The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.

Of Truth, and of a Lie: which place is treated of In Iudges 3. and also In 1. Sam. 21, verse 12.

* 1.1 28 Now let vs treat of another question; namelie, whether it be lawfull for a good and godlie man to lie. But before I speake of a lie, I thinke best to speake somewhat of truth; which doubtlesse is an excellent vertue. * 1.2 Truth (as saith Tullie in his booke De inuentione) is that, where∣by things which are, haue béene, and shall be, are spoken without alteration. Wherein we will first note, that it consisteth in words: for he saith, that they are spoken. Not that I am ignorant, but that dumbe men, and others, doo sometimes speake by signes. * 1.3 But bicause (as saith Augu∣stine in his first booke De doctrina christiana) a∣mong other signes, words are the principall and most plaine. Further, we be taught hereby, that truth is not onelie to be considered as tou∣ching one difference of time; but as touching thrée differences. For he saith, that both those things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be. These things be then spoken trulie, when they be set foorth without alteration; that is, e∣uen as they are, and by speaking made neither more ample, nor lesse than they be. The verie selfe-same thing in a maner hath Augustine said, in his booke De vera religione, * 1.4 the 36. chap∣ter, where he writeth; that Truth is, whereby that which is, is signified. And it is a vertue; * 1.5 bi∣cause by it men are made prone and readie to speake that, which is true.

If thou demand what is the generall word of truth; It is equalitie: wherevnto is ioined, * 1.6 for difference sake; namelie, of words, about the things which are signified. And as it is well knowne to all men, all vertues doo aime at the meane, and eschew extremities. Wherefore, * 1.7 in the kind of speaking, thou shalt perceiue two faults; namelie, if thou speake more than the thing will permit, or lesse than the thing is. Nei∣ther is vertue content onelie with the meane: for we must adde circumstances, which vse com∣monlie to followe it. So as the truth must not alwaies be spoken to euerie man, neither at all times, nor yet of euerie thing: and yet we must not lie. But it is wisedome sometime to kéepe secret those things, which for iust cause we will not haue known. He, which should vaunt abroad euerie-where, and to all men, the gifts of God giuen vnto him; should be counted foolish and fond. As contrariewise, he which should boast of a crime, whereinto by mans infirmitie he hath fallen, ought iustlie and woorthilie to be reproo∣ued. Wherefore, truth requireth, * 1.8 that what we haue within vs, as touching our sense and will, that should prudentlie be signified by vs as it is. Further, the vertue, whereof we speake, hath simplicitie most of all ioined with it: and it is verie contrarie vnto doublenesse.

Besides this, it is a part of iustice: for both vnto things it giueth the proper words; and vn∣to a neighbour the truth which is due vnto him: without the which, mans fellowship cannot stand. For, if a man should continuallie suspect himselfe to be deceiued by anie man, he would neuer giue anie credit vnto him: by meanes whereof, all trades and societies among men would decaie. Aristotle, in his Ethiks, * 1.9 affir∣meth; that Truth declineth somewhat toward the defect; especiallie when anie man speaketh of himselfe. For this wisedome requireth, that a man boast not of himselfe. Wherevpon Paule, in his second epistle to the Corinthians and twelfe chapter, wrote; If I will boast of my selfe, * 1.10 I shall not be vnwise, but I will forbeare, lest anie man

should thinke of me more than that he seeth in me, or that he heareth of me. By these words he reprooueth them as foolish and vnwise, which doo boast and glorie, euen of those good things, which they haue: and he saith, that he will absteine from it. Neither (saith he) doo I require, that anie man should thinke more of me, than either he séeth in me, * 1.11 or heareth of me. And he, which spea∣keth lesse of himselfe, than he is, is not strait∣waie to be accused as a lier. For that, which is the more, comprehendeth and conteineth in it the lesse. For whosoeuer hath fiftie, he may true∣lie saie that he hath twentie; although he spea∣keth not of all that he hath. Howbeit, if the same man should affirme, that he hath but twentie onelie; or else should denie that he hath anie at all, * 1.12 out of doubt he should lie: the which must not be committed, either for modestie sake, or (as they saie) for humilitie.

