A cleare, sincere, and modest confutation of the vnsound, fraudulent, and intemperate reply of T.F. who is knowne to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English Iesuite. Wherein also are confuted the chiefest obiections which D. Schulckenius, who is commonly said to be Card. Bellarmine, hath made against Widdrintons [sic] Apologie for the right, or soueraigntie of temporall princes. By Roger Widdrington an English Catholike.

THE SECOND PART (Book 2)

Wherein ALL THE PRINCIPALL ARGV∣ments, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to proue the vnion and subordination of the tempo∣rall and spirituall power, together with the Re∣plyes, which are brought, by D. Schulckenius to confirme the same, are exactly examined.

Chap. 1.

The true state of the question concerning the vnion of the temporall and spiri∣tuall power is declared.

1. BEcause my Aduersarie M^r. Fitzherbert, and all the rest, who doe so vehe∣mently maintaine the Popes power to depose Princes, doe much rely vpon the vnion, and sub∣ordination of the tempo∣rall power to the spiritu∣all, as vpon a principall proofe grounded vpon the light of reason, before I come to examine the particu∣lar points of his Reply, I thinke it not amisse for the better vnderstanding of what shall be said hereafter by either of vs concerning this subordination, or vnion, to declare, in what sort these two powers are among

Christians united and subordained, and what a weake ground this subordination is to proue, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to dispose of tempo∣ralls, and to punish temporally by way of coercion or constraint. And to proceede orderly herein, and that the Reader may clearely perceiue, what is the true state of the question, betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine and not be caried away with a confuse concept of I know not what kinde of vnion and subordination, I will first set downe that which is certain, and out of questi∣on, and then what is in controuersie betweene vs con∣cerning this vnion and subordination.

2. First therefore I agree with Card. Bellarmine in this, that the ciuill or temporall power of it owne na∣ture, and being considered precisely by it selfe, is a di∣stinct power from the spirituall, and no way subiect or subordained to it (as in my Apologiea 1.1 I affirmed out of Card. Bellarmine) but they are two seuerall, distinct, and disunited powers, and not depending one of the other, and haue distinct ends, distinct fun∣ctions, distinct lawes, distinct punishments, distinct, Magistrates and Princes. And this is very apparant partly in infidell Countries, where there is true ciuill or temporall power (saith Card. Bellarmineb 1.2) without any order or reference to any true Ecclesiasticall or spirit all power: and partly in the time of the Apostles, who had true and perfect spirituall power without 〈◊〉〈◊〉 true supreme temporall or ciuill authoritie. And from hence it followeth, that as the supreme spirituall Prince, or Pastour is subiect to none in spirituall ••o also the supreme temporall Prince is subiect to none in temporalls.

3. Secondly, we do also agree in this, that although among Christians the temporall, and spirituall power do still remaine two distinct supreme powers, for that the Mediatour betwixt God and men Christ Iesus hath also by proper actions, and distinct dignities distinguished

either power, as Pope Nicholas the first doth well af∣firmec 1.3, yet they are so vnited, and conioyned toge∣ther among Christians, that temporall authoritie and spirituall authoritie, temporall authoritie, and spirituall subiection, temporall subiection and spiri∣tuall subiection (to omit spirituall authoritie and temporall subiection) may be vnited and conioined, at one or diuerse times, in one and the selfe same Christian man: by reason of which vnion and coniun∣ction the same Christian man may be both a tempo∣rall, and also a spirituall Prince, as we see in the Pope, who by the institution of Christ is the supreme spiritu∣all Pastour of the Church, and by the consent of Chri∣stian Princes and people is become also a temporall Prince: the same Christian man may be both a tem∣porall Prince, and also a spirituall subiect, as are all Christian Princes, who, as Princes, are supreme in temporalls, and as Christians, are subiect in spirituals to the spirituall Pastour of Christs Church; the same Christian man may bee both a temporall, and also a spirituall subiect, as are other Christians whatsoeuer; and whether the same man may be a spirituall Prince, and yet a temporall subiect, dependeth on that que¦stion, whether and in what manner our Sauiour Christ hath exempted Cleargie men, and especially the Pope from subiection to temporall Princes. But the questi∣on betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine is, whether this manner of vnion and coniunction of these two pow∣ers, or subiections in the same Christian man, be suf∣ficient to make the whole Christian world to be for∣mally one complete and totall body, or common wealth, consisting of spirituall and temporall power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, or else, notwithstanding the aforesaid vnion and coniuncti∣on, the temporall and spirituall common wealth a∣mong Christians doe still remaine formally two totall and complete bodies or common wealths, the one

consisting onely of spirituall, and the other only of temporall power, although materially, and acciden∣tally vnited in one subiect, in that manner as I haue now declared.

4. Thirdly, I doe also make no question, but that, as the world containing both Christians and infidels, and therefore consisting of spirituall and temporall power, may be called one complete, and totall body or kingdome, whereof God onely is the chiefe head and King, although in the same totall body or king∣dome, but not of the same totall body or King∣dome, there be many supreme visible heads and Go∣uernours, and consequently being supreme, they doe not depend one of the other, in so much that neither the temporall power of Infidell Princes is subiect to the spirituall power of the Pope, nor the spirituall power of the Pope is subiect to the temporall power of Infidell Princes, but both of them are subiect imme∣diately to God alone the inuisible head and King of them both, in regard of whom they make one totall body or kingdome, although the temporall power alone being compared to the uisible heads on earth, doth actually make diuerse totall and complete earth∣ly kingdomes: So also I make no question, but that the whole Christian world, consisting of temporall and spirituall power, being compared to Christ the invisible head thereof, who, at least wise as he is God, is King of Kings, and Lord of Lords both temporall and spirituall, doth make one totall bodie, Kingdom, or Common-wealth, contayning in it both the earthly kingdomes of Christians, and the spirituall kingdome of Christ; neither of this can there in my iudgement be made any question.

5 But the question betwixt me and Card: Bel∣larmine is, whether the temporall & spirituall power among Christians, or the Christian world consisting of both powers, not as they are referred to Christ,

who, at least wise as he is God, is the invisible head of both powers (I say at least wise as he is God, for that it is a controuersie betwixt the Diuines and Ca∣nonists, whether Christ as man be only a spirituall, or also a temporall King) but as they haue relation to their visible heads here on earth, doe make one totall and compleat bodie, or common-wealth, consisting of temporall and spirituall power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, and Christian Kings are not supreme, but depending on him not onely in spi∣ritualls, but also in temporalls; or whether the tem∣porall and spirituall power among Christians doe truly, properly, and formally make two entire and complete bodies, Kingdoms, or Common-wealths, to wit, the earthly kingdoms of this Christian world, consisting only of temporall power, whereof tempo∣rall Princes are the supreme visible heads, and there∣fore in temporalls subiect to no other visible head here on earth, and the spirituall kingdom and mysti∣call body of Christ, consisting onely of spirituall power, whereof the Pope onely is the supreme visible head, Prince, and Pastour, and consequently in spi∣ritualls subiect to no other visible head or Superiour on earth. This is the true state of the question.

6 Concerning which question there is a great controuersie betwixt the Canonists, and Diuines. For the Canonists supposing Christ our Sauiour to bee, not onely a spirituall, but also a temporall King, and to haue directly and properly both temporall and spirituall power, ouer the whole world, and that hee gaue this power to his Generall Vicar here on earth S. Peter and his Successors, doe consequently affirme, that the whole world, but especially which is Chri∣stian, consisting of spirituall and temporall power doth make one entire or totall body, whereof the Pope, being by the institution of Christ not onely a spirituall, but also a temporall Monarch, is the su∣preme

visible head, to whom all Princes, especially who are Christians, are subiect not only in spiritualls, but also in temporalls. But contrariwise the Diuines, who doe hold, that Christ as man, was not a tempo∣rall, but only a spirituall King, and although hee had directly both temporall and spirituall power, yet that he gaue to S. Peter and his Successors onely the keyes of the kingdome of heauen, and not of earthly kingdomes, and only spirituall not temporall autho∣ritie, are consequently bound to maintaine that the temporall and spirituall power, as they are referred to the visible heads here on earth, doe not truly, pro∣perly, and formally make one totall and entire body, or kingdome, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, but two totall and entire bodies or kingdomes but vnited in subiect, as I declared before, to wit, earthly kingdomes, consisting only of temporall au∣thoritie, whereof temporall Princes only are the su∣preme visible heads, and the spirituall kingdome, the mysticall body, or the Church of Christ, consisting only of spirituall power, whereof the Pope is the su∣preme visible head, Prince, and Pastour.

7 Now what is the opinion of Card: Bellarmine touching this point, for that he speaketh so contrarie to his owne principles, truly I can not tell. For al∣though he adhereth to the Diuines, and impugneth the Canonists, in that they hold the Pope to be not only a spirituall, but also a temporall Monarch of the world, and to haue directly power in temporalls, yet contrarie to this his doctrine, as you shall see in the next chapter, he doth in expresse words, whatsoeuer his meaning is, affirme, that the temporall and spiri∣tuall power doe make one totall and entire bodie, Familie, Cittie, Kingdome, or Common-wealth, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head: yea he is so confident in this his assertion, that he feareth not to auerre,d 1.4 that it is against the Catholike faith to

say, that the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power are not parts of one and the same Common-wealth, but that they make altogether two common-wealths, vnlesse this distinction and explication be added, to wit, that the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power doe make one totall common-wealth (whiche 1.5 afterwards he calleth, the familie, cittie, King∣dome, mysticall bodie, and Church of Christ) and two partiall, which are indeed distinct by acts, offices, dig∣nities, and ends, but connected betweene themselues, and one subordained to the other. But how weakely and contrarie to his owne principles Card: Bellarmine pro∣ueth this vnion and subordination of the temporall and spirituall power, you shall forthwith perceiue.

Chap. 2.

Wherein the argument of Card. Bel∣larmine taken from the authoritie of S. Paul Rom. 12. wee being many are one body in Christ, is exa∣mined.

1. ANd to begin first with the vnion; Card. Bel∣larmine bringeth two arguments to proue, that the ciuill and spirituall power doe make one bodie or common-wealth among Christians. The first is taken from the authoritie of S. Paul Rom: 12. and 1 Cor: 12. where hee affirmeth, that wee being many are one body in Christ: from whence Card: Bel∣larmine concludeth,a 1.6 that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes doe not make two common-wealths, but one, to wit, the Church.

2 To this argument I answered in myb 1.7 Apologie, that the meaning of S. Paul in those places is, that all Christians, both Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes, as they are by Baptisme regenerate in Christ, doe truly, properly, and formally make one bodie, one house, one cittie, one communitie or common-wealth,

to wit, the spirituall kingdome, the mysticall body, or the Church of Christ, which Card. Bellar∣mine definethc 1.8 to be, a companie of men vnited together by the profession of the same Christian faith and Communi∣on of the same Sacraments vnder the gouernment of law∣full Pastours, and especially of one Romane Bishop Christ his Vicar in earth. But S. Paul doth not say, that the temporall and spirituall power doe make one onely bodie, communitie or common-wealth, and not also two, or that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes, not considered as Christians or regenerate in Christ by baptisme, but as by their naturall birth or ciuil con∣uersation they are subiect to temporal Princes, which subiection Baptisme doth not take away, doe not also truely, properly and formally make also another po∣litike bodie, another citie, another communitie or common-wealth, to wit, the earthly Kingdomes of the Christian world.

3. Wherefore it is not true, that Kings and Bi∣shops, Clearkes and Laikes considered diuerse waies do not make diuerse kingdoms or common-wealths, but one onely, as Card. Bellarmine concludeth out of S. Paul? for as by Baptisme they are regenerate in Christ, and subiect in spirituals to Christ his vicege∣rent in earth, they make one body, or common-wealth, which is the spirituall kingdome and Church of Christ, and this onely doth signifie S. Paul by those words, we being many are one body in Christ, but S. Paul doth not denie, that all Christians, as by their natu∣rall birth or ciuill conuersation they are subiect to Se∣cular Princes in temporall causes, which subiection Baptisme doth not take away, doe also truely, pro∣perly and formally make another body or common-wealth, which are the earthly kingdomes of the Chri∣stian world. Cleargie men, saith Card. Bellarmine him∣selfe,d 1.9 besides that they are Cleargie men; are also citi∣zens and certaine parts of the ciuill common-wealth, and

againe,e 1.10 if one, saith he, consider the companie of Lay∣men, not as they are Christians, but as they are Citizens, or after any other manner, that companie cannot bee called the Church, and consequently they must bee another common-wealth, and therefore the ciuill and Eccle∣siasticall power, or Clerkes or Laikes, in whom the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power doe reside, being con∣sidered diuerse waies, doe not truely, properly and formally make one only body, but two distinct & se∣uerall bodies or common-wealths, although materi∣ally and accidentally vnited in that maner as I de∣clared before,f 1.11 and presently will declare more at large.

4. And whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that although the temporall and spirituall power doe make two partiall common-wealths, yet they doe also make one entire and totall common-wealth, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, and to affirme the contrary, is, saith he, against the Catholike faith, hee doth heerein both speake contrarie to his owne prin∣ciples, and to that which hee knoweth to bee the Ca∣tholike faith, and hee must also of necessitie fall into the Canonists opinion, which he beforeg 1.12 pretended to confute concerning the Popes spirituall and temporall Monarchie ouer the whole Christian world. For if the Church of Christ be one totall body or common-wealth compounded of Ecclesiastical and ciuill pow∣er, as a man is compounded of soule and body (for this is that similitude which so much pleaseth Card. Bellarmine, and is therefore so often inculcated by him) it must necessarily follow, that the Pope as Pope, in whom, according to his other grounds, all the po∣wer of the Church doth reside, must haue truly, pro∣perly, and formally both temporall and Ecclesiasti∣call power, as a man who is compounded of soule and bodie, hath truely, properly and formally in him both the soule and bodie, and all the powers and fa∣culties

of them both: And what else is this, I pray you, then to maintaine with the Canonists, that the Pope as Pope is both a temporall and spirituall Mo∣narch, and that hee hath truely, properly and formal∣ly both ciuill and spirituall authority: And yet Card. Bellarmine in other places doth expressely affirme, that the Pope as Pope hath onely spirituall and not temporall power.

5 The Diuines, saith he,h 1.13 doe giue to the Pope tempo∣rall and spirituall power onely in the Dominions of the Church, which power in the patrimonie of S. Peter Pope Innocent in cap. per venerabilem doth call a full power; ouer other Christian Prouinces they doe giue to the Pope onely a spirituall power, which of it selfe and properly doth regard spirituall things, but temporall things it doth regard as they are subordained to spirituall. And therefore when we speake properly, we say that the Pope hath power in tem∣porals, but not that he hath temporall power, as he is Pope. Now how these two can stand together, that the spi∣rituall and temporall power among Christians doe make one entire and totall body, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, as the body and soule doe make one man, and yet that the Pope, as Pope, shall haue no temporall power, which in it selfe is tempo∣rall, but onely spirituall, athough in some cases ex∣tended to temporall things, seeing that these two powers doe truely compose the Church of Christ, and consequently both of them are truly and really in the Church which they compound, and so likewise in the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church doth re∣side, I remit to the iudgement of any sensible man.

5. Besides what a more flat contradiction can there be, then this, to say, that the ciuill and spirituall power among Christians doe compound indeede two parti∣all, but one entire and totall common-wealth, which is the Church of Christ, or Christian common-wealth, as hee heere affirmeth,i 1.14 and withall, that the Church of Christ

or the Christian common-wealth is compounded onely of spirituall authoritie, as a little beneath hee affirmeth in these words:d 1.15 That which my Aduersarie Widdring∣ton saith, that the mysticall bodie, Church, or Chri∣stian common-wealth is compounded of spirituall authority alone, is true in this sense, that to compound the Christian common-wealth there is not necessary a power, which is for∣mally ciuill, but yet there is necessarie a power, which is so formally spirituall, that it is also vertually ciuill &c. For how can the Church of Christ be compounded of ci∣uill and spirituall power, which are formally two di∣stinct powers, and yet the Church not haue power which is formally ciuill, but onely spirituall? Neuer∣thelesse I doe not intend to denie, that the spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power among Christians may in this sense be called vertually ciuill or temporall, because it may for the spirituall good command, and compell spiritually temporall Princes to vse their temporall po∣wer, for this were onely to contend about words, but that the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, is truely, properly and formally compounded of ciuil and spiritualll power, this I say is both vntrue, and also flat contrarie to Card. Bellarmines own grounds; but whether the spiritual power of the church may be called vertually ciuill or temporal, for that it may also constraine and punish temporall Princes temporally, or vse temporall and ciuill authoritie, in case the temporall Prince for the spirituall good will not vse it, this is the maine question betwixt mee and Card. Bellarmine.

7. To conclude therefore, this answere I doe freely grant: that Kings and Bishops, Clearks and La∣icks, as by baptisme they are regenerate in Christ, doe truely, properly, and formally, make one entire and totall body, which is the spirituall kingdome, and Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme vi∣sible head: but I vtterly deny, that this spirituall

kingdome, or Church of Christ is compounded of spirituall and temporall, but onely of spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall power: or that Clearks and Laicks, as they are citizens, or by their naturall birth are subiect in temporall affaires to temporall Princes doe com∣pound this Church of Christ, but onely the earthly kingdomes of the Christian world, which are onely compounded of ciuill and temporall authority. In which Christian world, or Christian common-wealth, (taking them for an aggregatum per accidens, including both the spirituall kingdome of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, and also earthly kingdomes, whereof Christian Princes are the onely visible heads, for the Church of Christ is seldome times taken in this sense) there is but one totall or intire Catholike Church: yet there be many intire temporall kingdomes or com∣mon-wealths, as of English, French, Spanish, which haue their seuerall Princes, Lawes, and gouernments, and haue no other communion then in friendship and amitie: Yea, & the Catholike Church is one totall body, or common-wealth in Christian and Infidell kingdomes. And also in one particular Christian kingdome there be two distinct totall bodies, or com∣mon-wealths, to wit, the temporall, consisting of ci∣uill power, and the Ecclesiasticall, consisting of spi∣rituall: wherein as there bee two distinct communi∣ons, the one spirituall in things belonging to grace, and the other temporall in things belonging to na∣ture. So also their be two excommunications, the one in spirituals; wherein those that be excommunicated by the Church, doe not participate, and the other in temporalls; whereof those, who be excommuni∣cated, or made out-lawes by temporall Princes, are not partakers; in so much that they, who are depri∣ued of one of these communions, are not thereby depriued of the other, for an out-law may be a mem∣ber of the Church, and be partaker of spirituall com∣munion:

and he, who by Excommunication is de∣priued of Ecclesiasticall communion, may bee a member of the ciuill common-wealth, as Heathens and Publicans were, and not therefore to be excluded from ciuill societie and conuersation.

8. Wherefore although the temporall and spiri∣tuall power among Christians, as they are referred to the visible heads thereof, doe truely, properly, and formally make diuerse totall bodies, or common-wealths, which neuerthelesse ought both to conspire in league & friendship, to bring both Princes and sub∣iects to life euerlasting: yet they are not like to two confederate Cities or Kingdomes, which are onely vnited in league and amity, and haue no ciuill com∣munion one with the other, neither is the same man a citizen of both Cities, or a subiect of both King∣domes; but the temporall and spirituall power are so vnited among Christians, that the same man, who by ciuill conuersation, or naturall birth is a citizen, part, and member of the temporall City, Kingdome, or Common-wealth, and consequently subiect to her Lawes, is also by baptisme or spirituall regenera∣tion made a citizen, part, or member of the spiritu∣all Citie, Kingdome, or Cōmon-wealth, which is the Church of Christ, and consequently is also subiect to her Lawes. So that although the vnion, and com∣munion of earthly Kingdomes, and the spirituall kingdome of Christ bee greater among Christians, then of two confederate Cities or temporall king∣domes, yet this vnion and communion being onely material, accidentall, and in subiect (as Musicke and Physicke are vnited in one man, by reason whereof the same man is both a Musician and a Physician, and consequently subiect to the precepts and directi∣ons of either art) is not sufficient to cause them to make truely properly, and formally one totall body, kingdome, or common-wealth, whereof the Pope

is head: as neither the vnion of two accidents in one subiect is sufficient to cause them to make truely, pro∣perly, and formally, one entire & totall accidentall cōpound. Neuerthelesse I do not deny, as I obserued before but that the temporal & spiritual power, earth¦ly kingdomes, and the spiritual kingdome of Christ, as they are referred to Christ: who, at leastwise as God, is the head of them both, doe make one totall body, whereof Christ onely is the head, which may be called the Christian world, consisting of ciuill and spirituall power: but in this manner neither the Pope nor temporall Princes are the head, but onely parts and members of this totall body, as beneathl 1.16 I will declare more at large.

Chap. 3.

Wherein the authoritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzen, comparing the temporall and spirituall power to the body and soule in man, is declared.

1. THe second argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to proue, that the ciuill and spiri∣tuall power among Christians doe make one totall body, or common-wealth, is taken from the autho∣rity of S. Gregory Nazianzene, who compareth the spirituall and temporall power among Christians to the soule and body of man. From which similitude Card. Bellarmine argueth in this mannera 1.17. These two powers in the Church, saith hee, are like to the spirit and body in a man. For the body & the spirit are as it were two common-wealths, which may be found diuided and vnited. The body is found without the spirit in beasts, the spirit is found without the body in Angels, the body and spirit are both vnited in man, and doe make one person. So likewise, the ciuill and spirituall power are somtimes found diuided, as long since in the Apostles time, somtimes vnited as now,

and when they are vnited they make one body, or com∣mon wealth.

2. To this argument I answered in my Apologieb 1.18, that from the words of S. Gregorie Nazianzene onely these two things can be gathered. The first, that the spirituall power is more worthy, and more noble then the temporall, and that therefore the temporall must in worthinesse yeeld and giue place to the spirituall. The second is, that Christian Princes, although in temporalls, and in things belonging to ciuill gouern∣ment they are supreme on earth, and therefore subiect to none, yet in that they are Christians, they are sub∣iect in spirituals, and in things belonging to Christian Religion to the command of spirituall Pastours of the flocke of Christ. For these bee the expresse wordes, which he vsed to the Christian President: For the law of Christ doth make you also subiect to my power and autho∣ritie, for we also haue authoritie to command, I add also, a more noble, and more perfect, vnlesse it be meete, that the spirit do submit her power to the flesh, and heauenly things doe giue place to earthly. From which words this onely can be inferred, that the spirituall power is more no∣ble, then the temporall, and that all Christian Princes and Magistrates, as they are the sheepe of Christ, are in spirituall things subiect to the spirituall Pastours of the Church, which all Catholikes will freely grant. But that the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, as they are referred to the supreme visible heads here on earth, do make one totall body or com∣mon wealth, as the soule and body do make one man, or that the temporall power among Christians, as it is temporall (for this much doth signifie the temporall and spirituall power taking them in abstracto) or which is all one, that temporall Princes are in meere tempo∣rall causes subiect to spirituall Pastours, cannot with any shew of probabilitie bee gathered out of those words of S. Gregorie Nazianzene.

3. Wherefore the vnion of the temporall and spi∣rituall power among Christians is nothing like to the vnion of the body and soule in man, for that the bo∣dy is a substantiall matter, and the soule a substantiall forme, and therefore being vnited they make one sub∣stantiall compound, which is called man; who there∣fore hath in him actually, properly, and formally both body and soule, as euery compound hath in him the parts, whereof it is compounded, but the ciuill and spirituall power are not among Christians vnited, as two parts, compounding really and actually one to∣tall body, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, for that, according to Card. Bellarmines owne doctrine, the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, is compounded only of spirituall power, and not of ciuill power, as ciuill is distinguished from spirituall, but ciuill and spirituall power, ciuill power and spirituall subiection, ciuill subiection and spiritu∣all subiection, (to omit now spirituall power and ci∣uill subiection) are only vnited among Christians, as two accidents, for example, Musike and Phisike, are vnited in one man, which vnion, being only acciden∣tall, and in subiect, is not sufficient to cause the tem∣porall and spirituall power to make truely, properly and formally one body, whereof the Pope is bead, but only to make the same man, either to haue in him both temporall and spirituall power, or temporall power, and spirituall subiection, or both temporall subiection and spirituall subiection, (to omit now spi∣rituall power and temporall subiection) and conse∣quently, the same man to bee guided, directed, and gouerned in temporall things by the lawes, precepts and directions of the temporall power, and in spiritu∣all things by the lawes, precepts, and directions of the spirituall power: As the vnion of Musike and Phisike in one man, although it be only materiall, acciden∣tall, and in subiect, yet it maketh the same man to be

both a Musician, and a Physitian, and as he is a Mu∣sitian, to be guided and directed by the lawes and precepts of Musicke, and as a Phisitian by the rules & precepts of phisike, but it doth not make Musike to be guided and directed by Physike, or a Musicion, as he is a Musician, to be guided and directed by a Phy∣sition, as he is a Physitian: So likewise the aforesaid vnion of temporall and spirituall power, of temporall power and spirituall subiection &c. in one man, doth not make the temporall power to be subiect to the spi∣rituall, or a temporall Prince, as hee is a temporall Prince, or which is all one, in temporall causes, to bee guided, directed, and gouerned by the spirituall pow∣er, as it is spirituall: But of this similitude of the soule and body wee shall haue occasion to treat againe beneathc 1.19.

4. Pardon me, good Reader, that sometimes I re∣peate the same things somewhat often; it is not to make my booke the bigger, and to fill it vp with idle repetitions of the same things, as my Aduersaries, to disgrace me, are pleased to lay to my charge, not con∣sidering that they themselues do often times commit the like, but it is onely to cleere thy vnderstanding, and to make thee throughly comprehend the diffi∣cultie, and in what manner the temporall and spiritu∣all power are vnited and subordained among Christi∣ans, considering that my Aduersaries, to prooue the Popes power to depose Princes, to dispose of all tem∣poralls, and to punish temporally by way of con∣straint, doe so often inculcate this vnion and subordi∣nation, as a principall ground, whereon the Popes power in temporalls doth depend. And thus you haue seene, how weakely Card. Bellarmine, and disa∣greeably to his owne principles, hath laboured to proue, that the temporall and spirituall power among Christians doe make one totall body, or common wealth, whereof the Pope is head: now you shall see,

how weakely also, and not conformably to his owne doctrine, he endeauoureth to proue, that the tempo∣rall power among Christians is subiect and subordai∣ned to the spirituall.

Chap. 4.

Wherein the true state of the question, concerning the subiection and subor∣dination of the temporall power among Christians to the spirituall is propoun∣ded, and the different opinions of Ca∣tholikes touching this point are rehear∣sed.

1. FIrst therefore, that you may perceiue the true state of the question, and wherein I doe agree with Card: Bellarmine, and wherein we differ, I doe agree with him in this, that Christian Princes, in whom the supreme temporall power doth reside, be∣ing the sheepe of Christ, no lesse then inferiour per∣sons, are subiect to the supreme visible Pastour of the Church of Christ: but the question is, in what things, and also in what manner they are subiect. Secondly, we also agree in this, that Christian Princes are in spi∣rituall things, or which doe belong to Christian faith and Religion, subiect not onely to the directiue, or commanding power, but also in spirituall punish∣ments to the coerciue or punishing power of spiri∣tuall Pastors, in such sort, that Christian Princes are not onely bound to obey the command of their spi∣rituall Pastors, in things which doe concerne Chri∣stian faith and religion, but also, if they be disobedi∣ent, they may with spirituall punishments he punished and compelled therevnto. Thirdly, we doe also a∣gree in this, that Christian Princes are bound to obey the commanding power of spirituall Pastours, not only in those things, which of their owne nature are

Ecclesiasticall or spirituall, but also in things tempo∣rall, when by accident they become spirituall; in so much that a spirituall Pastor hath authoritie to com∣mand a temporall Prince to vse or not vse his tempo∣rall power, when it is necessarie or hurtfull to Catho∣like faith and religion, but this is nothing else, then that temporall Princes in things spirituall (for whe∣ther they be per se, and of their owne nature, or onely by accident spirituall, it little importeth) are subiect to the commanding power of spirituall Pastors, as likewise all temporall causes and crimes, whether of their owne nature, or onely by accident they become temporall, are subiect to the commanding and co∣erciue power of temporall Princes.

2 But the controuersie betwixt me and Card: Bellarmine is concerning two things; the first is, con∣cerning the commanding power, to wit, whether temporall Princes are subiect to the commanding power of spirituall Pastors, not onely in things spiri∣tuall, and in temporall, when they become spirituall, but also in meere temporall things; for this is pro∣perly temporall power (taking temporall power in abstracto) to be subiect to the spirituall For as a Mu∣sician can not truly be said to be subiect, as he is a Mu∣sician, and in all things belonging to Musicke, to a Physition as he is a Physition, for that Musicke is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to Physicke, and if Musicke were per se, and of it owne nature subiect to Physicke, a Musician, as he is a Musician, and in all things belonging to Musicke, should be subiect to a Physician, as he is a Physician: for which cause a Shipwright, as he is a Shipwright, hath intrinsecall re∣ference to a Nauigator, for that the Art of making ships is per se, and of it owne nature ordayned for nauigation; So also if the temporall power among Christians be per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall power, it must follow, that temporall

Princes, who are Christians, are, as they are temporall Princes, and in all things belonging to temporall power, subiect to spirituall Pastours, as they are spiri∣tuall Pastours: And if temporall Princes, who be Christians, are not subiect, as they are temporall Princes, to spirituall Pastors, as they are spirituall Pa∣stors, the temporall power among Christians is not per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall power.

3 The second thing, which is in controuersie be∣twixt me, and Card. Bellarmine, is concerning the co∣erciue power of spirituall Pastors, to wit, whether tem∣porall Princes are subiect to the coerciue power of spirituall Pastors in such sort, that spirituall Pastors, (especially the Pope, who is the supreme Pastour of all Christians) haue by the institution of Christ au∣thoritie, to depriue temporall Princes of their King∣domes, to dispose of all their temporalls, and to pu∣nish them temporally, or with all kinde of temporall punishments, in case they will not obey their iust command. And this is the maine point, and prin∣cipall scope, at which both the Canonists, who hold that the Pope hath directly power in temporals in ha∣bit, although the vse they haue committed to tempo∣rall Princes, and also the Diuines, who hold that hee hath onely indirectly, that is, in order to spirituall good, power in temporalls, doe chiefly aime. Now concerning these two points, there be three different opinions of Catholikes.

4 The first opinion is of the Canonists, who holding, that the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, doth consist both of tem∣porall and spirituall power, doe consequently hold, that all Christian Princes, not only as they are Chri∣stians, but also as they are temporall Princes, are in all temporall causes subiect to the commanding power, and in all temporall punishments subiect also to the

coerciue power of the Pope, whom they make the su∣preme, both temporall and spirituall Monarch of the world, and to haue directly both temporall and spi∣rituall power, although the vse, exercise, and execu∣tion of his temporall power, he hath out of the terri∣tories of the Church, committed to Secular Princes, as to his Ʋice-Royes, Vicegerents, or Deputies: and this doctrine some Lawyers held to be so certaine, that they were not afraid to condemne the contrarie as hereticall, for which they are worthily taxed by Coverruviasd 1.20 of great temeritie; But with this opi∣nion, for that it is commonly reiected by all Diuines, and confuted also by Card: Bellarmine himselfee 1.21, I will not at this time intermeddle.

