example, when God worke faith, at the same time, he workes also vpon the will, causing it to desire faith, and willingly to receiue the gift of beleeuing: God makes of the vnwilling wil a willing will, because no man can receiue grace vtterly against his will, considering will constrained, is no will. But here we must remember, that howsoeuer in respect of time, the working of grace by Gods spirit, and the willing of it in man go together: yet in regard of order, grace is first wrought, and mans will must first of all be acted and moued by grace; and then it also acteth, willeth, and moueth it selfe. And this is the last point of consent betweene vs and the Romane Church, touching Free∣will, neither may we proceed farther with them. Hitherto M. Perkins.

Now before I come to the supposed difference, I gather first, that he yeeldeth vnto the principall point in controuersie, that is, freedome of will, in ciuill and morall workes in the state of corruption, and all good workes in the state of grace: for in his first conclusion distinguishing foure estates of man, he affirmeth, that in the third, of man renewed or (as we speake iustified) there is libertie of grace, that is, grace enableth mans will to do (if it please) such spirituall workes, as God requireth at his hands. Yet lest he be taken to yeeld in any thing,* 1.51 he doth in shew of words

contradict both these points in another place: For in setting downe the difference of our opinions, he saith: that mans will in his conuersion is not actiue, but passiue, which is flat opposite vnto that which himselfe said a little before in his first conclusion; that in the conuersion of a sinner, mans will concurreth not passiuely, but is co-worker with Gods grace.

R. ABBOT.

M. Bishop vnderstandeth not the principall point in controuer∣sie, and therefore thinketh that M. Perkins yeeldeth to the princi∣pall point in controuersie, when he doth nothing lesse. It was neuer any point of controuersie, whether man in the state of corruption haue freedome of will in ciuill or morall workes: for none of vs euer hath denyed it. Neither was it euer any point of controuersie, whe∣ther man in the state of grace haue freedome of will to good workes: for there is not one of vs but alwaies hath affirmed it, so that M. Bishop knoweth not indeed what he disputeth of. As for that libertie of grace, he expoundeth it also out of his owne blind fancie, and not out of our doctrine. For we do not meane thereby, that grace ena∣bleth mans will to do, if it please, such spirituall works as God requireth at his hands, but that grace worketh in the will of man to please to do such spirituall workes as God requireth at his hands. For he doth not hang his worke vpon the suspended if of our will, buta 1.52 worketh in vs to will, andb 1.53 causeth vs to do the things that he com∣maundeth vs to do. But M. Bishop here imagineth, that M. Perkins contradicteth in one leafe that which he yeeldeth in another. He saith one where, that mans will in his conuersion, is not actiue but pas∣siue. But let M. Bishop learne of S. Austine, thatc 1.54 he that concealeth the words of the point in question, is either an vnlearned ideot, or a wran∣gling crauen, that studieth more to cauill, then either to teach or learne. The words of M. Perkins are these: The Papists say, Will hath a na∣turall cooperation; we deny it, and say, it hath cooperation onely by grace, being in it selfe not actiue but passiue, willing well onely as it is moued by grace, whereby it must first be acted and moued, before it can act or will. Where he very plainely affirmeth the cooperation of mans will in his conuersion, but saith truly, that it is of grace it selfe, that it doth cooperate with grace. He saith, that in it selfe it is not actiue but pas∣siue, but though in it selfe it be onely passiue, yet he acknowledgeth

that it becommeth actiue also, by being acted or moued by grace. Now how is this contrarie to that which he saith in the fift conclusion, that mans Free will concurres with Gods grace, as a fellow or co-worker in some sort, and is not passiue in all and euery respect? In some sort, saith he, it is a co-worker with grace, and is not passiue in all and euery res∣pect. How is that? Mans will must first of all be acted and moued by grace, and then it also acteth, willeth, and moueth it selfe. How can M. Bishop deuise to haue a man speake more agreably to himselfe? But he playeth the lewd cousiner, and whereas the whole point of the controuersie lieth in these words, by it selfe, or in it selfe, he guile∣fully omitteth the same, and maketh M. Perkins absolutely to say, that mans will in his conuersion is not actiue but passiue, when he saith, that in it selfe it is not actiue but passiue, declaring that by grace it is made actiue. So in the other place where it is said, that mans will is a co-worker in some sort, and is not passiue in all and euery respect, he leaueth out those termes of restraint, as if M. Perkins had made the will simply and of it selfe a co worker with grace, and not passiue in any respect. The contradiction therefore was not in M. Perkins his words, but in M. Bishops head, or rather in his malicious and wicked heart, which blind-foldeth him to make him seeme not to see that which he seeth well enough.

5. W. BISHOP.

The like contradiction may be obserued in the other part of libertie in morall actions: for in his third conclusion he deliuereth plainely, man to haue a naturall freedome, euen since the fall of Adam, to do, or not to do the acts of wisedome, Iustice, Temperance, &c. and proues out of S. Paul, that the Gentiles so did: yet in his first reason,* 1.55 he affirmeth as per∣emptorily out of the eight of Genesis, that the whole frame of mans hart is corrupted, and all that he thinketh, deuiseth, or imagineth, is wholy euill, leauing him no natural strength to performe any part of morall du∣tie. See how vncertaine the steps be of men that walke in darknesse, or that would seeme to communicate with the workes of darknesse. For if I mistake him not, he agreeth fully in this matter of Free will, with the Doctrine of the Catholike Church: for he putting down the point of dif∣ference, saith, that it standeth in the cause of the freedome of mans will in spirituall matters: allowing then freedome of will with vs in the state

of grace, whereof he there treateth: for he seemeth to dissent from vs onely in the cause of that freedome. And as he differeth from Luther and Caluin, with other sectaries, in granting this libertie of will: so in the very cause also he accordeth with Catholikes, as appeareth by his owne words. For (saith he) Papists say, mans will concurreth with Gods grace by it selfe, and by it owne naturall power: we say, that mans will worketh with grace; yet not of it selfe, but by grace: either he vnderstandeth not what Catholikes say, or else accuseth them wrongfully: for we say, that mans will then onely concurreth with Gods grace, when it is stirred and holpen first by Gods grace. So that mans will by his owne naturall action, doth concurre in euery good worke, otherwise it were no action of man: but we farther say, that this actiō proceedeth principally of grace, wher∣by the wil was made able to produce such actions: for of it selfe it was vt∣terly vnable to bring foorth such spirituall fruite. And this I take to be that, which M. Perkins doth meane by those his words: that the will must be first moued and acted by grace, before it can act or will. He mistooke vs, thinking that we required some outward helpe onely to the will, to ioyne with it; or rather, that grace did but as it were vntie the chaines of sinne wherein our will was fettered: and then Will could of it selfe turne to God. Not vnderstanding how Catholikes take that Para∣ble of the man wounded in the way,* 1.56 betweene Ierusalem and Ierico, who was (not as the Papists onely say, but as the holy Ghost saith) left halfe, and not starke dead. Now the exposition of Catholikes is not, that this wounded man, (which signifieth all mankind) had halfe his spirituall strength left him; but was robbed of all supernaturall riches, spoyled of his originall iustice, and wounded in his naturall powers of both vnder∣standing and Will, and therein left halfe dead, not being able of his owne strength, either to know all naturall truth, or to performe all moral du∣ty. Now touching supernaturall workes, because he left all power to per∣forme them; not being able so much as to prepare himselfe conueniently to them: he in a good sence may be likened vnto a dead man, not able to moue one finger that way of grace: and so in holy Scripture the father said of his prodigall Son,* 1.57 He was dead and is reuiued. Yet as the same sonne liued a naturall life, albeit in a deadly sinne: so mans will after the fall of Adam, continued somewhat free in actions conformable to the na∣ture of man, though wounded also in them, as not being able to act many of them, yet hauing still that naturall facultie of Free-will, capable of grace, and also able, being first both outwardly moued, and fortified in∣wardly

by the vertue of grace, to effect and do any worke appertaining to saluation: which is as much as M. Perkins affirmeth. And this to be the very doctrine of the Church of Rome, is most manifestly to be seene in the Councell of Trent, where in the Session are first these words in effect, concerning the vnablenesse of man to arise from sinne of himselfe. Euery man must acknowledge and confesse, that by Adams fall we were made so vncleane and sinfull, that neither the Gentiles by the force of nature, nor the Iewes by the letter of Moses lawe, could arise out of that sinfull state. After it sheweth, how our deliuerance is wrought, and how freedome of will is recouered in speciall, and wherein it consisteth, saying: The beginning of iustification, in per∣sons vsing reason, is taken from the grace of God, preuenting vs through Iesus Christ, that is, from his vocation, whereby without any desert of ours we are called, that we who were by our sinnes turned away from God, may be prepared by his grace, both raising vs vp, and helping vs to returne to our owne Iustification, freely yeelding our consent vnto the said grace, and working with it. So as God touching the heart of man by the light of the holy Ghost, neither doth man nothing at all, receiuing that inspiration, who might also refuse it: neither yet can he without the grace of God, by his Free will, moue himselfe to that, which is iust in Gods sight. And that you may be assured, that this doctrine of the Councell, is no o∣ther then that which was taught three hundred yeares before, in the ve∣ry middest of darknesse, as Heretikes deeme:* 1.58 see what S. Thomas of Aquine one of her principall pillars, hath written of this point in his most learned Summe. Where, vpon these words of our Sauiour,* 1.59 No man can come to me, vnlesse my Father draw him, he concludeth it to be manifest, that man cannot so much as prepare himselfe to receiue the light of grace, but by the free and vndeserued helpe of God, mouing him inwardly thereunto. And this is all which M. Perkins in his pretended dissent auerreth here, and goeth about to proue in his fiue reasons fol∣lowing: the which I will omit, as being all for vs. And if any man desire to see more to that purpose, let him reade the most learned workes of that famous Cardinall, and right reuerend Archbishop Bellarmine.

R. ABBOT.

Here is another contradiction framed vpon the anuile of M. Bi∣shops

ignorance, whilest he vnderstandeth not, that workes morally good may be spiritually euill, and whilest theya 1.60 are highly esteemed with men for the substance of the act, yet may be abhominable with God by the vncleannesse of the heart. Which if he had duly consi∣dered, he might well haue seene, that both these assertions may stand together, that man hath freedome of will to do the outward acts of morall vertues, and yet that all that man deuiseth, frameth or ima∣gineth is wholy euill, because his morall vertues without grace are in Gods sight but so many corruptions of good workes, being poy∣soned in the roote of vnbeleefe, and wholy diuerted from their true and proper end, so that God hath no respect to them, because in them there is no respect at all to God. This followeth after∣wards more fully to be handled towards the end of this question, but in the meane time we see how simply he collecteth of this lat∣ter point, that M. Perkins leaueth a man no naturall strength to per∣forme any part of morall dutie, and as if he had very wisely handled the matter, addeth his epiphonema: So vncertaine are the steps of them that walke in darknesse, very fitly agreeing to himselfe, who neither vnderstandeth what the aduersarie saith, nor what he himselfe is to say for his owne part. Whereupon it is that he conceiueth that M. Perkins fully agreeth with the Romish Church in this matter of Free will, whereas they are as farre different one from the other, as heauen is from earth. The agreement forsooth is in that M. Perkins granteth Free will in the state of grace. But so did Luther & Caluin, and so do we all, as far as M. Perkins doth. The Papists say, that man hath in his owne nature a power of Free wil, which being only stirred and helped, can, and doth of it selfe adioyne it selfe to grace to accept thereof, and to worke with it. This is it that we denie: we say, that freedome of the will to turne to God, and to worke with him, is no power of nature, but the worke of grace; that it is in no sort of man himselfe, but wholy and onely the gift of God: that howsoeuer God do offer grace, yet that man hath no power in himselfe, or in his owne will to assent and yeeld vnto it, but it is God himselfe that withall worketh in him to accept there∣of: that to the conuersion of a sinner, there ariseth nothing from the motion of his owne will, howsoeuer assisted and helped of God, but what God by his Spirit doth worke in it.

Vpon this point onely Luther and Caluin, and we all insist to

chalenge all wholy vnto God. In this respect was it that Luther said, that Free will is, Res de solo titulo, a matter of name only, and a bare title, because of man himselfe it is nothing, and by it, or in it there can nothing be attributed vnto him. Fora 1.61 we will indeed, it is true, but God worketh in vs to will; we worke, but it is God that worketh in vs to worke; we walke, but he causeth vs to walke; we keepe his com∣maundements, but he worketh in vs to keepe his commandements, so that nothing is ours of our selues, but all is his onely. And this M. Bi∣shop in some shew of words here seemeth to affirme, but indeed he wholy ouerthroweth it. He saith, that mans will then onely concur∣reth with Gods grace, when it is first stirred and holpen by grace, and therefore that M. Perkins either doth not vnderstand them, or else doth wrongfully accuse them, in that he chargeth them to say, that mans will concurreth with Gods grace by it selfe, and by it owne naturall power. But M. Perkins vnderstood them well enough, and doth no whit wrongfully accuse them. For Andradius the expounder of the riddles of the councell of Trent, doth plainely tell vs,b 1.62 that the motion of Free will, and applying of it felfe to righteousnesse, doth no more depend vpon the grace of God, then the fires burning of the wood doth depend vpon the power of God; that grace lifteth it vp being fallen downe, and addeth strength vnto it, but that it is no lesse the efficient cause of applying it selfe to grace, then other naturall things are of all those operations whereto by force of nature they are caried. Therefore he comparethc 1.63 Free will to a man made fast in the stockes, who hath a power and ablenesse in himselfe to go, if he be let go out of the stockes, and the bonds be broken that held him before that he could not stirre. Whereby he giueth vs to vnderstand their mind, that as the fire and other naturall things being by the power of God vphol∣den in that which naturally they are, do of themselues worke their proper and naturall effects, and as a man vnbound and let go out of the stockes walketh and goeth, not by any new worke that is wrought in him, but by his owne former naturall power; so Free will though entangled in the delights of sinne, and bound with the bonds thereof, yet hath a naturall power whereby it can apply it selfe to righteousnesse, if grace by breaking the bonds, and aba∣ting the strength of sinne, do but make way for it to vse and exer∣cise it selfe; so that grace hauing wrought what concerneth it, they leaue it to the will by it selfe, and by it owne naturall power, to adioyne

it selfe to worke therewith. And this Bellarmine plainely testifieth, when he affirmeth,d 1.64 that grace doth no otherwise concurre to su∣pernaturall actions, then vniuersall causes do to naturall, so that it doth no more in the worke of righteousnesse, then the Sunne and heauenly powers do in the act of generation, or the producing of other naturall effects yeelding an influence and inclination, but leauing the very act to the will and worke of man. All which in effect M. Bishop himselfe afterwards expresseth, teaching that man after the fall of Adam, hath still a naturall facultie of Free will, which being first outwardly moued, and inwardly fortified by the vertue of grace, is able to effect and do any worke appertaining to saluation; ther∣by giuing to vnderstand, that there is still an abilitie left in nature, howsoeuer for the present ouerwhelmed and oppressed, which be∣ing excited and stirred vp, though in it selfe it be not sufficient to produce the effects of spirituall actions, yet hath a sufficiencie to apply it selfe to grace for the producing thereof. Which Costerus the Iesuite declareth, by the similitude ofe 1.65 a man fallen into a darke and deepe pit, whence he cannot get out by himselfe, nor hath care to get out, but sleepeth securely therein, till his friend come, who awaketh him out of his sleepe, and wisheth him to get out, and by reasons perswadeth him to be willing thereto, and so giueth him his hand, or reacheth to him a cord, which he taketh and layeth fast hold on it, and yeeldeth his owne vttermost strength that he may be pulled out. To which purpose also he vseth another example, of a manf 1.66 extremely faint and weake, ly∣ing with his face turned away from the fire or the Sunne, who is not able to turne himselfe to the fire or the Sunne, but if he haue one to helpe him, vseth his owne strength also for the turning of himselfe about to enioy the warmth thereof. Which comparisons do plainely shew, that they attribute vnto Free will a proper and seuerall worke be∣side that that is done by the grace of God. Whereby we see how guilefully M. Bishop speaketh, when he saith, that the wil is made able by grace to bring forth spiritual fruit, being of it self vtterly vnable ther∣to, because he meaneth not hereby, that grace doth worke in the wil that whole ability that it hath, but that to the abilitie which the wil naturally hath grace offereth, and being accepted, yeeldeth only an assistance and helpe for the accomplishment of the work. Which he implieth in that he saith, that the worke proceedeth principally of

grace: not wholy but principally; onely because grace first occasio∣neth and beginneth the same, whereas otherwise they make Free will parallel-wise, and as it were side by side concurre with grace to the effecting of that whereto it tendeth. Yet he will not haue vs thinke, that they require some outward helpe onely to the will, to ioyne with grace, or that grace doth but as it were vntie the chaines of sinne, wherein our will is fettered, and then will can of it selfe turne to God, when indeede he cannot well tell what he would haue vs thinke. We heare him and his fellowes talke of inward mouing, and inward fortifying, but in truth they make all this inward but onely outward, because they still deny, that grace worketh that intrinse∣call act of the will, whereby it first applieth it selfe to God, and do leaueg 1.67 the will of man to make vp the worke of grace, by that that meerely and naturally is his owne. In respect whereof Costerus compareth graceh 1.68 to a staffe in a mans hand, which at his owne will he either vseth for his helpe, or throweth away, still excluding that worke of God, whereby it is wrought in the will, to will and re∣ceiue the grace of God, and not to reiect the same. The necessitie of which worke herein plainly appeareth, for that man as touching spirituall life,i 1.69 the life of God is wholy dead, and therefore as the dead man hath no facultie or power left, whereby to do any thing for himselfe for recouerie of life againe, but his life and the life of all his parts must wholy and newly be put into him, so man hath nothing left in nature, whereof with any helpe whatsoeuer he can make any vse to returne to God againe, but this life must wholy and newly be wrought in him by the grace and power of God. Now in this point M. Bishop stutteth and stammereth, and know∣eth not how or what to say. Man, he saith, is but halfe dead, not starke dead, and by and by after, he is halfe dead in his naturall powers of vnderstanding and will, but touching supernaturall workes, he may in a good sence be likened to a dead man, and yet presently saith againe, that in this state there is a naturall facultie of Free will, which is able being outwardly moued and inwardly fortified, to effect and do any worke appertaining to saluation. Whereby he wholy ouer∣throweth the comparison of a dead man, because where there is re∣maining an actiue power that needeth onely to be stirred vp and strengthened, there cannot be affirmed the state of death. But the Scripture pronounceth man absolutely dead: Thek 1.70 dead shall heare

the voyce of the Sonne of God, and they that heare it, shall liue:l 1.71 Ye were dead in trespasses and sinnes; notm 1.72 halfe dead, like the man that descended from Ierusalem to Iericho (to whom S. Ambrose more fit∣ly resembleth man falling after Baptisme,m 1.73 and in the state of grace) but plainelyo 1.74 dead, likep 1.75 Lazarus, foure dayes dead, and now stinking in his graue, in whose raising vp wasq 1.76 the power of Christ, not any strength of the dead man, so as that the recouering of a man to faith and spirituall life, is byr 1.77 the same working of the mightie power of God, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead. Which if M. Bishop did acknowledge, according to the plaine eui∣dence of holy Scripture, he would not thus halt betwixt grace and Free will, but would confesse, that whatsoeuer the will doth in the worke of saluation, the same is fully and wholy wrought therein by grace. But now he doth but dally with the name of Grace, as Pe∣lagius the heretike did, onely to hide the venime and poyson of his false doctrine,s 1.78 to abate the hatred, and auoid the offence that should otherwise arise against him. And no otherwise doth the councell of Trent which he alledgeth for his warrant, the doctrine where∣of is the very same with the Pelagian heresie, being taken with those corrections and limitations wherewith Pelagius and his fol∣lowers did abridge and explaine themselues. For they denied not a necessitie of the grace of God, Pelagius himselfe plainely saying,t 1.79 We say that we haue a Free will which in all good workes is alwayes assisted with the helpe of God;u 1.80 We so confesse Free will, as that we say that vve alwayes stand in need of the helpe of God:x 1.81 We can do no good at all without God:y 1.82 We so prayse nature, as that we alwayes adde the helpe of the grace of God. And that we may see that he first trod the path for the councell of Trent to follow, he sticketh not to pro∣nouncez 1.83 Anathema to euery one that thinketh or saith, that the grace of God whereby Christ came into this world to saue sinners is not neces∣sarie, not onely euery houre and euery moment, but to euery act of ours, and they that go about to deny it shall be punished for euer. So doth the Pelagian heretike affirme to Hierome;a 1.84 There be very many of ours vvho say, that all things that vve do, are done by the helpe of God. By this acknowledgement of grace Pelagius deluded the Bishops of the Easterne Churches, before whom he was conuented, and

by that meanes was acquitted and dismissed, as hauing taught no∣thing against the truth. For as Augustin noteth,b 1.85 When they heard him confesse the grace of God, they could imagine no other grace, but what they were wont to reade in the booke of God, and preach to the people of God. Which grace by this occasion the same S. Austin in diuerse and sundrie places, defineth to be thatc 1.86 whereby we are Christians and the children of God; and being predestinate are called, iustified and glorified:d 1.87 whereby we are iustified to be iust men:e 1.88 which maketh the doctrine of God profitable vnto vs:f 1.89 whereby he doth not onely shew vs the truth, but also inspireth loue:g 1.90 whereby we are iusti∣fied, that is, whereby the loue of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the holy Ghost which is giuen vnto vs;h 1.91 whereby we are made good;i 1.92 wher∣by the excellencie of heauenly glorie, is not onely promised, but also be∣leeued and hoped for; nor wisedome onely reuealed, but loued, and euerie thing that is good is not onely aduised, but (fruitfully and effectually) perswaded. This onely grace and no other did they vnderstand to be the grace of Christ, whereby as touching the worke of our sal∣uation, God is all in all whilest of him and by him, meerely by his gift we are whatsoeuer we are towards him, so that althoughk 1.93 we will, and we worke, and we walke, and we runne, yet it is God that worketh in vs, to will, and to worke, and to walke, and to runne, and in all these things we haue nothing but what we haue of him, that there may be no exception to the Apostles question,l 1.94 What hast thou that thou hast not receiued? and if thou haue receiued it, why doest thou boast as if thou hadst not receiued it? But this grace Pelagius could by no meanes endure: he thought it absurd, that all should be ascribed to God, and therefore would needes deuise a course of grace that might giue way to the Free will of man. The contriuing of which course, if we duly consider from point to point, we shall see, that it most fully correspondeth and accordeth to that doctrine of grace and Free will, which is now taught in the Church of Rome; onely the specialties thereof their schoole di∣uines haue directed them to expresse somewhat more distinctly then he hath done. And first they tell vs of grace preuenting, exci∣ting and stirring vp, whereby saith the councell, without any desert of

ours we are called, that by his grace raising vs vp, and helping vs, we may be prepared to returne to our iustification. Where we are to note M. Bishops errour in his owne principles, who sundry times cal∣leth the grace of first iustification* 1.95 the first grace, forgetting that there is a former grace, to which he himselfe referreth their workes of preparation, and here bringeth the councell describing it as pre∣cedent to iustification. But of this preuenting grace Costerus the Ie∣suite saith, thatm 1.96 it is not that that dwelleth in the soule to make a man iust, but it is onely the impulsion and motion of the holy Ghost, be∣ing yet without, and standing knocking at the doore of the heart, not being as yet let in. This he expresseth by the comparison of a friend finding a man in a deepe pit, as before was sayd, and perswading him by diuerse reasons to be willing to be pulled out. Therefore Bellarmine saith, thatn 1.97 it is but onely a perswading which doth not determine the will, but inclineth it in manner of a propounding obiect. This grace Pelagius describeth in this sort:o 1.98 He worketh in vs to will that that is good, to will that that is holy, whilest finding vs giuen to earthly lusts, and like bruit beasts louing onely present things (note that he exclu∣deth all former merits as the councell doth) he enkindleth our minds with the greatnesse of the glorie to come, and with promise of reward: whilest by reuealing his wisedome, he raiseth vp our astonished will to the desire and longing after God; whilest he perswadeth and exhor∣teth vs to all good things. And againe to the same purpose he saith:p 1.99 God helpeth vs by his doctrine and reuelation, whilest he ope∣neth the eyes of our hearts, whilest he sheweth vs things to come, that we may not be holden with things present; whilest he layeth open vnto vs the snares of the diuell; whilest he enlighteneth vs with the ma∣nifold and vnspeakeable gift of his heauenly grace. Thus hitherto they agree as touching this preuenting grace, both calling that by the name of grace, which the auncient Church disclaimed vnder that name, because they vnderstood grace to be meant of that onely, whereby God himselfe maketh vs to bee that that hee calleth vs to be, and here is nothing but propoun∣ding, perswading, exhorting, stirring, enkindling, enlighte∣ning, moouing, knocking, but leauing it to vs either to ac∣cept

or reiect that that is propounded and perswaded, and* 1.100 both resting the act and effect of all vpon man himselfe, yeelding to his motion when it is at his owne discretion to doe other∣wise. For M. Bishop here telleth vs out of their learning, that there is in vs a naturall facultie of Free will, to which this propoun∣ding & perswading is vsed,q 1.101 to which it is left to giue to these motions either admission or repulse.r 1.102 It is left in the power of the will, saith Bel∣larmine, either to consent to God calling and perswading, or not to con∣sent vnto him. Now saith Costerus,s 1.103 He that by Free will admitteth of this grace, by the helpe of it (not being yet any spirituall renewing grace, but onely as the friend (as before was said) reaching his hand, or giuing a coard to the man in the pit) he prepareth himselfe by belee∣uing, hoping, repenting, and performing workes of pietie, to receiue the grace of iustification. So that before iustification, and without any inward or inhabitant grace of regeneration, euen by Free will re∣ceiuing onely a helpe which is without it, a man hath faith, hope, re∣pentance, loue, by which, and for which (as M. Bishop afterwards disputeth) God is induced and moued to bestow vpon vs his iusti∣fying grace. All this matter M. Bishop in the thirteenth Section of this question setteth downe thus: God by his grace knockes at the doore of our hearts: he doth not breake it open, or in any sort force it, but attendeth, that by our assenting to his call, we open him the gates, and then lo he with his heauenly gifts will enter in. Whereby it appeareth, that with thē the first intrinse call act of mans conuersion is of him∣selfe, and an act of his owne Free will, occasioned by God, but acted by man himself, because the act of grace on Gods part being com∣plete, there remaineth a distinct and seuerall act of the will of man for admitting of that grace of God, vpon admitting whereof fol∣loweth the endowment of the gifts of God, by which thence foorth Free will worketh according to the will of God. All this Pelagius also taught as they do, affirming a power of nature consisting in Free will,t 1.104 which power (being not sufficient of it selfe) God alwaies assi∣steth with the helpe of the foresaid grace.u 1.105 By his law, by his Scriptures, which we reade or heare, he worketh that we may be willing; but to con∣sent or not consent, is so ours, as that if we will, we do so; if not, we cause that the worke of God auaileth nothing. Now thenx 1.106 he that vseth

his Free will aright, saith he, he runneth vnto God, and desireth to be guided and directed by him, and hangeth his will vpon the will of God, to whom being ioyned by cleaning still vnto him, he becometh or is made one spirit with him: he so committeth himselfe wholy to God, and morti∣fieth all his owne will, that with the Apostle he may be able to say, Now I liue, yet not I, but Christ liueth in me: he putteth his heart into Gods hand, that God may incline it whither it shall please him. Here is Free will yeelding assent to God, and from thence (by assistance of grace which he also, as we haue heard, acknowledgeth in his meaning, which is the same with the Papists, to be necessarie alwaies, and in all things,) there follow the workes of preparation, which he expres∣seth by termes of running vnto God, desiring to be guided by him, mor∣tifying our owne will, putting our heart into Gods hand, hanging our wil vpon Gods will. Now hereupon will he haue to ensue the iustifying grace and gift of God, which he signifieth by becoming one spirit with God, by hauing Christ to liue in vs, by hauing God to incline our hearts whither it pleaseth him.y 1.107 A great helpe of grace indeed, saith Austine, that God incline our heart neither he will, but this so great helpe as he (Pelagius) doteth, we then merit (or obtaine) when with∣out any helpe onely by Free will, we runne to God, desire to be guided by him, &c. That these merits going before, we may so obtaine grace, that God may incline our heart whither he will. And this is also the very selfe same dotage, that now possesseth the Church of Rome. For if M. Bishop will except, that they do not affirme their workes of pre∣parations to be without any helpe of grace, onely of Free will, I answer him, that no more did Pelagius, who accursed them (as hath bene said) who held not the grace of God to be necessarie to euery act. But yet in that meaning, wherein S. Austine speaketh ofz 1.108 the helpe of God, as whereby the thing it selfe is wrought in vs, wherein we are said to be helped, they say, as S. Austine chargeth Pelagius to haue said, that their preparations are without any helpe of grace, and onely of Free will, because there is for the time of this preparation no inhabitant or renuing grace, no habitual qualitie or gift of grace that should be the worker thereof. They onely teach, as Pelagius did, a grace though internall in respect of the man, yet to the will onely externally assistant, mouing and directing it for the doing of these things, but meerely the will it selfe is the doer of them. Which hereby also is apparant, for that if they were properly the effects of

