A cleare, sincere, and modest confutation of the vnsound, fraudulent, and intemperate reply of T.F. who is knowne to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English Iesuite. Wherein also are confuted the chiefest obiections which D. Schulckenius, who is commonly said to be Card. Bellarmine, hath made against Widdrintons [sic] Apologie for the right, or soueraigntie of temporall princes. By Roger Widdrington an English Catholike.

THE PREFACE TO the Reader. Wherein M^r. FITZHERBERTS PREFACE is confuted, the matter which WIDDRING∣TON handleth, and the manner how he pro∣ceedeth therein, is declared, and his do∣ctrine proued to be truely probable, and neither preiudiciall to his MAIESTIES seruice, nor to the Consciences of Catholikes.

1. IT is not vnknowne to thee, Courteous Reader, the great controuersie hath been of late yeares, espe∣cially among vs English Catholikes, concerning the new oath of Allegi∣ance, which his Maiestie by Act of Parliament hath ordained to make triall how his Catholike Subiects stand affected towards him in point of there loyaltie, and due obedience. For although his Holinesse, by the insti∣gation and importunitie no doubt of others, hath by three seuerall Breues declared the said oath to be vn¦lawfull,

and to containe in it many things cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation, and many learned men, especially Iesuites, as Card. Bellarmine Fa: Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, and now lastly Suarez, haue by publike writings endeauoured to conuince the same, neuerthelesse since that M^r. George Blackwell then Archpraesbiter, and many other learned Priests did from the very first publishing of this oath defend it to bee lawfull, and not to containe in it any thing, which either expressely, or couertly is contrarie to Catholike faith or saluation, the said oath hath been maintained as lawfull by many learned Catholike Priests, and hath been taken by the most part of those Lay-Catholikes, to whom it hath been tendered; as∣suring themselues that his Holinesse command for the refusing thereof, being onely a declaratiue precept, and not grounded vpon any infallible definition, but at the most vpon a probable opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes (which is the maine substance of the oath, as my Aduersarie herea 1.1 con∣fesseth, and Fa: Suarez,b 1.2 also before him expressely acknowledgeth, is not, according to Suarez doctrine, of force to binde them, especially with so great pre∣iudice to his Maiestie and themselues, to embrace an vncertaine and doubtfull opinion, or to obey the Popes declaratiue precept grounded therevpon.

2 I therefore with other Catholikes considering how greatly this oath doth concerne our allegiance, and obedience due to God and Caesar, and the great harme both spirituall and temporall, which may en∣sue by breach thereof, thought it our best course, to set downe sincerely all the chiefest arguments, which haue been hitherto by any Author, or which might in our iudgements be obiected by any against the said oath, together with the answers, which haue been, or might be brought to the same Obiections, and with∣all dutifull submission to propound them to his Ho∣linesse,

humbly requesting him, that he would be plea∣sed diligently to peruse them, and in regard of his Pastorall Office would vouchsafe to instruct vs in the Catholike faith, satisfie the difficulties, which doe perplex our consciences, & to make knowne vnto vs, what clauses of the oath are, I doe not say, according to the opinion of Card. Bellarmine, or some other Catholike Doctors, who are no necessarie rule of the Catholike faith, but according to Catholike doctrine necessarily to be beleeued by all men, repugnant to faith and saluation, as his Holinesse affirmeth in his Breues. And this I performed in my Theologicall Dis∣putation, partly at the request of many Catholikes, whose case I greatly pittied, but chiefely for the duty I owed to God, Religion, my Prince and Countrey: Neither did I intend in that Disputation to affirme any thing of my selfe, but as representing the persons of those, who were perswaded, that the oath may, or may not be lawfully taken. And because when the said Disputation was in the presse, & almost finished, there came to my hands an English booke composed by F.T. and entituled a Supplement to the Discussion &c. wherein this Authour endeauoured to proue the said oath to bee repugnant to all lawes both humane and diuine, and therefore iustly condemned by his Holi∣nesse, in that it doth exempt temporall Princes from Excommunication and deposition by the Pope, I thought good to touch briefely in an Admonition to the Reader, both the substance of this Authors dis∣course, and of the chiefest arguments which hee brought against the oath, and also the answers, which might bee made to them; to the end his Holinesse, might be fully informed of all the reasons, which are alledged as well against as for the taking of the oath. And this was the cause, that I writing in Latin, did to informe his Holinesse briefely set downe what hee had written in English against the aforesaid oath.

3 But the said Authour F. T. who now hath tur∣ned backward the first letters of his name into T. F. and is knowne, acknowledged, yea and boasted of by his fauourers to be M^r. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English Iesuite (for which cause I was the more bold to expresse his name) hath of late set forth a Reply in English in defence of his arguments,c 1.3 which I briefe∣ly answered in Latine, to the end, saith he, that our Countreymen, whom it most importeth to vnderstand well the qualitie, and state of this controuersie, may discouer my weakenesse, and auoide the danger of their soules, whereto they may be drawne by the false fame, and opi∣nion, that many haue conceiued of my sufficiency. But howsoeuer my Aduersarie, or any other bee concei∣ted of my weakenesse or sufficiencie (for time will make knowne the weakenesse or sufficiencie of vs both) I doe not doubt (God willing,) but notwith∣standing all his vaunting bragges, to discouer cleere∣ly the weakenesse and insufficiencie of his Reply, al∣beit hee hath beene furthered with the former wri∣tings of many learned men, especially Card. Bellar∣mine, Fa: Lessius, & now lastly of Suarez (from whom he borroweth the chiefest Replyes he bringeth to my answeres, yet concealing their names) to omit the many other helpes I want, which he may haue in the place where hee liueth, both by the conference of learned men, & the commoditie of all sorts of books, wherewith that place is furnished. And although hee vseth very spiteful, and slanderous speeches against me (for the which I pray God to forgiue him) thin∣king thereby to magnifie himselfe, disgrace me and promote his owne cause, but in the end hee will finde that such exorbitant and irreligious courses will tend to his owne disgrace and not mine, and hee greatly preiudiciall both to his cause and conscience, yet I wil abstaine from such vncharitable and vniust procee∣dings, and with all modestie I will defend my owne

innocencie, by answering all his obiections, and by clearing my selfe of all those imputations, which hee hath falsly laid to my charge: and if in defending my selfe I lay open his fraude, and ignorance, and returne his slanders backe vpon himselfe, I ought not there∣fore to be taxed of calumniation, seeing that, to detect the slanders of the Aduersarie is not,d 1.4 to vse Card. Bellar∣mines owne words, to be accounted a defaming. Now to draw neere vnto the matter.

4. Before my Aduersarie come to examine my Answere to his arguments, he thinketh it not amisse to say somewhat concerning me, the matter which I handle, and the manner how I proceede therein. First then touching me he affirmeth,e 1.5 that whereas I call my selfe by the name of Widdrington, it is well knowne to many, that M. Roger Widdrington, vnder whose shad∣dow I shroude my selfe, is farre different from me in quali∣tie, habit, and profession. And albeitf 1.6 he is not ignorant what my true name, and qualitie is, yet he forbeareth to de∣clare it for iust respects, and will only say of me for the pre∣sent, that whereas our Aduersaries haue heretofore leuied, and Prest many souldiers of their owne profession to main∣taine their quarrells against vs, they haue now in this late quarrell of the oath Prest one of ours (I meane saith he, this Authour) who so much presumeth of his owne skill and strength, that albeit the prouerbe saith, Ne Hercules con∣tra duos, yet he feareth not to encounter tenne at once, yea hopeth, as it seemeth, to wrest the club out of Hercules his hand, and to beate him with his owne weapon. For he taketh vpon him to ouerthrow Card. Bellarmine with his owne arguments, to batter the fortresse of the Catholike Church with her owne Canons, and constitutions &c.

5. But first, whether Roger Widdrington be the true or supposed, the sole, or ioint Authour of that Dispu∣tation, it little auaileth to the matter, which is now in controuersie: and when my Aduersarie shall name more plainely that person, whom he forbearing, as he

saith, to name, yet cunningly nameth, I doubt not, but that hee will not be afraid to answere him more fully; neither will all my Aduersaries clamours, and threatnings discourage him from defending the truth, his Prince, and Countrey, for the loue wherof, & not for any hope of temporall lucre or preferment, or for to shew his wit as my Aduersary falsly affirmeth, he will not be ashamed to be Prest on to write against M^r. Fitzherbert, or any other such like Authour, who liuing in other Countries, and out of danger to loose any thing, but rather in hope to obtaine preferment by their writings, would presse English Catholikes to defend with danger of loosing all they haue, and of incurring his Maiesties high displeasuer that doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to be of faith, which the State of France hath accounted scandalous, seditious, damnable, and pernicious. In the meane time let this suffice, that he is a childe of the Catholike Ro∣mane Church, and as good a Catholike, if not better then M^r. Fitzherbert is, if we will dulie consider the true nature and definition of a Catholike, and that he is no true Catholike, who with true Catholike and su∣pernaturall faith beleeueth doubtfull, disputable, and vncertaine opinions, and which consequently are subiect to errour, to which true Catholike faith cannot in any wise be exposed.

6. Secondly, it is vntrue, that I doe presume so much of my owne skill and strength, that I dare ad∣uenture to wrest out the club of Hercules his hand, as my Aduersarie affirmeth or to encounter vpon equall tearmes with Card. Bellarmine, or any one of those learned writers, whom I named in my Disputation, accounting my selfe to be farre inferior to euery one of them in skill and strength (only excepting this my Aduersarie, whose skill and strength I doe not greatly feare, it being well knowne of what sufficiencie he is, and that his skill in Philosophie, or Schoole Diuini∣tie

is not great, although he hath prettie skill in ma∣king vse of other mens labours, and answering in En∣glish, what other men haue before replied in Latine) but if Hercules will leaue his club, and fight with a bulrush, it is no great maistrie for a weaker man to withstand him; if Card. Bellarmine insteed of the ex∣presse words of holy Scripture, and the true meaning thereof so declared to be by the ancient Fathers, or the vniuersall Church, or vndoubted definitions of Generall Councels, or necessarie inferences deducted from them (which are the only weapons wherewith Catholike doctrine can be conuinced) will flie to o∣uer wrested similitudes, false, or at the most probable suppositions, doubtfull and vncertaine collections, to proue an infallible doctrine of the Catholike faith, as he, and the rest, who follow him in this controuer∣sie for the Popes power to depose Princes haue done, it is an easie matter for one, who hath lesse skill and strength then they haue, to withstand them, yea and to vanquish them, and a hundred such others being so weakely armed.

7. And therefore very false, and friuolous is that, which my Aduersarie affirmethg 1.7 that Widdrington (for so still I will call my selfe) taketh vpon him to bat∣ter the fortresse of the Catholike Church with her owne Canons, and constitutions, and to vndermine the immouea∣ble rocke of S. Peter with his owne instruments, and all this he doth with such art and sleight, that whiles he fighteth against the Church, he pretendeth to be a friend and childe of the Church, and albeit he impugne the Popes authority, yet he dedicateth his booke to the Pope, laughing vpon him, whiles he woundeth him, and betraying Christ with a kisse, as Iudas did. But how vainely he laboureth in all this, he may easily see, if he call to minde, what he hath learned in the Catholike Chucrch, to wit, how inexpugnable is the rocke, and seate of Peter, which the proud gates of hell cannot ouercome. For I doe not batter the fortresse of

the Catholike Church whom I reuerence and loue as my deare mother (and to whose Censure I euer haue and do also now most humbly submit my selfe and all my writings) but the priuate opinions of some few Catholikes, especially Iesuites, who will needes en∣force vpon the Christian world, doubtfull, disputable and vncertaine opinions, for infallible grounds of su∣pernaturall faith, which onely is the fortresse of the Catholike Church. Neither doe I vndermine that immoueable rocke of S. Peter, whereon Christ hath built his Church, but those scandalous, seditious, dam∣nable and pernitious positions (for so the State of France doth call them) of murthering Princes, and thrusting them out, contrarie to the rules of law and reason, of the lawfull possession of their kingdomes, by an authority which is only doubfull and questio∣nable: Neither do I impugne that authoritie of the Pope, which is certainely knowne to be granted him by Christ, but that new doctrine of some few writers, which doth attribute to the Pope that authoritie, as certainly giuen him by Christ, which at the most is disputable, whether Christ hath giuen it him or no.

8. I do honour and reuerence in good truth Card. Bellarmine, as also many other learned men of his So∣ciety, and their singular learning I doe greatly ad∣mire, but that their learning or authoritie ought to be so greatly esteemed of by Catholikes, that whatsoe∣uer they thinke to be a point of faith, it is presently to bee taken for a diuine Oracle, and the contrarie opinion of other learned Catholikes, who haue seene and examined all their grounds, reasons, and autho∣rities, is not to be accounted an opinion, but an here∣sie, and that in a matter of such importance, which concerneth the dutifull obedience of euery Christian to God and Caesar, this is that which I cannot take in good part. And might not, I pray you, the Canonists, who do vehemently defend the Popes direct power

to dispose of all temporalls against Card. Bellarmine and others, whom they are not afraide to call impios politicos wicked politicians,h 1.8 pretending thereby to strengthen the fortresse of the Catholike Church, to confirme the immoueable rocke of S. Peter, and to maintaine the Popes authoritie, retort the very same inuectiue, which my Aduersarie hath borrowed of Card. Bellarmine,i 1.9 vpon Card. Bellarmine himselfe, who doth vehemently impugne the aforesaid direct authoritie, which the Canonists do yeelde vnto the Pope, and with the same facilitie crie out with my Ad∣uersary, that he taketh vpon him to batter the fortresse of the Catholike Church with her owne Canons, and constitu∣tions, and to vndermine the immoueable rocke of S. Peter with his owne instruments, and all this he doth with such Art and sleigth, that whiles he fighteth against the Church, hee pretendeth to be a friend and childe of the Church; and albeit he impugne the Popes authoritie, yet he dedicateth his booke to Pope Sixtus the fift, laughing vpon him whiles he woundeth him, and betraying Christ with a kisse, as Iudas did &c. And thus much concer∣ning me.

9. Now as touching the matter which I handle, and the manner of my proceeding therein,k 1.10 Widdring∣tons speciall purpose (saith my Aduersarie) in this his late worke is to defend the new oath of allegiance, and to confute all the chiefe arguments, that haue beene made by any against the seuerall clauses thereof; which neuerthelesse he meaneth no other waies to performe (as he himselfe often protesteth) but only by shewing probably, that the said Oath may be taken by Catholikes, and that nothing hath beene hitherto, or can be obiected against it, which hath not been or cannot be probably answered. And from hence my Aduersary gathereth certaine admonitions to the Rea∣der, which, as he saith, are worthy to be noted.