5 The second opinion is of many Schoole-Di∣uines especially of these later times, who although they seeme greatly to mislike the Canonists opinion, in that the Canonists hold the Pope, as Pope, to haue directly, not only spirituall, but also temporall power, and to be both a temporall Monarch, and also a spiri∣tuall Prince and Pastour of the whole Christian world, yet in effect they doe giue as full and ample authoritie to the Pope ouer Christian Princes, as the Canonists do; for whatsoeuer the Canonists affirme, that the Pope can directly effect by his temporall power, the same doe the Diuines affirme, that he can effect indirectly, and in order to spirituall good by his spirituall power: And therefore, although they will not grant, that the Pope hath formally temporall power, but only spirituall, yet they grant, that this spirituall power of the Pope is virtually, and in effect temporall; and that therefore the Pope by his spiri∣tuall power can in order to spirituall good depriue temporall Princes of their kingdomes, dispose of all their temporalls, punish them with all kinde of tem∣porall punishments, and finally whatsoeuer tempo∣rall Princes can by their temporall power doe for the

temporall good, they affirme that the Pope by his spirituall power can doe for the spirituall good. Yea some of them doe so extend this spirituall good and spirituall harme, taking spirituall harme, not only for spirituall crimes, as heresie, Apostacie, and such like, but also for all temporall crimes, as are drunkennesse, fornication, and the like, that they giue a more ample power to the Pope, to depriue Princes of their king∣domes, then by temporall lawes is vsually granted to temporall Princes to depriue their subiects of their lands, who for whoredome, drunkennesse, and many other temporall crimes, can not vsually by the lawes of any Christian kingdome bee depriued of their lands and possessions.

6. The third opinion is of many other learned Ca∣tholikes both Diuines and Lawyers whom I cited be∣fore,f 1.22 who although they agree with the second opi∣nion in this, that the Pope hath power to command temporall Princes in spirituals, but not in meere tem∣porals, and to punish them with spirituall punish∣ments, when they refuse to obey his iust command, yet that the Pope hath any coerciue power (call it spi∣rituall or temporall, for in effect it is truely tempo∣rall) to inflict temporall punishments, to dispose of temporals for the spirituall good, or to depriue tem∣porall Princes of their temporall dominions, they vt∣terly denie, affirming, that onely Excommunication, or some such like spirituall punishment, is the last, to which the Popes coerciue power can extend: And this their doctrine, which Card. Bellarmine, and some few others of his Society, haue presumed to condeme as al∣together improbable, yea and wholly repugnant to Catholike faith, I haue taken vpon me to maintaine, as neither repugnant to Catholike faith or religion, nor preiudiciall to eternall saluation, and that therefore it may be defended by any Catholike without any note of heresie, errour or temerity.

7. These bee the different opinions of Catholikes concerning the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, wherby you see, that althogh all Catho∣likes doe grant, that temporall Princes, who are som∣times called temporall powers, are subiect to the spi∣rituall Pastour in things spirituall, and in temporall when they become spirituall, yet all doe not grant, that the temporall power it selfe, euen among Chri∣stians, is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, nor that the Pope, as Pope, hath any co∣erciue power to constraine and punish with temporall punishments, but onely with spirituall; Neither doth it follow, that because Christian Princes are subiect to the Pope, therefore they are subiect in all things, and in all manner of subiection, but onely in that sort, as Christ hath giuen him power both to command & punish: As children are subiect to their Parents, ser∣uants to their Masters, wiues to their husbands, yet they are not bound to obey them, but in those things, wherein they haue power to command, nor to be pu∣nished by them, but in that sort, as the temporall common-wealth, whereof they are members, hath expressely or couertly giuen them leaue to punish; and the reason is, for that they are not Superiours in an absolute and indefinite, but onely in a limited and determinate manner.

8. Now what opinion Card. Bellarmine doth fol∣low, whether of the Diuines, or of the Canonists, tru∣ly I cannot as yet well vnderstand. For although he seeme to disallow the Canonists doctrine, which at large he confuteth in his controuersies, yet to prooue the Popes power to depose Princes, and to dispose of temporals in order to spirituall good, hee laieth such grounds, concerning the vnion and subordination of the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, which doe cleerely confirme the Canonists doctrine. For concerning the vnion of these two powers, hee

affirmeth, as you haue seene, that the temporall and spirituall power, the kingdome of Christ, and the king∣domes of this world, when they are Christian, doe make one totall body, which is the Christian common-wealth and Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head; from whence it necessarily followeth, that the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church doth reside, must haue truely, properly and formally both ciuill and spirituall power, which is the Cano∣nists opinion, and not onely spirituall power, which is not formally, but onely vertually ciuill, which the Diuines, and also Card. Bellarmine in places doe af¦firme. And now concerning the subiection and sub∣ordination of these two powers, he affirmeth, that the temporall power among Christians, not onely as it is Christian, but also as it is temporall, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasticall, or which is all one, that the temporall power it selfe among Christi∣ans is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spiri∣tuall: from whence it cleerely followeth as before I shewed by the examples of Musike and Physike, Christian Princes not onely in spirituals and in tem∣porals, when they become spirituals, which is in or∣der to spirituall good, but also in meere temporall causes, are subiect to spirituall Pastours, which is the Canonists opinion, and which Card. Bellarmine in o∣ther places doth disprooue.

9. But how vnsoundly Card. Bellarmine, and not conformably to his owne grounds laboreth to proue, that the temporall power it selfe among Christians, as it is temporall, is subiect to the spirituall, as it is spiri∣tuall, you shall anone perceiue. For six principall ar∣guments I doe finde in Card. Bellarmine, by which he endeauoureth to conuince, that the temporal power it selfe among Christians, as it is temporall, is subiect and subordained to the spirituall, as it is spirituall, or, which I take for all one, that the temporall power

among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature, sup∣posing the institution of Christ, subiect and subordai∣ned to the spirituall; which arguments of Card. Bel∣larmine I thinke it fit to examine in this place, together with the Replyes, which he either in his booke against D. Barclay, or in his Schulckenius against mee hath brought to confirme the same, that thereby the Rea∣der may fully vnderstand, in what manner the tempo∣rall power is subiect to the spirituall, and how strong or weake a proofe is the subiection or subordination of these two powers, which is by M^r. Fitzherbert sup∣posed to be so inuinsible a ground, to conclude from thence, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power, in order to spirituall good, to dispose of all temporalls, to depose temporall Princes, and to punish by way of coercion with all kinde of temporall punishments.

Chap. 5.

Wherein is examined Card. Bellar∣mines first argument taken from the ends of the temporall and spirituall power.

1. THe first argument, which Card. Bellarmine af∣firmetha 1.23 to demonstrate, that the temporall power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is ciuill, or temporall, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasticall, is taken from the ends of both the pow∣ers. For a temporall end, saith he, is subordained to a spi∣rituall end, as it is manifest, because temporall felicitie is not absolutely the last end, and therefore it ought to bee re∣ferred to eternall felicitie: but it is apparant out of Aristo∣tle, 1 Ethic. cap. 1. that faculties, or powers are so subor∣dained, as their ends are subordained.

2. To this argument I answered in my Apologieb 1.24,

that not euery temporall end is per se, and of it owne nature ordained, or subordained to a spirituall end

(speaking of create ends, and not of God almigh∣ty, who is the beginning and end of all things) but it is only by accident, or accidentally by man, who worketh for an end, ordained to a spirituall end. And therefore although temporall good, or felicity be not absolutely the last end of man, yet it is the last end of the temporall power it selfe, which is in man. For euery power, as it is a power, hath for her last end, her act or worke, as euery science hath of it owne nature for her last end the knowledge of her obiect, and euery art the effecting of her work, (as the last end of naturall philosophie is to know the secrets of nature, and of Phisike to cure and pre∣serue the body from diseases) although man him∣selfe, in whom that power, art, or science doth re∣side, doth intend a farther end. Whereupon S. Au∣stin doth well affirme, that the will to see hath no other end then seeing: The will, saith he,c 1.25 to see hath seeing for her end, and the will to see this thing hath for her end the seeing of this thing: The will therefore to see a skarre doth desire her end, that is, the seeing of a skarre, and no further doth appertaine to her. Wherefore, as the Philosophers do distinguish betwixt the last end of any art or worke, and the last end of the artificer, or worker, so we also ought to distinguish betwixt the last end of the power it selfe, and of him, in whom the power doth reside. It is called the last end of the worke, for that the worke is in that lastly ended, and not the last end of the worker, for that the wor∣ker doth not referre all that is his to that end, as a thing to be desired and loued aboue all things.

3. I grant therefore that the end of a Christian Prince, who hath temporall power, is spirituall and eternall felicitie, to which Christians ought to refer all their actions, and the vse not only of the Eccle∣siasticall, but also of the ciuill power, but withall I affirme, that the last end, which the ciuill power hath

per se, and of it owne nature, is only temporall peace and quietnesse, in the getting and conseruing wher∣of of it owne nature it doth lastly rest. And there∣fore for this reason it is not necessary, that the ciuill power it selfe be per se, and of it owne nature subor∣dained to the Ecclesiasticall, but onely accidentally and by the intention of him, who referreth tempo∣rall peace to eternall felicitie in that maner as I haue declared. To that assertion of Aristotle, powers are so subordained as their ends are subordained (al∣though in that place hee rather saith, that ••••ds are subordained, as powers are subordained) I answer∣ed, that it is to be vnderstood of those ends, which powers haue of their owne nature, and not of the ends of the men, in whom the powers doe reside.

Thus I answered in my Apologie.

4. Now you shall see how insufficiently Card. Bel∣larmine in his Schulckenius replyeth to this answere. I answere saith he,d 1.26 that not euery temporall or corporall end is subordained per se, and of it owne nature to a spirituall end, my Aduersary Widdrington doth say, but hee doth not proue. But first, who knoweth not, that it doth not appertaine to the Answerer to proue, for to this the op∣ponent only is tyed, and for the Answearer it sufficeth by granting, denying, or distinguishing for him to answere.

5. Secondly, I did not conceiue, that this asserti∣on, being so cleere and manifest of it selfe, needed a∣ny proofe at all, and therefore I little thought, that a∣ny learned man would euer deny the same: for that, according to the knowne principles of Philosophy and Diuinitie, no naturall thing can intrinsically, and of it own nature be referred to a thing, which is super∣naturall and aboue the course of nature; and there∣fore betwixt naturall and supernaturall things, there can be no naturall subordination. Now that tempo∣rall peace in a temporall common-wealth is a naturall

thing, and eternall felicitie, which consisteth in the cleere vision and fruition of almighty God, is super∣naturall, and goeth beyond the bounds, limits, and order of nature, no man can make any doubt; and therefore temporall peace cannot of it owne na∣ture be referred to eternall felicity; but onely by the will and intention of man, who by the helpe of super∣naturall light and grace doth referre it, direct it, and eleuate it to that supernaturall end.

6. And for this cause also it is very cleere, that temporall power cannot of it owne nature bee refer∣red to true spirituall and Ecclesiasticall power, for that it is supernatural, and giuen onely by God, as he is the Author, not of nature, but of supernaturall grace. Yea out of Card. Bellarmines owne grounds it may be cleerely conuinced, that the temporall power among Christians is not of it own nature subiect, and subor∣dained to the spirituall power, and consequently, that temporall peace, which is the end of temporall pow∣er, is not of it own nature referred or ordained to eter∣nal felicity, which is the last create end of the spiritual power, for that according to Aristotlee 1.27, ends are so subordained, as their powers are subordained. His first ground is, for that in his Controuersies he affirmethf 1.28, that in Infidels there is true ciuill power without any order, or relation to any true spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall power, and consequently in Infidels the ciuill power is not subiect or subordained to the spirituall, for where there is no order, or relation, there can be no subiecti∣on, or subordination, for that subiection and subordi∣dation doth necessarily imply an order, relation, or reference to that, to which any thing is subordained.

7. Seeing therefore that Christian Religion doth not take away true ciuill power, as Card. Bellar∣mine himselfe also in another place affirmethg 1.29, neither is the true nature, or any intrinsecall propertie of the ciuil power changed or altered, for that it is in a Chri∣stian,

or an Infidell, in this subiect, or in that, it neces∣sarily followeth, that if true ciuill power bee not of it own nature subiect, or subordained in Infidels to true spirituall, or Ecclesiastical power, it is not also in Chri∣stians per se, and of it own nature subiect or subordai∣ned to true spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power. This onely alteration hath ciuill power for being in this subiect, or in that, in Infidels, or in Christians, that Christians ought, according to the true grounds of Christian Religion, referre it by the aide of true su∣pernaturall faith to a true supernaturall end, to which Infidels, who want true supernaturall faith, cannot re∣ferre it: but this alteration is extrinsecall or acciden∣tall, not intrinsecall or essentiall, neither doth it pro∣ceed from the nature of the ciuill power it selfe, but from the wil & intention of him, in whom true ciuill power doth reside. As likewise the nature or intrinse∣call properties of other accidents, as of Musick, Phy∣sick, and such like, are not altered, or changed by the changing or altering of their subiects, & for that they are in Christians, or in Infidels, although a Christian Musician will refer & ordaine his Musick to the true worship of God, & an Infidel to the honor of his Idol.

8. The second ground, which Card. Bellarmine layeth to prooue, that the temporall power among Christians is not per se, and of it owne nature sub∣iect to the spirituall power, is, for that in his Schulcke∣nius he affirmethh 1.30, That among the Heathen Romanes, the ciuill power was subiect to the spiritual power of a false religion: and a little beneath, if the ciuill power, saith he, be ioyned with a false Ecclesiasticall power, that is of a false Religion, as it was in the Heathen Romane Com∣mon-wealth, then it is actually subordained to a false Ec∣clesiasticall power, and if it bee ioyned with a true Ec∣clesiasticall power, as in the Christian and Catholike Church, then it is actually subordained to a true Ecclesi∣asticall power. Now what Philosopher, or Diuine

will affirme that a true ciuill power is per se, and of it owne nature actually ordained, subordained, or refer∣red to a false Ecclesiasticall power, that is of a false Religion, or to the worshipping of false Gods. Ther∣fore this subiection, subordination, or relation of true ciuill power to the spirituall, proceedeth from the intention of him, in whom the ciuill power doth reside, who according to his faith and religion (bee it true or false) referreth his true ciuill power to a true or false Religion, to a true or false worshipping of God, and not from the nature, or any intrinsecal pro∣pertie of the true ciuill power it selfe which, as it is the same in Infidels and Christians, or in whatsoeuer subiect it be so also of it own nature hath the same end as well in Infidels as in Christians, to wit, temporall peace, to which of it owne nature it is alwaies refer∣red. And therefore I doe not onely say: but also I doe cleerely prooue, and that out of Card. Bellar∣mines owne grounds, to which neuerthelesse I being only an answerer, and not an opponent, was not tied, that neither the ciuil power, being only a naturall po∣wer, nor the end of ciuill power, which is temporal peace, being onely a naturall end, is per se, and of it owne nature subiect, or subordained to a true super∣naturall power or end, but onely by the intension of him, in whom the ciuill power doth reside.

9. Now you shal see how wel D. Schulckenius pro∣ueth the contrarie. But wee prooue the contrary, saith he,i 1.31 because the end of the spirituall common-wealth is e∣uerlasting saluation, which is the last end; the end of the temporall common-wealth is the peace of the Citie, or Kingdome, which is not the last end, but a mediate end. But all ends are subordained per se, and of their owne na∣ture to the last end, and in vertue of it they doe mooue, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their owne nature to the first efficient cause, and in vertue of it they worke whatsoeuer they doe worke. See S. Thomas 1••. 2••. q. 1. ar. 6.

10. But to this argument I answered before, that the last create end of the spirituall common-wealth, which is a companie of men vnited by Baptisme, in that manner as I declared before, is eternal saluation, to which they ought to referre all their powers both temporall and spirituall, and all their actions both in generall and particular: but I denied, that the last end of the temporall power it selfe, although it bee con∣ioyned in one & the selfe same subiect with true spiri∣tuall power, is eternall saluation, but onely temporall peace in the common-wealth, to which of it owne nature it is onely referred, as to her last end, although by the intention of him, in whom true ciuill and spi∣rituall power doth reside, it ought to bee referred to eternall saluation, as to the last end of a Christian man, but not as to the last end, which the temporall power it selfe hath per se, and of it owne nature. Nei∣ther hath D. Schulckenius proued the contrary, but ra∣ther in his Reply to my answere hee in expresse words confirmeth what I haue said. For in his answere to the authority, which I brought out of S. Augustine, hee affirmeth, That the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act or operation, and therefore it cannot of it owne nature be referred to eternall salua∣tion, as to the last end, vnlesse D. Schulckenius will admit, that the same particular power hath of it owne nature two last ends, or a later end then the last, which implieth a manifest contradiction; but it must onely be referred extrinsecally to eternall saluation by the intention of him, in whom the particular power doth reside.

11 True it is, That all create ends are subordained per se, and of their nature to that end, which is simply and absolutely the last end, and doe moue in vertue thereof, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their owne nature to that, which is simply and absolutely the first efficient cause, and in vertue thereof they doe worke what∣soeuer

they do worke: But this efficient and finall cause of all created things is not the eternall saluation of men, but God a mighty, who is Alpha & Omega, prin∣cipium & finis, the beginning and end of all created things, both naturall and supernaturall, both vnrea∣sonable and reasonable, of accidents and substances, of all powers and of all things wherein powers doe reside, and who is glorified not onely by the eternall saluation, but also by the eternall damnation of men. God alone is simply and absolutely the last end of all created things, to whome all naturall things are of their owne nature lastly referred, as to the first Au∣thour and last end of nature, and supernaturall things, as to the first Authour and last end of grace and glory: Neither can naturall things of their owne nature be referred to any supernaturall create end, as is eternall saluation, but onely by the will and inten∣tion of him: who by the helpe of supernatural grace shall referre and eleuate them aboue their nature to a supernaturall end. Neither doth S. Thomas in that place affirme the contrary, but rather most cleerely confirmeth, what I haue said: for there he only dis∣puteth, how euery man by his wil, intention, and de∣sire, referreth all good things, which hee desireth to the last end.

12. Marke now, I beseech you, D. Schulckenius his second proofe, which is no whit better then the former. Moreouer is not the body, saith hek 1.32, per se, or of it owne nature for the soule? why then are not corporall things, per se, or of their owne nature for spirituall things? And whereas my Aduersarie Widdrington seemeth to say, that euery temporall end is per accidens, or acciden∣tally referred to a spiritual end: as by man, who worketh for an end, it is ordained to a spirituall end, it is altoge∣ther false. For oftentimes wicked men doe ordaine spiri∣tuall things to temporall, of whom the Apostle saith, whose God is their belly: and by this a temporall end is

per se, and of it owne nature alwaies ordained to a spiritu∣all end, but by accident and against nature by the wicked∣nesse of humane intention sometimes a spirituall end is or∣dained to a temporall.

13. The reason why the body is per se, and of it owne nature for the soule or spirit, and yet the tem∣porall power, or the end thereof, is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to the spirituall power, or the end thereof, I did declare in my Apologiel 1.33, which D. Schulckenius also did relate a little before,m 1.34 because the bodie and soule doe compound one substantiall thing consi∣sting of two essentiall parts, whereof the bodie is the mat∣ter, as the Philosophers doe call it, and the soule the forme; and this is the reason, why the body is per se, and of it owne nature, for the soule and subiect are subordained to it; for that all Philosophers doe grant, that euery matter is per se, and of it owne nature for the substan¦tiall forme, wherewith it maketh one essentiall com∣pound; but the temporall and spirituall powers doe not make one totall bodie or common-wealth, whereof the temporall power is insteed of the matter, and the spirituall insteede of the forme. And therefore D. Schulckenius had small reason to make that interrogation, seeing that hee himselfe did a little before set downe this my reason, which doth fully satisfie the aforesaid de∣mand.

14 Neither did I say, as D. Schulckenius here af∣firmeth me to say, although a little before, as you haue seenen 1.35, he related my words otherwise, that euery temporall end is per accidens, or accidentally re∣ferred to a spirituall end, but I only affirmed, that not euery temporall end, and in particular temporall peace among Christians, which is the last end of the ciuill power it selfe, is not per se, and of it owne nature ordai∣ned to eternall saluation, which is the last end of the spirituall power, but onely per accidens, or acciden∣tally, as by the will and intention of a Christian man,

it is ordained to eternall saluation, which is a super∣naturall end, and therefore not proportionate to the nature of any ciuill or naturall power. And although I had said, that euery temporall end is per accidens referred to a spirituall end, yet D: Schulckenius could not but perceiue by the whole scope of my words, that my meaning was to say, that euery temporall end, which is referred to a spirituall end, is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to that spirituall end, but per accidens, and extrinsecally by the will and in∣tention of man, who referreth it to that spirituall end, for no man can bee so ignorant as to imagine, that Christians doe alwaies referre and ordaine all temporall ends to the eternall saluation of their soules.

15 True it is, that all naturall things belonging to man are of such a nature, as that by the intention of man they may be ordained to good or bad ends, and temporall peace, which is a naturall end, may by the will of man, being aided with supernaturall grace, be referred and eleuated to eternall felicitie, which is a supernaturall end; and this is agreeable to reason, and to the nature of man, as he is a reasonable crea∣ture, or led by reason, to ordaine, referre, and eleuate all naturall things, which are in his power, when by the helpe of grace he is able so to doe, to true super∣naturall ends, and to eternall felicitie, for which hee was created, and to doe otherwise were against rea∣son, and against the nature of man, as hee is endued with reason: But that naturall powers, or ends, should be per se, and of their owne nature actually referred, and eleuated to supernaturall powers or ends, much lesse supernaturall powers or ends, should be referred and depressed to naturall powers or vicious ends, but only by the good or wicked intention of a man, in whose power it is to ordaine a good thing to a bad end, a naturall power to a supernaturall, and contra∣riwise,

this truly I thinke no man of any learning can conceiue, and before I haue clearely proued, that it is altogether false.

16 Lastly, to those words, which I alledged out of S. Austin, and to the rest which follow in my An¦swer, D. Shulckenius replyeth in this manner: I an∣swer first, saith heo 1.36, It is true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, but it is not true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or sci∣ence is not referred per se and of their owne nature to that end, which is simply the last end, but onely by accident by the intention of him, who hath that will, power, or science. And this not only S. Thomas in the place cited doth teach, but also S. Austin in the place alledged by Widdrington, to wit, lib. 11. de Trinit. cap. 6. All these, saith S. Au∣stin, and such like wills haue first their ends, which are referred to the end of that will, whereby we are willing to liue happily. Thus S. Austin, who, when he subioyneth, the will therefore to see a skar doth desire hir end, to wit, the seeing of a skar, and farther doth not apper∣taine to hir, he signifieth indeed, that the seeing of a skar is the last end of the will to see a skar, but hee doth not deny, that the seeing of a skar is per se, and of it owne nature referred to a higher end of a higher will, and that to an other, vntill we come to that end, which is simply the last end. For all good ends are of their owne nature refer∣red to that end, which is simply the last end, and as ends are of their owne nature subordained one to an other, so also it is necessarie, that wills, powers, or sciences be sub∣ordained. As for example, (to persist in S. Austins ex∣ample) a man hath many wills, one to see a skar, an other, by seeing the skar to finde the wound; the third, by fin∣ding the wound, to convince and correct him, who did inflict the wound; the fourth, by correcting him to heale the wound of his soule; the fift, by this act of charitie to me∣rit life euerlasting; it is certaine, that euery one of these wills haue their proper end, neither any thing farther doth

appertaine to them, but it is also certaine, that the end of the first will is referred to the end of the second will, and the first will it selfe subordained to the second, and so in order. Thus D. Schulckenius.

17 But truly in my opinion D. Schulckenius doth in this Reply both plainly contradict himselfe, and also clearely confirme my Answer. And first no man can make any doubt, but that all wills, powers, scien∣ces, ends, and things whatsoeuer are per se, and of their owne nature referred to that, which is simply the last end; but that, which is simply the last end of all things, is not the eternall felicitie of any creature, but God almightie, who alone is simply the efficient and finall cause of all things, and made all things, both hea∣uen and hell, for himselfe, Prouerb. 16. and who is glorified not only in the eternall saluation, but also in the eternall damnation both of Men and Angells: And this D. Schulckenius can not deny, and he might haue seene the same confirmed by S. Thomas in the same question cited by him ar. 8. but more expressely 1^a, part. q. 44. ar. 4. where he proueth, that because God almightie is the first efficient cause of all things, he must of necessitie be also the last end of all things: and by S. Austin also in infinite places.

18. Secondly, whereas D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, and withall, that this last end is per se, and of it owne nature referred to a further create end, (whereof only he speaketh) and consequently that particular will or power must also be referred to that farther end, and so it must be referred to a farther end then to the last, he cleerely contradicteth himselfe. For how can any act be per se, and of it owne nature be the last end of one particular will, power or science, and yet this last end bee per se, and of it owne nature referred to a farther end, seeing that according to the approoued grounds of philosophie, which kinde of arguing the

Logicians call Sorites, or à primo ad vltimum, an argu∣ment from the first to the last, euery particular will, pow∣er or science, which is per se, and of it owne nature re∣ferred to any particular end, is also referred to all those ends, to which that particular end is per se, and of it owne nature referred? As for example, if any particular will be per se, and of it owne nature referred to the seeing of a skar, and the seeing of a skarre bee per se, and of it owne nature referred to the finding out of the wound, and the finding out of the wound be per se, and of it owne nature referred to the corre∣cting of him who did inflict the wound &c. then à primo ad vltimum, from the first to the last, the will to see a skarre must per se, and and of it owne nature bee referred to the correcting of him, who did inflict the wound &c. Wherefore if the seeing of a skarre bee the last end of the will to see a skarre, as D. Schulcke∣nius heere affirmeth, it cannot per se, and of it owne nature bee referred to a farther end, vnlesse hee will grant, that the same will shall haue per se a farther end, then the last, which is a flat contradiction; but if it be referred to a farther end, it is onely by accident, and extrinsecally by the intention of the seer, who refer∣reth the seeing of a skarre to a farther end, then it hath of it owne nature. Neither doth S. Thomas, or S. Austin affirme the contrary, but confirme what I haue sayd.

19. For although S. Austin doth affirme, that all these & such like wils haue their proper ends, which are re∣ferred to the end of that will, wherby we desire to liue hap∣pily, and to come to that life, which is not referred to any other thing, but it doth of it selfe satisfie the Louer, yet he doth not say, that these proper ends, are per se, and of their owne nature referred to euerlasting happinesse, but he doth rather in expresse words say, that they are by some particular will, or intention of man referred to euerlasting happinesse. And therefore he conclu∣deth,

that all wils are well connected together, if that will be good, whereunto all the rest be referred, but if that bee bad, all the other wils are bad. So that S. Austin cannot be so vnderstood, that all those wils are per se, and of their owne nature referred to a good, or to a bad will, for that a will, which of it owne nature is good can not of it owne nature be referred to a bad will, or to a bad end. And therefore when S. Austin saith, that the will to see a skarre hath for her proper end the seeing of a skarre, and no farther appertaineth to her, hee vnderstan∣deth of the last end, which the will to see a skar hath per se, and of it owne nature, and when he saith, that it may be referred to a farther end, good or bad, he vnder∣standeth of a farther end, not which it hath of it owne nature, but which it hath by some other will or inten∣tion, which may be good or bad, according as it re∣ferreth all the other wils to a good or bad end.

20. Moreouer those examples, which D. Schulcke∣nius bringeth in the end of his Reply, doe most cleerly confirme my answer, and confute his owne Reply. For if a man haue many wils, one to see a skarre, another by seeing the skar to prooue the wound, the third by prouing the wound to correct him who inflicted the wound and so foorth, it is certaine, that the seeing of the skarre is not per se, and of it owne nature referred and ordained to prooue the wound, and to correct him, who did inflict the wound, but onely by the will and intention of the seer, who referreth it to those ends, in whose choice it is to refer the seeing of a skar to other ends: neither is their any naturall or necessa∣ry connexion betwixt the seeing of the skar, the proo∣uing of the wound, and the correcting of him, who did inflict it: for that a skar may be seene for many o∣ther ends, and not at all for those. Besides, it is re∣pugnant to the course of nature, that the seeing of a skar, which is a naturall thing, should be per se, and of it own nature referred & ordained to the euerlasting

happinesse of man, which is a thing aboue nature, and beyond the course of naturall things, and therefore it is only by accident, and extrinsecally by the intention and will of man referred and ordained to that super∣naturall end. And thus you see, that I haue not only clearely answered to this first argument of Card. Bellar∣mine, which had been sufficient for me, who tooke vpon mee only to answere, and not to proue, but also haue clearely prooued, that although eternall felicitie, be the last create end of man, yet temporall peace, and not eternall felicitie is the last create end, to which temporall power euen among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature referred.

21. Neuerthelesse, I will go a little farther with Card. Bellarmine, and grant him for Disputation sake, which hitherto he hath not in my iudgement so much as probably proued, that thereby the weakenesse also of this his first pretended demonstration may the more easily appeare; to wit, that not only the Ecclesiasticall, but also the ciuill power among Christians is per se; and of it owne nature, and not only by the will and in∣tention of Christian men referred to the true eternall saluation of man, as to the last end not only of man, but of the ciuill power it selfe, yet it can not therefore from hence by any necessarie consequence bee infer∣red, that the ciuill power among Christians is per se; and of it owne nature subiect and subordained to the spirituall power, or that the end of the ciuill power is subordained to the end of the spirituall power, but at the most, that both of them haue one & the selfe same last end, to wit, the eternall felicitie of man, to which the spirituall power leadeth Christian men by spirituall meanes, to wit, by spirituall directions, lawes, and pu∣nishments, and the ciuill power by ciuill meanes, dire∣ctions, lawes, and punishments: And therefore there is no subordination of ends, betwixt the ends of the spirituall and temporall power, and consequently no

subordination of powers, but they haue both one last end, to wit, euerlasting happinesse, although diuerse waies, or meanes to attaine thereunto, not much vn∣like diuerse lines in a circle, which doe end all in one center, and yet one line is not subordained to another, although all of them ••e tend by diuerse waies to the same center. And therefore by this first argument Card. Bellarmine hath not sufficiently proued, that the ciuill power among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature subordained to the spirituall, or the proper end of the ciuil power, which is her act tending to tēporall peace, subordained to the proper end of the spirituall power, which is also her act tending lastly to euerla∣sting happinesse; although I should grant him, that both of them haue per se, and of their owne nature one and the selfe same last end, which is the eternall salua∣tion of man, in whom those powers doe reside. And therefore D. Schulckenius perceiuing belike the suffici∣encie of my answere, and the weaknesse of his owne Reply, flieth to a second Reply, which neuerthelesse is as insufficient as the former.

