A cleare, sincere, and modest confutation of the vnsound, fraudulent, and intemperate reply of T.F. who is knowne to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English Iesuite. Wherein also are confuted the chiefest obiections which D. Schulckenius, who is commonly said to be Card. Bellarmine, hath made against Widdrintons [sic] Apologie for the right, or soueraigntie of temporall princes. By Roger Widdrington an English Catholike.

Chap. 5.

Wherein is examined Card. Bellar∣mines first argument taken from the ends of the temporall and spirituall power.

1. THe first argument, which Card. Bellarmine af∣firmetha 1.1 to demonstrate, that the temporall power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is ciuill, or temporall, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasticall, is taken from the ends of both the pow∣ers. For a temporall end, saith he, is subordained to a spi∣rituall end, as it is manifest, because temporall felicitie is not absolutely the last end, and therefore it ought to bee re∣ferred to eternall felicitie: but it is apparant out of Aristo∣tle, 1 Ethic. cap. 1. that faculties, or powers are so subor∣dained, as their ends are subordained.

2. To this argument I answered in my Apologieb 1.2,

that not euery temporall end is per se, and of it owne nature ordained, or subordained to a spirituall end

(speaking of create ends, and not of God almigh∣ty, who is the beginning and end of all things) but it is only by accident, or accidentally by man, who worketh for an end, ordained to a spirituall end. And therefore although temporall good, or felicity be not absolutely the last end of man, yet it is the last end of the temporall power it selfe, which is in man. For euery power, as it is a power, hath for her last end, her act or worke, as euery science hath of it owne nature for her last end the knowledge of her obiect, and euery art the effecting of her work, (as the last end of naturall philosophie is to know the secrets of nature, and of Phisike to cure and pre∣serue the body from diseases) although man him∣selfe, in whom that power, art, or science doth re∣side, doth intend a farther end. Whereupon S. Au∣stin doth well affirme, that the will to see hath no other end then seeing: The will, saith he,c 1.3 to see hath seeing for her end, and the will to see this thing hath for her end the seeing of this thing: The will therefore to see a skarre doth desire her end, that is, the seeing of a skarre, and no further doth appertaine to her. Wherefore, as the Philosophers do distinguish betwixt the last end of any art or worke, and the last end of the artificer, or worker, so we also ought to distinguish betwixt the last end of the power it selfe, and of him, in whom the power doth reside. It is called the last end of the worke, for that the worke is in that lastly ended, and not the last end of the worker, for that the wor∣ker doth not referre all that is his to that end, as a thing to be desired and loued aboue all things.

3. I grant therefore that the end of a Christian Prince, who hath temporall power, is spirituall and eternall felicitie, to which Christians ought to refer all their actions, and the vse not only of the Eccle∣siasticall, but also of the ciuill power, but withall I affirme, that the last end, which the ciuill power hath

per se, and of it owne nature, is only temporall peace and quietnesse, in the getting and conseruing wher∣of of it owne nature it doth lastly rest. And there∣fore for this reason it is not necessary, that the ciuill power it selfe be per se, and of it owne nature subor∣dained to the Ecclesiasticall, but onely accidentally and by the intention of him, who referreth tempo∣rall peace to eternall felicitie in that maner as I haue declared. To that assertion of Aristotle, powers are so subordained as their ends are subordained (al∣though in that place hee rather saith, that ••••ds are subordained, as powers are subordained) I answer∣ed, that it is to be vnderstood of those ends, which powers haue of their owne nature, and not of the ends of the men, in whom the powers doe reside.

Thus I answered in my Apologie.

4. Now you shall see how insufficiently Card. Bel∣larmine in his Schulckenius replyeth to this answere. I answere saith he,d 1.4 that not euery temporall or corporall end is subordained per se, and of it owne nature to a spirituall end, my Aduersary Widdrington doth say, but hee doth not proue. But first, who knoweth not, that it doth not appertaine to the Answerer to proue, for to this the op∣ponent only is tyed, and for the Answearer it sufficeth by granting, denying, or distinguishing for him to answere.