they should by their doctrine be meritorio us ex condigno, whereas now they are denyed so to be, and therby are denied to be the pro∣per effects of grace. And hence M. Bishop thinketh to haue ano∣ther difference betwixt the Pelagians and them, because Pelagius affirmed merits before the grace of iustification, and they do not so. But this will not serue his turne, because Bellarmine confesseth, as the truth is, that the Fathers in condemning Pelagius for affir∣ming grace to be giuen in respect of merits, did vnderstand merita 1.109 when any thing is done by our owne power, in respect whereof grace is giuen, though the same be not merit ex condigno. Such are their workes of preparation, which are done by our owne power in that meaning as the Fathers spake, as hath bene said, because they are no proper effects of renewing grace, and are defended by thē to be the cause for which God bestoweth his grace vpon vs. They defend therfore that which was condemned in the Pelagians, that the grace of God is giuen according to our merits,b 1.110 that we first giue somewhat by Free will, for which grace is to be rendred for reward. They say as the Pela∣gians did,c 1.111 We worke to merit that God may worke with vs. Yea they professedly teach, that their preparations are merits, though not ex condigno, yet ex congruo, because by the rule of their schoolesd 1.112 it is meete or standing with reason, that whilest a man well vseth his owne po∣wer, God according to his more excellent power do worke more excel∣lently. They thinke themselues well discharged, for that they put no merits before the first grace, as they call it, whereas therein they say no more then Pelagius did. He made the first gracee 1.113 a thing com∣mon both to the wicked and to the godly, to Pagans and Christians, to be∣leeuers and infidels, consisting in motions and illuminations, offered to all, and left to euery mans Free will, to accept or reiect them, euenf 1.114 so do they. They say, that before that first grace there are no merits at al precedent; euen so said he, affirming the calling of God, whilest he findeth vs giuen to earthly lusts, and like bruite beasts louing onely present things, as his own words haue told vs. But the first grace or preuenting grace, before which the Fathers say there are no me∣rits is iustifying grace,g 1.115 the grace whereby he maketh vs to walke, to ob∣serue, to do what he commaundeth; whereby he himselfe worketh the effect of that which either by outward instruction, or inward motion and illumination he doth commend vnto vs. Before this grace they place their merits or workes of preparation, thereby to

obtaine it, contrarie to the words of the Apostle, as S. Austin wit∣nesseth:h 1.116 Not of workes, lest any man should boast: and againe, If it be of grace, it is not of workes. And herein their iniquitie is the greater, in that they borrow the termes of a distinction ofi 1.117 grace preuenient and subsequent from S. Austin, and apply it otherwise then he meant it, to the maintenance of an heresie, which he oppugned by it. Thus M. Bishop for his life cannot imagine a better accord, then there is betwixt Pelagius the Heretike and their Councell of Trent, both auouching, and by fraudulent deuices maintaining the power of nature and Free will against the truth of the grace of God. And to assure vs that they attribute thereto as much as Pelagius did,k 1.118 who so defended the power of nature, as that a man without the name of Christ might be saued by Free will, Andradius telleth vs, out of the secrets of that Councell, that they also hold,l 1.119 that heathen Philoso∣phers, hauing no knowledge of the law or of the Gospel of Christ, were iu∣stified and saued onely by the law of nature; that they religiously worship∣ped one God, put all their trust in him, hoped for reward of their ver∣tues from him, yet all this by the grace of God he saith, which Pelagius also would say, but both teaching no other grace but what the hea∣thens themselues confessed, thatm 1.120 neuer any man proued great and excellent without some diuine instinct: so that Aristotle, and Tully, and such other acknowledging the same, must now be taken for Prea∣chers of the grace of God. Wherein we may wonder at their impu∣dencie, that doubt not to affirme a thing so plainely absurd, and so resolued against by S. Austin in his defences against the Pelagians, concluding by imitation of the Apostles words, thatn 1.121 if by the law of nature there be righteousnesse without the faith of the passion and re∣surrection of Christ, then Christ died in vaine. And againe; thato 1.122 to affirme, that a man may be iustified by the law of nature and Free will, is to make the crosse of Christ of no effect. But by all this we see, that their speech of grace for conuerting of man to God, is but collusion and meere Pelagian hypocrisie, as whereby indeed they attribute no greater a work to God in bringing man to righteousnesse, then to the diuell in bringing man to sinne. Which being condemned in thep 1.123 Pelagians as a horrible impietie and blasphemie, yet by Co∣sterus the Iesuite in his Enchiridion, is manifestly acknowledged to

be their meaning,q 1.124 that as the diuell by temptation and suggestion tou∣cheth our minds, and knocketh at the doore of the heart, and seeketh to moue the will to consent to sinne, which notwithstanding is at it owne libertie to admit or reiect the same, so are the influences of Gods preuen∣ting grace, whether sudden or more constant, which do beate and knocke at the hart, but so, as it is left in the libertie of the wil to accept or refuse, euen in as plain termes as Pelagius said,r 1.125 that to consent to God consi∣steth in mans Free wil, and that by libertie of nature he doth so if he will. This paines I haue taken to vnhood M. Bishop and his Councell of Trent, and to make good that that I haue before affirmed, that the Church of Rome now maintaineth the heresie of Pelagius which anciently was condemned by the Church of Rome. That which he alledgeth out of Thomas Aquinas is of the same stampe, neither can his antiquitie of three hundred yeares adde any grace to that which eight hundred yeares before him was vniuersally condemned by the whole Church. Whether M. Perkins his rea∣sons do destroy their assertion of Free will, vpon determining the state of the question in the next section it shall appeare.

6. W. BISHOP.

Now the verie point controuersed, concerning Free will, M. Per∣kins hath quite omitted, which consisteth in these two points, expressed in the Councell: First, whether we do freely assent vnto the said grace, when it is offered vs, that is, whether it lie in our power to refuse it; And secondly, when we concurre and worke with it, whether we could if we listed refuse to worke with it. In both which points we hold the affir∣matiue part, and most sectaries of this time the negatiue. Of which our Author is silent: only by the way in his fourth reason, toucheth two texts out of Saint Paul, which are commonly alledged against Free will.

R. ABBOT.

This true point of the controuersie is contained in the proposi∣tion of the Pelagians, thata 1.126 to consent to the Gospell is not the gift of

God, but that this we haue of our selues, that is to say, of our owne will, which he hath not wrought for vs in our hearts. For thus you haue, M. Bishop, all this while affirmed, that grace hauing performed and done what appertained to it for the conuersion of man, there is behind a distinct and proper act of the will, which either by con∣senting and yeelding maketh good, or by dissenting and refusing maketh frustrate all that grace hath done. This you all inculcate & beate vpon that, that when God hath wholy done his part, it is in mans will either to make or marre, and so do plainly teach with Pelagius, that God doth helpeb 1.127 possibilitatem naturae, our naturall power, that we may be able to consent and will, but actually to consent and will, is left still free to our owne will and choise. And thus, M. Bishop, you your selfe informe vs, when propounding the first part of the question, Whether we do freely assent vnto grace when it is offered vs, that is whether it lie in our power to refuse it, you hold affirmatiuely, that by Free will we assent vnto grace, hauing it in our power and choise to refuse the same. Whether this be so or not is the point, and we resolue with S. Austin,c 1.128 that God doth not onely giue vs and helpe vs to be able to will and to worke, but also wor∣keth in vs to will and to worke: he doth not so offer vs grace, as to leaue vs to assent vnto it if we will, but himselfe worketh also in vs to be willing and to giue our assent vnto it, whod 1.129 so hath our hearts in his power, as that in wonderfull and vnspeakeable manner he worketh in vs to will that good that we cannot haue but with our will. And whereas you say that it lieth in our power to refuse the grace of God, you thereby subiecte 1.130 the accomplishment of the promise of the grace of God, to the power and will of man; so that if man list, it shall take place: if man list not, it shall not take place.f 1.131 God promised children to Abraham that should follow the steps of his faith.g 1.132 He pro∣mised them forgiuenesse of sinnes, obedience, perseuerance, the feare of him. He offereth grace to that purpose, where if it lie in mans power to refuse the same, then it must be in mans power whether the promise of God shall be fulfilled or not. But God didh 1.133 not make that promise vpon the power of our will, as foreseeing what we would do, but vpon his owne purpose, determining what he himselfe would do, cau∣sing men to do what he hath commanded, not hauing from men to per∣forme

what he hath promised, because he intended suchi 1.134 a grace, not as whereby man may attaine to righteousnesse if he will, but whereby it is wrought in him to will and loue the same;k 1.135 he hauing in his power the wils of men more then they themselues haue. In a word, man by na∣ture hath in him to resist and refuse the grace of God: to this his power serueth, and doth not serue to do otherwise. But God ouer∣ruleth this power, and worketh in him not to refuse his grace, and when God worketh in man not to refuse, it cannot be said, that to refuse is in the power of man; not that God maketh man iust a∣gainst his will, butl 1.136 he taketh away from him hardnesse of heart, wher∣by he did refuse, and ism 1.137 altogether inflexible towards God, and giueth him a new heart, a heart of flesh willing to obey, whereby a man groweth to be as aduerse to sinne, as he was before to righteous∣nesse, and entreth to that state which S. Iohn describeth,n 1.138 Euery one that is borne of God sinneth not, neither can he sinne, that is, serue sinne, giue himselfe altogether ouer to sinne, because he is borne of God, which is here the happie beginning of the euerlasting blessed state of Gods elect,o 1.139 Non posse peccare, non posse bonum deserere, to be freed from all possibilitie of sinne, or forsaking that good that God hath yeelded vnto vs by Iesus Christ. Now hereby we see how absurdly M. Bishop propoundeth the second part of this question, when we concurre to worke with grace, whether we could, if we listed, refuse to worke with it. For who doubteth but if we list, we do refuse? but therefore the worke of grace is that we shall not list to refuse the worke of grace, but that our list shall be to submit our selues vnto it.p 1.140 Where Christ prayeth for Peter that his faith might not faile, will any man dare to say that it might faile if Peter list to haue it faile, that is, would not haue it to perseuere vnto the end? As if Peter could list or will in any sort otherwise then Christ had prayed for him that he might will. For who knoweth not, that Peters faith should faile if the will of faith should faile in him, and continue, if that should con∣tinue. But because the will is prepared by the Lord, therefore the pra∣yer of Christ for Peter could not be in vaine, whereby he prayed that he might haue in the faith a most free, most strong, inuincible and perseue∣ring will. This is the worke of grace to all the faithfull: it standeth

not vpon their list to refuse the grace of God, for then they cer∣tainly giue it ouuer, butq 1.141 he putteth his feare into their hearts, that they shall not depart from him. Now the question being truely and rightly propounded, whether God hauing fully done his part for the conuersion of a sinner, it remaine free to his owne will, either to ac∣cept or refuse this grace: the reasons vsed by M. Perkins are verie effectuall and strong to proue the contrarie, and it was M. Bishops cunning to passe by them, because he knew not any probable an∣swer to giue vnto them. His first reason sheweth the vniuersall corruption of mans heart,r 1.142 the whole imagination whereof God te∣stifieth to be onely euill continually; so thats 1.143 flesh sauoureth of nothing but enmitie against God, and is not subiect to the law of God, nor indeed can be. If mans heart be onely euill and enmitie against God, then can it not be truly sayd, that there is in it any naturall facultie of Free will, to assent and yeeld it selfe to the grace of God. If it be not subiect to the law of God, nor indeed can be, shall we say by plaine contradiction, that it hath in it whereby to assent and giue it selfe in submission vnto God? Free vvill requireth integritie in iudge∣ment of vnderstanding, in election of will, in obedience of affe∣ction; but here man is vtterly disabled in all these. What facultie of iudgement hath he to conceiue and approue the things of God, who in all his thoughts is onely euill, and in his very wisedome is ene∣mie vnto God?t 1.144 Euerie man is a beast by his owne vnderstanding, his mind altogetheru 1.145 darknesse and ignorance; and as he auaileth no∣thing that offereth light to the blind, or bringeth him into the clee∣rest Sunne-shine, vnlesse he can make him see; so it booteth not that God doth set his light before man, and causeth it most cleerely to shine vnto him, vnlesse hex 1.146 open the inward eye of the soule, and make him to vnderstand; not leaue him to vnderstand if he will, but make him to vnderstand. To this purpose is the second reason of M. Perkins, thaty 1.147 the naturall man perceiueth not the things of the spirit of God; that they are foolishnesse vnto him; that he cannot know them because they are only spiritually, that is,z 1.148 by the spirit, to be discerned. If there be no free wil in spiritual things, without iudging & discerning, and vnderstanding thereof, and there be no discer∣ning or vnderstanding thereof, but onely by thea 1.149 spirit and mind of Christ, surely in nature there can be no Free will that can be helpe∣full vnto vs, to the attainment of spirituall life, and the power ther∣of

serueth but to condemne for folly the counsels and instructions thereto tending, the wisedom whereof it is not able to apprehend. Let grace do what may be done, yet nature perceiueth nothing of the spirit, if the same spirit of grace worke not therein to per∣ceiue. Now where the vnderstanding is capable, yet what per∣uersenesse and crosnesse still remaineth in the will? It hood-win∣keth the mind, and maketh it seeme to it selfe not to see when it doth see; it shutteth the gates, and intercepteth the passages of the vnderstanding, shunning to admit any thing whereby it should be checked and interrupted in it course;b 1.150 it hateth and is afraid to vn∣derstand, that it may not he vrged to do when it doth vnderstand. Yea where the conscience is conuicted by knowledge and vnderstan∣ding, yet the will being entangled with it owne respects, how mightily doth it struggle and fight against God? and neuer ceaseth fighting, till God doc 1.151 heale the rebellions of it, not by putting it in case to yeeld if it will, but working in it to will and to yeeld vnto him. And when will hath now begun to yeeld, what vnto ward∣linesse doth it find in the affections, which as a swift and mightie streame, do euery while ouerbeare both the iudgement of the vn∣derstanding, and the resolution of the will, so thatd 1.152 we cannot do the things that we would. The peruersenesse whereof, if it preuaile so much with men iustified and in the state of grace, as that it cau∣seth many bitter lamentations for ouersights thereby committed contrarie to the intendment of the will, how much more do they like flattering Dalilaes, bind all our strength, and ouercome all the power of nature, when the will as yet hath receiued no fortification of inward grace to resist and fight against them? Seeing therefore the heart is on the one side so blind that it cannot see, and on the other side so peruerse, as that one while it will not see, another while crosseth whatsoeuer it doth see, we may well say as S. Austin doth:e 1.153 What good may a man do out of a heart that is not good? but to haue our heart good, we must looke to him that saith, I will giue you a new heart, and will put into you a new spirit, so that till the heart be renewed and made good, there is no doing good, and therefore no assenting to the grace of God. The third argument of M. Per∣kins he omitteth with the rest, and yet lighting vpon some idle de∣uice afterwards, he thought good to set it downe in steed of an ob∣iection, which shall be examined in the place which he hath giuen

it. The fourth reason is taken from that that the Scripture in the conuersion of a sinner ascribeth all to God, and nothing at all to mans Free will, as appeareth from the termes off 1.154 new birth,g 1.155 new crea∣ture,h 1.156 regeneration, &c. Whereby is argued, that as man confer∣reth nothing to his generation and birth; so neither doth he to his regeneration and new birth. As man doth nothing for himselfe in his creation, so hath he nothing whereby to steed himselfe to become a new creature. Whereto agreeth the definition of the an∣cient Church:i 1.157 We in no wise suffer, nay according to wholsome do∣ctrine we forbid, whether in our faith or in our workes, to chalenge to our selues any thing as our owne. We haue to chalenge nothing as our owne; and therefore it is not our act of Free will, but Gods worke in vs to assent to the grace of God. How then doth M. Bi∣shop say, that this is nothing against him, who saith in effect the same that Pelagius did,k 1.158 It is of God that we are able to do or speake or to thinke any thing that is good, but to do, or to speake, or to thinke it is our owne, because, if we beleeue him, the grace of God leaueth it to our owne Free will, either to accept or refuse, to do or not to do, to worke with it, or not to worke. M. Perkins fift reason is taken from the iudgement of the auncient Church; which how far it auaileth we shall see anone: but he that well weigheth these reasons, and the circumstances of them, as M. Perkins hath set them downe, will surely thinke, that either M. Bishop was not well awake, or his wits here in the beginning of his booke were not yet wel come to him, when he passed them ouer with this opinion, that they were all for them. But he thought he had a long way to go, and was loth in the beginning to put himselfe out of breath.

7. W. BISHOP.

* 1.159The first. I haue (saith he) laboured more abundantly then all they, yet not I, but the grace of God, which is in me, attributing the whole worke to grace. To which I briefly answer, that they do corrupt the text, to make it seeme more currant for them: the Greeke hath on∣ly, He son emoi, which is, with me, not, which is in me, so that the words in true construction, make much more for vs then against vs? S. Paul affirming the grace of God, which was working with him, to haue done these things: And so S. Augustine whom they pretend to follow

most in this matter, expoundeth it. Yet not I,* 1.160 but the grace of God with me; that is, not I alone, but the grace of God with me. And by this, neither the grace of God alone: neither he alone, but the grace of God with him, thus S. Augustine. The like sentence is in the booke of Wisedome. Send that (wisedome) from thy Holy heauen,* 1.161 that it may be with me, and labour with me.

R. ABBOT.

Corruption of texts is not wont to be but for aduantage. It is no aduantage more to vs to readea 1.162 the grace of God which is in me, then to reade the grace of God which is with me. The ancient father Hierome readeth it both wayes: one where,b 1.163 the grace of God which is in me: another where,c 1.164 the grace of God which is with me, as be∣twixt which in effect there is no difference. To reade, the grace of God which is in me, though it do not here literally answer the Greeke, yet hath no other meaning but what the Apostle else∣where iustifieth by the same phrase of speech;d 1.165 Now I liue; yet not I, but Christ liueth in me, yea and in the same place immediatly be∣fore, we haue literall example of it;e 1.166 His grace which is in me. The words in true construction, saith M. Bishop, make much more for vs then against vs. And why so? Forsooth because S. Paul affirmeth the grace of God which was working with him, to haue done these things. But how is that for them? For if his meaning be, that be∣cause it is sayd, that grace did worke with him, therefore it must be also vnderstood, that he did worke with grace, he must remember that he hath sayd before,f 1.167 By the grace of God I am that I am, and therefore that it was of grace it selfe, that he did worke with grace. As if he should haue sayd, I haue laboured more abundantly then they all, yet I can attribute nothing to my selfe herein, but all to grace, be∣cause it is the worke of grace in me whatsoeuer I haue done, in working with grace.g 1.168 Fearing least the worke should be ascribed to himselfe, saith the Scholiast, he referreth it to the grace of God. To which purpose the same Apostle elsewhere saith:h 1.169 I haue whereof to re∣ioyce in Christ Iesus, in the things that pertaine to God: for I dare not speake of any thing which Christ hath not wrought by me, &c. Where Photius thus obserueth;i 1.170 He sheweth that nothing is his, but all wholy is Christs. If all wholy be of Christ, then is no part to be ascribed

to the Free will of man. The Pelagians vrged this place to the Co∣rinthians with the same pretence that M. Bishop doth. Let him take the answer of Orosius as spoken to him:k 1.171 Thou heedlesse pre∣sumptuous man, what doest thou looke at that he saith, with me? Marke well that he hath first said, Not I. Betwixt, not I, and, with me, com∣meth in the middest, the grace of God, whose indeed it is both to will and to worke for the making of a good will, albeit the will be the will of man. Wherefore he was bold to say, with me, because he had sayd, not I. So then the grace of Gods power worketh in the will of man, which hath giuen to it to will the same. Whereupon the conscience of man professeth and saith, not I, but the grace of God giueth him that he may say, with me. Paul then saith and may say, with me, but it is not by any proper act of his owne Free will, but by the onely gift and worke of grace, whereby he attaineth to say, with me. And no o∣therwise would S. Austin haue spoken, if he had not fallen into hucksters hands, who vse him onely for aduantage, and not for truth. For hauing in hand to shew, that God calling vs, and iusti∣fying vs onely by his grace, vseth thenceforth our will and worke to accompanie his grace, in going forward with the worke of our saluation, giueth for example hereof the Apostle S. Paul, who professing that by Gods meere grace he was all that he was towards God, sheweth that hauing receiued this grace, it was not idle in him, but he laboured more abundantly then all the rest, but adding, yet not I, but the grace of God with me;l 1.172 that is, saith Austin, not I alone, but the grace of God with me; and therefore neither the grace of God alone, nor he himselfe alone, but the grace of God with him. Now the next words are; But that he was called from heauen, and by that mightie and most effectuall calling was con∣uerted, Gratia Dei erat sola, it was onely the grace of God. Which words M. Bishop hath fraudulently concealed, as be∣ing expresly against him, and cleering this whole point most manifestly on our part. Our conuersion is onely by the grace of God, as Austin saith S. Pauls was; Free vvill hath no part therein. We say as he saith, that the will of man being conuerted and re∣newed by grace, doth afterwards apply it selfe to worke with grace, and so there is not onely the grace of God, nor onely the will of man, but the grace of God accompanied with the will of man, not as by any proper worke of the will it selfe, but by the

worke of grace, by which it was first conuerted. Therefore the same S. Austin elsewhere mentioning those words, By the grace of God I am that I am, saith thereupon:m 1.173 This is the first mercie, after which do follow the workes of Free will. But that good vvorkes might follow after the calling of the Apostle, vvhat doth he say himselfe; And his grace vvas not in me in vaine. There is no Free vvill then to righteousnesse, before a man can say, By the grace of God I am that I am. Thereby the will is made free, and thereby it worketh with grace to bring forth the fruits of all good workes. So that Saint Austin leaueth vs this place very strong to prooue that both our conuersion, and our working with grace, when we are conuerted, is altogether and wholy to be attributed vnto grace. Hereby the other place is cleered, if it were ought worth.

8. W. BISHOP.

The second text is. It is God that worketh in vs,* 1.174 both to will and to accomplish. We grant that it is God, but not he alone vvithout vs, for in the next vvords before, Saint Paul, saith: Worke your salua∣tion with feare and trembling. So that God worketh principally by stirring vs vp by his grace, and also helping forward our will, to ac∣complish the worke; but so sweetly and conformably to our nature, that his vvorking taketh not away, but helpeth forward our vvill to con∣curre vvith him. Againe, the vvhole may be attributed vnto God, considering that the habits of grace infused, be from him as sole efficient cause of them, our actions indued also vvith grace, being onely dis∣positions and no efficient cause of those habits: but this is an high point of schoole Diuinitie, verie true, but not easily to be conceiued of the vn∣learned.

R. ABBOT.

S. Austin in expresse termes contradicteth M. Bishop saying,a 1.175 vt velimus sine nobis operatur: without vs he worketh in vs to will. And so S. Bernard also saith, thatb 1.176 the creating of vs to freedome of will, is wrought without vs. Our will is the subiect wherein it is wrought, but the efficient cause thereof is onely the grace of God. This M. Bishop denieth, because the Apostle in the words immediatly be∣fore

saith, Work out your saluation with feare and trembling. But the Apostle when he biddeth them to worke, biddeth them to do it with feare and trembling. And why is that?c 1.177 The Apostle addeth the cause, saith S. Austine: for it is God that worketh in you to will and to worke, of his owne good will. If then God worke in thee, it is by the grace of God that thou workest well, not by thine owne power. How peruersly then doth M. Bishop deale, that when the Apostle vseth the latter words to expound the former, he will take the former words to crosse the latter. Men are to be called vpon by exhortation to do good workes, but yet they are to know, that the effect of exhortation, is the worke of grace. True saith M. Bishop, it is of grace, but not of grace onely: for Free will also hath a part. But S. Austin telleth, thatd 1.178 it is more safetie for vs to attribute all wholy to God, and not commit our selues partly to God, and partly to our selues: ande 1.179 true faith requi∣reth this in the defending of one God, that whatsoeuer is his, we make it onely his: for so shall it be accounted his, if it be accounted onely his. If God do worke in vs to will, let vs acknowledge it to be his onely, and none of ours. God worketh principally, saith M. Bishop, by stir∣ring vs vp by his grace, and also helping forward our will to accomplish the worke, but so sweetly and conformably to our nature, that his wor∣king taketh not away, but helpeth forward our will to concur with him. Here is stirring vp the wil, and helping forward the will, and no more but what the Pelagians confessed, as I haue shewed before; but why doth he make it so daintie, to say as the Apostle saith, that God wor∣keth in vs to will? He nameth grace, which is but a grace if we will, but we require the grace which the Apostle teacheth, whereby God worketh in vs to will. He saith, that God doth not take away our will. So did Pelagius say:f 1.180 that God doth not worke holinesse in vs with∣out our will. We answer, that our will is the subiect wherein God worketh, as before was said, but it is no part of the efficient cause, whereby it is wrought in vs to will. The Arausicane Councell de∣termineth,g 1.181 that if any man do maintaine, that God expecteth our will that we may be purged from sinne, and doth not confesse, that by the in∣fusion and operation of the holy Ghost it is also wrought in vs to be wil∣ling to be purged, he resisteth the Apostle, in that he preacheth accor∣ding to wholesome doctrine, that it is God which worketh in vs, both to will and to worke, of his good will. This M. Bishop maintaineth: he saith that God offereth grace to that purpose, but expecteth our will to

make good that grace to our selues: he confesseth that God stirreth and helpeth forward our will, but cannot endure to say, that it is God that worketh in vs to will. He answereth yet further, that the whole may be attributed to God, because the habits of grace infused, be frō him as sole efficient of thē, our actiōs endued also with grace, being onely dispo∣sitions, & no efficient cause of those habits. But herein he absurdly tri∣fleth, by altering the state of the questiō, For the controuersie is not of the efficient cause of infused grace, but of the efficient cause of our receiuing that grace. We say, that the holy Ghost worketh the same immediatly in our will; they say, that the grace of God and the Free will of man makeh 1.182 one efficient cause of the receiuing thereof. They say, that God offereth his grace with condition if we wil; but we say, that God without putting vs to condition of our wil, worketh in vs to will, and where he expresseth a condition doth himself performe the same,i 1.183 giuing what he commandeth, andk 1.184 himselfe making vs to do what he requireth to be done. The words of the Apostle are plain for vs, and as plaine against thē. But I take it to be but a point of M. Bi∣shops cunning thus to speake, yet his learning will gaine but small credit thereby.

9. W. BISHOP.

One other obiection may be collected out of M. Perkins third reason against Free will, which is touched, as he saith, by the holy Ghost, in these words: When we were dead in sinnes.* 1.185 If a man by sinne become like a dead man, he cannot concurre with God, in his rising from sinne.

Answ. Sure it is, that he cannot, before God by his grace hath quicke∣ned, & as it were, reuiued him, to which grace of God, man giues his free consent. How can that be, if he were then dead? Marry you must re∣member what hath bene said before: that albeit man in sinne be dead in the way of grace, yet he liueth naturally, and hath Free will in naturall and ciuil actions: which will of his being by grace fortified, and as it were lifted vp vnto a higher degree of perfection, can then concurre and worke with grace to faith, and all good works necessary to life euerlasting. (As for example) a Crab-tree stocke hath no ability of it selfe, to bring foorth apples, & therfore may be tearmed dead in that kind of good fruite: yet let a siance of apples be grafted into it, and it will beare apples: euen so albeit our soure corrupt nature of it selfe be vnable to fructifie to life e∣uerlasting, yet hauing receiued into it the heauenly graft of Gods grace, it is enabled to produce the sweete fruite of good workes: to which

alludeth S. Iames:* 1.186 Receiue the ingraffed word, which can saue our soules. Againe, what more dead then the earth? and yet it being tilled and sowed, doth bring foorth, and beare goodly corne: now the word and grace of God is compared by our Sauiour himselfe vnto seed,* 1.187 and our hearts vnto the earth that receiued it: what maruel then if we otherwise dead, yet reuiued by this liuely feed, do yeeld plenty of pleasing fruite?