10. But before I come to set downe his worthy admonitions, I thinke it fit, to put thee in remem∣brance

(Curteous Reader) what is the true state of the question betwixt vs concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, and what was my chiefe intent in ma∣king that disputation of the Oath. The maine question therefore betwixt me, and these my Aduersaries, as my Aduersarie T. F. also confesseth,l 1.11 is touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which specially is denied in this new oath: to wit, whether it be a point of faith, and not to be denied by any Catholike without note of heresie, or errour, that the Pope hath by Christ his in∣stitution power to depriue temporall Princes of their Kingdomes for any crime whatsoeuer. For whereas some very few late writers especially Card. Bellarmine and other Iesuites, could not bee content to defend this doctrine for the Popes power (call it temporall, or spirituall as you will) to depose Princes in a mode∣rate manner, but would needes take vpon them to make it a point of the Catholike faith, and cleerely to demonstrate by the testimonie of holy Scriptures, of sacred Councells, and by inuincible reasons, that Christ hath giuen to S. Peter, and his Successors such a temporall power ouer Soueraigne Kings and Princes (a doctrine neither practised, nor knowne by the Fa∣thers of the Primitiue Church, and which hath beene a chiefe occasion, why this Kingdome is departed from the obedience to the See Apostolike) and to condemne all those Catholikes of heresie, who do not runne with them in this their violent course, when I seriously considered with my selfe, what scandall this new doctrine maintained with such violence brought to Catholike Religion, what danger to our Prince and Countrey, and what great calamities and disgrace En∣glish Catholikes do daily suffer thereby, as not being accounted true, and loyall Subiects to their Prince, euen according to the doctrine of those, who are esteemed to bee the chiefe pillars of the Catholike Church, but so long only as it shall please the Pope, I

thought my selfe bound by the duty which I do owe to the Catholike Religion, & to my Prince & Coun∣try, to take away as much as lieth in mee (notwith∣standing the manifold slaunders, which I fore-saw some persons would therefore raise against mee) the aforesaid scandals, dangers and disgraces, and to an∣swer probably all the arguments which Card. Bellar∣mine hath from the chiefest Authors, who haue hand∣led this question collected, to demonstrate that it is a certaine and infallible doctrine, and the contrary, not so much an opinion, as an heresie, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution authority to depriue Soueraigne Princes of their temporall Kingdomes and dominions.

11 Wherefore the present controuersie betwixt me and my Aduersaries is not at this time concerning the absolute proposition, to wit, whether the Pope hath or hath not power to depose, (the reason why I doe not dispute of this absolute proposition I will de∣clare beneathm 1.12) but concerning the modall, whether it be certaine, without controuersie, and a poynt of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose, as this Author T. F. following Card. Bellarmine and some few Iesuites, will needes haue it to be, and I with other Catholikes, and the Kingdome of France, as Petrus Pithaeus witnessethn 1.13, doe vtterly deny the same, And from hence it euidently followeth, that although Card. Bellarmine should alledge an hundred Catho∣like Authors, who doe affirme, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, yet if they doe not also af∣firme that it is certaine, and to be beleeued as a point of faith, that the Pope hath such a power, they neither confirme his opinion, nor gaine-say mine concerning the present controuersie, which is now in hand. And thus much concerning the matter and manner of my Apologie for the right of Princes. Now touching my Theologicall Disputation concerning the oath of Alle∣geance,

although in very deede hitherto I haue not seene any sufficient reason to condemne the sayd oath as vnlawfull, and from the doctrine which I taught in my Apologie it doth necessarily follow, that with a probable and safe conscience it may bee taken by any Catholike, considering that the Popes power to depose Princes, as my Aduersarie heere confesseth, is the maine question betwixt him and me, and which is specially denied in this oath, neuerthelesse I did not intend in that Disputation positiuely to defend the sayd oath, but sincerely to propound vnto his Holinesse, who as I am fully perswaded, was neither truely, nor throughly informed of the reasons, why English Catholikes thought the sayd oath to bee lawfull, all the arguments on both sides, which might be vrged against or for the oath, affirming nothing of my selfe, but as representing the persons of those, who either impugned or approoued the sayd oath; hum∣bly requesting his Holinesse, that after he had diligent∣ly examined the reasons on both sides, he would bee pleased to satisfie those difficulties, which wee pro∣pounded, and to make knowne to vs English Catho∣lickes, those many things, which he in his Breues had affirmed to be in this oath cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation.

12 Now let vs see those worthy admonitions, and those things, which my Aduersary sayth, are worthy to be noted. First therefore, sayth he,o 1.14 Widdrington doth not account his owne opinion and doctrine in this point to be certaine and assured, but only probable, neither yet con∣demneth our doctrine as manifestly false, or repugnant to faith, or to the saluation of soules: besides that he confesseth also elsewhere,p 1.15 that his Holinesse in three seuerall Bre∣ues declared the contrary doctrine contained in the oath to be repugnant to the Catholike faithq 1.16 whereupon I in∣ferre, that it were no lesse then most dangerous temeritie, and extreme folly to reiect our doctrine, and to adhere to

his; for if it be wisdome in doubtfull matters to take the surest way, it cannot with reason be denied, but that albeit his opinion seeme probable to him, yet the contrary is much more to be imbraced, seeing that by his owne confession it is at least probable, and therefore may be imbraced without danger, whereas his is not onelie doubted of, but also decla∣red to be contrarie to the Catholike faith, both by his Holi∣nes, & also by very many learned Catholikes (as he him∣selfe also confesseth:r 1.17) besides that he acknowledgeth also afterwards, that there are very few Authors extant,s 1.18 which doe deny our doctrine in comparison of those that teach and defend it; whereto I also adde, that it is altogether con∣forme to the practise of the Church, confirmed by diuerse generall Councels, as I haue showed particularly in my Sup∣plement; so as no man, that hath care of his soule,* 1.19 can haue any reason to venter it vpon his opinion, impugned and con∣demned by so great authority, when our doctrine may by his owne confession be securely followed without doubt or dan∣ger.

13. But marke (Courteous Reader) how many frauds, and falshoods my Aduersarie hath here com∣mitted. And first how cunningly hee would deceiue thee by not distinguishing the absolute proposition concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, which is not now in question, from the modall, which onely is now in controuersie. For although I do not take vpon me at this present to condemne that opi∣on for the Popes power to depose Princes as mani∣festly false, or to defend the contrary as certaine and without controuersie, yet it is vntrue, that I doe not assuredly account that opinion and doctrine, which affirmeth it to bee a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and the contrary to be here∣ticall, to be absolutely false, and to vse the words of the Parliament of Paris against Suarez doctrine, to be scandalous, seditious, damnable and pernicious.

14. Secondly, it is also vntrue, that I doe acknow∣ledge

that there are very few Authors extant, which doe deny their doctrine concerning the modall pro∣position, in comparison of those, that doe teach and defend it: for although I affirmed, that very few Authors, whose writings are now extant, in compa∣rison of others, who defend this temporall power of the Pope, are to be found that deny his authority to depose Princes, (the reasons whereof which I alled∣ged in that place and before in my Apologie, because they clean ouerthrow the common argument taken from the multitude of Authors, who doe cleaue to their opinion touching the absolute proposition, both my Aduersarie, and D. Schulckenius also do altogether conceale,) yet touching the modall proposition I con∣fidently auerred, that there were very few writers, and those for the most part Iesuites, who doe hold this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to be a poynt of faith. For behold my expresse words.u 1.20 And frō hence any man may plainly perceiue, that Widdrington doth not oppose himselfe either against all Diuines, or a∣gainst the common opinion of the Church, or Doctours, but onely against very few writers, considering that among those seuentie Authors related by Card. Bellarmine very few are to be found, who (although they are perchance of opi∣nion, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath authori∣tie to depose Princes for enormious crimes) doe so peremp∣torily adhere to that opinion, as to taxe them with heresie, who doe maintaine the contrary. And if Card. Bellar∣mine in the later Editions of his bookes, yet bringing no new reason to confirme his former opinion, had not condem∣ned the contrarie opinion of Catholikes as hereticall, but had suffred euery man to perseuere without note of heresy, in his owne opinion, which he should thinke to be the truer, he should not doubtlesse haue had Widdrington to be his Aduersarie, or to haue attempted to ouerthrow his reasons as insufficient to demōstrate an vndoubted point of faith.

15 Thirdly, it is also vntrue, that confesse the

Popes Holinesse to haue declared in his Br••ues, that the doctrine, which denyeth his power to depose Princes, is contrary to the Catholike faith: I onely confesse, that in his Breues he hath declared the Oath to be vnlawfull, for that it containeth in it many things flat contrary to faith and saluation; but what these many things be, his Holinesse doth not expresse in his Breues, neither as yet hath he been pleased to signifie it vnto vs, although we haue both by priuate letters, and also publike writings most humbly and instantly requested it at his hands. I did indeede confesse, that his Holinesse was by all likelyhood mis∣informed of those many things, which he thought in this oath to be flat contrary to faith and saluation, by Card: Bellarmine, who hath publikely in his bookes declared, that the Popes spirituall Primacie, his power to excommunicate, and to binde and loose are plainely denied in this Oath, and the Kings spirituall Supremacie is therein acknowledged, but how vn∣true this is, I haue sufficiently shewed in my Theolo∣gicall Disputation, and beneath I shall haue occasion to repeat againe. And albeit his Holinesse had in his Breues particularly declared the doctrine for his power to depose Princes to be of faith, and the con∣trary to be haereticall, (as likewise Pope Celestine the 3. did in a Breue, or Decretall letter of his, which was in times past for almost two hundred yeeres together extant in the Canon Law, declare, that Marriage was so dissolued by heresie, that the partie, whose consort was fallen into heresie, might lawfully marry another, which doctrine is now flatly condemned in the Councell of Trent) yet this declaration of the Pope being no infal∣lible definition, but onely a signification of his opi¦nion, as I proued abundantly in the foresaid booke, no Catholike is bound in conscience to follow it nei∣ther to obey his declaratiue precept grounded there∣on as out of Suarez doctrine I shewed in that placex 1.21.

16 Fourthly, it is also vntrue, that I confesse the contrary doctrine of theirs touching the absolute proposition to be at least probable, and that it may be securely followed without doubt or danger; for tou∣ching practise I doe vtterly condemne that doctrine as absolutely false, impious, dānable, seditious, yea & in some sort hereticall, as shall appeare beneathy 1.22, and for speculation, I doe neither approue it as probable, nor condemne it as improbable, because with the probabi∣litie or improbabilitie of the affirmatiue part of this question, I do not at this time intermeddle. That on∣ly, which I affirme, is touching the negatiue part of the question, to wit, that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, but whether it be probable, that he hath power to depose Princes I nei∣ther confes nor deny, but only for Disputation sake I doe grant, that although it be probable, that the Pope hath such a power, yet it doth not therefore follow, that it is certaine and of faith, and the contrarie here∣ticall, improbable, and not to be imbraced by any Ca∣tholike without note of heresie, errour, or temeritie.

And by this you may also easily perceiue, another fraude, and cunning of my Aduersarie. For whereas he affirmeth, that my speciall purpose is to shew probably, that the said oath may lawfully be taken by Catholikes, he doth heere turne cunningly the question an other way, affirming, that it is also probable, yea & the more probable opinion, that the oath may lawfully be refu∣sed by Catholikes, with which question I doe not in∣tend at this present to intermeddle, but only to proue by true probable arguments, that the oath may law∣fully be taken by Catholikes. For be it so for Dispu∣tation sake, that it is probable, yea and the more pro∣bable opinion, that Catholikes may lawfully refuse the oath, (by reason that so many learned men, yea and the Pope himselfe, doe thinke it to be vnlawfull) which neuerthelesse I will not at this time either af∣firme,

or denie, for the reason I will alledge beneathz 1.23, yet can it not from thence be rightly concluded, that therefore it is not probable, that the oath may lawfully be taken, or that it is a most dangerous temeritie and ex∣treme folly, as my Aduersarie seemeth to insinuate, to follow an opinion which is truly probable against the more probable opinion of the Pope, and other Diuines, as out of the doctrine of Ʋasquez affirming it also to be the more opinion of Diuines, I did in my Theolo∣gicall Disputationa 1.24 cleerely convince. It is sufficient for my purpose at this present, that Catholikes may lawfully take the oath, but whether they may also re∣fuse it, I at this time will neither affirme nor denie. This onely I will say, that if Catholikes may lawfully take the oath, and so auoide his Maiesties indignation against them, and also their owne temporall ouer∣throw, and will not, they may thanke themselues, & such like violent spirits, as my Aduersarie is, who by sleight and cunning endeauoureth to perplexe their consciences, & guilefully to perswade them, that it is the more safe and the more probable way to suffer all temporall miseries and disgraces, which he himselfe in my opinion, if hee were in their case would not suffer, then to do that which with a safe and probable conscience they may doe.

18 Fiftly, it is also vntrue, that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is conforme to the practise of the Church, although it be indeed conforme to the practise of diuers Popes since the time of Gregorie the seuenth, who was the first Pope, that trusting to the power and riches of other men, contrary to the custome of his Ancestours, contemning the Emperours authoritie, de¦priued him of his Empire, a thing before those times not heard of, saith Onuphriusb 1.25 which practise neuertheles was then, and hath been euer since contradicted by Catholike Princes and subiects. As also it is vntrue, that this doctrine is confirmed by any one Generall Coun∣cell,

that it is a point of faith, or the contrary doctrine hereticall, or improbable, as I haue partly shewed in the Preface of my Apologeticall Answer, where I answered all those nine Councells, which Card: Bellarmine in his Answer to D. Barclay brought to proue his do∣ctrine in this point to be of faith, and the contrary not Catholike, and partly I will shew beneath, when I shall answer to the Replies, which haue been made by Fa: Lessius, masked vnder D. Singletons name, (from whom my Aduersarie borroweth the third part of his booke, to wit, eight whole Chapters which he consumeth in defence of the Councell of Lateran) to the answers I made to that Decree of the said Lateran Councell, whereon this new doctrine of faith accor∣ding to these men is chiefely grounded.