5. Secondly, I did not conceiue, that this asserti∣on, being so cleere and manifest of it selfe, needed a∣ny proofe at all, and therefore I little thought, that a∣ny learned man would euer deny the same: for that, according to the knowne principles of Philosophy and Diuinitie, no naturall thing can intrinsically, and of it own nature be referred to a thing, which is super∣naturall and aboue the course of nature; and there∣fore betwixt naturall and supernaturall things, there can be no naturall subordination. Now that tempo∣rall peace in a temporall common-wealth is a naturall

thing, and eternall felicitie, which consisteth in the cleere vision and fruition of almighty God, is super∣naturall, and goeth beyond the bounds, limits, and order of nature, no man can make any doubt; and therefore temporall peace cannot of it owne na∣ture be referred to eternall felicity; but onely by the will and intention of man, who by the helpe of super∣naturall light and grace doth referre it, direct it, and eleuate it to that supernaturall end.

6. And for this cause also it is very cleere, that temporall power cannot of it owne nature bee refer∣red to true spirituall and Ecclesiasticall power, for that it is supernatural, and giuen onely by God, as he is the Author, not of nature, but of supernaturall grace. Yea out of Card. Bellarmines owne grounds it may be cleerely conuinced, that the temporall power among Christians is not of it own nature subiect, and subor∣dained to the spirituall power, and consequently, that temporall peace, which is the end of temporall pow∣er, is not of it own nature referred or ordained to eter∣nal felicity, which is the last create end of the spiritual power, for that according to Aristotlee 1.5, ends are so subordained, as their powers are subordained. His first ground is, for that in his Controuersies he affirmethf 1.6, that in Infidels there is true ciuill power without any order, or relation to any true spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall power, and consequently in Infidels the ciuill power is not subiect or subordained to the spirituall, for where there is no order, or relation, there can be no subiecti∣on, or subordination, for that subiection and subordi∣dation doth necessarily imply an order, relation, or reference to that, to which any thing is subordained.

7. Seeing therefore that Christian Religion doth not take away true ciuill power, as Card. Bellar∣mine himselfe also in another place affirmethg 1.7, neither is the true nature, or any intrinsecall propertie of the ciuil power changed or altered, for that it is in a Chri∣stian,

or an Infidell, in this subiect, or in that, it neces∣sarily followeth, that if true ciuill power bee not of it own nature subiect, or subordained in Infidels to true spirituall, or Ecclesiastical power, it is not also in Chri∣stians per se, and of it own nature subiect or subordai∣ned to true spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power. This onely alteration hath ciuill power for being in this subiect, or in that, in Infidels, or in Christians, that Christians ought, according to the true grounds of Christian Religion, referre it by the aide of true su∣pernaturall faith to a true supernaturall end, to which Infidels, who want true supernaturall faith, cannot re∣ferre it: but this alteration is extrinsecall or acciden∣tall, not intrinsecall or essentiall, neither doth it pro∣ceed from the nature of the ciuill power it selfe, but from the wil & intention of him, in whom true ciuill power doth reside. As likewise the nature or intrinse∣call properties of other accidents, as of Musick, Phy∣sick, and such like, are not altered, or changed by the changing or altering of their subiects, & for that they are in Christians, or in Infidels, although a Christian Musician will refer & ordaine his Musick to the true worship of God, & an Infidel to the honor of his Idol.

8. The second ground, which Card. Bellarmine layeth to prooue, that the temporall power among Christians is not per se, and of it owne nature sub∣iect to the spirituall power, is, for that in his Schulcke∣nius he affirmethh 1.8, That among the Heathen Romanes, the ciuill power was subiect to the spiritual power of a false religion: and a little beneath, if the ciuill power, saith he, be ioyned with a false Ecclesiasticall power, that is of a false Religion, as it was in the Heathen Romane Com∣mon-wealth, then it is actually subordained to a false Ec∣clesiasticall power, and if it bee ioyned with a true Ec∣clesiasticall power, as in the Christian and Catholike Church, then it is actually subordained to a true Ecclesi∣asticall power. Now what Philosopher, or Diuine