R. ABBOT.

This obiection M. Bishop saith, he collecteth out of M. Perkins third reason against Free will, whereas it is indeed the whole mat∣ter of that third reason. He wold haue kept due order, and haue an∣swered the rest as well as this, but that he doubted he should haue answered the rest as badly as he hath done this. He propoundeth the obiection at his owne liking, and cutteth off what he list. If man by sinne become like a dead man, he cannot concurre with God in his rising from sinne. For this the words of the Apostle are alledged by M. Perkins,a 1.188 When we were dead in sinnes. M. Bishop answereth, sure it is that he cannot, before God by his grace hath quickened and as it were reuiued him, to which grace of God man giueth his free consent. Which answer, who is so blind as that he cannot see how absurdly it crosseth it selfe. Man must giue his free consent to grace, that he may be quickened thereby; and yet man cannot consent or concur with God, before he be quickened by grace. If man cannot consent or concurre with God before he be quickened, then the consent of of his owne Free will cannot be the efficient cause of his quicke∣ning, because that that cometh after, cannot be the cause of that that necessarily goeth before, and the effect is neuer the cause of it owne cause. And this is indeed the very truth, iustified by M. Bishops owne words, against his will. But his whole discourse driueth the other way, that a man not yet quickened, must by Free will giue consent to grace, and concurre with God, that he may be quicke∣ned; because though grace be offered, yet it taketh no effect vntill our Free will do make way for it, and do adde it owne indeauour and helpe to the worke thereof. Which is all one as to require of a dead bodie to giue consent, and to put to it owne helpe for the re∣storing of it selfe to life againe. Yet he thinketh to cleare the mat∣ter of all impossibilitie: for asking the question againe, How can that

be, (namely, that man should giue his free consent to grace) if he were then dead? he answereth, Marry you must remember what hath bene said before, that albeit man in sinne be dead in the way of grace, yet he liueth naturally, and hath Free will in naturall and ciuill actions. But what is this to the purpose, seeing that spiritually he still conti∣nueth a dead man? Yea but this will of his being fortified and lifted vp to a higher degree of perfection, can then concurre and worke with grace to faith and all good works necessary to life euerlasting. Where he doth but runne in a ring, and in other words repeateth the same answer, still sticking fast in the briars, wherein he was tangled before. For how is this will to be fortified and lifted vp to a higher degree of perfe∣ction? He hath told vs before, by grace, and that to grace man must giue his free consent. So then he telleth vs that Free will cannot con∣curre and worke with grace, except by grace it be first fortified and lifted vp to a higher degree of perfection: and yet it cannot be for∣tified by grace, and lifted vp to a higher degree of perfection, ex∣cept it first concurre with grace. I may here againe iustly returne v∣pon him his owne words, See how vncertaine the steppes are of men that walke in darknesse, &c. Now the Reader will obserue that the obiection is of man dead as touching Free will to righteousnesse, & he answereth of naturall Free will only fortified and lifted vp to a higher degree of perfection. What fortifying is there of a dead man, and how should he be lifted vp to a higher degree of perfection, except he first recouer life? Why doth he by babling and trifling bobbe his Rea∣der, and make shew to say something, when indeed to the purpose he saith nothing at all? The argument still standeth impregnable. Man is not onely weake and vnperfect, but dead, not halfe dead, but wholy dead in sinne, and therefore by S. Austine likened to theb 1.189 Shu∣namites sonne being dead, whom the Prophet Elizeus raised from the dead. He must be madec 1.190 aliue from the dead, before he can concurre with grace. Which if M. Bishop confesse, or because he cannot de∣ny, therefore he must confesse also, that as the dead man hath no∣thing whereby to helpe himselfe to receiue life againe, so man spi∣ritually dead,d 1.191 inwardly in soule dead, hath nothing in him, no fa∣cultie or power of the soule, whereby he can any way further the recouerie of his owne life. But to fill vp the measure of his folly, he will set foorth this matter vnto vs by a comparison. A Crab-tree flocke (forsooth) hath no abilitie of it selfe to bring foorth apples, and

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therefore may be tearmed dead in that kind of good fruite: yet let a siance of apples be grafted into it, and it will beare apples: euen so (saith he) al∣beit our sowre corrupt nature of it self be vnable to fructifie to life euer∣lasting, yet hauing receiued into it the heauenly graft of Gods grace, it is enabled to bring foorth the sweet fruite of good workes: Similes habent labra lactucas: as his doctrine is, so must his similitudes needes be, crabbed and crosse. Is the Crab-tree stocke dead to the bringing foorth of apples, which by it owne naturall life without alteration, continueth life, and giueth nouriture and increase to the siances and graffes of apples, that are engraffed and implanted vpon it? which receiueth nothing at all of the graffes or siances, but mini∣streth vnto them that, whereby they bring foorth fruite? Is this the condition of the grace of God in vs, that we giue it sappe and strength in vs to bring foorth good fruite vnto God? And yet the Crab-tree stocke in the receiuing of the new graffes is meerely and wholy passiue, and not actiue in any sort. The engraffing thereof is altogether the worke of the gardiner or husbandman. Yea and that they bring foorth such or such fruite, they haue it not of the stocke, but altogether and onely of their owne kind. Therefore we must likewise say, that the nature of man in the receiuing of the graft of grace, is altogether passiue and doth nothing thereto, and whene 1.192 the superfluitie of maliciousnesse being cast away and cut off, the same grace vseth our naturall powers to the bringing foorth of the fruite of good workes, the commendation of the fruite ariseth onely frō the graffe, from grace it selfe and the power thereof, not by the stocke, but by it selfe, digesting and turning all to the nature and qualitie of it selfe. So that his owne comparison doth most effectu∣ally serue to strengthen our part, and to ouerthrow his owne. But as he vseth it, it sauoureth very rankly of the Pelagian heresie. For Pelagius made of the power of nature,f 1.193 a fertile and fruitfull roote, which out of the will of man did bring foorth diuersly, and might as the dresser thereof list, either be garnished with the flowers of vertue, or else grow wild with the thornes of vice. Whereby as S. Austine no∣teth, he made one and the same roote, both of good and euill workes, e∣uen as M. Bishop doth by his Crab-tree stocke, contrarie to the truth of the Gospell, and the doctrine of the Apostle. For in the Gospel we reade ofg 1.194 a good tree and an euill tree, and that the good tree can∣not bring foorth euill fruite, nor the euill tree good fruite.h 1.195 The good

tree is a tree of a good root, and the euill tree a tree of an euill root, not both of the same roote. The tree of a good root is the man of a good wil; the tree of an euill root is the man of euil will, not growing both vpon the Crab-tree stocke of M. Bishops Free will. Whereby we are gi∣uen to vnderstand, that for the bringing foorth of good fruite, it suf∣ficeth not to haue any thing ingraffed in vs, but we our selues must become graffes, to be implanted into a new stocke, and to grow vpon a new root. We must be engraffed into thei 1.196 true vine Iesus Christ, by him to be purged from the corruption that we haue drawne from our old root, and to liue wholy by his spirit, that we may bring foorth fruit, not according to our owne nature and kind, as other graffes do, but according to a new life and nature, that we receiue by being ioyned vnto him. M. Bishop is of another mind, he will haue Christ to be ingraffed vpon the Crab-tree stocke of our Free will, he seeth no necessitie to leaue his old roote to be engraf∣fed into Christ. As for the place of S. Iames,k 1.197 Receiue the engraffed word, &c. it auaileth him nothing at al: for it doth not import in any wise, that the word of God ingraffed in our naturall Free will, doth bring foorth fruite vnto God, but onely telleth vs in what sort the word of God is to be receiued of vs, that it may saue our soules: namely, that it must be inwardly wrought in our hearts, that it may become to vsl 1.198 the immortall seed, whereby through saith we arem 1.199 begotten and borne againe, andn 1.200 created anew in Iesus Christ, which is not doneo 1.201 by the will of man, that is, by Free will, but Godp 1.202 of his owne will hath begotten vs, and that so, as that thoughq 1.203 Paule plant, and Apollo water, yet God onely giueth the increase, and neither he that planteth is any thing, nor he that watereth (which is in vaine spoken if he that is planted or watered be any thing by his owne Free will) but God onely that giueth the increase. Another comparison he vseth of the earth. What more dead, saith he, then the earth? and yet it being tilled and sowne, doth bring foorth and beare goodly corne. Whereof he maketh application thus: Now the word and grace of God is compared by our Sauiour to seed, and our hearts to the earth that receiue it. What maruell then if we otherwise dead, yet reuiued by this liuely seed, do yeeld plentie of pleasing fruite? Where we see how loth he is that the Pela∣gians in any absurditie should go beyond him. As before he made one roote, so here he maketh one ground of Free will, common and indifferent to good and euill, and which is strange, maketh it as na∣turall

to this ground or earth to bring foorth fruite of the seed of Gods word, as it is to the tilled ground to yeeld corne of the seed that is sowne vpon it. Moreouer of grace he maketh no other mat∣ter but the seed, which is, the word of God,r 1.204 the law and doctrine, and exhortation, euen as Pelagius did; and that by this seed of Gods word Free will is, reuiued, to bring forth plentie of pleasing fruite. But our Sauiour Christ in the Gospell maketh foure sorts of ground, and thereof one onely good ground, which is not good of it selfe, but made good, hauing nothing in it whereof to bring foorth fruite of the seed or Gods word,s 1.205 vntill the spirit be powred vpon it from aboue, that of a wildernesse it may become a fruitfull field. So that the grace of God consisteth not in the seed of the word, but importeth a spiritual and heauenly influence of the blessing of God, altering and chan∣ging the nature of the soyle of mans heart, that it may be fit to re∣ceiue the seed, and to fructifie thereby. For otherwise the Scripture teacheth vs, that mans heart is at 1.206 stonie heart, that hisu 1.207 forehead is brasse, and his necke an iron sinew, and that to bestow labour vpon him by the word of God, is but as to washx 1.208 an Aethiopian or a Leo∣pard, to take away the blacknes and spots of them, or toy 1.209 plow vpon the rocke, where there is no entrance neither for plow nor seed. There∣fore howsoeuer the seed be sowne, it auaileth nothing, neither can the will of man fructifie thereby, vntill it doz 1.210 heare and learne of the Father to come to Christ,a 1.211 that is, vntill it receiue a gift of the Father whereby to beleeue in Christ,b 1.212 it being meant not of the very earth, saith Austin, but spiritually which is said: The Lord will yeeld his sweetnesse, and our land or earth shall giue increase, as to note, that not by any power of our Free will, but onely by his sweet and heauenly dew,c 1.213 the raine of righteousnesse,d 1.214 the raine of blessing, which he raineth vpon vs, we bring foorth the seed of the word of God.

10. W. BISHOP.

Hauing hitherto explicated the state of the question, and solued such obiectiōs as may be gathered out of M. Perkins against it, before I come to his solution of our arguments, I will set downe some principall places, both out of the Scriptures, and auncient Fathers, in defence of our do∣ctrine, because he proposeth but few for vs, and misapplyeth them too.

* 1.215First then, God saith to Caine: If thou do well, shalt thou not re∣ceiue

a reward? But if thou do euill, thy sinne will presently be at the gates, but the appetite of it, shall be vnder thee, and thou shalt beare dominion ouer it. Here is plaine mention made of the power, which that euill disposed man Cain, had not to sinne, if he had listed; which was (no doubt) by the assistance of Gods grace, and on the other side, that grace did not infallibly draw him to good, but left it to his free choice, whether he would follow it or no. And because they, who secke out all manner of starting holes, wrest these words, of ruling and bea∣ring sway, as spoken of his brother Abel, and not of sinne: first, to see their iniquitie, marke the text, where is no mention of Abel, neither in that verse, nor in the next before; but expresse mention is made of sinne in the next words before: therefore those Pronounes, (that are to be re∣ferred to the words next before) must needes in true construction be re∣ferred to sinne, and not to his brother. Besides this plaine construction of the text, S. Augustine followeth, saying as it were to Cain:* 1.216 Hold thy selfe content, for the conuersion of it shall be to thee, and thou shalt rule ouer it. What (saith he) ouer his brother? God forbid, that so wicked a man should rule ouer so good: Ouer what then? but he shall rule ouer sinne. See how manifestly that worthy Doctor hath preuented their cauill. And if it were need, I might ioyne with him that most skilfull Father in the Hebrew text, S. Hierome,* 1.217 who in the person of God expoundeth it thus: Because thou hast Free will, I ad∣monish and warne thee, that thou suffer not sinne to ouercome thee, but do thou ouercome sinne.

R. ABBOT.

M. Perkins he saith, proposed but few places for them, and misapplied them to; and therefore he will himselfe set downe some principall places, both out of the Scriptures and fathers, in defence of their doctrine. But what ill hap had he at first to light vpon an example, whereby as Austin noteth, it is so manifest,a 1.218 that howsoeuer God himselfe do speake to the sense of man, either to his outward or inward senses, yet if he do not by inward grace rule and worke the mind, all the preaching of truth auaileth nothing, and that it is the holy Ghost that must worke inwardly, that the medicine may auaile that is outwardly applied.

Which is a worke whereby God putteth difference betwixt the ves∣sels of mercie and the vessels of wrath; so that the question why one receiueth the grace of God, and another doth not,b 1.219 is not answered by the vvilling or nilling of Free vvill, as to say, one by Free vvill would when God offered grace, the other would not, but by Gods working that in the one which he worketh not in the other, who both haue by nature to nill and refuse, but neither haue to will but by the gift of God; whereas with M. Bishop, the worke of God is the same to both, neither doth God make the difference betwixt man and man, offering himselfe alike to all, but man by Free will either receiuing or refusing, maketh difference betwixt himselfe and o∣ther men. God himselfe spake to Cain, yet was he not the better for it. M. Bishop telleth vs, that the reason was in his owne Free vvill, whereby he had it in his owne power, at his owne list to con∣uert and turne to God, and that God did signifie so much by say∣ing vnto him, that the desire of sinne should be vnder him, and he should beare dominion ouer it. Where he should haue had regard for proofe of his doctrine,c 1.220 to make choise of plaine and manifest pla∣ces, as S. Austins rule is, not of such as being figuratiue or obscure, may be expounded and taken diuersly. There are sundry expositions of this place deliuered by the ancient fathers, and therefore there is no necessitie to vrge vs to take that exposition which he alledgeth. First Chrysostome expoundeth the place according to the true mea∣ning thereof, that God hauing byd 1.221 the same phrase of speech con∣stituted before the superioriuie of the husband oner his wife, doth here yeeld to the first borne a superioritie and kind of Lordship ouer the rest of his brethren, which here he signifieth to Cain, he would not infringe, to giue him occasion that way of offence to∣wards his brother, howsoeuer he accepted his brothers sacrifice better then his, albeit readie to accept his sacrifice also if he offe∣red in the like sort as his brother did.e 1.222 Thinke not, that because I haue refused thy sacrifice because of thy corrupt mind, and haue accep∣ted thy brothers sacrifice because of his vpright and sound heart, ther∣fore I will d••priue thee of thy superioritie, and take away from thee the honour of thy birthright. For albeit I haue honoured him, and haue accepted his gifts, yet his turning shall be to thee, and thou shalt haue dominion ouer him. And albeit thou hast sinned, yet I yeeld thee to en∣ioy the priuiledges of thy birthright, and do appoint that he shall be vn∣der

thy power and rule. Against this exposition M. Bishop giueth an exception, that there is no mention of Abel, neither in that verse, nor in the verse next before; but expresse mention is made of sinne in the next vvords before: therefore those pronounes (that are to be referred to the next words before) must needs be referred to sinne, and not to his brother. But if his skill had serued him to consider, that the Hebrew word there forf 1.223 sinne is in the feminine gender, and the pronoune relatiues in theg 1.224 masculine gender, he would haue learned there∣by to except against this exception, and rather say, that the pro∣noune relatiues must needs be referred to his brother, and not to sinne. And so the Greeke translators did take it,h 1.225 the tur∣ning of HIM shalbe to thee, &c. So doth Arias Montanus translate it, being himselfe a Papist, yet that way incomparably more faithfull then commonly Papists are, The desire of HIM shalbe to thee, that is, in thy power, and thou shalt haue rule ouer HIM. Another excep∣tion he taketh from S. Austins exposition of those words, who not acquainted with the Greeke and Hebrew text, and finding in the Latine the pronounes eius and illius indifferent to the masculine or feminine gender, not thinking it fit in such meaning as he con∣ceiued thereof, to attribute to Cain a dominion ouer his brother Abel, construeth the place as touching sinne, and deliuereth two interpretations thereof, but no way according to M. Bishops mea∣ning, nor any way fit to serue his turne: the more lewdly doth he deale, to make S. Austin the patron of an opinion, which as appea∣reth in all this discourse, he did so highly and inwardly detest. One exposition of his is in the reading of the words thus;i 1.226 Ad te conuer∣sio cius sit: let the conuerting or turning of it be to thee, and thou shalt rule ouer it; as willing him to turne his sinne vpon himselfe, to accuse himselfe thereof, to know that he was not to attribute his sinne to any other but himselfe, and therefore not to defend it, but to repent and to aske pardon of it, and that this was the way to subdue it, and to become maister of it. Thus God left him not, as he saith, vvithout a com∣mandement iust and holy and good, but in him giueth example, as was before said, how the commandement auaileth nothing from the mouth of God himselfe, where he himselfe worketh not within, that which he commandeth. To this agreeth in effect the expo∣sition of Ambrose, though taking the words by way of accusation, which Austin construeth by way of precept or exhortation.

k 1.227 The sinne, saith God, returneth vpon thee which began of thee. Thou hast not wherein to blame necessitie more then thine owne mind, Thy wickednesse is turned backe vpon thee; thou art the beginner of it. Rightly doth he say, thou art the beginner of it; for impietie is a mo∣ther of sinnes, &c. Thus he maketh God in those words to accuse Cain of sinne, not to attribute to Cain Free will for conuerting vn∣to God. The other exposition of Austin is in reading the place,l 1.228 Ad te conuersio eius erit, &c. The conuerting or turning thereof shall be to thee, and thou shalt rule ouer it, vnderstanding sinne to be meant of carnall concupiscence or lust, and making the construction thus, that when carnal concupiscence is moued or stirred to commit any wicked thing, if a man rest and harken to the Apostle saying, Let not sin reigne in your mortall bodies; giue not your members weapons of vnrighteousnesse vnto sinne, then it being tamed and ouercome, is conuerted and turned to be in subiection to the mind, that reason may haue the rule and do∣minion ouer it. Therefore he taketh it, as if God had willed Cain to giue ouer that which by his owne wicked desire and lust he had in∣tended, and if he did resist it, it should turne and yeeld to him, and whilest it was not suffered to worke without, it might be the bet∣ter accustomed not to stirre within. Prosper bringeth these latter expositions all into one, as if God had sayd to Cain,m 1.229 This is thy error and thy sinne; be quiet, and be not mooued against thy harmelesse brother; rather let thy sinne be charged vpon thy selfe: yeeld not to it that it shold reigne in thee, but do thou take on thee the dominion & rule ouer it. By repenting thou shalt not go to any further wickednesse, & thou shalt be reformed in that wherein thou shalt grieue that thou hast offen∣ded me. Thus here is counsell and commandement to Cain, but no assertion of Free will, and by Cains going forward in his wic∣ked course, we see that Free will auaileth nothing to true obedi∣ence, and keeping of Gods commandement. Now then that M. Bishop can find nothing in Austin, let vs see what Hierome hath to iustifie Cains example to be the maintenance of Free will. Hierome hath indeed the words and exposition which he alledgeth:n 1.230 Be∣cause thou hast Free will, I admonish and warne thee, that sinne do not ouer-rule thee, but that thou ouer-rule sinne. But that this neither helpeth him nor hurteth vs, it will easily and plainly appeare, if we consider what was accorded before betwixt him and vs. For we deny not Free will in morall and ciuill outward actions, as hath

bene before acknowledged by him. For in vaine were education and lawes, and exhortations, and all precepts and directions of life, if there were not left in man a power to conforme himselfe outwardly to the prescriptions thereof. God hath left in natureo 1.231 some outward most lineaments, some vnperfect shadowes and por∣traiture of his image, for the preseruing of publike order and so∣cietie amongst men, which could not stand, if men for feare or shame, or other respects could not containe and bridle themselues from those mischiefes and villanies, whereto corruption of nature doth incline them. To this the words of Hierome are to be refer∣red. For Cain wasp 1.232 now contriuing and plotting the murder of his brother. There was now no law to terrifie him from the accompli∣shing of that which he had intended, but God himselfe taketh vp∣pon him to set before him the horrour of his fact, and to reclaime him from proceeding any further. If therfore we do with Hierome referre the words here questioned to sinne, God speaketh to Cain to this effect: Why art thou so much offended that thy brother is better accepted then thy selfe? why art thou thus moued with en∣uie towards him, and intendest mischiefe against him? If thou doest well as he doth, assure thy selfe thou shalt be accepted as well as he. But if thou do wickedly, if thou go forward with that hor∣rible villanie that thou hast conceiued, know for a suretie, that thy sinne shall lie waiting for thee at the doore, and shall neuer cease to attend and follow thee till it haue brought vpon thee iust re∣uenge. Wherefore I aduise thee to giue ouer, bridle thy passion, be maister thus farre of thine owne affections; let not enuie carrie thee forward to commit so monstrous and vnnaturall a fact: it is yet in thine owne power, and therefore stay thy selfe, and giue no further way to this bloudie designement to be sorie when it is too late. Thus much and no more, do Hieromes words expresse vnto vs, and we doubt not but Cain had Free will as touching commit∣ting of this cruell act. For if some man had stood in his way with a sword drawne to slay him if he should attempt the killing of his brother, who doubteth but that it would haue made him hold his hands; which he could not, if he had not had in him power and li∣bertie to forbeare. And if M. Bishop meant no more when he speaketh of Cains power not to sinne, if he had listed, we would ac∣knowledge the same with him, but he would hereby prooue a Free

will to good, whereto he saith Cain had the assistance of Gods grace, which yet did not infallibly draw him to good, but left him to his free choise, whether he would follow it or not. For proofe whereof there is no shew of any syllable, either in the text, or in the other testimo∣nies which he hath alledged. For as touching grace, we find here none but that which the Pelagians spake of, to counsell and aduise him, whereas the true grace inwardly worketh whatsoeuer out∣wardly is counselled or aduised. And whereas he saith, that grace doth not infallibly draw to good, it is true indeed of his Pelagian grace, which consisteth onely in the commandement, but the true grace of God doth infallibly draw to good.q 1.233 No man, saith our Sauior Christ, can come vnto me,r 1.234 that is to say, beleeue in me, except my Fa∣ther which hath sent me draw him, therby importing that all that are drawne of the Father do come vnto him, that is, do beleeue in him, becauses 1.235 to be drawne of the Father vnto Christ, is to receiue a gift of the Father wherby to beleeue in Christ; so thatt 1.236 they which beleeue not are not drawne at all. Therefore our Sauiour addeth in the next words; Euery one that heareth and learneth of the Father, that is, eue∣rie one that the father draweth, commeth vnto me. Now M. Bishops drawing leaueth a man at his free choise whether he will follow or not. He saith as the Pelagians did;u 1.237 If he will, he doth so, if he will not, he doth not; or as the Donatists,x 1.238 if he will, he beleeueth; if he list not, he beleeueth not: if he will, he perseuereth; if he will not, he perseuereth not. These were the progenitors and predecessors of his faith. But the true drawing grace, finding a many 1.239 resisting, drawing backe, vn∣willing, persecuting the faith as Paul did,z 1.240 conuerteth his will to the faith; of vnwilling, it maketh him willing; of resisting, it maketh him consenting; of an oppugner of the faith, it maketh him a louer thereof. Let M. Bishop acknowledge this grace, if he will speake of grace as the Scripture speaketh: this is the onely true grace; and this grace Cain was neuer partaker of, and therefore being left to his owne will, he did not what he might haue done, in giuing eare to the warning and aduice that was giuen him of God.

11. W. BISHOP.

The second is taken out of this text of Deut.* 1.241 I call this day (saith Moses) heauen and earth to witnesse, that I haue set before you, life, and death, benediction, and malediction, therefore chuse life, that thou mayst liue and thy seed. Which words were spoken in vaine, if it had not beene in their power, by the grace of God, to haue made choise of life: or if that grace would haue made them do it infallibly, without their consent.

R. ABBOT.

Moses saith,a 1.242 I haue set before you life and death, &c. Therefore chuse life that thou mayst liue. These words, saith M. Bishop, were spoken in vaine, if it had not bene in their power by the grace of God, to haue made choise of life. Where he still goeth on with his Pelagian deuice, yeelding no more to grace, but onely adiuuare possibilitatem, to helpe the power of man, that whereas the power of man is not suf∣ficient, it may by grace be made able to make choise of life, but yet so, as that still it resteth in the will, whether to make vse of this power or not. But by the true grace of God man not onely hath power to chuse, but indeed doth chuse the way of life. And although man haue no power in himselfe whereof he can make vse to make this choise, yet the words of God are not therfore spoken in vaine, because the word & the preaching thereof is the instrument wher∣by God worketh in man to chuse life, whilest through the spirit it taketh effectb 1.243 according to the purpose and grace of God. He saith by the ministerie of the word, Chuse life, and by his gracec 1.244 openeth the heart to attend to that which he saith, and in the meane whiled 1.245 gi∣ueth repentance,e 1.246 giueth faith,f 1.247 giueth the spirit of wisedome and re∣uelation,g 1.248 giueth to know the mysteries of the kingdome of heauen,h 1.249 giueth a new heart,i 1.250 giueth the feare of God, and all things where∣in consisteth the choise of life. He saith, Chuse life, but so, as that he telleth vs also,k 1.251 Ye haue not chosen me, but I haue chosen you, as if he should say, that it is not by our Free will, but by his chusing of vs that we make choise of him.l 1.252 It is of God, saith Prosper, that man maketh choise of the way of God, and ariseth from his fall; and against all election or choise proceeding of Free will inuincibly resisteth the sen∣tence

of the Apostle, saying, Who separateth thee? what hast thou that thou hast not receiued? M. Bishop saith, My Free will, my choise hath made difference betwixt me and another man; because when God made offer of life to vs both alike, I by Free will made choise thereof, and he refused. But the Apostle telleth him, no. If he haue made choise of life, it is no worke of Free will, it is a thing re∣ceiued.m 1.253 Of whom, saith S. Austin, but of him who hath not giuen to another that which he hath giuen vnto thee? Who, as he also answe∣reth the Pelagian heretike obiecting the same place,n 1.254 inspireth the loue whereby we chuse. He addeth further, that vainely it should be sayd, Chuse life, if grace would haue made them do it infallibly with∣out their consent. Where we may wonder at his absurd manner of speech. Who was euer so mad, as to say that God maketh a man to chuse life without his consent, which is the same as if he should say, that he should make him consent without consent, for how should chusing be without consenting? We deny not consent, but we say with S. Austin,o 1.255 It is God who by his secret calling worketh the mind of man to giue consent. We say with S. Bernard,p 1.256 Consent is not of man himselfe, but God maketh a man willing, that is, consenting vnto his will.q 1.257 It is his desire of thee, that causeth thy desire of him, and that thou art forward to receiue his word, it commeth of his forwardnesse and hasting to enter into thee.

12. W. BISHOP.

Vnto these two places of the old Testament (one vnder the law of Na∣ture, and the other vnder Moses law) l••t vs couple two more out of the new Testament.

The first may be those kind words of our Sauiour vnto the Iewes: Ie∣rusalem,* 1.258 Ierusalem, &c. how often would I haue gathered together thy children, as the hen doth her chickens vnder her wings, and thou wouldest not: Which do plainly demonstrate, that there was no want, either of Gods helpe inwardly, or of Christs perswasion outwardly, for their conuersion: and that the whole fault lay in their owne refu∣sing, and withstanding Gods grace, as th••se words of Christ do plain∣ly witnesse, And thou wouldest not.