22. But although we should grant, saith hep 1.37, to Widdring∣ton, that the end of the ciuill power is not referred per se, and of it owne nature to the end of the spirituall, but onely by the intention of the Prince, in whom the ciuill power doth re∣side, yet the argument which Card. Bellarmine brought from the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, to proue that the spirituall Prince could not onely command temporall Princes, but also dispose of temporalls in order to spirituall good, would be most strong and good. For a Chri∣stian temporall Prince ought to referre the publike peace, which is the end of ciuill power, to the eternall peace and fe∣licitie of himselfe and of his people, which is the end of the spirituall power. And therefore hee ought to subiect and subordaine the end of his power to the end of the power of the spirituall Prince. But as he ought to subiect and subordaine end to end, so also power to power. Wherefore hee ought not

to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Christian Prince, that the Pope by his spirituall power direct, and correct the ciuill power, and that so the sword be vnder the sword, and in the Christian common wealth there be order, peace, and quiet∣nesse, whiles Superiours do rule inferiours, and inferiours be subiect to Superiours.

23. But in this Reply there lie hidden some cun∣ning equiuocations, and the most that it proueth, as oftentimes heretofore I haue signified, is, that the tem¦porall power or sword, or rather temporall Princes who haue temporall power, and beare the temporall sword, are in spirituall causes) whether of their owne nature, or by some accidentall circumstance they be∣come spirituall) to the spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power, by which they are to be directed & corrected, not in meere temporals, but only in spirituals, not by temporall lawes, or with temporall punishments, which doe belong onely to the temporall power, but only by Ecclesiasticall lawes or directions, and with Ecclesiasticall or spirituall punishments or corrections, which onely do appertaine to the Ecclesiasticall or spi∣rituall power.

24. True it is, that eternall saluation is the last cre∣ate end not only of the spirituall, but also of the tem∣porall power among Christians, seeing that all Christi∣an Princes are bound by the law of Christ to referre their temporall power, and the vse thereof, not onely to temporall peace in the common weath, which is the last end, which temporall power hath per se, and of it owne nature, but also to the eternall peace and felici∣ty of themselues, and of their people; And therefore there is here no subordination of ends betwixt the temporall power and the spirituall, and consequently in this respect no subordination of powers, as D. Schulckenius doth here from thence inferre, but aswell the ciuill power among Christians, as the spirituall, haue one and the selfe same last end (whether it bee in∣trinsecall

to one power, and extrinsecall to the other, or intrinsecall to both as I declared before) to which the temporall power by temporall lawes, directions, and corrections, and the spirituall power by spirituall lawes, directions, and corrections or punishments are by the law of Christ bound to direct, and lead all Christians.

25. Whereupon S. Thomas, or whosoeuer bee the Authour of that booke de Regimine Principum doth well affirme,q 1.38 that the end which a King ought principal∣ly to intend in himselfe, and in his subiects, is eternall hap∣pinesse, which doth consist in the seeing of God, and because this seeing of God is the most perfect good of all, it ought to moue exceedingly a King and euery Lord, that their sub∣iects may attaine to this end. Therefore, when Kings, saith S. Austin,r 1.39 in the time of the Apostles did not serue our Lord, then impieties could not be forbidden by lawes, but rather exercised. But afterwards, when that began to be fulfilled which is written,s 1.40 And all the Kinges of the earth shall adore him, all nations shall serue him, What sober minded man can say to Kings, Doe not you regard by whom the Church of your Lord is defended or impugned in your kingdome, that it doth not appertaine to you, who will be religious or sacrilegious in your kingdome, to whom it can not be said, that it doth not appertaine to you, who will bee chast, or wanton in your kingdome.

27. Wherefore if a Christian Prince should by his lawes, or otherwise, withdraw his subiects from the at∣taining to eternall saluation, should impugne not de∣fend the Church, command not forbid impieties, hee should greatly offend God and the Church, and ought not to take it in ill part, that hee should be therefore corrected by the chiefe Pastour of the Church, to whom he is subiect in spiritualls, with Ecclesiasticall and spirituall punishments, which only doe belong to the spirituall power. But if the Pastour of the Church should take vpon him to correct such a Prince by

way of coercion and constraint with temporall pu∣nishments, which kinde of correction doth passe the limits of his spirituall power, then the Prince may iustly take it in ill part, for this were to vsurpe tempo∣rall Iurisdiction, which is proper only to a temporall Prince, and not to obserue due order, but to make a confusion betwixt sword and sword, betwixt the spiri∣tuall and temporall power, which temporall power is only in spirituall corrections, and not in temporall punishments subiect to the constraint of the tempo∣rall power.

28 And therefore well said our most learned Countryman Alexander of Halest 1.41 cited by me be∣fore, that the subiection of Kings and Emperours to the Pope is in spirituall not corporall punishment, according as it is said 2^a. q. 7. that it belongeth to Kings to exercise corporall punishment, and to Priests to vse spirituall corre∣ction. Wherevpon S. Ambrose did excommunicate the Emperour Arcadius, and did forbid him to enter into the Church. For as an earthly Iudge not without cause beareth the sword, as it is said Rom: 13. so Priests doe not without cause receiue the keyes of the Church; he bea∣reth the sword to the punishment of malefactors and com∣mendation of the good, these haue keyes to the excluding of excommunicated persons, and reconciling of them who are penitent. Expound therefore; A King is to be pu∣nished only by God, that is, with materiall punishment, and againe, A King hath no man to iudge his do∣ings, that is, to inflict corporall punishment▪ and a little beneath, A King, saith Alexander, doth excell, 1. Pet: 2. true it is in his order, to wit, to inflict corporall punishment, with which punishment, if he offend, he hath none to punish him but only God▪ what can be spoken more plainly.

29 And by this you easily see the weaknes of D. Schulckenius his argument, and how cunningly with generall and ambiguous words he would delude his Reader. A temporall Prince, saith he, ought to refer

publike peace to the eternall peace and fol••estie of him selfe and of his people, which is the end of the spirituall power. And what then? And as hee ought to subiect temporall peace to eternall peace, so he ought to subiect his temporall power to the spirituall power. But how, in what manner, in what causes, in what punishments temporall power ought to bee subiect to spirituall power D. Schulc. cunningly concealeth. Temporall power to be subiect to spirituall, if wee will speake properly, and in abstracto, doth signifie, that a tem∣porall Prince is in all temporall affaires subiect to the spirituall power of spirituall Pastors. And if by those generall words D. Schulckenius meaneth this, he fal∣leth into the Canonists opinion, whose doctrine in this point learned Ʋictoriau 1.42 is not afraid to condemn as manifestly false, and who being poore themselues in learning and riches to flatter the Pope gaue him this direct power and dominion in temporalls. For the truth is, that temporall Princes in temporall affaires are not sub∣iect to any besides God alone, which is the receiued doctrine of the ancient Fathers. The sense therefore of that proposition must be, that temporall Princes are in spiritualls, but not in temporalls subiect to the spirituall power of the Pope. But what then? where∣fore he ought not to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Chri∣stian Prince, that the Pope by his spirituall power direct, and correct the ciuill power &c. Still you see he spea∣keth ambiguously, and in generall words, the sense whereof if hee had declared, you would presently haue perceiued the weaknesse of his argument: for if he meane, that therefore a temporall Prince ought to be directed in spiritualls, and in things belonging to Christian Religion, and corrected with spirituall punishments by the Pope, this I easily grant him, and so he proueth nothing against me, but if hee meane, that therefore a temporall Prince ought to be dire∣cted by the Pope in temporalls, and corrected by him

with temporall punishments, this consequence I vt∣terly denie, for this were to confound all good order, and to vsurpe temporall Iurisdiction, as I declared before. And thus much concerning Card: Bellar∣mines first argument, my answer, and D. Schulckenius his Reply to the same.

Chap. 6.

Wherein is examined the second argu∣gument taken from the vnion of Kings, and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes in one Church.

1. THe second argument, which Card: Bellar∣mine bringetha 1.43 to proue, that the ciuill power among Christians not onely as it is Christian, but also as it is ciuill, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasti∣call, is this: Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes doe not make two common-wealths but one, to wit, one Church. Rom: 12. & 1. Cor. 12. but in euery bodie the members are connected, and one dependeth on the other, but it can not rightly be said, that spirituall things doe depend vpon temporall, therefore temporall things doe depend vpon spi∣rituall, and are subiect to them.

2 To the Maior proposition of this argument I answered beforeb 1.44, that Kings and Bishops, Clearkes and Laikes, being diuerse waies considered, doe make two totall, and not onely one totall body or common-wealth. For as they are referred to the Ec∣clesiasticall or spirituall power of the chiefe visible Pa∣stour, to whom all Christians are subiect in spirituals, they make one totall body or common-wealth, to wit, the Catholike Church, which is the spirituall Kingdome and mysticall body of Christ, but as they are referred to the ciuill power of temporall Princes, to whom all inferiour Clerkes and Laikes are subiect in temporals, as all members are subiect to the head,

they make another body or common-wealth, to wit, earthly kingdomes, as before I declared more at large. And this is sufficient to shew the weaknesse of this second argument, the Maior proposition thereof being cleerely false.

3. But to declare more fully the insufficiencie thereof, and to shew most plainely, that not onely his Maior proposition, as I haue prooued before, but also his Minor is apparantly false, I answer secondly with D. Barclay to his Minor,

that although in euery body the members are vnited and connected ei∣ther immediately, or mediately to the head, vpon whom they all depend, yet that in euery body all the members doe depend one vpon the other, there is no man so ignorant that will affirme: for neither one foote doth depend vpon the other, nor one arme vpon the other, nor one shoulder vpon the o∣ther, but they are connected to some third either immediately by themselues, or to other members, to which they adhere. May it not, I pray you, by the same manner of arguing, and by the very same argument be concluded thus: The armes or euery man are members of one body, but in euery bodie the members are connected, and depending one vpon the other, but it cannot rightly bee said that the right arme doth depend vpon the left, therfore the left arme of euerie man doth depend vpon the right, and is subiect vnto it. Who would not skorn such foolish arguments?

4. To this answer Card. Bellarminec 1.45 replieth in this manner. That which I sayd, that the members of the same body are connected, and that one doth depend vpon another, I vnderstood of members of a diuerse kinde, as is a finger, a hand, an arme, a shoulder and a head, and not of members of the same kinde, as are two hands, two feet, two eyes, two eares. For the ciuill and Ecclesiasticall power, whereof we speake, are of a diuerse kinde, as it is manifest,

and words are to bee vnderstood according to the matter, which is treated of, otherwise there could not bee any de∣monstration so certaine, against which there could not bee brought some cauill. Therefore Kingly power, which is principall in his kinde, if it compound one body with the Ec∣clesiasticall power, which also in his kinde is principall, must of necessitie be either subiect, or superiour, least that in one bodie there be two heads; and seeing that it is manifest e∣nough, that the Pope is head of the Church in steede of Christ, it doth plainely follow, that a King must either bee no member of this body, or else hee must bee subiect to the Pope, and in the same manner the ciuill power, which doth chiefely reside in the King, must either bee subiect to the spirituall, which doth chiefely reside in the Pope, or else it must remaine out of the Church; in that manner as a fin∣ger cannot be in the body, which doth not depend vpon the hand, nor a hand, which doth not depend vpon the arme, nor an arme, which doth not depend vpon the shoulder, nor a shoulder, which doth not depend vpon the head.

5. But that, which Barclay saith a little after, that the spirituall and ciuill power are as two shoulders in a body, whereof neither is subiect to the other, but both of them are subiect to one head, which is Christ, is not onely false, be∣cause those powers are not of the same kinde; that they may be compared to two shoulders, but also it appertaines to the heresie of this time. For what doe the heretikes of this time more endeauour to perswade the people, then that the Pope is not the visible head of the body of the Church, vn∣to whom all Christians, if they will be saued, must bee sub∣iect? But this Barclay of his owne accord doth grant them, who neuerthelesse in all his booke doth make himselfe a Ca∣tholike: Therefore the spirituall and ciuill power are not well compared to two shoulders, but they ought either to bee compared to the spirit and flesh, as did S. Gregorie Nazianzene in the place often cited compare them, or else to the shoulder and head, to wit, principall members, wher∣of neuerthelesse the one, although of it selfe very strong and

potent, ought to bee directed and gouerned by the other, which is superiour.

6 But this Reply of Card: Bellarmine, although at the first sight may seeme especially to the vnlearned to haue in it some shew of probabilitie, yet to the iu∣dicious Reader, who will be pleased to examine it more exactly, it will clearely appeare, to be in very deede very vnsound and fallacious, to D. Barclay very iniurious, to Catholike religion very scanda∣lous, and in very truth to haue in it no probabilitie at all,d 1.46 as M^r. Iohn Barclay in his answer to Card. Bellar∣mine hath most clearely convinced. And first, where∣as Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that when he said, that members of the same body are depending one vpon the other, he vnderstood of member•• of a diuers kinde, as is a finger, a hand, an arme, a shoulder, a head, and not of members of the same kind, as are two hands, two feet &c.

M^r. Barclay replyeth, that it is vntrue, that mem∣bers of a diuerse kind are depending one vpon the other, as the hand doth not depend vpon the foot, the liuer vpon the lights, the splene vpon the shoul∣ders, &c.

7 And as for those examples, which Card. Bel∣larmine doth bring, hee vseth therein great deceipt, for neither doth the finger for that cause depend vpon the hand, nor the hand vpon the arme, nor the arme vpon the shoulder, for that they are mem∣bers of one body, but for that by order of nature the finger cannot consist, or bee of it selfe without the hand, nor the hand without the arme, nor the arme without the shoulder; Neuerthelesse many members of the same body also of a diuerse kinde can well consist one without the other, as the eye without the eare, the shoulder without the foot, the nose without the eie &c as likewise these two mem∣bers, whereof we now treate of the Christian com∣mon-wealth, not onely may, but also did actually,

as Card. Bellarmine himselfe confesseth,e 1.47 in the A∣Apostles time consist one without the other.

And if this proposition of Card. Bellarmine be true, that the members of one body, if they bee of a diuerse kinde must depend one vpon the other, hee must acknow∣ledge, that in one kingdome the Musician must de∣pend vpon the Physician, or the Physician vpon the Musician, the Shooe-maker vpon the Taylor, or the Taylor vpon the Shooe-maker, the Lord Chamber∣laine vpon the Lord Treasurer, or the Lord Treasu∣rer vpon the Lord Chamberlaine, to omit infinite o¦ther such like trades and dignitie••, all which are mem¦bers of the same bodie or Kingdome, whereas it is too too manifest, that they are not subiect, or depend one vpon the other, but either immediately vpon the King, or vpon those Magistrates, whom the King shall appoint.

8. Secondly, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that it is manifest enough, that the Pope is head of the Church in place of Christ, from whence it doth clearely follow, that a King must either be no member of this body,

or else he must be subiect to the Pope, M^r. Barclay re∣plyeth, that Card. Bellarmine doth cunningly equiuo∣cate in that word, [Church]. For the Pope indeed is head of the Church, that is of Ecclesiasticall things, or of Christians, as they are Christians, in so much that a King cannot be a member of the Church being ta∣ken in this manner, but hee must be sub••ect to the Pope. But if by the Church hee vnderstand both powers, ciuill and Ecclesiasticall, which are among Christians, both Lay-men and Cleargiemen, who are ioyned by one linke of faith, he i•• altogether de∣ceiued. For the Pope is not the head of ciuill things: and therfore in vaine doth Card. Bellarmine affirme, that Kingly power must of necessitie be either subiect or superiour, least that there be two heades in one bodie. For taking the Church in that sense, as it compre∣hendeth

ciuill and spirituall power, the Church hath Christ only for the head, and the Pope and Kings for chiefe members, who also in an other respect are ministeriall heades vnder Christ, the King of ciuill gouernment, and the Pope of spirituall. Besides, Card. Bellarmine doth now change his medium, as the Logicians call it: His argument, which he tooke vpon him to defend, was this: They are members of one body, therefore one dependeth vpon the other; now his argument proceedeth thus; Members doe depend vpon the head, the Pope is head of the Church, therefore Kings, who are members of the Church, doe depend vpon the Pope,

which are two distinct arguments, yet both of them fallacious, and insufficient to proue, that the temporall power it selfe, or which is all one, that tem∣porall Kings in temporall causes are subiect to the Pope, as you haue seene before.

9. Thirdly, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that the assertion of D. Barclay comparing these two powers to two shoulders of the Church, which are connected to one head, who is Christ, doth appertaine to the heresie of this time, which affirmeth, that the Pope is not the visible head of the Church, and that D. Barclay doth of his owne ac∣cord grant thus much,

M. Iohn Barclay answereth, that Card. Bellarmine doth in this both slander D. Bar∣clay, and also maketh the Church and Pope odious to Princes. For what Protestant reading this may not with very good reason conclude, that Catho∣likes, according to Card. Bellarmines doctrin, when they say, that the Pope is the visible head of the Church, and that this is a point of Catholike-faith, doe vnderstand, that he is head and Gouernour not onely in Ecclesiasticall, but also in ciuill causes? what wise men of this world will not relate these say∣ings to Princes? and what Prince can without in∣dignation here them. Neither did D. Barclay euer make any doubt, but that the Pope Christs Vicar in

earth was head in Ecclesiasticall causes, neither did Catholike faith euer teach, that he was head in ciuill causes. Only Christ is head of Popes and Kings, the chiefe head I say of the Church. Whereupon S. Austin doth affirme,f 1.48 that an excommunicated person is out of the Church, and out of the body, whereof Christ is the head.

10. And therefore that similitude betweene the soule and body compounding one man, and the spiri∣tuall and ciuill power compounding one Church, or rather one Christian common wealth, or Christian world, is no fit similitude, and it is wrongfully ascri∣bed to S. Gregorie Nazianzene by Card. Bellarmine, as I shewed beforeg 1.49, for that the soule is as the forme, and the body as the matter, compounding one essen∣tiall thing, which is man, but the ciuill power is not as the matter, nor the spirituall as the forme compoun∣ding one essentiall body, which is the Church of Christ: but if we will haue them to compound one to∣tall body, which is the Church, taking the Church for the Christian world consisting both of the temporal and spirituall power, which are in Christians, whereof Christ or God, and not the Pope is the head, they are onely integrall, to vse the termes of Philosophers, and not essentiall parts, neither doe they compound one essentiall; but only one integrall compound, in which kinde of compound it is not necessary, that one part doth depend vpon the other, as hath beene now con∣uinced; but all must of necessitie depend vpon the head, although in an essentiall compound one part must of necessitie depend vpon the other, for that in such a compound one part must bee as the matter and the other as the forme, as I declared before.

11. Wherefore the spirituall and ciuill power in the Church, taking the Church for the Christian world containing in it both powers, or which is all one, for the company of all Christians, in whome are both

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powers, or both subiections, are not like to the soule and body, which are essentiall parts of man: but they are as two shoulders, or two sides, which are on∣ly integrall parts of mans body: both which powers, although each of them in their kinde bee a visible head, the one of temporals, the other of spirituals, and in that respect doe formally make two totall bo∣dies, to wit, earthly kingdomes, whereof temporall Princes are the head, and the spirituall kingdome, or Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the chiefe visi∣ble head, yet they are connected to one celestiall and inuisible head which is Christ, in which respect they make one totall body, whereof Christ onely and not the Pope is head, which may bee called the Christian world, consisting of earthly kingdomes, and the spi∣rituall kingdome, or Church of Christ.

12. Neither is it true, that these two powers be of so diuerse a kinde, that they cannot be well com∣pared to two shoulders, for both of them are pow∣ers, and in that respect of the same kinde, and as powers they are compared to two shoulders. And why may they not bee aptly compared to two shoulders, seeing that there is nothing more strong and more neere to the head in the Christian com∣mon-wealth? Neither is it materiall, that one is a more strong shoulder then the other; for in mans body the right arme is stronger then the left, and yet one is not more an arme then the other.

May not, I pray you, two pillars of a diuerse kinde, one of brasse, the other of marble, bee aptly compared one with the other, in that both of them are pillars. The temporall and the ciuill power, or Kings as Kings, and hauing temporall authoritie, and Bishops as Bishops, and hauing spirituall power, are as two vi∣sible pillars which doe sustaine the edifice of the Chri∣stian world, or common-wealth, the one in tempo∣ralls, the other in spirituals, they are as two shoulders,

which as in mans body are next vnder the head, and all the other inferiour members doe depend vpon them; so also they are next vnder God the head of both, and all other inferiour members of the Chri∣stian world doe depend vpon them; nay being com∣pared to the inferiour members of the Christian world, they are also as two visible and ministeriall heads; from whence, as from the head of mans bo∣dy, which is the roote, beginning, and foundation of all sense and motion in all the inferiour parts, all spirituall and temporall directions, Lawes, and pu∣nishments doe proceed.

13. And truely if D. Barclay must bee taxed of heresie, for comparing the temporall and spirituall power in the Church, or Christian world (for now the Church and Christian world which consisteth of both pow∣ers, is taken for all one) to two shoulders, and for affir∣ming, that Christ only is the chiefe celestial and invisible head of both these powers, and that Kings and Popes are two ministeriall heads thereof (although both of them are also principall in their owne kinde, and in the nature of a visible head) then must Hugo de S. Ʋictore be taxed of heresie, when he comparethi 1.50 these two powers to two sides, affirming, that Lay-men, who haue care of earthly things are the left side of this body, and Clergie men, who do minister spirituall things are the right, and that earthly power hath the King for the head, and the spirituall hath the Pope for head: Lo heere two sides (and consequently two shoulders) and two visi∣ble heads, wherof Christ is the principal and inuisible head.

14. Then must Thomas Waldensis our learned Country-man be taxed of heresie, when after hee had related the aforesaid words of Hugo, hee concludeth thusk 1.51: Behold two powers, and two heads of power: and beneath Likewise, saith he, neither Kingly power, which by the ring of faith or fidelitie is espoused to the king∣dome,

is reduced to any man authoritatiuely aboue the King besides Christ: and therefore the Pope is not head of the King, or Kingdome in temporalls. Then must S. Fulgentius be taxed of heresie, when he affirmethl 1.52, that in the Church none is more principall then a Bishop, and in the Christian world none more eminent then the Emperour. Then must S. Ignatius be taxed of heresie, when hee affirmethm 1.53, That no man is more excellent then a King, nor any man is like to him in all created things, neither any one is greater then a Bishoppe in the Church. Then must S. Chrysostome, Theophylact, and Oecumenius bee taxed of heresie, when they affirmen 1.54, That whosoeuer hee bee, whether he be a Monke, a Priest, or an Apostle, he is according to S. Paul subiect to tempo∣rall Princes; as likewise Pope Pelagius the first, who affirmetho 1.55, That Popes also according to the command of holy Scriptures were subiect to Kings.

15. Then must the ancient Glosse of the Canon Lawp 1.56, related and approued by Cardinall Cusanusq 1.57, (which Glosse Card. Bellarminer 1.58, with small respect to antiquity, doth shamefully call a doting old woman, and which perchance is abolished for ouermuch old age) be taxed of heresie, affirming, That as the Pope is Fa∣ther of the Emperour in spirituall••; so the Emperour is the Popes Father in temporalls. Then must Pope Inno∣cent the fourth bee taxed of heresie, when hee affir∣meths 1.59, That the Emperour is Superiour to all both Church-men and Lay-men in temporalls. Then must Hu∣go Cardinall related by Lupoldus of Babenberg be tax∣ed of heresie, when he affirmetht 1.60, That the Emperour hath power in temporalls from God alone, and that in them he is not subiect to the Pope. Then must Ioannes Driedo be taxed of heresie, when hee affirmethu 1.61, That the Pope, and the Emperour are not in the Church as two subordi∣nate Iudges, so that one receiueth his iurisdiction from the other: but they are as two Gouernours, who are the Mi∣nisters of one God deputed to diuerse offices, so that the

Emperour is chiefe ouer Secular causes, and persons for the peaceable liuing in this world, and the Pope ouer spiri∣tualls for the aduantage of Christian faith and charitie. Then must many of the ancient Fathers be taxed of heresie, when they affirme,x 1.62 that Kings and Emperors are next vnder God, and inferiour to God alone; as like∣wise infinite other Catholike writers, who with He∣ctor Pintus doe affirme,y 1.63 that Kings in temporalls haue no Superiour, although in spiritualls they are subiect to Priests.

16 But to these and such like pittifull shifts and extremities are sometimes driuen men otherwise very learned, when they are not afraid by clamours, slan∣ders, and threatnings, rather then by force of reason, to thrust vpon the Christian world their owne vncer∣taine opinions for infallible grounds of the Catho∣like faith, and rather then they will seeme to haue been too rash in their Censures, or not so sound in their iudgements, they care not, although with pal∣pable sophismes, so that they may in regard of their authoritie any way blinde the eyes of the vnlearned Reader with their cunning and ambiguous speeches, to maintaine what they haue once begun, and with no small scandall to Catholike religion, and great hurt to their owne soules, and which also in the end will turne to their owne discredit, to impeach those Catholikes of disobedience, heresie, or errour, who shall impugne their new pretended faith and doctrine, as being no point of the true, ancient, Catholike, and Apostolike faith, nor grounded vpon any one cer∣taine authoritie or argument taken either from the testimonie of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, de∣crees of Councells, practise of the primitiue Church, or any one Theologicall reason, wherevpon any one of the most learnedst of them all dare rely.

17 For which cause they are so often enforced to vse so great equiuocation and ambiguitie of words

in their arguments and answers, not declaring in what sense they take such ambiguous words: as in this question, concerning the temporall power com∣pounding the Church, and being subiect therevnto, in one proposition they will seeme to take temporall power formally and in abstracto, signifying temporall Princes formally, as they haue temporall power, and in an other they will take it materially, and in concreto, for temporall Princes, who indeed haue temporall power, but not as they haue temporall power; In one proposition they will seeme to take the Church formally, as it signifieth the spirituall kingdome of Christ, and consisteth only of spirituall power, and in an other they will take it materially for all Christian men, or for the Christian world, as it is compounded both of temporall and spirituall power, and contay∣neth both the spirituall kingdome of Christ, and the earthly kingdomes of the Christian world. So like∣wise they will not insist vpon any one authoritie of holy Scriptures, any one decree of Pope or Councell, or any one Theologicall reason, as vpon a firme, sure, and infallible ground of their new pretended faith, which if they would doe, this controuersie would be quickly at end, but from one place of holy Scripture they flie to an other, from the new Testament to the ould, from one Councell to an other, and from one Theologicall reason to an other, and when all their arguments be answered, then with clamours, slan∣ders, and forbidding of the bookes which are written against them, but not declaring why, or for what cause they are forbidden, or what erroneous do∣ctrine is contayned in them, they will make the mat∣ter cleare. But truth and plaine dealing in the end will preuaile, neither will violence, but reason satisfie mens vnderstandings, and this their violent, shuffling, and vnsincere proceeding doth plainly shew, that they distrust their cause. And thus much concer∣ning the second argument.

Chap. 7.

Wherein the third argument, which is taken from the changing of tempo∣rall gouernment, when it hindereth the spirituall good, is examined.

1. THe third argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to proue, that the ciuill power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is ciuill, is subiect, and subordained to the Ecclesiasticall as it is Ecclesiasticall, is this: Thirdly, saith he,a 1.64 if the tempo∣rall gouernment hinder the spirituall good, the Prince, ac∣cording to the opinion of all men, is bound to change that manner of gouernment, euen with the hinderance of tem∣porall good, therefore it is a signe that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall.

2 Neither doth he satisfie, that should answer, that a Prince is bound to change that manner of his gouern∣ment, not for the subordination to the spirituall power, but onely for order of charitie, by which wee are bound to preferre greater goods before losser. For in regard of the order of charitie, one common-wealth is not bound to suf∣fer detriment, that an other common-wealth more noble doe not suffer the like detriment. And one priuate man, who is bound to giue all his goods for the conseruation of his owne common-wealth, is not bound to doe the like for an other common-wealth, although the more noble. Seeing therefore that the temporall common-wealth is bound to suffer detriment for the spiritual common-weatlh, it is a signe that they are not two diuerse common-wealths, but parts of one and the same common-wealth, and one subiect to the other.

3. Neither also is it of force, if one should say, that a temporall Prince is bound to suffer detriment for the spiri∣tuall good, not in regard of any subiection of the temporall commonwealth to the spirituall common wealth, but because

otherwise he should hurt his subiects, to whom it is hurtfull to loose spiritualls for temporalls. For although those men, who are not his subiects, but are of an other kingdome, should suffer any notable hurt in spiritualls, for the gouern∣ment in temporalls of some Christian King, he is bound to change his manner of gouernment, whereof no other reason can be giuen, but that they are members of the same body, and one subiect to the other.

4. By this argument Card. Bellarmine, as you see, laboureth to proue two things, the one is, that not on∣ly Lay-men, and Cleargie-men doe make one totall body, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, for of this no Catholike maketh any doubt, but also that the temporall & spirituall power themselues, or which is all one, the temporall and spi∣rituall common wealth, as they consist of temporall and spirituall power, are parts or this totall body cal∣led the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the su∣preme visible head. The second is, that not only tem∣porall Princes are in spirituals subiect to the supreme spirituall Pastour, but also, that the temporall power itselfe, as it is temporall, is among Christians subiect to the spirituall power, as it is spirituall, and conse∣quently, that temporall Princes not onely in spiritu∣alls, but also in all temporalls are subiect to the spiri∣tuall power.

But neither of these can bee rightly con∣cluded from this argument, as I shewed in my Apolo∣gieb 1.65, where I denied the consequence of this third argument, speaking of subiection and subordination per se, and of it owne nature. For if temporall go∣uernment doe hinder spirituall good, the temporall Prince is bound to change that manner of gouern∣ment euen with detriment of temporall good, not for that the temporall power is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, as though of the tem∣porall and spirituall power were made formally one politike body, but for both the reasons alledged by

Card. Bellarmine, which he did not sufficiently con∣fute in his Replyes.

5. The first reason is for the order of charitie, by which we are bound to prefer greater goods before lesser. To the Reply, which Card. Bellarmine made to the con∣trarie, I answered thus, that although for the order of charity one common wealth is not bound to suf∣fer detriment, that an other common wealth more noble doe not suffer the like detriment, yet in case that both common wealths bee subiect to one Prince, or that the Prince of the lesse noble cōmon wealth be also a subiect of the more noble, then that Prince is bound for order of charitie, all other things being alike, to preferre the more noble common-wealth before the lesse noble. And although one priuate man, who is bound to giue all his goods for the conseruation of his owne common-wealth, bee not bound to doe the like for an other common-wealth, although the more noble, yet in case that the same priuate man should at the same time bee a Citizen of both common-wealths, if he be bound to giue all his goods for the conseruation of the lesse noble common wealth, whereof he is a Citizen, he is much more bound for the same order of charitie, to giue all his goods for the conseruation of the more noble common wealth, to which also he is subiect. And this is the very case in this present question. For the spirituall and ciuill power, and the common wealths which they compound, are so vnited and connected among Christians, that euery Christian is a Citizen of both common wealths, and both com∣mon wealths may be subiect to the same Prince, as appeareth in the Pope, who is the spirituall Prince or Pastour of the whole Christian world, and also a temporall Prince of some Prouinces thereof.

6. The second reason, for which a temporall Prince is bound to change the manner of his gouernment

in the aforesaid case, is, for that otherwise he should hurt his subiects, to whom it is hurtfull to loose greater goods for the lesser, that is spirituall goods for temporall. To the Reply, which Card. Bellarmine made to the contrary, I answered, that the reason wherefore a temporall Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, if it be greatly hurtfull to the spirituall good not only of his owne subiects, but also of the subiects of another Kingdome, is not for that the temporall power is per se, and of it owne nature sub∣iect to the spirituall, or for that both of them are parts of one, and the same totall common wealth, but because both the King, and also those subiects of an other temporall kingdome, are also members of the same mysticall body of Christ, and Cittizens of the same spirituall Kingdome, and therefore that King least that he should greatly preiudice in spiri∣tualls the kingdome of Christ, whereof he is a Citi∣zen, by his temporall gouernment, is bound to change that manner of gouernment. Thus I an∣swered in my Apologie.