will affirme that a true ciuill power is per se, and of it owne nature actually ordained, subordained, or refer∣red to a false Ecclesiasticall power, that is of a false Religion, or to the worshipping of false Gods. Ther∣fore this subiection, subordination, or relation of true ciuill power to the spirituall, proceedeth from the intention of him, in whom the ciuill power doth reside, who according to his faith and religion (bee it true or false) referreth his true ciuill power to a true or false Religion, to a true or false worshipping of God, and not from the nature, or any intrinsecal pro∣pertie of the true ciuill power it selfe which, as it is the same in Infidels and Christians, or in whatsoeuer subiect it be so also of it own nature hath the same end as well in Infidels as in Christians, to wit, temporall peace, to which of it owne nature it is alwaies refer∣red. And therefore I doe not onely say: but also I doe cleerely prooue, and that out of Card. Bellar∣mines owne grounds, to which neuerthelesse I being only an answerer, and not an opponent, was not tied, that neither the ciuil power, being only a naturall po∣wer, nor the end of ciuill power, which is temporal peace, being onely a naturall end, is per se, and of it owne nature subiect, or subordained to a true super∣naturall power or end, but onely by the intension of him, in whom the ciuill power doth reside.

9. Now you shal see how wel D. Schulckenius pro∣ueth the contrarie. But wee prooue the contrary, saith he,i 1.9 because the end of the spirituall common-wealth is e∣uerlasting saluation, which is the last end; the end of the temporall common-wealth is the peace of the Citie, or Kingdome, which is not the last end, but a mediate end. But all ends are subordained per se, and of their owne na∣ture to the last end, and in vertue of it they doe mooue, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their owne nature to the first efficient cause, and in vertue of it they worke whatsoeuer they doe worke. See S. Thomas 1••. 2••. q. 1. ar. 6.

10. But to this argument I answered before, that the last create end of the spirituall common-wealth, which is a companie of men vnited by Baptisme, in that manner as I declared before, is eternal saluation, to which they ought to referre all their powers both temporall and spirituall, and all their actions both in generall and particular: but I denied, that the last end of the temporall power it selfe, although it bee con∣ioyned in one & the selfe same subiect with true spiri∣tuall power, is eternall saluation, but onely temporall peace in the common-wealth, to which of it owne nature it is onely referred, as to her last end, although by the intention of him, in whom true ciuill and spi∣rituall power doth reside, it ought to bee referred to eternall saluation, as to the last end of a Christian man, but not as to the last end, which the temporall power it selfe hath per se, and of it owne nature. Nei∣ther hath D. Schulckenius proued the contrary, but ra∣ther in his Reply to my answere hee in expresse words confirmeth what I haue said. For in his answere to the authority, which I brought out of S. Augustine, hee affirmeth, That the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act or operation, and therefore it cannot of it owne nature be referred to eternall salua∣tion, as to the last end, vnlesse D. Schulckenius will admit, that the same particular power hath of it owne nature two last ends, or a later end then the last, which implieth a manifest contradiction; but it must onely be referred extrinsecally to eternall saluation by the intention of him, in whom the particular power doth reside.

11 True it is, That all create ends are subordained per se, and of their nature to that end, which is simply and absolutely the last end, and doe moue in vertue thereof, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their owne nature to that, which is simply and absolutely the first efficient cause, and in vertue thereof they doe worke what∣soeuer

they do worke: But this efficient and finall cause of all created things is not the eternall saluation of men, but God a mighty, who is Alpha & Omega, prin∣cipium & finis, the beginning and end of all created things, both naturall and supernaturall, both vnrea∣sonable and reasonable, of accidents and substances, of all powers and of all things wherein powers doe reside, and who is glorified not onely by the eternall saluation, but also by the eternall damnation of men. God alone is simply and absolutely the last end of all created things, to whome all naturall things are of their owne nature lastly referred, as to the first Au∣thour and last end of nature, and supernaturall things, as to the first Authour and last end of grace and glory: Neither can naturall things of their owne nature be referred to any supernaturall create end, as is eternall saluation, but onely by the will and inten∣tion of him: who by the helpe of supernatural grace shall referre and eleuate them aboue their nature to a supernaturall end. Neither doth S. Thomas in that place affirme the contrary, but rather most cleerely confirmeth, what I haue said: for there he only dis∣puteth, how euery man by his wil, intention, and de∣sire, referreth all good things, which hee desireth to the last end.

12. Marke now, I beseech you, D. Schulckenius his second proofe, which is no whit better then the former. Moreouer is not the body, saith hek 1.10, per se, or of it owne nature for the soule? why then are not corporall things, per se, or of their owne nature for spirituall things? And whereas my Aduersarie Widdrington seemeth to say, that euery temporall end is per accidens, or acciden∣tally referred to a spiritual end: as by man, who worketh for an end, it is ordained to a spirituall end, it is altoge∣ther false. For oftentimes wicked men doe ordaine spiri∣tuall things to temporall, of whom the Apostle saith, whose God is their belly: and by this a temporall end is

per se, and of it owne nature alwaies ordained to a spiritu∣all end, but by accident and against nature by the wicked∣nesse of humane intention sometimes a spirituall end is or∣dained to a temporall.