R. ABBOT.

If M. Bishop were put to the framing of an argument from this

place, and to bring in this conclusion, that man hath Free vvill to conuert and turne to God, I suppose it would trouble him very sore. The words do rather import, that howsoeuer Christ himselfe be a∣mongst vs and speake vnto vs, yet our Free will auaileth nothing to make vs to hearken to him, but we still refuse and rebell, vntill God do worke it in vs to obey and to hearken to his call. And thus Moses to giue a reason why the people of Israel profited not by the sight of so manifold signes and wonders, which the Lord had done before them and for them, sayth,a 1.259 The Lord hath not giuen you an heart to perceiue, and eyes to see, and eares to heare vnto this day. Christ speaketh those words out of his humane affection; he sheweth his loue towards them as man, he signifieth his paines and labour bestowed amongst them, and what occasion he had to complaine, as Esay had foretold,b 1.260 I haue laboured in vaine, I haue spent my strength in vaine and for nothing. The words do no more im∣port Free will then all other places of Scripture, that do declare and set forth the rebellion of mans nature against God. But yet M. Bishop telleth vs, that hereby it is signified that God vsed all meanes that concerned him for the sauing of them, & they by their Free will crossed his purpose herein. The words, saith he, do plainly demonstrate that there was no want either of Gods helpe inwardly, or of Christs perswasion outwardly, for their conuersion. But they do not demonstrate so much, yea by diuerse places of the Gospell we see they are very farre from that demonstration. For if there wanted no inward helpe for their conuersion, how was it sayd by our Sauiour Christ,c 1.261 Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent of the world:d 1.262 To them it is not giuen to know the secrets of the kingdome of heauen:e 1.263 all things are to them in parables, that they seeing may see and not discerne, and they hearing may heare and not vnderstand, least at any time they should turne, and their sinnes should be forgiuen them. How was it sayd by the Euangelist S. Iohn:f 1.264 Therefore could they not beleeue, because Esay saith againe: He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes, nor vnderstand with their heart, and should be conuerted and I should heale them? How doth S. Paul say;g 1.265 The election hath obtained, but the rest haue bene hardened, according as it is written, God hath giuen them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, &c. These things being so apparant and plaine, how doth M. Bishop tell vs

that there wanted no helpe of God inwardly for their conuersion, but the want was onely in their owne Free will? Surelyh 1.266 where God is willing to saue, as S. Austin saith, there no will of man resisteth. For to will or to nill, is so in the power of him that willeth or nilleth, as that it neither hindereth the will of God, nor ouerruleth his power, be∣cause euen of the wils of men he maketh what he will.i 1.267 In no wise may we thinke, saith he, that the Almightie God would haue any thing to come to passe, and that the same doth not come to passe; who if he do whatsoeuer he will both in heauen and earth, as the truth instructeth vs, surely had no wil to do whatsouer he hath not done. If therfore God had willed the conuersion of the people of Ierusalem, and had inward∣ly yeelded them grace for their conuersion, it had followed infal∣libly that they had beene conuerted, neither should the froward∣nesse of their will haue defeated the purpose of his will.k 1.268 My coun∣sell shall stand, saith he, and I will do whatsoeuer I will: therefore of the children of Ierusalem, whomsoeuer God would gather, he cer∣tainly did gather. His will was to gatherl 1.269 a remnant according to the election of grace. Ierusalem would not, but resisted the will of God, and hindered so much as in it lay, the gathering of this rem∣nant of her children.m 1.270 But though Ierusalem would not, yet God ga∣thered whom he would, and to them he yeelded his infallible sauing grace, whereby he worketh to will and to do, and giueth the gifts be∣fore mentioned of repentance, faith, knowledge and such like, without which there is no conuersion, and the giuing whereof is our conuersion vnto God. Which seeing God gaue not to Ierusa∣lem, saue only to his remnant, it is absurdly sayd by M. Bishop, that there was no want of Gods helpe inwardly for their conuersion. Their re∣fusing and withstanding was the fruit of Free will, which howsoe∣uer God do otherwise offer grace, hath nothing in it selfe, wherof to do otherwise.

13. W. BISHOP.

* 1.271The last testimonie is in the Reuel. where it is sayd in the person of God: I stand at the doore and knocke if any man shall heare my voyce and open the gates, I will enter in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me. Marke well the words: God by his grace, knocks

at the doore of our hearts, he doth not breake it open, or in any sort force it, but attendeth, that by our assenting to his call, we open him the gates, and then, lo he with his heauenly gifts will enter in: otherwise he leaues vs. What can be more euident in confirmation of the freedome of mans will, in working with Gods grace?

R. ABBOT.

Here M. Bishop doth somewhat plainly shew himselfe, and assu∣reth vs that it is not without cause that we haue hitherto accused him of the Pelagian heresie. The grace which for fashion sake he speaketh of, is no other but such as whereby God knocketh at the doore of our hearts, but worketh nothing in our hearts, till we first of our selues assent to let him in. He attendeth till we open him the gates, and then he with his heauenly gifts will enter in, which was the damnable errour of the Pelagians, that Gods grace and gifts are be∣stowed vpon the precedence of our will and workes. But we haue heard before out of the Arausicane councell, thata 1.272 if any man say that God exspecteth or attendeth our will, and doth not confesse that God worketh in vs to will, he gainsayth the doctrine of the Apostle. Which is the same as to say, If any man say that God attendeth for our opening the gates vnto him, and doth not confesse that God himselfe ope∣neth the gates vnto himselfe, he is contrarie to the doctrine of the Apostle.b 1.273 The entrance of Gods calling is wrought or procured by the grace of God himselfe; he knocketh with one hand, & openeth with another,c 1.274 breaking the gates of brasse, and smiting the barres of iron in sunder, and howsoeuer mightily he knocke, we neuer heare, we ne∣uer open till he open and make entrance for himselfe. It is he thatd 1.275 openeth the heart, hee 1.276 openeth the vnderstanding, hef 1.277 openeth the eyes, he openethg 1.278 the eares, he openethh 1.279 the lips, he openethi 1.280 the doore of faith, and why then doth M. Bishop say, that he attendeth till we open? He doth not attend our assenting to his call, butk 1.281 by his calling which is according to his purpose, he worketh in the harts of mē, that they heare not the Gospel in vaine, but do conuert, and turne, & receiue it not as the word of man, but as it is indeed, the word of God. And whereas he saith, that God doth not break open the doores, it is not alwaies true. For God somtimes with great violence assaulteth the hart, &l 1.282 by terror & feare pulleth men out of the fire, & as with a mighty hammer brea∣keth the pride & rebelliō of the wil, fighting & stirring against him.

When men are in the height of their insolencie madly raging a∣gainst him, he striketh them to the ground, as he did the Apostlem 1.283 S. Paule, and by astonishment ouercometh and subdueth them vnto himselfe, thus,n 1.284 not leading them as vpon their precedent will, but drawing them; not to beleeue against their wils which is vnpossible, but of vnwilling to become willing. In a word, when God knocketh,o 1.285 the doore is opened in them onely to whom it is giuen, but they to whom it is not giuen are still aduerse, and they neuer open: and therefore M. Bishop saith amisse, that God attendeth that we open him the gates, or otherwise leaueth vs. Neither do the words alledged serue for confirmation of the freedome of mans will, telling vs onely what must be done that God may enter, but not importing, that we do it by any power of Free will.

14. W. BISHOP.

To these expresse places taken out of Gods word, let vs ioyne the te∣stimonie of those most auncient Fathers, against whose workes the Pro∣testants can take no exception. The first shall be that excellent learned Martyr Iustinus in his Apologie, who vnto the Emperour Antonine speaketh thus: Vnlesse man by Free will could flie from foule disho∣nest deedes, and follow those that be faire and good; he were with∣out fault, as not being cause of such things as were done. But we Christians teach, that mankind by free choice, and Free will, doth both do well and sinne.

To him we will ioyne that holy Bishop and valiant Martyr Irenaeus, who of Free will writeth thus:* 1.286 Not onely in workes, but in faith also, our Lord reserued libertie and freedome of will vnto man: saying, Be it done vnto thee according to thy faith.

I will adde to that worthie companie S. Cyprian, who vpon those words of our Sauior,* 1.287 Wil you also depart? discourseth thus: Our Lord did not bitterly inueigh against them, which forsooke him, but ra∣ther vsed these gentle speeches to his Apostles, will you also go your way: and why so? Marry obseruing and keeping (as this holy Father declareth) that decree, by which man left vnto his libertie and put vnto his free choice, might deserue vnto himselfe, either damnation or saluation. These three most auncient, and most skilfull in Christian religion, and so zealous of Christian truth, that they spent

their bloud in confirmation of it, may suffice to certifie any indifferent reader, what was the iudgement of the auncient and most pure Church, concerning this article of Free will: specially when the learnedst of our Aduersaries confesse all Antiquitie, (excepting onely S. Augustine) to haue beleeued and taught Free will. Heare the words of one for all. Ma∣thias Illiricus in his large, long lying historie, hauing rehearsed touching Free will, the testimonies of Iustine, Irenaeus, and others, saith, In like maner Clement Patriarch of Alex. doth euery where teach Free will,* 1.288 that it may appeare (say these Lutherans) not onely the Doctors of that age to haue bene in such darknesse but also that it did much in∣crease in the ages following. See the wilfull blindnesse of heresie. Illy∣ricus confessing the best learned in the purest times of the Church, to haue taught Free will: yet had rather beleeue them to haue bene blindly led, by the Apostles and their best Schollers who were their Masters, then to espie and amend his own error. These principall pillars of Christs Church were in darknesse belike as Protestants must needes say: and that proud Persian, and most wicked Heretike Manes (of whom the Manichees are named) who first denied Free will, began to broach the true light of the new Gospell.

R. ABBOT.

M. Bishop held it to be the best course for him clanum clauo pel∣lere, to driue out one naile with another, not answering the places which M. Perkins alledged out of the Fathers, but o••ely crossing them with other places. Nay, he so passed them ouer, as that frau∣dulently and falsly he would make his Reader beleeue, that they made all for him. But marke I pray thee gentle Reader, when M. Bishop driueth all to this, that when God hath done his worke for mans conuersion, it is left to mans free choice, whether to will the same or not, doth it make for him, or is it not against him which M. Perkins citeth out of Austin, thata 1.289 man therefore willeth, because God worketh in him to will? Surely if man therefore will, because God wor∣keth in him to will, then Gods worke doth not leaue man to the free choice of his owne will. When M. Bishop saith, that there is in man a naturall facultie of Free will, which being stirred vp and fortified is able to do any act appertaining to saluation, doth the same S. Austine agree with him when he affirmeth,b 1.290 that man lost Free will to the

loue of God by the greatnesse of Adams sinne? When he attributed mans conuersion but onely principally to grace, and blameth vs for that we attribute the whole worke to grace, doth S. Bernard agree with him, when he saith,c 1.291 that it is wholy of grace that we are new created, healed, saued? By these it is easie to make application of the rest; but we may looke for good answers at his hands herafter, who in the beginning being so directly oppugned, would seeke thus in a cloud to steale away. But if M. Perkins were able to say nothing against him, we must thinke he is able to say for himselfe exceeding much. Yet his first authoritie out of Iustinus Martyr, maketh no∣thing at all for him: for being written to an heathen Emperour, it toucheth onely morall and externall actions, in which we deny not but that God hath left some freedome and liberty to mans will, as before hath bene declared. His veryd 1.292 drift there, is to condemn the wicked fancies of Astrologers and Stoicke Philosophers, who did hang all vpone 1.293 destinies and constellations, and fatall necessitie, and thence sought excuse of their lewd and abominable actions. And if we wil more largely extend the words, yet are they nothing for M. Bishops turne.f 1.294 We Christians, saith he, do affirme, that by free choice, and Free will, mankind doth both do well and sinne. And so much we affirme also, that man by free choice and Free will doth well, for thereg 1.295 is no vertue where a man hath no will to that he doth, but we say still against M. Bishop, that this is not that Free will that he requireth: it is not a power of nature, but wholy the effect of grace:h 1.296 It is the grace of God whereby mans will is made free, both to eschue euil and do good, and they that teach any other Free will, they arei 1.297 not the defenders, but the puffers vp and break-neckes of Free wil. And no otherwise did Iustine Martyr conceiue thereof, as appea∣reth by these words in the same Apologie:k 1.298 In like sort as God crea∣ted vs when we were not, so do we thinke that he vouchsafeth them of immortalitie and being with him, who willingly make choice to do those things that are pleasing vnto him. But to haue being at the first, it was not of our selues. In like sort then to choose and follow what is pleasing to him by those reasonable powers which he hath giuen vs, it is by his per∣swading and mouing of vs to the faith. In which words he plainely confesseth, that Free will to righteousnesse is wholy the gift of grace, and no more of our selues, then it was at first to create our selues. The place of Irenaeus auaileth him as little, who disputing in

like sort against them that held, that men by an immutable neces∣sitie of created nature, are some good and some euill, proueth, that good and euill consist in election and will, and that this appeareth,l 1.299 by that the Apostle, and before him our Sauiour Christ, did giue coun∣sell to do some things, and from some other things to abstaine. After∣wards he sheweth, that not in workes onely, but also in faith our Saui∣our reserued to man libertie and freedome of will, meaning that it is* 1.300 not by any compelling violence that a man either beleeueth or wor∣keth, butm 1.301 by condition of nature he is such, as may either beleeue or not beleeue; and when he beleeueth, it is by his will that be∣leeueth, and by a power of the will that he hath to beleeue: yet so, as that we must say with S. Austine,n 1.302 Sedea potestas nulla est nisi à Deo detur; but that power is none, except it be giuē of God. We may not take Irenaeus to be so grosse, as to thinke faith to be of our owne po∣wer, which the Scripture so plainely telleth vs, iso 1.303 the gift of God. And as the places that he alledgeth are far from any such purpose,p 1.304 According to thy faith be it vnto thee:q 1.305 All things are possible to the beleeuer, so he himselfe elsewhere out of the words of the Apostle,r 1.306 I know that in me, that is, in my flesh dwelleth no good thing; plainely affirmeth,s 1.307 that the good which belongeth to our saluation, is not of our selues but of God, and that the grace of our Lord Iesus Christ is our de∣liuerer, that is, the thing whereby we are made free. Therefore he prayeth for the Heretikes, against whom he wrote, thatt 1.308 they might not continue in the pit which they had digged, but might be conuerted to the Church, and that Christ might be formed in them, and that they might know the onely true God and Lord of all. Wherby it appeareth, that he did not take repentance, and faith, and conuersion to God, to be matters of our Free will and power, but the mercifull gifts of God, and therefore by prayer to be begged at his hands. The place of Cyprian soundeth very harshly, but yet being taken in that sence wherein the Fathers commonly spake before the Pelagian heresie, namely to affirme against the Manichees an act of mans will both in good and euill, so that by his will and election, it is that either he is good or euill, it importeth nothing against vs, because we deny not the act and election of mans will, but onely teach, that this act and election of the will is nothing at all of it selfe, as tou∣ching righteousnesse, but onely what it is by being corrected & re∣ctified by the grace of God. Our Sauiour saith to his disciples, Will

ye also go away?u 1.309 He obserueth the law (saith Cyprian) whereby man left to his libertie, and put to his owne will, not deserueth, (as M. Bishop falsly translateth) but desireth to himselfe either death or saluation, importing hereby, that man freely and by his owne will maketh choice to continue with Christ vnto saluation, but not affirming, that mans owne will is herein free of it selfe, or hath of it owne, whereby to make this choice. And that he was of farre other mind then so to thinke, appeareth by his owne wordsx 1.310 often cited by Austin against the Pelagians:y 1.311 We are to glorie of nothing, (namely, as touching righteousnesse) because therin nothing is our own.z 1.312 It is of God, saith he, all that we can do: of him it is that we liue, of him it is that we haue any power. But most direct to this purpose is it which he noteth as touching the petition of the Lords prayer, Leade vs not into temptation, that we are therebya 1.313 put in mind of our own frail∣tie and weaknesse, and that for perseuering and continuing with Christ to the glorie of confessing him, and suffering for his sake, it is who∣ly to be ascribed vnto God, and we are not to assume any thing proudly to our selues. Whereof S. Austin collecteth (as before) against the Pelagian heresie, thatb 1.314 Cyprian leaueth vs nothing wherein to glorie as our owne; that he sheweth, that not to depart from God, is no other∣wise but giuen of God, in that he teacheth, that it is to be begged of God: for he that is not led into temptation, doth not depart from God. This saith he, is not in the strength of Free will as now it is. It was in man be∣fore his fall, but after the fall of man, God would not haue it belong saue onely to his grace, that we come vnto him; neither would he haue it be∣long saue onely to his grace, that we do not depart from him. Thus he conceiued and obserued as touching Cyprians meaning out of Cy∣prians owne words, and bereaueth M. Bishop of Cyprians war∣rant for that, which he would father vpon him by some words ob∣scurely vttered in another place.c 1.315 Cyprian that worthy Martyr saw well enough, saith he, that we liue most in safetie, when we ascribe all to God, and do not commit our selues partly to God, and partly to our selues. By these three therefore M. Bishop hitherto hath gained nothing, but by Cyprian whose words seeme to make most for him, he gai∣neth least of all. But now he vrgeth the confession of some of our

best learned, that all Antiquitie (excepting onely S. Austin) beleeued and taught Free will. To this purpose he alledgeth a place out of the Centuries, which he calleth a large long lying historie, marry spea∣king but by roate as children do, or as the clowne did of Aristides, who giuing his voyce to the banishment of the same Aristides, and being asked of him vnknowne,d 1.316 whether he knew him against whom he gaue his voyce, answered, that he knew him not, but it was trouble vnto him to heare him tearmed a iust man. For so M. Bishop knoweth not the Centuries, (alas poore man, what should he meddle with such great bookes?) but he hath heard that Protestants were the Authors thereof, and that is enough to warrant him to giue his voyce against them. But his fellowes know, that they haue good cause to speake well of the Authors of those Centuries, because by them they haue bin able to say more for themselues then euer they were before: so faithfully did those men deale in the compiling of that storie. Now they say indeed, as he alledgeth from his Author, that Clement Alexandrinus doth euery where teach Free will, and that not onely the Doctors of that age were in such darknesse, but also that it did much increase in the ages following. Where taking the matter to be simply, as they say, and as M. Bishop doth obiect, what doth he gaine more by that obiection, then the Pelagians did?e 1.317 who defen∣ded their obstinacie by antiquitie, and affirmed, that none of all the ec∣clesiasticall Writers that were before, did so expound the Scriptures, as Austin did, namely, against the Free will and merits of man: and that examining the opinions of the more auncient Fathers, they were found to be in a manner all of one mind against him. But this he tooke to be no sufficient argument, but freely professeth of his doctrine,f 1.318 I know that no man without error could dispute against it. He excuseth the an∣cients that were before him:g 1.319 that before the heresie of the Pelagians began, they had not any such need to deale much in that question, and therefore what they thought of the grace of God, they touched but brief∣ly and by the way, in some places of their workes, but stood more vpon those things which they handled against other enemies of the Church. Yet he saith, that by their supplications and prayers it plainely appeared what grace doth, because they would not haue asked of God those things

which he hath commanded to be done, but that they held that the doing thereof is the gift of God:h 1.320 that the Church would not haue prayed to God, as it alwaies did, to giue men repentance, faith, obedience, perseue∣rance, but that it beleeued, that God so hath our heart in his power, as that he worketh in vs to will the good that we cannot haue without our will. He further obserueth, thati 1.321 all heresies haue brought their seue∣rall questions into the Church, by occasion whereof as touching those points, the truth of Scripture was the more diligently defended, and that by occasion of the Pelagian heresie, the places of Scripture concerning Predestination and grace of God, were by his labour more plentifully and plainely defended then they were before. And to conclude, out of all Antiquitie before him, he bringeth onelyk 1.322 foure or fiue testimonies out of Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregorie Nazianzene, whereby to iu∣stifie what he taught. Now by this answer of Austin to the Pelagi∣ans, M. Bishop and his fellowes must receiue their answer. If it were no preiudice to him, that the Fathers before him taught other∣wise then he did, it is no preiudice to vs teaching the same that he taught. He professed himselfel 1.323 to be free in the writings of any such men, and that it was the Scripture onely to which he was bound, without refusall to giue consent: why then doth M. Bishop seeke to bind vs in a matter wherein S. Austin refused to be bound? Prosper being vr∣ged by the Pelagians with a sentence out of the booke of the Pa∣stor, reiected itm 1.324 as a testimonie of no authoritie, albeit Antiquitie hadn 1.325 so accounted of that book, as that they had ioyned it to the books of the new Testament, & did reade it publikely in their Churches, and doth M. Bishop thinke it much, that we reiect some few testi∣monies alledged by him of farre lesse authoritie then that was? But yet Austine found in these few testimonies of the more auncient Fa∣thers, sufficient to iustifie both for him and vs,o 1.326 that we haue nothing whereof to glorie as ours, which God hath not giuen vnto vs; that our heart and thoughts are not in our owne power but Gods: that all is to be ascribed vnto God, and that we must confesse, that we receiue all wholy of him, as touching our conuersion to God, and continuing with him: that it is wholy the gift of grace, the gift of God, which of him we haue, and

not of our selues to will that that is good: to receiue Christ, to beleeue in God, and by voice to confesse that which we beleeue. And surely how∣soeuer those more ancient Fathers spake obscurely of Free will, and some of them questionlesse meant amisse, yet for the most part their speeches being applyed, as I said before, against heathen Astrolo∣gers, and wicked heretickes, excluding mans will wholy from being any cause either of good or euil, they spake worse then they meant, and if we will take their words with those qualifications and con∣structions, wherwith S. Austin cleared some speeches of his against the Manichees, asp 1.327 before was shewed in the answer to M. Bishops Epistle, they shal easily be recōciled to the truth. Therfore i••arhem also that speake most amisse, we find somtimes a right and true ac∣knowledgement of the grace of God. Who was a greater Patron of Free will then Origen who yet notwithstanding confesseth,q 1.328 that our will sufficeth not for the hauing of a cleane heart, but that we haue need of God to create the same in vs, and that therefore he that know∣eth how to pray, saith, Create in me a cleane heart, O God:r 1.329 that the true knowledge of God by his mercie and grace is graunted onely vnto them who are praedestinate to liue worthy of him whom they know:s 1.330 that whatsoeuer is in vs worthie our reioycing, is not our owne, but the gift of God. Yea where he affirmeth, that there is in euery soule a strength of power and freedome of will whereby it may do euery thing that is good: yet further to expresse his mind he addeth,t 1.331 that this benefite of na∣ture was cropped by meanes of sinne, and was turned aside to shame and lasciuiousnes; but that the same being repaired by grace, and restored by the doctrine of the word of God, doth giue that sweet sauour which God the first Creator put into it but the trespas of sin had takē away. Where it appeareth plainely, that in speaking of Free will, his purpose was to shew what mans will is by condition of creation, and to what it may be repaired by the grace of God, not what power it hath of it selfe in this state of corruption, to open to God when he knoc∣keth, or to assent to God when he calleth. And thus Clemens Ale∣xandrinus affirming Free will against the heretikes Ʋalentinus and Basilides, who thought that men by an essential state of nature were some good, some euill, some faithfull and some vnfai••hfull, so as that the will of man is nothing at all either way, yet reserueth due

place to the grace of God, saying:u 1.332 We haue speciall need of Gods grace, and true doctrine, and of chast and pure affection, and of the Fa∣thers drawing vs to himselfe. Where by affirming the Fathers draw∣ing vs to himselfe, he plainely excludeth the voluntarie opening and assenting, and yeelding of Free will, because drawing (as before was shewed out of Austin) importeth that there is no will in vs, till God of vnwilling do make vs willing. Let one speech of Austine serue to cleare all this matter,x 1.333 We must confesse (saith he) that we haue Free will both to do euill and to do good. This is the common assertion of the Authors whom M. Bishop opposeth against vs: but let vs take the w••rds following withall, and by them expound the same asser∣tion. For euil-doing euery man is free from righteousnesse, and the ser∣uant of sinne, (there he hath alreadie Free will) but in that that is good no man can be free, except he be made free by him that saith: If the Sonne shall make you free, then are ye free indeed. If any of them thought otherwise, they erred in that they thought: neither lear∣ned they so to thinke of the Apostles, or their best scholers, as M. Bishop idlely talketh, but either borrowed it of heathen Philoso∣phers, or presumed it of themselues. And whatsoeuer they thought or meant, their manner of speaking was not Apostolike, neither learned they it by the word of God: and therefore those times were not the purest times, which had thus in phrase and speech varied from thaty 1.334 character and forme of doctrine, whereto the Church was first deliuered. And if M. Bishop will say, that they learned these things of the Apostles, then he must condemne S. Austine, and the whole Catholike Church of that time in which Austine liued, for teaching otherwise then they taught: which if he will not do, he must perforce acquit vs as well as him, and let the blame rest vpon them to whom it doth appertaine. Whom we ac∣count no further to be pillars of Christs Church, then they them∣selues continued built vpon the Gospell, which Christ hath madez 1.335 the pillar and fortresse of our faith, neither doubt we to say of them that they were in darknesse, where thea 1.336 word of the law and testimony did not giue them light. Now for conclusion, he vpbraideth vs a∣gaine with the heresie of the Manichees, onely to shew himselfe a perfect scholer of the Pelagian schoole. For so did theb 1.337 Pelagians obiect to Austine and other teachers of the Catholike Church, that they tooke part with the Manichees, and defended their heresie in

the denying of Free will. They called them Manichees, and of thē∣selues said,c 1.338 that they dealt for the Catholike faith against the prophane opinion of the Manichees, onely to colour their owne heresie and enmitie against the grace of God by falsly vpbraiding their aduer∣saries with another. But S. Austin answered them:d 1.339 The Manichees deny, that to man being made good, Free will became the beginning of euill: the Pelagians say, that man being become euill, hath a will suffici∣ently free for the doing of the commandement of good. The Catholike Church condemneth them both, saying to the Manichees, God made man iust: and to the Pelagians, If the Sonne shall make you free, then are you free indeed. Let M. Bishop turne the name of the Pelagians into Papists, and take this answer to himselfe. The Pelagians and Papists are not therefore to be approued, because they condemne the heresie of the Manichees, but are therefore to be detested, be∣cause they haue set vp another heresie of their owne.e 1.340 Two errors (saith S. Austine) may be contrarie one to the other, and both to be de∣tested, because they are both contrarie to the truth. So is it with the Manichees and Papists, and we take the course that the auncient Church did to condemne them both. But of this matter I haue spo∣ken sufficiently before in answering his Epistle, and therefore need not here to stand vpon it.

15. W. BISHOP.

Here I wold make an end of citing Authorities,* 1.341 were it not that Cal∣uin saith, that albeit all other auncient writers be against him, yet S. Augustine as he vaunteth, is clearely for him in this point: but the poore man is fouly deceiued, aswell in this, as in most other matters. I wil brief∣ly proue, and that out of those workes which S. Augustine wrote after the Pelagian heresie was a foote: for in his others, Caluin acknowled∣geth him to haue taught Free will.* 1.342 Of our Freedome in consenting to Gods grace, he thus defineth: To consent to Gods calling, or not to consent, lyeth in a mans owne will. Againe: Who doth not see eue∣ry man to come, or not to come by Free will? but this Free will may be alone, if he do not come, but it cannot be holpen, if he do come. In another place, that we will (do well) God will haue it to be his & ours; his, in calling vs; ours, in following him. Yea more: To Christ working in him, a man doth cooperate, that is, worketh with him, both his owne iustification, and life euerlasting: will you heare him speake yet more formally for vs. We haue dealt with your bre∣thren

and ours, as much as we could: that they would hold out and continue in the sound Catholike faith; the which neither denieth Free will, to euill or good life, nor doth attribute so much to it, that it is woorth any thing without grace. So according to this most wor∣thie Fathers iudgement, the sound Catholike faith doth not deny Free will, as the old Manichees, and our new Gospellers do; nor esteeme it without grace able to do any thing toward saluation, as the Pelagians did.* 1.343 And to conclude, heare S. Augustines answer vnto them, who say, that he, when he commendeth grace, denyeth Free will. Much lesse wold I say, that which thou lyingly dost affirme me to say, Free will to be denyed, if grace be commended, or grace to be denyed, if Free will be commended.