19 Wherefore vnlesse my Aduersarie be able to convince, as without doubt he is not, that the opi∣nion, which denieth the Popes power to depose Princes, is altogether improbable, and the State of France, besides many other Doctors, as thou shalt see beneath, to be extreame fooles, he will neuer be able to demonstrate, that it is most dangerous temeritie, and extreme folly to adhere to that opinion, (which my Aduersarie to perswade his Reader, that it is a singular opinion of one onely Authour, and as he vntruly saith, of no one Catholike, euer calleth it my opinion) considering that according to Ʋasquez doctrine, which is, as he saithc 1.26, the common doctrine of the Schoole men, it is neither follie nor temeritie, to follow a pro∣bable opinion against the more probable, the more common, and the more sure opinion of the Pope and other learned men, although they should pretend to convince their opinion by the authoritie of holy Scriptures, declarations of Generall Councells, the practise of the Church, and other Theologicall rea∣sons, which seeme to them invincible. For it is vsuall in a controuersie among Catholike Doctors, to al∣ledge

for confirmation of both opinions the afore∣said authorities and proofes, which neuerthelesse doth not discourage either part from maintayning their opinions, as it is manifest in the question con∣cerning the superioritie of the Pope and Generall Councells, the conception of our B. Lady in originall sinne, and many questions concerning the Popes authoritie to dispence, and now of late in the que∣stion touching grace, and freewill, betwixt the Domi∣nicans, and the Iesuites.

20 Therefore it is rather great temeritie, and ex∣treme folly, that you, my Catholike Countrymen, should venter your soules and whole estates vpon this my Aduersaries writings, whose knowledge in Diuinitie, is knowne to be but small, and his desire to ease your griefes, as you shall perceiue beneathd 1.27, is also no whit lesse: besides he handleth this con∣trouersie, which doth so greatly concerne your spiri∣tuall, and temporall good or harme, and your obedi∣ence due to GOD and CAESAR, so vnsincerely, and corruptly, that either he concealeth my answers, or peruerteth the true meaning of my words, rather thereby to disgrace me with the Reader, and to make him to haue a preiudicate conceipt of what I wrote, then really and sincerely to finde out the truth, and by a cleere and moderate debating of the controuer∣sie to satisfie his Readers vnderstanding. And this very argument taken chiefly from the Popes Breues, which this man to terrifie, and perplexe the timo∣rous conscience of the deuout Catholike Reader vr∣geth here, I haue so largely answered in my Theolo∣gicall Disputatione 1.28, wherein I fully satisfied this ob∣iection taken from the authoritie of the Popes Breues, and of so many learned men, who condemne the oath as contayning in it many things cleerely repug∣nant to faith and saluation, that I thought he would haue blushed to repeat the same argument here a∣gaine

so nakedly, which I my selfe vrged there more plainly and strongly, without making any Reply, or taking any notice of the answers I made in that place thervnto. For there I shewed the difference according to Ʋasquez doctrine between a doubtfull and dispu∣table question, and that there is neither doubt nor danger of any imprudence, temeritie, disobedience, or of any other sinne not to obey the Popes declaratiue command, when it is grounded vpon an opinion, or doctrine which is not certaine, but disputable, for that diuers Popes haue in their Breues, or Decretall let∣ters declared and taught false and also hereticall do∣ctrine, and that the Popes declaratiue command hath no greater force to binde, then hath the doctrine or opinion whereon it is grounded, as Suarez, whom I related in that place, doth expresly affirme. And thus much concerning my Aduersaries first Admo∣nition.

21 Secondly, whereas Widdrington, saith my Ad∣uersaries 1.29 professeth not to giue for his opinion any assured, and certaine proofes, which may breed in the hearers, or Readers a firme and doubtlesse assent, but onely probable reason drawne from credible principles, which may induce a probable perswasion, hee sheweth euidently, that his mea∣ning is not to seeke out the truth, but rather to obscure it by wrangling and cauilling, to shew his wit, labouring to main∣taine paradoxes with some shew of probabilitie, knowing right well, that as Cicero saith, there is nothing so in∣credible, but it may bee made probable by discourse &c. And what else may this man be thought to intend, but to shew his wit, seeing that hee pretendeth to produce no o∣ther proofe of his opinion, but onely probabilitie, and withall acknowledgeth, that the contrarie doctrine is, and hath been professed, and held by almost all the learned Catho∣likes that euer haue written, at least whose workes are now extant. Is it likely then, that hee meaneth to establish the truth, or to quiet mens consciences by the discussion thereof?

No truely. But rather that he seeketh, as I haue said, to ob∣scure it, and make it doubtfull, when he can not ouerthrow it, which is the most diuellish deuise, that any man could inuent to impugne any point of the Catholike faith; to wit, not to doe it all at once, but by degrees, seeking to shake the foundation of it, first calling it in question, and then teach∣ing it to bee but probable, and consequently doubtfull, to the end that the mindes of men hanging in suspence, may be disposed to admit, as well the errour, as the truth.

22 But whether I or my Aduersarie doth intend to establish the truth, or rather to obscure it by wrang∣ling and cauilling, seeing that hee still persisteth in misinterpreting the meaning of my words, and in dis∣sembling the true state of the question concerning the modall proposition, which is the maine controuersie betwixt him, and me, (wherein although hee sheweth in deede in some part his wit, yet verily he sheweth no sincere and vpright dealing) I leaue to the iudgement of the indifferent Reader. For first it is vntrue, that I professe, (as my Aduersarie affirmeth) to giue for my opinion no assured and certaine proofes which may breed a firme and vndoubted assent, which the Rea∣der would quickly haue perceiued, if my Aduersarie had been pleased to haue entirely related my words, which are these: wherefore the present controuersie be∣tweene me, and Card. Bellarmine is not concerning this absolute question, or proposition, whether the Pope hath, or hath not power to depose Princes for heresie or no, but concerning the modall proposition, whether it bee so cer∣taine, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath such a power to depose Princes, as that those, who defend the contrarie opinion, doe expose themselues to manifest dan∣ger of heresie, errour, or of any other mortall sinne. Wherefore although in my Apologie I brought certaine arguments drawne from inconueniences, which the Logi∣cians call, ad impossibile, to proue that Christ our Lord did not grant such an authoritie to the Pope, which is the 〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

son then can my Aduersarie haue to taxe me, for not bringing any assured or certaine proofes, but onely probable, to proue that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes.

26 Wherefore to establish and confirme this do∣ctrine, that it is not a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, or that it is not impro∣bable, that he hath no such power, it is sufficient to an∣swere probably all the reasons and authorities to the contrarie, and to bring probable proofes, which may cause a probable perswasion, that he hath no such au∣thoritie: considering that according to the approued ground of all Philosophers, and Diuines, certaintie of one part of the contradiction cannot stand with probabilitie of the other, taking probable in that sense, as the Diuines doe take it, and not for that, which hath onely a shew of probabilitie, and is not truely probable; for if it bee certainely true, that the Pope hath power to depose, it is certainely false, and there∣fore not probable, that hee hath not power to depose. And therefore my Aduersarie rather, seeketh to ob∣scure the truth, and to intangle mens consciences by wrangling and cauilling, whiles first he requireth eui∣dent demonstrations, to proue a probable doctrine, and secondly dissembleth the true state of the question, confounding the absolute proposition and the proofes thereof with the modall, which distinction doth ex∣presse the true state of the question, and discouereth both his fraude and weakenesse, not onely in this, but almost in all the rest of his Replyes, and thirdly he concealeth the answere, which I gaue to this argu∣ment taken from the authoritie of the Popes Breues and of other learned men, and also the reasons, why so many learned Catholikes whose bookes are now extant, haue from the time of Pope Gregorie the se∣uenth defended this opinion for the Popes power to depose Princes. And thus much concerning my

Aduersaries second admonition, the weakenesse whereof will also presently more cleerely appeare by my answere to his third and fourth admoni∣tion.

27 Therefore it is to be considered for the third point, saith my Aduersarie,h 1.30 what Widdrington meaneth by a probable opinion, or a probable answere, which no doubt, he vnderstandeth so, that whatsoeuer he saith, must be held for probable, how absurd so euer it be; for other∣wise he could not challenge to himselfe such a priuiledge of probabilitie as he doth, his arguments and answers being so weake and impertinent, as you shall finde them to be; in which respect he is faine to dissemble the answeres already made by some to his former arguments, and authorities in his Apologie, whereto he now remitteth his Reader very often, without taking so much as any knowledge of the con∣futation thereof, as though the same had neuer been answe∣red, or that euery assertion or position of his, being once laid downe, must needs stand for an eternall law, or were a decree of the Medes and Persians,i 1.31 quod non licet immutari.

28 But not to returne these bitter speeches of my Aduersarie backe vpon himselfe, which with the same facilitie, and with farre better reason I might doe, first, It is very vntrue, that I take probable for what∣soeuer I doe say how absurd so euer it be, as this man, if it were lawfull for mee to vse his absurd word, very ab∣surdly affirmeth, that without doubt I doe; Neither doe I take probable for that, which hath onely a shew of probabilitie, as Cicero tooke probable in his Paradoxes, but I take probable, as Philosophers and Diuines doe take it, as it is distinguished from demonstratiue and fal∣lacious, to wit, for that, which is approued by wise and learned men in the art, which they professe, which therefore as in speculation may be embraced without any imputation of errour or folly, so in practise it may bee followed without any note of imprudence, or

sinne: As in a matter of Physicke, that is accoun∣ted probable, which is approued by learned Physiti∣ons, of Law by learned Lawiers, and of Diuinitie by learned Catholike Diuines. Secondly, it is also vn∣true, that I haue in my Theologicall Disputation dissem∣bled the answeres made by some to my former arguments and authorities in my Apologie, whereto I remit my Reader oftentimes, considering that my Theologicall Disputation was wholly finished, and in the presse, before the Replyes of D. Schulkenius, and of D. We∣ston, and also my Aduersaries Supplement were pub∣lished, so that I could take no notice of them in my Disputation; for which cause I was constrained to touch them briefely onely in an Admonition to the Reader. But my Aduersarie himselfe to make his owne Replyes to seeme the more probable, and my answeres absurd, foolish, impertinent, ridiculous (for so hee is pleased to call them) is not ashamed to dissem∣ble in many points the true state of the question, and also the answeres, which in my Theological Disputa∣tion I made to his chiefest Replyes, especially those whereby hee laboureth to terrifie the timerous con∣sciences of vnlearned Catholikes, with the pretence of his new Catholike faith, with the authoritie of the Popes Breues, and the testimonies of so many lear∣ned men, who haue condemned the oath, as con∣taining in it many things flat contrarie to faith and saluation.

29. Now let vs see his fourth consideration, by which the Reader may perceiue, how insufficiently he declareth what is a probable argument, or opinion, and how little he satisfieth the vnderstanding of vnlearned Catholikes, who by his obscure, and confuse descrip∣tion of a probable argument, cannot perceiue, what argument or opinion is probable.k 1.32 Fourthly, saith he, it is to be considered, that to make an argument, or proofe probable, it sufficeth not that it seeme good and true in it

selfe, but it must also be able in some sort to counterpoyse the arguments and proofes of the contrary opinion: for often it falleth out that the reasons of one part are so pregnant, that they seeme to conuince, and yet when they are weighed with the reasons of the other part, they are neither pregnant, nor so much as probable: for according to the old prouerbe, one tale is good vntill an other be heard.

30. To which purpose it is to be considered, that many heretikes, and namely the Arians (of whom there are ma∣ny euen at this day) both doe, and may well pretend a farre greater probabilitie for their opinion, than Widdrington doth or can for his, considering their aboundant allegation of Scriptures, their subtill shifts in answering the arguments and obiections of the Catholikes, the great multitude of learned men of their Sect in times past, and their dignitie in the Church, the Conuenticles assembled, and held in their fauour, and finally the ample propagation of their opinion and Sect, especially in the time of Constantius the Empe∣rour. For which respects their followers, at this day, doe hold their doctrine not only for probable, but also for in∣fallibly true, and condemne the contrary for pernicious he∣resie: whereas Widdringtons grounds and proofes of his opinion seeme to himselfe so weake, that he dare not affirme them to be more then probable.

31. Therefore as there is no good Christian that doth now hold the arguments of the Arrians to be so much as probable, considering the potent reasons, and proofes of the Catholike doctrine in that point, so albeit the arguments and authorities, which Widdrington produceth, were they farre more plausible and pregnant then they are, yet no Catholike could esteeme them to be any way probable, being compared and ballanced with the irrefregable proofes of the other part; I meane the arguments, and necessarie consequences drawne from the holy Scriptures, the autho∣ritie of almost all the learned Doctors and Diuines that haue written of that point, and the practise of the Church for some hundreths of yeares confirmed by nine or ten Coun∣cells,

l 1.33 whereof some haue been the greatest that euer were in Gods Church; and therefore I say that all this being well weighed, no Catholike man of sound wit, or iudgment can imagine this mans arguments (which he himselfe houldeth but for probable) to haue any probabilitie in the world, or to proue any thing else but his weakenesse, wilfulnesse, and folly in propounding and mainteining them.

32. For albeit he teacheth out of Vasquezm 1.34, and o∣thers, that of two opinions the lesse probable and lesse safe may securely be followed, and that the opinion of a few, yea of one approued Doctor, sufficeth sometimes to make an opi∣nion probable, though many hold the contrary to that one Doctor (to which purpose he filleth aboue a dozen pages of his booke with Vasquez his doctrine and text) yet he is absurd in applying the same to this our case; for although Vasquez doe teachn 1.35 that a man may in doubtfull cases or questions securely follow the opinion of a few learned Doc∣tours, though the same be lesse safe, and probable, then the contrarie opinion held by many, yet he is to be vn∣derstood to speake only of such disputable questions, as my Aduersary Widdrington himselfe alleagetho 1.36 for exam∣ple sake out of Vasquez, to wit, whether there are any habits infused by God alone, concerning which question Vasquez saith,p 1.37 that albeit Pope Clement the fift did determine expressely in a Councell held at Vienna, that there opinion who held that there are such habits, is more probable, then the negatiue, yet it was neuer either by that decree, or any other of Pope, or Councell determined to be more then probable, in which respect he doth not condemne the contrarie doctrine for heresie, notwithstanding that he, and the farre greater part of learned men do hold the other to be certainely true.

33. So as Vasquez is to be vnderstood to speake of questi∣ons and opinions altogether vndecided, and not of such a doctrine as ours, touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which, as I haue said, hath not onely beene taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also is grounded vp∣on

the holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practise and decrees of diuers Popes and Councells, as well Generall as Prouinciall, as (to omit the other mentioned in my Sup∣plementq 1.38) it is euident by the decree of the famous Coun∣cell of Lateran, which expressely ordained the practise of it in some cases, and did therefore necessarily suppose, and firmely beleeue the verity of the doctrine, as I will clearely proouer 1.39 hereafter in this Reply, and withall shew the ridi∣culous absurditie of Widdringtons arguments and in∣stances against the same, yea and conuince hims 1.40 euen by his owne testimonie to be falne (to vse his owne words) into errour or heresie, for not beleiuing this doctrine, which that famous Generall Councell beleiued, and ordained to be practised.

