A cleare, sincere, and modest confutation of the vnsound, fraudulent, and intemperate reply of T.F. who is knowne to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English Iesuite. Wherein also are confuted the chiefest obiections which D. Schulckenius, who is commonly said to be Card. Bellarmine, hath made against Widdrintons [sic] Apologie for the right, or soueraigntie of temporall princes. By Roger Widdrington an English Catholike.

Chap. 8.

Wherein is examined the fourth argu∣ment, taken from the authoritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, comparing the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, to the body and soule in man.

1. THE fourth argument, which Card. Bellar∣mine bringeth to prooue this subiection of of the temporall power among Christians, to the spi∣rituall power of the Church, is taken from the autho∣ritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, who compareth the temporall and spirituall power among Christians to the body and soule in man: yea, and also affirmeth, that temporall Magistrates are subiect to spirituall Pastors. And this similitude doth so greatly please Card. Bel∣larmines conceit, that when hee hath any fit occasion, he spareth not to inculcate it, as a very strong argu∣ment, and fit similitude to proue, that the temporall power among Christians is per se, and of it owne na∣ture subiect to the spirituall, as the body in man is per se, subiect to the soule. For as the spirit and flesh, saith hea 1.1, are in man, so are the spirituall and temporall power in the Church. For the spirit and flesh are as it were two common-wealths, which may be found separated, and also vnited. The flesh hath sense and appetite, to which are answerable their acts and proper obiects, and of all which the immediate end is the health & good constitution of the body. The spirit hath vnderstanding and wil, and acts and proportionate obiects, and for her end the health and perfection of the soule. The flesh is found without the spirit in beasts, the spirit is found without the flesh in Angels.

2 Whereby it is manifest, that neither of them is pre∣cisely for the other. The fl••sh also is found vnited to the spirit in man, where because they make one person, they haue necessarily subordination and connexion. For the flesh is subiect, the spirit is superiour, and although the spirit doth not intermeddle hir selfe with the actions of the flesh, but doth suffer the flesh to exercise all hir actions, as shee doth exercise in beasts, yet when they doe hurt the end of the spirit, the spirit doth command the flesh, and doth punish hir, and if it be needfull, doth appoint fastings, and also other afflictions, euen with some detriment, and weakning of the bodie, and doth compell the tongue not to speake, the eyes not to see, &c. In like manner if any action of the flesh, yea and death it selfe, be necessarie to obtaine the end of the spirit, the spirit hath power to command the flesh to expose hir selfe and all hirs, as wee see in Mar∣tyrs.

3 Euen so the ciuill power hath hir Princes, lawes, iudgements &c. and likewise the Ecclesiasticall hath hir Bishops, Canons, iudgements. The ciuill hath for hir end temporall peace, the spirituall euerlasting saluation. They are sometimes found separated, as long since in the time of the Apostles, sometimes vnited as now. And when they are vnited, they make one bodie, and therefore they ought to be connected, and the inferiour subiect, and subor∣dained to the superiour. Therefore the spirituall power doth not intermeddle hir selfe with temporall affaires, but doth suffer all things to proceed, as before they were vni∣ted, so that they be not hurtfull to the spirituall end, or not necessarie to the attayning therevnto. But if any such thing doe happen, the spirituall power may and ought to compell the temporall by all manner, and waies, which shall seeme necessarie therevnto.

4 Thus you see, that Card: Bellarmine hath made here a plausible discourse, but truly more be∣seeming, as I will most clearely convince, a cunning oratour, who with fine, and wittie conceipts seeketh

rather to please curious eares, then a sound Diuine, who with substantial arguments, and forcible proofes should endeauour to convince the vnderstanding of iudicious men, especially in such points, as are pre∣tended to belong to Catholike faith, and eternall saluation. For neither is the temporall and spirituall power among Christians well compared to the body, and soule of man, either in vnion, or in subiection, and besides, although it were in all things a fit simi∣litude, yet it doth not any way proue that, which Card. Bellarmine pretendeth to proue thereby, but it doth clearely and directly, as you shall see, convince the flat contrarie.