R. ABBOT.

Caluin indeed confesseth as the truth is, that thea 1.344 auncient Wri∣ters saue onely Austin, haue written so diuersly and intricately, or ob∣scurely of Free wil, as that hardly a man can gather from them any cer∣tainty as touching that point. But yet he saith further, thatb 1.345 albeit they went too farre sometimes in extolling Free will, yet he dareth to affirme, that they aimed at this marke, to turne man altogether away from the confidence of his owne strength, and to teach him to make the repose of his strength in God onely. But whereas Caluin thinketh that Austin is cleare for him in this point, M. Bishop saith, the poore man was fouly deceiued as well in this, as in most other matters. Where I can∣not but smile to see, how euery ignorant brabler will haue a snatch at Caluin, when he in the mean time going like a stately Lion, sha∣keth them off like curres, and dasheth them against the walles. If Caluin were so poore a man, alas what shal we thinke of M. Bishop? what shall we make of him but a begger outright? Yet he taketh vpon him to proue, and that out of those workes which S. Austin wrote after the Pelagian heresie was a foote, that the same Austin taught Free will. And we deny not, but that he did so, and in that meaning wherein he taught it, we are readie to affirme it. Yea let him remē∣ber that Caluin professeth, thatc 1.346 if any man will vse the name of Free will without the corrupt meaning of it, he will not gainesay him, onely because it cannot be retained without danger of euill vnderstanding, he wisheth it to be forborne, and in that respect we for the most part do

forbeare it. But this Free will in true meaning, is no facultie of nature, as M. Bishop will needs haue it, butd 1.347 it belongeth to the grace of God, to the gifts of God, not onely the being of it, but the conuerting of it vnto God. And very truly doth the same S. Austin argue, thate 1.348 if we haue of God (by nature) a Free will, which may be either good or euill, and haue of our selues a good will (by consenting or applying it when God calleth to that that is good) then better is that that we haue of our selues, then that that we haue of God. Which because it is absurd, we must needes acknowledge, that a good will, that is to say, Free will to faith and righteousnesse, is not of our selues, but of God one∣ly. But M. Bishop alledgeth Austin affirming, thatf 1.349 to consent to Gods calling, or not to consent, propriae voluntatis est, belongeth to mans owne will. But rather he should say, propriè voluntatis est, that is, it concerneth properly the will: the place by changing of a letter being vndoubtedly corrupted, S. Austins purpose there, being onely to note the will to be the subiect not the cause of this consenting. To consent he meaneth is an act of the will, which howsoeuer God worketh in the will to do, yet the will it is that doth it, but that the will consenteth by a power of it own, he meaneth not: yea he him∣selfe plainly euicteth the contrarie in the words immediatly going before. For what is it to consent, but velle credere, to be willing to beleeue? Andg 1.350 God it is (saith he) that worketh in vs to be willing to beleeue. Therefore it must needes be, that God worketh in man to giue consent. Mans will consenteth, it is true:h 1.351 sed praeparatur vo∣luntas à Domino: but the will is framed or prepared of the Lord. Faith is in the power of man:i 1.352 sed nulla est potestas nisi à Deo, but there is no power but of God. It is in mans will, when God hath giuen him to will: it is in mans power, when God hath giuen him power. And more then this, howsoeuer we reade the words, S. Austin intended not. For full and certaine assurance whereof, M. Bishop should haue remembred, that S. Austin himselfe reporteth it as an error which he had sometimes holden,k 1.353 that to consent to the Gospell when it is preached is of our owne will, and that we haue that of our selues. From which error he professeth he was reclaimed by those words of the Apostle:l 1.354 What hast thou that thou hast not receiued? For if it be of our own will that we consent, then somwhat we haue of our selues which we haue not receiued. He should further haue remembred, that S. Austin noteth it as the error of the Pelagiās, thatm 1.355 to consent,

or not to consent is in our selues, and of our selues, so that if we will, we do so: or if we will not, we cause that the worke of God nought auaileth in vs. M. Bishop therefore doth amisse, to make Austin a patron of that opinion which he reformed as an error in himselfe, and condem∣ned as an error in other men.

The second place that he alledgeth, in Austins true meaning is altogether against him.n 1.356 Who doth not see (saith he) that euery man cometh or cometh not arbitrio voluntatis, by his will? (Let it be as M. Bishop saith, by Free will:) But this will may be alone (saith he) if he come not; but it cānot be but helped if he do come. Where shewing that our coming or not coming to Christ is acted by our will, he giueth to vnderstand, that our will is of it selfe free to refuse to come: but that the Free will whereby we do come, is the gift of God, euen as our Sauiour Christ teacheth vs, saying:o 1.357 No man can come vnto me, except it be giuen him of my Father. And therfore the same S. Austin elsewhere reasoneth with a man in this sort:p 1.358 Thou sayest vnto me, I am come to Christ by my Free will, I am come by mine owne will. Why art thou proud of this? Wilt thou know that euen this also was giuen thee? Heare him that called thee: No man cometh vnto me except my Father draw him. Forq 1.359 when God will haue a man do that which is not to be done but by the will, he in an vnspeakable and wonderfull sort wor∣keth in him to will. But M. Bishop perhaps groundeth vpon that that S. Austin saith, that the wil of man is helped if he do come, as im∣porting that man doth somwhat of himselfe, but yet is not fully suf∣ficient without helpe. Whereto I answer againe, that man doth somwhat, but not of himself, & God helpeth man doing somwhat, but so, as that that wherein he helpeth him is of God also, so that Gods help••ng of vs doth alwaies presuppose a worke of his owne in vs, which he alone and wholy doth without vs.r 1.360 Without vs (saith Austine) he worketh in vs to will, and worketh with vs, or helpeth vs when we do will:s 1.361 the will is chaunged from euill to good, and helped when it is good.t 1.362 He prepareth the good will that is to be helped, and helpeth it when it is prepared.u 1.363 Free will to righteousnesse is first made free, and then helped. Herein then standeth M. Bishops error, that he ioyneth man to God in the first framing of the wil to come to God so that for the performance hereof, as God is mans helper, so man is also Gods helper, not by that that God hath now wrought in man, but by that that man hath naturally of his owne: and there∣fore

God helpeth man for his saluation, if man by his Free wil help God for the sauing of himselfe: but if man withdraw his helpe, the helpe of God auaileth nothing. But the true helpe of God which S. Austine teacheth, is that whereby God himselfe worketh in vs, that whereby we are helpefull vnto him, neither doth he helpe any thing in vs, but what he himselfe hath wrought and prepared in vs to be helped. And therefore he maketh a distinction of two kindes of helpe.x 1.364 Aliud est adiutorium, sine quo aliquid non fit, & a∣liud est adiutorium, quo aliquid fit. There is a kind of helpe, without which a thing is not done, and there is another kind of helpe by which a thing is done. There is a helpe without which a thing is not done, but though that helpe be had, it followeth not thereupon that the thing is done, because some other helpe is wanting, without which that helpe auaileth not. Without food we cannot liue, and yet though food be had, he liueth not thereby that will die, or ma∣keth away himselfe. Such was the helpe of God to Adam in Para∣dise,y 1.365 without which he could not continue though he would, by which he might continue if he would; but was left to his owne will, either to continue by this helpe, or by forgoing it to fall away. Such the Pa∣pists say the helpe of God is to vs, by which we come to Christ, and continue if we will: but both for coming and for continuing it is left to our Free will, either to vse it, or refuse it: so that it is in vs whether it shall be a helpe or not. Butz 1.366 the helpe of the grace of Christ is such, as whereby the thing is certainly effected, for which it is a helpe; not such as whereby we come to Christ, or continue with him if we will, but which maketh vs to will: so that it is first a meere gift of that, of which afterwards it becommeth a helpe. For example hereof Saint Austine saith, thata 1.367 blessednesse is a helpe by which when it is giuen, a man is foorthwith blessed. Thereby giuing to vnderstand, that this helpe is the giuing of the thing wherein God is said to helpe vs. So that Gods helpe for our coming to Christ, is the gift of God whereby we do come: his helpe for our beleeuing, is his very gift whereby we do beleeue: hisb 1.368 helpe for our perseuering and continuing with Christ, is his gift, whereby we do perseuere, and no other but perseuere and continue to the end. And this helpe doth Saint Austine meane in the place cited by M. Bishop. The will cannot but be holpen, if a man come to Christ, meaning, that mans will cometh not to Christ,

except God giue vnto the will to will and to come, that is, to be∣leeue in him. And therefore he addeth,c 1.369 And so helped, as that he not onely know what is to be done, but do also that which he knoweth: which in the Chapter before he hath thus expressed, thatd 1.370 to them which are called of purpose, God at once giueth both to know what they should do, and to do what they know. Gods helping therefore is no o∣ther but his giuing, and by this second place M. Bishop gaineth as little as he gained by the first.

As little aduantage hath he by the third place, nay, we see ther∣in a notable peece of fraud and falshood in concealing the former part of the words, which should cleere the latter.e 1.371 In one sort, saith Austin, God yeeldeth to vs to will; in another sort he performeth the thing that we will. That we will, he would haue it to be his and ours: his in calling; ours in following. But the thing that we will he alone per∣formeth, that is, to be able to do well, and for euer to liue in blisse. Where plainly he affirmeth, that it is God that doth or performeth both the one and the other; he maketh vs to will, and he maketh good to vs the thing that our will desireth. How then will he haue it to be ours that we will or are willing, but by his working it in vs to be ours? It is the act of our will when we do will, and so ours, but yet it is Gods, because he worketh in vs to will. It is his in calling, ours in following; but it is his also that we follow, because he maketh vs to follow. For how do we folow when he calleth, butf 1.372 by willing and beleeuing? And no man can beleeue,g 1.373 except it be giuen to him to beleeue, andh 1.374 that there is a yeelding or assenting of the will, it is he that giueth it, saith Austin in that very treatise, it is he that granteth it; so that although we will, and we runne, and this willing and running be ours, yet as the Apostle saith;i 1.375 it is neither of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. Con∣cerning which words, it is worth the while to obserue what Saint Austin writeth in the same discourse, whence M. Bishop taketh this obiection, and within a very few lines after, and thought worthie to remember in diuerse places of his workes. M. Bishop saith as all his fellowes, that all is not of God, but somewhat belongeth to mans Free will for his conuersion vnto God, which yet sufficeth not vnlesse it be helped by the grace of God. But S. Austin saith,

k 1.376 If therefore onely it be sayd, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, because the will of man alone is not sufficient, except it be helped by the mercy of God, it may be also thus sayd, that it is not of God that sheweth mercy, but of man that willeth, because the mercy of God alone sufficeth not, vnlesse there be adioyned the consent of the will of man. More effectually doth he ex∣presse it in another place.l 1.377 If therefore it be sayd, It is not of him that willeth, or of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, because it is done by both, that is, by the will of man, and by the mercy of God, as if it were sayd, the will of man alone sufficeth not, if there be not also the mercy of God, then also the mercy of God sufficeth not, if there be not also the will of man: and by this meanes, if it be rightly sayd, It is not of him that willeth, but of God that sheweth mercy, because the wil of man alone auaileth not, why is it not on the contrarie rightly sayd, It is not of God that sheweth mercy, but of man that willeth, because the mercy of God alone auaileth not? Now if no Christian man will dare to say so, it re∣maineth that we vnderstand it therefore sayd, It is not of him that wil∣leth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, Vt totum Deo detur, that all vvholy may be attributed to God, vvho prepareth or maketh the good wil of man. What could be more notably spoken to ouerthrow all Popish assertion of mans Free will, which seeing S. Austin gaue M. Bishop occasion to note in the verie place whence he tooke his obiection, we must needs thinke him a man of a seared conscience, that would thus wilfully bend himselfe a∣gainst an apparant truth. In a word, I answer his obiection out of Austin by the words of Hierome, hauing reference to the same sen∣tence of the Apostle:m 1.378 To will, and to nill (according to godlinesse) is ours; but euen that that is ours, is not ours vvithout the mercy of God.

His fourth place of Austin, is thatn 1.379 Christ vvorking in man, man himselfe doth cooperate, that is, vvorketh together vvith him his owne iustification and life euerlasting. An idle obiection, because by that very place, if it were discussed, it should appeare which the same S. Austin for a full answer expresly saith elsewhere,o 1.380 that God ma∣keth

the spirit of a man to cooperate, or vvorke together vvith him in doing of good vvorkes, so that this cooperating, or vvorking together vvith God, attributeth nothing to the will of man, but what is the proper effect of the grace of God.

In the fifth testimonie he saith, that Austin speaketh yet more for∣mally for them, but let him conceiue of the forme as he will, we are sure he is farre from the matter of S. Austins speech.p 1.381 The sound Catholike faith, saith he, neither denieth Free will, vvhether to e∣uill life or to good, neither attributeth so much to it, as that it auaileth any thing vvithout grace, either to be conuerted from euill to good, or by perseuerance to go forward in that that is good, or to attaine to the euerlasting good. Now we whom M. Bishop termeth new gospellers, but yet out of the old Gospell do affirme, according to the true meaning of S. Austin, that there must be a Free will either in euill or good life. For a man cannot be either good or euill against his will, and if he be willingly that that he is, it is by Free vvill, be∣cause the vvill is alwayes Free, and cannot but be Free in that that it willeth. But the will of man is of it selfe Free in that that is euill; to that that is good,q 1.382 it is so farre onely Free, as it is made Free;r 1.383 neither can any man in this respect be free, vvhom the purchaser of freedome hath not made free. We say therefore, that the Free vvill of man auaileth nothing vvithout grace, that is in S. Austins constru∣ction, auaileth nothing but by that that grace vvorketh in it, either for conuerting vnto God, or perseuering in that whereunto it is conuerted. And therefore as S. Austin in the epistle cited spea∣keth,s 1.384 It is by grace that good men haue obtained a good vvill, and grace must be vnderstood to make the wils of men of euill good, and to preserue the same when it hath so made them; and of our Father vvhich is in heauen vve are to begge all things whereby vve liue vvell, least presuming of Free vvill, vve fall away from the grace of God. If all things, then are we to begge of him to open, to yeeld, to assent, to receiue his grace, and therefore these things cannot be attribu∣ted to the power of our owne Free will. Now M. Bishop meerely abuseth Austin, as if he had meant, that Free will hath a power and abilitie of it owne to righteousnesse, but that this power is not suf∣ficient, is not strong enough vvithout grace adioyned to it, where∣as S. Austins meaning is to chalenge wholy to grace, whatsoeuer the will of man doth, so that it doth nothing but what grace wor∣keth

in it to do.t 1.385 Of that as touching which we are somewhat in the faith of Christ, how much soeuer it be, we may take nothing to our selues, but we must giue the glorie of all vnto God. The new gospellers ther∣fore according to the doctrine of the auncient Gospell, detest the Manichees for denying Free will in sinne and euill; and detest also Pelagians and Papists, for attributing to Free will an abilitie and power of it owne, wherby to apply it selfe to righteousnesse, which whereas M. Bishop saith the Pelagians affirmed vvithout grace, I haue before shewed, that he saith vntruly, and that the Papists do now teach in that behalfe the very same that the Pelagians did. To the last place the answer is readie by that that hath bene sayd. Free vvill and grace, are not the one excluded by the other, neither is the one denied in the affirming of the other, if we make the one the cause of the other, as Austin doth, and teach it to be the worke of grace to make the will Free. But grace is denied in the preaching of Free will, if as touching saluation it be affirmed to haue any free∣dome which it hath not of grace, or any thing at all be attributed vnto it which is not the effect of grace. Foru 1.386 man doth not by free∣dome of will attaine to grace, but by grace obtaineth freedome of vvill; and though it be in the will, and by the will, that we receiue grace, yetx 1.387 in all men the will of God himselfe is the cause of the receiuing of the grace of God.

16. W. BISHOP.

Now in fevv words I will passe ouer the obiections which he frameth in our names. But misapplyeth them.

First obiection. That man can do good by nature, as giue almes, do iustice, speake the truth, &c. and therefore will them vvithout the helpe of grace. This argument we vse to proue libertie of vvill in ciuill and morall matters, euen in the corrupted state of man, and it doth de∣monstrate it: and M. Perkins in his third conclusion doth graunt it. And his answer here is farre from the purpose, for albeit (saith he) touching the substance of the vvorke it be good, yet it faileth both in the beginning, because it proceeds not from a pure heart, and a faith vnfai∣ned: and also in the end, which is not the glorie of God.

Answer. It faileth neither in the one nor other: for that almes may issue out of a true naturall compassion, which is a sufficient good fountaine

to make a worke morally good: faith and grace do purge the heart, and are necessarie onely for good and meritorious workes: Againe, being done to releeue the poore mans necessitie, God his Creator and Maister, is thereby glorified. And so albeit the man thought not of God in particu∣lar: yet God being the finall end of all good, any good action of it selfe, is directed towards him, when the man putteth no other contrarie end thereunto.

R. ABBOT.

It was a caution giuen by the Pelagians,a 1.388 that vve may not so at∣tribute to God all the merits or good workes of holy men, as that we a∣scribe to the nature of man nothing but that that is euill. This caution the Papists, not willing in any thing to swarue from the Pelagian heresie, do very religiously obserue. For the prouing of Free will they obiect vnto vs that man can do good by nature, as giue almes, do iustice, &c. and therefore can will these things without the helpe of grace. M. Bishop saith they vse this argument to proue libertie of will in ciuill and morall matters. But therefore very lewdly do theyb 1.389 vse it against vs, and exclaime that we by deniall of Free will, make lawes and exhortations and instructions of no effect, when as we deny not libertie and freedome of will in morall and ciuill actions. Yet of such workes we say, that although in morall and ciuill life they stand for good, yet spiritually and with God they are not good workes but euill, because howsoeuer there is the outward matter and substance, yet there wanteth the inward forme and life where∣by they should haue the condition of good workes. Hereof M. Per∣kins saith, that the good thing done by a naturall man, is a sinne in re∣spect of the doer, because it failes both for his right beginning, which is a pure heart, a good conscience, and a faith vnfained, as also for his end, which is the glorie of God. But saith M. Bishop, it faileth neither in the one nor in the other, for that almes may issue out of a true naturall compassion, which is a sufficient good fountaine to make a worke morally good. Where I wonder whether he did well aduise of that he saith. For if naturall compassion be a sufficient good fountaine to make a worke morally good, then because bruit beasts haue true naturall compassion, and true naturall affections, we must needs attribute to them vertuous and morall actions. But S. Austin was not of M.

Bishops mind when he sayd,c 1.390 Beleeue in him that iustifieth the vngod∣ly, that thy workes may be good workes. For I will not call them good workes, so long as they proceed not from a good roote. Faith then by S. Austins iudgement, is the good roote whence good workes must grow, and if they grow not from this roote, they cannot be called good. And this he learned of the Apostle, teaching vs thatd 1.391 with∣out faith it is vnpossible to please God, and thate 1.392 whatsoeuer is not of faith it is sinne. And therefore of naturall compassion, he saith, thatf 1.393 although in it selfe it be a good worke, yet he vseth this good worke a∣misse that vseth it vnbeleeuingly, and doth it amisse that doth it vnbe∣leeuingly. Now he that doth any thing amisse, saith he, sinneth therein, and therefore the good workes which vnbeleeuers do are Gods, who v∣seth to good purpose them that are euill: but to them that do them they are sinnes, in that they do good things amisse, because they do them with an vnbeleeuing, that is, with a foolish and corrupt will. Wherin he ac∣cordeth with the Apostle saying, thatg 1.394 to vnbeleeuers all things are vncleane, because euen their mind and conscience is defiled. And there∣to Prosper alluding saith, thath 1.395 in the minds of the vngodly albeit there be found many commendable things, yet there dwelleth no vertue, but all their workes are polluted and vncleane, whilest therein they are sub∣iect to him who did first fall by apostasie from God. Therefore M. Bi∣shops distinction of good workes and meritorious worke, is an idle and vaine presumption, there being no workes meritorious at all, nor any workes good, but onely such as are done in the faith of Christ. The other circumstance required by M. Perkins in good workes, is the end whereto they are referred. For Austin rightly saith,i 1.396 that workes are not esteemed by the actions, but by the ends, so that when a man doth a thing wherein he seemeth not to sinne, if he do it not for that end for which he should do it, that which he doth becommeth thereby sinne. Now the true and proper end of all good workes, and which maketh them good, is the glorie of God, of which the Apostle saith,k 1.397 Whether ye eate or drinke, or whatsoeuer ye do, do all to the glo∣rie of God, and of which Prosper telleth vs, thatl 1.398 albeit a

man liue in good behauiour, yet he liueth still an euill life, if he liue not to the glorie of God. But hereto belongeth the knowledge of God, which ism 1.399 as it were the leauen that seasoneth the whole life of man. And this knowledge of God, must be by the word of God, so thatn 1.400 they who without the word of truth do worke or speake any thing, are as they that striue to go without feete. And it must breed the loue of God, becauseo 1.401 chastitie, and so the like, are not vertues except they be done or obserued for the loue of God. And in the loue of God con∣sisteth the worship of God,p 1.402 without which worship of the true God, euen that that seemeth to be vertue is sinne, and therefore it offended Austin, and he retracted it as a thing mis-spoken, that he had saydq 1.403 that the Philosophers shined with the light of vertue, who were not endued with true pietie or religion towards God. A part of which pie∣tie it is in all our good workes, to haue a respect vnto him, to do them for his sake, thereby intending to serue, and obey, and to please him, so thatr 1.404 vaine is euerie action, and euerie speech that hath not somewhat inwardly for God, and for the commandement of God, ands 1.405 when vertues are referred to themselues, and desired onely for themselues, and not for some other respect (to God) they are swelling and proud, and are not to be accounted for vertues but vices. And this respect to God must acknowledge him to be the giuer of all our vertue and goodnesse, and that we do but serue him with his owne, so thatt 1.406 although to cloth a naked man, or any other such like worke, by it selfe be not a sinne, yet of such a worke not to glorie in the Lord, and not to referre it to him as the author of it, none but a wicked man will denie it to be a sinne. Now these conditions and circum∣stances being required to make a worke good,u 1.407 it may be that a man minding to do a seruice may commit an offence, if he do not first learne in what sort he should do it. Which a man cannot learne by Free vvill, and by the law of nature, and therefore offendeth euen in those things wherein he seemeth outwardly to do well. But M. Bishop telleth vs, that in such workes God is glorified, because albeit the man thought not of God in particular, yet God being the finall end of all good, any good action of it selfe is directed towards him, when the

man putteth no other contrarie end thereunto. Where we may iustly wonder, that so absurd a fancie should preuaile with him, that God should be glorified there where he is neither thought of nor knowne, and that actions should be directed to God, where there is nothing to direct them; that mens actions are the directors of themselues, and that though a man haue no meaning to glorifie God, yet he doth glorifie him so long, as he propoundeth not to himselfe a contrarie end. These are M. Bishops dreames, and vpon the credit hereof we must beleeue that the Gentiles not knowing none but idol gods, yet did glorifie God in those workes wherein they did not put a contrarie end, nay, the bruit creatures do direct their workes of naturall compassion to the glorie of God, for their naturall compassion is a sufficient good fountaine to make their workes good, and they propound no end contrary to the glorie of God. But S. Austin telleth vs, thatx 1.408 it is the intent that maketh the worke good, and that it is faith that directeth the intent, and therefore where there is neither intent to glorifie God, nor faith to direct the intent thereto, there cannot be any glorifying of God, neither can the worke that is done be called a good worke. M. Bishop therefore doth amisse to ioyne with the Pelagians,y 1.409 to bring in a kind of men, which without the faith of Christ, by the law of nature can please God. This is it, saith S. Austin to them, for which the Church of Christ most highly doth detest you. I will end this point with the resolution of Origen:z 1.410 Euerie good worke, saith he, which men seeme to do, except they do it in the worship of God, in the acknowledgement and confession of God, it is but bootlesse and vaine. I will boldly say that they do all in vaine, if they do it not in faith: they do all to no purpose, except they do it in the acknowledgement of one God the Father, and in the confession of his onely begotten sonne Iesus Christ, and by the en∣lightening of the holy Gbost. He that doth a worke of righteousnesse be∣ing a stranger from the true worship of God, and from true faith, he doth it to no good, he doth it in destruction, it profiteth him not, it helpeth him not in the day of wrath. Whereof the Apostle is witnesse, saying, What∣soeuer

is not of faith is sinne. Why so? because he hath not the faith and knowledge of him for whose sake he should do it. For of whom shall he receiue reward? Of him whom he hath not sought after, whom he knoweth not, whom he beleeueth not, nor confesseth? He shall receiue no reward of him, but iudgement, and wrath, and condemnation. For as nothing is delightsome to vs without light, so is nothing delightsome or pleasing to God without the light of faith. Onely this I will adde, that God to such actions amongst the Gentiles gaue temporall rewards for temporall respects, not to shew any approbation thereof in respect of himselfe, to whom the doers thereof had no respect, but onely to entertaine the liking thereof, for the common good of mankind, and for the maintenance of ciuill order and so∣cietie, which God would vse to such ends, and in such sort as plea∣sed him for the benefit of his Church. And therefore euen them who most excelled in the renowme and commendation of these vertues, God sometimes gaue ouer temporally also to such ends as to the world seemed vnworthie to their former life, to shew that he stood not in any sort bound to them for the vertues, if we so call them, wherein they had not respected him, in that he would neither be the defender of them in this world, nor the rewarder of them in the world to come.

17. W. BISHOP.

2 Obiection. God hath commanded all to beleeue and repent, therefore they haue naturall Free vvill, by vertue whereof being hel∣ped by the spirit of God, they can beleeue. The force of the argument consisteth in this, that God being a good Lord, vvill not commaund any man to do that, which he is no way able to do.

Answer. M. Perkins answereth in effect (for his vvords be ob∣scure) that God commandeth that, vvhich vve be not able to per∣forme, but that vvhich vve should do: Then I hope he vvill admit that he vvill enable vs by his grace to do it, or else hovv should vve do it? God surely doth not bind vs by commaundement to any impos∣ble thing, he is no tyrant, but telleth vs, that his yoke is sweete, and his burthen easie.* 1.411 And Saint Iohn vvitnesseth, that his comman∣dements are not heauie. He vvas farre off from thinking that God vvould tie any man by lavv, to do that vvhich he vvas altogether

vnable to performe. This in the end M. Perkins himselfe approueth.

R. ABBOT.

Where they obiect that God commaundeth all to beleeue and repent, and therefore that all haue Free will to do that which he commandeth, M. Perkins answereth, that the argument is not good, because God by such commandements doth not shew what men are able to do, but what they should do, though of themselues they can∣not do it. Which answer why M. Bishop calleth obscure, I know not, but that his head haply fell out to be somewhat cloudie when he came to consider of it. Yet he replieth; then I hope that he will ad∣mit, that he will enable vs by his grace to do it, or else how should we do it? We will admit, that God by his grace enableth whom he thin∣keth good, to do his commaundements for the state of his life so farre as he thinketh good, and to them onely the yoke of Christ is sweete, and his burthen easie, and his commandements not grieuous, because of hima 1.412 they receiue a gift whereby they become not grieuous vnto them. And to these the vse of the law and commandements doth properly belōg, which God did not deliuer as exspecting that any man could fulfill the same,b 1.413 but thereby to bring men to the knowledge of sinne, and of condemnation thereby due vnto them, that by this meanes he might moue them whom he would call, to apprehend that meanes of saluation which he had promised in Ie∣sus Christ; who by his spirit giuen vnto themc 1.414 delight in the law of God as touching the inner man, but by the rebellion of the law of sinne, are holden backe in this life from attaining to the perfect righte∣ousnesse of the law. To the rest the law is a conuiction of sinne, no helpe of righteousnesse; whilest Godd 1.415 by vnsearchable, but iust iudgement, denieth to them that grace, which to others he vouch∣safeth, becausee 1.416 he sheweth mercie to whom he wil, and whom he wil he hardeneth. Albeit that man is vnable to fulfill the law, it is not any default of God, but of man himselfe, and therefore there was no cause whyf 1.417 the iust God should diminish any thing of the rule of righteousnesse, though vnrighteous man had by sinne disabled himselfe of the performance thereof; the righteousnesse of God I say required, that God should iustifie himselfe from seeming to approue any sinne by the defect of the commaundement, howso∣euer

man could not iustifie himselfe from sinne by the keeping of it. But of the end of Gods giuing the law and the possibilitie of keeping it, there will be occasion afterwards to entreate more largely, and therefore with this briefe answer I referre that point to his due place.

18. W. BISHOP.

3. Obiect. If man haue no Free will to sinne, or not to sinne, then no man is to be punished for his sinnes, because he sinneth by a necessitie, not to be auoided.

He answereth, that the reason is not good; for, though man cannot but sinne, yet is the fault in himselfe, and therefore is to be punished. Against which, I say that this answer supposeth that which is false, to wit, that a man in sinne,* 1.418 cannot chuse but sinne: For by the helpe of God, who de∣sireth all sinners conuersion, and thereunto affoordeth grace sufficient; a sinner in a moment, may call for grace and repent him: and so chuse whe∣ther he will sinne or no, and consequently hath Free will to sinne, or not to sinne: And that example of a bankrupt is not to purpose; for he can∣not when he will, satisfie his creditors, who content not themselues with his repentance, without repay of their money, as God doth.