34. In the meane time he is to vnderstand, that where∣as to shew the probabilitie of his doctrine, he bringeth ma∣ny Authors, partly in his Theologicall Disputation, and partly in his Apologie, I remit him to D. Schulckenius; who hath answered particularly to euery one of them, and proued clearely, that diuerse of them doe make flatly against him, and many nothing at all for him (being truely vnder∣stood) and that some others are worthily reiected, being ei∣ther so absurd, that they are easily confuted by the circum∣stances of the places alledged, or else Heretikes (as it ap∣peareth by their doctrine in other things) or knowne Schis∣matikes, who liuing in the time of the Emperors or Kings that were deposed, wrote partially in their fauour, of which sort neuerthelesse there are very few; so as of all the Au∣thours, that he hath scraped together to make some shew of probability in his doctrine, he hath no one cleare and suffi∣cient witnesse to iustifie the same.

35. And therefore seeing that all his pretended, pro∣babilitie consisteth partly in the authoritie of the Authors, and partly in the sufficiencie (as he supposeth) of his an∣sweres to our grounds, arguments, and authorities, which answeres I shall haue occasion to confute in this Treatise, and to shew them to be so farre from probabilitie, that

they are wholly impertinent, and sometimes ridiculous for their absurdity; therefore I conclude, that he cannot any way cleere or excuse himselfe from the note of great te∣merity and grosse errour (yea flat heresie if he bee obsti∣nate) in impugning our doctrine grounded vpon such assured and solid foundations as I haue here signified, and will more particularly and manifestly declare heereafter; as also I will put thee in minde (good Reader) oftentimes by the way to note how probably or rather (to say truely) how absurdly he argueth and answereth, to the end thou maiest the better iudge, how dangerous it will be for thee to venter thy soule vpon his pretence of probability, which is no o∣ther but such as any heretike may haue for his doctrine.

36. For all Heretikes doe thinke themselues and their followes as good and sufficient Doctors to make an opinion probable, as he either is, or esteemeth his Authors to be; and they neuer want Scriptures and Fathers that seeme to them to confirme their opinions, and doe make as proba∣ble answers to our obiections out of Scriptures and Fathers as hee doth, and many times much more probable, then he, yea and they may either with his arguments and instan∣ces, or other as probable as they, impugne the authoritie of any decree of a General Councel, be it neuer so expresse against them, saying that the fathers who made it followed, but a probable opinion, and so might erre, as you shal hearet 1.41 he answereth to the decree of the Councell of Lateran.

37. And so you see, that if is pretended probability be admitted against the common doctrine, practise and de∣crees of the Church, any heretike will not onely easily de∣fend, but also establish his heresie: and any point of Catho∣like faith may easily be called in question & made only pro∣bable, and consequently doubtfull, obnoxious to error, and to be reiected by any man that list to embrace the contrary: which truely I leaue (good Reader) to thy consideration, whether it bee not the right way to ouerthrow Catholike Religion, and to introduce all Heresie and Atheisme.

38. This is my Aduersaries fourth admonition, the

substance whereof although I could haue comprised in few lines, yet I thought good to set it downe en∣tirely word by word as it lieth, to the end the Reader may more plainely perceiue his fraudulent, vnchari∣table, and insufficient proceeding therein. And first he declareth, what is requisite to a probable argument. Secondly, he affirmeth, that Vasquez doctrine, which I related in my Theologicall Disputation, for following of probable opinions is to be vnderstood to speak only of questions & opinions altogether vndecided, & not of such a doctrine as theirs is touching the Popes pow∣er to depose Princes, which hath beene taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded vpon the holy Scriptures &c. Thirdly, he inferreth, that any heretike, and namely the Arrians may pretend as great, yea and farre greater probability to prooue their heresie, then I doe, or can doe to prooue my doctrine. Fourthly, he auerreth, that all my pretended probability consi∣steth partly in the authoritie of those Authors, which I bring in my Theologicall Disputation and also in my Apologie, and partly in the sufficiencie, as I suppose, of my answers to their grounds, arguments and au∣thorities; for confutation of the first my Aduersarie remitteth his Reader to D. Schulckenius, and for the second he himself promiseth to shew them to be so far from probabilitie, that they are wholly impertinent, and sometimes ridiculous for their absurditie, and that therefore I cannot any way cleere or excuse my selfe from the note of great temerity and grosse errour, yea, flat heresie, into which he will, forsooth, conuince me euen by mine owne testimonie to be falne, for not beleeuing this doctrine touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which that famous Generall Councell of Lateran beleeued, and ordained to be practised. But how vaine are the brags of this glorious boasting man, and who in very deede is the impertinent, ridiculous and absurd, thou shalt haue (good Reader) a taste by my answer to this his admo∣nition,

and by my answers to the rest of his Replies thou shalt more fully perceiue, as also that I am free from all note of temerity, errour or heresie, and how dangerous it is for thee to venter thy soule and whole estate vpon the credit of this vnlearned and vnchari∣table man, who as hee is knowen to bee a man of no great learning, so also both heere and in the grea∣test part of his Replies sheweth great want not onely of learning, but also of charity, sinceritie, and al∣so of Christian modestie, as partly thou hast seene al∣ready and heereafter shalt most cleerely vnderstand.

39. First therefore consider (Courteous Reader) whether M^r. Fitzherbert by his description of a proba∣ble argument intendeth to quiet and satisfie, or rather to disturbe and perplexe the timorous consciences of vnlearned Catholikes, who cannot vnderstand what he meaneth by those words, in some sort, and how an argument, which is far the lesse probable, can by those words be distinguished from an argument, of the con∣trarie opinion, which is by much, the more probable. For although it be true, that probable arguments for one opinion must be able in some sort to counterpoise the arguments of the contrary opinion in the iudge∣ment of those, who thinke that opinion to bee proba∣ble, and are able to weigh and ballance the intrinsecall grounds, or arguments on both sides, yet vnlearned men, who are not able to iudge & examin the intrin∣secall grounds of any opinion, but are onely led by authority, can not easily discerne, how farre this, in some part, which hath so great a latitude, is to bee ex∣tended. Neither is my Aduersarie, as I suppose, so ignorant in philosophy, although perchance he hath spent smal time in the studie therof, as to imagin, that probability, is in the thing it selfe, as truth and falshood are, according to that saying of the philosophers, ex eo quod res est vel non est, propositio dicitur vera vel falsa: a proposition is sayd to bee true or false, for that the

thing it selfe, which is affirmed or denyed is, or is not.

40 For probabilitie is not in the thing it selfe, but in the vnderstanding of him, who approueth the opi∣nion or doctrine, in so much that although an opi∣nion, which once is true, can afterwards neuer be false, nor which once is false, be afterwards euer true, yet an opinion, which once was probable, may after∣wards be improbable, and contrariwise, which was once improbable, may afterwards proue probable, ac∣cording as it shall be approued or disproued by men skilfull in the arte which they professe: yea an opi∣nion, which to some Doctors is improbable, and also hereticall, to others may be probable, yea and appro∣ued as the more true opinion: And this proceedeth from the diuersitie of mens iudgements and opini∣ons, where oftentimes are seene, according to the vulgar saying, quot capita tot sententiae, as many heads so many opinions. That is probable, say the Philosophers, taking it from Aristotleu 1.42, which is approued by wise and skilfull men in the arte, which they professe: so that what argument or opinion learned men doe approue, is a probable argument or opinion. And this description of probable is not obscure and intricate, but cleare and perspicuous euen to ignorant men, who can ea∣sily discerne, what opinion or argument learned men do approue. And therefore well said Armillax 1.43, whom I cited in my Theologicall Disputationy 1.44, that a man is not bound alwaies to follow the better opinion, but it suffi∣ceth that he follow that, which some skilfull Doctors iudge to be true: and learned Nauarra, whom I also related in that bookez 1.45, for the quieting of scrupulous consciences affirmeth,a 1.46 that in the Court of Conscience, to the effect of not sinning, it sufficeth to choose for true his opinion, whom for iust cause we thinke to be a man of a good conscience, and of sufficient learning.

41 Wherefore when my Aduersarie affirmeth,

that to make an argument probable, it sufficeth not, that it seeme good and true in it selfe, but it must also be able in some sort to counterpoyse the arguments of the contrary opinion, if he meane, that it must alwaies be able in some sort to counterpoyse the arguments of the contrarie opinion, in the iudgements of those who are not of the con∣trary opinion, and doe not approue the argument for good, this, if it were lawfull for me to vse my Aduer∣saries vndecent words, is absurd and ridiculous, for that oftentimes it falleth out, that some Doctours doe thinke an opinion to be improbable and hereticall, which other Doctours of the contrary opinion doe thinke not onely to bee probable, but also to bee the more true opinion, as it is euident in the question touching the superioritie of the Pope and Councells. For the ancient Doctors of Paris, as Ioannes Maior, & Iacobus Almainus,* 1.47 who wrote against Cardinall Ca∣ietane concerning this question, thought the opinion, which held the Pope to be aboue a Generall Councell, to be improbable, yea and other Doctors, as Cardina∣lis Cameracensis, and Iohn Gerson, thought it to be er∣roneous and hereticall, which neuerthelesse Cardinall Caietan defended to be the more true opinion.

42 But if my Aduersarie meane, as needs he must, if he will speake with reason, that to make an argument probable, it must alwaies be able in some sort to counter∣poyse the arguments of the contrary opinion, in the iudge∣ments of those, who either are not of that contrary opinion, or else doe not reiect the argument as impro∣bable, this is most true: for in the iudgments of those, who do not onely reiect the argument as improbable, but doe absolutely approue it for good, and for the more probable, it doth not only in some sort coun∣terpoyse, but it doth also in some sort overpoyse the ar∣guments of the contrarie opinion, as any man may plainely perceiue by Vasquez doctrine, which because it fully cleareth this present difficultie, and is able to

quiet the conscience of any man, be he neuer so igno∣rant, I related word by word in my Theologicall Dispu∣tation,b 1.48 which doctrine because my Aduersarie knew right well, that it did amply declare what is a probable opinion, and how farre forth both vnlearned, and learned men may follow a probable opinion against the more common, the more probable, and the more secure opinion of Catholike Diuines, he cunningly concealeth, as you shall see, the chiefe and principall point thereof, and yet he carpeth at me for filling aboue a dozen pages of my booke with Vasquez do∣ctrine and text, affirming withall, that I am absurd in applying Ʋasquez doctrine to this our case, but who is the absurd, you shall forthwith perceiue.

43 For whereas Ʋasquez doth teach, that if a learned and skilfull man, who hath taken no small paines in studies, and hath also throughly seene and examined all the reasons of the contrarie opinion, shall iudge against all other writers, who haue gone before him, that his opinion is the more probable, he may although it be the lesse secure opinion, lawfully embrace it, and in practise follow it, whose opinion also an vnlearned man, who ought according to rea∣son, saith Vasquez, giue credit to the learning and hone∣stie of a learned and vertuous man, may lawfully follow, my Aduersarie affirmeth, that Ʋasquez is to be vnder∣stood to speake of questions and opinions altogether vnde∣cided, as is that, which I cited there out of Vasquez, concerning the infusing of habits by God alone, and not of such a doctrine, as is this concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, which hath not onely been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practise, and decrees of diuers Popes and Counsells &c. But whether I be absurd in accounting that doctrine to be probable, vn∣decided, and questionable among Catholikes, about which the Schoolemen are at strife, and as yet the contro∣uersie is not decided by the Iudge, saith Trithemiusc 1.49, and

which very many Doctors doe defend, saith Almainusd 1.50, and which the Kingdome of France hath alwaies appro∣ued for certaine saith Pithaeuse 1.51, and which the late proceeding of the Parliament of Paris against the con∣trarie doctrine taught by Suarez, Card: Bellarmine, and others hath cleerely confirmed (to omit the forme of oath lately propounded by the tiers Estates,) and that Card: Peron himselfe doth not re∣iect it as improbable, I remit to the iudgement of the indifferent Reader.

44. Yea my Aduersarie himselfe, although hee vntruly and vnlearnedly, as you shall perceiue be∣neath, chargeth me with heresie, for defending the aforesaid doctrine as probable, or to vse Cardinall Pe∣rons word, as problematique, dare not auouch, that the doctrine is defined by any Generall Councell, which neuerthelesse, as I shewed in my Theologicall Disputationf 1.52 out of Card: Bellarmine, and Canus, is necessarie that a decree of a Generall Councell can make a point of faith, and the contrarie doctrine to be hereticall, but with mincing tearmes onely affir∣meth, that it hath been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practise and decrees of diuers Popes and Councells, especially of the great Councell of Lateran, which expresly ordained the practise of it in some Cases, and did there∣fore necessarily suppose, and firmely beleeue the veritie of the said doctrine. But besides that here is no speech of any definition, which onely can make any doctrine to be of faith, and the contrarie to be hereticall, and also it is vsuall among Diuines to affirme, that their doctrine hath been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, is not onely confirmed by the practise, but is also expressely defined by the decrees of Generall Councells, which neuerthelesse doth not terrifie other learned men from impugning their doctrine and opinions, I will

shew beneathg 1.53, that the Councell of Lateran did nei∣ther ordaine the practise of that doctrine, nor neces∣sarilie suppose or firmely beleeue, especially with di∣uine and supernaturall beleefe, the veritie thereof; and I will answer all the Replyes, which my Aduersarie hath taken out of Fa: Lessius (masked vnder D. Sin∣gletons name) against my answers, and hath filled not only a dozen pages, but well neere foure dozen pages of his booke with Fa: Lessius his doctrine & text, yet concealing his name, belike to make his Reader be∣leeue what a learned Diuine he is now become, and that those Replyes were not the fruits of other mens witts, but the subtle inventions of his owne fertile braine, whereas it is well knowne, what small skill M^r. Thomas Fitzherbert hath in Theologicall lear∣ning.