29 Concerning testimonies out of the holie scriptures, which doo stir vs vp to speake the truth; doubtlesse verie manie might be alled∣ged: but a few shall suffice. In the ten comman∣dements, * 1.13 it is written; Thou shalt not beare false witnesse. Which commandement must be obserued, not onelie in iudgement, but in all things, which in our talke we testifie, to be either true or false. Moreouer, God is set before our eies to be followed; * 1.14 whom the scriptures in eue∣rie place pronounce to be true. Wherefore we also ought to be most feruent louers of the truth. * 1.15 And for that cause Iethro, in the 18. chap∣ter of Exodus, counselled Moses to set such men to be rulers ouer the people, as did feare God, men of courage, louers of the truth, and those, which hated couetousnesse. * 1.16 Also Dauid saith; Be∣hold, thou hast loued truth, and therefore thou hast made me to vnderstand wisdome in the in∣ward and secret parts of my mind. These things sufficientlie declare, that we are taught of God both by inward inspiration, and also by out∣ward doctrine; bicause he is a louer of the truth: neither dooth he suffer, that his children should either erre, or be deceiued by lies. In Zacharie, the eight chapter, * 1.17 it is written; Speake ye the truth euerie man to his neighbour. Which selfe-same sentence Paule vseth to the Ephesians: * 1.18 and he commandeth the same to the Colossians. But in the latter epistle to the Corinthians, * 1.19 he saith of himselfe, and of the other apostles, that they can haue nothing against the truth. Yea and the Scribes and Pharisies, being ioined with the Herodians, on this wise flattered Christ (whom they went about to intrap in his spéech;) Maister, * 1.20 we knowe that thou acceptest no per∣sons, yea thou teachest the waie of God in truth. Hereby they declared, that it is a singular ver∣tue for a noble and notable man, to prefer the truth before all things. But let these testimo∣nies of the holie scriptures be sufficient at this time.

30 It remaineth, * 1.21 that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, * 1.22 who wrote thereof to Con∣sentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signifi∣cation of the spéech. And vndoubtedlie, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contra∣rie position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrarie to that, which Tullie affir∣med of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be, are said to be vnaltered. And a lie is that, where∣by is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrarie. This vice is so hurtfull, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to reioise, and be glad in falsehood. The generall word of truth, is equalitie; * 1.23 and the generall of this vice, inequalitie. And as truth is verie néere ioined with simplicitie, so a lie belongeth to doublenesse. Truth is a part of iustice, but a lie is a part of iniustice. By truth, the societie of man is preserued; but by lieng, it is hurt and ouerthrowne. But returne we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceiue speaketh that, which is false: & that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liers speake another thing than they haue in their mind. But the desire to deceiue is vtterlie against iustice, loue, and ami∣tie; which we mutuallie owe one towards ano∣ther. So then there be thrée things in a lie; first, * 1.24 to speake that which is false; secondlie, his will in speaking; and thirdlie, a desire to deceiue. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts perteine vnto the forme.

31 A lie is distinguished into an officious lie, a sporting lie, and a pernicious lie. * 1.25 And this diuision commeth of no other thing, but of the ef∣fects, or of the ends. For this is euermore true, that the ends themselues may haue the nature both of the cause, and of the effect: séeing lies doo either profit, or delite, or else hurt. The end of a pernicious lie, is to hurt; the end of a sporting lie, is to delite; and the end of an officious lie, is to profit. But, forsomuch as in vertue, * 1.26 Aristotle hath respect chéeflie vnto the meane, if then in speaking thou excéed that meane, * 1.27 he calleth it boasting: but if thou come short, he nameth it dissimulation or mocking. And in this euill, that most of all hurteth; bicause an euill or false opi∣nion is ingendred in the mind of our neighbor. For which cause it séemeth, that the same Aristo∣tle said well; that Lieng is a wicked thing, * 1.28 and must be auoided. Which we may prooue by te∣stimonies of the holie scriptures. For herevnto belong all those things, which we rehearsed be∣fore, for prouoking of vs to speake the truth. And there be manie other places dispersed here and there, which detest lieng. Dauid saith; * 1.29 Thou shalt

destroie all those which speake lies. * 1.30 There be rea∣sons also, which persuade the same: whereof one is, * 1.31 that in a lie there is an abuse of signes. And for so much as it is not lawfull to abuse the gifts of GOD: a lie also is vnderstood to be forbidden.