7. Now you shall see how cunningly D. Schulcke∣nius would shift of this answere. To the first part of my answere he replyeth thus:c 1.66 H••ere I see nothing that needeth any answere sauing that [as though of the tem∣porall and spirituall power were formally made one politike body] For my Aduersary Widdrington doth grant the antecedent▪ of Card. Bellarmines argument, and denieth the consequence, and for this cause he doth de∣ny it, for that of the temporall and spirituall power is not made formally one politike body, and therefore one power is not per se subiect to the other. But what man that is well in his wits did euer say, that of the temporall and spirituall power is made formally one politike body? For although Cleargie men are Cittizens of the ciuill com∣mon wealth, as they liue together with the Citizens of that common wealth, and do buy, sell, and doe other things ac∣cording

to the lawes of that common-wealth, yet because they are exempted from the power of the politike Prince, and doe obserue his lawes not by force of the law, but by force of reason, they cannot properly and formally, but onely materially be called parts of the ciuill common-wealth.

8. Adde also that if the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power should make one politike body, the Ecclesiasticall should either be superiour, or subiect to the ciuill, superiour it could not be, for that the King is head of the politike body, neither could it be subiect, for that a superiour power ought not to be subiect to an inferiour. And besides (as it hath beene sayd) Cleargie men are exempted from the power of a politike Prince, and therefore the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power doe not make properly and formally one politike body. But my Aduersarie doth faine absurd opi∣nions, which hee may refell. That which Card. Bellar∣mine saith, is, that the spirituall and temporall power, that is, Bishops, Kings, and their subiects, Clerkes and Laikes doe make one Church, one Christian common-wealth, one people, one kingdome, or mysticall body of Christ, where∣in all things are well ordered and disposed, and therefore superiour things doe rule inferiour things, and inferiour things are subiect to superiour things. Let my Aduersarie Widdrington ouerthrow this, and then let him deny the consequence of Card. Bellarmines argument. Thus D. Schulckenius.

9. But how vnsound, cunning, and insufficient, is this Reply of D. Schulckenius, and also repugnant to his owne grounds, you shall presently perceiue. And first when I denied, that the spirituall and temporall po∣wer doe make formally one politike body, by a politike body I did not vnderstand, as it distinguished and contra-diuided to a spirituall body, but as it is distinguished from a naturall body, and comprehendeth in generall all politike gouernments, whether they be temporall, spirituall, or mixt, in which sense not onely earthly kingdomes compounded of temporall power, but

also the spirituall kingdome, mysticall body or Church of Christ consisting onely of spirituall power is a politike body. Wherefore by the name of a politike body I vnderstood a common-wealth in generall, whe∣ther it were temporall, spirituall, or mixt of both, as any man, who is not desirous to cauill, may easily perceiue by all those answers and assertions, which I did so often inculcate concerning the vnion and con∣iunction of these two powers. So that my meaning in that place onely was to deny, that the temporall and spirituall power, as they are referred to the visible heads and subiects of both powers, doe make for∣mally one totall common-wealth, but onely materially, for that the same Christian men, who haue temporall power or temporall subiection, doe make one spiritu∣all Kingdome or Church of Christ, but not formally, as they haue temporall power, or temporall subiecti∣on, for so they make onely temporall and earthly kingdomes, but formally as they haue temporall and spirituall power, temporall and spirituall subiection, and are referred to the visible heads thereof, they make two totall bodies or common-wealths, as before I haue declared more at large.

10. Secondly, although it be true, that temporall and spirituall power, that is, Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, as D. Schulckenius expoundeth those words (which neuerthelesse is a very improper accep∣tion of those words, for that temporall and spirituall power in abstracto doth signifie Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes as they haue temporall and spiri∣tuall power) doe make one Church, one Christian com∣mon-wealth, one people, one kingdome or mysticall body of Christ, yet this was not all that, which Card. Bellar∣mine affirmed, for Card. Bellarmine affirmed another thing, which I pretended to impugne, and which D. Schulckenius cunningly concealeth, to wit, that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes doe not make two com∣mon-wealths,

but one; This was that which I impug∣ned, [not two common-wealths, but one] I neuer denied that they did make one common-wealth, to wit, the Church of Christ, but withall I affirmed, that they did make also two, to wit the earthly kingdomes also of this Christian world: So that I did not inuent, or faine absurd opinions to confute them, as D. Schulc∣kenius vntruely affirmeth, but I haue cleerely shewed, and that out of Card. Bellarmines, or D. Schulckenius his owne grounds, as before you haue seene more at large,d 1.67 that the temporall and spirituall power doe make formally two totall bodies or common-wealths, and that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes di∣uerse wayes considered are parts and members of them both.

11. Thirdly, although I had taken a politike bodie for a temporall common-wealth, as in very truth I did not, but onely for a common-wealth in generall, as a politike bodie is distinguished from a naturall bodie, yet I might be very well in my wits, and neuerthelesse haue affirmed, that the temporall and spirituall power doe in the like manner, and for the same cause make formally one temporal common-wealth, for the which D. Schulckenius doth heere affirme, that temporall and spirituall power doe make formally one spirituall bodie or common-wealth. For the reason why he affirmeth, that the temporall and spirituall power doe make formally one Ecclesiasticall or spirituall common-wealth, is, for that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes are mem∣bers of the spirituall kingdome of Christ, and subiect to the spirituall power of the supreme spirituall Pastor, which reason, if it be of force, doth also conclude, that the temporall and spirituall power may in like manner ••e sayd to make formally one temporal common-wealth, for that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes, are also true members and parts of the temporall common-wealth, and therfore they are either temporall Princes them∣selues,

or subiect in temporals, to the temporal power of temporal Princes. And therfore the reason, why D. Schulckenius doth here affirm, That the temporall and spiritual power do not make formally one politicke or tempo∣ral body, is, as you haue seen, for that the Clergie are ex∣empted from the power of a politicke Prince, and do obserue his Lawes not by force of the Law; but by force of reason, and therefore, saith he, they cannot properly and formal¦ly, but onely materially be called a part of the politicke com∣mon-wealth. From whence it cleerly followeth, that if a man may be well in his wits, and yet affirme, that Cleargie men are true parts, members, and subiects of the temporall common wealth, and consequently are not exempted from temporall subiection; but doe owe true fidelitie and allegiance to temporall Princes, hee may also bee well in his wits, and yet affirme accor∣ding to D. Shulckenius his reason, that of the tempo∣rall and spirituall power, that is, of Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes is made properly and formally one po∣litike body, or temporall common-wealth.

12. And dare D. Schulckenius, trow you, presume to say that S. Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius,* 1.68 and those others whom partly I did cite beforee 1.69, and part∣ly I will beneathf 1.70, were not well in their wits, when they affirmed, That whether he be a Monke, or a Priest, or an Apostle, he is according to S. Paul, subiect to tempo∣rall Princes. Or dare he presume to say, that Domini∣cus Sotus, Franciscus Ʋictoria, Medina, Sayrus, Valentia, and innumerable other Diuines cited by Sayrusg 1.71, and also by Salash 1.72 the Iesuite, whose opinion hee approo∣ueth and withall affirmeth, That some few moderne Di∣uines doe hold the contrary, were not well in their wits; when they taught, that Cleargie men are directly subiect to the ciuill Lawes, which are not repugnant to their state, nor to Ecclesiasticall Lawes, or Canons, and that Kings are Lords of Cleargie men, and that Cleargie men are bound to come at their call, and as Subiects to sweare alle∣geance

and obedience to them, as Salas in expresse words affirmeth; and that Cleargie men are not exempted from secular power concerning the directiue, or commanding force thereof, in ciuill Lawes, which are profitable to the good state of the common wealth, which are the expresse words of Gregorius de Ʋalentia, tom. 3. disp. 9. q. 5. punc. 3.

13 And to conclude, dare D. Schulckenius pre∣sume to say, that Cardinall Bellarmine was not well in his wits, when hee wrote,i 1.73 That Cleargie men are not in any manner exempted from the obligation of ciuill Lawes, which are not repugnant to holy Canons, or to the office of their Clergie, although in the last Editions of his Booke, he hath left out those words [in any manner] not alleaging any cause wherefore. And therefore al∣though Cleargie men are by the Ecclesiastical Lawes, and priuiledges of temporall Princes, exempted f••om the tribunalls of secular Magistrates, and from pay∣ing of certaine tributes, and personall seruices: yet to say that they are exempted wholly from temporall subiection, and that they are not subiect to the direc∣tiue power of the ciuil Lawes, nor can truely and pro∣perly commit treasons against any temporall Prince, for that they owe not true fidelitie, allegiance, and ciuill subiection to any temporall Prince (as some few Iesuites of these latter times haue not feared to a uerre, whose opinion Card. Bellarmine now, contra∣rie to his ancient doctrine, which for many yeeres to∣gether he publikely maintained, doth now seeme to follow) is repugnant in my iudgement both to holy Scriptures so expounded by the ancient Fathers, to the common opinion of the Schoole Diuines, and once also of Card. Bellarmine himselfe, at which time I thinke D. Schulckenius will not say, that he was not wel in his wits, and also to the practise both of the primitiue Church, and of all Christian Kingdomes euen to these dayes, and it is a doctrine newly broa∣ched

in the Christian world without sufficient proofe, scandalous to Catholike Religion, iniurious to Chri∣an Princes, and odious to the pious eares of all faith∣full and well affected Subiects.

14. The other reason, which D. Schulckenius al∣legeth, why Kings and Bishops, Clearkes and Laicks doe not make properly and formally one politike body or tem∣porall common-wealth, (for to say that temporall and spirituall power in abstracto doe make formally either one temporal, or one spiritual cōmon-wealth, is very vntrue and repugnant to his owne grounds, as I haue shewed before, vnlesse we will speake very improper∣ly) to wit, for that Cleargie men are superiour and not subiect, is as insufficient as the former; for that tem∣porall Princes are in temporalls superiour, and haue preheminence not onely ouer Lay-men, but also o∣uer Cleargy men. And therefore the temporall, and spirituall power, or Kings and Bishops, Clearkes and Laikes, as they are referred to the visible heads heere on earth, doe neither make one politike or temporall body, nor one spirituall or Ecclesiasticall body, nor one total common-wealth consisting of both powers, whereof the Pope is head, but they doe make formally, and properly two totall bodies or common-wealths, to wit, the spirituall kingdome of Christ, which consi∣steth onely of spirituall power, and the earthly king∣domes of this Christian world, which consisteth one∣ly of temporall and ciuill authority, both which bo∣dies are commonly signified by the name of the Christian world, or Christian common-wealth, wher∣in all things are well ordered, and rightly disposed, and therefore superiours are aboue inferiours, and in∣feriours are subiect to superiours; but in temporall causes temporall power, whereof temporall Princes are the head, hath the preheminence not onely ouer Lay-men, but also ouer Cleargy-men, and in spiri∣tuall causes the spirituall power, whereof the Pope is

head, is superiour, and to confound these two powers, were to breake all good order, as before I also de∣clared. And therfore for good reason I granted the antecedent proposition of Card. Bellarmines argu∣ment, and denied his consequence.

15. But fourthly obserue, good Reader, another palpable vntruth, which D. Schulckenius in this place affirmeth. Card. Bellarmine, as you haue seene, ende∣uoured by his third argument to proue, that the tem∣porall power as it is temporall, is among Christians subiect to the spirituall power, as it is spirituall; and his argument was this: If the temporall gouernment hinder the spirituall good, the Prince is bound to change that manner of gouernment, euen with the hinderance of the temporall good, therefore it is a signe that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall.. The antecedent pro∣position I did grant, and I denied his consequence. Now D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that for this cause I denyed his consequence, for that of the temporall and spi∣rituall power is not made formally one politike body, which is very vntrue. For although I should acknowledge, as in very deede I doe, that the temporall and spiri∣tuall power, as they are referred to Christ the invisible and celestiall head, doe make properly and formally one totall body, or common-wealth, consisting of both powers, which may be called the Christian com∣mon wealth, but more properly the Christian world, yet I would and doe denie his consequence: and the reason hereof I alledged before, for that they are not essentiall parts of this totall bodie, as the bodie & soule are of man, but integrall parts, as two shoulders, two sides, hands, feete, eyes, eares, &c. are integrall parts of mans bodie, and doe not make an essentiall, but an in∣tegrall compound, in which kinde of compound it is not necessarie, as I shewed beforek 1.74, that one part bee subiect to an other, but it sufficeth that both be sub∣iect to the head. And although I should also grant,

as I doe, that temporall and spirituall power doe make formally one politike bodie, or temporall common wealth, taking temporall and spirituall power in that im∣proper sense, as is declared by D. Schulckenius, to wit, for Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, who diuerse waies considered, doe make properly, and formally not onely a spirituall, but also a politike bodie or tempo∣rall common-wealth: yet I should and do notwith∣standing denie his consequence, for those two causes, which Card. Bellarmine did in his Replyes alledge, but, as you haue seene, not sufficiently confute.

16 And truly if this argument of Card. Bellar∣mine were of force, it would in my opinion convince, that not only the temporall power among Christians is subiect to the spirituall power of the Pope, but also that the temporall power among infidell Princes is also subiect to the Popes spirituall authoritie, which neuerthelesse Card. Bellarmine doth denie; for if the temporall gouernment of an infidell Prince doe hurt and hinder the spirituall good of Christian Religion, he is bound to change that manner of gouernment euen with the hinderance of temporall good, there∣fore I might conclude with Card. Bellarmine, that it is a signe that the temporall power of an heathen Prince is subiect to the spirituall power of Christian religion. And therefore as the changing of tempo∣rall gouernment among infidells, when it hindereth the spirituall good of Christian religion, is no proba∣ble signe of any subiection per se of their temporall power to the Popes spirituall authoritie, but onely of a bond of charitie, whereby all men are by the law of God and nature bound not to hinder true spirituall good for a temporall commoditie, so also among Christians it is no probable signe of any subiection or subordination of the temporall power to the spiri∣tuall, but at the most of a greater bond of charitie, whereby Christians not only by the law of God and

nature, but also by the bond of Christian religion, which they professe, are obliged not to hinder the spi∣rituall good thereof for a temporall commoditie.

17 Now you shall see, how insufficiently also D. Schulckenius replyeth to those two answers, which I made to Card. Bellarmines Replyes, wherein are al∣ledged the causes, why I denyed the consequence of his argument, and why a temporall Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporall gouernment, when it hindereth the spirituall good. And first to my first answer D. Schulckenius replyeth thus:l 1.75 that by my answer it is clearely gathered, that I say nothing in this place, which maketh to the ouerthrowing of Card. Bellarmines argument. For I confesse, saith he, that a Prince of a lesse noble common-wealth is not bound to suf∣fer any detriment onely for the order of charitie, that an other common-wealth more noble doe not suffer the like, vnlesse either hee bee subiect to the Prince of that noble common-wealth, or vnlesse one hath both the common wealths subiect to him. Therefore I am constrained, saith he, to confesse, that the principall reason, why a tem∣porall Prince ought to suffer detriment in temporalls, lest that the spirituall good be hindered, is not the order of charitie, but the subiection of the temporall common wealth to the spirituall, when they concurre to make one Christian common-wealth, or one mysticall bodie of Christ. Therefore I haue not, saith hee, confuted Card: Bellar∣mines argument, but haue yeelded vp the bucklers, yea and also haue confirmed it.

18 But truly it is strange to see, with what bold∣nesse, men otherwise learned, dare aduenture to auouch such grosse and palpable vntruths, and when their answers are cleane ouerthrowne, to brag not on∣ly of the victorie, but also that their Aduersarie hath granted, and confirmed their answers. For obserue, good Reader, how vntrue and fraudulent this answer is. I affirmed, as you haue seene, that the reason, why a

temporall Christian Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, if it hinder the spirituall good, is not, for that the temporall power is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, as Card. Bellarmine pretended, but because he being a Christian Prince, to whom especially, more then to a Heathen, it doth belong to haue care of true spirituall good, which Christian Religion ought chiefly to in∣tend, is by the order of charitie, and not for any in∣trinsecall subiection, or subordination of the tempo∣rall power to the spirituall, bound to preferre, caeteris paribus, the spirituall good before the temporall. And whereas Card. Bellarmine replyed, that for the order of charitie one common wealth, although the lesse noble, is not bound to suffer detriment, that an other common wealth more noble do not suffer the like detriment; and one priuate man, who is bound to giue all his goods for the preseruation of his owne common wealth, is not likewise bound to doe the like for an other common wealth although more noble; Seeing therefore that a temporall common-wealth is bound to suffer damage for the spirituall, it is a signe, that they are not two diuerse common-wealths, but parts of one and the selfe same common wealth, and one subiect to another.

12. To this Reply I answered, by shewing the dis∣paritie betwixt one temporall common-wealth com∣pared to an other, and a temporall common-wealth compared to the spirituall common wealth: because the same Prince, or subiect of one temporall common wealth is seldome, or neuer, a Prince or subiect of the other, and therefore the order of charitie requireth, that both the Prince and subiect ought to prefer the temporall good of their owne common wealth, be∣fore the temporall good of an other more noble com∣mon wealth: As also a man lesse noble ought in cha∣ritie to prefer, if other things be alike, his own tempo∣rall good before the temporall good of an other man more noble. But if it should so fall out, that the same

man were Prince of both common wealths, or the same priuate man were a part and member of both common wealths, in this case the order of charitie would require, that he, who is member, or hath charge of both common-wealths, should preferre, if other things be alike, the temporall good of the more noble common wealth before the temporal good of the lesse noble, not by reason of any subiection of one com∣mon wealth to the other, but because both common-wealths are subiect to the same Prince, or the same priuate man is subiect to both common wealths, and therefore they ought with due respect and order of charitie to haue care of both, and to preferre the more worthy common wealth before the lesse worthy.

20. As likewise if one man hath diuerse trades, one more noble, an other lesse noble, one more profita∣ble, and other lesse profitable, if in case he should bee compelled to loose, or preiudice one of his trades, the order of charitie would require, that hee should rather loose, or preiudice the lesse noble, then the more no∣ble, the lesse profitable, then the more profitable trade, neither from hence could it bee gathered, that one trade were subiect, or subordained to another, but on∣ly that both trades were subiect to one man. So likwise if a man were constrained to loose either his eye or his finger, the order of charitie would require that hee should preferre the eye before the finger, for that the eye is a more noble, a more necessarie, a more profi∣table part of the body then the finger, and yet from hence we cannot well conclude, that therefore the fin∣ger is subiect or subordained to the eye, but that both are parts and members of the body of the same man, who therefore by order of charitie ought with due or∣der and respect to haue a care of the whole body and euery part thereof, and to preferre the more worthy, necessary or profitable before the lesse worthy, neces∣sarie or profitable member. And this I said was the

plaine case of the temporall power among Christians compared to the spirituall, for that the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power, temporall power and spirituall sub∣iection &c. are among Christians so vnited in one subiect, that the same Christian man is a part, mem∣ber, and Citizen both of the temporall, and also of the spirituall common wealth, and both common wealths may be subiect to the same Prince, as appeareth in the Pope, and therefore the order of charitie doth re∣quire, that euery Christian man ought to preferre the spirituall good, and spirituall common wealth, before the temporall good and the temporall common-wealth, not for that the temporall power, or common wealth is subiect to the spirituall, but for that all Chri∣stian Princes and people are parts, members, and Ci∣tizens of both common wealths, and the spirituall is farre more noble, and worthy, and therefore if other things be alike, to bee preferred before the tempo∣rall, by them who are parts and members of them both.

21. Now D. Schulckenius would cunningly forsooth make the Reader beleeue, that I say the very same that Card. Bellarmine doth, and that I doe not by my answere ouerthrow, but confirme Card. Bellarmines Reply: for that I am enforced, saith he, to confesse that the chiefe cause, why a temporall Prince ought to suffer da∣mage in temporalls, least the spirituall good should be hinder∣ed, is not the order of charitie, but the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, when they make one spiri∣tuall common wealth, or mysticall body of Christ, which neuerthelesse, as you haue seene, is apparantly vntrue. For although I doe indeed alledge subiection for a cause, why the order of charitie doth require, that a temporall Christian Prince ought to preferre the spi∣rituall good before the temporall, by which word [subiection] D. Schulckenius taketh occasion to delude his Reader, yet I doe not alledge that manner of sub∣iection,

which Card. Bellarmine doth, as D. Schulcke∣nius vntruly affirmeth, to wit, the subiection of the tem∣porall power to the spirituall, or of the temporall common wealth to the spirituall, taking temporall common-wealth properly as it consisteth of temporall power and tempo∣rall subiection, but the subiection of both common-wealths to one Prince, or the subiection of all Christi∣ans to both common wealths, to bee the cause, why the order of charitie requireth, that a Christian Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, when it hindereth the spirituall good.

22. Belike D. Schulckenius would inferre, that be∣cause the Pope is Lord of Ancona, and Ferrara, and ought to prefer caeteris paribus the good of the one be∣fore the other, therefore the State of Ancona is sub∣iect to the State of Ferrara, or contrariwise, or because the King of Spaine is King of Naples and Duke of Mil∣lan, therefore the State of Millan is subiect to Naples, or because a man hath two trades, and ought to pre∣ferre the one before the other, therefore the one is subiect to the other, or because one man is a Cittizen of two cities, therefore one of those cities is subiect to the other, or because the eyes and eares are parts and members of the same body of man, who ought there∣fore by order of charity to preferre the good of the more worthy and necessary member before the good of the lesse worthie and lesse necessarie, therefore the eares are subiect to the eyes or contrariwise. I euer affirmed, that the temporall power among Christians is not per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spi∣rituall, and that they doe not properly and formally, as they are referred to the visible heads heere on earth, make one totall, but two totall common-wealths, al∣though the same Christian man being considered di∣uerse waies, is a part and member of both common-wealths, and as in spirituall causes he is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall power, which onely doth properly and

formally make the spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall com∣mon-wealth, so in temporall causes hee is subiect to the ciuill power, which onely doth properly and for∣mally make the remporall or earthly kingdomes of this Christian world, and because the spirituall com∣mon-wealth and good thereof is the more noble and more worthy, therefore the same Christian man, be∣ing a member and citizen of both common-wealths, ought to preferre, if other things be alike, the spiritu∣all good before temporall, and not for any subiection of the temporall power, or commonwealth to the spi∣rituall. But when men are not disposed to deale sin∣cerely for truthes sake, but are resolued to defend per fas & nefas, what they haue once taken in hand to maintaine, and doe not fight for truth, but for credit, they little regard what they say, so that with cun∣ning & smooth words they may colour their sayings in such sort, as that they may blind, dazel or confound the vnderstanding of the Reader. And thus much concerning Card. Bellarmines first Reply.

23. Now to the answer, which I made to Card. Bellarmines second Reply, by which hee pretended to prooue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, D. Schulckeniusm 1.76 replieth in this manner. I answer that my Aduersary Widdrington saith nothing, which doth weaken Card. Bellarmines argument. That which Card. Bellarmine did assume, to wit, that a tempo∣rall Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, not onely, least that hee should hurt in spirituals his owne subiects, but also least that he should hurt other Christians, my Aduersarie Widdrington doth grant. And in this as∣sumption, or antecedent proposition all the force of Card. Bellarmines argument doth consist. Besides, when Wid∣drington denyeth, that the temporall power is per se sub∣iect to the spirituall, or that both of them bee parts of one, and the selfe same Christian common-wealth, and after∣wards granteth, that a temporall King, and those, who are

ciuilly subiect vnto him, are members of the mysticall body, and Citizens of the same spirituall Kingdome, he doth ma∣nifestly contradict himselfe. For what else is this, that Christian Kings and their Subiects are members of the same mysticall body of Christ, and Citizens of the same spi∣rituall Kingdome, I say, what else is this, then that Chri∣stian Kings, and their Lay-Subiects are parts of the Chri∣stian common-wealth? For the Christian common-wealth, and the mysticall bodie of Christ, and the spirituall King∣dome of Christ are altogether the same: of which common-wealth Kings with Laikes, Bishops with Clerks are parts, as oftentimes hath beene sayd. In which Christian com-wealth, and mysticall body, and Kingdome of Christ all things are so well disposed and ordered, that temporall things doe serue spirituall, and ciuill power is subiect to Ecclesiasticall, which conclusion my Aduersarie Wid∣drington hath many waies attempted to ouerthrow, but he was not able. And he was not able not onely to ouerthrow the conclusion, but also he hath not beene able to weaken at all with any probable answer the first argument which Card. Bellarmine brought to prooue this conclusion, which the Readers will easily perceiue, if without perturbation of minde they will consider that which hath beene sayd by vs.

24 But this Reply of D. Schulckenius is as fraudu∣lent, and insufficient, as the former: for in effect it is only a repetition of his former Reply, to which I haue already answered, besides some fraudulent dealing, which he hath vsed herein. And first it is very true, that I granted the antecedent proposition of this se∣cond Reply of Card. Bellarmine, but that all the force of Card. Bellarmines argument doth consist in the antece∣dent proposition, or assumption, as D. Schulckenius affir∣meth, is very vntrue, and I wonder, that D. Schulcke∣nius is not ashamed with such boldnesse to affirme the same. The Antecedent proposition was, that a Chri∣stian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporal

gouernment, if it hurt the spirituall good, not onely of his owne Subiects, but also of the Subiects of other Christian Princes, and this proposition I did willingly grant him, but the force of his argument did not consist only in this antecedent proposition, as D. Schulckenius vntruly affirmeth, but in the consequence, which hee inferred from this antecedent proposition, or if wee will reduce his argument to a syllogisticall forme, in his Minor proposition, or assumption, which was this, but of this, to wit, that a Christian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporall gouernment in the case aforesaid, no other reason can be giuen, but that both powers are members of the same body, and one power or body subiect to the other. And this consequence, as∣sumption, or Minor proposition, wherein the whole force of his argument did consist, I vtterly denyed, and I alledged, as you haue seene, an other plaine and perspicuous reason, why a Christian Prince in the case aforesaid is bound to change the manner of his tem∣porall gouernment, to wit, not for that temporall power is per se subiect to the spirituall, or for that they make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, con∣sisting of temporall and spirituall power, but for that all Christians, both Princes and subiects, are parts and members not onely of the temporall, but also of the spiritual common-wealth, for which cause a Chri∣stian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporall gouernment, when it is hurtfull to the spi∣rituall good of the Church, or spirituall kingdome of Christ, whereof he is a true part and member, as I de∣clared before.

25. Secondly, it is very vntrue, that I doe any waie contradict my selfe, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, first in denying that temporall power is per se subiect to the spiri∣tuall, or that both of them are parts of one and the selfe-same Christian common-wealth or Church of Christ, and afterwards in granting, that temporall Kings, and their

subiects, are members of the same spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ. For these propositions, temporall power is not per se, subiect to spirituall power, and tempo∣rall Princes are subiect to spirituall power, are not re∣pugnant or contradictorie one to the other, as nei∣ther these propositions are contradictory, Temporall power and spirituall power, are not parts of the spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ, and temporall Princes are parts of the spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ. For contradiction according to Aristotlen 1.77, is an affirming and denying of the same thing, and in the same manner: But there is no man so ignorant that will affirme that the same thing, and in the same manner is affirmed and denied in the aforesaid propositions: for the subiect of the first propositions, is temporall power in ab∣stracto, and it is taken formally, and in the second propositions it is temporall power in concreto, and it is taken onely materially, and hath this sense, that tem∣porall Princes, who haue both temporall power, and also spirituall subiection, are indeed subiect to the spi∣rituall power, and are parts and members of the spi∣rituall kingdome of Christ, but not formally, as they haue temporall power, but onely materially, who haue temporall power, but formally as they haue spi∣ritual subiection. But D. Schulckenius doth manifest∣ly contradict himselfe, as I plainely shewed beforeo 1.78, first affirming, That the Church of Christ is compoun∣ded of temporall and spirituall power, which are formal∣ly two distinct powers, as he himselfe also confesseth, and afterwards in denying, that it is compounded of temporall, or ciuill power, which is formally ciuill.

26. But marke now good Reader, what fraude D. Schulckenius vseth in prouing, that I doe manifestly contradict my selfe. He would seeme to his Reader to proue, that I affirme and deny one and the selfe same thing: for this he taketh vpon him to proue, and yet he proueth nothing else, but that which I haue al∣waies

affirmed, and neuer denied, to wit, that Chri∣stian Kings, and their subiects are parts and members of the Church, and subiect to the spirituall power thereof, but the contradiction, which hee pretended to proue, he doth not proue at all, nor make any shew of proofe thereof, to wit, that it is all one to say, that Christian Princes and their subiects are parts and members of the Church, and subiect to her spirituall power, which I alwaies granted, and that the tempo∣rall and spirituall power doe compound the Church, or that the temporall power it selfe is per se, subiect to the spirituall power of the Church, which I euer de∣nied, and out of Card. Bellarmines owne grounds haue cleerely proued the contrary, and haue plainely shewed, that temporall power doth only compound a temporall or ciuill body or common-wealth, where∣of the King is head, as D. Schulckenius doth heere ex∣presly affirme, and that the Church of Christ his my∣sticall body, and spirituall Kingdome, or Christian common-wealth (taking the Christian common-wealth for the Church onely, and not for the Chri∣stian world, as it containeth temporall and spirituall power) is compounded onely of spirituall, and not of temporall power. In which Church of Christ, and also Christian world, all things are so well ordered and disposed, that temporall things ought by the in∣tention of good Christians, to serue spirituall things, and temporall Princes, although in spiritualls they are subiect to the spirituall power of the Church, yet in temporalls, or as they haue temporall power, they are not subiect but supreame, and consequently the temporall power it selfe speaking properly and for∣mally, is not subiect to the spirituall, nor dooth compound the spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ. And therefore I haue not onely weakened, but also quite ouerthrowne, and that out of his owne grounds this conclusion of Card. Bellarmine, and all

those three arguments, which he brought to confirme the same, as any iudicious Reader, who will duly ex∣amine both our writings, will easily perceiue.

Chap. 8.

Wherein is examined the fourth argu∣ment, taken from the authoritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, comparing the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, to the body and soule in man.

1. THE fourth argument, which Card. Bellar∣mine bringeth to prooue this subiection of of the temporall power among Christians, to the spi∣rituall power of the Church, is taken from the autho∣ritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, who compareth the temporall and spirituall power among Christians to the body and soule in man: yea, and also affirmeth, that temporall Magistrates are subiect to spirituall Pastors. And this similitude doth so greatly please Card. Bel∣larmines conceit, that when hee hath any fit occasion, he spareth not to inculcate it, as a very strong argu∣ment, and fit similitude to proue, that the temporall power among Christians is per se, and of it owne na∣ture subiect to the spirituall, as the body in man is per se, subiect to the soule. For as the spirit and flesh, saith hea 1.79, are in man, so are the spirituall and temporall power in the Church. For the spirit and flesh are as it were two common-wealths, which may be found separated, and also vnited. The flesh hath sense and appetite, to which are answerable their acts and proper obiects, and of all which the immediate end is the health & good constitution of the body. The spirit hath vnderstanding and wil, and acts and proportionate obiects, and for her end the health and perfection of the soule. The flesh is found without the spirit in beasts, the spirit is found without the flesh in Angels.