45 But if my Aduersarie had been resolued sin∣cerely to handle this question, and really to finde out the truth, he might easily haue gathered out of Ʋas∣quez doctrine, the answer to this his Reply. For when Ʋasquez affirmeth, that if a learned man, who hath throughly seene, and examined all the reasons of the con∣trary part, shall iudge against all other writers, who haue gone before him, that his opinion is the more probable, he may although it be the lesse secure opinion, embrace it, and in practise follow it, his assertion is generall, whether it be concerning any doctrinal point, which is thought to belong to faith, or any text of holy Scripture, or any decree or definition of Pope or Generall Councell, which are in controuersie among Catholikes. Yea according to Ʋasquez doctrine, it is lawfull for other men, who hold the contrarie opinion to be the more probable, without any note of temeritie, to embrace it, and in practise follow it, vnlesse it be a singular opi∣nion and of one onely Doctour (as this doctrine which denieth the Popes power to depose Princes is not singular and of one only, but of many, as I will

shew beneath:) for then, saith Vasquez, if it be a sin∣gular opinion, and of one onely Doctor, although it may be probable to that Doctour (who is not therefore so easi∣ly to be condemned of temeritie) yet to him, who li∣keth not the proper and intrinsecall grounds of that singu∣lar opinion, and of one onely Doctor, and seeth it to bee grounded vpon the authoritie of one onely Doctor, hee ought not to account it probable to this effect, that he may prudently follow it in practise against his owne, and the common opinion of all others.

46 But if it be not a singular opinion and of one onely Doctour, although the learned men of the contrarie opinion doe vrge for their doctrine some law, decree, or definition, which the contrarie part hath seene and examined, and hath in some sort an∣swered therevnto, it is lawfull for any learned man according to Ʋasquez, to follow in practise that other lesse secure and lesse common opinion, against his owne opinion, albeit it be the more secure and com∣mon opinion. For when we perceiue, saith Vasquez, that the Authors of the contrarie opinion haue seene, and considered all the grounds and reasons for our opinion, and haue obserued that obiection taken from that law or de∣cree, and haue endeauoured to answer them, and that they were not convinced by them, we may iustly thinke, that we may prudently and lawfully follow in practise the opinion of those other men against our owne, neither ought wee to suppose that our reasons are euident demonstrations, and which doe make the contrarie opinion to be voide of all probabilitie.

47 And this doctrine of Vasquez is euident in the question concerning the superioritie of the Pope a∣boue a Generall Councell, which hath been so long de∣bated betwixt the Doctors of Rome and Paris. For both of them affirme, that their opinion is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, is confirmed by the practise and decrees, yea and definitions of Generall Councels, and yet both of

thē, because they are approued by learned Catholike Diuines, are probable, although, as Nauarra,h 1.54 out of Ioannes Maior a learned Diuine of Paris relateth, that the opinion of the Parishioners is not permitted to bee de∣fended at Rome, nor the opinion of the Romanes to bee de∣fended at Paris. And therefore into what fowle tearmes, trow you, would my Aduersarie breake, if the Doctors of Paris, who doe resolutely hold, that the Pope is inferiour to a Generall Councell, should argue a∣gainst Card. Bellarmine and others of his opinion, in the same manner, as this fowle mouthed man, who hath still in his mouth absurd, ridiculous, impertinent, foolish, impudent, temerarious, impious, hereticall, or erro∣neous, that their doctrine hath not onely beene taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also it is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, confirmed by the practise and de∣crees of diuers Counsels, but especially of the famous Councell of Constance, which did not onely ordaine the practise of it in some cases, and therefore necessarily suppose and firmely beleeue, but did also expressely define, and con∣sequently command all Christians to beleeue the verity of that doctrine, and that therefore Card. Bellarmine is falne into heresie, for not beleeuing that doctrine, which that famous Generall Councell, beleeued, defined, and ordained to be practised and also to be beleeued.

48 By this it is apparant, that Vasquez doctrine is to be vnderstood generally of all cases, questions, and opinions, which are in controuersie among learned Catholikes, although one or both parts doe pretend their doctrine to be of faith, and to be grounded vpon the authoritie of holy Scripture, or some decree of Pope, or Generall Councell, and that learned Catho∣likes ought not, according to Vasquez, to bee easily condemned of temeritie, and much lesse of errour or heresie, who doe not follow the more common, the more probable, and the more secure opinion of other Catholike Doctors, although this common opinion

seeme to some followers thereof to be an vndoubted doctrine, and to be confirmed by some Decree, Law, or Canon of Pope, or Generall Counsell, which Decree, Law, or Canon those learned Catholikes haue seene, examined, and answered, although their answeres doe not satisfie the contrarie side. And conformably to this doctrine did Vasquez, as I obserued in my Theologicall Disputation, dispute that question, whe∣ther there be any habits, which are infused by God alone. For although he expressely affirmeth, that it is the con∣stant, without controuersie, and vndoubted opinion of the Schoole-Diuines, that there bee certaine vertues called Theologicall, Faith, Hope, and Charitie, which of their owne nature are infused by God alone, and that some Do∣ctors, as Andreas Vega, doe hold this doctrine to bee of faith, and the contrarie to be hereticall, or erroneous, en∣deauouring to proue the same, not out of the Councell of Vienna, which did onely declare it to be the more probable opinion, but out of the Councell of Trent, yet Ʋasquez would not condemne the contrarie opinion not one∣ly of heresie, as my Aduersarie would cunningly per∣swade the Reader, but not so much as of temeritie. From whence I inferred, that, according to Ʋas∣quez doctrine, which my Aduersarie fraudulently concealeth, the constant, without controuersie, and vn∣doubted opinion of Schoole-Diuines, and which some of them thinke to be a point of faith, may sometimes bee re∣iected without any note, not onely of heresie or errour, but also of temeritie, which doctrine doth cleerely satisfie the common argument drawne from the authoritie of learned men, who hold the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to bee a point of faith, and consequently the oath to bee repugnant to faith and saluation. And thus much concerning the first and second point of my Aduersaries fourth Admo∣nition.

49 As touching the third point it is apparantly

vntrue, and very iniurious to Catholikes, and to Ca∣tholike Religion to affirme, that the Arrians, or any other heretikes may well pretend a farre greater probabi¦litie for the establishing of their heresies, then may I and those other Catholikes, who hold it probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes. For (besides that the Arrian heresie was expressely condemned in the first eight Generall Counsels, and afterwards in many o∣thers, and the Arrians haue euer been accounted he∣retikes by ancient Fathers and all other Catholikes, wheras there cannot be alledged so much as any shew or colour of any one definition of a Generall Councell, wherein the doctrine which denyeth the Popes po∣wer to depose Princes is condemned for hereticall, but all the proofes that my Aduersaries alledge, that the Pope hath such a power, are onely ouer-wrested similitudes, facts, examples, inferences, and supposi∣sitions of their owne, drawne from the authoritie of holy Scriptures, Popes, or Councels) when the Phi∣losophers and Diuines doe affirme, that the authori∣tie of learned and skilfull men sufficeth to make the doctrine or opinion probable, which they approue, they vnderstand of learned and skilfull men appro∣uing a doctrine belonging to the art, which they pro∣fesse, according to that vulgar maxime, vnicuique in sua arte perito credendum est, we must giue credit to euery man skilfull in his art.

50 So that in a point of Law, the authoritie of skil∣full Lawiers, and not of skilfull Physitions, in a point of Physike the authoritie of skilfull Physitions and not of Lawiers, and in a point of Catholike Religion, the authoritie of learned Catholikes, and who are skilfull in points of Catholike Religion which they professe, and not of heretikes, and who doe not pro∣fesse Catholike Religion, doth make the opinion, or doctrine which they approue to bee probable. And therefore my Aduersarie very insufficiently (not to

vse those fowle words absurdly & ridiculously, which hee so often vseth against mee) argueth from the authoritie of learned Catholikes to the authoritie of heretikes, whose doctrine according to the definition of probable, can neuer make the opinions, which they approue in points of Catholike Religion, which they doe not professe, to be probable. Neither by this can any point of Catholike faith, which is knowne to all learned Catholikes to bee a point of Catholike faith, be easily called in question, and made onely probable, for that no learned Catholike will cal in question any doctrine, which is cleerely knowne to be the Catho∣like faith, and as for heretikes their authoritie can neuer make any doctrine belonging any way to Ca∣tholike Religion, which they doe not professe, to be probable.

51 But if there should arise any controuersie a∣mong learned Catholikes, whether this or that do∣ctrine be of faith, and in what sense the words of such a text of holy Scripture, or of such a Canon, or De∣cree of Pope or Councell are to be vnderstood, there is no doubt, but that the authoritie of learned Catho∣likes may in those cases make their opinion probable although other Catholikes would be so stiffe in their owne opinion, as to condemne the contrarie part of heresie, errour, or temeritie. A manifest example here∣of we haue in the Councell of Constance, wherein ac∣cording to Iohn Gerson and other learned men, who were present at that Councell, it was expressely defi∣ned, that the Pope is inferiour and subiect to a Ge∣nerall Councell lawfully assembled, and therefore the contrarie to be flat hereticall, but since that other Ca∣tholikes, especially Romane Diuines haue called that Decree in question, and haue endeauoured to answer therevnto, affirming that it was only meant of Popes in time of Schisme, or that the aforesaid Decree was not confirmed by Pope Martin in the end of the

Councell, which answeres neuerthelesse doe not sa∣tisfie the Doctors of the contrarie opinion, I doe not thinke, but that my Aduersarie will confesse, that the opinion of the Romans may bee accounted probable, and that the calling of that Decree in question was not the right way to ouerthrow Catholike Religi∣on, and to introduce all heresie and Atheisme.

52. But if it should perchance fall out, that some Catholikes would be so selfe opinatiue, as to affirme without any definition at all of the Church, although vnder pretext of zeale and deuotion to the See Apo∣stolike, any doctrine to be of faith and the contrarie to be hereticall, and other Catholikes although the farre fewer in number should deny the same, especi∣ally in a matter which concerneth our obedience due to God and Caesar, if the first part only should be per∣mitted to write freely what they please, and to taxe the other part of heresie, to omit errour, temeritie, folly, ri∣diculous absurditie and such like, and this other part should be forbidden to defend their good names, and to answere for themselues, I leaue (good Reader) to thy consideration, whether this be not the right way to ouerthrow Catholike Religion and the vndoubted grounds thereof, and to introduce vncertaine opini∣ons for an infallible doctrine of the Catholike faith, which is to open a wide gap to heresie, Atheisme, and euident iniustice, and to make among Christians a perpetuall dissention betwixt the Cleargie, and Laity, the temporall and spirituall power. Now that this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not by any definition at all of the Church declared to bee true, my Aduersary cannot denie, and that it euer hath been and is impugned by learned Catholikes, and the contrarie hath euer beene, and is by them ap∣proued, and therefore it is truly probable, and not only hath a pretence of probabilitie I will shew beneath, where I will both relate the Catholike Authours, who

deny this authoritie of the Pope to depose Princes, which only is sufficient to make their doctrine proba∣ble, and also I will discouer the insufficiencie of those Replies, which my Aduersary hath made against my answeres. And thus much concerning the third point.

53. For the fourth and last point, consider, Catho∣like Countreimen, whether M^r. Fizherbert intendeth to declare vnto you plainly and sincerely this present controuersie, and by a cleare explayning of the questi∣on to quiet your consciences, or rather by wrangling and cauilling to obscure the difficultie, and blind your vnderstandings. The question betwixt him and mee at this present is, whether it be a probable doctrine, that the Pope hath not any power by the institution of Christ to depriue Soueraigne Princes of their tempo¦rall power, and Regall authoritie: And there are two only grounds to perswade any man, that this or that doctrine or opinion is truely probable. The one are called intrinsecall groundes, to wit, the arguments and reasons, which are drawne from holy Scriptures, sacred Canons, Theologicall reasons and such like, to proue that doctrine or opinion: and these groundes are proper only to learned men, who are able to weigh and examine the arguments on both sides; ••••e other are called extrinsecall grounds, which doe onely consist in the authority of those learned men, who doe hold that doctrine or opinion, because according to that which hath been said before, that doctrine is trulie probable, which is approued by wise and skilfull men in the art which they professe; and by these onely grounds vnlearned men can be perswaded, that any doctrine or opinion is truly probable.

54. Now my Aduersarie seeing, as he saith, that all my pretended probabilitie consisteth partly in the authority of those Authours, which I haue brought in my Theologi∣call Disputation, and in my Apologie, and partly in the

sufficiencie, as I suppose, of my answeres to their groundes, arguments and authorities, yet he taketh vpon him in this Reply only to confute some of my answers to their intrinsecall grounds, and for the confutation of the au∣thorities which I bring, hee remitteth his Reader, to D. Schulckenius, who, as he saith, hath answered particu∣larly to euery one of them. Seeing therefore that there is no sufficient way to satisfie the vnderstandings of vnlearned men, that the doctrine, which holdeth the Pope to haue no authoritie to depose Princes, is not truely probable, but by shewing that no learned Catho∣likes do approue the same, for that vnlearned men are not able to examine the intrinsecall grounds of any Theologicall question, but are only led by authoritie, and extrinsecall grounds, and if they once perceiue, that learned Catholikes doe approue any doctrine they will presently also perceiue that doctrine to bee truly probable, is there any likelihood, that M^r. Fitz∣herbert intended to giue satisfaction to his vnlearned Countreimen, by replying to some of the answeres, which I made to their arguments, and intrinsecall grounds of their doctrine, which intrinsecall grounds vnlearned men cannot examine, and for an answere to the authorities and extrinsecall grounds which I brought, which only grounds vnlearned men can vn∣derstand, to remit his English Readers, and who for the most part vnderstand not Latine to D. Schulcke∣nius a Latine writer.

55. Besides, from my Aduersaries own wordes the Reader may easily perceiue a great fraude of his. For my Aduersarie confesseth, that I haue brought many Authours partly in my Theologicall Disputation, and partly in my Apologie, which is very true; for in my Theo∣logicall Disputation of set purpose I chose out certaine Authours named in my Apologie, which I thought did speake more plainly, and against which no iust excep∣tion could be taken; whereunto also I added certaine

other Authours which in my Apologie were not named at all: And yet my Aduersarie remitteth his Reader for an answere to them all, to D. Schulckenius, who hath only answered (but how insufficiently you shall see beneath) those authorities which I brought in my Apologie: for my Theologicall Disputation he could not at that time see, it being then but in the PRINTERS hands. But the plaine truth is, that vnlesse my Ad∣uersarie would haue shewed apparantly to wrangle and cauill, hee could take no iust exception whereby his Reader might be fully satisfied, against those Au∣thours, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation, and therfore he thought it his best course cunningly to shift them of, and not to meddle with the answering of them at all, least the Reader perceiuing so many learned Catholikes to ioyne with Widdrington in de∣nying this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes especially to be a point of faith, should pre∣sently obserue both the fraudulent proceeding of my Aduersarie, who laboureth to perswade his Reader, that only Widdrington doth impugne this authoritie of the Pope to depose Princes, and also that the con∣trarie doctrine being approued not only by Widdring∣ton, but also by so many learned Catholikes is, and ought to be accounted truly probable, and therefore may according to Vasquez doctrine without any note of temeritie be embraced by any Catholike. But of these authorities I will treat more at large beneath. And thus much concerning my Aduersaries fourth Admonition, and all the foure points thereof.