Moreouer, as it is before said; a lie is enimie vnto the societie of man. For in lieng, the vn∣derstanding of the mind is not communicated vnto our brethren; but lies. Wherefore, séeing by nature man is made vnto societie and com∣munication, when he speaketh that which is false, he striueth against his owne nature. And (as Augustine saith; * 1.32 ) Faith héerein is harmed, bicause he which heareth, beléeueth those things which are spoken. Wherefore, that faith, which he giueth vnto others words, is made void: and so notable a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And to conclude, euerie man by lieng looseth his owne credit; for being taken in a lie, he shall be euer after suspected of it. Wherefore, though he would, he shall not be able, by admonition or correction, to helpe his neighbour. So the fault that is in a lie, not onelie respecteth the losse or hurt of our neighbour, but it is in it of his owne kind: as manifestlie appéereth by that, which we haue alreadie said. * 1.33 But among lies, that sée∣meth to be most heinous, which is in matter of religion, doctrine, and godlinesse: for in no other thing can guile be more hurtfull and pernicious. For if we shall erre therein, we be cast from e∣uerlasting felicitie. Wherefore Augustine, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, hath verie well written; that They indéed sinne gréeuouslie, which deceiue trauelling men, in shewing them a contrarie waie. But they be much more de∣testable, which in lieng about matters of reli∣gion, doo bring men into error.

32 If the thrée kinds of lies should be compa∣red togither, I meane the pernicious lie, the sporting lie, and the officious lie; the pernicious lie should iustlie be counted the more detestable. Bicause in it are two euils: one is, the abuse of signes; * 1.34 an other is, the hurt of our neighbour, and that both of the mind that is deceiued (which is common to all lies,) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they be not without fault; yet is the same fault much diminished by the benefit either of delight, or of supplie of the helpe. * 1.35 And indéed, a sporting lie hath in it but a small and slender nature of a lie: for so much as the falshood is straitwaie found out, neither can it be long hidden from the hea∣rers. * 1.36 Yea Augustine writeth, that such lies are not to be counted for lies. But as touching an officious lie, * 1.37 the iudgement thereof is more hard and obscure; séeing some denie it to be sinne: for they saie it hath a respect vnto helping of our neighbour, whom we ought in woords and déeds to reléeue as much as we can. So as they thinke that therein is no abuse of the signes: forsomuch as all our dooings ought to haue respect to the commoditie of our brethren. Neither doo they thinke, that therin is offense committed against mans societie: bicause through this kind of lie, men are made safe, and kept harmelesse.

Further, they saie, that whereas it is written in the holie scriptures; * 1.38 that God will destroie all those that speake lies: the same is not to be vnderstood of euerie kind of lie; but of a pernici∣ous lie onelie. Which Augustine also, in his En∣chiridion, the 18. chapter, séemeth to grant. They alledge also the opinion of Plato, * 1.39 in his booke De Repub. who, as he did fraie the common people from lies; yet he gaue magistrates libertie to lie: especiallie in making of lawes. But in my iudgement, the thing is farre otherwise. Neither can I easilie grant, that an officious lie is with∣out the abuse of the signes. For Aristotle, * 1.40 in his booke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in defining of words, saith; that They are notes of those affections, which we haue in our mind. Whereby it followeth, that all they abuse words, which signifie things to be o∣therwise, than they thinke in their mind. Fur∣ther, that reason, which they bring of loue, is verie weake. For we ought to helpe our neighbours; but that must be by iust and honest meanes: o∣therwise we will suffer our selues to steale, to the intent to bestowe it in giuing of almes. But the sentence of the apostle must stand fast, which is; that Euill must not be doone, * 1.41 to the intent that good may come thereof. Neither doo I thinke it to be true, that by those kind of lies, the societie of man is not hurt: séeing that, if fideli∣tie be taken awaie, there remaineth no dealing of one man with an other.