2 Whereby it is manifest, that neither of them is pre∣cisely for the other. The fl••sh also is found vnited to the spirit in man, where because they make one person, they haue necessarily subordination and connexion. For the flesh is subiect, the spirit is superiour, and although the spirit doth not intermeddle hir selfe with the actions of the flesh, but doth suffer the flesh to exercise all hir actions, as shee doth exercise in beasts, yet when they doe hurt the end of the spirit, the spirit doth command the flesh, and doth punish hir, and if it be needfull, doth appoint fastings, and also other afflictions, euen with some detriment, and weakning of the bodie, and doth compell the tongue not to speake, the eyes not to see, &c. In like manner if any action of the flesh, yea and death it selfe, be necessarie to obtaine the end of the spirit, the spirit hath power to command the flesh to expose hir selfe and all hirs, as wee see in Mar∣tyrs.

3 Euen so the ciuill power hath hir Princes, lawes, iudgements &c. and likewise the Ecclesiasticall hath hir Bishops, Canons, iudgements. The ciuill hath for hir end temporall peace, the spirituall euerlasting saluation. They are sometimes found separated, as long since in the time of the Apostles, sometimes vnited as now. And when they are vnited, they make one bodie, and therefore they ought to be connected, and the inferiour subiect, and subor∣dained to the superiour. Therefore the spirituall power doth not intermeddle hir selfe with temporall affaires, but doth suffer all things to proceed, as before they were vni∣ted, so that they be not hurtfull to the spirituall end, or not necessarie to the attayning therevnto. But if any such thing doe happen, the spirituall power may and ought to compell the temporall by all manner, and waies, which shall seeme necessarie therevnto.

4 Thus you see, that Card: Bellarmine hath made here a plausible discourse, but truly more be∣seeming, as I will most clearely convince, a cunning oratour, who with fine, and wittie conceipts seeketh

rather to please curious eares, then a sound Diuine, who with substantial arguments, and forcible proofes should endeauour to convince the vnderstanding of iudicious men, especially in such points, as are pre∣tended to belong to Catholike faith, and eternall saluation. For neither is the temporall and spirituall power among Christians well compared to the body, and soule of man, either in vnion, or in subiection, and besides, although it were in all things a fit simi∣litude, yet it doth not any way proue that, which Card. Bellarmine pretendeth to proue thereby, but it doth clearely and directly, as you shall see, convince the flat contrarie.

5 For first, as I shewed beforeb 1.80 out of Card Bellarmines owne grounds, the temporall and spiri∣tuall power, as they are referred to their visible heads here on earth, doe not make properly and formally one totall bodie, or common-wealth, which is the spiri∣tuall kingdome, or Church of Christ, but they doe make properly, and formally two totall bodies, or com∣mon wealths, to wit, earthly kingdomes, or a tempo∣rall, and ciuill bodie, whereof the King is head, as D. Schulckenius expressely affirmethc 1.81, and the spirituall kingdome, mysticall bodie, or Church of CHRIST, whereof the Pope is head, and which as D. Schulckenius also affirmeth,d 1.82 is onely compounded of spirituall power. Seeing therefore, that the reason why Card. Bellar∣mine affirmeth, that temporall power among Christi∣ans is subiect to the spirituall, is for that they do make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, as the bodie and soule doe make one man, and consequently the temporall power must be subiect to the spirituall, as the bodie is subiect to the soule of man, and as I haue clearely proued, there is no such vnion of the tempo∣rall and spirituall power to make one totall bodie consisting of both powers, which is the spirituall kingdome or Church of CHRIST, it is manifest, that

Card Bellarmines argument drawne from this simili∣tude of the soule and bodie, being grounded vpon this vnion of the temporall and spirituall power, com∣pounding one totall bodie, hath no sure ground, or foundation at all.

6 Secondly, although I doe willingly grant, as you haue seene beforee 1.83, that not onely the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, as they are referred not to their visible heads here on earth, but to CHRIST the invisible head of them both, doe make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, consisting actually of both powers, which may bee called the Christian world (in which sense the Christian com∣mon wealth is vsually taken, but the Church of CHRIST, and especially the spirituall kingdome of CHRIST is seldome taken in that sense) but also the whole world, consisting of Christians, and Infidells, may in that manner be called one totall bodie, where∣of CHRIST, at least wise, as he is GOD, is the invisi∣ble, and celestiall head, neuerthelesse this similitude of the soule and bodie vnited in one man doth no∣thing auaile to proue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, both vnited in one totall bo∣die, whereof CHRIST onely, and no earthly crea∣ture is the head. For the reason, why the bodie in man is subiect to the soule, is because the bodie and soule doe make one essentiall compound, as the Phi∣losophers doe call it, whereof the bodie is the matter, and the soule is the forme, and consequently the bo∣die must of necessitie, and by a naturall sequele, be subiect to the soule, as euery matter is per se and of it own nature subiect to the form, with which it maketh one essentiall compound, but the temporal & spiritual power or earthly Kingdomes, and the spirituall king∣dome of Christ, as they make one totall body, wherof Christ onely is the head, doe not make one essentiall compound, whereof one is as the matter, and the o∣ther

as the forme, but they doe make one integrall compound, as the Philosophers doe call it, in that manner as the bodie of man is compounded of eyes, eares, tongue, hands, feete, which are called by the Philosophers integrall, and not essentiall parts of mans bodie; but in an integrall compound, it is not necessa∣ry, as I shewed beforef 1.84, that one part be subiect to a∣nother, although all must be subiect to the head, as it is apparant in the eyes, eares, tongue, hands, and feet of mans bodie, whereof none is subiect one to the o∣ther, although all be subiect to the head. Seeing therefore that the temporall and spirituall power are onely integrall parts of the totall body, whereof Christ onely is the head, it is euident that from hence no probable argument can be drawne to proue, that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, but that both of them are vnited and subiect to Christ the inui∣sible head of them both.

7. Thirdly, although I should also grant, that this were a fit similitude in all things, and that the tempo∣rall power is subiect to the spirituall in that manner as the body is subiect to the soule of man, yet this man∣ner of subiection would nothing auaile to proue, that the spirituall power could either directly, or indirect∣ly dispose of temporalls, depriue temporall Princes of their temporall liues or dominions, vse temporall pu∣nishments, or exercise any temporall action, but it is rather a very fit similitude to conuince the flat con∣trary. For as I will easily grant, that the soule hath power to command, or forbid the body to exercise a∣ny corporall action, when it is necessarie or hurtfull to the end not onely of the soule but also of the body, (which last clause Card. Bellarmine cunningly omit∣teth, for that it fauoureth, as you shall see, the Popes direct power to command temporalls) as to see, to heare, to speake, and such like actions, which are sub∣iect to the command of mans will, I say, which are sub∣iect

to the command of mans will, for that there be many corporall actions, which are not in the power of mans will to command, as are all the actions of the nutri∣tiue, vegetatiue and generatiue powers; But if the body by any let, or hinderance can not, or (if it were possible) would not doe that corporall action, which the soule would willingly haue the body to doe, as to see, to heare, to speake, or to goe, the soule hath no power of her selfe either directly, or indirectly, that is, either for the good of the body, or for the good of the soule, to do that corporall action, as to see, heare, speake, or goe, without the concurrence of the body it selfe.

8. Neither hath the soule any power to inflict any corporal punishment by way of coercion or constraint, that is, to punish actually with corporall punishment any member of the body without the concurrence of some one or other member thereof, but onely by the way of command, that is, to command some one mem∣ber to punish it selfe; or an other member, as the hands, feete, or head, to put themselues into fire or water, or the hands, to whip the shoulders, to close thy eye-lids, to stop the eares, not to put meate into the mouth, and such like, which if the bodily member by any let, or hinderance can not, or, if it were possible, would not doe, the soule hath done all that is in her power to doe, for that she cannot of her selfe doe any corporall action, without the concurrence of some corporall member, but the most that she can doe con∣cerning any corporall action or punishment, is to command the body to concurre with her to the do∣ing of that corporall action, or punishment. I said [if it were possible] for that there is such a naturall, ne∣cessarie, and intrinsecall subiection of the body to the soule, that the body cannot resist the effectuall com∣mand of the soule in those things which are subiect to her command, and therefore I said, that if it were possi∣ble,

that the body could resist the command of the soule, yet the soule of her selfe hath not power to exer∣cise any corporall action without the concurrance of a corporall organ; which manner of subiection is not betweene the temporall and spirituall power, for that this subiection being in diuerse persons hauing free will, is free and voluntarie, and therefore the com∣mand may be resisted, but the former being of the body to the soule, making one only person, who hath free will, is necessarie and naturall, and therefore can not be resisted.

9. In the like manner I will easily grant, that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, or rather that temporall Princes, who haue temporall power, but not as they haue temporall power, are subiect to spirituall Pastours, who haue spirituall power, in such sort, that the spirituall Pastour hath power to com∣mand the temporall Prince to do those temporal acti∣ons belonging to his temporall power, which are ne∣cessarie to the end of the spirituall power, and to for∣bid him those actions belonging to his temporall power, which are repugnant to the end of the spiritu∣all power, which is eternall saluation, which if hee re∣fuse to doe, and will not obey the command of the spirituall Pastour, the spirituall Pastour can not by vertue only of his spirituall power exercise any tempo∣rall; or ciuill action, belonging to the temporall, or ciuill power, without the consent, or concurrance of the temporall power: Neither can the spirituall Pastor inflict any temporall, or ciuill punishment by way of coercion, constraint, or compulsion, that is, punish actually with any temporall, or ciuill punishment without the consent, & concurrance of the temporall, or ciuill power, but only by the way of command, that is, he hath power to command the temporall Prince, who only hath supreme temporall authoritie, to pu∣nish himselfe, or his subiects with temporall, or ciuill

punishments, if they vse their temporals to the hurt? and preiudice of the spirituall power, or the end ther∣of? although I doe willingly grant, that the spirituall Pastour hath power to punish the temporall Prince, or his subiects, with spirituall punishments, not one∣ly by the way of command, but also of coercion and con∣straint that is, to punish them actually, whether they will or no, with spirituall punishments, when they shall refuse to obey his iust command, for that this manner of punishing by way of coercion doth not exceede the limits of the spirituall coerciue power.

10. Now if my Aduersaries demand or mee, why the spirituall power may of her selfe command tem∣porall actions, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for temporall, nor spirituall good, ex∣ercise temporall actions, may command ciuill punish∣ments, when they are necessarie to the end of the spi∣rituall power, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly punish actually with ciuill punishments without the concurrance of the spirituall power, I answer them by their owne similitude, which pleaseth them so much; for the same reason, that the soule hath power of her selfe to command bodily actions, and yet nei∣ther directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for the good of the body, nor of the soule, to doe of her selfe alone any bodily action, hath power to command bodily punishments, and yet of her selfe hath not power to inflict any bodily punishment, without the concurrance of the bodie it selfe. And thus you see, that this similitude, of which Card. Bellarmine, and his followers doe make so great account, is no fit si∣militude to prooue their doctrine, but rather to con∣firme ours, and that from this similitude no probable argument can be drawen to prooue, that the spirituall Pastour hath power either directly or indirectly to di∣spose of temporals, to depose temporall Princes, or to punish temporally by way of coercion or constraint.

11. But fourthly, although the temporall and spi∣rituall power were aptly compared by Card. Bellar∣mine to the bodie and soule, yet it would prooue two things more then he, as I suppose, would willingly admit; The first is, that: the temporall power can ex∣ercise no temporall action without the concurrance and assistance of the spirituall power, as the body can doe no corporall action, vnlesse the soule also, as an efficient cause thereof, doe concurre thereunto; For this is a cleere and approoued principle in philoso∣phie, that the soule is cause of all motions in the body, according to that common definition or description of the soule assigned by Aristotleg 1.85; Animaid est, quo vinimus, & sentimus, & mouemur, & intelligimus primò. The soule is that, whereby we first or principally liue, and haue sense, and are mooued, and doe vnderstand.

12. The second is, that the spirituall power may command or forbid the ciuill power to exercise ciuill actions, not onely when they are necessarie, or hurt∣full to the end of the spirituall power, which is the health of the soule, but also when they are necessarie or hurtfull to the end of the temporall power, which is temporall peace, as the soule hath power to com∣mand or forbid the bodie to exercise bodily actions, as to see, heare, speake &c. not onely when they are necessary, or hurtfull to the end, and good of the soule, which is spirituall life and health, but also when they are necessarie or hurtfull to the good of the bo∣dy, which is bodily health and life. And therefore Card. Bellarmine declaring this similitude of the spirit and flesh doth only affirme, that the spirit doth com∣mand the flesh, when her actions are hurtfull to the end of the spirit, but cunningly omitteth, that the spi∣rit also dorh command the flesh, when her actions are necessarie, or hurtfull to the end of the flesh, least the Reader should presently perceiue therby the disparity of this similitude, or else from thence inferre, that in

the same manner the spirituall power may command the temporall power not onely in order to spirituall good, but also in order to temporall good, which is the Canonist, doctrine, and which Card. Bellarmine doth at large impugne.

13. Lastly, in what manner S. Gregory Nazianzene did compare the temporall and spirituall power, or rather temporall and spirituall Princes to the bodie and soule, I haue sufficiently declared beforeh 1.86 to wit, not in the manner of their vnion or subiection, but onely in nobility, and in that temporall Princes are in as excellent and worthy manner subiect to tempo∣rall Princes, as spirituall things are more excellent and worthy then temporall. So that neither from the au∣thority of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, nor from the simi∣litude it selfe of the bodie and soule, as it is declared and vrged by Card, Bellarmine, can it with any proba∣bilitie be gathered, that the spirituall power can of her selfe exercise any temporall action belonging to the ciuill power, without the concurrance of the ciuill power, although it be necessarie to the end of the spi∣rituall power, as the soule cannot of her selfe without the concurrance of the bodie exercise any bodily a∣ction, although it be necessarie to the end, not onely of the body, but also of the soule. And therefore I maruell, that Card. Bellarmine could bee so much o∣uerseene, as to vrge and repeat so often this similitude of the soule and body to prooue the Popes power to depose, and to dispose of all temporals, which is so flat against him, and which, if it were a fit similitude, doth rather confirme the doctrine of the Canonists, whom Card. Bellarmine taketh vpon him to confute, then his owne opinon. But the truth is, that it confir∣meth neither, for that, as I declared before,i 1.87 the tem∣porall and spirituall power, or the temporall and spirituall Common-wealth are not parts com∣pounding one totall Body or Common-wealth,

as the bodie and soule doe compound a perfect man.

Chap 9.

Wherein the fift argument to proue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, taken from the authori∣tie of S. Bernard and Pope Boniface the eight, is examined.

1. THe fift argument, which Car. Bellarmine bring∣etha 1.88 to proue the subiection of the tempo∣rall power among Christians to the spirituall, is taken from the authoritie of S. Bernard Lib. 4. de considerat and Pope Boniface the eight, in the Extrauagant, Ʋ∣nam Sanctam, who doth imitate, saith Card. Bellarmine, S. Bernards words. The words of S. Bernard to Pope Eugenius are these. Why dost thou againe attempt to v∣surpe, or vseb 1.89 the sword, which once thou wast comman∣ded to put vp into the scabbard? which neuerthelesse hee that denieth to be thine, doth seeme to me not sufficiently to haue considered the speech of our Lord saying, Returne thy sword into the scabbard. Therefore it is also thine, to be drawne forth perchance at thy beckec 1.90, or direction, although not with thy hand. Otherwise if also it doth in no maner appertaine to thee, when the Apostles said, Be∣hold to swords heere, our Lord had not answered, It is enough, but it is too much. Therefore both the spirituall, and the materiall sword doe belong to the Church, but the materiall is indeed to bee exercised, or drawne forth for the Church; but the spirituall also by the Church: the spi∣rituall with the hand of the Priest, the materiall with the hand of the Souldier, but indeed at the booke, or directi∣on, of the Priest, and at the command of the Emperour.

2. The pricipall words of Pope Boniface, besides those which hee doth imitate out of S Bernard are, That in the Catholicke, and Apostolike Church, whereof

Christ is the head, and S. Peter his Ʋicar, and in her pow∣er there be two swords, the spirituall, and the temporall, as we are instructed by those words of the Gospell, Behold heere; that is in the Church, two swords, &c. And that the sword must be vnder the sword, the temporall au∣thoritie subiect to the spirituall power. For the spirituall, the truth so witnessing, hath to instruct the earthly power, and to iudge if it be not good. So of the Church, and of the Ecclesiastical power, the prophesie of Ieremy is verified, be∣hold I haue appointed thee this day ouer nations and Kingdomes, and the rest which follow. Therefore if the earthly power goeth out of the way, shee shall be iudged by the spirituall power, but if the inferiour spirituall power goeth out of the way, shee shall be iudged by her superiour, but if the supreme goeth out of the way, shee can be iudged by God alone, and not by man, according to the testimony of the Apostle, That the spiritual man iudgeth all things, and he is iudged by none. From all which Card. Bel∣larmine, who only relateth S. Bernards words, and af∣firmeth, that Pope Boniface doth imitate the same, doth conclude, that the meaning of S. Bernard, and Pope Bo∣niface was to affirme, that both the temporall and spiritual sword are in the power of the Pope, & that the Pope hath per se, and properly the spirituall sword, and because the temporall sword is subiect to the spirituall, therefore the Pope may command, or forbid a King the vse of the tem∣porall sword, when the necessitie of the Church doth re∣quire it.

3. Thus you see what S. Bernard and Pope Boni∣face doe affirme, and also that Card. Bellarmine infer∣reth, and concludeth from their words. And although to this, which Card. Bellarmine inferreth from their words, there needeth no answere at all, for that I doe willingly grant all that, which he doth inferre, to wit, that the temporall sword is subiect in some cases to the commanding power of the Pope, and that the Pope may command, or forbid a King the vse of the tempo∣rall

sword, when the necessitie of the Church shall re∣quire it: seeing that the question betweene mee and Card. Bellarmine is not concerning the Popes comman∣ding power, and whether the Pope may command a King to vse the temporal sword in the necessitie of the Church, as I haue oftentimes in all my Bookes ex∣presly affirmed, but concerning the Popes coerciue power, and whether if a King will not vse the tempo∣rall sword at the Popes command, the Pope hath power to vse it himselfe, and may constraine a King not on∣ly with spirituall, but also with temporal compulsion, and punishment to fulfill his iust command; Neuer∣thelesse, because Card. Bellarmine hath now in his Schulckenius, taken some exceptions against the an∣swere, which I made in my Apologie to the authortie of S. Bernard, and consequently of Pope Boniface, who, as hee saith, doth imitate S. Bernards words, I thinke it not amisse to set downe my answere, and also his Reply, that so the Reader may cleerely perceiue, whether S. Bernard doth fauour, or disfauour Card. Bellarmines opinion concerning the Popes power to vse the temporall sword, in case a temporall King will not vse it at the Popes command, and whether D. Schul∣ckenius hath sufficiently confuted the answere, which I did make to the aforesaid authoritie of S. Bernard.

4 Thus therefore I answered in my Apologied 1.91,

that the words of S. Bernard doe only signifie, that both the materiall, and the spirituall sword doe be∣long in some sort to the Church, and are subiect vn∣to hir, not for that the ciuill power is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, or that the Church, hath by the law of God any power to vse the materiall sword euen in order to spirituall good, but because Christian Princes, being chil∣dren of the Church, are bound (and consequently the Church may command them, and by Ecclesia∣sticall Censures compell them therevnto) in de∣fence

of their holy mother the Church, to vse the temporall sword. Wherfore although the Church, when she hath present need, hath power to command, or forbid the vse of the materiall sword, or rather without any positiue, or constitutiue command of the Church Secular Princes are bound in that case to vse it, yet it doth not therefore follow, that the Church hir selfe hath dominion, right, or power to vse the corporall sword, seeing that to command the vse thereof, and to vse it hir selfe are farre different things, as I haue shewed beforec 1.92 yea and the very words of S. Bernard doe plainly shew as much. For otherwise if the Church, that is, as shee consi∣steth of Ecclesiasticall power, should haue the do∣minion of the materiall sword, and might vse it in order to spirituall good, it might by the law of God be drawne forth and vsed, not only for the Church but also by the Church, not onely with the hand of the souldier, but also of the Priest, which neuer∣thelesse S. Bernard doth affirme to be against our Sauiours command, who commanded S. Peter to put vp his sworde into the scabberd.

5 Wherefore I doe not mislike that very ex∣position (if it be rightly vnderstood) which Card: Bellarmine him selfe gathereth from those words of S. Bernard, who in this very place, as you haue seen, doth affirme, that S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface did by those words signifie, that the Pope hath per se, and properly the spirituall sword, (as a temporall Prince hath per se, and properly the materiall sword) and because the temporall power is subiect to the spiri∣tuall (not per se, but per accidens to command tem∣porall things in order to spirituall good, but not to punish temporally by way of coercion, but only spi∣ritually as I haue often declared) therefore the Pop-hath power to command or forbid a King the vse of the temporall sword, when the necessitie of the Church doth require it.

6 Therefore the temporall sword according to the opinion of S. Bernard doth belong to the Pope, and is called his sword, for that, when the ne∣cessitie of the Church doth require, it is to bee drawne forth for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the souldier, but not of the Priest, at the becke indeede, or direction, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperour. By which last words S. Bernard doth signifie, that the Emperour in v∣sing the temporall sword for the necessitie of the Church is indeed to bee directed by the Pope (for that the Pope ought to declare, when the Church hath necessitie, but the vse it selfe of the sword doth immediately depend vpon the Emperors command, to whose command the souldiers in vsing the tempo∣rall sword are immediately subiect.

7 But what if the Emperour shall refuse to vse the temporall sword at the Popes becke, or direction? Hath therefore the Pope, according to S. Bernards opinion, power to draw it forth himselfe, or can the Emperour by the Popes authoritie be depriued of the dominion thereof? No truly. But because he doth not keepe that promise, which he hath giuen to the Church, and contrarie to the law of God hee doth not relieue the necessities of the Church, the Church hath power to punish him with Ecclesiasti∣call and spirituall punishments, as I haue often said. Wherefore these words of S. Bernard doe nothing fauour the Popes temporall power, or his power to vse the temporall sword, but rather do directly con∣contradict it. And this very answer hath Ioannes Parisiensis* 1.93 in expresse words &c.

Thus I answe∣red in my Apologie.

8 Now you shall see, how well D. Schulckenius replyeth to this my answer. I answer, saith hef 1.94, that which my Aduersarie Widdrington first doth say, that both the swords doe belong to the Church, hee saith well, but

that which hee addeth, that both the swords are subiect to the Church, he saith not well. For the spirituall sword to bee subiect to the Church, doth signifie no other thing, then that the Popes power is subiect to the Church, which is manifestly false, whereas contrariwise it is to bee said, that the Church is subiect to the spirituall sword, or to the power of the Pope, vnlesse perchance Widdrington be of opinion, that the Sheepheard is subiect to his sheepe, and not the sheepe to the Sheepheard.

9 Marke now, good Reader, the cunning, not to say, fraudulent proceeding of this man. Hitherto he hath, as you haue seene, taken the Church, the Chri∣stian common-wealth, the mysticall bodie, or spiri∣tuall kingdom of Christ to be all one, and to be one totall bodie, consisting both of temporall, and spiri∣tuall power, and compareth hir to a man compoun∣ded of bodie and soule; And may it not, I pray you, be rightly said, that all the powers both of bodie and soule are subiect to man? and why then may it not also be rightly said, that the spirituall sword or power is subiect to the Church? But now forsooth this Do∣ctor, that hee might take an occasion to charge me with a manifest falshood, will not take the Church, as hee tooke it before for the whole mysticall bodie of Christ, which totall bodie includeth both the Pope, and all other inferiour members thereof, in which sense I did take the Church, when I affirmed, that not onely the spirituall, but also the temporall sword is in some sort subiect to the Church, but hee will take the Church for one part onely of this mysticall bo∣die, to wit, for all the members of the Church be∣sides the Pope, in which sense the Church is indeed sometimes taken, as when the Church is compared with the Pope, and it is said, that the Pope is head of the Church; but when the Church is compared with Christ, and is said to be the mysticall bodie and spiri∣tuall kingdome of Christ, the Church doth include

both the Pope, and all other inferiour members there∣of, who iointly make one totall bodie, whereof Christ is the head. And the very like is seene in the bodie of man; for when the bodie is compared with the head, the bodie doth not include the head, but when the bodie is compared with the soule, & said to be sub∣iect to the soule, & that of the bodie & soule is made one man, then the bodie doth also include the head.

10. Wherefore taking the Church, as it doth signi∣fie the whole mysticall body of Christ, in which sense both Card. Bellarmine himselfe, and also S. Bernard in this very place doe take it, when they affirme, that the materiall sword is to be drawne foorth for the Church, and the spirituall by the Church, it is truly said, that the spi∣rituall sword is subiect to the Church: Neither doth this signifie, that the Popes spirituall power, is subiect to the Church, for now the Church is taken, as it exclu∣deth the Pope, but rather that all spirituall power, which is in any member of the Church, is subiect to the whole body of the Church, and consequently to the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church according to Cardinall Bellarmines opinion, doth reside. And would not D. Schulckenius thinke, that I did cauill, if I should say of him, as hee saith of mee, that he spake not rightly, when in this very place hee affirmeth, that Christ gaue to the Church both the swords. For the spirituall sword to be giuen to the Church doth signifie no other thing, to vse his owne words, then that the Popes power was by Christ our Sauiour giuen to the Church, which in Card. Bellarmines opinion is not on∣ly manifestly false, but also an erroneous doctrine.

11. I omit now, that the ancient Doctours of Paris, (who hould, that the whole body of the Church ta∣ken collectiue, and not including the Pope, which a ge∣nerall Councell lawfully assembled doth represent, is su∣periour to the Pope) would not thinke to speake any falshood at all, if they should say, that Christ gaue all

the power, which the Pope hath, also to the Church, and that the Popes power is subiect to the Church, and that it doth not therefore follow, that the Pastour is subiect to the sheepe, or the superiour to the inferiour, but rather contrariwise. But in very truth this was not my meaning, when I affirmed, that both swords are in some sort subiect to the Church, for by the name of Church I vnderstood also the Pope, as I declared before

12. Secondly, when Widdrington affirmeth, saith D. Schulckenius, that the ciuill power is not per se subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, he doth corrupt the text of S. Bernard, and of Pope Boniface the eight. For when S. Bernard saith, that the materiall sword is the Popes, and is to bee drawne forth at his becke, and direction, he clearely con∣fesseth, that the materiall sword is subiect to the spirituall sword, which Pope Boniface doth declare more plainely, when he saith, that the sword must be vnder the sword, and temporall authoritie subiect to spirituall power.

13. But how shamefully D. Schulckenius accuseth me of corrupting the text of S. Bernard, and Pope Bo∣niface, let the Reader iudge; seeing that I neither add, nor diminish, nor alter any one word of their text, but doe say the very same words which they doe say. For S. Bernard doth say, that the materiall sword is the Popes, and doth belong to the Pope, but with this limi∣tation, in some sort, to bee drawne foorth for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Souldier, not of the Priest, at the becke, or direction, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperour: and I also say the very same. But S. Bernard doth not say, that the materiall sword is subiect to the spirituall sword per se, but only in some sort, to be drawne forth for the Church, not by the Church &c. From which words it is plainely gather∣ed, that the materiall sword, or temporall power is, according to S. Bernard, subiect to the spirituall, not per se, but per accidons, in spiritualls, not in temporalls, to be commanded in some case by the Priest, as he is a

Priest, but not to be drawne forth, or vsed by a Priest as he is a Priest, but as he is a temporall Prince, or a publike, or priuate souldier. In like manner I say with Pope Boniface, that the sword is vnder the sword, and the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, but Pope Boni∣face doth not say, that the sword is per se vnder the sword, and the temporall power is per se subiect to spi∣rituall authoritie, and therefore, seeing that hee doth imitate S. Bernards words, as Card. Bellarmine here affirmeth, he is to be vnderstood in that sense, as S. Bernard vnderstood them, to wit, that the sword is vn∣der the sword, in some sort, and the temporall power subiect to the spirituall in some sort, to be drawne foorth, or vsed for the Church, but not by the Church &c. as I now declared.

14. Thirdly, when Widdrington, affirmeth, saith D. Schulckenius, that the Church hath not by the law of God power to vse the materiall sword euen in order to spiri∣tuall good, he speaketh too ambiguously. For the law of God doth not command Ecclesiasticall men to vse with their own hand the materiall sword, neither doth it so forbid them, but that his lawfull for them in some cases to vse it also with their owne hand: But neuerthelesse according to S. Bernards opinion Christ gaue both the swordes to the Church, and by this he gaue her power to vse the materiall sword in that manner, as doth beseem her, to wit, by the ser∣uice, or hands of others, in directing Secular Princes, that they draw it forth, or put it in the scabard, as it is expedient to the honour of God, and the saluation of Christian people.

15. But my words are very plaine, and no whit ambiguous I say, that the Church, taking the Church, not materially, for all the members of the Church, but for Churchmen, formally as they are Churchmen, or which is all one, for the Church, as it consisteth of Ec∣clesiasticall power, are according to S. Bernards doc∣trine commanded not to draw forth, or vse with their owne hands the materiall sword euen in order to spi∣rituall

good. For S. Bernards words are plaine, why dost thou againe attempt to vse the sword, which thou wast once, not only counselled, but cōmanded to put vp into the scabard &c. But if the Pope becom a temporall Prince or a Priest do lawfully becom a Soldier, to fight either in his own defence, or in the defence of others, which Christ did not forbid, although the Church in some cases hath forbidden it, neither I, nor S. Bernard doe denie, that the Pope, as he is a temporall Prince, or a Priest, as he is a lawfull Souldier, hath power to vse with their owne hands the materiall sword. Neither did S. Bernard euer grant, that the Pope, as he is Pope, or a Priest as he is a Priest, or, which is all one, by his spirituall, or Priestly authority, hath power to draw foorth, or to vse with his owne hands the materiall sword, although the Pope by his spirituall power may direct and command a temporall Prince to draw it foorth, and vse it, when the necessitie of the Church shall require, which onely D. Schulckenius in this pa∣ragraph doth affirme.

16. Fourthly, that is false, saith D. Schulckenius,g 1.95 which Widdrington affirmeth, that the materiall sword in that onely sense doth belong to the Church, because Se∣cular Princes being children of the Church are bound to fight in defence of the Church their mother. For S. Ber∣nard doth grant much more to the Ecclesiasticall Prince, when he saith, Therefore it is also thine, to wit, the ma∣teriall sword. And beneath, Therefore both the spiri∣tuall and the materiall sword are the Churches, but the materiall sword is to bee drawen foorth for the Church, and the spirituall also by the Church, the spirituall with the hand of the Priest, the materiall with the hand of the Souldier, but truly at the becke, or direction of the Priest, and at the command of the Emperour. Where S. Bernard doth not only signifie, that Souldiers or Princes are bound to draw foorth the sword for the Church, but also at the becke, or direction of the

Priest, that is, with subordination to the Ecclesiasticall power, as Souldiers ought to vse the sword with subordina∣tion to the command of the Emperour.