13. The reason why the body is per se, and of it owne nature for the soule or spirit, and yet the tem∣porall power, or the end thereof, is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to the spirituall power, or the end thereof, I did declare in my Apologiel 1.11, which D. Schulckenius also did relate a little before,m 1.12 because the bodie and soule doe compound one substantiall thing consi∣sting of two essentiall parts, whereof the bodie is the mat∣ter, as the Philosophers doe call it, and the soule the forme; and this is the reason, why the body is per se, and of it owne nature, for the soule and subiect are subordained to it; for that all Philosophers doe grant, that euery matter is per se, and of it owne nature for the substan¦tiall forme, wherewith it maketh one essentiall com∣pound; but the temporall and spirituall powers doe not make one totall bodie or common-wealth, whereof the temporall power is insteed of the matter, and the spirituall insteede of the forme. And therefore D. Schulckenius had small reason to make that interrogation, seeing that hee himselfe did a little before set downe this my reason, which doth fully satisfie the aforesaid de∣mand.

14 Neither did I say, as D. Schulckenius here af∣firmeth me to say, although a little before, as you haue seenen 1.13, he related my words otherwise, that euery temporall end is per accidens, or accidentally re∣ferred to a spirituall end, but I only affirmed, that not euery temporall end, and in particular temporall peace among Christians, which is the last end of the ciuill power it selfe, is not per se, and of it owne nature ordai∣ned to eternall saluation, which is the last end of the spirituall power, but onely per accidens, or acciden∣tally, as by the will and intention of a Christian man,

it is ordained to eternall saluation, which is a super∣naturall end, and therefore not proportionate to the nature of any ciuill or naturall power. And although I had said, that euery temporall end is per accidens referred to a spirituall end, yet D: Schulckenius could not but perceiue by the whole scope of my words, that my meaning was to say, that euery temporall end, which is referred to a spirituall end, is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to that spirituall end, but per accidens, and extrinsecally by the will and in∣tention of man, who referreth it to that spirituall end, for no man can bee so ignorant as to imagine, that Christians doe alwaies referre and ordaine all temporall ends to the eternall saluation of their soules.

15 True it is, that all naturall things belonging to man are of such a nature, as that by the intention of man they may be ordained to good or bad ends, and temporall peace, which is a naturall end, may by the will of man, being aided with supernaturall grace, be referred and eleuated to eternall felicitie, which is a supernaturall end; and this is agreeable to reason, and to the nature of man, as he is a reasonable crea∣ture, or led by reason, to ordaine, referre, and eleuate all naturall things, which are in his power, when by the helpe of grace he is able so to doe, to true super∣naturall ends, and to eternall felicitie, for which hee was created, and to doe otherwise were against rea∣son, and against the nature of man, as hee is endued with reason: But that naturall powers, or ends, should be per se, and of their owne nature actually referred, and eleuated to supernaturall powers or ends, much lesse supernaturall powers or ends, should be referred and depressed to naturall powers or vicious ends, but only by the good or wicked intention of a man, in whose power it is to ordaine a good thing to a bad end, a naturall power to a supernaturall, and contra∣riwise,

this truly I thinke no man of any learning can conceiue, and before I haue clearely proued, that it is altogether false.

