citeth a verse out of
Accius an old Poet; Hast thou broken thy faith? Atreus, whom he bringeth in to speake, answereth; Neither haue I giuen neither doo I giue my faith to anie faith∣lesse person.
But this is no sure rule at all times. For if one be wicked, and false of promise: yet oughtest not thou for that cause to shrinke from thy pro∣mises; séeing God dooth oftentimes kéepe pro∣mise euen with vs that doo euill. He promised, that he would continue the kingdome, or else some great honour in the familie of
Dauid, euen vnto Messias. He promised that he would giue a sonne which should redéeme mankind. Men vndoubtedlie were euill, vnfaithfull, and vn∣worthie to haue the promises kept with them: yet did he performe these things to them, accor∣ding to his excellent faithfulnes. Some answer on this wise, that faith in déed must be kept with an euill and vnfaithfull man, if he be vnfaithfull towards other, so he be no such towards vs; or else, if he doo hurt vs, so it be not in the selfe same thing, wherein it was agréed vpon betwéene vs. Naie rather, if he faile euen in the verie same thing which is agréed vpon, yet must we kéepe promise: if by that meanes, neither his naugh∣tinesse be increased; nor a greater power to doo hurt be giuen vnto him. We be therefore loosed of our promise, if the thing cannot be, which we haue promised; or else, if it should fall out ill vn∣to himselfe, to whom the promise is made: as if thou deliuer a sword vnto a furious man, which thou didst promise vnto a man of sobrietie; or if he wax woorse and woorse, as though, through thy patience, he meaneth to reape a benefit of his vnfaithfulnesse: or else, if thou shalt promise such a thing, as is against the word of God, or the pro∣fit of the Church or Common-weale. Therfore it is written in the 22. cause, question second; In euill promises breake thy faith.
But most of all, we be at libertie of our pro∣mise, if we being circumuented by anie fraud, haue promised anie thing that we ought not to haue doone; or else, if the things themselues be now changed. Some haue added; If thou being compelled either by force or feare, dooest promise anie thing that thou wouldest not. But it can scarselie be perceiued, how so great a feare and compulsion can happen vnto a couragious and good man, that he should promise that, which might be against either his dutie, or the word of God. Howbeit, if a man be fallen in such wise, he is at libertie. But aboue all, we must take héed, that we doo not craftilie colour our promises, and séeke by fraud and counterfet meanes to vnwind our selues out: séeing fraud (as Cicero verie rightlie said) dooth not vndoo periurie, but it tieth it fast.
Dauid, when as perhaps he might haue inuented manie things to breake his pro∣mises; yet would he doo no such thing. For be∣ing a godlie prince, he was rather minded to followe truth and faithfulnesse.
43 Certeinlie, the nature and considerati∣on of these two vertues; [namelie, truth and faith] is both alike, yet is it not altogither the selfe-same: wherein they doo agree, and how they differ, I will in few words declare.
Truth is a vertue, whereby we are readie to speake those things, which the meanings and cogitations of our mind doo expresse: for hereby, bicause we speake those things which we thinke, are we cal∣led faithfull and true of our word. And faith is a vertue, whereby is brought to passe, that our déeds be answerable to our promises. There is some conformitie on both parts. In truth there is a conformitie of words with the mea∣ning of the mind, and in faith a conformitie of déeds with promises. So as lieng is contrarie vnto truth, and falsehood vnto faith. For Cicero thinketh; that Faith is so called, bicause that is doone which is spoken. And he defined the same after a sort on this maner;
Faith is a con∣stancie of words and of couenants. In ano∣ther place he saith, that Faith is the truth of a mans word.
But thus the definition will be more full; Faith is a good habit, according to right reason, whereby we are readie to doo those things that we haue promised. This definition (as I haue said) is more perfect, and it consisteth of a gene∣rall word, and of a difference. For faith apper∣teineth vnto iustice, and it causeth vs to yéeld vnto euerie man, that which perteineth to him; séeing what thou shalt promise to anie man, that is now become his, to whom thou hast promised. And the same vnlesse thou performe in time, thou withholdest that, which is another mans. And so great is the force of faith, as it compre∣hendeth in one all the parts of mans life: bi∣cause neither matrimonie, neither the bargains which citizens haue among themselues, neither anie part of the Common-weale can consist without faith. It differeth (as I said) from truth, although with the same it hath manie things that be like. The matter of truth is infinite: for all things that we speake, are either true or false; whether they be past, whether they be present, or whether they be to come. But faith hath to doo onelie in promises: neuerthelesse, those pro∣mises must be of the thing that is good; and not of that, which is euill, or a hinderance to good: otherwise they ought not to be firme.
Wherefore, faith should haue the verie same companions ioined therewith, that an oth hath; namelie, truth, righteousnesse, and iudgement. So as he, that breaketh his prom••se, dooth not onelie sinne in so dooing; but he must also make amends for the hinderance, which through his