5 For first, as I shewed beforeb 1.2 out of Card Bellarmines owne grounds, the temporall and spiri∣tuall power, as they are referred to their visible heads here on earth, doe not make properly and formally one totall bodie, or common-wealth, which is the spiri∣tuall kingdome, or Church of Christ, but they doe make properly, and formally two totall bodies, or com∣mon wealths, to wit, earthly kingdomes, or a tempo∣rall, and ciuill bodie, whereof the King is head, as D. Schulckenius expressely affirmethc 1.3, and the spirituall kingdome, mysticall bodie, or Church of CHRIST, whereof the Pope is head, and which as D. Schulckenius also affirmeth,d 1.4 is onely compounded of spirituall power. Seeing therefore, that the reason why Card. Bellar∣mine affirmeth, that temporall power among Christi∣ans is subiect to the spirituall, is for that they do make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, as the bodie and soule doe make one man, and consequently the temporall power must be subiect to the spirituall, as the bodie is subiect to the soule of man, and as I haue clearely proued, there is no such vnion of the tempo∣rall and spirituall power to make one totall bodie consisting of both powers, which is the spirituall kingdome or Church of CHRIST, it is manifest, that

Card Bellarmines argument drawne from this simili∣tude of the soule and bodie, being grounded vpon this vnion of the temporall and spirituall power, com∣pounding one totall bodie, hath no sure ground, or foundation at all.

6 Secondly, although I doe willingly grant, as you haue seene beforee 1.5, that not onely the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, as they are referred not to their visible heads here on earth, but to CHRIST the invisible head of them both, doe make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, consisting actually of both powers, which may bee called the Christian world (in which sense the Christian com∣mon wealth is vsually taken, but the Church of CHRIST, and especially the spirituall kingdome of CHRIST is seldome taken in that sense) but also the whole world, consisting of Christians, and Infidells, may in that manner be called one totall bodie, where∣of CHRIST, at least wise, as he is GOD, is the invisi∣ble, and celestiall head, neuerthelesse this similitude of the soule and bodie vnited in one man doth no∣thing auaile to proue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, both vnited in one totall bo∣die, whereof CHRIST onely, and no earthly crea∣ture is the head. For the reason, why the bodie in man is subiect to the soule, is because the bodie and soule doe make one essentiall compound, as the Phi∣losophers doe call it, whereof the bodie is the matter, and the soule is the forme, and consequently the bo∣die must of necessitie, and by a naturall sequele, be subiect to the soule, as euery matter is per se and of it own nature subiect to the form, with which it maketh one essentiall compound, but the temporal & spiritual power or earthly Kingdomes, and the spirituall king∣dome of Christ, as they make one totall body, wherof Christ onely is the head, doe not make one essentiall compound, whereof one is as the matter, and the o∣ther

as the forme, but they doe make one integrall compound, as the Philosophers doe call it, in that manner as the bodie of man is compounded of eyes, eares, tongue, hands, feete, which are called by the Philosophers integrall, and not essentiall parts of mans bodie; but in an integrall compound, it is not necessa∣ry, as I shewed beforef 1.6, that one part be subiect to a∣nother, although all must be subiect to the head, as it is apparant in the eyes, eares, tongue, hands, and feet of mans bodie, whereof none is subiect one to the o∣ther, although all be subiect to the head. Seeing therefore that the temporall and spirituall power are onely integrall parts of the totall body, whereof Christ onely is the head, it is euident that from hence no probable argument can be drawne to proue, that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, but that both of them are vnited and subiect to Christ the inui∣sible head of them both.

7. Thirdly, although I should also grant, that this were a fit similitude in all things, and that the tempo∣rall power is subiect to the spirituall in that manner as the body is subiect to the soule of man, yet this man∣ner of subiection would nothing auaile to proue, that the spirituall power could either directly, or indirect∣ly dispose of temporalls, depriue temporall Princes of their temporall liues or dominions, vse temporall pu∣nishments, or exercise any temporall action, but it is rather a very fit similitude to conuince the flat con∣trary. For as I will easily grant, that the soule hath power to command, or forbid the body to exercise a∣ny corporall action, when it is necessarie or hurtfull to the end not onely of the soule but also of the body, (which last clause Card. Bellarmine cunningly omit∣teth, for that it fauoureth, as you shall see, the Popes direct power to command temporalls) as to see, to heare, to speake, and such like actions, which are sub∣iect to the command of mans will, I say, which are sub∣iect

to the command of mans will, for that there be many corporall actions, which are not in the power of mans will to command, as are all the actions of the nutri∣tiue, vegetatiue and generatiue powers; But if the body by any let, or hinderance can not, or (if it were possible) would not doe that corporall action, which the soule would willingly haue the body to doe, as to see, to heare, to speake, or to goe, the soule hath no power of her selfe either directly, or indirectly, that is, either for the good of the body, or for the good of the soule, to do that corporall action, as to see, heare, speake, or goe, without the concurrence of the body it selfe.