56. Now to come to my Aduersaries fift and last admonition, which indeede, as he truely saith, is wor∣thie to be noted, but not for any truth therein to be ob¦serued, but for the manifest fraud and falshood therin contained: The first and last consideration shall be, saith my Aduersarie,* 1.55 that Widdringtons doctrine is dange∣rous and pernicious not onely to the consciences of Catho∣likes,

(as I haue shewed) but also to his Maiesties seruice, which he pretendeth to further and aduance thereby; for he cannot denie, but that the contrary opinion being pro∣bable (as he confesseth it to be) may bee lawfully imbraced by all men; whereupon it followeth, that any man may not only refuse the oath lawfully, but also hold, that his Maie∣stie may be deposed by his owne subiects vpon a sentence of Excommunication and Deposition, and that consequently they may lawfully take armes against his Maiesty in that case; and this being so, what security hath his Maiesty, or aduancement of his seruice by this mans doctrine? For al∣beit many doe now take the Oath, and sweare that they thinke in their conscience, that the Pope cannot depose the King; yet for as much as it is, and alwaies will be probable, in the opinion of some learned men, that they haue sworne a thing, which is false, and consequently that their Oath is inualide, it followeth (according to the grounds of his do∣ctrine) that they may breake their Oath, seeing that they may alwaies probably perswade themselues, that they pro∣mised and swore a thing false and vnlawfull, and that ther∣fore they are not bound to obserue it.

57. Furthermore, if his Holinesse should at any time dispence with them particularly for their Oath, or excom∣municate and depose his Maiestie, discharging his Sub∣iects of their bond of fidelitie, and all others of Allegeance, this man cannot deny, but that it is probable at least, that then they are free from the Oath, and consequently that they may (euen according to his doctrine of probabilitie) concurre to the deposition of his Maiestie: and therfore see∣ing that his doctrine doth not giue any security to his Ma∣iestie, and that according to his opinion any man may as lawfully condemne and refuse the Oath, as approoue and take it, it is euident, that his sayd doctrine is not onely vaine and fruitlesse to his Maiestie, but also dangerous and per∣nicious, no lesse impugning the authoritie of his Maiestie commanding it to be taken, then of his Holinesse forbid∣ding it.

58. Whereupon I inferre three things; the first, that he is neither so good a subiect to his Maiesty, as he pretendeth, nor such an obedient childe to the Church as he professeth to be. The second is, that his bookes deserue to be prohibi∣ted no lesse in England then Rome; and therefore truely wise men in these parts doe greatly maruel how it can stand with the wisdome of his Maiesties Councell to permit them to be printed and published in England as we see they are. The third is, that he is one of those, whom God threat∣neth in the Apocalyps,* 1.56 to spit out of his mouth, saying of such indifferent men as he, Vtinam esses aut calidus, aut frigidus &c. I would thou wert either hot or cold, but because thou art luke-warme, I will beginne to vomit thee out of my mouth.

59. And this shall suffice, good Reader, for the pre∣sent, touching those aduertisements and considerations, which I meant to giue thee concerning Widdringtons do∣ctrine in generall: and therfore I will now passe to the exa∣mination of his answers to me in particular, and lay downe in order as much of the text of his Admonition, as concer∣neth me, to the end that he shall not haue occasion to say, that I haue concealed or dissembled any thing that he hath said against me; as also that thou maiest see, how probably he hath answered me, and thereby the better iudge of the probability, as well of his answers to other men, as of his whole doctrine in his Theologicall Disputation, which as I vnderstand, thou shalt shortly see fully confuted in La∣tine to his confusion, Besides that, I doubt not, but thou shalt also, euen in this my Reply, see a cleere confutation of the chiefe grounds of his doctrine, and of his principall argu∣ments and answers touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which is the maine question betwixt him and vs, and specially impugned, and abiured in the new oath.

60. But what strange paradoxes and positions void of all probabilitie M^r. Fitzherbert dare aduenture to maintaine, yea and to perswade his Maiestie, and the wisdomes of his most honourable priuie Councell,

that it is dangerous to his Maiesties safetie, to haue this doctrine for the Popes power to depose his Ma∣iesty, to be so much as called in question in his Domi∣nions, thou maiest, good Reader, cleerely perceiue by this his last Admonition, wherein thou shalt obserue the manifest fraud and falshood of this man. For if M^r. Fitzherbert had either sincerely, or entirely rela∣ted my opinion and doctrine, or else had put in mind his Reader against what kind of Aduersaries I do op∣pose, any man of meane vnderstanding would pre∣sently haue perceiued (as I obserued elsewhere,i 1.57 which my words I thinke it not amisse to set downe heere againe) that it is too too apparantly and shamefully vntrue, that my manner of handling this question probably can be dangerous or pernicious to his Maie∣stie, as my Aduersarie endeauoureth to perswade his Maiestie, not for any loue that he is knowen to beare vnto the State, but to the end by all likely-hood, that he and such like violent spirits may write more freely of this subiect, and without being controlled or con∣tradicted by Catholikes, who, as he is perswaded, do little regard the writings and opinions of Protestants concerning this or any other doctrine.

61. For it may bee dangerous to his Maiesty to handle a question probably against one Aduersary, which will be nothing dangerous to handle it probably against another. As for example, if it wer agreed vp∣on by all Catholikes, that the Pope hath no power to depose his Maiestie, then it would bee dangerous to his Maiestie, that any Catholike should call this in question, and dispute it probably: but if on the con∣trary side all Catholikes should agree in this, that it were certaine, vnquestionable, and a poynt of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose his Maiestie, and to absolue his Subiects of their Allegeance, to command them to take armes against him &c. then if a Catholike should call this in question, or which is all one, dispute it probably,

and maintaine, that it is not certaine, that the Pope hath such an authoritie, but that it is questionable, and probable that he hath it not, no man of any sense or vnderstanding can affirme, that such a manner of disputing this question probably against those Aduer∣saries, who hold it for certaine and vnquestionable, can bee any way dangerous or pernicious to his Maiestie.

62 Now behold the manner, which I haue taken in handling this controuersie. Card: Bellarmine, Fa: Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, Suarez, and some other Diuines, especially of the Societie of Iesus, whom M^r. T. F. in euery step, as though he were their crea∣ture, (as now he is become one of their companie,) doth follow, haue laid this for a sure and vndoubted ground, that it is a point of faith, and to be beleeued as certaine, and vnder paine of eternall damnation by Catholikes, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to absolue Subiects from their allegiance, and therevpon to command them to take armes, and raise tumults against their Prince so deposed. So that you see, that these men haue already laid the danger and vndoubted ouerthrow to his Maiesties Person and Crowne, if the Pope should perchance depose him, in that they affirme, that all Catholikes are in that case bound in conscience to forsake him, and to fulfill the Popes command to the destruction of his Maiesties Person and State. This doctrine, to wit, that it is a point of faith, and an vndoubted principle of Catholike Religion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to inflict all temporall punishments by way of coercion, and that all Catho∣likes are bound in conscience to forsake his Maiestie, and to take armes against him, I haue taken vpon me for two principall reasons to impugne, and doe not doubt clearely to maintaine the same, against the cla∣mours of M^r. T. F. or any other whatsoeuer.

63 My first reason was, for that it is against the truth and puritie of the Catholike Church, Shee be∣ing a pillar and ground of truth, that doubtfull opini∣ons, and which among Catholikes are onely in con∣trouersie, and by the Parliament of Paris haue been condemned as scandalous, seditious, damnable, and per∣nicious, should be enforced vpon English Catholikes, as an vndoubted doctrine of the Catholike faith, to the vtter ouerthrow of themselues, and their whole posteritie, by men who are in no danger to loose, but rather to gaine temporall aduancement by their wri∣tings. My second reason was to assure his Maiestie, that all English Catholikes may, if they will, accor∣ding to the grounds of Catholike Religion be true and constant Subiects to his Maiestie, and that not∣withstanding any sentence of Excommunication or depriuation denounced, or to be denounced against his Maiestie by the Pope, whereby his Subiects should be absolued from their Allegiance, or commanded not to obey him in temporall causes, they may with a safe conscience, & also in practise (marke well what I say) they are bound to adhere to his Maiestie, to obey him in temporall causes, as still remayning their true and lawfull Soueraigne, and to resist any such sentence of Excommunication or depriuation.

64 The reason wherefore I affirmed, that Catho∣likes may with a safe conscience adhere to his Maie∣stie, and resist the Popes sentence of depriuation, was, for that it is a probable opinion, and which with a safe conscience, and without danger of heresie, error, or temeritie may be embraced by Catholikes, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Princes, nor to in∣flict any temporall punishments by way of coercion, but that the last punishment, to which the coerciue power of the Church doth extend, are onely Eccle∣siasticall and spirituall Censures. Wherefore that which my Aduersarie affirmeth, that I confesse, it to be

probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that the oath cannot lawfully be taken, is very vntrue, vn∣les he meane that I confes it for Disputation sake, or, as we vsually say, Dato, sed non concesso, it being ad∣mitted, not granted, for that it maketh nothing for, or against the question which is in hand. Therefore positiuely I neither confesse it, nor deny it, approue it, or condemne it, nor with that part of the contra∣diction, whether it be probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and whether it be probable, that the Oath may not be taken, doe I at this time intermeddle, but whereas my Aduersaries doe so vio∣lently maintaine, that it is certaine, and an vndoubted doctrine of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that the oath is repugnant to faith and saluation, and therefore can not lawfully be taken, I at this present doe affirme the contrarie, to wit, that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, and that the oath may lawfully be taken.

65 But the principall reason, which I brought for the securing of his Maiestie (which M^r. Fitzher∣bert fraudulently concealeth) that English Catholikes not onely may for the reason aforesaid, but also in practise are bound to adhere to his Maiestie, and to resist the Popes sentence of depriuation, was, for that supposing it to be speculatiuely vncertaine, whether the Pope hath any such power to depose a King or no, it is an vndoubted rulek 1.58 among the Lawyers, and grounded vpon the light of nature and princi∣ples of Diuinitie, that in causa dubia siue incerta melior est conditio possidentis, In a doubtfull or disputable case, the state of him that hath possession is the better. And againe, Cum sunt iura partium obscura, fauendum est Reo, potiùs quàm Actori, when it is vnknowne whether of the parties who are in suite, hath right, the defendant is to be preferred or fauoured before the plaintiffe. Seeing therefore that from the very first beginning of this

controuersie, concerning the authoritie of Popes, and Soueraigntie of Kings, that is, from the time of Pope Gregorie the seuenth, who was the first Pope, that chal∣lenged vnto him this temporall power ouer Kings (call it temporall or spirituall as you please, for sure it is that the effect is temporall) hath been vncertaine, dis∣putable, and euer contradicted by Catholikes both Kings and Subiects, and therefore it can not bee said, that the Pope was euer in possession of this authoritie (although wee should grant, that power, right, or au∣thoritie may be said to bee possessed) it consequently followeth, that what opinion soeuer any Catholike follow in speculation, concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, yet in practise, vntill this Controuer∣sie concerning the Popes power to depose Kings, and the right of Kings not to be deposed, shall be decided, as yet it is not, hee can not with a good conscience endeauour to thrust out a King so deposed from the Kingdome or Dominions which hee lawfully pos∣sesseth.

66 Wherevpon in the end of my Apologie I infer∣red this conclusion, whereof also in my Epistle Dedi∣catorie to his Holinesse I made mention: And therefore if either Pope, Prince, or any other of a forraine countrey should attempt to thrust an hereticall Prince out of the kingdome, which he possesseth, this controuersie concerning the deposition of Princes being vndecided, hee should con∣trarie to the rules of iustice doe that Prince most manifest wrong. And much more a Subiect can not be excused from manifest treason, what soeuer opinion in speculation he doth maintaine concerning the Popes temporal power, who should in practise, vnder pretence perchance of deuotion to the See Apostolike, not duely also considering the bond of his Allegiance towards his Soueraigne, endeauour to thrust his lawfull Prince out of his kingdome, which he possesseth, notwithstanding any Excommunication or sentence of de∣priuation denounced against him by the Pope.

67 But because D. Schulkenius, hath endeauoured to confute that reason, which I out of the aforesaid rule of the Law, In causa dubia melior est conditio possi∣dentis, I brought to proue, that no man in practise can with a safe conscience obey the Popes sentence of de∣priuation, so long as this controuersie concerning the Popes power to depose Princes remaineth vndecided, I will briefely declare, how insufficiently he obiecteth against that reason. First therefore he affirmethl 1.59, that this doctrine to depose Princes is not doubtfull or in contro∣uersie among Catholikes, but it is certaine and of faith, and none but heretikes and schismatikes doe defend the contra∣rie, and therefore that rule In causa dubia &c. In a doubtfull or disputable cause the condition of the possessour is the bettter, can not bee applyed to the Popes power to depose Princes, But how vntrue this is, and also how slanderous and iniurious it is to many learned Catholikes especially to the most Christian Kingdom of France, I will cleerely shew beneath, in so much that for this cause onely if there had been no o∣ther, his book was deseruedly burnt publikly at Paris.

68 Secondly, D. Schulkenius would seeme to af∣firme that the aforesaid rule, In causa dubia, &c. In a doubtfull, or disputable cause the state of him, who hath possessions is the better, is not a rule of the Law, for that saith he, I finde not in the rules of the Law, In a doubtfull, or disputable cause, but, In a like or equall case the state or condition of him, who hath possession is the better. But it D. Schulkenius will cauill about the words, and not regard the sense, I may likewise say, that hee findeth not in the rules of the Law, In an equall or like case but in an equall and like cause the state of him, who hath possession is the better. But because cause and case, like, equall doubtfull, vncertaine, and dis∣putable haue all one sense, for that if two causes or ca∣ses be doubtfull, vncertaine, or disputable, they are like or equall in that, therefore I regarding the sense, and

not the words, did rather vse the words, doubtfull, vn∣certaine and disputable, then like, or equall, both for that the former words doe declare the sense of the rule more plainely, and also because Diuines in alled∣ging that rule of the Law do commonly vse the word doubtfull, as it may be seene in Dominicus Sotus,m 1.60 Ioan∣nes Azor,n 1.61 Ioannes Salas,o 1.62 and Gabriel Vasquez,p 1.63 and therefore Vasquez citing the aforesaid rule taketh like and doubtfull for all one, The aforesaid rule, saith hee,q 1.64 In dubijs, seu in pari causa &c. In doubts, or in a like cause the state of the possessor is the better &c.