33 But as touching that sentence of the ho∣lie scriptures, wherein it is said; Thou shalt de∣stroie all them that speake lies: we grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not vniuersal∣lie spoken. For, so long as the strength of our faith, and ioining togither with Christ indureth; so long those sinnes are not imputed: which o∣therwise of their owne nature would be our de∣struction. And this also I may easilie grant tou∣ching officious and sporting lies: bicause they are not so much against charitie, as pernicious lies be. But this no man can denie, but that in making of a lie, we deale against faith. And we must wholie grant, that he which lieth, dooth loose his owne credit thereby: so that afterward he cannot profitablie admonish, reprooue, or fruit∣fullie giue counsell, as he ought to doo. For they, which heare him, will soone thinke that he lieth officiouslie; to call them againe into the waie, and not that the thing is so in verie déed.

Certeinlie, this was the cause that Augustine was against Ierom, who in a maner fathered an

officious lie vpon the holie scriptures: If this (saith he) should be so, the authoritie of the holie scriptures would soone be impaired; for the rea∣ders thereof would soone saie, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written for the kéeping of men in their dutie. Neither ought the authoritie of Plato to mooue vs much; * 1.42 séeing in that place he erred greatlie, granting, that in things per∣teining to GOD, they might feine fables, which should serue to bring foorth and kéepe a good opi∣nion of them. Doubtles we must not ieast in di∣uine matters. Further, the lawe of God is e∣quall, and euermore one: and as it will not haue the common people to lie; so dooth it also forbid the same to magistrates. Howbeit, they cannot iustlie be accused of a lie, which in their talke be farre from double meaning. For other∣while it commeth to passe, that some speake that which is false; and yet they thought the same to be true. * 1.43 Among which men they also are to be ex∣cused, who haue giuen a promise to doo a thing; which afterward they be not able to performe: bicause at the beginning, when they promised it, they were fullie minded to doo that, which they had promised: and therefore they haue not lied. If they afterward doo not accomplish those things, which they spake, the same happeneth by some other occasion.

And otherwhile it commeth to passe, that he which deliuereth his sword to a man to kéepe, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he that hath the custodie of the sword, ought not to redeliuer it vnto him; bicause (as the lawiers saie) a new case requireth a new helpe. * 1.44 After the verie same sort is Paule excused, who said, that he would go into Spaine; when as neuerthelesse he went not thither. * 1.45 Paule also promised to the Corinthi∣ans, that he would come vnto them; which he performed not, but yet he lied not: bicause, when he spake those words, he was minded so to doo: but God had otherwise appointed it, as Gelasius hath well written, as we find in the 22. cause, question the second, in the chapter Beatus. Vn∣doubtedlie, the disposition of God breaketh and dissolueth all bonds: as it is written in the 19. cause, question the second, chapter Duae sunt.

34 But what shall we saie touching the hy∣perbolicall spéeches, which are in the holie scrip∣tures, which at the first sight séeme to be lies? I answer, that although there in signification the sentence kéepe not a meane in respect of quanti∣tie; yet, as touching the maner, it dooth. For those excessiue spéeches amplifie a matter, bi∣cause their nature is not onelie to set foorth a thing, but also to lead men into an admiration, which by that maner of spéech they most commo∣diouslie atteine vnto. Neither haue lies anie place there, forsomuch as they bréed not in the the minds of the readers and hearers anie false or corrupt sense. A meane therefore must there be kept; vndoubtedlie, not of the thing, but of the maner. The euangelists also are not to be holden as liers, when as they, setting foorth the acts of Christ, doo not all vse the selfe same words. For it is sufficient vnto the truth, that a thing be set foorth as it was: but it is not required to be expressed by the selfe same words. Yea, it is oftentimes doone through the goodnesse of the holie Ghost, that the maner of the narration should differ. For by such meanes, those things, which are not sufficientlie expressed by one, are more plainelie shewed by an other.

