The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.

5 But to followe some order herein; first let vs search whether there be anie prouidence, or no; secondlie, what it is; thirdlie, whether all things be subiect vnto it; fourthlie, whether it can be changed; and lastlie, whether it may a∣bide anie casualtie of things. But before I come to the purpose, let vs speake somewhat as tou∣ching the signification of the names thereof. Wherefore among the Grecians a thing that commeth by chance is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.1 which is of such sort, as both it may be, and it may not be: and whether it be or be not, there is no ab∣surditie, either against reason, or against the word of God. It is distinguished into 3. parts; of which the first is called by the Grecians 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, bicause it inclineth equallie as much one waie as another. The second 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which for the most part vseth to happen after this maner or after that, but yet may otherwise come to passe. The third is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, bicause it falleth out but seldome, and not vsu∣allie. The philosophers assigne two grounds or beginnings of chance, one in the matter, * 1.2 the which as it lighteth vpon diuers and sundrie ac∣tiue causes, so it receiueth a diuers and sundrie forme; the other in the will, whereby our acti∣ons are gouerned: now the will hath conside∣ration of the matter, bicause it is directed and

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forced by the vnderstanding. Augustine in his booke of questions, * 1.3 quest. 31. saith, Wisedome is by the philosophers diuided into thrée parts; namelie, into vnderstanding, memorie, and pro∣uidence: and that memorie is referred vnto things past, vnderstanding to things present; and that he is prouident, * 1.4 which through the consi∣deration of things past, and things present, can determine what will afterward come to passe. But God, not onelie vnderstandeth and séeth what will come to passe, but he also addeth a will vnto the same. For wée affirme not onelie a bare vnderstanding to be in God, but an ef∣fectuall will also, whereby he ruleth and go∣uerneth all things. * 1.5 This of the Gretians is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, Prouidence. And Cicero in his booke De natura deorum, nameth it An old soothsaieng wife of the Stoiks; who was of such account among them in old time, as in the Isle of Delos, she was woorshipped euen for a Goddesse, * 1.6 bicause she helped Latona at hir child-bearing. But that fable signifieth nothing else, but that second causes, although they haue some force in themselues, yet they bring nothing to passe without the prouidence of God. For Latona, is nature; and prouidence the midwife: so that vnlesse this latter be pre∣sent, doo helpe, and as it were plaie the midwifs part, the other bringeth foorth nothing.

6 But now, as touching those fiue points, which at the beginning I determined to in∣treat of seuerallie. In the first place, I propound to my selfe, * 1.7 that there is a prouidence: which thing may be prooued by manie sure and inuin∣cible arguments. For first, séeing that God is the author and creator of all things, and that he can doo nothing vnaduisedlie, but that with him∣selfe he hath his owne certeine and assured rea∣sons, therefore of necessitie there is a proui∣dence. For if there be no artificer, but that hée séeth the reasons and ends of his worke, and con∣ceiueth the waies by which he may bring the same to his purposed ends; it were a madnes not to attribute that vnto God the chéefe worke∣man, whome the holie scriptures not onlie teach to be the creator of all things, but as it were a potter. Chrysostome in the 19. Homilie vpon the epistle to the Ephesians saith, that If a ship, though it be sound and well rigged, can not brooke the seas without a good maister or gouer∣nour; how much lesse can the whole workeman∣ship of the world stand without the care and go∣uernment of God? For if a maister-worke∣man will not begin to build, before he haue de∣uised in his mind all the parts, fashions, and fourmes of the building; shall we thinke, that God hath rashlie, without counsell, or reason, made all things vniuersallie? Vndoubtedlie, the heauenlie spheares, the stars, the firmament, the aire, the water, the heate, the cold, so manie causes and changes of things contrarie and re∣pugnant one to another, would fall to ruine, vn∣lesse they were susteined by some gouernour. Without care and prouidence, our bodie might not be defended from the rigor of the heauen. We call those prouident men, which being of such excellent iudgement and disposition, doo kéepe all the parts of their bodie in their proper office and dutie. But God hath the same place in the world, that the mind hath in man. Be∣sides this, the holie scriptures ascribe vnto God the destructions of kingdoms, and prophesies, and miracles, which things doo far passe the com∣pas of our nature. And last of all, they attribute vnto him the generall iudgement, wherein God will one daie render to euerie man according to their works. Wherefore we, being induced by these, and manie more reasons, doo conclude that there is a prouidence. For we passe not for the Epicureans, whose maner of spéech is this;

* 1.8 Euen so the powers on high, With labours toile are prest, The care whereof which on them lie, Bereaue them of their rest.

And this also; God walketh vpon the poles of heauen, and considereth not the affaires of men. These monstruous opinions haue they bred, partlie for that they being of grosse wit, could not perceiue higher things; and partlie being of a shamefull and abhominable life, would de∣uise for themselues this consolation, least they should be perpetuallie tormented with the feare of punishments. For, He that liueth wickedlie, * 1.9 abhorreth the light. And children, when they haue done a fault, would not haue either their father to be at home, or the maister in the schoole. And as touching the first part, these things vn∣doubtedlie should be sufficient for Christians, who are perswaded onelie by the word of God, without other reason, that there is a prouidence.