69 Wherefore D. Sculckenius perceiuing, that this exception of his against the aforesaid rule is only ver¦ball, will not absolutely deny the rule, but answereth thirdly, that if there be such a rule of the Law (as without doubt in sense there is both in the Canon,r 1.65 and Ciuill Law, and in expresse words the Diuines and Lawiers doe cite it so) it doth make for the Pope,s 1.66 who hath beene for many hundred yeares in possession to iudge and depose Seclar Princes, especially in a cause belonging to faith. But this answere of D. Sculckenius is very insufficient. For first, although we should grant, that right, power, or authoritie may bee said to be possessed, in that sense, as Possession is taken in Law, (whereas according to the Lawiers, as Molina the Iesuite obserueth,t 1.67 possessi∣on properly is onely of corporall things, and right, po∣wer, and such like spirituall things are onely said to bee as it were possessed, yet supposing that it is a doubtfull, vncertaine, and disputable question, whe∣ther the Pope hath power to depose Princes or no, as the Pope is said to be in possession of his right to de∣pose Princes, so Princes may be said to bee in possessi∣on of their right not to be deposed by the Pope; and therefore in this cause is like, or equall, doubtfull or disputable, as well for Princes right not to be deposed, as for the Popes right to depose them; and on the o∣ther side Princes are not onely in possession of their

right not to bee deposed by the Pope, but also in qui∣et, peaceable, and lawfull possession of their King∣domes and temporall Dominions, which onely are properly said to be possessed, in respect whereof this rule fauoureth onely Princes, and not the Pope, and therefore in this doubtfull and disputable case of the Popes power to depose Princes, the state and conditi∣on of Princes, who are in lawfull possession, not onely of their right not to be deposed by the Pope, but also of their Kingdomes and Dominions which they possesse, is, according to the aforesaid rule, to be pre∣ferred.

70. Moreouer, that the Popes right, power, or au∣thoritie to depose Princes may be said to be possessed, (if possession properly be of rights) it is necessarie, that hee exercise that power to depose Kings, they knowing thereof, and bearing it patiently and without contradiction, as may clearely be gathered out ofu 1.68 Molina, andx 1.69 Lessius: And the reason is euident, for otherwise if any man should challenge a right, bee it good or bad, and should exercise that pretended right, the contrarie part contradicting, he may neuerthelesse be said to be in lawfull possession of that right. And so if temporall Lords should pretend to haue a spiritu∣all Iurisdiction ouer temporall and spirituall persons, and should exercise that pretended spirituall Iurisdi∣ction ouer them, they contradicting and excepting against the same, they might neuerthelesse be said to be in possession of that spirituall Iurisdiction. But Christian Kings from the time of Henry the fourth Emperour, who was the first Emperour, that euer was deposed by the Pope, vntill the time of Henry the fourth most Christian King of France, who was the last King, whom the Pope deposed, haue euer resisted and contradicted this authoritie of the Pope to depose them. And therefore although Popes haue for as many hundreds of yeares, as haue beene since the

time of Pope Gregorie the seuenth, challenged this authoritie to depose Kings, yet they cannot be said to haue been for one yeare, or one day in possession of that authoritie ouer Kings, seeing that Kings haue e∣uer gainsaid and contradicted it. And although there should perchance haue beene some one, or other Christian King, who for some priuate, or publicke respect hath not resisted the Popes sentence of depri∣uation denounced against him, but rather yeelded thereunto, yet this cannot be a sufficient warrant to preiudice his Successours, or that the Pope may bee said to be in possession of his pretended authoritie to depose Kings in generall, but at the most to depose that King in particular, who did not resist or gainsay, but rather acknowledged the authoritie, which the Pope claimed to depose him.

71. Fourthly, and lastly D. Schulckenius answereth, that the aforesaid rule is to be vnderstood, when the contro∣uersie is betwixt two inferiour parties who are in suite, and not betwixt the Iudge, and the partie accused, or if wee will apply it to the Iudge, and the partie accused, the Iudge is to be preferred before the partie accused, but the Pope is Iudge ouer all Christian Kings and Princes, and therefore this rule, saith he, is in fauour of the Pope. But how vn∣sound and insufficient is also this Reply of D. Schulcke∣nius, it is very apparant. For First, although the Pope be Iudge ouer all Christian Kings and Princes in spiri∣tuall causes and punishments, yet in temporall causes and punishments they haue no Iudge, or Superiour be∣sides God, the supreme Iudge of all both Kings and Popes; and therefore well said our learned Countrei∣man Alexander of Hales,y 1.70 expound those words, A King is to be punished by God alone, with materiall punishment: And againe, A King hath no man, who may iudge his facts to wit, to inflict corporall punishment: And againe, A king doth excell, as it is written 1. Pet. 2. it is true, in his de∣gree, to wit, to exercise corporall punishment, with which

punishment, if he offend, he hath none to punish him but God alone.

72. Yea rather contrariwise the Roman Emperors were in times past Iudges in temporall causes of all the Romane Empire and of euery member thereof both Cleargie and Laitie: but the deposition of Kings is a temporall cause and punishment, for what crime soe∣uer whether temporall or spirituall a King be deposed: and therefore the controuersie about deposing Kings betwixt the Pope challenging to himselfe that authori∣tie, and Kings, who are supreme Iudges in temporalls denying it, is not betwixt the Iudge and the party ac∣cused, but at the least betwixt two equalls in tempo∣rall causes, whereof the Pope, who first challenged this power to make Kings no Kings is the plaintiffe, and Kings who defend their ancient right, and prerogatiue not to be deposed by the Pope, are the defendant: and so also that second rule of the Law, Cum sunt iura partium obscura &c. When 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is not cleare whether of the parties, who are in suite, haue right, the defendant is to be preferred before the plaintiffe, fauoureth, Kings, and not the Pope, who only from the time of Gregorie the se∣uenth claimed this authoritie to make Kings no Kings.

73. Secondly, I doe not thinke, that any Lawyer will affirme, that if a Iudge, who is onely knowne to haue authoritie in ciuill matters, as ciuill is opposed to criminall, should challenge a Iurisdiction in crimi∣nall causes, and condemne a man to death, before he shewed that hee had sufficient warrant from the Prince so to doe, the partie condemned is bound to obey that Iudge, or that the aforesaid rule, In a like or doubtfull cause hee that hath possession it to be preferred, should fauour the aforesaid Iudge, and not the party condemned, who is not onely in possession of his life, but also hath right to defend his life, vntill the Iudge shew sufficient warrant, or it is otherwise publikely

knowne, that he hath authoritie to take it away. Nei∣ther is it a sufficient warrant for the Iudge, that it is knowne, that he is a Iudge in ciuill matters, vnlesse it be also knowne that he is a Iudge also in criminall cau∣ses, as likewise it is not a sufficient warrant for the Pope to depriue Kings of their temporall kingdomes, that it is cleare that he is a Iudge in all spirituall mat∣ters, vnlesse also it be cleare, as yet it is not, that he is also a Iudge in temporall causes, and to inflict tempo∣rall punishments by way of coercion, as without doubt are the taking away of temporall kingdomes, for what crime soeuer they be taken away.

74. Wherefore that Dialogue, which D. Schulcke∣nius maketh betwixt the Pope, and a conuicted here∣tike, whose goods are without any controuersie con∣fiscated both by the Ciuill and Canon Law, is vnapt∣ly applyed to the deposing of Kings, which hath beene, and is at this present in controuersie among Catholikes. Besides, that this Dialogue also suppo∣seth, that the Pope is in possession of his authoritie to depose Kings, and that Kings are not in possession of their right not to bee deposed by the Pope; and that the Pope is a Iudge of temporall Kings in tem∣porall causes, and to punish them with temporall pu∣nishments by way of coercion: and also, that the a∣foresayd rule fauoureth the Iudge, and not the per∣son conuented before the Iudge, when the authority of the Iudge ouer the person conuented is not suffi∣ciently knowen, all which, as I haue shewed before, are very vntrue. And by this thou maiest perceiue, good Reader, how insufficient are the exceptions, which D. Schuclkenius bringeth against my argument grounded in the aforsaid rule of the Law, as in very deed are al the rest of his Replies against my Apology, as God willing ere long, (for I cannot answer fully and exactly as I intend all my Aduersaries at once) I will most cleerely shew.

75. Consider now (do are Country-men) first, the vnsincere dealing of this my Aduersarie T. F. who concealeth the chiefest part of opinion and do∣ctrine for the securing of his Maiesty of the constant loyaltie and allegeance, wherein all his Catholike Subiects are in conscience bound vnto him, that thereby he may cause his Maiestie to bee iealous of my fidelity, and to account me no good Subiect, as this man slanderously affirmeth, that I am neither a good Subiect, nor a good Catholike, or child of the Church, as I professe my selfe to be, but that I am falne into flat he∣resie, from which I cannot any way cleere or excuse my selfe, for impugning that doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, which is grounded vpon such assured and solid foundation, as this man (forsooth) heere hath signified but how guilfully and vnsoundly you haue partly seene) and he will more particularly and manifestly declare heereafter, where also his particular frauds and false∣hoods I will more particularly and manifestly lay o∣pen to his owne shame and confusion. But for all his slanderous words, I trust in God, that it wil appear to all men, that insurrexerunt in me testes iniqui,z 1.71 & men∣tita est iniquit as sibi; that false witnesses haue risen vp a∣gainst me, and that wickednesse hath be lied her selfe: and that I will euer prooue my selfe to bee both a good Subiect to his Maiestie, and also a good Catholike, and a dutifull childe of the Catholike Church, as partly I haue prooued heere already, and will more particu∣larly and manifestly declare heereafter. In the meane time let M^r. Fitzherbert examine well his Catholike faith, and consider what a kinde of Catholike hee is, who so stiffely maintaineth vncertaine opinions for the Catholike faith, which, if it bee truely Catholike, cannot be exposed to any falshood or vncertainty, as this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, which with Catholike faith hee pretendeth truely to beleeue, may in very deede bee false, and without all

doubt is vncertaine and questionable among Catho∣likes.

76. Secondly consider, how vntruely M^r. Fitzher∣bert affirmeth, that my manner of disputing this que∣stion probably concerning the Popes power not to de∣pose Princes, and the lawfull taking of the Oath, doth not onely giue no security to his Maiestie, but is also dangerous and pernicious to his Maiesties safety, and how vnlearnedly hee argueth from speculation to practise. For although I should admit not onely for Disputation sake, as onely I doe, but also positiuely confesse, that in speculation it is probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes (whereas with that affirmatiue part of the question, to wit, whether it bee probable that the Pope hath power to depose Princes I do not intermeddle, but I do only handle the negatiue part, and doe affirme, that it is probable he hath no such power, which manner of disputing against such Aduersaries, who hold it not onely pro∣bable, but certaine, that he hath such a power, can in no sort be dangerous or pernicious to his Maiesties safetie, as I cleerely shewed before) neuerthelesse this my Aduersarie very vnsoundly from hence inferreth, that because in speculation it is probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, therefore in practise it is lawfull to concurre to: the actuall deposing or thru∣sting them out of the possession of their Kingdomes, or for Subiects notwithstanding any sentence of de∣position to beare armes against them, so long as this question concerning the Popes power to depose Prin∣ces remaineth disputable and vndecided. Wherfore my firme, resolute and constant opinion is, that the Pope hath not power to dispēce or absolue any of his Maiesties Subiects what opinion soeuer in speculati∣on they follow concerning the Popes power to de∣pose Princes, from anie promissorie parts of the Oath, which onely doe belong to practise, and as for the as∣sertory

parts of the Oath, which belong to specula∣tion, they are not subiect to the Popes power of di∣spencing, as I shewed at large in my Theologicall Di∣sputationa 1.72.

77. Now whether this my doctrine doth not onely giue no securitie to his Maiestie, but is also dan∣gerous and pernicious to his Maiesties safetie (as this my Aduersarie to procure his Maiesties displeasure against me falsely and vnlearnedly affirmeth) if the Pope should denounce any sentence of depriuation against him, I leaue to the iudgement of any sensible man. Neither is it vnusuall that an opinion or do∣ctrine may in speculation bee probable, which yet in practise it is not lawfull to follow, as may bee seene in the ministring of corporall physicke, and of those Sa∣craments which are necessarie to saluation. For al∣though it bee probable, that such a medicine will cure such a dangerous disease, for that learned Physicians are of that opinion, although other learned Physici∣ans thinke the contrarie to be true, or that such a mat∣ter or forme be sufficient to the validitie of the Sacra∣ment, for example sake of Baptisme, because learned Diuines hold it to bee sufficient, although other lear∣ned Diuines bee of the contrarie opinion, and so in speculation both opinions be probable, yet in practise wee are bound by the law of charitie to apply to our neighbour those remedies either spirituall or corpo∣rall, which are out of question and controuersie, and to leaue those that are questionable, if certaine and vndoubted remedies can be had: So likewise althogh it be probable, that such a house or land doth not by a lawfull title belong to him who is in lawfull possessi∣on thereof, for that learned Lawyers are of that opi∣nion, although other learned Lawyers thinke the contrarie to bee true, and so in speculation both opi∣nions bee probable, yet in practise wee are bound by the rules of Iustice not to dispossesse him by violence

of that howse or land, before the Iudge hath decided the controuersie.

78 Thirdly, consider the reason, why this my Aduersarie T. F. is so greatly offended, that I for this present doe onely take in hand (by answering proba∣bly all the arguments which are obiected on the con∣trarie side) to shew, that it is probable, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Princes; and conse∣quently that any man may with a safe and probable conscience take the Oath; for that the doctrine con∣cerning the Popes power to depose Princes, is by this my Aduersaries owne confession, the maine question betwixt him & me, and the chiefe ground wherefore the Oath is iudged to be vnlawfull. His reason ther∣fore is, for that he saw right well, what great aduan∣tage I had against him, and what little aduantage hee had against me in arguing or rather answering in this manner; and therefore he calleth it in heate of his zeale, as you haue heard, The most deuilish deuice that any man could invent. And truly if I should at this first beginning haue treated of this controuersie in any other manner, then by handling it probably in that sense as I haue declared, I might worthily haue been taxed of great imprudencie in giuing my Aduersarie more aduantage against me then was needfull. For this is the state of the question, whether it can bee clearely convinced by the authoritie of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Generall Councells, or by necessarie infe∣rences from any of them, as my Aduersaries pretend to convince, that it is an vndoubted doctrine of faith, and the contrarie not to be maintained by any Catholike, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and consequently that the Oath can not lawfully be taken. This is the question.