35 But they vse to obiect the midwiues of the Hebrues, which although they lied, * 1.46 yet God rewarded them. * 1.47 The same also happened to Ra∣hab the harlot, or vitler. Augustine answereth, * 1.48 that it was not the lie which the midwiues made, but the faith and feare that they had to∣wards God, and the mercie shewed vnto the Is∣raelits, that pleased the Lord: which the holie hi∣storie by expresse words dooth testifie. And no o∣therwise must we thinke of Rahab. * 1.49 But I ne∣uer like of the opinion of Gregorie, who saith; that for the lie which they made, their eternall reward was turned to a temporall reward: bi∣cause it is said, that God, for their euerlasting blessednesse, builded them houses. But I iudge, that by reason of the true faith, which was effec∣tuall in them, in such sort, as it brought foorth in them both loue and the feare of God, (which be lawfull and iust fruits of that faith) the lie, which they made through infirmitie, béereaued them not of eternall felicitie.

36 Abraham also is obiected, who said, * 1.50 that Sara was his sister. Howbeit, therein (as Augu∣stine teacheth) he lied not: he told that which was true, but yet he spake not all the truth. And that is of no man required, to vtter all that he knoweth to be true. He did not saie that she was his wife: yet, bicause she was his kinswoman, he might (according to the maner of the He∣brues) truelie saie that she was his sister. Not∣withstanding, he séemeth not to be holden alto∣gither excused: for although he lied not in cal∣ling of hir sister; yet it appéereth that therein he fell, bicause, by not reuealing that she was his wife, he put hir in danger of loosing hir chastitie; sith he lest hir void of that helpe, whereby one∣lie she might haue béene defended from falling into the loue of strangers. Neither is it néedfull, that I should indeuour to excuse Abraham alto∣gither: for he was a man, and by too muth feare might easilie doo amisse. Howbeit, * 1.51 Augustine mentioneth; that Abraham was then in dan∣ger two maner of waies: the one, least he should be killed him selfe; the other, the adulte∣rie of his wife. The first he might shun, in cal∣ling

hir his sister: the other; namelie, least she should be polluted, he was not able to repell. For although he had said that he was hir hus∣band, that would not haue serued, to deliuer hir from the shamefull lusts of the Aegyptians. Wherefore, that which he himselfe was not able to shun, he committed vnto God: and in that, which was in his owne power, he would not tempt him. This séemeth to be the iudgement of Augustine. But what I iudge, I haue before de∣clared.

37 But did not the same Abraham lie, when he said vnto his seruants; * 1.52 Tarrie here, and we will returne vnto you: when neuerthelesse he was minded to sacrifice his sonne? Which if he had doone, he might not haue returned, hauing his sonne with him; but should haue returned alone without him. Iacob also by expresse words lied, * 1.53 when he said vnto his father; I am Esau thy sonne. Paule also (as it is written in the Acts) saith, that he knew him not to be the chéefe priest, which commanded him to be striken; when for all that (as Augustine testifieth in his sermon of the Centurions sonne, and as it is written in the 23. cause, question the first, chap∣ter Paratus) he knew him well enough. Paule (saith he) was brought vp among the Iewes, he had learned the lawe at the féet of Gamaliel: wherefore he verie well knew the chéefe priest from other men. * 1.54 Iehu also lied manifestlie, when he said, * 1.55 that he would worship Baal. Augustine writeth, that there be two kinds of men menti∣oned in the holie scriptures. For that there were some so perfect, as although they were not without sinne, yet we may not rashlie iudge euill of them; but rather séeke how we may de∣fend those things, which in their works haue a shew of sinne. They oftentimes were so mooued by the holie Ghost, that God by their words and acts might make certeine secrets knowne. And so we must beléeue, that oftentimes they both spake and did certeine things by prophesie. So Abraham, when he said; We will returne vnto you, prophesied vnwares, that which shuld come to passe: for he safelie returned from the moun∣taine with Isaac.