16 Lastly, to those words, which I alledged out of S. Austin, and to the rest which follow in my An¦swer, D. Shulckenius replyeth in this manner: I an∣swer first, saith heo 1.14, It is true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, but it is not true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or sci∣ence is not referred per se and of their owne nature to that end, which is simply the last end, but onely by accident by the intention of him, who hath that will, power, or science. And this not only S. Thomas in the place cited doth teach, but also S. Austin in the place alledged by Widdrington, to wit, lib. 11. de Trinit. cap. 6. All these, saith S. Au∣stin, and such like wills haue first their ends, which are referred to the end of that will, whereby we are willing to liue happily. Thus S. Austin, who, when he subioyneth, the will therefore to see a skar doth desire hir end, to wit, the seeing of a skar, and farther doth not apper∣taine to hir, he signifieth indeed, that the seeing of a skar is the last end of the will to see a skar, but hee doth not deny, that the seeing of a skar is per se, and of it owne nature referred to a higher end of a higher will, and that to an other, vntill we come to that end, which is simply the last end. For all good ends are of their owne nature refer∣red to that end, which is simply the last end, and as ends are of their owne nature subordained one to an other, so also it is necessarie, that wills, powers, or sciences be sub∣ordained. As for example, (to persist in S. Austins ex∣ample) a man hath many wills, one to see a skar, an other, by seeing the skar to finde the wound; the third, by fin∣ding the wound, to convince and correct him, who did inflict the wound; the fourth, by correcting him to heale the wound of his soule; the fift, by this act of charitie to me∣rit life euerlasting; it is certaine, that euery one of these wills haue their proper end, neither any thing farther doth

appertaine to them, but it is also certaine, that the end of the first will is referred to the end of the second will, and the first will it selfe subordained to the second, and so in order. Thus D. Schulckenius.

17 But truly in my opinion D. Schulckenius doth in this Reply both plainly contradict himselfe, and also clearely confirme my Answer. And first no man can make any doubt, but that all wills, powers, scien∣ces, ends, and things whatsoeuer are per se, and of their owne nature referred to that, which is simply the last end; but that, which is simply the last end of all things, is not the eternall felicitie of any creature, but God almightie, who alone is simply the efficient and finall cause of all things, and made all things, both hea∣uen and hell, for himselfe, Prouerb. 16. and who is glorified not only in the eternall saluation, but also in the eternall damnation both of Men and Angells: And this D. Schulckenius can not deny, and he might haue seene the same confirmed by S. Thomas in the same question cited by him ar. 8. but more expressely 1^a, part. q. 44. ar. 4. where he proueth, that because God almightie is the first efficient cause of all things, he must of necessitie be also the last end of all things: and by S. Austin also in infinite places.

18. Secondly, whereas D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, and withall, that this last end is per se, and of it owne nature referred to a further create end, (whereof only he speaketh) and consequently that particular will or power must also be referred to that farther end, and so it must be referred to a farther end then to the last, he cleerely contradicteth himselfe. For how can any act be per se, and of it owne nature be the last end of one particular will, power or science, and yet this last end bee per se, and of it owne nature referred to a farther end, seeing that according to the approoued grounds of philosophie, which kinde of arguing the

Logicians call Sorites, or à primo ad vltimum, an argu∣ment from the first to the last, euery particular will, pow∣er or science, which is per se, and of it owne nature re∣ferred to any particular end, is also referred to all those ends, to which that particular end is per se, and of it owne nature referred? As for example, if any particular will be per se, and of it owne nature referred to the seeing of a skar, and the seeing of a skarre bee per se, and of it owne nature referred to the finding out of the wound, and the finding out of the wound be per se, and of it owne nature referred to the corre∣cting of him who did inflict the wound &c. then à primo ad vltimum, from the first to the last, the will to see a skarre must per se, and and of it owne nature bee referred to the correcting of him, who did inflict the wound &c. Wherefore if the seeing of a skarre bee the last end of the will to see a skarre, as D. Schulcke∣nius heere affirmeth, it cannot per se, and of it owne nature bee referred to a farther end, vnlesse hee will grant, that the same will shall haue per se a farther end, then the last, which is a flat contradiction; but if it be referred to a farther end, it is onely by accident, and extrinsecally by the intention of the seer, who refer∣reth the seeing of a skarre to a farther end, then it hath of it owne nature. Neither doth S. Thomas, or S. Austin affirme the contrary, but confirme what I haue sayd.

19. For although S. Austin doth affirme, that all these & such like wils haue their proper ends, which are re∣ferred to the end of that will, wherby we desire to liue hap∣pily, and to come to that life, which is not referred to any other thing, but it doth of it selfe satisfie the Louer, yet he doth not say, that these proper ends, are per se, and of their owne nature referred to euerlasting happinesse, but he doth rather in expresse words say, that they are by some particular will, or intention of man referred to euerlasting happinesse. And therefore he conclu∣deth,

that all wils are well connected together, if that will be good, whereunto all the rest be referred, but if that bee bad, all the other wils are bad. So that S. Austin cannot be so vnderstood, that all those wils are per se, and of their owne nature referred to a good, or to a bad will, for that a will, which of it owne nature is good can not of it owne nature be referred to a bad will, or to a bad end. And therefore when S. Austin saith, that the will to see a skarre hath for her proper end the seeing of a skarre, and no farther appertaineth to her, hee vnderstan∣deth of the last end, which the will to see a skar hath per se, and of it owne nature, and when he saith, that it may be referred to a farther end, good or bad, he vnder∣standeth of a farther end, not which it hath of it owne nature, but which it hath by some other will or inten∣tion, which may be good or bad, according as it re∣ferreth all the other wils to a good or bad end.