Now concerning the force of this argument, heare Saint Augustines opinion. De duab. animab. cont. Manich. in these words. Neither are we here to search obscure bookes to learne, that no man is worthie of dispraise or punishment, which doth not that, which he cannot do: for (saith he) do not shepheards vpon the dounes, sing these things? Do not poets vpon the stages act them? Do not the vnlearned in their assemblies, and the learned in their libraries acknowledge them? Do not maisters in their schooles, and Prelats in their pulpits, and finally all mankind throughout the whole world, confesse and teach this, to wit, that no man is to be punished, because he did that, which he could not chuse but do. Should he not then (according to S. Augustines censure) be hissed out of all honest companie of men, that denieth this so manifest a truth, confessed by all Mankind? How grosse is this heresie, that so hoodeth a man, and hard∣neth him, that be he learned, yet he blusheth not to deny roundly, that which is so euident in reason, that euen naturall sence doth teach it vnto shepheards. God of his infinite mercie, deliuer vs from this strange light of the new Gospell.

R. ABBOT.

As touching ciuill and outward actions, we doubt not, as before is sayd, but that God hath left a libertie and power to the will of man, and therefore iustly are they punished, who runne wil∣fully into enormous actions from which it is in them to forbeare. And this addeth much to the iust condemnation of man, that euen in those things wherein he hath power to do otherwise, yet he ca∣rieth himselfe frowardly and rebelliously against God. And yet of outward actions in some degree, Hierome rightly obserueth,a 1.419 that a man can forbeare to sinne if he will at a time or in some place, or by some let of bodily weaknesse, or so long as the mind is intent and heedie, but he soone findeth, that wholy not to sinne it is not possible. To speake then indefinitely of sinne, it is true that man left in the power of his owne Free will cannot chuse but sinne. For how can he chuse but sinne, who of himselfe is nothing but sinne? Yea we know, that the corruption of sinne lieth as a punishment vpon the whole nature of man, and therefore is sayd to haue befallenb 1.420 by the iust reuenge of God, and is calledc 1.421 Poenalis vitiositas, a poenall vitiousnesse, or sub∣iection to sinne. Now if it be as it were a prison or punishment, it is not in our choise to be rid thereof, because a man cannot rid himselfe of a prison or punishment, which he hath drawne vpon himselfe. And therefore doth Saint Austin affirme it to bed 1.422 the punishment of man by condemnation, to approue falshood for truth, so as to erre against his will, and being vexed with the griefe of the bond of the flesh, yet not to be able to temper himselfe from libidinous actions. Thus haue we heard him before to auouche 1.423 a necessitie of sinning, and this necessitie he acknowledgeth in some part to continue still in the state of grace,f 1.424 alledging thereof the words of the Pro∣phet Dauid.g 1.425 De necessitatibus meis educ me: deliuer me from all my necessities. And therefore vainely doth M. Bishop except, that by the helpe of God a sinner may call for grace and repent him, and chuse whether he will sinne or no. For in men conuerted it is true that they cannot chuse but sinne; in repentant men it is still true that they cannot chuse but sinne. For the forbearing of this or that action doth not put a man in case to chuse to sinne, but though he arise one way, yet the law of sinne holdeth him still vnder a necessitie to fall another way, vntillh 1.426 this euill necessitie be taken away, and full

libertie granted, which shalli 1.427 then be, when we shall see him face to face. Or if M. Bishop will say otherwise, let him bring vs foorth the man that can chuse to sinne; the man that can do more then euer Patriarch, or Prophet, or Apostle, or Euangelist could do. For if they could chuse to sinne, why did they sinne? or if they did not sinne, why did they say, Forgiue vs our trespasses? If he will needs follow the Pelagian deuice, thatk 1.428 though no man be indeed without sinne, yet a man may be so if he will, I will answer him with Hieromes words,l 1.429 What a reason is this, that that may be that neuer was, and that he should yeeld that to I know not whom, which in the Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Apostles he cannot proue? Repentance therefore and conuersion so altereth the course of a mans life in the maine, as that euen in the way of righteousnesse it still leaueth in him a necessitie of sinne. Neither doth this conuersion stand indifferent to all, as he dreameth, nor doth God affoord to all sinners grace sufficient to bring them to repentance. He noteth for his purpose the place of Peter, that God would not haue any to perish, &c. but let him take the whole words, and they will cleere themselues,m 1.430 He is patient TO∣VVARDS VS, not willing that any (namely of vs) should perish, but that all (of vs) should come to repentance. He speaketh of Gods elect, of them whom he hath chosen to make vp the body of his Church, of whom our Sauior Christ saith,n 1.431 This is the will of the Father that hath sent me, that of all that he hath giuen me I should loose nothing, but should raise it vp at the last day. Of these he will haue none to perish, but doth patiently beare till he haue accomplished the nū∣ber that he hath decreed for himselfe. So did God say by the Pro∣phet,o 1.432 As I liue, saith the Lord, I desire not the death of a sinner, but ra∣ther that he be conuerted & liue; but he said it to the house of Israel; he said it not to the Philistims; he said it not to the Babylonians, the Ammonits, the Moabits, &c. It was not for their sakes that he sware, butp 1.433 willing to shew to the heires of promise the stablenesse of his coun∣sell, he bound himselfe by an oath. Therefore to those peoples he gaue not the meanes of conuersion,q 1.434 he gaue his word vnto Iacob, his statutes and ordinances vnto Israel; he dealt not so with any other nation. How then doth M. Bishop say, that God affordeth to all sinners grace sufficient for their conuersion? Will he say that the beholding of heauen and earth, and such other naturall motiues, were sufficient to bring men to repentance? He may dally with vs, that in them∣selues

they were such as might sufficiently auaile to moue men; but what is that to the purpose, so long as to the state and condi∣tion of man they were not sufficient? The light of the Sunne is a sufficient light, and yet it is not sufficient to make a blind man see. What were al those motiues and occasions whatsoeuer they were, but euen as a good lesson to a dead man? And what, will he terme those meanes of conuersion by the name of grace? Away, away with this Pelagian conceipt, and let vs acknowledge the truth as S. Austin doth;r 1.435 Communis est omnibus natura, non gratia: Nature is common to all, but grace is not so. It is buts 1.436 a glassie tricke of wit, as he saith, to deuise a grace that is common to all: it maketh a faire shew, but it is soone crackt.

Now M. Perkins, alledging that because it is by mans owne de∣fault that he cannot chuse but sinne, therefore he is notwithstan∣ding iustly punished, bringeth for declaration thereof the example of a bankrupt, who is not therfore freed from his debts because he is not able to pay them, but the bils against him stand in force, because the debt comes through his owne default. But M. Bishop saith, that this example is not to the purpose, because the bankrupt cannot, when he wil, satisfie his creditors, who content not themselues with his repentance, without repay of their money, as God doth. How many miles to Lon∣don? a poke-full of plummes. What is this to the purpose, that God is content to remit his debtors without satisfaction? for so creditors also deale sometimes with bankrupts when they haue nought to pay: but is this any thing against that which M. Per∣kins saith, that by the example of a bankrupt, it appeareth that a man may iustly be punished for that which now he cannot helpe, because by his owne default he is runne into it? The creditor may remit all if he will, but otherwise the bils of debt are iustly liable a∣gainst him who by default and negligence is come to that passe that he hath nothing to pay. And yet in his exception there are two absurdities implied. For it is absurd that he saith that God doth remit and pardon his debtors without satisfaction. There is no man reconciled to God, but by tendring a full and perfect sa∣tisfaction, which because he hath not to do of his owne, therefore by faith he pleadeth the payment of his suretie Iesus Christ,t 1.437 who bare our sinnes in his body vpon the tree; that inu 1.438 him we might haue redemption through his bloud, euen the forgiuenesse of our sinnes.

Nowx 1.439 all men haue not faith, and therefore all men cannot pleade this satisfaction for themselues, and yet without this faith there is no repentance that can auaile to bring vs vnto God. And seeing bothy 1.440 faith andz 1.441 repentance are the gifts of God, whicha 1.442 he giueth to some, and to other some doth not giue, it is another point of absurdity to subiect the gift of God to the arbitrarie will and power of man, as if man haue in him to beleeue and repent when∣soeuer himselfe will. But against this M. Bishop for conclusion bringeth a place of Austin against the Manichees, thatb 1.443 shepheards and poets, and learned, and vnlearned, and schoolemaisters, and prelats, and all mankind confesse, that no man is worthie of dispraise or punish∣ment, which doth not that which he cannot do. Nay, to helpe the man somewhat, I will adde more out of the next chapter to that which he citeth;c 1.444 That a man should be holden guiltie for not doing that which he could not do, it is a point of iniquitie and madnesse to af∣firme. Now what a strange matter is this, that shepheards and poets, and all sorts of men, should see reason to affirme this, and yet M. Bishop perforce should be driuen to deny it? For let vs aske him in his owne profession and doctrine what he thinketh of chil∣dren dying vnbaptized? He will giue vs a peremptorie answer, that questionlesse they are damned. But what haue poore infants done why they should be damned, or how could they auoid that for which they are damned? Tell vs M. Bishop, how could they chuse to be other then they be, and if they cannot chuse but be that they are, how can it stand with your rule, that they should be condemned for being that which they cannot chuse but be? Per∣force he must take a fall in his owne trippe, neither can he giue an answer as touching this point, which doth not yeeld vs a full an∣swer against himselfe. But S. Austin himselfe cleereth this point for vs, who, vsing the words cited by M. Bishop to iustifie a defini∣tion of sinne which he had set downe against the Manichees, thatd 1.445 sinne is a desire of retaining or obtaining that which iustice forbiddeth, and whence it is in a mans libertie to abstaine, telleth his Reader in the perusing of that place in his Retractations, that he spake there of thate 1.446 which is onely sinne, and is not also the punishment of sinne. For in that sinne which is also the punishment of sinne, how little is it that the will can do against concupiscence or lust hauing dominion ouer it,

and therfore by reason hereof a man cannot do that that he should do, neither can he but do that that he should not do, which yet ceaseth not to be a sinne and subiect to punishment, because he hath purchased this condition to himselfe, by the merit of a former sinne. For Adam had it in his power not to sinne, and yet did sinne by doing that which he ought not to do, and was in his power and libertie not to do, and for this cause was giuen ouer as a prisoner to sinne, that thenceforth he could not do what he ought to do, nor could chuse but do what he should not do. Therefore the same Austin asking, if that rule that he hath set downe be true, howf 1.447 in∣fants become guiltie, and are so holden, answereth that it is by being borne of him who did not that that was in his power to do. In a word, man is not worthie of punishment for not doing that which he cannot do, except he haue disabled himselfe for the doing of it; but if he haue disabled himselfe, as indeed he hath by the first sinne, then is he iustly punished, both for not doing that which he once could, but now cannot do, and for doing that which he once could, but now cannot chuse but do. Which being a case very euident, and sundrie times deliuered by S. Austin, in retracting the like places against the Manichees, may we not wonder at the ab∣surd folly of this man, who for conclusion braueth in his termes, as if he had caried the matter very cleere, when indeed like an igno∣rant cauiller, he himselfe vnderstandeth not what he saith. We re∣spect not what natural sence doth teach to shepheards, but we can∣not but thinke him an ill shepheard ouer the flocke of Christ, who taking vpon him to be a doctor of Diuinitie, is so ignorant in a principle of religion, which by the word of God euery shepheard should know. God make him wise to see his owne folly, and then he will submit himselfe in obedience to that truth which now in his ignorance seemeth vnto him a strange light of a new Gospell.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Ephes. 4.24.
• b 1.2

  Tertul adu. Marcion lib. 2. Libertas & po∣testas arbitrij quasi ubripens emancipatia deo boni.
• c 1.3

  Iohn 8.36.
• d 1.4

  Rom 6 18.
• e 1.5

  Cap. 8.21.
• f 1.6

  August. de ci∣uit dei. lib 5. cap. 10. Necesse est esse vt cùm vo∣lumus libero ve¦limus arbitrio.
• g 1.7

  Bernard. de grat & li•• arb. Angeli sancti ita sunt boni vt non possuit esse & ••••ali.
• h 1.8

  Ib••d praeuari∣catores angeli ita sunt mali vt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non valeant esse boni.
• i 1.9

  August. cont 2. epist. Pelag. lib. 1. cap 2 Libe∣rum arbitrium vsque a••••o in pec∣catore non perij•• vt per illud pec∣cant, maximè omnes qui cum delectatione pec∣cant & lib. 3. ca. 8 Non nisi ad peccatu•• v••let.
• k 1.10

  Idem. de pec∣cat. mer. & rem. lib. 2. cap. 6. Ip∣sum liberum ar∣bitrium ad dei gratiam hoc est ad Dei dona per∣tinere non ambi∣gens. &c.
• l 1.11

  Cont 2. epist. Pelag. l. 3. cap. 8. Ad iustitiam ni∣si diuinitùs libe∣ratum aduitum∣que non valet.
• m 1.12

  Ibid. lib. 4 ca. 8 Quid mihi obi••••d••s liberum arbitrium quod ad faciendam iu∣stitiam liberum non erit, nisi ouis fuerit? Qui facit igitur òues homines ipse ad obedientiam pietatie humanas liberat voluntates.
• n 1.13

  Epist. 107. Li∣berum arbitrium ad diligendum Deum primi peccati granditate perdidimus: & antea: Gratia nostrum ad de. linan∣dum à malo & faciendum bonum liberatur arbitrium.
• o 1.14

  Ibid. si verè volumus defenders liberum arbitrium non oppugnemus v••de ••ic liberum.
• p 1.15

  Cont. 2. ep. Pelag. l. 4 cap. 9. Nunquid liberum arbitrium negat hominibus quia Deo totum tribuit quòd rectè viuimus?
• q 1.16

  Retract. lib. 1•• cap 9. Tale est. vt sine illo rectè vi∣uere nequeamus.
• r 1.17

  Cont 2. epist. Pelag. lib. 3 cap. 7. Hominis non libera sed Dei gratia liberata voluntas.
• s 1.18

  De ciuit. Dei. lib. 14. cap. 11. Arbitrium vo∣luntatu tunc est vere liberum, cùm vetijs pecca∣tisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo quod amis∣sum proprio vi∣tio, nisi à quo dari potuit reddi non potest.
• t 1.19

  Esai. 51.12.
• u 1.20

  Esa. ••1 1.
• x 1.21

  Col. 1.13.
• y 1.22

  1 Cor. 7.22.
• a 1.23

  Rom. 8.23.
• b 1.24

  2. Cor. 3.17.
• c 1.25

  August. in Ioan. tract. 41. Ex parte liber∣tas, ex parte ser∣uitus; nondum tota, nondum pura, nondum plena liberias.
• d 1.26

  De peccat. mer. & rem lib. 2. cap. 7. Ani∣mus qui est homo interior nondum totus est renoua∣tus, & in quantū nondum est reno∣uatus, intantum adhuc in vetu∣state est.
• e 1.27

  Rom. 7.14.
• f 1.28

  Psal. 142.7.
• g 1.29

  Hieron. ad Ctesiphont. Non sufficit mihi quòd semel donauit, nisi semper donauerit: Peto vt accipiam, & eum accepero rursus peto.
• h 1.30

  Au∣gust epist. 106. Fateatur gratiam Dei & ad••utorium etiam ad singulos actus dari.
• i 1.31

  Enchirid cap. 32. Nolen∣••em praeuenit vt velit; volentem subsequitur ne frustra velit.
• k 1.32

  Exod. 14.11.12.
• l 1.33

  Bernard. in Cant. ser. 84. Non est aliud anima nostra quàm spi∣rites valiens & non rediens••••, ita fuerit derelicta.
• * 1.34

  Rom. 2.14.
• * 1.35

  Phil 3 6. Mat 6 5. Ezech. 29.19.
• * 1.36

  Summe. 12 ••. 109. art. 4. & 8.
• a 1.37

  Thomas Aqui. 1 2. q. 109. art. 4. & 8.
• b 1.38

  August. Hy∣pognost. lib. 3 Rectè dictus est sentiuiuus: habe∣bat enim vitalē motum, id est li∣berum arbitrium ••uburatum (mo¦rum scilicet or∣namentis & bo∣no pos••i••litatis liberi arbitrij per∣dit••) quod ei so∣lum ad vitam ae∣ternam quam perd derat red••. 8 non sufficiebat.
• c 1.39

  Hieron adu. Pelag. lib. 2. Ʋt scramus non ex nobis, sed ex Dei cunct•• pendere iudicio, veniam, inquit, &c. Qui enim dicit, veniā ad vos, ostendit se velle, mostrat cupere, promittit aduentum: sed vt cautiùs haec lo qu••tur, infert; si Dominus volue∣rit. Si quis enim putat si quid nos∣se necdum nouit sicut 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Jeoportet
• d 1.40

  August de grat. & lib ••bit. cap. 20. Scriptu∣ra intendit non solù̄ bonus ••o∣minum volunta∣tes, &c virum••∣tiam quae conser∣uant seculiore ••∣turamita esse in Dei potestate, vt eas quo voluerit, quando voluerit, facia•• inclinar••, &c.
• e 1.41

  Ibid. cap. 20, 21
• f 1.42

  De Praedest. sanct. cap. 20. Cogitate quale sit, vt credamus ad constituenda regna terrena hominum volun∣tates operari De∣um, & ad capes∣sendum regnum c••elorum homi∣nes operari vo∣luntates suas.
• b 1.43

  August. de perfect. iustit. Rat. 9 Quia pec∣cauit voluntas secula est pec∣cantem peccatū habendi dura ne∣cessitas.
• c 1.44

  Retract. lib. 1. cap. 1 Naturae nostrae dura ne∣cessitas merito praecedentis ini∣quitatis exortae est.
• d 1.45

  De nat. & gra. cap. 66 Ex vitijs naturae, non ex cōditione naturae est quaedam pec∣candi necessitas.
• e 1.46

  Cont Fortunat. disput. ••. Post quā libera ipse volun¦tate peccauit nos in necessitatem praec••pitati sumus
• f 1.47

  Bernard. in Cantic. Ser. 81. Ipsa sua volūtas necessitatē facit, vt nec necessitas cùm voluntaria sit excludere va∣leat voluntatem, nec voluntas cùm sit illecta excludere neces∣sitatem. Et post•• Anima sub vo∣luntaria quadam & malè libera voluntate tene∣tur. Et iterum post. Ʋoluntas inexcusabilem & incorrigibilē necessitas facis.
• g 1.48

  Jdem de grat. & lib. arist. sup.
• h 1.49

  August de per∣fect. iustitia.
• * 1.50

  Se••. 15 de verb. Apost.
• * 1.51

  Pag. ••0.
• a 1.52

  Phil. 2.13.
• b 1.53

  Ezech 36.27. August. de Prae∣dest. sanct. cap. 10 Ipse facit vti illi faciant quae prae¦cepit. Et cap. 11. Promissit factu∣rum se vt faciā••, quae ••ulci vt fi∣ant.
• c 1.54

  August. quaest. ve••. Test. 14. Qui verba sup∣pronit quaestionis aut imperitu•• est aut tergiuersa∣tor, qui calumniae magis studeat, quam doctrinae.
• * 1.55

  Pag. 19.
• * 1.56

  Luk. 10.
• * 1.57

  Luk. 15.
• * 1.58

  12. q. 109. Art. 6.
• * 1.59

  Ioh. 6.
• a 1.60

  Luk 16.15.
• a 1.61

  August. de bono perseu. cap. 13. & cont. 2. ep. Pelag lib. 4. ca. 6.
• b 1.62

  Andrad. or∣thodoxar. expli∣cat lib. 4. Libere nostri arbitrij motto atque ad institiam ap••li∣catio non magis a gratia Deipen∣det, quam à di∣uina virtute sti∣pitis exultio, &c. Cum diuina gra∣tia iacentem li∣bertatem erigat & confirmet vi∣resque illi addat quibus oblata iu∣stitiae ornamentae complecti possit, non secus qui∣dem sui ad iusti∣tiam applicatio∣nis causa effici∣ens dicenda est ac ea quae natu∣ra constant ea∣rum omnium operationum ad quas naturae im∣pulsione ferun∣tur.
• c 1.63

  Ibid. Non se∣cus ac ligneis so∣le•• deuincti qui incedendiqui∣dem facultatem habent, etsi in∣gredi nullo modo possit ni vincula rumpantur pri∣ùs quae motum reprimunt ac re∣tardam.
• d 1.64

  Bellarm de grat. & lib. arb. lib 6 cap 15. Si∣cut auxilium generale ita con∣currit cum omni∣bus rebus in acti∣onibus naturali∣bus, vt tamē non impediat liberta∣tem & conti••gē∣tiam, ita speciale auxil um ad••••∣uans ita concur∣rit ad omnes ac∣tiones supernatu¦rales vt non im∣pediat hominis libertatem: quo∣niam eodē pror∣sus modo auxilia ista concurrunt.
• e 1.65

  Coster. Enchi∣rid ca. 5. Sit quis∣piam lapsus in fo∣ueam tenebrico∣sam ex qua ne{que} cogitete gredinec exire solus possit; sed in ea securus obdormiat: acce∣dat ad eum ami∣cus qui hominis miserius de som∣no exertatum ad egressum moneat multisque ratio∣nibus vt assinti∣atur inducat: tum ei manum vel funem potri∣gat & simul co∣••antem educat in lumen
• f 1.66

  Ibid. Homo languidus qui ab igne vel à lumi∣ne solis facie a∣uersus se ipse so∣lus non potest cō∣uertere; sed si ac∣cedat amicus qui iuuet & langui∣dus ipse conatum aliquens adhibeat sit tandem vt conuersus calore solis aut ignis fruatur.
• g 1.67

  Andrad vt supra. Homini semper liberum relinquitur diui∣nae operationi praebere impedi∣mentum, eamque vel amplecti vel repudiare.
• h 1.68

  Coster. vt su∣pra. Est haec gra∣tia in arbitrio voluntatis vt ea vti possit, & non vti retinere & abijcere: quem∣admodum bacu∣lus in manu con∣ualescentis, cuius auxilio si velit vtetur, sin minus poterit eum re∣mouere.
• i 1.69

  Ephes. 4.18.
• k 1.70

  Iohn. 5 25.
• l 1.71

  Epes. 2, 1.5. Col. 2.13.
• m 1.72

  Luk. 10.30.
• m 1.73

  Ambros. de poe••tit. lib. 1. cap. 10.
• o 1.74

  Mat. 8.22.
• p 1.75

  Iohn 11.39.
• q 1.76

  Aug in Ioan. trail. 49 Surre∣xes, protessit. Jn v••roqu•• potentia Domin. erat, non vires mortut.
• r 1.77

  E••nes. 1.19
• s 1.78

  August. cont. Pelag. & Celest. lib. 1. cap. 37. Gratiae vocabulo frangens inuidi∣am effensionem{que} decli••ians.
• t 1.79

  Pelag. apud Aug. ibid lib. 1. cap. 31. Liberum arbitrium habere nos dicimus quod in omnibus bonu operibus diuino semper adiuua∣rur auxilio.
• u 1.80

  Cap. 33. L••be∣rum sic confite∣mur arbitrium vt dicamus nos indigere Dei semper auxilio.
• x 1.81

  Cap. 35 Episto∣ta nostra consite∣tur nos omnino nihil boni facere ••asse sine Deo.
• y 1.82

  Cap. 37. Inue∣meni nos ita ho∣minis laudare naturam vt Dei semper gratiae addamus auxi∣lium.
• z 1.83

  Cap. 1. A thema qui sentit vel docet grati∣am Dei qua Christus vinit in hunc mun••um peccatores silu••s facere, non solum per singulas horas aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros non esse necessariam, & qui hanc conantur aufer••e, paenas sortiuntur aeternas.
• a 1.84

  Hieron. adis. Pelag. lib. 3. Su••t plerique nostrorum qui omina quae agimus dicant fieri praesilio Dei.
• b 1.85

  August. epist. 95. His audius ver••is thommem Dei gratia adiu∣nari, &.) Ca∣tholici antistit•••• nullam aliam Dei gratiam in∣telligere potue∣runt, nisi quam in libris Dei le∣gere & populis Dei praedicare consueuerunt.
• c 1.86

  Ibid. Gratiae qua Christiani & filij Dei su∣mus. Et postea: Qua praedesii∣nati vocamur, iustificamur, glo∣rificamur.
• d 1.87

  Epist. 105. Qua iustificati sumus vt homi∣nes iusti essemus,
• e 1.88

  Epi. 107. Ag∣noscamus grati∣am quae facit proasse doctri∣nam.
• f 1.89

  Cont. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 13. Ʋt non ••stendat tan∣tummodo veri∣tatem, verum∣etiam impertiae charitatem.
• g 1.90

  Ibid. cap. 30. Qua iustifica∣mur, id est, qua charitas Dei dif∣funditur in cor∣dibus nostris, &c.
• h 1.91

  Cont. 2. Epist. Pelag lib. 4. cap. 6. Haec est gratia Dei bonos faci∣ens nos.
• i 1.92

  Cont Pelag, &c. vt supra. cap. 10. Istam aliquando fateatur qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur, verumetiam creditur & spe∣ratur; nec reuelatur solum sapientia, verumetiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, verumetiam pers••••ad tur.
• k 1.93

  De grat. & lib. arb••t cap. 16. Certum est nos velle cum volumus sed ille facit vt velimus, &c. Certum est nos facere cùm facimus, sedille facit vt faciamus, &c,
• l 1.94

  1. Cor. 4.7.
• * 1.95

  Of Iustifica∣tion. sect. 32. Of Merits. sect. 1 &c.
• m 1.96

  Coster. de lib. arbit Haec gra∣tia praeuenitas non est illa quae in anima nomina inhabitans us∣stū ••onstitu••t & filium Dei efficit, sed impulsus tan∣tùm & motio sp. sancti adhuc fo∣ris degentis, qui stat ad ostrum eordis pulsans nondum admissus ad eius domici∣lium.
• n 1.97

  Bellarm. de grat & li arbit. lib 6. cap. 15. Ni¦hil est aeliud n••si su••sio quae non deter••t nat vo∣luntatem sed in∣••linat per modū proponentis ob∣iecti.
• o 1.98

  Pelag apud a August cont. Pelag. & Celest. lib. 1. cap. 10. Operatur in no∣bis velle quod bo∣num est, velle quod sanctum est dum nos serrenis cupidit itibus de∣ditor, mutorum more animalium taentummede presentia diligē∣tes futurae gloriae magnitudine & prae••••orum pol∣licitatione suc∣cendit, dum reue∣latione sapientiae in desiderium dei stupentem susci∣tat voluntatem: dum nobis suadet omne quod bonum est.
• p 1.99

  Ibid ca 7 Adiuuat nos Deus per doctrinam & reuela∣tionem suam dum cordis nostri oculos aperit, dum nobis ne praesentibus occupemur futura demonstrat, dum diaboli pan∣dit insidiat, dum nos multiformi & ineffabili dono gratiae caelestis illuminat.
• * 1.100

  Jbid. cap. 4. Nostrum est, quia haec omnia vertere etiam in malum possumus Conc. Trid. Sess. 6. cap. 5. Neque homo ip. c nihil omnino agit, in∣spirationem ill•• recipiens qu•• pe qui illam & ab∣ijcere potest.
• q 1.101

  Coster. vt supr. Relicta volunta∣ti libertate, quae fieri potest, vt vel suscipiantur in∣fluxus diuini vel repulsam patian∣tur.
• r 1.102

  B llar de grat. & lib arbit. lib. 5. cap. 29. In po∣testate volunta∣tis relinquitur consentire vo••āti & sua senti vel non consentire.
• s 1.103

  Coster. ib. Qui hanc gratiam admittit, cadem aduitus progre∣ditur vlterius, vt credendo. speran∣do, poenitendo, ad iustificationis gratiam se paret. •• Of Iustifica∣tion. Sect. 21.
• t 1.104

  Pelag apud August. contrae Pelag & Ce est. lib 1 cap. 4. Jpsā possi••ilitatem gratiae suae ad. ••∣liat semper auxi∣lio.
• u 1.105

  August. Epist. 107. Per legem, per Scripturas suas Deus opera∣tur vt velimus, sed eu consentire vel no consentire, ita nostrum est vt si velimus fiat: si autem nolimus, nihil in nobis operationem Dei valere faciamus.
• x 1.106