79 Marke now the aduantage I haue. For first I am not to proue, but only to answer, to defend, not to oppose. Secondly, it is sufficient for me, that my

Answers be onely probable, but their Replyes must not be onely probable, but also convincing, and which can not with any probabilitie be answered. So that if I should goe about at the first to proue my opi∣nion to be most true, which my Aduersaries contend not to be questionable, I should, as it is euident, greatly disaduantage my selfe. For in such contro∣uersies as are so violently maintained by the Aduer∣sarie, that hee will not grant the contrarie part to be questionable, it is necessarie to proceed by degrees; first, to make the thing questionable and disputable, which the aduerse part will not haue to be called in question; and after this is once agreed vpon, then to examine whether opinion be the truest. For per∣chance it may fall out, that as the opinion for the im∣maculate conception of the Blessed Ʋirgin, before Scotus did oppose himselfe herein against S. Thomas and his followers, was scarse accounted probable, yet afterwards it was daily more and more embraced, so that it is now esteemed to be by farre the more true opinion, and as Alphonsus, Salmeronb 1.73, and Franciscusc 1.74 Suarez doe affirme, agreed vpon by the consent almost of the vninuersall Church, and of all Ecclesiasticall writers, Bishops, Religious Orders, and Ʋniuersities: And as that opinion, which holdeth, that the Pope can not dis∣pence in the solemne vow of Religious chastitie, nei∣ther in any lawfull marriage before it bee consum∣mate, is accounted by very many learned men to be the truer opinion, notwithstanding the practise of many Popes to the contrarie; So it may fall out, that in processe of time, this opinion, which denyeth the Popes power to depose Princes, may be accounted by the greatest number of learned men to be by farre the more true opinion, and may be agreed vpon by the consent almost of the Vniuersall Church, and of all Ecclesiasticall writers, Bishops, Religious Orders, and Vniuersities, notwithstanding the practise of ma∣ny

Popes, and the vehement opposition of the Iesuits at this present time to the contrarie.

80 Fourthly consider, how little beholding are English Catholikes to this my Aduersarie T. F., who will needs inforce them euen with the temporall o∣uerthrow of themselues, and of their whole posteri∣tie, to defend that doctrine to be of faith, which the State of France accounteth scandalous, seditious, dam∣nable and pernicious, and also endeauoureth to per∣swade his Maiestie, that no Catholike can, according to the grounds of Catholike Religion, be a true and loyall Subiect to his Maiestie, but at the Popes plea∣sure, or which is all one, so long onely as the Pope shall not depose him, which he may doe at his plea∣sure. But we haue great affiance in his Maiesties sin∣gular wisdome, and element disposition, whereof we haue had both by his Maiesties gracious Proclama∣tion, publike bookes, and effectuall deeds, sufficient tryall, that he will not be drawne by the false sugge∣stion of this my Aduersarie (who would haue all his Catholike Subiects to be of the same violent spirit as he is) to haue all his Catholike Subiects in the same degree of iealousie, but that he will euer make a di∣stinction betwixt them, who are his true hearted Subiects, and most loyall in all temporall affaires, and will aduenture all that they haue, and are, in defence of his Maiesties Royall Person and dignitie, against any sentence of depriuation whatsoeuer, which shall be denounced against him by the Pope (assuring themselues that it is conformable to the grounds of Catholike Religion which they professe, and not re∣pugnant to that spirituall obedience wherein they stand bound to the supreme Pastour of the Catholike Church) and those other Catholikes, who thinking it to be a point of faith, that the Pope hath authoritie to dethrone Soueraigne Princes, and to make tem∣porall Kings priuate men, will only defend his Ma∣iestie,

and yeeld him temporall obedience, vntill the Pope after his sentence of depriuation shall com∣mand them the contrarie.

81 But what small reliefe are English Catho∣likes to expect from M^r. Fitzherberts hands, if it were in his power to relieue them, you may (Catholike Countrymen) coniecture by this, that towards the end of Queene Elizabeth hir raigne (when those foure Reuerend Priests were at Rome to seeke redresse of Pope Clement the eight, to whom they and other of their brethren had appealed, for the manifold wrongs and slaunders wherewith they were charged both at home and abroad, at which time this my Aduersarie running from Cardinall to Cardinall to informe a∣gainst them, made no scruple of conscience to dis∣grace and slaunder them, as Schismatikes, Spies, Re∣bells, and disobedient persons to the See Apostolike &c. as now in his publike writings he handleth me) hee and some others vpon whom he depended, fearing lest that hir Maiestie should shew some fauour, and giue some sort of toleration to such hir Catholike Subiects, whom for their constant loyaltie she might securely trust (for out of hir Princely and mercifull disposition Shee had already shewed ouer great fa∣uour to those oppressed Priests, considering the pre∣sent lawes of the Realme made against them) had so little commiseration of the continuall calamities of distressed Catholikes, that he was not ashamed to ad∣uise then his Holinesse in a little Treatise, or Pamphlet written in Italian, that it was not good, or profitable to the Catholike cause, that any libertie or toleration of Religion should be granted by the State to the Catholikes of England.

82 And that this is most true hee can not for shame deny, and I haue also heard diuerse vertuous Priests, and Laymen, who were then at Rome, protest vpon their saluation, that they

did both see and reade the aforesaid Italian Pam∣phlet, affirming withall, that it was thought then by diuerse at Rome, that this my Aduersarie T. F. was in that businesse onely an agent and in∣strument for others, vpon whose command and becke hee wholly depended, who feared, least that if her Maiestie should haue granted vvhich they then greatly suspected, any toleration or mi∣tigation of the Law to those hir Catholike Sub∣iects, who would giue sufficient securitie of their true, vnfaigned, and constant loyaltie, it would haue beene the ready way to haue thrust all the Iesuites quite out of England. Now vvhat de∣signements this my Aduersarie can haue, and what construction you may make of such his pro∣ceedings, and whether hee sincerely intendeth so much your good, as his priuate ends, and of those vpon whom hee now dependeth, and how diligently you are to examine his words, deeds, and writings, who dare aduenture with such pal∣pable fraude to delude his Holinesse, his Maie∣stie, and your selues, as partly you haue seene in this his Preface, and more fully you shall see beneath, I leaue, Catholike Countreymen, to your prudent considerations.

83 Lastly, the applying of those words of the Apocalyps, I would thou wert either hot or cold, &c. to mee being but a slanderous calumnie affirmed without proofe, needeth no confutation. And with the same facilitie might Carerius, and the Ca∣nonists apply them to Cardinall Bellarmine and o∣thers of his Societie, for which cause hee calleth them wicked polititians, who are so luke warme, that they will not grant with the Canonists, that the Pope is not onely a spirituall, but also a temporall Lord of the whole Christian world. True it is that I am not of so fierie a spirit, as vnder pretence of zeale

to approue Gunpowder plots, or that desperate do∣ctrine, from whence such furious attempts doe pro∣ceede, neither vnder colour of feruent deuotion to attribute to the Pope an authoritie ouer the King∣domes, bodies, and liues of temporall Princes, which is not knowne to bee granted him by Christ, and which is more scalding, to brand those Catholikes with heresie that haue not the like feruour: Neither am I so cold as to deny either to Pope or Prince, that authoritie which is knowne to be due to them, all ex∣tremities I hate, virtue consisteth in a meane, nei∣ther to take from Caesar, and giue it to God, nor to take from God, and giue it to Caesar, but to render to God and Caesar, that which is their due.

84 And this shall suffice (Deare Countrimen) tou∣ching those aduertisement & considerations, which M^r. Fitzherbert hath giuen you concerning my do¦ctrine in generall, and therefore I will now passe by degrees to the examination of his Replyes to mee in particular, and I doubt not to discouer also herein so plainly his manifold frauds & falshods, that you haue iust cause not to hazard your consciences and whole estates vpon such his fraudulent words and writings, as partly you haue already seene in this his Preface, how vnsincerely and guilefully in euery one of his aduertisement and considerations hee hath procee∣ded, and more cleerely you shall see beneath in this Treatise, which Treatise to the end you may more plainely vnderstand the chiefe grounds of this con∣trouersie touching the Popes power to depose Prin∣ces, which is the maine question, as my Aduersarie confesseth, betwixt him and me and specially impug∣ned in the new oath of allegiance, I will deuide into three principall parts.

In the first I will set downe those Authors, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation to proue, that any Catholike might by reason of extrinsecall grounds,

and the authoritie of learned Catholikes probably per∣swade themselues, that the Pope hath not by Christ his institution any power to depose Princes, together with a confutation of the Replyes, which Card. Bellar∣mine masked vnder D. Schulkenius his name, to whom my Aduersarie here remitteth his English Reader, hath made against them.

In the second I will examine all the principall argu∣ments which Card. Bellarmine hath brought to proue the vnion and subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, which subordination my Aduersarie here supposeth to be a chiefe foundation, whereon the doctrine for the Popes Power to depose Princes doth depend, and also the Replyes which D. Sculckenius hath made to confirme the said pretended vnion and subordination.

In the third and last part I will discouer in particu∣lar the insufficiencie or M^r. Fitzherberts whole Reply, in the same manner, order, and number of Chap∣ters, which hee hath obserued in replying to my An∣sweres.

Notes

• a 1.1

  In the end of his Preface.
• b 1.2

  Lib. 6. defens. a cap. 2.
• c 1.3

  In the Prae∣face nu. 2.
• d 1.4

  Cap. 5. Apo∣logiae.
• e 1.5

  In his Pre∣face num. 3.
• f 1.6

  Num. 3.
• g 1.7

  Num 4. and 5.
• h 1.8

  Alexander Carerius.
• i 1.9

  Against Bar∣clay cap. 1. and in the Epistle Dedicatory of his Schulcke∣nius against me.
• k 1.10

  Num. 6.
• l 1.11

  In the end of his Preface.
• m 1.12

  Num. 78.79
• n 1.13

  In Cod. libert. Eccles. Galli••.
• o 1.14

  num. 10.
• p 1.15

  In Epist. De••••icat. & in Disp. Theolog. cap. 3. num. 1.
• q 1.16

  Num. 11.
• r 1.17

  Vbi supra.
• s 1.18

  Cap. 3 s•••• 3. num. 15.
• * 1.19

  Supplem. cap. 2. ••••o. 76. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• u 1.20

  In Pres. Resp. Ap••log. nu. 10.
• x 1.21

  Disp▪ Theo∣log. c••p: 10. s••••. ••.
• y 1.22

  In the Ad∣ioinder num: 106. & seq.
• z 1.23

  Num: 7 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• a 1.24

  Cap. 10 s••••.
• b 1.25

  De varia•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Rom: Pont: lib. 4.
• c 1.26

  1••.2••. disp. 62. cap: 4.
• d 1.27

  Num: 81. 82.
• e 1.28

  Cap. 10 sec. 2.
• s 1.29

  Num. 12.
• h 1.30

  Nu. 15.
• i 1.31

  Dan 6.
• k 1.32

  Num. 17.
• l 1.33

  S••e Supplem. chap. 2. num. 76. 77.
• m 1.34

  Disput. The∣olog. cap. 10. sec. 2. num. 7. vsque ad num. 21.
• n 1.35

  1a. 2a. disp. 62. cap. 1. nu. 1.
• o 1.36

  Ibidem num. 26.
• p 1.37

  Vbi supra disp. 79 cap. 1. & disp. 86.
• q 1.38

  Cap. 2. num. 76. 77.
• r 1.39

  Cap. 15. nu. 6. 7. 8.
• s 1.40

  Ibidem num. 9. 11. 12.
• t 1.41

  Infra chap. 13. num. 1.
• u 1.42

  1. Top: cap. 1.
• x 1.43

  Verbo opinio nu: 2.
• y 1.44

  cap: 10. sec. 2. nu: 21.
• z 1.45

  cap: 3. sec: 3. nu: 14.
• a 1.46

  in Manuali cap: 27. num. 288.
• * 1.47

  Maior de au∣ctorit: Ecclesiae circa finem. Almainus de authorit: Eccle∣siae cap: 7. Card: Came∣rac. de autho∣rit. Eccles. part. 3. cap: 4. Gerson in li∣bello contra Petrum de Lu∣na. artic: 22. & alibi.
• b 1.48

  Cap: 10. sec: 2.
• c 1.49

  In Chron: monast: Hir∣saug: ad annum 1106.
• d 1.50

  De dominio nat: civ: & Eccles. in pro∣ba••: 2. concl.
• e 1.51

  in Cod. libert. Eccles. Gallic.
• f 1.52

  Cap: 10. sec. 2. num. 32.
• g 1.53

  In the third part, chap. 9. and the rest.
• h 1.54

  In cap. Nouit de Iudicijs no∣tab. 3. nu. 84.
• * 1.55

  Num. 25. & seq.
• * 1.56

  Apoc. 3.
• i 1.57

  In the Ad∣monition to the Reader before my English Pur∣gation sent to his Holinesse.
• k 1.58

  De regulis Iuris in 6••.
• l 1.59

  Cap. 15. ad nu. 468. pag. 629. & pag. 633. ad nu. 470.
• m 1.60

  Lib. 7. de instit. q. 3. ar. 2.
• n 1.61

  Tom. 1. lib 2. Instit. cap. 18.
• o 1.62

  Dis. 1. sec. 9. de Legibus.
• p 1.63

  Prima secun∣dae disp. 65. cap.
• q 1.64

  Disp. 66. ca. 7
• r 1.65

  De Regulis Iuris in sexto.
• s 1.66

  ff. De regulis Iuris regula 170. In pari causa &c.
• t 1.67

  De Iustitia tract. 2. Disp. 12.
• u 1.68

  Tract. 2. de Instit. disp. 14.
• x 1.69

  Lib. 2. cap. 3. dub. 11.
• y 1.70

  3 part. q. 40. mem. 5. q. 4.
• z 1.71

  Psal. 26.
• a 1.72

  Cap. 6. sec. 3.
• b 1.73

  in Rom: 5. Disp: 51. § de∣inde.
• c 1.74

  Tom. 2. Disp: 3. sec. 5.