20. Moreouer those examples, which D. Schulcke∣nius bringeth in the end of his Reply, doe most cleerly confirme my answer, and confute his owne Reply. For if a man haue many wils, one to see a skarre, another by seeing the skar to prooue the wound, the third by prouing the wound to correct him who inflicted the wound and so foorth, it is certaine, that the seeing of the skarre is not per se, and of it owne nature referred and ordained to prooue the wound, and to correct him, who did inflict the wound, but onely by the will and intention of the seer, who referreth it to those ends, in whose choice it is to refer the seeing of a skar to other ends: neither is their any naturall or necessa∣ry connexion betwixt the seeing of the skar, the proo∣uing of the wound, and the correcting of him, who did inflict it: for that a skar may be seene for many o∣ther ends, and not at all for those. Besides, it is re∣pugnant to the course of nature, that the seeing of a skar, which is a naturall thing, should be per se, and of it own nature referred & ordained to the euerlasting

happinesse of man, which is a thing aboue nature, and beyond the course of naturall things, and therefore it is only by accident, and extrinsecally by the intention and will of man referred and ordained to that super∣naturall end. And thus you see, that I haue not only clearely answered to this first argument of Card. Bellar∣mine, which had been sufficient for me, who tooke vpon mee only to answere, and not to proue, but also haue clearely prooued, that although eternall felicitie, be the last create end of man, yet temporall peace, and not eternall felicitie is the last create end, to which temporall power euen among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature referred.

21. Neuerthelesse, I will go a little farther with Card. Bellarmine, and grant him for Disputation sake, which hitherto he hath not in my iudgement so much as probably proued, that thereby the weakenesse also of this his first pretended demonstration may the more easily appeare; to wit, that not only the Ecclesiasticall, but also the ciuill power among Christians is per se; and of it owne nature, and not only by the will and in∣tention of Christian men referred to the true eternall saluation of man, as to the last end not only of man, but of the ciuill power it selfe, yet it can not therefore from hence by any necessarie consequence bee infer∣red, that the ciuill power among Christians is per se; and of it owne nature subiect and subordained to the spirituall power, or that the end of the ciuill power is subordained to the end of the spirituall power, but at the most, that both of them haue one & the selfe same last end, to wit, the eternall felicitie of man, to which the spirituall power leadeth Christian men by spirituall meanes, to wit, by spirituall directions, lawes, and pu∣nishments, and the ciuill power by ciuill meanes, dire∣ctions, lawes, and punishments: And therefore there is no subordination of ends, betwixt the ends of the spirituall and temporall power, and consequently no

subordination of powers, but they haue both one last end, to wit, euerlasting happinesse, although diuerse waies, or meanes to attaine thereunto, not much vn∣like diuerse lines in a circle, which doe end all in one center, and yet one line is not subordained to another, although all of them ••e tend by diuerse waies to the same center. And therefore by this first argument Card. Bellarmine hath not sufficiently proued, that the ciuill power among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature subordained to the spirituall, or the proper end of the ciuil power, which is her act tending to tēporall peace, subordained to the proper end of the spirituall power, which is also her act tending lastly to euerla∣sting happinesse; although I should grant him, that both of them haue per se, and of their owne nature one and the selfe same last end, which is the eternall salua∣tion of man, in whom those powers doe reside. And therefore D. Schulckenius perceiuing belike the suffici∣encie of my answere, and the weaknesse of his owne Reply, flieth to a second Reply, which neuerthelesse is as insufficient as the former.