  Contr. Pelag. vt supra cap. 32.33. Qui currit ad Deum, & ab eo seregi cupit, ad est, voluntatem suam ex eius voluntate suspendit, qui ei adherendo nigiter vnus eum illo fit spiritus, non hoc nisi de arbitrij efficit libertate. Qua qui benè vtitur, ita se totum trauit Deo omnem{que} suam mort ficat voluntatem, vt cum Apostolo possit dicere, Viuo autem, &c. ponti{que} cor suum in manis Dei vt illud quo voluerit Deus ipse declinet.
• y 1.107

  August ibid. Magnum profe∣cto diuinae gratiae adiutorium, vt cor nostrum, quo voluerit Deus, ipse declinei: sed hoc tam magnū adiutorium, sicut ipse desipit, tunc mere mur, cùm sine vllo adiuto∣rio nonnesi de ar∣bitrij libertate ad Dominum cur∣rimus, &c. vs his praecudentibus meritis sic eius consequamur gratiam, vt cor nostrum quo vo∣luerit, ipse decli∣net.
• z 1.108

  See after in Sect 15.
• a 1.109

  Bellar. de grati & lib. arbit lib. 6. cap. 5 Gratiā Dei secundum merita nostra dari intolligunt Patres, cùm ali∣quid fit propri••s viribus ratione cuius datur gra∣tia, etiamsi non sit illud meritum de condigno.
• b 1.110

  August. contr. 2. Epist Pelag. lib 4. cap. 6. Pri∣ores vtique dore quod libet ex li∣bero arbitrio vt sit gratia retri∣buenda pro proe∣mio.
• c 1.111

  Ibid. Nos faci∣mus vt merea∣mur, cum quibus faciat Deus.
• d 1.112

  Thom. Aquin. 1. 2. q 114. art 6. in Corp Congru∣tem est, vt dum homo bene vti∣tur virtute sua, Deus secundum superexcellentem virtutem excel∣lentiùs operetur,
• e 1.113

  Aug. Epist. 106. Haec intel∣ligitur doctore ipso gratia Dei, quae Paganis at∣que Christianis, napüs & pijs, fi∣delibus atque in∣fidelibus commu∣nis est.
• f 1.114

  Bellar. de grat. & lib. arbit, lib. 2 cap. 3. Lumine gratiae nemo om∣nine priuatur.
• g 1.115

  Aug contr. 2. Epist. Pelag. lib. 4 cap. 6. Ille facis vt ambulemus, vt obseruemus, vt faciamus. Haec est gratia bonos faciens nos: haec miscricerdia praeueniens nos.
• h 1.116

  Contr. Pelag. & Celest lib. 1. cap. 23.
• i 1.117

  Enchir. cap. 32
• k 1.118

  August dena. & grit. cap. 39 Po•••• ••at item hu¦mo••ae naturae ita ••••st••dis, vt ho∣mo per Liberum ar••••erium etiam sine Christi nomi∣ne salu a esse posse credatur.
• l 1.119

  Andrad. Ortho. expli aedi 3. Sine lege Mos•• & E∣uangelit vnobis per Christura da∣ta sola lige natu∣rae perm••iltos pu∣isse Dei gratia iustificatos & saluatos: & prius vmeum Deum religio••è venera∣ti sunt; in ipso spes suas omnes collocarum; illi perpetuo placere studuerunt ab illo virtutum re∣munerationem sperarunt.
• m 1.120

  Arist. de mun∣do. Cic. de Nat. Deer. Nemo vir magnus sine ali∣quo afflatud ui∣no vnquam suit. Neminem nisi inuante Deo, ta∣lem fuisse creuō dum est.
• n 1.121

  Aug de nat. & grat. cap. 2. Se••er uniturum iull••••a sutilla f••∣d•• assi••••s Chri∣sti & resurrecti∣ous inst••tans) cego C••••ss•••• gra¦tis ••••••••us est.
• o 1.122

  Ibid. cap. 9. Fece quod est crutem Chr sti eu••cuare sine illa quenquam per naturalem legem & voluntatis arbitrium iustificari posse contendere.
• p 1.123

  Frosp. de lib. arbit. Ostendere volun inter boni & mali contrarius suasiones, ita omnem h••minem proprie discretiom esse commissum ••t c••••mplus a Deo praesidij quàm a Diabolo fis periculi.
• q 1.124

  Coster. Enchi∣rid. cap 5. Sicut daemon tentati∣one mentem no∣stram praua co∣g••tatione & con∣cupiscentiae motu tangit ac pulsat afficere{que} cona∣tur voluntatem vti•• peccatum consentiat, quae sua libertate mo∣tiones has omnes & admittere po∣test & reijcere: tia sunt in nobis d••umi quidam insiuxus aliqud∣do quidem, ali∣quando constan∣tiores qui cor no∣strum pulsant relicta interim voluntati sua libertate qua fieri potest vt vel sus∣ciptan tur vel repulsam patiantur.
• r 1.125

  August. Epist. 107. Consentire hominis libero arbitrio constitutum est. &c. Libertate: naturali si vult facit; si non vult, non facit.
• a 1.126

  Aug. ep. 107. Vt Euangelio consentiamus non est donum Dei sed hoc nobis est à nobis, id est, expropria voluntate, quam nobis in nostro corde non operatus est ipso.
• b 1.127

  Idem de grat. Certisti to it. Pelag. & Celest. lib. 1. cap. 25.
• c 1.128

  Idem. ibid. Non solùm Deus posse nostrum donauit atque adiuuat, sid eti∣am velle & ope∣ratioperatur in nobis.
• d 1.129

  De praedest. sanct cap. 20. Cum Deus vult aliquid fieri quod non nisi volenti∣bus hominibus o∣portet fieri, incit∣nantur eorum cordae vt hoc vt l••t eo scid••cet in∣cli••ante, qui in nobis ••urabilt modo & Ineffa∣bili operatur & velli: & de bono pers••uer. cap. 23. sic in potestate habet cor nostrū, &c.
• e 1.130

  De Praedest. sanct cap. 10 per ho•• vt promissi sua Deus possit implere non est in Dei sed in ho∣minis potestate.
• f 1.131

  Jbid. Filios, promisit Deus Abrahae quo ••idei c••us vestig••a se¦ct ••rentur.
• g 1.132

  Prosp. de ••o∣cat. gene. l b 1. cap. 3 Creditucos promisit, &c re¦cr••cidi••dos pro∣misit, obilitu∣ros, persiuerat••∣••os. &c.
• h 1.133

  August. ibid. Non di nostrae voluntetis pote∣state, sed de sua praedestinatione promisit. Promisit enim quod ipse facturus fuerat, non quod homines; quia etsi faciunt h••mines bona quae pertinent ad cele••dum Deum ipse facit vt illi facia••t quae praecepit, non illi faciunt vt ipse faciat quod promisit.
• i 1.134

  Jdem. de cor∣rept & grat. ca. 11. Secunda plus potest, qua fit e∣tiam vt velit.
• k 1.135

  Ibid cap. 14. Magis habet in potestate volun∣tates homi••um quàm ipsi sua••.
• l 1.136

  De praedest, sanct. cap. 8. A nullo duro corde respitutur. edeo quippe triburtur vt cordis duritia primitus aufe∣ratur.
• m 1.137

  De grat. & lib. arbit. cap 14. Cor lapideum aduersus Deum omnino inflexi∣bile est.
• n 1.138

  1. Iohn 3.9.
• o 1.139

  August. de corrept & grat: cap. 11. Prima libertas volunta∣tis erat posse non peccare: nouissi∣ma multò maior erit non posse pec∣care, &c.
• p 1.140

  August de corrept. & grat. cap 8, An aude∣bis dicere etiam rogante Christo¦ne deficeret fides Petri, defectu∣ram fuisse si Pe∣trus eam deficere voluisset, hoc est, si cam vsque in sinem perseuera∣re noluisset. Quasi aliud Pe∣trus vllo modo vellet quàm pro illo Christus ro∣gasset vt vellet. Nam quit igno∣rat tunc suisse perituram fidem Petri, si ea quae fidelis erat voluntas ipsa deficeret, & permansuram si cadem voluntas maneret? sed quia praeparatur voluntas à Domino ideo pro illo non posset esse inanis oratio. Quando rogauit ergò nefides cius deficeret, quid aliud rogauit, nisi vt haberet in fide liberrimam, fortissimam, inuictissimam, perseuerantissimam volun∣tatem?
• q 1.141

  Ierem. 32.40.
• r 1.142

  Gen. 6.5.
• s 1.143

  Rom. 8.7.
• t 1.144

  Ierem. 10.14.
• u 1.145

  Ephes. 4.18.
• x 1.146

  Psal. 119.18.27.
• y 1.147

  1. Cor. 2 14.
• z 1.148

  Vers. 10.12.
• a 1.149

  Vers 16.
• b 1.150

  August. de verb. Apost ser. 13. Im••••a mens odit etiam ipsum intellectum, & homo aliquando nimium mente peruersa timet intelligere, ne co∣gatur quod intel∣lexerit facere.
• c 1.151

  Ose. 14.5.
• d 1.152

  Gal. 5.17.
• e 1.153

  August cone∣duas epist. Pe∣lag. lib. 4. cap. 6. Quid potestis bo∣ni sacere de corde non bono? vt au∣tem habeatis cor bonum; Daboin∣quit, &c.
• f 1.154

  Iohn. 3.3.
• g 1.155

  Gal. 6.15.
• h 1.156

  Tit. 3.5.
• i 1.157

  Fulge a ad Monimum lib. 1. Null itenus sini∣mus, immo salis∣briter prohibe∣mus tam in no∣stra fide quàm in nostro opere tan∣quam nostrum nobis aliquid vin licare.
• k 1.158

  Aug. cont Pe∣laeg & Celest. lib. 1. cap. 25. Quod possumus omne bonum facere, di∣cere, cogitare il∣lius est qui hoc posse donauit; quod vero bené vel ag••mus vel loquimur vel cogitamus no∣strum est.
• * 1.159

  1. Cor. 25.
• * 1.160

  De grat. & lib. arb. cap. 15.
• * 1.161

  Cap. 9.
• a 1.162

  Cor. 15.10.
• b 1.163

  Hieron. adu. Iouinian. lib. 2.
• c 1.164

  Idem ad Prin∣cip. explanat. Psal. 44. & adu. Pelag lib. 2.
• d 1.165

  Gal. 2.20.
• e 1.166

  1. Cor. 15.10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• f 1.167

  Ibid.
• g 1.168

  Oecumen in 1: Cor. cap. 13. Ve∣ritus ne rectum opus sibi attribu∣eretur, gratiae Dei ipsum fere acceptum.
• h 1.169

  Rom. 15.17.
• i 1.170

  Photius apud Oecumen. in Ro. cap. 15. Ostendit quòd nihil erat ipsius sed totum Christi.
• k 1.171

  Oros. Apolo∣get. de arbit. li∣bert. Quid in∣caute praesump∣tor aspicis, quia dixerit, mecum Attende quia praemiserit, Non ego. Qua propter tu haec a••o verba, Non ego, & me∣cum, gratia Dei media est; cuius est verè & velle & perfi••cre pro bona voluntate et tamē volūtate hominis. Vnde & ille confisus est vt diceret, me∣cum, quia dixe∣rat, Non ego. Jn voluntate er∣go hominis gra∣tia diuinae virtu∣tis operatur, quae & hoc ipsum velle donauit. Ita conscientia ho∣minis profitetur vt dicat, Non ego: gratia Dei largitur vt me∣cum.
• l 1.172

  August. de grat. & li. arbit. cap. 5. Id est, non solus, sed gratia Dei mecum; ac per hoc nec gra∣tia Dei sola, nec ipse solus sed gra∣tia Dei cum illo. Vt autem de coelo vecaretur & tam magna & efficacissima vo∣catione conuerte∣retur, gratia Dei erat sola, &c.
• m 1.173

  De praedest. & grat. cap. 11. Haec est prima misericordia quam liberae vo∣luntatis opera consequuntur. Sed vt Pauli vo∣cationem bona o∣pera sequeren∣tur, quid ait; Et gratia eius, &c.
• * 1.174

  Phil. 2. v. 13.
• a 1.175

  August. de grat. & li. arbit. cap 17.
• b 1.176

  Bernard. de grat. & lib arbit. Creatio (in liber∣tatem volūtatis) facta est & sine nobis.
• c 1.177

  Aug. in Psal. 65. Subiecit cau∣sam, Deus est e∣nim, &c. Si ergo Deus operatur in te, gratia Dei benè operaris non viribus tuis.
• d 1.178

  De bono perse∣ueran. cap. 6 Tu∣tiores viuimus, si totū Deo damus, & non nos illi ex parte & nob•••• ex parte commutti∣mus.
• e 1.179

  Tertul. aduers. Hermog. Veritas sic vnum Deum exigit defenden∣do, vt solius sit quicquid ipsins est. ita enim ip∣sius erit si fuerit solius.
• f 1.180

  August. contr. Pelag. & Celest. lib 1. cap 7. Di∣cimus eam sine voluntate nostra nequaquam in nobis perficere sanctitatem.
• g 1.181

  Concil Arau∣sican 2. cap 4 Si quis vt à pec∣cato purgemur voluntatem no∣stram, Deum ex∣pectare conten∣dit. Non autem vt etiam purgari velimus per san∣cti Spiritus infu sionem & opera∣tionem in nobis fieri confitetur, resistit Apostolo, &c.
• h 1.182

  Andrad Orth. explicat. li. 4 Ex gratia & libero arbitrio vnica causa conflatur nostrae ad iustiuā applicationis.
• i 1.183

  Aug. Confess. lib. 10. ca. 29. Da quod ••ubes.
• k 1.184

  De Praedest. sanct. cap. 11. Deus facit, vt illa faciamus.
• * 1.185

  Ad Ephes. 2.2,
• * 1.186

  Cap. 1.
• * 1.187

  Mat. 13.
• a 1.188

  Ephes. 2.1.
• b 1.189

  Aug. contra duas Epist. Pela. lib. 4 cap. 5. & de verbis Apost. Ser. 11.
• c 1.190

  Rom. 6.13.
• d 1.191

  August. de verb. Dom. Ser. 18. Mortuos eos vocat. Vbi nisi intus in anima?
• e 1.192

  Iam. 1.21.
• f 1.193

  August. contrae Pelag. & Celest. lib. 1 ca. 18. Ha∣bemus possibilita∣tem vtrius{que} par∣tis à Deo insitam velut quandam, vt ita dicam, ra∣dicem fructiferā atque foecundam quae ex volunta∣te hominis diuer∣sa gignat & pae∣riat, & quae possit ad proprij culto∣ris arbitrium vel nitere flore vir∣tutum, vel senti∣bus horrere vi∣eiorum. Vbi non intuens quid lo∣quatur vnam eandem{que} radicē constituit bonorū & malorum con∣crae Euangelicam veritaetem, &c.
• g 1.194

  Mat 7.17.18.
• h 1.195

  Quid est bo∣nus homo nisi vo∣luntaus bonae, hoc est, arber rae∣dicis bonae? Et quid est homo malus, nisi volū∣tatis malae, hoc est, arbor radicis ••ale?
• i 1.196

  Ioh. 15.1.
• k 1.197

  Iam. 1 21.
• l 1.198

  1. Pet. 1.23.
• m 1.199

  Iam. 1.18.
• n 1.200

  Ephes. 2 10,
• o 1.201

  Ioh. 1.13.
• p 1.202

  Iam. 1.18.
• q 1.203

  1. Cor. 3.••.
• r 1.204

  August. contr. Pelag. & Celest. lib 1. cap. 7. & Epist 107. Gra∣tiam Dei po•••••• in lege atque do∣ctrina.
• s 1.205

  Esa 32.15.
• t 1.206

  Prech 36 26.
• u 1.207

  Esa. 48.4.
• x 1.208

  Ierem. 13.23.
• y 1.209

  Amos 6.12.
• z 1.210

  Ioh. 6.45.
• a 1.211

  August. de Praedest. sanct. cap. 8 Nihil est aliud quàm do∣num accipere à Patre quo credat in Christum.
• b 1.212

  Idem de peccat. nun & remis. li. 2. cap. 17. Sciat quam verè non de terra ista, sed spiritualiter di∣ctum sit, Domi∣nus Dabit, &c.
• c 1.213

  Ose 10.12.
• d 1.214

  Ezech. 34.26.
• * 1.215

  Genes. 4.
• * 1.216

  Lib. 15. de ciuit. Dei cap. 7.
• * 1.217

  In quaest. He∣braicè.
• a 1.218

  August de ciuit. Dei. lib. 15. ca. 16 Spiritus sanctus operatur intrinsecus vt valeat aliquid medicina quc ad∣hibetur extri••fe∣cus. A••equm etiamsi Deus ip∣se vtens creatura sibi sub ect vinae∣••qua specie hu∣man•• sensus allo∣quatur humanos, &c. nec interiore gratia mentem regat atque agat, nihil prodest homini omn••s praedicatio veritatis. Facit hoc Deus, à va∣sis misericordiae irae vasa discernens, &c. Et cap. 7. Hoc ipsum cùm Deus locutus esset ad Cain quid ei prosuit, &c.
• b 1.219

  Prosper. de vo∣cat gent lib. 1. cap 9 Pr••sun li∣tas illius quaestio∣nis per liberi ar∣bitrij velle & nolle non soluitur quia licet ••••sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bonum nelle, tamen ni∣si ••••na••um non habet bonū velle.
• c 1.220

  Aug. de va••t. eccles cap. 5 Hoc prae••ico at{que} pro∣pono, vt qu••que aeperta & mani∣festa deligamus. & ca. 16. Nec itae vt ea colligant & commemorent quae obscurè vel ambiguè vel fi∣guratè dicta sunt quae quis{que} sicut voluerit inter∣pretur ad sensum suum. Talia enim recte intellige non possunt, nisi prius ea quae aperissimè dicta sunt firma fide teneantur.
• d 1.221

  Genes. 3.16.
• e 1.222

  Chrysan Gen. hom. 18. Ne pu∣tes licet tuum aeduersatus sim sacrificiū ob pra∣uam mentem fra∣t••s{que} oblationem acceptā hab••aer. in ob s••nā intentio nē quod ideo pri∣matu te destituā et primageniturae dig••••t trem à te an••erant. Nam licet honore ego illum proficatus fuerins, accepta{que} fu••••nt di••us do∣••••, veruma••••ē ad te conuer••io illi •• et in ipsi•• domi∣nabet••, At{que}, post peccati•••••• per. ••••••to vt primo. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 priuile. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gandeas, illunque sub tua potestate & dominio esse ••ubeo.
• f 1.223

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sinne.
• g 1.224

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the desire of him, or his desire, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: ouer him.
• h 1.225

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• i 1.226

  August. de ci∣uit. Dei. lib 5. ca. 7. Potestitae intelligi ad ho∣minem conuer∣sionem esse debere peccati, vt nulli alij sciat quam sibi tribuere de∣bere quod peccat, &c. Tunc enim dominabitur quisque peccato, si••d sibi non de∣fendendo prae∣sumpserit sed poe∣nitendo subiece∣rit, &c.
• k 1.227

  Am••r, de Cain & Abel li 2. ca. 7. In te reuerti∣tur crimen quod ae te c••pit. Non habes in quo ne∣cessit item magis quam mentē t••ā arguas. In te re∣t••rque tur impro∣bitas tut, ••u princeps ill••us es: Ben? a••t, Tit princeps es illius. Et enim impretas mater quaedā est delictoram, &c.
• l 1.228

  Aug. vt supra. Cum commota fuerit pars ipsa carnalis ad ali∣quid perperam committendum, si acquiescatur, Apostolo dicenti, Ne exhibeatu membra, &c. ad mentem domita & victa conuer∣titur vt subditae ratio dominetur.
• m 1.229

  Prosper. de vocat. gent lib. 2. ca. 4. Tuus hic er∣ror est, enum{que} peccatum; qui••sce & noli in inson∣tem fratrem mo∣vert: ad te potius tua culpa reuo••i∣tur. Noli peccato regnum in te da∣re••sed tu potius in ipsum sume do∣minatū. Paeniten∣do enim nec in manus facinus progredieres, & ab eo in quo te doles displicuisse mundaberis.
• n 1.230

  Hieron tradit. Hebrat. in Genes. Quia liberi arbi∣trises, monto vt non tibi peccatum sed tu peccato do∣mineris.
• o 1.231

  August. desp. & lit. cap. 28. Non vsqueadeo in anima huma∣na imago Dei de∣trita est. vt nullae in ea velut linea∣menta extrema remanserint. Origen. cont: Celsum lib. 4. Impossibile vt eius imaginis lineamenta in totum delcantur. &c.
• p 1.232

  Chrysost in Gen. hom. 18. Sciebat ab ini∣tio quòd fratrem hic adoriturus esset, & ideo an∣tea verbu repr••∣mit.
• q 1.233

  Iohn 6 44.
• r 1.234

  August. cont. duas epist. Pelag. lib 1. cap. 19. Ve∣nire ad me intel∣ligitur credere in me.
• s 1.235

  De praedest. sanct. cap. 8. Ni∣hil est aliud quā donum accipere a patre quo cre∣dat in Christum.
• t 1.236

  Prosper. de vo∣cat. gent. lib. 2. cap 9. Qui non credant nec tra∣huntur omni••ò.
• u 1.237

  August epist. 107. Libertate naturali si vult, facit; si nonuult non facit. Verse. 45.
• x 1.238

  Idem de vnit. eccles. cap. 9. Cum arbitrio libero homo creatus est & si vult credit in Christum, si non vult, non credit.
• y 1.239

  Hieron. a. li. Pelag. lib. 3 Qui trahitur non spo∣te currit, sed a••t retrectans & tardus aut inui∣tus adiucitur.
• z 1.240

  August cont. duas epist. Pelag lib. 1. ca. 19 Quis trahitur si tam volebat? Et ta∣men ne••io venit nisi velit. Trabi∣tur ergo mires modis vt velit ab illo qui nouit t••tus in ipsis hominum cordibus operari, non vt homines quod fieri non petest nolentes credant, sed vt vo∣lemes ex nolentibus fiant. Et lib. 4 cap. 9. Ex repugnantibus consentientes, ex oppugnant••bus amantes.
• * 1.241

  Cap. 30.19.
• a 1.242

  Deut. 30.19.
• b 1.243

  2. Tim. 1.9.
• c 1.244

  Act. 16.14.
• d 1.245

  2. Tim. 2.25.
• e 1.246

  Phil. 1 29.
• f 1.247

  Ephe. 1.17.
• g 1.248

  Mat. 13.11.
• h 1.249

  Ezech. 36.26.
• i 1.250

  Ierem 32.40.
• k 1.251

  Iohn. 15.16.
• l 1.252

  Prosper de vo∣c••t. gent. lib. 1. ca. 9. Ex Deo est vt homo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Dei eligat & sur∣gat à laps••s &c. Et post. Contra omnem electio∣nem de ••••ero ar∣bitri•• vementens inuictissim•• illa renitum senten∣tia dir•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Apo∣stoli; Quis te dis∣cernit, &c.
• m 1.253

  Aug. de prae∣dest. sanct. cap. 5. A quo nisi ab illo qui te a•• ceruit ab alio cui non donauit quod do∣nauit tibi?
• n 1.254

  ••acu••. de per∣fect. instit. prepe fi••em. ••••••p rat 〈…〉〈…〉.
• o 1.255

  Aug. ep••st. 107. V••catione illa alta atque secre••a si•• eius agit se sunt vt eidem lege at{que} doctrin•• accom∣modet assensum
• p 1.256

  Bernard de grat. ex l b ar∣bit Non quod vel ipse consen∣sus ab ip••so fit. &c fecit volentem, no•• est volunt vt: su•• consentientē.
• q 1.257

  In Cant ••er. 57. Illius diside∣r••ū tuum creat, & quod tu eius properas sermonē admittere inde est quòd ipse festi∣nit inirare.
• * 1.258

  Math. 23.
• a 1.259

  Deut. 29.4.
• b 1.260

  Esa. 49.4.
• c 1.261

  Mat. 11.25.
• d 1.262

  Cap. 13.11.
• e 1.263

  Mar. 4.11.12.
• f 1.264

  Iohn 12.39.
• g 1.265

  Rom. 11.7.
• h 1.266

  Aug. de cor∣rept. & grat. ca. 14. Cui vol••nti saluu•• f••cere nullum hominū resistit arbitriū. sic enim v••lle & nolle in volen∣tis aut nolentis est potestate vt diuinam volum∣tatem non impe∣diat nec superet potestatem De his enim qui fa∣ciunt quae non vult facit ipse quae vult, &c. De ipsis voluntatibus hominum quod vult facit.
• i 1.267

  Euchirid. ad Laurent. ca. 103 Dum tamen cre∣dere non coga∣mur aliquid om∣nipotentem Deū voluisse fieri fa∣ctum{que} non esse qui sine vllu am∣••iguitatibus si in coelo & in terra quaecunque vo∣luit fecit, profe∣ctò facere noluit quodcunque non fecit.
• k 1.268

  Esa 46.10.
• l 1.269

  Rom 11.5.
• m 1.270

  August. Eu∣chir•••• cap. 97. Vbi est illa om∣n••potentia, &c. si colligere filios Hierusalem vo∣luit & non f••cit? An potius & illa quidem filios sis ••s ab ipso c••lligi neluit, sede: quoque relente filios eius c••llegit ipse quos voluit, quia in coelo & in terra non quaedam v••∣luit & fecit, quaedam vero veluit & non fecit, sedomnia quaecunque vol••••t fecit
• * 1.271

  Cap. 3.
• a 1.272

  Arausican. Concil. 2. cap 4. Supra. sect 8.
• b 1.273

  August cont. duas epist. Pelag. lib. 4. cap. 6 Adi∣tus diuinae voca∣tionis ipsa Dei gratia procura∣tur.
• c 1.274

  Psal. 107.16.
• d 1.275

  Act. 16.14.
• e 1.276

  Luk. 24.45.
• f 1.277

  Psal. 119.18.
• g 1.278

  Iob. 33.16.
• h 1.279

  Psal. 50.15.
• i 1.280

  Act. 14.27.
• k 1.281

  August. de praedest sanct. cap. 19 Deus o∣peratur in cordi∣bus hominum vocatione illa se∣cundum proposi∣••um, vt non ina∣rater aud••••nt E∣uangelium sed eo aud••to cont••er tā∣tur & credant, exerpientes non vt verbu••a ho∣minum, sed sicum est verò verbum Dei.
• l 1.282

  Iude, vers. 23.
• m 1.283

  Act. 9.4.
• n 1.284

  August contr. duas Epist. Pel••. lib. 1 cap. 19. Non ait duxe∣rit, vt illic ali quo modo intelliga∣mus praecedere voluntatem. Quis trah••tur, &c vt supra Sect 10
• o 1.285

  Idem de Prae∣dest sanct ca. 20. Ostrum ergo a∣pertum est in ••is, quibus datū est, aduersarij autem multi ex eis qui∣bus non est datū.
• * 1.286

  Lib. 4. cap. 72.
• * 1.287

  Ioan. 6. Lib. 1. Epist. 3.
• * 1.288

  Cont. 2. cap. 4. col. 59.
• a 1.289

  Aug. de correp. & grat. cap. 12. I••••o sic volunt, quia Deus opera∣tur vt veli••t.
• b 1.290

  Epist. 107. L••cerum arbi∣trium ad diligen∣dum Deum prin••s peccati gra•• di∣tate per••••emu••,
• c 1.291

  Bernard. de grat. & lib. arb. Totum ex gratia
• d 1.292

  Justin. Mar∣tyr Apol. 2. Ne quis nostra dicta sic acciptat, quasi Fati necessitatē asseramus, & quae fiunt ideò fieri, quiae praedi∣cta sunt exp••ica bonus hoc quo{que} &c
• e 1.293

  Aug. contra duas Epist. Pela. lib. 2. ap. 6. & in Psal. 1••0 & de ciuit. Dei. lib. 5. cap. 1.
• f 1.294

  Hominem libe∣ro arbitrio, libe∣ra{que} voluntate & peccare & re∣ctè agere doce∣mus.
• g 1.295

  Prosper de vo∣c••t. Gent lib 2. cap. 9. Virius no∣lenuum nulla est
• h 1.296

  Aug. Epi. 107. vt supra Sect. 1.
• i 1.297

  Idem de grat. & lib arbit. cap. 14. Non defenso∣res, sed inflatores & praecipitatores liberi arbit.
• k 1.298