And Iacob, in saieng; I am Esau, ment to de∣clare nothing else, but that he was the man, to whom the degrée, blessing, and dignitie was due: which séemed to perteine vnto Esau, who was the first borne. Paule also prophesied, what should at the length become of the high priest; namelie, that as a painted wall, and a thing al∣togither feigned and hypocriticall, he should be taken awaie. Further (saith Augustine) there were other men, not so perfect, but were euill; which are spoken of in the old testament, either to haue lied; or else to haue doone some thing, that might séeme to be sinne. But he thinketh, that we should not so greatlie indeuor to defend the good name and opinion of those men. Of this sort of men was Iehu: for although that mur∣ther, which he executed vpon Achab, and his fa∣milie, and also his wéeding out of Baal, and the worshippers thereof, pleased God: yet neuerthe∣lesse, he was a wicked king; neither forsooke he the worshipping of golden calues. Wherefore it shall be lawfull to confesse, that in lieng he committed sinne. But in my iudgement (and as I noted before) by this onelie distinction we may easilie dissolue this doubt; namelie, * 1.56 that those men were stirred vp to lie, either by the spirit of man, or by the motion of God. When they did it as men, we will not denie, but that they sinned: but when they spake so by the inspi∣ration of God, we maruell at their saiengs and dooings. But we will not take it as an example and president to followe.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Of truth.
• * 1.2

  What is truth. Cicero.
• * 1.3

  Augustine.
• * 1.4

  Augustine.
• * 1.5

  Truth is a vertue.
• * 1.6

  The gene∣rall word of truth.
• * 1.7

  Two faults in speeches.
• * 1.8

  What thing truth requi∣reth.
• * 1.9

  Aristotle.
• * 1.10

  2. Cor. 12, 6.
• * 1.11

  He that speaketh lesse of him∣selfe than he hath, li∣eth not.
• * 1.12

  We must not lie for humilitie sake.
• * 1.13

  Exo. 20, 16.
• * 1.14

  Rom. 3, 4.
• * 1.15

  verse. 21.
• * 1.16

  Psal. 51, 8.
• * 1.17

  verse. 16.
• * 1.18

  Ephes. 4, 25. Col. 3, 9.
• * 1.19

  2. Cor. 3, 8.
• * 1.20

  Matt. 22, 16.
• * 1.21

  Of a lie.
• * 1.22

  Augustine.
• * 1.23

  Inequalitie the generall word of a lie.
• * 1.24

  Three things incident to a lie.
• * 1.25

  The distin∣ction of a lie.
• * 1.26

  Aristotle.
• * 1.27

  Looke In 2. Sam. 16, verse 33.
• * 1.28

  A lie is wicked and must be shunned.
• * 1.29

  Psal. 5, 6.
• * 1.30

  Psal. 5, 6.
• * 1.31

  In a lie is an abuse of signes.
• * 1.32

  Augustine.
• * 1.33

  What kind of lie is most gree∣uous.
• * 1.34

  In a perni∣cious lie are two e∣uils.
• * 1.35

  A sporting lie.
• * 1.36

  Augustine.
• * 1.37

  Whether a s•…•…ssable lie be sinne.
• * 1.38

  Psal. 5, 6.
• * 1.39

  Plato.
• * 1.40

  Aristotle.
• * 1.41

  Rom. 3, 8.
• * 1.42

  Plato in an error.
• * 1.43

  Who are to be excused of a lie.
• * 1.44

  Rom. 15, 24 and 28.
• * 1.45

  2. Cor. 1, 15.
• * 1.46

  Exod. 1, 19.
• * 1.47

  Iosua. 2, 5.
• * 1.48

  Augustine.
• * 1.49

  Gregorie.
• * 1.50

  Looke In Gen. 12. at the end, and 19. 8. Gen. 12, 13.
• * 1.51

  Augustine.
• * 1.52

  Gen. 22, 5. Looke In Gen. 27, 19.
• * 1.53

  Gen. 27, 19.
• * 1.54

  2. Kin. 10. 18
• * 1.55

  Augustine. Two kinds of men.
• * 1.56

  Note a di∣stinction.