17. But anie man who readeth ouer but sleightly my answer in that place, will easily perceiue, that this is a meere cauill, and also a plaine vntruth; for that in expresse words I doe affirme, that Secular Princes and Souldiers are, according to S. Bernard, to draw foorth, and vse the materiall sword for the necessity of the Church, at the becke, counsell, direction, yea, and command of the Priest, which is as much, as D. Schulckenius heere affirmeth S. Bernard to say; al∣though S. Bernard did expressely distinguish betwixt becke and command, at the becke, saith he, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperour; whereby it is manifest, that S. Bernard did not account becke and command to be all one, and consequently, hee did not approoue the same subordination to be betwixt Secu∣lar Princes, and the Priest in vsing the materiall sword, as is betwixt Souldiers, and the Emperour. For albeit S. Bernard by the name of becke did not onely vnder∣stand aduise and counsell, which Christian Princes in all their weightie affaires concerning the Law of God and Christian Religion ought to demand of lear∣ned Priests, and who are skilfull in the Law of God, and Christian Religion, but also a command to fight, and vse the materiall sword in defence of the Church and Christian Religion, & to the obseruing of which command, Christian Princes may, as also I sayd, by Ecclesiasticall censures bee compelled, yet this com∣mand being a declaratiue command, which doth onely declare a former command of God, and nature, and doth not make a new bond, but onely declare and sig∣nifie a former obligation, may rather be called a becke∣ning, and signifying, that Christian Princes are by the Law of God bound in that case to draw foorth, fight, and vse the materiall sword, then a true, proper, and

constitutiue command, which doth not onely signifie. but also induce a new bond or obligation.

18. And in this sense not onely Ioannes Parisiensis, whom I cited before,h 1.96 doth vnderstand those words of S. Bernard (at the becke indeede of the Priest) but also our learned Countri-man Alexander of Hales, There is, saith he,i 1.97 an authority to command, and an au∣thority to beckon; in the authority to command it doth fol∣low, he doth that thing by whose authority it is done, but in the authority to beckon this doth not follow. The au∣thoritie to command wicked men to be slaine is in the Empe∣rour, but the authoritie to beckon is in the Pope and Priests. And this beckoning as hath beene sayd, is a preaching of the Law of God, and an exhorting, that Princes will obey the Law of God, Wherupon S. Bernard sheweth how both the materiall and spirituall sword are the Churches, and doe belong to the Church, not for as much as concerneth vse or command, but for as much as concerneth beckoning: whereupon he speaketh in this manner to Eugenius, hee that denieth the materiall sword to be thine, seemeth to me not to regard sufficiently the word of our Lord saying, Returne thy sword into thy scabard, and so foorth as it followeth in S. Bernard.

19. Wherefore, according to S. Bernard, the ma∣teriall sword is subiect to the spirituall, not absolute∣ly, but in some sort to be beckoned, but not to bee vsed or commanded, as beckoning is distinguished from command, by the Priest, as he is a Priest. And there∣fore that Glosse, which D. Schulckenius maketh of those words [at the becke indeede of the Priest] that is, saith he, with subordination to the Ecclesiasticall power, as Souldiers ought to vse the sword with subordination to the command of the Emperor, is verie vntrue, & expresly against S. Bernards words; both because the Empe∣rour hath power to command the souldier to vse the materiall sword, but the Priest according to S. Bernard hath onely power to beckon, but not to command the

vse thereof, and also because if the Souldier will not vse the materiall sword at the Emperours command; the Emperour, as Emperour, may vse it himselfe, and with his owne hand, which the Priest, as Priest, or, which is all one, the Ecclesiasticall power, according to S. Bernard, cannot doe; and moreouer because the Emperour, as Emperour, may compell the souldier with temporall punishments to vse the materiall sword, and not onely depriue him of his power and right to vse the same; but also of his temporall life, which the Priest, as Priest, or the Ecclesiastical power, cannot doe.

20. And therefore who would not maruaile to see D. Schulckenius so boldly, and in such publike writings to affirme, That the question is not, whether the spirituall Prince hath dominion, right, or power to vse the materiall sword: but onely, whether the sword be vn∣der the sword, and whether the temporall power bee sub∣iect to the spirituall. And whereas Widdrington, saith he, in this place confesseth, that the Church hath power to command, or forbid in time of necessitie the vse of the materiall sword, from thence we doe gather that the sword is vnder the sword, and the temporall power is subiect to the command, and prohibition of the spirituall power, which onely Card. Bellarmine in that his second argu∣ment did intend. Wherefore Widdrington doth seeme to decline of set purpose the principall question. For, as wee haue often said, the question is not concerning the dominion, or vse of the materiall sword, but concerning the power to direct it, and concerning the subiection of the materiall sword to the spirituall. But these in the option of S. Ber∣nard are most manifest. And for as much as appertaineth to the vse of the materiall sword, wee assent altogether to S. Bernard, that it doth not beseeme Ecclesiasticall men to vse the materiall sword, but onely the spirituall, and thus much onely those words of our Sauiour doe signifie, Put vp thy sword into thy scabbard, and those of S. Bernard,

Why doest thou againe attempt to vse the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put into the scabbard? For heere it is not meant of the Law of God, by which Ecclesiasticall men are absolutely forbidden to vse the materiall sword; seeing that it is manifest, that in some cases, and especially in defence of themselues, and of their Countrey: this is lawfull, but of the command of God, by which Cleargie men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the materiall, but with the spi∣rituall sword. Thus D. Schulckenius.

21. But it is strange to see, how farre affection will carry the pens of learned men; In very truth I should neuer haue imagined, that D. Schulckenius, or any o∣ther learned man, who hath read my Apologie, would euer haue beene so bold, as to affirme, That the questi∣on betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine is not, whether the Pope hath power to vse the materiall sword, but onely whether the sword be vnder the sword, and the temporall power subiect to the command, and prohibition of the spi∣spirituall power, and that this only was intended by Card. Bellarmine in his second argument. For first concerning the question betwixt mee, and Card. Bellarmine it is euident, that I haue oftentimes declared in my Apo∣logie, and D. Schulckenius also setteth downe my words, that the true state of the question betwixt mee and Card. Bellarmine, is not concerning the Popes power to command, but to dispose of temporalls, nor whether the sword be in any manner whatsoeuer vn∣der the sword, or the temporal power in any sort subiect to the spirituall, but in what manner the sword is vnder the sword, and after what sort the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall. For I haue often granted, that the spirituall power, or the Pope as Pope, may command temporalls, and the vse of the materiall sword, and punish disobedient Princes with Ecclesia∣call censures: but what, which I vtterly denied, was, that the spirituall power, or the Pope as Pope may dis∣pose

of temporalls, vse the materiall sword, or punish disobedient Princes by taking away their liues, king∣domes, or goods.

22. Secondly, it is also manifest, that Card. Bellar∣mine in his second argument did not onely intend to proue, that the temporal power is subiect to the com∣mand, and prohibition of the spirituall power, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, but also, that the spirituall power may vse, and dispose of temporalls, depose temporal Princes, and institute others, and constraine or punish with temporall punishments. For marke, I pray you, his second argument: In the first part thereof he argueth thus. The power to vse and dispose of temporalls (and consequently of the materiall sword which is a temporall thing) is necessary to the spirituall end, because otherwise wicked Princes might without punishment fauour Heretickes, and overthrow Religion, therefore the Church hath also, this power. And yet D. Schulckenius doth not blush to affirme, that Card. Bellarmine in his second argument did onely intend to proue, that the temporall power is subiect to the command, and prohibition of the spirituall power. And in the second part of his argument hee concludeth thus: Therefore much more the spirituall common-wealth, hath power to command the temporall common-wealth, which is subiect vnto her, and to con∣straine her to change her gouernment, and to depose Princes, and to institute others, when she can not otherwise defend her spirituall good. And in this manner are to bee vnderstood the words of S. Bernard, and Pope Boni∣face, &c. Thus Card. Bellarmine. So that according to Card. Bellarmine, S. Bernards words doe proue, that the Pope hath power not onely to command the materiall sword, but also to vse it, vnlesse the materiall sword is not to be comprehended vnder the name of temporalls. And therefore not I, but D. Schulckenius doth of set purpose decline the difficultie, and also

vntruly affirmeth, that Card: Bellarmine did not in∣tend to proue in his second argument, that the Pope hath power to vse the materiall sword, but onely that the materiall sword is subiect to the command and prohibition of the spirituall power, seeing that Card: Bellarmines second argument doth most clearely shew the contrarie.

23 But marke now how clearely D. Schulckenius doth either contradict S. Bernards words and him selfe, or else fowly equiuocate, and confirme the an∣swer which I gaue to the authoritie of S. Bernard. I affirmed, that S. Bernards words are so to be vnder∣stood, that it is lawfull for Ecclesiasticall men, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, to command in some cases the vse of the materiall sword, but that to vse the ma∣teriall sword themselues, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, they are forbidden by the expresse command of Christ. Now D. Schulckenius affirmethk 1.98, that for as much at appertaineth to the vse of the materiall sword, he assenteth altogether to S. Bernard, that it doth not be∣seeme Ecclesiasticall men to vse the materiall sword, but onely the spirituall; and thus much onely those words of our Sauiour doe signifie, Returne thy sword into the scabbard; and those of S. Bernard, why dost thou againe attempt to vse the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put into the scabard? For here it is not meant of the law of God, by which Ecclesiasticall men are absolutely forbidden to vse the materiall sword, seeing that it is manifest, that in some cases, and especially in defence of themselues and of their countrey, this is law∣full, but of the command of God, by which Cleargie men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the materiall, but with the spirituall sword. Thus D. Schulckenius.

24 But if D. Schulckenius meane that Ecclesiasti∣call men are onely for decencie, which implyeth no command, not to vse the materiall sword, he plainly

contradicteth S. Bernard, to whom neuerthelesse hee affirmeth altogether to assent, who expressely auer∣reth, that the Pope in S. Peter was not only counsailed, but commanded not to vse the materiall sword. And therefore S. Bernards words can not otherwise be vn∣derstood, but that Ecclesiasticall men, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, and the Pope, as Pope, are by the command of Christ absolutely forbidden to vse the materiall sword; for S. Bernard did not intend to affirme, that Ecclesiasticall men, if they become temporall Princes, or being considered, as they are priuate men, or citizens, and parts, or members of the temporall common-wealth, are by the command of Christ forbidden to vse the materiall sword, and to fight in defence of their owne persons, or of their Countrey.

25 Wherefore those last words of D. Schulckenius, to wit, that S. Bernards saying is to be vnderstood of the command of God, by which Cleargie men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the materiall, but with the spirituall sword, are somewhat equivocall. For if D. Schulckenius doe onely vnder∣stand of such an instruction, which implyeth no com∣mand of Christ, but onely a certaine decencie, coun∣sell, and aduise, for that it doth not beseeme the per∣fection of those men, who haue a spirituall vocation, to fight with the materiall sword, hee plainly contra∣dicteth himselfe, and also S. Bernard himselfe, for that hee acknowledgeth a command of God, whereby Cleargie men are instructed &c. but this instruction supposeth no command of God; S. Bernard also he contradicteth, who expressely speaketh of a command, whereby Ecclesiasticall men are by the law of Christ, and not only of the Church forbidden to vse the ma∣teriall sword, which command of Christ, as I said be∣fore, can bee no other, then that Ecclesiasticall men can not, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, vse the mate∣riall

sword; for that although the Ecclesiasticall power doth according to S. Bernard and the truth, extend to the beckoning, or declaratiue commanding of the materiall sword in some cases, yet it doth not extend to the vsing thereof, but this power to vse the materiall sword doth proceed from the law of nature, or the ciuill power, who doe giue authoritie to euery man, whether he be a Clerke, or Laike in case at least wise of necessitie, to vse the materiall sword in de∣fence of his owne person, or of his countrey. And if D. Schulckenius only intend to signifie thus much by those last words of his, which in very deede can not be otherwise vnderstood, vnlesse wee will make them repugnant to themselues, hee doth fauour, not contradict, confirme and not impugne my answer.

26 Fiftly, obserue, good Reader, how cunningly D. Schulckenius would shift off the last, and principall Answer, which I made to the authoritie of S. Bernard. I granted, as you haue seene before, that the Pope, as Pope, hath, according to S. Bernard, power to beckon, or command the Emperour to vse the materiall sword, when the necessitie of the Church shall require and to punish him with Ecclesiasticall punishments, if he shall refuse to obey his iust command, or becke, and I affirmed, that this is the most, that can be gathe∣red from those words of S. Bernard. But if the Emperour should refuse to vse the materiall sword at the Popes command, or becke, I affirmed, that it could not be inferred from that authoritie of S. Bernard, that the Pope, as Pope, could vse it himselfe, or depriue the Emperour of his temporall dominion, or power to vse the materiall sword, for this were to vse, and to dis∣pose of temporalls, and implyeth a power to vse, and draw forth the materiall sword it selfe, which S. Ber∣nard expressely denyeth to the Pope: and that there∣fore S. Bernards authoritie doth nothing fauour, but clearely contradict the Popes power, I doe not say, to

command temporalls, but to dispose of temporalls, and to vse temporalls, as Ioannes Parisiensis, and Alexander of Hales,l 1.99 did before affirme. Now to this my answere D. Schulckenius replyethm 1.100 in this manner.

27. Thou didst runne well, who hath hindered thee so soone not to obey the truth? For now thou dost not follow S. Bernard, but William Barclay, as thy Master. If that the Emperour shall refuse to vse the sword at the becke of the Pope in great necessitie of the Church, it is not indeed fit∣ting for the Pope to vse the materiall sword, but hee hath power to constraine the Emperour, first with Ecclesiasticall punishments, and afterwards also by depriuing him of the sword, as in the like case the Councell of Lateran often cited doth teach, which one Councell is to be preferred before all the Barclaies, or Iohns of Paris, all men doe thinke, who are not mad.

28. Is not this thinke you a trim answere? The question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine in this place was not concerning the Councell of Lateran, wher∣of I will treat beneath,* 1.101 and plainely shew, that, not∣withstanding all the clamours of my Aduersaries, the said Councell hath neither defined, or supposed for cer∣taine, nay or supposed at all, that the Pope hath power to depose Soueraigne Princes, as D. Schulckenius doth here collect from thence, but the question was onely concerning the authoritie of S. Bernard. And I prooued clearely out of S. Bernards wordes, that al∣though the Pope, as Pope hath power to command, or forbid in some cases the vse of the materiall sworde, yet that he hath power, as he is Pope, to vse it himselfe, or to depriue the Emperour of the vse thereof, which implyeth a power to vse it himselfe, this I said could not be proued, but rather the contrarie out of those words of S. Bernard, who doth not only say, that it is not fitting for the Pope to vse the materiall sword, as D. Schulckenius would mince his words, but that it is for∣bidden the Pope to draw foorth, or vse the materiall

sword. Now D. Schulckenius passeth ouer S. Bernard, and flyeth to the Councell of Lateran to proue, that if the Emperour refuse at the Popes command to vse the materiall sword, he may by the Popes authoritie bee depriued of the vse thereof, whereas the present que∣stion was only concerning the opinion of S. Bernard, and not what was the doctrine of the Councell of La∣teran in this point, whose authoritie I doe asmuch re∣spect either as Card. Bellarmine, or any other Catho∣like is bound to doe. But it is an easie matter to wrest the words of the Councell of Lateran, or any other to their purpose, contrary to the true meaning of the Councell, and then to crie out ô the Councell of Lateran, which is to be preferred before all Barclaies, and Wid∣dringtons &c. whereas we doe asmuch respect the autho∣ritie of the Councell of Lateran, or any other, as they do, although we doe not so much respect their ouer wrest∣ed collections, which they to serue their owne turnes, doe gather from any Councel, or text of holy Scripture, contrarie to the plaine, proper, and true sense and mea∣ning of the words. But to such shiftings, and win∣dings euen learned men are sometimes brought, when they will make their vncertaine opinions, and priuate expositions of holy Scriptures, or Councells to be infal∣lible grounds of the Catholike faith.

29. Lastly but the foundation, saith D. Schulckenius, of Widdringtons errour is, for that he thinketh, that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour by reason of the faith, and free promise, which the Emperour gaue, and made to the Pope, according to the similitude, which a little before he put concerning one, who promised an other to spend his life, and all his goods in defence of him. But this foundation is false, because the authoritie of the Pope ouer Christian Princes doth not proceed from their onely promise, or faith, which they haue giuen, but from the law of God, by which law the Pope is made by Christ the Pa∣stour of all his stocke, the chiefe of all his familie, the head.

of all his body, and the Rectour of all his Church, Where∣fore it is no maruaile, if from false foundation he conclude a falshood to wit, that S. Bernards words do not onely, not fauour the Popes temporal power, but are flat contrarie to it. What I beseech you, could be spoken more cleerely for the Popes temporall power, then that which S. Bernard said, that the temporall sword is the Popes, and that both swords are the Churches, and that the temporall sword ought to be drawne foorth at the Popes becke? And as for Ioannes Parisiensis there is no great reckoning to be made of him whatsoeuer he saith, both for that he is re∣pugnant to the Councell of Lateran, and many others, and also that other his errours are condemned by the Church in the common Extrauagant, Vas electionis, and lastly, for that either he denieth only the Popes direct power in tem∣poralls, or else he doth plainly contradict himselfe.

30. But truely it is strange, that learned men, and who pretend to maintaine nothing but truth, dare ad∣uenture to auouch so bouldly, and in such publike writings so manifest vntruths, and which they them∣selues in their consciences can not but see to be plain, and palpable vntruths. I very often, and that of set purpose did affirme in my Apologie, and D. Schulcke∣nius doth also set downe my words, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to command temporall Princes in tempo∣rals in order to spirituall good, and yet this man to make his Reader beleeue, that I doe teach flat heresie, blush∣eth not to affirme in an other place,n 1.102 that I deny, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to commaund temporall Princes in temporalls in order to spirituall good. So like∣wise, I did oftentimes in my Apologie affirme,o 1.103 and D. Schulckenius doth also set downe my words, that the Pope, as Pope hath power by the law of God, and for that he is appointed by Christ to be the supreme spirituall Pastour of the Catholike Church, to constraine and pu∣nish all disobedient Christians both Princes and peo∣ple, with spirituall and Ecclesiasticall punishments;

and yet now this man to perswade his Reader, that I teach heere a manifest errour, is not ashamed to af∣firme, that I am of opinion, that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour in regard onely of the free pro∣mise, which the Emperour hath made to the Pope. And therefore D. Schulckenius neither dealeth truely nor sincerely, and both deludeth his Reader, and also wrongeth mee, in affirming, that to bee my doctrine, which I expressely impugne, and that to be the foun∣dation of my opinion (which hee is pleased to call an errour) which I in expresse words, and that often∣times haue denied.

21. For as I doe willingly grant, that although a temporall Prince hath power to command, and with temporall punishments to compell, if neede require, his temporall subiects to make, and sweare an expresse promise of that true faith, loyaltie and temporall al∣legeance, which by the Law of God and nature they doe owe to their lawfull Prince, yet I doe not affirme, that a temporalll Prince hath power to constraine his rebellious subiects by vertue onely of the promise, which they haue made, but by vertue of his supreme temporall power which hee hath, as hee is a supreme temporall Prince by the Law of God and nature; So also I do willingly grant, that although the Pope hath power to command, and with spirituall punishments to compell, if neede require, all Christian Princes and people to make and sweare an expresse promise of that the true faith, loyalty and spirituall allegeance, which as they are Christians and members of the mysticall body of Christ, they doe owe by the Law of God to the supreme spirituall Pastour and visible head of this mysticall bodie and Church of Christ, and the Empe∣rour at his coronation taketh such an oath, neuerthe∣lesse I doe not affirme, that the Pope hath power to constraine and punish disobedient Princes, and peo∣ple by vertue onely of the promise, which they haue

made to the Pope of their spirituall obedience, but by vertue of his supreme spirituall power, which he hath by the Law of God, and his Pastorall authority giuen to him by our Sauiour Christ Iesus.

32. True it is, that the Reader might the better vn∣derstand, that to command one to vse a temporall thing, and to vse it himselfe, to command one to di∣spose of temporals, and to dispose of them himselfe, are very different things, and that the one doth not necessarily follow from the other, I brought a familiar example of one, who either, by promise, or by some other obligation (and yet D. Schulckenius taketh hold onely of the promise, and cleane omitteth the other obligation) is bound to dispose, and giue his goods, or life at an∣thers command, who notwithstanding this promise, or other obligation, doth still keepe the property, do∣minion and right ouer his goods and life, in such sort, that the other cannot be vertue of his comman∣ding power, which he hath ouer him and them, take them away and dispose of them without his consent, but if hee will not dispose of his goods at the others command, according as by vertue either of his pro∣mise, or of some other obligation he is bound to doe, the other may complaine to the Magistrate, that hee will punish him for his offence, or cause him to per∣forme his promise, so far forth as the coerciue power of the Magistrate doth extend. From which I conclu∣ded, that considering to haue the power to command the vse of the temporall sword, and to haue a power to vse it, or to depriue of the vse thereof, are two diffe∣rent things, neither doth one necessarily follow from the other, although the Pope, as Pope, hath according to S. Bernard, power to command the Emperour to vse the temporall sword, yet it doth not therefore follow that if the Emperour will not vse the temporall sword at the Popes command, the Pope, as Pope, can vse it himselfe, or depriue the Emperour of the vse

thereof, which implieth a power to vse the same, but onely, that the Pope, being a spirituall Prince or Ps∣tour, may punish the Emperor for his contempt with spirituall punishments, which only doe belong to the coercive power of the supreme spirituall Prince & Pas∣tor of the spirituall kingdome & Church of Christ.

33. Thus therefore you haue seen, that S. Bernard doth nothing fauour, but it is rather flat contrarie to the Popes power to vse the temporall sword, neither could he scarse speake more cleerely against the same, then he hath done. For although it be cleere, that the temporall sword is, according to S. Bernard, the Popes in some sort, and doth belong to the Church in some sort (which words [in some sort] D. Schulckenius heere cunningly omitteth) and that in some cases it must be vsed at the becke, direction or declaratiue command of the Pope, yet the aforesayd limitations of S. Bernard that it is the Popes, and belongeth to the Pope in some sort, that it is to be vsed for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Souldier, and not of the Priest, at the becke indeede of the Pope, but at the command of the Em∣perour, and that our Sauiour commanded, and not only counselled S. Peter to put vp his sword into the scabard, do plainly shew, that, according to S. Bernard, the Pope as Pope, cannot vse the temporal sword, nor constrain a temporall Prince by, vsing temporall punishments, which doth imply a power to vse the temporal sword.

34. And for D. Barclay, and Iohn of Paris (to omit our learned Country-man, Alexander of Hales, whose words I related before)p 1.104 who doe giue the very same answere, which I haue giuen to the aforesaid words of S. Bernard, of whose authoritie although Card. Bellarmine, heere doth make very small recko∣ning, yet I do plainly confesse, that in this controuersie concerning the Popes authoritie to vse the temporall sword, and to dispose of all temporals in order to spi∣rituall good, I doe more regard their authoritie, then

I doe Card. Bellarmines, speaking with all dutifull re∣spect, for that in my opinion they haue handled this question more soundly, more cleerely, and more sin∣cerely then he hath done. Neither is their doctrine repugnant to the Councell of Laterane, but onely to the particular exposition, which som few especially of late yeeres (who haue scraped together all the autho∣rities of Fathers, Councells, Scriptures, facts, and decrees of Popes which may seeme any way to fauour the Popes temporall authoritie) haue wrested out the words of the said Councel, contrarie to the plaine sense of the words, and the common vnderstan∣ding of all ancient Diuines, who neuer vrged this authoritie of the Councell of Laterane, although it hath beene so long publikely extant in the body of the Canon Law. But it is now adaies a common fault euen among Catholike Diuines, and those also, who, not perceiuing their owne errour, doe accuse others of the same, to alleadge, in confirmation of their opinions, the holy Scriptures, and sacred Councels vnderstood according to their owne priuate spirit and meaning, and then to cry out against their brethren, who mislike their opinions, that they haue the holy Sriptures, and sacred Councels on their side, and that therefore their doctrine is of faith, and the contrary hereticall, and that their Aduersaries doe oppose them∣selues against the holy Scriptures, and decrees of the Catholike Church, whereas wee doe regard, with all dutifull respect the holy Scriptures, sacred Councels, and decrees of the Catholik Church (the authority of which consisteth in the true and authenticall sense, & not in the letter, or in the expositiō of any priuate Ca∣tholike Doctour, which exposition others doe contra∣dict) and do oppose our selues only against their vn∣certaine opinions, and expositions of holy Scrip∣tures, or sacred Councells, grounded vpon their pri∣uate spirit and vnderstanding, contrary to the true,

proper, and plaine meaning of the words.

35. And although this Ioannes Parisiensis, or ra∣ther another Iohn of Paris liuing at the same time, and surnamed de Poliaco, as I said beforeq 1.105, was cōpelled to recall in open Consistory, at Auinion before Pope Iohn the 22. certain errors, which he maintained cōcerning confession, and absolution (of whose authoritie ne∣uerthelesse Card. Bellarmine in the latter Editions of his controuersies; notwithstanding those his errours, maketh some rekoning, seeing he citeth him as a Clas∣sicall Doctour in fauour of his opinionr 1.106) yet this ra∣ther confirmeth mee in my opinion. For if his doc∣trine, which denieth that the Pope, as Pope, hath pow∣er to depriue iuridically, and by way of sentence, temporall Princes of their dominions, and to vse the temporall sword, had beene thought in those daies to haue beene hereticall, or erronious, as now Card. Bel∣larmine, and some few other Iesuites will needes haue it to be, it is like, that he should also haue beene compelled to recall that doctrine, and that those lear∣ned Authors, who write of heresies, as Alphonsus de Castro, Prateolus Genebrard, D. Sanders, and others would for the same haue taxed him, and Marsilius of Padua (as also Albericus, and those many Schoole∣men and Doctours, related by Trithemius and Al∣maine, who did defend the same doctrine) with some note of heresie, or errour, which seeing they haue not done, it is a manifest signe, that they did not account that doctrine for hereticall, or erronious, & that the de∣cree of the Councel of Lateran, which was long before any of these mens daies, and which was also so pub∣like and registred in the corps of the Canon Law, was not in those times vnderstood in that sense, as Card. Bellarmine now of late (for before in his con∣trouersies he made small reckoning of that authority, for that he cleane omitteth that decree: yet bringing many particular facts of Popes, yea & of Pope Innocēt

the third, in whose time, and by whose authoritie that Councell was held) and some few others without suf∣ficient proofe, as I will shew beneaths 1.107, will needes haue that decree to be vnderstood.

36. Neither is that true, which D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that Ioannes Parisiensis (in acknowledging. That when the Pope doth becken, the Emperour ought to exercise the iurisdiction of the secular power for the spiri∣tuall good. But if hee will not, or if it doth not seeme to him expedient, the Pope hath no other thing to do, because he hath not the materiall sword in command, but onely the Emperour, according to S. Bernard) dooth either speake of the direct power of the Pope to vse them materiall sword, or else contradict himselfe, when afterwards hee writeth, that the Pope may per accidens, depose the Emperour, by causing the people to depose him. For Ioannes Parisiensis in that his Treatise, de potestate Regia & Papali, doth expresly impugne both the direct, and indirect coer∣ciue power of the Pope to punish by way of sentence, and iuridically with temporall punishments, affir∣ming, as D. Schulckenius also himselfe heere relateth, that Excommunication, or some such like spirituall punish∣ment is the last, which an Ecclesiasticall Iudge can inflict. For although it belongeth to an Ecclesiasticall Iudge, to bring men backe to God, and to withdraw them from sinne, yet he hath not this, but according to the way or meanes gi∣uen him by God, which is by excluding from the Sacra∣ments and the participation of the faithfull.

37 Neither doth Ioannes Parisiensis therefore con∣tradict himselfe in affirming, that the Pope may depose per accidens by meanes of the people. For although he be of opinion, as I shewed beforet 1.108, that the people haue in some cases a coerciue power ouer their Prince and in some cases may depose him, and consequently the Pope may in those cases, if it be necessarie to the good of the Church, command the people, and with spirituall punishments compell them to vse their co∣erciue

power, and so the Pope may be said to depose a Prince per accidens by meanes of the people, with which philosophicall question I will not at this time, as I often said, intermeddle, yet concerning the Popes coerciue power to vse him selfe the temporall sword, or to depose the Emperour by way of iuridicall sen∣tence, (which is not repugnant to his authoritie to depose by meanes of the people, if the people haue any such authoritie to depose, which many learned Diuines, to whose opinion the ancient Fathers seeme to assent as I haue signified heretofore doe denie,)u 1.109 Ioannes Parisiensis is cleane opposite to Card. Bellar∣mines opinion, and expressely affirmeth, that the Pope hath no power to depriue iuridically, or by way of sentence, temporall Princes of their kingdomes, but only to inflict by way of coercion or constraint Eccle∣siasticall or spirituall Censures. And thus much both concerning my answer to S. Bernards authori∣tie, and also the Reply, which D. Schulckenius hath made therevnto.

38 Now to the authoritie of Pope Boniface the 8. I answer first that his words are to be vnderstood in that sense, as I expounded S. Bernard, whom hee, as Card: Bellarmine affirmeth, did imitate, to wit, that the temporall power is in order to spirituall good, or, which is all one, in spirituall things subiect to the com∣mand of the spirituall power, and that shee is to be in∣structed by the spirituall, not absolutely in temporall gouernment, but in Christian faith and religion, and that if shee goe out of the way, or erre in things be∣longing to Christian faith and religion, shee is to bee iudged by the spiritual, but with spirituall not tempo∣rall punishments. And in this sense it is very true, that the sword is vnder the sword, and the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, but by this it is onely signified, that temporall Princes are in spiritualls, but not in meere temporals, subiect to the spirituall com∣mand,

and spirituall correction of spirituall Pastours.

39 Secondly, although Pope Boniface should vn∣derstand those words in this sense, that temporall Princes are, not onely in spiritualls, but also in tempo∣ralls subiect to the Popes power both to command, and also to punish temporally, yet his authoritie here∣in, as he is Pope, (for as he is a priuate Doctor, it is no greater then of other Doctors) is not of any great weight; considering first, that, as well obserueth D. Duvallx 1.110 a learned Schoole-Diuine, & one of the Kings Readers in the Colledge of Sorbon, although Pope Boniface doth make mention both of the spirituall, and temporall sword, and in the progresse of his Consti∣tion doth say, that the temporall sword is vnder the spiri∣tuall yet in the definition or conclusion (which chiefely as in the decrees of Councells is to be regarded, seeing that this onely bindeth to beleeue) this onely hee pronounceth in generall, but we declare, say, define, and pronounce, that it is necessarie to the saluation of euery humane creature to be subiect to the Bishop of Rome. But in what man∣ner all men must be subiect, it is not expressed in this definition; and therefore not to contradict this de∣finition it is sufficient to affirme, that all men must in spiritualls bee subiect to the Popes power to com∣mand, and to punish s;piritually.