  Iustin. vt supr. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• l 1.299

  Iren. lib. 4. cap. 72. Si non in no∣bis esset facere haec aut non fa∣cereq uam cau∣sam habebat A∣postolus, & mul∣to prius ipse Do∣minus consilium dare?
• * 1.300

  Non de vio∣lentia cogens.
• m 1.301

  August. de Praedest. sanct. cap. 5. Posse ha∣bere fidem sicut posse habere cha∣ritatem naturae est hominum: ha∣here autem fidem sicut habere cha∣ritatem gratiae est fidelium. Vid. Prospide vocat. Gen. lib. 2. cap. 2.
• n 1.302

  August. Re∣tract. lib. 1. ca. 22
• o 1.303

  Ephes. 2.8.
• p 1.304

  Mat. 8 13.
• q 1.305

  Mar. 9.23.
• r 1.306

  Rom. 7.18.
• s 1.307

  Iren. lib 3. cap. 22. Sign••ficans quoniam non à nobis sed à Deo est bonum salutis nostrae. Et iterū: Miser ego homo, &c. Deinde in∣sert liberatorem, Gratia Dei, &c.
• t 1.308

  Ibid. cap. 46. Nos precamur non perseuerare eos in fou••a quā ipsi foderunt, sed segregari ab nu∣tusmodi matre, &c. & legitimè eos generari, cō∣uerses ad Eccle∣siam Dei, & for∣mari Christum in eis, & cognos∣cere eos fabricae∣torem huius vni∣uersitatu, &c.
• u 1.309

  Lib. 1. Epist. 3 Seruans legem qua homo liber∣tati suae relictus, & in preprio ar∣bitrio constitutus fi••••m••tipsi, vel ••••••rtem appetit, vel salutem.
• x 1.310

  Aug. contra 2. Epist. Pelag lib. 4 cap. 9. & de Prae∣dest. sanct. cap. 3. & de bono perse. cap 19. &c.
• y 1.311

  Cypr. ad Quir. lib. 3. cap. 5. In nulla gloriandum quando nostrum nihil sit.
• z 1.312

  Lib. 2. Epist. 2. Dei est, Dei est omne quod possu∣mu•••• inde v••••••∣mus, inde polle∣mus.
• a 1.313

  Cyprian. in O∣rat. Dominic. Admonemur in∣firmitatu & im∣becillitatis nostrae dum si•• rogam••s ne quis se inso∣lenter extollat, ne quis sibi superbè atque arrogan∣ter aliquid assu∣mat•• ne quis aut confessionis aut passionis gloriam suam dicat, &c. vt dum praecedit & submissi con∣fessio, & datur ••••••um Domino, qu••quid suppli∣••••ter petitur, i••∣st••s pictate prae∣st••tur
• b 1.314

  Aug de bono perseuer. cap. ••7 Nihil nobi•• reli∣qu••t, in qu•• ta••∣quam in nostro gloriemu••. Siqu••dem & vt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 disced••mus à D••o n••n estend••t, da••dum esse nisi à Deo, cùm pascendum estendat à Deo. Qui enivi non in errur in tentationem, non disc••dit à Deo. Non est hoc omnino in viribus Liberi arbi••r•• quales nunc sunt, fuera••us 〈◊〉〈◊〉 antequam caderet, &c. Post casum autem hominis nonnisi ad gratiam suam Deus voluit perti∣nere, vt hom•• accedat ad eti•••• neque nisi ad gratiam suam pertinere voluit, vt homo non recedat ab eo.
• c 1.315

  Jbid cap. 6. T••••••res vi••••••us si totum Deo damus, non autem nos illi ex parte & nobu ex parte commutimus. Quod vidit iste vene∣rabil•• Martyr, &c.
• d 1.316

  Plutarch. A∣pophiheg.
• e 1.317

  Prosper. Epist. ad August. Ob∣stinationem suā vetustate defen∣dunt. A nullo vnquam eccle∣siasticorum ita esse intellecta ve nunc sentiuntur, affirmant.
• f 1.318

  Aug. de bono perseuer. cap 18. Hoc sc••oneminē contra istam Praedestinationē, &c. nisi errando disputare potu∣isse.
• g 1.319

  De Praedest. sanct. cap. 14. Priusquam ista Haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad soluendum quae∣stione versari, &c. vnde factū est, vt de gratia Dei quid sentirent, breuiter quibusdam scriptorum suorum locis & transeuntèr attingerent, immorarentur vero in eis quae aduersus alios inimicos Ecclesiae disputabant, &c. frequentationibus aut orationibus simplicitèr apparebat Dei gra∣tia quid valeret. Non enim poscerentur à Deo quae praecepit fieri, nisi ab illo donaretur, vt fierent.
• h 1.320

  De bono perse∣uer. cap. 23. No oraret Ecclesia, vt daritur infi∣delibus fides, nisi Deum crederet & auersas & aduersas hominū ad se conuertere voluntates; nec oraret Ecclesia vt perseueraret in fide Christi, ni∣si crederet Domi∣num sic in pote∣state habere cor nostrum, vt b••••ū quod non tene∣mus nisi propria voluntate, non tamen teneamus, nisi ipsi in ••o••is operetur & velle
• i 1.321

  Ibid cap. 20. Didicimus sin∣gulas quas{que} hae∣reses intulisse Ec∣clesiae proprias quaestiones: cotra quas di••igentiùs defenderetur S••riptura diuina quam si nulla ta∣lis necessitas co∣geret. Quid autē coegit loca Scrip∣turarum, quibus Praedestinatio commendata est copiosiùs & enu∣cientius i••••o no∣stro libere defen∣di, nisi quod Pe∣lagiani dicunt, &c.
• k 1.322

  Ibid cap 19.
• l 1.323

  De nat. & gra. cap. 61
• m 1.324

  Prosper. de lib. arbit Nullius authoritatis te∣stimonium de libello Pastoris.
• n 1.325

  Ruffi•• ••n exposit. Symb. apud Cyprian.
• o 1.326

  Aug. de bono perseuer. cap. 19. Istitales tanti{que} doctores dicentes non esse aliquid de qu•• tanquam de nostro, quod nobis De•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ed••rit gloriemur, nec ipsum cor nostrum & cogitationes nostrari•• potestate nostra esse, & tetum dant••s Deo atque ab ipso nos acc••pere confitentes, vt permansu•••• conuertamur ad cum, vt id quod bonum est, nobis quoque videatur ••••••um, & quod velimus illud, vt honore∣mus Deum, & recipiamus Christum: vt ex indenotis efficiamur deu••••i & religiosi, vt in ipsam Trinitatem ••redamus, & confiteamur etiam voce quod credimus, haec vtique gratiae Dei tribuunt, &c.
• p 1.327

  Sect. 6.
• q 1.328

  Origen. contra Ceisum lib 7. No∣strum propositum non est sufficiens ad hoc, vt mun∣dum cor habea∣mus, sed Deo est opus qui tale no∣bis creet: ide••rcò, qui scit precari dicit Cor mun∣dum, &c.
• r 1.329

  Jbid. Bonitate ac humanitate Dei, & diuina ipsius gratia con∣ceditur cognitio Dei duntaxat his qui ad hoc praedestinat•• sunt vt cognito Deo dignè viuāt, &c
• s 1.330

  Jn Mat. cap. 13. Quod glori∣atione dignum est, id nostrum non est, sed domō est Dei.
• t 1.331

  In Cantic. Ho∣mil. 4. Se•• quia hoc naturae bonū praeuaricationis occasione deceip∣tum, vel ad ig∣nomimam, vel ad lasciuiam fuerat inflexum, vbi per gratiam reparatur, & per doctrinam verbi Dei restituitur, odorem reddit sine dubio illum quem primus conditor Deus indiderat, sed peccati culpa subtraxerat.
• u 1.332

  Clem. Alexan. Strom••t. lib 5. Oportet mentem habere sanam, &c. ad quod ma∣ximè diuina opus habemus gratia recta{que} doctrina casta{que} & mun∣da animi affecti∣one, & Patris ad ipsum attra∣ctione.
• x 1.333

  Augu. de cor∣rept. & grat. ca. 1 Liberum arbi∣trium & ad ma∣lum, & ad bonū faciendum con∣fitendum est nos habere sed in ma lo faciendo liber est quisque iusti∣tiae, peccati autē seru••••m bono autem liber esse nullus potest, nisi fuerit liberatus ab eo qui dixit: Si vos filius, &c.
• y 1.334

  Rom 6.17.
• z 1.335

  Iren lib. 3. ca 1. Euangelium no∣bis in Scripturis tradiderunt A∣postoli columnā & f••••d amentū f••aci nostrae futu∣rum.
• a 1.336

  Esa. 8.10.
• b 1.337

  Aug. contra 2. Epist. Pelag li 3 cap. 9. Excogita∣verunt Ma••••∣chaeorū detesta∣bili nomine im∣peritos quos po∣tuerint d••terrere ne aduersus eorū dogmata peruer∣sissima aures ac∣commodent veri∣tati.
• c 1.338

  Ibid. lib. 2. ca. 1 Pro Catholica fide contra Ma∣nichaeorum sicut loquuntur profa nitatem consen∣sionem Orienta∣lium Episcoporū videntur expos∣cere, &c.
• d 1.339

  Ibid. cap. 2. Manichaei ne∣gant homini bono ex libero arbi∣trio fuisse initria mal••. Pelagiani dicunt etiam ho∣minem malum sufficienter hae∣bere liberum ar∣bitrium ad faci∣endum praeceptū bonum. Catholicae vtrosque redar∣guit, &c.
• e 1.340

  Ibid. possunt duo errores inter se esse contrarij, sed ambo sunt detestandi quia sunt ambo con∣trarij veritati.
• * 1.341

  2. Inst. ca. 2. q 4.
• * 1.342

  De spi. & lit 34. De gra. Chr. 14 Ad Simpli. q. 2. Tract. 72. in Ioan. Epi. 47.
• * 1.343

  Lib 4. contr. Iul. c. 8.
• a 1.344

  Institut lib. 2. cap. 2. Sect. 4.
• b 1.345

  Ibid. Sect. 9.
• c 1.346

  Ibid. Sect. 8.
• d 1.347

  Aug de pecca. mei & remiss. lib. 2 ca. 6 Ipsum liberum arbitriū ad gratiam Dei, hoc est, ad dona Dei pertinere nō amb••go, nec solū vt sit, sed etiam vt bonum sit, hoc est, ad facienda Domini manda∣ta conuertatur.
• e 1.348

  Ibid cap. 18. Si nobis libera quaedam volun∣tas ex Deo est, quae adhuc potest esse vel bona vel mala, bona verò voluntas ex no∣bis est, melius est id quod à nobis, quam quod ab illo est.
• f 1.349

  De spirit. & lit. cap. 34.
• g 1.350

  Ipsum velle credere Deus operatur in ho∣mine.
• h 1.351

  Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 1 cap. 18 & lib. 2. cap 8. & de Prae∣dest. sanct. ca. 5.
• i 1.352

  De spir & lit. cap. 31.
• k 1.353

  De Praedest. sanct. cap. 3. Vt praedicato nobis Euangelio con∣sentiremus no∣strū esse, & nobis ex nobis esse ar∣bitrabar. Quem meum errorem nonnulla opuscu∣la mea satis in∣dicam ante Epis∣copatum meum scripta.
• l 1.354

  1. Cor. 4.7.
• m 1.355

  Epist. 107 Cō∣sentire, vel non consentire, ita no∣strum est vt si velimus.
• n 1.356

  Contra Pelag. & Celest. lib 1. cap. 14 Quis nō videat & venire quenquam & nō venire arbitrio voluntatis? sed hoc arbitrium potest esse solum si non venit, non potest autem nisi aediutum esse si venit.
• o 1.357

  Ioh. 6.65.
• p 1.358

  August. Quo∣modo venisti? &c Veni, ••••quis, li∣bero arbitrio: vo∣luntate propria ven••. Quid tur∣gescu? v•• nosse, quod & hoc prae∣stitum est tibi? Ipsum audi vo∣cantem. Nemo venit ad me, &c.
• q 1.359

  De Praedest. sanct. cap. 20. supra Sect 6.
• r 1.360

  De grat. & li. arbit. cap. 17 Vt velimus sine no∣bis operaturicùm autem voluntus, nobiscum coope∣ratur.
• s 1.361

  Jbid. cap. 20. Ex mala muta∣tur in bonam, & cùm bona fuerit adiu••atur.
• t 1.362

  Enchir cap. 32. Hominis volun∣tatem bonam & praeparat ad iu∣uandam. & ad∣iuuit praeparatā.
• u 1.363

  C••ntra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 8. Ad iu∣stitiam nisi diu∣nitùs liberatum adiutum{que} non valet.
• x 1.364

  De corrept, & grat cap 12.
• y 1.365

  Jbid. cap. 11. Adiutorium per quod posset (si vellet) & sine quo non posset per seueranter bonū tenere quod vel∣let.
• z 1.366

  Ibid. Est in no∣bis per hanc gra∣tiam non solùm posse quod volu∣mus, verumetiā velle quod possu∣mus.
• a 1.367

  Cap. 12. Beati∣tudo cùm daia fuerit continuò fit beatus: adiu∣torium est enim nō solum sine quo non fit, verume∣tiam quo fit prop∣ter quod datur.
• b 1.368

  Ibid. Sanctis tale adiutotium perseuerantiae da¦tur, vt eis perse∣uerantia ipsa do∣netur, non solùm vt sine isto dono perseuerantes esse non possint, verumetiam vt per hoc donum nonnisi persiue∣rantes sint.
• c 1.369

  Et sic adiu∣tum vt non so∣lum quid faci∣entum sit sciat, sed quod scierit et••am faciat.
• d 1.370

  Cont Pelag. & Cel••st lib. 1. cap. 13 Si do∣cet eos Deus qui secundum pro∣positum vocati sunt simul donans & quod agant scire, & quod sciunt agere.
• e 1.371

  Ad Simplic. q. 2. Alitèr Dius praestat vt veli∣mus, alitèr prae∣stat quod volue∣rimus: vt veli∣m••s & suum vo∣luit esse & no∣strum: suum vo∣cando, nostrū se∣quēdo. Quod au∣tem voluerimus solus prae••••at, id est posse benè a∣gere & semper beatè vinere.
• f 1.372

  Prosper. de v••cat gent lib. 2. cap. 9. sequaces fide & volun∣tate
• g 1.373

  August cont. duas epist. Pe∣lag. lib 1. cap. 19.
• h 1.374

  Ad simplic. q. 2. Vt sit nutus voluntatis ille tribuit, ille lar∣gitur.
• i 1.375

  Rom. 9.16.
• k 1.376

  Ad Simplic. q. 2 si propterea so∣lum dictum est, Non volentis, quia voluntas hominis so••a non suffi it vt iustè rectè{que} viuamus nisi adiuuentur misericordia Dei. potest & hoc modo dici. Igitur non miserentis est Dei sed volentis est hominis, quia misericordia Dei sola non sufficit nisi consensus no∣strae voluntatis addatur At il∣lud manifestum est frustra nos vell nisi Deus misereatur. Illud. autem nesc••o quomodo dicatur frustra Deum misereri nisi nos velimus.
• l 1.377

  Enchirid cap. 32. Si propterea dictum est. Non volentis. &c. quia ex vtroque fit, id est, ex vo∣luntate hominis & misericordia Dei, vt si•• dictū accipiamus, Non volentis, &c tan∣quam diceretur non sufficit sola voluntas homi∣nis si non s••t etiā misericordia Dei, non sufficit ergo sola misericor∣dia Dei si non sit etiam vo∣luntas homi∣nis: ac per hoc si rectè dictum est, Non volentis hominis sed miserentis est Dei quia id voluntas hominis solae non implet, cur non & è contrario rectè dicitur, Non miserentis est Dei sed volentis est hominis, quia id miserecor∣dia Dei sola non implet? Porro si nullus Christianus dicere audebit, Non miserentis est Dei sed volentis est hominis ne Apostolo apertissimè contradicat, restat vt propterea recte dictum intelligatur, Non volentis, &c. Vt totum Deo detur qui hominis voluntatem bonam & praeparat adiuuandam & adiuuat praeparatam.
• m 1.378

  Hieron epist. ad Deme∣triad. Velle & nolle nostrum est, ipsumque quod nostrum est sine Dei miseratione nostrum non est.
• n 1.379

  August. in Ioan. tract. 72. Operante in se Christo cooperatur sa••utem aeternam ac iustificationem suam.
• o 1.380

  Jn Psal. 77. Dei gra∣tia non solum operatur remissionem peccatorum, sed etiam cooperantē sibi facit spiritum hominis in opere bonorū factorū,
• p 1.381

  Epist 47. Ca∣tholica ••ides ••••{que} liberum arb triū negat siue in ••i∣tam malam, siue in bonam, neque tantum eitribuit vt sine gratia Dei valeat ali∣quid siue vt ex malo cōuertatur in bonum, siue vt in bono perseue∣rantèr proficiat, siue vt ad bonū sempiternum peruentat.
• q 1.382

  Retract. lib. 1. cap 15. Intantū l••bera est 1 qua∣tum liberata est.
• r 1.383

  Cont. duas ep. Pelag. lib 1. ca. 3. Et De corrept. & grat. cap 1. Liberum in bono non erit quod li∣berator non libe∣rauerit. In bono liber esse nullus potest nisi fuerit liberatus.
• s 1.384

  Epist. 47. Boni ipsam bonam vo∣luntatē per Dei gratiam conse∣cuti sunt Et post; Gratia intelligi∣tur voluntates hominum ipsus ex mala bonas facere, ipsas eti∣am quas fecerit custodire: & ante, Omnia quae ad mores nostros pertinent quibus rectè viuimus à patre nostro qui in coe••i•• est do••uit esse poscenda, ne de libero praesu∣mentes arbitrio à diuina gratia decidamus.
• t 1.385

  De verb Apos. ser. 11 Nihil ex eo quod aliqu••d sumus. si tamē in eius side aliquid sumus quantum cunque sumus ••i∣h••l nobis arroge∣mus, ne & quod accepimus perda∣mus; sed in eo quod accepimus, illi gloriam de∣mus.
• u 1.386

  De corrept. & grat. ca. 8. Vo∣luntas humana non libertate cō∣sequitur gratiam sed gratia potius libertatem.
• x 1.387

  Prosper de vo∣cat. gent lib. 1. cap. 5. Omnibus hominibus perci∣piendae gratiae causa voluntas Dei est.
• a 1.388

  Prosper de lib. arbit. Proclamat cauendum esse ne ita ad Deum omnia sanctorū merita refera∣mus, vt nihil n si quod malum est humanae ascri∣baemu•• naturae.
• b 1.389

  Coster. Enchi∣rid. cap. 5.
• c 1.390

  Aug in Psal. 31. Crede in cum qui iustificat im∣pium, vt possint opera tua esse opera bona: nam nec bona illa ap∣pellauerim, quā∣que non deradice bona procedunt.
• d 1.391

  Heb 11.6
• e 1.392

  Rom. 14.23.
• f 1.393

  Aug contra Iulian li 4 ca 3. Etsi misericordia ipsa per seipsam naturali compas∣sione opus est bo∣nam, etiam isto bono malè v••••tur qui infideliter v∣••••••m, & hoc bo∣num malè facit qui infideliter facit. Qui autē in••s•• pacit ali∣quid prefecto pec cat. Ex quo colli∣gitur etiam ipsa bona opera quae•• faciunt infi••e••es, non ipserum esse, sedillius qui benè v••••tur malis ip∣sorum autem esse peccata, qui∣bus & bona ma∣lè faciunt, quia ea non fideli sed ••••fideli, hoc, est, stul••a & noxta faciunt volun∣tate
• g 1.394

  Tit. 1.15.
• h 1.395

  Prosp. de lib. arbit. Patet in impiorum ani∣mis nullam ha∣bitare virtutem, sed omnia opera eorum immunda esse atque pollu∣ta, &c. dum ea ipsa quae non haberent, nisi dante Deo subduntur ei qui primus recessit à Deo. Et post. Multa laudabilia reperiuntur etiam in ingenijs ••••••orum quae ex na••••a ••uidem prodeunt, sed quoniam ab eo qu•• ••aturam condidit, re∣cesserunt virtutes esse non possu••t.
• i 1.396

  Aug. cont. Julian lib 4 cap. 3. Noueris non officijs sed finib••s a vitijs d••s••e••∣nendas esse virtutes, &c. Cum itaque facit homo aliquid vbi peccare non videtur, si non propter hoc facit, propter quod facere debet, peccare conuincitur.
• k 1.397

  1. Cor. 10.31.
• l 1.398

  Prosp••r. de vocat. gent. lib. 1. cap. 2. etiamsi in bonis moribus. agat, malè adhuc viuit, si non in gloriam Dei viuit,
• m 1.399

  Arnob. cont. gent. lib. 2. Cog∣nitio Dei fermē∣tum quoddam est vitae
• n 1.400

  Clem. Alex∣and. in Protrepi. Qui absque ver∣bo veritatis ope∣rantur aliquid vel loquuntur, sunt similes ijs qui conantur in gredi absque pe∣dibus.
• o 1.401

  Jdem Stro∣mat. lib. 3. Nec castitas est bonū & ex virtute, ni∣si fiat propter de∣lectionem in Deum
• p 1.402

  Prosper. de vo∣cat. gent. lib. 1. cap 3. Sine cultis veri Dei etiam quod virtui vi∣detur esse pecca∣tum est, nec pla∣cere vllus Deo si∣ne Deo potest.
• q 1.403

  August. Re∣tract. lib. 1. cap. 3 Displi••et mihi quod philosophos non vera pietate praeditos dixi virtutis luce ful∣••••se.
• r 1.404

  Origen. in Nu∣mer. hom. 25. In∣anis est omnis actus, & omnis sermo in quo non est intrinsecus a∣liquid pro Deo & pro mandato Dei.
• s 1.405

  August. De ciuit Dei. lib. 19. cap. 21. Virtutes cum ad se ipsas referuntur, nec propter aliud expetuntur, etiam tunc inflatae & superbae sunt.
• t 1.406

  Idem. cont. Iulian. Pelag. lib. 4 cap. 3. Non quia per seipsum factum quod est operire nudum peccatum est, sed de tali opere non in Domino gloriari solus impius negat esse peccatum. Et ante: Cum non ad suum authorem referu••tur donae Dei hoc ipso mali his vtentes afficiuntur iniusts
• u 1.407

  Arnob. in Psal. 26. Fieri poterit vt obsequendi voto offendam si qualitèr debeant ante non discam.
• x 1.408

  August. in Psal 31. Bonum opus intentio fa∣cit: imentionem fides dirigit.
• y 1.409

  Cont. Iulian. Pelag. lib. 4. cap. 3. Introducens 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hominum genus quod Deo placere pessit sine fide Christi lege na∣turae. Hoc est vn∣de vo•• maximè Christiana dete∣statur ecclesia.
• z 1.410

  Origen. in Iob. lib 1. Omne opus bonum quod visi fuerint homin••e facere, nisi in Dei cultura, nisi in Dei agnitione atque confessione fecerint, sine cau∣sa faciunt & su∣peruacuè. Audē∣tèr dicam, omnia gratis faciunt, si non in fide fece∣rint: sine causa agunt nisi in agnitione vnius Dei patris, & in confessione filij eius Domini nostri Jesu Christi, & illu∣minatione Sp. Sancti hoc fecerint. Omnem iustitiam qui foris a vera Dei cultura atque vera fide fecerit, gratis facit, in perditione facit, non prodest ei, non adiuuat eum in die trae, &c. Ad quod testis est Apostolus: Omne quod ex fide, &c. Quare? Quia bona fecisse videntur non quaesita fide, non quaesita agnitione eius propter quem hoc fecerint A quo enim accipiet mercedem? Ab eo quem non requisiuit, quem non agnouit, cui non eredidit, quem non est confessus, non accipiet ab eo remunerationem nisi iudicium & iram & condemnationem, &c. Sicut enim nihil est delectabile hominibus sine luce, sic nihil est delectabile neque acceptum Deo absque fidei lumine.
• * 1.411

  M••th. 1••. Iohn 5.
• a 1.412

  Aug. de per∣fect. iustitia. Cui grauia sunt intel∣ligat se nondum accepisse donum quo grauia non sint.
• b 1.413

  Ambr in Gae∣lat. cap. 3 Lex ad hoc data est, vt peccatores reos se scirent apud Deum. Manife∣statu enim pec∣catis suis conclusi sunt vt se excu∣sare nō possēt, sed quaererent mise∣ricordiam. &c.
• c 1.414

  Rom. 7.22.
• d 1.415

  August. de bono perseuer. cap. 14.
• e 1.416

  Rom. 9.18.
• f 1.417

  August. de peccat. merit. & remiss. lib. 2. cap. 16. Neque pec∣catum erit siquid erit si non diuini∣tus iubeatur vt non sit. Et iterū, Quomodo non vetatur pe•• iu∣stitiam si pecca∣tum est?
• * 1.418

  3. Pet. 3.
• a 1.419

  Hieron. cont, Pelag. li. 3. Dici∣mus posse homi∣nem non peccare si ve lit pro tem∣pore, pro loco, pro imbecillitate cor∣porea, quamdus intentus est ani∣mus, &c. Quòd si se paululum remiserit, &c. discit fragilitatē suam & multa se non posse cog∣noscit.
• b 1.420

  August. de nat. & grat. ca. 34.
• c 1.421

  Idem. de per∣fect. iustit. Rat. 9
• d 1.422

  De nat. & grat. cap. 67. ex lib. 3. de lib. arbit. cap. 18. Approbare falsa pro veris vt erret inuitus, & resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculà non posse à libidi∣nosis operibus tē∣perare, non est natura instituti hominis sed poen•• damnati.
• e 1.423

  Sect. 3.
• f 1.424

  De nat. & grat. cap. 66.
• g 1.425

  Psal. 24.18.
• h 1.426

  August de nat & grat. cap. 66. Opitulante gratia, &c. & mala necessitas remouebitur, & libertas plena tribuetur.
• i 1.427

  Idem. in Ioan. tract. 41 Quan∣do plena atque perfecta libertas trit? Quando nullae inimicitiae, quādo nouissimae inimica destruc∣tur mors.
• k 1.428

  Hieron. epist. ad Cresiph: Licet alius non fuerit, tamen potest esse qui esse voluerit.
• l 1.429

  Ibid. Quae est argumentatio ista, posse esse quod nunquam fuerit, &c. & dare cui libet quod in Patriar∣chis & Prophetis & Apostolis ne∣qu••as approbare.
• m 1.430

  2. Pet. 3 9.
• n 1.431

  Iohn. 6.39.
• o 1.432

  Ezech. 33.11.
• p 1.433

  Heb. 6.17.
• q 1.434

  Psal. 147.19.
• r 1.435

  August. de verb. Apost. Ser. 11.
• s 1.436

  Videre acumē sed vitreum. Qu••si lucet va∣nitate sed fran∣gitur veritate.
• t 1.437

  1. Pet. 2.24.
• u 1.438

  Eph. 1.7.
• x 1.439

  2. Thess. 3.2.
• y 1.440

  Ephe. 2.8.
• z 1.441

  Act. 5.31. & 11 18.
• a 1.442

  Aug. de prae∣dest. sanct. cap. 6 & de bono perse∣uer. ca. 14. Alijs praeparatur, alijs non praeparatur voluntas à Do∣mino. Illis qui veritatis exhor∣tationem obedi∣enter audiunt, ipsum donum Dei datum est, hoc est, obedien∣tèr audire: illis autem qui non sic audiunt non est datum.
• b 1.443

  August. de duabus animab. cont. Manich. ca. 11. Nemo vitu∣••••ratione suppli∣ciovè dignus est qui id non faci∣at quod facere non potest. Nonnè ista cantant & in montibus pa∣stores & in thea∣tris poetae, &c.
• c 1.444

  Ibid. cap. 12. Peccati reum te∣neri quenquam quia non fecit quod facere non potuit summae iniquitatis est & infantae.
• d 1.445

  Ibid. cap 11. Peccatum est voluntas retinē di vel consequē∣di quod iustitiae vetat est & vnde liberum est absti∣nere.
• e 1.446

  Retract lib 1. cap. 15. Id defini∣tum est quod tā∣tummodo pecca tum est, non quod est etiam poena peccati. Nam quando tale est vt idem sit & poena peccati quantum est quod valet voluntas sub dominante cupiditate, nisi fortè si piae est vt oret auxilium, &c.
• f 1.447

  Ibid. Cur par∣uuli tenentur rei? Respondetur, quia ex eius ori∣gine tenentur qui non fecit quod facere po∣tuit, diuinum scilicet seruare mandatum.