8. Neither hath the soule any power to inflict any corporal punishment by way of coercion or constraint, that is, to punish actually with corporall punishment any member of the body without the concurrence of some one or other member thereof, but onely by the way of command, that is, to command some one mem∣ber to punish it selfe; or an other member, as the hands, feete, or head, to put themselues into fire or water, or the hands, to whip the shoulders, to close thy eye-lids, to stop the eares, not to put meate into the mouth, and such like, which if the bodily member by any let, or hinderance can not, or, if it were possible, would not doe, the soule hath done all that is in her power to doe, for that she cannot of her selfe doe any corporall action, without the concurrence of some corporall member, but the most that she can doe con∣cerning any corporall action or punishment, is to command the body to concurre with her to the do∣ing of that corporall action, or punishment. I said [if it were possible] for that there is such a naturall, ne∣cessarie, and intrinsecall subiection of the body to the soule, that the body cannot resist the effectuall com∣mand of the soule in those things which are subiect to her command, and therefore I said, that if it were possi∣ble,

that the body could resist the command of the soule, yet the soule of her selfe hath not power to exer∣cise any corporall action without the concurrance of a corporall organ; which manner of subiection is not betweene the temporall and spirituall power, for that this subiection being in diuerse persons hauing free will, is free and voluntarie, and therefore the com∣mand may be resisted, but the former being of the body to the soule, making one only person, who hath free will, is necessarie and naturall, and therefore can not be resisted.

9. In the like manner I will easily grant, that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, or rather that temporall Princes, who haue temporall power, but not as they haue temporall power, are subiect to spirituall Pastours, who haue spirituall power, in such sort, that the spirituall Pastour hath power to com∣mand the temporall Prince to do those temporal acti∣ons belonging to his temporall power, which are ne∣cessarie to the end of the spirituall power, and to for∣bid him those actions belonging to his temporall power, which are repugnant to the end of the spiritu∣all power, which is eternall saluation, which if hee re∣fuse to doe, and will not obey the command of the spirituall Pastour, the spirituall Pastour can not by vertue only of his spirituall power exercise any tempo∣rall; or ciuill action, belonging to the temporall, or ciuill power, without the consent, or concurrance of the temporall power: Neither can the spirituall Pastor inflict any temporall, or ciuill punishment by way of coercion, constraint, or compulsion, that is, punish actually with any temporall, or ciuill punishment without the consent, & concurrance of the temporall, or ciuill power, but only by the way of command, that is, he hath power to command the temporall Prince, who only hath supreme temporall authoritie, to pu∣nish himselfe, or his subiects with temporall, or ciuill

punishments, if they vse their temporals to the hurt? and preiudice of the spirituall power, or the end ther∣of? although I doe willingly grant, that the spirituall Pastour hath power to punish the temporall Prince, or his subiects, with spirituall punishments, not one∣ly by the way of command, but also of coercion and con∣straint that is, to punish them actually, whether they will or no, with spirituall punishments, when they shall refuse to obey his iust command, for that this manner of punishing by way of coercion doth not exceede the limits of the spirituall coerciue power.

10. Now if my Aduersaries demand or mee, why the spirituall power may of her selfe command tem∣porall actions, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for temporall, nor spirituall good, ex∣ercise temporall actions, may command ciuill punish∣ments, when they are necessarie to the end of the spi∣rituall power, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly punish actually with ciuill punishments without the concurrance of the spirituall power, I answer them by their owne similitude, which pleaseth them so much; for the same reason, that the soule hath power of her selfe to command bodily actions, and yet nei∣ther directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for the good of the body, nor of the soule, to doe of her selfe alone any bodily action, hath power to command bodily punishments, and yet of her selfe hath not power to inflict any bodily punishment, without the concurrance of the bodie it selfe. And thus you see, that this similitude, of which Card. Bellarmine, and his followers doe make so great account, is no fit si∣militude to prooue their doctrine, but rather to con∣firme ours, and that from this similitude no probable argument can be drawen to prooue, that the spirituall Pastour hath power either directly or indirectly to di∣spose of temporals, to depose temporall Princes, or to punish temporally by way of coercion or constraint.