22. But although we should grant, saith hep 1.15, to Widdring∣ton, that the end of the ciuill power is not referred per se, and of it owne nature to the end of the spirituall, but onely by the intention of the Prince, in whom the ciuill power doth re∣side, yet the argument which Card. Bellarmine brought from the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, to proue that the spirituall Prince could not onely command temporall Princes, but also dispose of temporalls in order to spirituall good, would be most strong and good. For a Chri∣stian temporall Prince ought to referre the publike peace, which is the end of ciuill power, to the eternall peace and fe∣licitie of himselfe and of his people, which is the end of the spirituall power. And therefore hee ought to subiect and subordaine the end of his power to the end of the power of the spirituall Prince. But as he ought to subiect and subordaine end to end, so also power to power. Wherefore hee ought not

to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Christian Prince, that the Pope by his spirituall power direct, and correct the ciuill power, and that so the sword be vnder the sword, and in the Christian common wealth there be order, peace, and quiet∣nesse, whiles Superiours do rule inferiours, and inferiours be subiect to Superiours.

23. But in this Reply there lie hidden some cun∣ning equiuocations, and the most that it proueth, as oftentimes heretofore I haue signified, is, that the tem¦porall power or sword, or rather temporall Princes who haue temporall power, and beare the temporall sword, are in spirituall causes) whether of their owne nature, or by some accidentall circumstance they be∣come spirituall) to the spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power, by which they are to be directed & corrected, not in meere temporals, but only in spirituals, not by temporall lawes, or with temporall punishments, which doe belong onely to the temporall power, but only by Ecclesiasticall lawes or directions, and with Ecclesiasticall or spirituall punishments or corrections, which onely do appertaine to the Ecclesiasticall or spi∣rituall power.

24. True it is, that eternall saluation is the last cre∣ate end not only of the spirituall, but also of the tem∣porall power among Christians, seeing that all Christi∣an Princes are bound by the law of Christ to referre their temporall power, and the vse thereof, not onely to temporall peace in the common weath, which is the last end, which temporall power hath per se, and of it owne nature, but also to the eternall peace and felici∣ty of themselues, and of their people; And therefore there is here no subordination of ends betwixt the temporall power and the spirituall, and consequently in this respect no subordination of powers, as D. Schulckenius doth here from thence inferre, but aswell the ciuill power among Christians, as the spirituall, haue one and the selfe same last end (whether it bee in∣trinsecall

to one power, and extrinsecall to the other, or intrinsecall to both as I declared before) to which the temporall power by temporall lawes, directions, and corrections, and the spirituall power by spirituall lawes, directions, and corrections or punishments are by the law of Christ bound to direct, and lead all Christians.

25. Whereupon S. Thomas, or whosoeuer bee the Authour of that booke de Regimine Principum doth well affirme,q 1.16 that the end which a King ought principal∣ly to intend in himselfe, and in his subiects, is eternall hap∣pinesse, which doth consist in the seeing of God, and because this seeing of God is the most perfect good of all, it ought to moue exceedingly a King and euery Lord, that their sub∣iects may attaine to this end. Therefore, when Kings, saith S. Austin,r 1.17 in the time of the Apostles did not serue our Lord, then impieties could not be forbidden by lawes, but rather exercised. But afterwards, when that began to be fulfilled which is written,s 1.18 And all the Kinges of the earth shall adore him, all nations shall serue him, What sober minded man can say to Kings, Doe not you regard by whom the Church of your Lord is defended or impugned in your kingdome, that it doth not appertaine to you, who will be religious or sacrilegious in your kingdome, to whom it can not be said, that it doth not appertaine to you, who will bee chast, or wanton in your kingdome.

27. Wherefore if a Christian Prince should by his lawes, or otherwise, withdraw his subiects from the at∣taining to eternall saluation, should impugne not de∣fend the Church, command not forbid impieties, hee should greatly offend God and the Church, and ought not to take it in ill part, that hee should be therefore corrected by the chiefe Pastour of the Church, to whom he is subiect in spiritualls, with Ecclesiasticall and spirituall punishments, which only doe belong to the spirituall power. But if the Pastour of the Church should take vpon him to correct such a Prince by

way of coercion and constraint with temporall pu∣nishments, which kinde of correction doth passe the limits of his spirituall power, then the Prince may iustly take it in ill part, for this were to vsurpe tempo∣rall Iurisdiction, which is proper only to a temporall Prince, and not to obserue due order, but to make a confusion betwixt sword and sword, betwixt the spiri∣tuall and temporall power, which temporall power is only in spirituall corrections, and not in temporall punishments subiect to the constraint of the tempo∣rall power.