40 Secondly, for that this Extrauagant was recal∣led by his Successour Pope Clement the fift, in cap. meruit, de privilegijs, wherein hee declareth, that no preiudice shall arise to the King of France by that Extra∣uagant of Pope Boniface, but that all things shall be vn∣derstood to be in the same state, as they were before that definition, as well concerning the Church, as concerning the King, and Kingdome of France, Thirdly, for that all the authorities, which hee bringeth from holy Scriptures to proue, that the Pope hath both the tem∣porall and spirituall sword, doe proue only, that the Pope is the spirituall Pastour of the Church, and hath

spirituall power to binde, and loose, to iudge and pu∣nish spiritually, as, whatsoeuer thou shalt binde on earth &c. and a spirituall man doth iudge all things, and he is iudged by none, which place some Catholike writers expound of publike and authenticall iudgments: For all the other places of holy Scripture, which Pope Boniface alledgeth, are either taken in the mysticall, and not in the literall sense, as those behold two swords here, and put vp thy sword into the scabard, but from the mysticall sense no forcible argument can bee drawne, as all Diuines doe grant, to proue any do∣ctrine, vnlesse to haue that mysticall sense it be decla∣red in other places of holy Scripture, or else they make nothing to the purpose, as are those words, which God spake to the Prophet Ieremie, Behold I haue appointed thee this day ouer the Gentiles, and ouer Kingdomes, that thou maiest plucke vp and destroy, and waste and dissipate, and build and plant, not to destroy nations, and kingdomes, and raise vp others, but by his preaching to plant virtues, and destroy vices, as S. Hierome expoundeth, and by foretelling the destru∣ction of Kingdomes and Nations, if they doe not re∣pent, and their increase and saluation if they will bee converted. Neither is the Pope S. Ieremies Successour in the spirit of prophesie, neither doe wee read, that Ieremie destroyed any kingdom, although he fulfilled all that, which he was appointed to do by Alm: God.

41. It is the same, saith Andreas Capella vpon this place, to appoint him ouer the Gentiles, and to giue him a Prophet in the Gentiles; as he said before. I giue thee power and authoritie, saith God, to declare and foretell in my name, as my Prophet, the ruines and wastings of the Gen∣tiles and of Kingdomes. That thou threaten my enemies, whom in their Countries I haue planted, placed, confirmed, erected that I will abolish them with captiuities, vnlesse they will repent. And contrariwise, that I will build them, and plant them againe, that is, restore to their ancient state,

them whom I shall destroy and abollish if they will acknow∣ledge their sinnes. And in these words all the charge of Ie∣remie is comprehended, and the matter of this whole booke is declared. For it is a prophecie of the destruction of the City, and temple, and of the captiuitie of the people, and of their returne from captiuity, and of the reedifying of the temple and City, and of the ouerthrow of other nations, and kingdomes. Thus Capella. And the same exposition of these words hath the Glosse vpon this place Besides Pope Boniface in this Extrauagant alledgeth for Scrip∣ture that, which is no Scripture, to wit, for the truth testifying the spirituall power hath to institute or instruct the earthly power, and to iudge it if it shall not be good, which words are not to be found in the holy Scripture.

42. Lastly, there is no more account to be made of the authoritie of Pope Boniface the eight for this his doctrine in this point, touching the Popes temporal authoritie ouer temporall Princes, if we take him, as a priuate Doctour deliuering his opinion, then of an o∣ther Doctour, as well learned as he was, who holdeth with the Canonists, that the Pope is direct Lord & King of the world not only spirituall, but also temporall; for that Pope Boniface was of this opinion, that the Pope hath direct power not only in spiritualls, but also in temporalls. Whereupon he wrote to Philip the faire, King of France, that he was subiect to him in spirituals and temporalls, and that all those, who should hold the contrary he reputed for heretikes: and that the kingdome of France by reason of the Kings disobedience was falne to the Church For which words Pope Boniface is taxed by Ioannes Ti∣liusx 1.111 Bishop of Meldune, by Robertus Guaguinusy 1.112, by Platinaz 1.113, and others, of great pride, impudencie and ar∣rogancie. Whereupon Paulus Aemilius (who doth o∣therwise greatly fauour Pope Boniface) writeth thus:* 1.114 Pope Boniface did add, at which all men did marmaile, that the King of France ought to reuerence the Pope not only in sacred manner, and by Episcopall right, as a Father

of our soules, but he ought also to acknowledge him, as his Prince by ciuill Iurisdiction, and in prophane matters and dominion. All this being considered, as also, that all the words of that Extrauagant are so generall, that they may be vnderstood as well, if not better, of the Popes direct dominion in temporalls, as of his indirect power to dispose of temporals, which is only in order to spirituall good, what great reckoning is to be made of this cōstitution of P. Boniface, it being withal reuer∣sed by P. Clemens the 5. who next but one succeeded him, I remit to the cōsideration of the iudicious Reader

Chap. 10.

Wherein the similitude of Pope Innocent the third, who compareth the spirituall and tempo∣rall power to the Sun & Moone, is examined.

1. THe sixt, and last argument, which Card. Bel∣larmine bringth to proue the sbiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, is taken from the au∣thority of Pope Innocent the third, who in cap. Solitae de maioritate & obedientia doth wel, saith he,a 1.115 compare the spirituall & temporall power to the Sun & Moone. There∣fore as the moone is subiect to the Sun, for that she receiueth light from the Sun, & the Sun is not subiect to the Moone, for that the Sun receiueth nothing from the Moon, so also a king is subiect to the Pope, & the Pope is not subiect to a king

2. But first this similitude doth not proue, that the temporall power it selfe is subiect to the spirituall, or, which is all one, that a temporall King is subiect to the Pope in respect of his temporall power, which he doth not receiue from the Pope, but in respect of the light of faith, which a temporall King receiueth from the spi∣rituall power. And therefore as the Moone, when she is eclypsed, & in opposition to the Sun, doth not loose that little light, which, according to the doctrin of the Philosophers and astronomers, she hath of her owne nature, and not deriued from the Sunne, so temporall Princes, when of Catholikes or Christians they be∣come

heretikes, or infidells, and are in opposition to the Pope, do not loose their temporall power, and the light of naturall reason, which they receiue not from the Pope, but only the light of faith and grace, which they did receiue from the spirituall power.

3. Secondly, that, which Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that the Pope receiueth nothing from temporall Princes is very vntrue, and therefore in this point also that part of the similitude is not fitly applyed. For the Pope hath receiued from temporall Princes all his temporall do∣minion, iurisdiction, and temporall sword, and the whole patrimonie of S. Peter, wherein, as the same Pope Innocent affirmeth,b 1.116 he doth now exercise the power of a supreme temporall Prince. Neither is it only true, that temporall Princes are in spiritualls subiect to the spiri∣tuall power of spirituall Pastours, from whom they re∣ceiue spirituall light, and supernaturall directions by the holy Scriptures & Ecclesiasticall lawes, by which they may see how to liue like good Christians, and to attaine to life euerlasting, but it is also true, that spiri∣tuall Pastours, as inferiour Bishops and Cleargie men are in temporals subiect to the temporall power of temporall Princes, from whom they receiue the in∣crease of naturall light, and ciuill directions by ciuill and temporall Lawes, by which they may see, how to conuerse ciuilly among themselues and other men, and to attaine to temporall peace and quietnesse in the ciuill common-wealth.

4. Whereupon well sayd S. Ambrose,c 1.117 If thou wilt not be subiect to Caesar, doe not haue wordly things, but if thou hast riches, thou art subiect to Caesar. For all men, saith Astensis,d 1.118 are subiect to the Emperour, Lay-men in temporals, and Cleargie men, who doe receiue from him temporals. And Gratian the Compiler of the first and most ancient part of the Canon Law, called the De∣cree, writeth thus:e 1.119 Cleargie men by their office are sub∣iect to the Bishop, by the possessions of farmes or mannours

they are subiect to the Emperour. From the Bishop they receiue vnction, tithes and first fruits, from the Emperour they receiue possessions of farmes or mannours. Ther∣fore because by the Emperiall Law it is made, as he proo∣ueth out of S. Austin, that farmes be possessed, it is mani∣fest that Cleargie men by the possessions of farmes are sub∣iect to the Emperour. See also abouef 1.120 many other Ca∣tholike Authours who doe affirme that Cleargy men are subiect to the directiue power of temporall Prin∣ces. Neither doth Pope Innocent in the aforesayd Chapter denie, but in expresse words affirme, that the Emperour is superiour to those, who doe receiue from him temporals; And therefore this similitude of the Sunne and Moone doth not prooue, that the temporall po∣wer is subiect to the spirituall, or, which is all one, that temporall Princes are in temporals, or as they haue temporall power, subiect to spirituall Pastours, but it rather prooueth the flat contrarie.

5. Yea and Card. Bellarmine himselfe,g 1.121 did for ma∣ny years together hold with Albertus Pighius,h 1.122 that it is the more probable opinion, that S. Paul, (& consequent∣ly the rest of the Apostles) was subiect in temporals to Cae∣sar, not only de facto, but also de iure: from whence sup∣posing another true & vndoubted principle granted also by Card. Bellarmine,i 1.123 that the Law of Christ doth depriue no man of any his right or dominion, it necessarily followeth, that if infidell Princes haue rightfull power and dominion, or iurisdiction ouer Cleargy men, there is no repugnance, but that they may keepe the same power, and iurisdiction ouer Cleargy men, al∣though they become Christians. But Card. Bellar∣mine hath now forsooth in his Recognitions recalled that opinion. I doe not now approoue, saith he,k 1.124 that which I said with Albertus Pighius, that S. Paul did appeale to Caesar, as to his lawfull Prince. And therefore I do persist in the former answer, that S. Paul was subiect to Caesar de facto, not de iure, and did appeale to him, not as his owne

Superiour, but as to the Superiour of the President of Iew∣ry and of the Iewes, by whom he was wronged. For other∣wise he could not free himselfe from that vniust iudgement and danger of a most vniust death, but by hauing recourse to their Prince and Iudge, which hee himselfe did signi∣fie Acts 28. when he saith, I am constrained to appeale to Caesar.

6 If Card. Bellarmine hath vpon sufficient ground recalled either this, or any other of his former opini∣ons, he is truly therefore much to be commended, as likewise is S. Austin, for making his booke of Retracta∣tions. But if she should without sufficient ground not onely recall this opinion, which he for aboue twentie yeeres together in publike print, and for many yeeres before in publike writings had defended for the more probable, but also condemne it for improbable, it being also the common opinion of Diuines, any man might iustly imagine, that affection, not reason moued him thereunto. I doe not approue, saith he,l 1.125 in his Recogni∣tions, that which I said in that place with Albertus Pig∣hius, that S. Paul did appeale to Caesar as to his lawfull Prince. But in his booke against D. Barclay hee goeth much farther. I haue admonished, saith he,m 1.126 in the Re∣cognition of my writings, that the opinion of Pighius, which in times past I did follow, is improbable, and that with better Doctours it is to be affirmed, that the Apostles were exempted de iure from all subiection to earthly Princes.

7. But truly I cannot but maruell, that Card. Bell. could be so much ouerseen, as to affirm, that he did ad∣monish in his Recognitions, that the opinion of Pighius is improbable, seeing that he only saith there, I doe not ap∣proue the opinion of Pighius, &c. But he doth not say, that it is improbable, vnlesse, forsooth, what opinion C Bellarmine doth not approue, although it be approued by other learned Catholikes, must forth with be ac∣counted improbable. Besides I wold gladly know, who be those better Doctours, whom Card. Bellarmine saith

are to be followed against the opinion of Phighius. For my owne part I doe not know what better Doctours there be (abstracting from the ancient Fathers, and Doctors of the Church) if we speake only of the Doc∣tours themselues, and not of the doctrine which they teach; then among the Thomists, Iohn of Paris, Domi∣nicus Sotus, Victoria, Bartholomaeus, Medina, Bannes; a∣mong the Scotists, Richardus de Media villa, Ioannes, Medina, Ioseph Angles; and among the Iesuites, Salme∣ron, Molina, Valentia, Richeome, Salas, and many other Diuines, whom Salas citeth, who doe hold, that Cler∣gie men are not by the law of God & nature, but only by the Ecclesiasticall Canons and priuileges of Prin∣ces exempted from the coactiue power of Secular Ma∣gistrates, and not at all from their directiue power, but that they are subiect to the directiue power of Secular Princes in those things, which doe not repugne to the Ecclesiasticall Canons, and their state, and conse∣quently, that Cleargie men in the time of the Apo∣stles, and long after were subiect to the coactiue power of temporall Princes. Yea and the ancient Fathers, especially S. Chrysostome, Theophylact, and Oecumenius doe in expresse words affirme,n 1.127 that whether hee be a Monke, a Priest, or an Apostle, hee is according to the do∣ctrine of S. Paul subiect to Secular powers. Only the Ca∣nonists (& yet not all of them, as Pope Innoc: Nauar, and Coverruvias) whom now Card: Bellarm: leauing the Diuines, & his ancient opinion vpon very weake grounds, as you shall see, doth follow, do vehemently defend, that Cleargie men are by the law of God and nature, exempted from all subiection to Secular Princes.

8 Now you shall see, for what reasons Card: Bel∣larmine was moued to recall his former opinion, and to condemne it as improbable. For if the reason, saith heo 1.128, of the exemption of Clergie men be for that they are ministers of Christ, who is the Prince of the Kings

of the Earth, and King of Kinges, truely they are ex∣empted de iure not onely from the power of Christian Kinges, but also of Heathen Princes. If Card. Bellar∣mine meane, that the reason, wherefore the Eccle∣siasticall Canons, and Christian Princes haue exemp∣ted Cleargie men (I doe not say from all subiection, for notwithstanding their exemption they still remaine subiects to temporall Princes, but from paying of tri∣butes, from the tribunall of Secular Magistrates and such like) be, for that they are Ministers of Christ in spirituall, but not in Secular matters, I will not con∣tradict this reason, but from hence it doth not follow that therefore Cleargie men in the time of the Apost∣les, when there were no such positiue lawes of their exemption, were not in temporall causes subiect de iu∣re to infidell Princes.

9. But if Card. Bellarmine meane, that the reason, why Cleargie men are not onely by the Ecclesiasticall Canons and lawes of Princes, but also by the law of GOD and nature exempted from all subiection to tem∣porall Princes, is, for that they are Ministers of Christ, who is the King of Kings, this reason doth not proue, but suppose, that which is in question, to wit, that Clear∣gie men are by the law of GOD, and nature, exemp∣ted from all subjection to temporall Princes, which the common opinion of Diuines doth constantly de∣ny, whose opinion to account improbable, or temera∣rious for such a weake reason, which doth not proue, but suppose the question, were in my iudgement to ex∣ceede the limits of Christian prudence, and modesty. Neither is there any repugnance in naturall reason, but that the Ministers of Christ, who, as it is proba∣ble, was, according to his humanity, onely a spirituall, and not a temporall King, (and although he was also a temporall King, yet Secular Princes are his Ministers in temporalls, and the Apostles & their Successors are his Ministers in spiritualls) might in temporall causes

be truely, and de iure subject to temporall Princes, as the Apostles them-selues, who are Christ his chiefe Ministers in his spirituall kingdome, and Church, were, according to the expresse doctrine of the anci∣ent Fathers, as they are parts, members and cittizens of the temporall common-wealth subiect to temporall Princes, in their temporal kingdomes, and in temporall affaires. Neither doe those words of Saint Paulp 1.129 I am constrained to appeale to Caesar, signifie, that hee was subject to Caesar onely de facto, and not de iure, more, then if a Priest, being vniustly oppressed by his Ordi∣nary, should appeale to the Pope, and say, that he was constrained, for that hee had small hope to finde iu∣stice at his Ordinaries hands, to appeale to the Pope, signifie thereby, that hee was not subject de iure, but onely de facto to the Pope.

10. An other reason, which mooued Card. Bellar∣mine to recall his former opinion, and to affirme, that Saint Paul did not appeale to Caesar, as to his owne lawfull Iudge but as to the Iudge of the president of Iewrie and of the Iewes, who did vniustly oppresse him, was saith heq 1.130, for that the cause of which they did accuse him being spirituall, to wit, concerning the resurrection of Christ, and the ceremonies of the law of Moyses, could not by right appertaine to a Heathen Prince. See the Acts of the A∣postles chap. 21. 22. 23. 24. & 25.

11. But truely it is strange, that Card. Bellarmine durst so confidently remit his Reader to those chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, to proue, that the cause, whereof Saint Paul was accused by the Iewes to the Tribune, and President of Iewrie, and wherefore he ap∣pealed to Caesar, was spirituall, and not appertaining by right to a Heathen Prince, vnlesse hee will haue the raising of sedition, and tumults, and the committing of a crime worthy of death, not to belong to a Heathen Prince. For it is cleere by those chapters, that the Iewes accused him of sedition, and that he had offended

Caesar, and endeauoured to haue him therefore put to death. We haue found, saith one Tertullusr 1.131, who went to accuse S. Paul before the President Felix, this man pestiferous, and raising seditions to all the Iewes in th•• world, &c. And afterwards,s 1.132 the Iewes before the President Festus obiected against S. Paul many, and gre••∣uous crimes, which they could not proue, but they might easily haue proued, that S. Paul did preach the Resur∣rection of Christ, for that hee confessed the same be∣fore both the Presidents, and King Agrippa: Where∣vpon King Agrippa said to S. Pault 1.133, A little thou per∣swadest me to become a Christian. And beforeu 1.134 S. Paul made answere to the President Festus, that neither a∣gainst the law of the Iewes, nor against the Temple, nor a∣gainst Caesar, haue I any thing offended; which signifi∣eth, that he was accused that he had offended against Caesar. And a little after saith S. Paul to Festus, The Iewes I haue not hurt as thou very well knowest. For if I haue hurt them, or done any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to dye, but if none of those thinges be, whereof they ac∣cuse me, no man can giue me to them, I appeale to Cae∣sar.

12▪ By all which it is very cleare, that the Iewes sought to haue S. Paul put to death, and that all the crimes which they obiected against him, were false, and consequently that he was not accused merely for preaching the resurrection of Christ, which S. Paul would neuer haue denied, but for raising sedition and tumults in the people, and for doing wrong to Caesar. Whereupon S. Chrysostomex 1.135 commendeth S. Paul, that he would be iudged before him whom he was accused to haue wronged. And Card. Bellarmine himselfe, not a∣greable to this his reason, did before in his Controuer∣sies affirmey 1.136, which as yet he hath not recalled, that S Paul did for good and iust cause appeale to Caesar, when he was accused for raising sedition and tumults in the peo∣ple. And in that very place of his Recognitions, where

he recalleth his opinion, he doth very plainely insinu∣ate, as you haue seene, that the cause whereof he was accused, was criminall, for which he was in danger saith Card. Bellarmine, of a most vniust death.

13 True it is that S. Paul did preach to the Iewes the resurrection of Christ, according to the predictions of the holy Prophets, and for this cause they accused him of sedition, and to be a man worthy of death, and therefore he appealed to the tribunall of Caesar, not that Caesar should iudge, whether Christ was risen from death to life, for this indeed had been a spirituall cause, but whether to preach to the Iewes the resurrection of Christ, according to the predictions of the holy Pro∣phets, were sedition, and a crime worthy to be punish∣ed with death by the Secular Magistrate. Wherefore Festus the President of Iewrie, and King Agrippa, af∣ter that S. Paul had discoursed about the resurrection of Christz 1.137, and King Agrippa had said to S. Paul, A little thou dost perswade me to become a Christian, they all rose vp, and going aside they spake among themselues, saying, that this man hath done nothing worthy of death, or bonds; which answere also made Lycias the Tri∣bune to the President Foelix before in the 23. Chap∣ter.

14 A third reason, which moued Card. Bellar∣mine to recall his former opinion, and that S Paul did not appeale to Caesar, as to his lawfull Iudge, is, for that, saith hea 1.138, it doth seeme to be altogether repugnant to the Gospell, that Christ did not free expresly, and by name S. Peter, and the Apostles from the obligation, wherein they stood bound to Heathen Princes. For Christ Mat. 17. did pay the didrachmes for himselfe and Peter, to auoide scandall. For that otherwise neither himselfe, nor Peter were bound to pay that tribute, he did demon∣strate by those words: The Kinges of the earth, of whom doe they receiue tribute or cense? of their children, or of strangers? And Peter answering, of strangers, Ie∣sus

said vnto him, therefore the sonnes are free: by which words he declared, that he was free from all tribute & cense, for that he was the sonne of the King of all Kings, and because when the sonne of a King is free, also his fami∣lie is reputed free, therefore Peter, and the Apostles, who by the gracious fauour of Christ did appertaine to his familie, ought also to be free.

15 But this reason is neither sufficient, nor a∣greable to Card. Bellarmines owne principles. For first Card. Baronius affirmethb 1.139, that this didrachme, which was exacted from our Sauiour in this place, was not a tribute due to Caesar, but onely to God for the vse of the Temple, according to the law of God decreed in the 30. chapter of Exodus: And therefore from this place no sufficient argument can be drawne, accor∣ding to Card. Baronius doctrine, that the Apostes were exempted from paying of tributes, or any other temporall subiection, due to temporall Princes. Yea, and which is more, Card. Bellarmine himselfe in the latter Editions of his Controuersies approueth this Exposition for most true. There be two interpretati∣ons, saith hec 1.140, of this place: Therefore sonnes are free. The former is of S. Hillarie, who affirmeth, that this place is onely meant of the tribute, which God did impose vpon the Children of Israell, Exodus 30. to the vse of the temple, which tribute was properly called a didrachme; and according to this Exposition, which seemeth to vs to be most true, this is the force of the argument. The Kings of the earth, do not exact tribute of their sonnes but of strangers, therefore the King of heauen will not ex∣act tribute of mee, who am his proper and naturall sonne. The second interpretation, which is of S. Hierome, who expoundeth those wordes of the tribute which was to bee paid to Caesar, seemeth to bee the lesse probable, be∣cause the tribute which was to be paid to Caesar, was not a Didrachme, but a penny, as it is plaine by Math. 22. Shew me the tribute coyne: and they offered him a

penny. Neither can it be demonstrated by any found rea∣son, that the tribute of the Didrachme was wont to be paid to Caesar, but after the Ascension of Christ into heauen. For Iosephus lib. 7. de bello Iudaico cap. 26. doth write that the tribute of the Didrachme, which all the Iewes did pay to the temple euery yeare, should afterwards be brought into the Capitole. Thus Card. Bellarmine.

16 Wherefore it is strange, that hee should now be so forgetfull, as to bring this text of holy Scripture for a reason, why hee changed his former opinion, and which reason also hee saith doth demonstrate, that Christ our Sauiour did expresly, and by name free S. Peter and the Apostles from the obligation wherein they stood bound to Caesar, whereas Card. Bellarmine himselfe, as you haue seene, expoundeth this place not of any tri∣bute to bee paid to Caesar, but onely due to God for the vse of the temple. And therefore small reason had Card. Bellarmine for the aforesaid reasons, which are so weake, and repugnant to his owne doctrine, as you haue seene, to recall his former opinion, which for so long time hee had in publike Schooles, and writings, with the common opinion of Diuines, taught and maintained against the Canonists: but truely he had no reason to condemne for such weak reasons the con∣trary opinion of the Schoole Diuines, of whose pro∣fession he himselfe also is, as improbable.

17 Far more agreeable to reason, and also to Card. Bellarmines profession, hee being a Schoole Diuine, were it for him in my iudgement to returne to his anci∣ent opinion, which the Schoole Diuines doe general∣ly maintaine, and rather to recall some other his o∣pinions, wherein hee plainely contradicteth his owne doctrine, as I haue shewed before: As that our Sauiour by those wordes, therefore sonnes are free &c. Math. 17. did expresly, and by name free S. Peter and the Apostles from the obligation, wherein they stood bound to Heathen Princes, which is flatly repugnant to that, which hee

taught in another place, that these wordes are not meant of any tribute, which was to be paid to Caesar, but onely of the tribute, which God did impose Exod. 30. vpon the children of Israell to the vse of the Temple. And besides that, the cause whereof the Iewes did accuse S. Paul, and for which hee appealed to Caesar, was spirituall,d 1.141 which is cleerely repugnant to that, which hee taught in another place,e 1.142 that S. Paul did for good and iust cause appeale to Caesar, and did acknowledge him for his Iudge, when he was accused of raysing sedition, and tumults in the people. And moreouer, (to omit sundry other his con∣tradictions) that the Church of Christ is compoundedf 1.143 of spirituall and temporall power, as a man is compoun∣ded of soule and body, and that the temporall and spiri∣tuall Common-wealth doe make one totall body whereof the Pope is head, as a man is compounded of b••dy and soule, which is cleerely repugnant to that which hee taught in other places, that the Church of Christ is compounded onely of spirituall power, and that the Pope, if wee will speake properly, hath onely spirituall and not tem∣porall power.

18 But secondly although wee should grant, that those words of our Sauiour, therefore sonnes are free &c. were meant of the tribute which was to bee paid to Caesar and not to the temple, yet Card. Bellarmine him∣selfe did in the former Editions of his Controuersies giue therevnto a very sufficient answer, and which in his latter Editions he hath not confuted. For thus he writethg 1.144: I answer first that this place doth not conuince: for otherwise he should exempt from tributes all Christians, who are regenerate by Baptisme. Secondly I answer, that our Sauiour doth speake onely of himselfe. For he maketh this Argument: The sonnes of Kinges are free from tri∣butes, because they neither pay tribute to their fathers, for that the goods of the parents and children are common, nor to other Kings, because they are not subiect to them, but I am the sonne of the first and chiefest King, therefore I owe

tribute to no man. Wherfore when our Sauiour saith, there∣fore Sonnes are free, from thence hee meant onely to gather this, that he himselfe was not bound to pay tribute: of other men hee affirmed nothing.

19 Thus answered Card. Bellarmine in times past, when he followed the opinion of the Diuines, con∣cerning the exemption of Clergy men against the Ca∣nonists, who vrged this place of holy Scriptue to proue, that Clergy men are exempted from paying of tributes by the law of God. But now, forsooth, he for∣saketh the Diuines, and this very text, therefore sonnes are free, which then hee brought for an obiection a∣gainst his opinion, and cleerely answered the same, he bringeth now for a chiefe ground to proue his new o∣pinion, and (which is very remarkable) hee concealeth the answer which he then made to the said obiection: onely hee addeth this: that when the sonnes of Kings are exempted from tribute, not onely their owne persons, but also their seruants and Ministers, and so their families are exempted from tributes. But it is certaine that all Clergie men do properly appertaine to the family of Christ, who is the sonne of the King of Kings. And this our Lord did seeme to signifie when hee said to S. Peter, But that wee may not scandalize them, finding the stater take it, and giue it for me and thee. As though he should say, that both hee, and his family, whereof S. Peter was a chiefe gouernour, ought to bee free from tributes. Which also S. Hierome doth seeme to haue vnderstood in his Commentary of that place, when hee saith, that Clergy men doe not pay tributes for the honour of our Lord, and are as Kings children free from tributes: and S. Austin lib. 1. qq. Euang. q. 23. where he writeth, that in euery earthly Kingdome, the children of that King∣dome vnder which are all the Kingdomes of the earth, ought to be free, (not are free, as Card. Bellarmine affir∣meth S. Austin to say,) from tributes.

20 Thus you see, how Card. Bellarmine runneth

vp and downe from the words of holy Scripture, by which it is demonstrated, saith he, that S. Peter was not bound to pay tribute to Caesar, to the sense which he him∣selfe disproueth, and then from the sense to his pri∣uate collections, and inferences, that if S. Peter was free, all the Apostles were free, and if all the Apost∣les, all Cleargie men. But if it had pleased him to haue also set downe the answere, which in the former Edi∣tions of his bookes he made to this obiection, the Rea∣der would easily haue perceiued, that from this place of holy Scripture no sufficient reason could be gathe∣red to cause him to recall his former opinion, although wee should grant, that those words of our Sauiour were meant of the tribute, which was to be paide to Caesar, of which neuerthelesse Card. Bellarmine will not haue them to be vnderstood, but onely of the tri∣bute which the children of Israell were by the law of God, Exod. 30. commanded to pay for their soules vn∣to the vse of the tabernacle of testimonie, for at that time the temple was not built. For first, saith he, if this argument did conuince, not onely Cleargie men, but also all Christians, who being regenerate by baptisme are the children of Christ, and also doe properly appertaine to his spirituall familie, or Church, of which, S. Peter and the rest of the Apostles vnder him were chiefe gouer∣nours, should be exempted from paying tributes. Second∣ly, our Sauiour, saith he, doth speake onely of himselfe, who was the sonne of the first and chiefest King, and that he himselfe was not bound to pay tribute: of other men he affirmeth nothing.

21 Thirdly, to the authority of S. Hierome, he an∣swereth, that S. Hierome did not intend in that place, to proue out of the Gospell, that Cleargie men are free from tribute, but onely he doth bring a certaine congru∣ence, wherefore they are freed by the decrees of Pri••ces: for therefore he saith, that they doe not pay tributes as the children of the Kingdome, and he addeth an o∣ther

cause, to wit, the honor of Christ: for he saith, that for his honour Cleargie men doe not pay tributs. Ther∣fore not the law of God, but the decrees of Princes made for the honour of Christ, haue exempted Cleargy men. Thus Card. Bellarmine.

22 Fourthly, to the authority of S. Augustine he an∣swereth, that although Iansenius (whom Salmeron and Suarez doe follow) doth affirme, that S. Austen by the children of the supreme kingdome did vnderstand the na∣turall children of God, and that he spake in the plurall number to obserue the manner of our Sauiours spech, so that the meaning of S. Austen was, that all the naturall sonnes of God if it were possible that God could haue more naturall sonnes then one, should be exempted from paying of earthly tributes: yet Card. Bellarmine doth not like well of this answere, and therefore he thinketh the an∣swere of Abulensis to be the more probable, that S. Aust∣en did not vnderstand naturall children, but Clergie men and Monkes, who, as also S. Hierome affirmeth, in Cap. 17 Mat., were and are free from tributes, as those who appertaine to the familie of Christ. Neither doth it there∣fore from hence follow, that Cleargie men are by the law of God free from tributes. For first, that which S. Austen saith, is not in the words of our Sauiour, but it is onely gathered by a probable consequence, For our Sauiour doth onely speake of the true and naturall children of Kinges, as S. Chrysostome doth expound that place. Se∣condly, our Sauiour himselfe doth allso properly command nothing in this place, that it may be called the law of God, but doth onely shew by the vse and custome of men, that the children of Kinges are free from tributes. Thus Card. Bellarmine answered in his former Editions, which an∣swere in his later editions he altogether concealeth, but for what cause I remit to the iudgement of the pru∣dent Reader.

23 By all which it is apparant that our Sauiour did onely speake of himselfe, and of the naturall children

of Kings, when hee vsed those words, therefore sonnes are free; and of the seruants, or familie, either of Kings, or of the children of Kinges he saith nothing at all; and therefore from an other consequence drawne from the vse, and custome of men, and not from the words of our Sauiour, can it be gathered, that those who are seruants, or of the familie of the children of Kings, are exempted either from subiection to the inferiour magistrates of the kingdome, or from the paying of tributs. But by no probable consequence it can be de∣duced, that those who are either seruants, and of the familie of Kinges children, or also seruants, and of the familie of the King himselfe, are by the custome of a∣ny nation either exempted from subiection to inferiour Magistrates, and much lesse to the King himselfe, or also from paying tributes, vnlesse the King vpon some other speciall consideration doth grant to any of them such a priuiledge.