11. But fourthly, although the temporall and spi∣rituall power were aptly compared by Card. Bellar∣mine to the bodie and soule, yet it would prooue two things more then he, as I suppose, would willingly admit; The first is, that: the temporall power can ex∣ercise no temporall action without the concurrance and assistance of the spirituall power, as the body can doe no corporall action, vnlesse the soule also, as an efficient cause thereof, doe concurre thereunto; For this is a cleere and approoued principle in philoso∣phie, that the soule is cause of all motions in the body, according to that common definition or description of the soule assigned by Aristotleg 1.7; Animaid est, quo vinimus, & sentimus, & mouemur, & intelligimus primò. The soule is that, whereby we first or principally liue, and haue sense, and are mooued, and doe vnderstand.

12. The second is, that the spirituall power may command or forbid the ciuill power to exercise ciuill actions, not onely when they are necessarie, or hurt∣full to the end of the spirituall power, which is the health of the soule, but also when they are necessarie or hurtfull to the end of the temporall power, which is temporall peace, as the soule hath power to com∣mand or forbid the bodie to exercise bodily actions, as to see, heare, speake &c. not onely when they are necessary, or hurtfull to the end, and good of the soule, which is spirituall life and health, but also when they are necessarie or hurtfull to the good of the bo∣dy, which is bodily health and life. And therefore Card. Bellarmine declaring this similitude of the spirit and flesh doth only affirme, that the spirit doth com∣mand the flesh, when her actions are hurtfull to the end of the spirit, but cunningly omitteth, that the spi∣rit also dorh command the flesh, when her actions are necessarie, or hurtfull to the end of the flesh, least the Reader should presently perceiue therby the disparity of this similitude, or else from thence inferre, that in

the same manner the spirituall power may command the temporall power not onely in order to spirituall good, but also in order to temporall good, which is the Canonist, doctrine, and which Card. Bellarmine doth at large impugne.

13. Lastly, in what manner S. Gregory Nazianzene did compare the temporall and spirituall power, or rather temporall and spirituall Princes to the bodie and soule, I haue sufficiently declared beforeh 1.8 to wit, not in the manner of their vnion or subiection, but onely in nobility, and in that temporall Princes are in as excellent and worthy manner subiect to tempo∣rall Princes, as spirituall things are more excellent and worthy then temporall. So that neither from the au∣thority of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, nor from the simi∣litude it selfe of the bodie and soule, as it is declared and vrged by Card, Bellarmine, can it with any proba∣bilitie be gathered, that the spirituall power can of her selfe exercise any temporall action belonging to the ciuill power, without the concurrance of the ciuill power, although it be necessarie to the end of the spi∣rituall power, as the soule cannot of her selfe without the concurrance of the bodie exercise any bodily a∣ction, although it be necessarie to the end, not onely of the body, but also of the soule. And therefore I maruell, that Card. Bellarmine could bee so much o∣uerseene, as to vrge and repeat so often this similitude of the soule and body to prooue the Popes power to depose, and to dispose of all temporals, which is so flat against him, and which, if it were a fit similitude, doth rather confirme the doctrine of the Canonists, whom Card. Bellarmine taketh vpon him to confute, then his owne opinon. But the truth is, that it confir∣meth neither, for that, as I declared before,i 1.9 the tem∣porall and spirituall power, or the temporall and spirituall Common-wealth are not parts com∣pounding one totall Body or Common-wealth,

as the bodie and soule doe compound a perfect man.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Lib. 5. de Rō. pont. cap. 6.
• b 1.2

  Cap. 2. 3.
• c 1.3

  Pag. 339.
• d 1.4

  Pag. 203.
• e 1.5

  Cap. 1.
• f 1.6

  Cap. 6. nu: 10.
• g 1.7

  2. De Anima tex. 24.
• h 1.8

  Cap. 3.
• i 1.9

  Cap. 2.3.