28 And therefore well said our most learned Countryman Alexander of Halest 1.19 cited by me be∣fore, that the subiection of Kings and Emperours to the Pope is in spirituall not corporall punishment, according as it is said 2^a. q. 7. that it belongeth to Kings to exercise corporall punishment, and to Priests to vse spirituall corre∣ction. Wherevpon S. Ambrose did excommunicate the Emperour Arcadius, and did forbid him to enter into the Church. For as an earthly Iudge not without cause beareth the sword, as it is said Rom: 13. so Priests doe not without cause receiue the keyes of the Church; he bea∣reth the sword to the punishment of malefactors and com∣mendation of the good, these haue keyes to the excluding of excommunicated persons, and reconciling of them who are penitent. Expound therefore; A King is to be pu∣nished only by God, that is, with materiall punishment, and againe, A King hath no man to iudge his do∣ings, that is, to inflict corporall punishment▪ and a little beneath, A King, saith Alexander, doth excell, 1. Pet: 2. true it is in his order, to wit, to inflict corporall punishment, with which punishment, if he offend, he hath none to punish him but only God▪ what can be spoken more plainly.

29 And by this you easily see the weaknes of D. Schulckenius his argument, and how cunningly with generall and ambiguous words he would delude his Reader. A temporall Prince, saith he, ought to refer

publike peace to the eternall peace and fol••estie of him selfe and of his people, which is the end of the spirituall power. And what then? And as hee ought to subiect temporall peace to eternall peace, so he ought to subiect his temporall power to the spirituall power. But how, in what manner, in what causes, in what punishments temporall power ought to bee subiect to spirituall power D. Schulc. cunningly concealeth. Temporall power to be subiect to spirituall, if wee will speake properly, and in abstracto, doth signifie, that a tem∣porall Prince is in all temporall affaires subiect to the spirituall power of spirituall Pastors. And if by those generall words D. Schulckenius meaneth this, he fal∣leth into the Canonists opinion, whose doctrine in this point learned Ʋictoriau 1.20 is not afraid to condemn as manifestly false, and who being poore themselues in learning and riches to flatter the Pope gaue him this direct power and dominion in temporalls. For the truth is, that temporall Princes in temporall affaires are not sub∣iect to any besides God alone, which is the receiued doctrine of the ancient Fathers. The sense therefore of that proposition must be, that temporall Princes are in spiritualls, but not in temporalls subiect to the spirituall power of the Pope. But what then? where∣fore he ought not to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Chri∣stian Prince, that the Pope by his spirituall power direct, and correct the ciuill power &c. Still you see he spea∣keth ambiguously, and in generall words, the sense whereof if hee had declared, you would presently haue perceiued the weaknesse of his argument: for if he meane, that therefore a temporall Prince ought to be directed in spiritualls, and in things belonging to Christian Religion, and corrected with spirituall punishments by the Pope, this I easily grant him, and so he proueth nothing against me, but if hee meane, that therefore a temporall Prince ought to be dire∣cted by the Pope in temporalls, and corrected by him

with temporall punishments, this consequence I vt∣terly denie, for this were to confound all good order, and to vsurpe temporall Iurisdiction, as I declared before. And thus much concerning Card: Bellar∣mines first argument, my answer, and D. Schulckenius his Reply to the same.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Lib. 5. de Rom Pont. c. 7.
• b 1.2

  Num. 162. & seq.
• c 1.3

  Lib. 11. de Trin. cap. 6.
• d 1.4

  Pag. 329. ad num. 162.
• e 1.5

  Lib. 1. Ethic. cap. 1.
• f 1.6

  Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 6.
• g 1.7

  Lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29.
• h 1.8

  Pag. 276. ad nu. 140.
• i 1.9

  Pag. 329. ad nu. 162.
• k 1.10

  Pag. 330.
• l 1.11

  Num: 140.
• m 1.12

  Pag. 275.
• n 1.13

  Num. 4.
• o 1.14

  Pag. 332.
• p 1.15

  Pag. 333.
• q 1.16

  Lib. 1 c. 14.
• r 1.17

  Tom. 2. epist. 50.
• s 1.18

  Psal. 71.
• t 1.19

  3. part. q. 40. memb. 5. q. 4.
• u 1.20

  in Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. num. 2. & 3.