24 To those words of our Sauiour, But that wee may not scandalize them &c. it is easily answered accor∣ding to the first exposition of that didrachme, which Card. Bellarmine thinketh to be most true, that it was a tribute due to the temple or tabernacle, and not to Cae∣sar: For I doe willingly grant, that S. Peter, who was appointed by Christ to be the chiefe gouer∣nour of his Church and temple, was exempted from paying tribute to the temple. But although we should admit, that the aforesaide didrachme was a tribute due to Caesar, and not to the temple, yet from those words of our Sauiour, no sufficient argument can be drawne to proue, that S. Peter, and especially the rest of the Apostles, were by the law of God exempted from pay∣ing tributes, and much lesse from temporall subiecti∣on to Heathen Princes.

25 First, for that we may probably answere with Iansenius, and Abulensis, that Christ did speake to S. Peter in the plurall number, [but that wee may not scan∣dalize

them] not for that S. Peter was bound to pay tribute onely by reason of scandall, but either because our Sauiour did speake of his owne person, vsing the plurall number for the singular, as it is vsuall, especially among great persons; we are wont, saith S. Epiphani∣ush 1.145, to speake singular thinges plurall, and plurall singu∣lar. For wee say, wee haue tould you, and we haue seene you, and we come to you, and yet there be not two who speake, but one who is present: or else because the scan∣dall, which Christ should haue giuen, would in some sort haue redounded to S. Peter, as being a mediatour in that businesse. And therefore, as well affirmeth Ian∣seniusi 1.146, our Sauiour did pay tribute for himselfe onely to auoid scandall & for S. Peter to honour him as with a cer∣taine reward for his faith, obedience, and diligence, as a mediatour of this busines, and an executor of the Miracle of finding the stater in the fishes mouth, or as Barradius the Iesuite, and others doe affirmek 1.147, to honour him a∣boue the rest, as the Prince of the Apostles, and the head of the Church. See Abulensis, q. 198. 199. and 200. in cap. 17. Mat. and Barradius vpon this place.

26 Secondly, although wee should grant, that our Sauiour did for some speciall cause exempt S. Peter from paying tribute to Caesar, either by a personall pri∣uiledge, or else reall, and descending to his successors, it doth not therefore follow, that he did exempt him from all ciuil subiection to temporal Princes, as neither doth it follow, that because the Children of Kinges, for that their goodes and their fathers are common, or any of the Kinges seruants are by speciall priuiledge exempted from paying tributes, they are therefore ex∣empted from all ciuil subiection and alleagiance to the King.

27 Thirdly, for that there is no probabilitie in my iudgment, that either Christ did by those words in∣tend to exempt the rest of the Apostles, seeing that there is no mention at all made of them in that place,

or also that this priuiledg of exemption is extended to S. Peter, and the rest of the Apostles, in regard onely that they were of the spirituall familie, or Church of Christ (I say of the spirituall familie, for that I will not deny, but that as they were of his corporall fami∣lie, and liued with him here on earth, and had no cor∣porall goods but such as belonged to Christ, they were exempted from paying tributes, but not from ciuill subiection to Heathen Princes) because the exempti∣on of seruants with their Maister, or of those, who are of the familie of Kinges Children with the Kinges Children themselues, is not grounded in the law of nature, but onely in a certaine congruity, and cust∣ome of men, from which custome this argument to exempt the Apostles, for that they were of Christs fa∣milie, is drawne: but there is no such custome among nations, that the seruants or familie of Kinges Children or of the King himselfe, are exempted from paying tributes, although the children of Kinges hauing no o∣ther goodes, then which are their fathers, be exemp∣ted, as Card. Bellarmine a little aboue affirmed. But howsoeuer, neither the seruants to Kinges children, nor the kinges children themselues, are exempted from ciuill subiection, or from the directiue, or coerciue pow∣er of the King.

28 And therefore neither Fa. Suarez, who hand∣leth this question at large, dare affirme, that from those words of our Sauiour it can certainely, but onely probably be gathered, that this exemption was exten∣ded to the rest of the Apostles. I answere, saith heel 1.148, that it is true, that Christ did not say plainly, that the fa∣milie is exempted with the children, neither doth it follow by any euident, or necessary consequence, and therefore the aforesaid opinion, for as much as belongeth to this part, is neither of faith, nor altogether certaine. Neuerthelesse it is most likely, that this extention to the rest of the Apost∣les is according to the intention of Christ,

29. But truely, although there may be alleadg∣ed some probable congruities, wherefore our Sauiour might grant some speciall prerogatiue, and priuiledge of exemption to S. Peter, whom he had chosen to be the first and principall head and gouernour of his Church, rather then to the rest of the Apostles, as likewise the Diuines doe yeeld probable congruities, wherefore God almighty might giue to the B. Virgin Mary, whom he had chosen to be the mother of his immaculate Sonne, a speciall prerogatiue and pri∣uiledge of exemption from originall sinne, but whe∣ther he did grant that priuiledge or no, it cannot cer∣tainely be proued, neuerthelesse for my owne part I doe not see any probable likelihood, that our Sauiour should giue to the rest of the Apostles, and much lesse to all Cleargie men, any speciall priuiledge of exemp∣tion from all ciuill subiection to temporall Princes. And therefore the most part of the Schoole Diuines, yea also and of the Iesuites themselues doe hould, that Cleargie men are directly subiect to the ciuill lawes of temporall Princes, in all those thinges, which are not re∣pugnant to their state, nor to the Ecclesiasticall Canons, and consequently that they are not exempted from all subiection and obedience, and from the directiue or commanding power of Secular Princes, but that they are bound not onely by force of reason, but also by vertue of the law, and of their due obedience, to ob∣serue such ciuill lawes.

30 A fourth reason which Card. Bellarmine bring∣ethm 1.149 wherefore he recalled his former opinion, and why the Apostles were not de iure subiect to temporall Princes, is because they are appointed by God Princes o∣uer all the earth, as wee read in the 44. Psalme. For although that principality was spirituall, not temporall, yet it was true principallity, and farre more noble then temporall principallitie. But this reason is not sufficient, for as I obserued in my Apologie,n 1.150 the same man be∣ing

considered diuerse waies may be subiect, and su∣periour; subiect in temporalls, and supreame in spiritu∣als, and contrariwise; neither is temporall subiection repugnant to spirituall authority, nor temporall authori∣ty repugnant to spiritual subiection: neither from hence doth it follow, that either temporall authority it selfe, is subiect to spirituall power, or spirituall power sub∣iect to temporall authority, but onely that the same man, who is superiour in temporalls, is subiect in spiritualls, and who is superiour in spiritualls is subiect in temporalls, as the same man who is a Musition may be subiect and seruant to a Physition, or contrariwise, and yet it doth not from hence follow, that Mu∣sicke it selfe is subiect to Physicke, or contrariwise.

31 And if Card. Bellarmine doe answere, as he doth in his Schulckeniusn 1.151, that when the powers are e∣quall, it may perchance fall out, that the same compared diuerse waies may be subiect and superiour, but if the pow∣ers be vnequall, and one subordained to an other, as are spirituall and ciuill power, it cannot fall out, that the same man be subiect to him who is his superiour, this answere is also as insufficient as the former. First, for that the temporall power it selfe is not subordained to the spiri∣tuall, as I haue shewed before: for otherwise tempo∣rall Princes should not onely in spiritualls, but also in mere temporalls be subiect to spirituall Pastours, as if Musicke it selfe be subiect to Physicke, a Musition, as he is a Musition, and in all thinges belonging to Musicke, should be subiect to Physicke, and conse∣quently to a Physition, as he is a Physition. Secondly, for that it is the common opinion of the Schoole Di∣uines, and also of the Iesuites, that Cleargie men are subiect to the directiue temporall power, or command of temporall Princes.

32 Thirdly, for that there is no repugnance, but rather a necessary consequence, that spirituall Princes, not as they are spirituall Princes, but as they are true

parts and members of the temporall common wealth, should be subiect in temporall affaires to temporall Princes, for euery member, sai••h Card. Bellarmine,o 1.152 ought to be subiect to the head, and Cleargie men, besides that they are Cleargie men, are also citizens and parts of the ciuill common wealth, as Card. Bellarmine affirmeth in an other placep 1.153, and the King is head of the politike or ciuill body, as also in his Schulckenius, he expresly affirmethq 1.154. Fourthly, for that Card. Bellarmine is al∣so now of opinion, at least wise he was when he wrote against D. Barckley, that it is probable, that the Priests of the old law, who had true spirituall power, and were true spirituall Princes, were subiect to Kinges, and ther∣fore for this reason to recall his former opinion, and especially to condemne it as improbable, were both to contradict himselfe, and also to condemne of temeritie the learnedst Schoole Diuines of this age, and also of his Societie.

33 These be all the principall reasons, which I can finde in Card. Bellarmine, for which he was moued to recall his former opinion, and to condemne it as impro∣bable, which how probable they be, or rather very insufficient to moue such a learned man, as Card. Bel∣larmine is, to forsake the Schole Diuines, and to fly to the Canonists, who as pope Pius the fift sincerely con∣fessed,r 1.155 doe attribute to the Pope more authoritie then is fitting, and to censure so rigorously, and rashly the learnedst Catholikes of this age, and also of his owne Societie, of temeritie, I remit to the iudgement of the discreete Reader, as also to consider, whether reason, or affection to aduance the Popes authoritie moued him not onely to recall his former opinion, but also to condemne it as improbable.

33 Lastly, that the Reader may haue some know∣ledge of the true state of the question concerning the authority of spirituall Pastors to exempt Clergy men from the power of Secular Princes, for that some Di∣uines

are of opinion, that from the exemption of Cler∣gy men a strong Argument may bee drawne to p••oue that a spirituall Prince or Pastor hath power to depose or depriue a temporall Prince, who is subiect to him in spiritualls, of his temporall Kingdome and Domini∣ons. First therefore the true state of the question be∣twixt mee and my Aduersaries is, not concerning the exemption of Cleargie men by way of command, for I doe willingly grant, that a spirituall Prince, or Pastor as hee is a spirituall Pastor, hath power to command a Christian Prince, who is subiect to him in spiritualls, not to exercise his temporall power in some cases, if the necessity of the Church, or Christian Religion doth require it, ouer the persons of Clergy men, who are his temporall Subiects: so that if a secular Prince should disobey the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastor, hee should offend against the vertue of Religi∣on, for the which offence his spirituall Pastor might punish him with Ecclesiasticall censures: and of this manner of exemption by way of command, and spiritu∣all coercion, all the Canons and Decrees of Popes and Councells. which doe signifie. imply, or suppose that Clergy men may by the authority of the Church with∣out the consent of temporall Princes bee exempted from secular powers, either touching their persons or their goods, may bee very well vnderstood: I said if the necessity of the Church doth require it; for at this pre∣sent I will not enter into particulars, what manner of necessity is required, that a spirituall Pastor may im∣pose such a command vpon his temporall Prince.

34 But the controuersie betwixt mee and my Ad∣uersaries betwixt those Catholikes who are so vehe∣ment for the Popes power to depose Princes, and those on the contrary side is, whether spirituall Pastors, as they are spirituall Pastors, or by vertue of their spiri∣tuall power, haue not onely by way of command, and spirituall coercion, but also by way of sentence authori∣ty

to exempt without the consent of Princes Clergy men, who before were subiect to them in temporalls, from the directiue, and coerciue power of secular Prin∣ces, in such sort, that after the sentence of such exemp∣tion bee giuen, Clergy men are no more the subiects of that secular Prince, for that his spirituall Pastor doth depriue him of that ciuill power, which before the sentence hee had ouer Clergy men: And what is said of particular Bishops, in respect of Princes who are their spirituall children, is to bee vnderstood of the Supreme spirituall Pastor in respect of all Christian Princes, who are subiect to him in spiritualls. This is the true state of the question.

35 So that the Reader may clearely perceiue, that although from the first manner of exemption, by way of command, and spirituall coercion, no good argument can be drawne, to proue, that the spirituall power can depose Princes, and depriue them of their Regall authoritie, by way of sentence, yet there is great coherence betwixt these two questions concerning the power of spirituall Pastors to depose Princes by way of sentence, and their power to exempt by way of sentence Cleargie men from all subiection to Secu∣lar Princes. For the first question is whether the spiri∣tuall power can by way of sentence depriue temporall Princes of all their temporall power, and absolue all their Subiects from their temporall alleagiance: and the second is, whether it can depriue them of some part of their temporall power, and absolue some of their subiects from their temporall allegiance. And therefore those Catholikes who doe grant the second, will easily grant the first, and who doe grant the first, must of necessity grant the second, for that there can be no sufficient reason alleadged, why the spirituall power can in order to spirituall good depriue Princes of some part of their Regall authoritie, and not of all, and absolue some subiects from their temporall allegi∣ance,

and not all; and if it can depriue o•• all, i•• must needes follow that it can also of some part. And con∣trariwise those Catholikes, who affirme, that the spi∣rituall power cannot exempt, ot absolue Cleargie men from their temporall allegiance and subiection to tem¦porall Princes, must consequenily affirme, that it can not exempt or absolue all subiects from their tempo∣rall allegiance: and who affirme, that it can not ab∣solue, or exempt all subiects from their temporall al∣legiance, nor depriue a temporal•• Prince of all his Re∣gall authority, will easily affirme, that it cannot ex∣empt or absolue Cleargie men from their temporall al∣leagiance and subiection, nor depriue a temporall Prince of any part of his Regall authority.

36 But some doe greatly vrge this obiection: If the spirituall power can command temporall Princes not to exercise their temporall power ouer the persons or goods of Cleargie men, without the consent of their Ecclesiasticall superiour, it doth consequently follow, that a temporall Prince doth offend, if he trans∣gresse the iust and lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour, and therefore it seemeth, that a temporall Prince hath no power ouer the persons or goods of Cleargie men after such a command, supposing it to be lawfull, vnlesse wee will grant, that a temporall Prince hath power to commit sinne, and to transgresse the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour.

37 To this obiection (wherewith I haue knowne diuers men of learning to bee somewhat perplexed) those Catholikes, who deny that the spirituall power can depriue by way of sentence, a temporall Prince of his Regall Authority, either wholly or in part, may easily answer in this manner: that if a temporall Prince doth excercise his temporall power ouer the persons or goods of Clergy men against the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour, hee sinneth indeed against Religion, and the generall vertue of obedience, in

that hee vseth his power contrary to the lawfull com∣mand of his spirituall Pastour, but hee doth not sinne against the speciall vertue of legall, or morall iustice, in vsing his authority ouer them, who are not his sub∣iects, and ouer whom hee hath no temporall power and Authority, in that manner as another man, who is not their Prince, should offend. Neither is it vn∣vsuall for a man to commit a sinne in doing that which in respect of iustice hee hath power and authority to doe.

38 As for example, it is a sinne against the vertue of liberality for one to giue away his goods prodigally, although if wee respect iustice hee hath true and full power to giue them away, for that he giueth nothing but that, which is his owne: and therefore that prodi∣gall guift, although it be vnlawfull, yet is not vniust, as iustice is taken, not as it comprehendeth all vertues in generall, but in particular for a speciall vertue, and one of the foure Cardinall vertues. So also it is a sin against the vertue of temperance to giue money to commit an vnhonest act, and yet the gift is not vniust for that hee giueth nothing but his owne, and which according to iustice hee hath power to giue. So like∣wise if a Ghostly father command his penitent to giue a certaine part of his goods to the poore in satisfaction of his sinnes, if the penitent doe bestow them other∣wise then hee was commanded, hee sinneth against the vertue of Religion and Sacrament of pennance, in transgressing his Ghostly fathers lawful command, but he committeth no iniustice, because hee giueth that which is his owne, and which, if wee regard the ver∣tue of iustice, hee hath power to giue: neither doth the command of his Ghostly father depriue him of the right, dominion, property and power, which he had before ouer those goods.

39 Lastly, if the Pope should vpon iust cause suspend a Priest from the Altar, or a Bishop from his Episco∣pall

function, and consequently forbid the Priest to consecrate, and the Bishop to giue orders, if they should disobey the Popes lawfull command, they should sinne against the vertue of Religion, in vsing their power vnlawfully, but they should not sinne for doing that which they haue no power to doe, as hee who is no Priest or Bishop should in consecrating or giuing orders offend, for that the power of a Priest to consecrate and of a Bishop to giue orders, cannot ei∣ther wholly or in part bee taken away from them by the Pope. So likewise although a spirituall Pastor should for iust cause forbid a temporall Prince, who is his spirituall child, and subiect, to excercise his Regall power and authority ouer Clergy men, if that tempo∣rall Prince should heerein transgresse the command of his spirituall Pastor, supposing it to bee lawfull, hee should indeed offend against religion, in vsing his Re∣gall power and authority contrary to the lawfull com∣mand of his spirituall Pastor, which command was im∣posed for the motiue of Religion, neuerthelesse hee should not offend against iustice, in doing that which hee hath no power and authority to doe, in that man∣ner as another man, who is not their Prince, should by depriuing them of their goods, or punishing their persons if they transgresse the lawes, offend. For that it is not in the power of a spirituall Pastor to de∣priue a temporall Prince either wholly or in part of his Regall power, and temporall Soueraignty.

40 Wherefore if wee respect the power it selfe, and the vertue of legall or morall iustice, a temporall Prince hath full, ample, and supreme royall power and authority ouer Clergy men, notwithstanding that his spirituall Pastor should for iust cause command him not to exercise his Regall power vpon the persons of Clergie men, who doe offend his lawes: but if wee respect rhe vse and execution of the power, and the vertue of religion, the vse indeed of his power in the

aforesaid case is so limited by the lawfull command of the spirituall Pastor, that the Prince vsing his power ouer Clergy men, sinneth against Religion, for that hee disobeyeth the lawfull command of his spirituall Superiour, which was imposed for the motiue of reli∣gion, but not against iustice for that hee doth not ex∣cercise his Regall power but vpon those who are his Subiects, and doe owe vnto him true loyalty and tem∣porall obedience.

41 And truely if the aforesaid obiection were of force, that the temporall Prince hath no power or au∣thority ouer Clergie men, who are subiect to him in temporalls, against the lawfull command of his spiritu∣all Pastour, because he hath no power to sinne, it would likewise follow, that a suspended Bishop, or Priest, haue no power to giue orders, or to consecrate, because they haue no power to sinne; and a penitent hath no lawfull right, or power to sell, or giue away his goods against the lawfull command of his Ghostly Father, because he hath no power to sinne; and a man hath no power, or right to giue money to a dishonest end, or to giue away his goods prodigally, and con∣sequently they should be restored back againe, because he hath no power to sinne. I will say nothing at this time, how farre Cleargie men, either by the priui∣ledges of Christan Princes, or by the Ecclesiasticall Canons are de facto exempted both in their goods, and in their persons from ciuill powers, but onely I thought good at this time to set downe the true state of the question among Catholikes concerning the au∣thority of spirituall Pastours to exempt Cleargie men from the temporall power of Christian Princes, that thereby they may clearely perceiue, what kinde of ar∣gument may be drawne from the exemption of Clear∣gie men, to proue the Popes power to depose Princes, and by way of sentence to depriue them wholy of their Regall authoritie.

42 Thus you haue seene in what manner tempo∣rall thinges are subiect to spirituall, temporall endes to spirituall endes, temporall power to the spirituall pow∣er, the temporall sword to the spirituall sword, the flesh to the spirit, the Moone to the Sunne, and tem∣porall Princes to spirituall Pastors; and that from the subiection and subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, no good argument can be brought to proue, that the Pope, by vertue of his spirituall power can dispose of temporalls, depose temporall Princes, or punish temporally by way of coercion, but onely that in order to spirituall good he can command temporalls, and punish temporally by way of command, but by way of coercion onely with spirituall, and not with temporall punishments. And by this which hath bene saide, the Reader may easily vnder∣stand the true sense and meaning of a certaine proposi∣tion, which Card. Bellarmine in his Schulckenius doth often inculcate (as though there were some great my∣stery lye hidden therein) to proue the Popes power to depose temporall Princes, to wit, that a Christian Prince is a child of the Church, and subiect to the Pope, not one∣ly as he is a Christian man, but also as he is a Christian Prince; and the same he affirmeth of a Christian ••awyer, of a Christian Souldier, of a Christian Physitian, and so of the rest.

43 For all these three propositions, A Christian Prince, as he is a Christian Prince, is a child of the Church, and subiect to spirituall Pastours: A Christ∣ian Prince as he is a Christian is a Child of the Church, and subiect to spirituall Pastours: and a Prince as he is a Christian, is a Childe of the Church and subiect to spirituall Pastours; haue one and the selfe same sense; and so likewise of a Christian Lawier, of a Christian Soldier, of a Christian Physitian &c. For the true mea∣ning of them all is, that Christianitie, and not Regall authority, or the knowledge of lawe, warfare, or

Physicke, is the cause why a Prince, a Lawier, a Soldier, a Physitian, and all other men of what trade soeuer they be, are Children of the Church, and sub∣iect to spirituall Pastours; and that therefore they are to be directed and instructed by spirituall Pastours, not precisely in the rules of ciuill gouernment, in the rules of lawe, warfare, or Physicke, but onely in the rules and principles of Christian doctrine, and how they ought to gouerne ciuilly, and vse their knowledge and trades according to the rules and precepts of Christian Religion: which if they refuse to doe, they may be corrected and punished by spirituall Pastours, with spirituall or Ecclesiasticall punishments.

44 But from hence it doth not follow, that ei∣ther temporall power, the knowledge of the lawe, warfare, or physicke, are among Christians per se sub∣iect to the spirituall power, but onely per accidens, as I haue often declared, and in those thinges, which doe concerne or belong to Christian Religion, or that spirituall Pastours can by vertue of their spirituall pow∣er correct, or punish Christian Princes, Lawiers, Sol∣diers, Physitians &c. by depriuing them by way of sentence of their Regall authoritie, of their skill and knowledge in the lawes, in warfare, or Physicke, which they did not receiue from the spirituall power, but onely by depriuing them of the Sacraments, and such like spirituall benifites, of which they are made partakers by being Christians, and by meanes of the spirituall power and authority of spirituall Pastours. And thus much concerning the vnion and subiection of the temporall and spirituall power, and also of the second part.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Num. 132. & seq. & nu. 150. 153. 154.
• b 1.2

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6.
• c 1.3

  In epst. ad Micha••lem Imp. Cum ad verum dist. 96.
• d 1.4

  in his Schulc∣kenius cap. 5. pag. 195.
• e 1.5

  Cap. 7. p. 287. & pag. 340.
• a 1.6

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont: cap. 7.
• b 1.7

  Num: 83. 89. 165.
• c 1.8

  Lib. 3. de Ec∣clesia cap 2.
• d 1.9

  Lib. de Cle∣ricis cap. 28.
• e 1.10

  Ibid. cap. 30.
• f 1.11

  Cap. 1. nu. 3.
• g 1.12

  Lib. 5. de Ro. Pont. a cap. 2.
• h 1.13

  In his book against D. Barclay ca. 12. pag. 137.
• i 1.14

  In his Schulc∣kenius cap. 5. pag. 195.
• d 1.15

  In his Schulckenius cap 5. p. 203.
• l 1.16

  Cap. 1. nu. 4.
• a 1.17

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6.
• b 1.18

  num. 139. 140.
• c 1.19

  Cap. 8.
• d 1.20

  In Regula, peccatū. 2. part. Relect. §. 9. num. 7.
• e 1.21

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. a cap. 2.
• f 1.22

  Part. 1. per totum.
• a 1.23

  Lib. 5. de Rom Pont. c. 7.
• b 1.24

  Num. 162. & seq.
• c 1.25

  Lib. 11. de Trin. cap. 6.
• d 1.26

  Pag. 329. ad num. 162.
• e 1.27

  Lib. 1. Ethic. cap. 1.
• f 1.28

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 6.
• g 1.29

  Lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29.
• h 1.30

  Pag. 276. ad nu. 140.
• i 1.31

  Pag. 329. ad nu. 162.
• k 1.32

  Pag. 330.
• l 1.33

  Num: 140.
• m 1.34

  Pag. 275.
• n 1.35

  Num. 4.
• o 1.36

  Pag. 332.
• p 1.37

  Pag. 333.
• q 1.38

  Lib. 1 c. 14.
• r 1.39

  Tom. 2. epist. 50.
• s 1.40

  Psal. 71.
• t 1.41

  3. part. q. 40. memb. 5. q. 4.
• u 1.42

  in Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. num. 2. & 3.
• a 1.43

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 7.
• b 1.44

  Cap. 2.
• c 1.45

  In Tract. contra B••rcl. cap. 14.
• d 1.46

  Cap. 14. §. 2^o.
• e 1.47

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6.
• f 1.48

  In serm. de remiss pec. & refertur 1. q. 1. can. Vt eui denter.
• g 1.49

  Cap. 3.
• i 1.50

  Lib. 2. de Sa∣••ram. p. 2. ca. 3.
• k 1.51

  Lib. 2. doctr. fid. art. 3. ca. 78
• l 1.52

  In lib. de veri∣tate praedest. & gratiae.
• m 1.53

  In Epist. ad Smyrnenses.
• n 1.54

  Ad Rom. 13.
• o 1.55

  Apud. Bini∣num tom. 2. Concil. pag. 633
• p 1.56

  In cap. Adri∣anus dist. 63.
• q 1.57

  Lib. 3. de Concord. Cath. cap. 3.
• r 1.58

  In Tract. cōtr. Barcl. ca. 13. 16
• s 1.59

  Super ca. No∣uerit de sent ex∣com.
• t 1.60

  De iure regni & Imperij cap. 9. in principio.
• u 1.61

  Lib. 2. de li∣bert. Christiana cap. 2.
• x 1.62

  Expounding those words of the 50. Psalme. Tibi soli pec∣caui.
• y 1.63

  In cap: 45. Ezech.
• a 1.64

  Lib. 5. de Rom: Pont. cap: 7.
• b 1.65

  Num. 160. & seq.
• c 1.66

  Pag. 339.
• d 1.67

  Cap. 1. 2. 3.
• * 1.68

  Ad Rom. 13.
• e 1.69

  Cap. 6.
• f 1.70

  Cap. 12.
• g 1.71

  Lib. 3. The∣saurie. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 16
• h 1.72

  Disp. 14. de Legibus sect. 8.
• i 1.73

  Lib. 1. de Clericis c••p. 28. propos. 2a.
• k 1.74

  Cap. 6. nu. 6. 10.
• l 1.75

  Pag. 341.
• m 1.76

  Pag. 343.
• n 1.77

  Lib. 1. de Interp. cap. 4.
• o 1.78

  Cap. 2.
• a 1.79

  Lib. 5. de Rō. pont. cap. 6.
• b 1.80

  Cap. 2. 3.
• c 1.81

  Pag. 339.
• d 1.82

  Pag. 203.
• e 1.83

  Cap. 1.
• f 1.84

  Cap. 6. nu: 10.
• g 1.85

  2. De Anima tex. 24.
• h 1.86

  Cap. 3.
• i 1.87

  Cap. 2.3.
• a 1.88

  Lib. 5. de R••m Pont. c. 7.
• b 1.89

  Vsurpare.
• c 1.90

  Nutu tuo.
• d 1.91

  Nu. 196. & seq.
• c 1.92

  Num. 99.
• * 1.93

  in Tract. de potest Regia, & Papali cap. 1••.
• f 1.94

  Pag. 386. ad num. 196.
• g 1.95

  Pag. 387.
• h 1.96

  Num. 8.
• i 1.97

  3. Par. q. 34. memb. 2. ar. 3.
• k 1.98

  Pag. 390.
• l 1.99

  Num. 18.
• m 1.100

  Pag. 393.
• * 1.101

  Part. 3. cap. 9. & seq.
• n 1.102

  Pag. 256.
• o 1.103

  Num. 90.91.181.223.341.
• p 1.104

  Num. 18.
• q 1.105

  Part. 1. ca. 3. nu. 7. & seq.
• r 1.106

  Lib. 5. de Rō. Pont. cap. 1.
• s 1.107

  Part. 3. ca. 9. & seq.
• t 1.108

  Part. 1. ca. 2.
• u 1.109

  in my Apo∣logie nu. 411. and here part: 1. cap. 3. nu. 5.
• x 1.110

  De suprema Rom. Pont. potest. part. 2. q. 4. pag. 262.263.
• x 1.111

  In Chron. ad annum 1302.
• y 1.112

  Lib. 7. in Philippo Pulch.
• z 1.113

  In vita Boni∣faci•• octaui.
• * 1.114

  In Philippo Pulchro.
• a 1.115

  In tract. con∣tra Barcl: c. 13. in fine.
• b 1.116

  In cap. per venerabilem qui filij sint legitimi.
• c 1.117

  Lib. 10. in Lucā. cap. 20.
• d 1.118

  In summa. lib. 2. tit. 39.
• e 1.119

  Causa 11. q. 1. cap. 11.
• f 1.120

  Cap. 6. nu. 13. 14. 15. & cap. 7. nu. 12. 13.
• g 1.121

  Lib. 2. de Ro. Pont. cap. 29.
• h 1.122

  Lib. 5. hierach. Eccles. cap. 7.
• i 1.123

  Lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29. & lib. 5. cap. 3.
• k 1.124

  Pag. 16.
• l 1.125

  Pag. 16.
• m 1.126

  Cap. 21. pag. 206.
• n 1.127

  Ad Rom. 13.
• o 1.128

  In his Recog∣nitions, pag. 16.
• p 1.129

  Act. 28.
• q 1.130

  In tract. con∣tra Bard. cap. 3 pag. 51.
• r 1.131

  Act. 24.
• s 1.132

  Act. 25.
• t 1.133

  Act. 26
• u 1.134

  Act. 25.
• x 1.135

  Hem. 51. in Act.
• y 1.136

  Lib. 2. de Rom. Pon••. cap. 19.
• z 1.137

  Act. 26.
• a 1.138

  In tract. con∣tra Barclaium. cap. 3. pag. 49.
• b 1.139

  Ad ann. Christi 33. nu. 31.
• c 1.140

  Lib. 1 de Cle∣ricis cap. 28. in propos. 4.
• d 1.141

  In tract. con∣tra Barcl. cap. 3 pag. 51.
• e 1.142

  Lib 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29.
• f 1.143

  See aboue cap. 2.
• g 1.144

  lib. 1. de Cle∣ricis Cap. 28.
• h 1.145

  In the here∣sie of the Ma∣nichies.
• i 1.146

  In C••ncord. Euang. cap. 69. in Mat. 17.
• k 1.147

  In cap 17. Mat. ••om. 2. Lib. 10. cap. 32.
• l 1.148

  In defens. fid•• Ca••••o & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 4 cap. 8. in sine.
• m 1.149

  In tract. contra Barcl. cap. 3. pag. 50
• n 1.150

  nu. 68. & seq
• n 1.151

  Pag. 172.
• o 1.152

  Li•• de Mo¦nachis. cap. 19.
• p 1.153

  Lib. de Cle∣ricis. cap. 28.
• q 1.154

  Pag. 339.
• r 1.155

  Nauar. super cap. non liceat Papa•• 12. q. 2 55. 3••. nu. 6