7 But what prouidence is, we shall easilie vnderstand by the definition of the same. * 1.10 Pro∣uidence is the power of God, whereby he direc∣teth all things, and bringeth them to their [ap∣pointed] ends. In this definition, the generall word is power. Assuredlie, God is most abso∣lute, yet for our capacitie sake, we saie that there is in him two maner of powers, to wit, the pow∣er of vnderstanding, & the power of willing. For God vnderstandeth and séeth all things; and not this onelie, but he also willeth all things. Héere I will make no néedles disputation, whe∣ther the will of God be before the vnderstan∣ding, or vnderstanding before the will. If anie man would knowe these things, I send them vnto Scotus and Thomas. This power and fa∣cultie which I speake of, belongeth vnto the qualitie, for it is a naturall power. The diffe∣rence

is, that God by this power directeth all things, whatsoeuer either be, or hereafter shall be. But yet this is not enough; for he also con∣ducteth them to their ends. But to what ends? Euen vnto agréeable ends. And those be agrée∣able, which his purpose hath appointed. The po∣wer is the cause: and, that things be brought to their proper ends, is the effect. Here haue we comprehended all the kinds of causes which can be assigned in this matter. * 1.11 This I speake, bi∣cause there can be giuen no efficient cause of the prouidence of God. The formall cause is the power of God. The matter whereabout, are all manner of things whatsoeuer; for we in no wise except anie thing. But the finall cause is, that all things may atteine to their owne ends, and may redound to the glorie of God. By this de∣finition we sée, * 1.12 that the prouidence of God is not onlie a bare knowledge, but it is some brin∣ging to effect. For as Paule saith; In him we liue, we mooue, and haue our being. And a∣gaine; Of him, and in him, and by him are all things. And as Salomon saith; Man may pre∣pare his heart, but God ordereth the speach. For we are not able to mooue, no not the toong, being the lightest part of the bodie, without the prouidence of God. * 1.13 And Christ saith; that A sparowe dooth not light vpon the ground with∣out the will of our heauenlie Father. And, All the heares of our head are numbered. Some dreame that God indéed made all these things; but after he had made them, * 1.14 cast them off. So (forsooth) carpenters, when they haue doone suffi∣cientlie in building of a house, they afterward leaue the same: but if God should doo so, this world would soone come to ruine. For a house, vnles it be oftentimes repaired and vnderprop∣ped, falleth to ruine and decaie. If the soule be se∣uered from the bodie, what remaineth, but that the bodie will become putrified and rotten?

Neither are they to be heard, which saie; that God indéed ruleth all things: but that this is nothing else, but to minister vnto all things the common influence, which euerie thing dra∣weth vnto it selfe. This is euen to make God, not in verie déed, but in name to be the ruler and gouernour of the world. * 1.15 For if so be that euerie thing, according to the nature thereof doo bend and applie vnto it selfe that common influence of God, then God followeth the nature of things created; where as rather contrariwise all things created ought to followe and séeke after God. But they saie, that euen as he, which throweth a stone, * 1.16 or shooteth an arrowe, hath doone enough to haue first forced the same, although he him∣selfe afterward followe not after them, when they be out of his hand: so it was sufficient for God, in that he indued all things with a certeine power, although he do not perpetuallie gouerne them. But these things be not alike; for a stone and an arrowe doo fall immediatelie after that they be shot, bicause that force which is in things created cannot be of long continuance. Where∣fore, vnlesse that God should prosecute by his euerlasting care and prouidence, the thing which he hath forced, the nature of euerie thing could not abide. When the Peripatetiks perceiued that all these inferiour things, were continuallie troubled; they iudged that the prouidence of God was aboue the moone: as if it were not conuenient for it to be carefull for these inferi∣our things, no further foorth than a certeine common influence is therby ministred vnto all things. But these are fond reasons; for the scriptures teach vs, that euen these things, which to vs may séeme to come most of all by chance, * 1.17 are yet gouerned by the prouidence of God. In Deuteronomie the 19. If an ax flieng by chance out of his hands that heweth wood, strike a man and kill him as he passeth by; It is I (saith the Lord) that deliuered him into the hand of the slaier. And in the 14. chapter of Iob, it is said of God; Thou hast appointed man his bounds, which he shall not passe. Also in the booke of wis∣dome, (which booke though it be not in the ca∣non, yet conteineth it manie good and godlie sai∣engs) in that booke (I saie) in the eight chapter, it is written; Wisedome reacheth from one end to another 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.18 & disposeth all things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: it reacheth (saith he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to saie, Strong & mightie: & disposeth Profitablie: for so soundeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; & not Sweetlie, as the old tran∣slation hath. And that profite, although it be not oftentimes perceiued of vs, yet is it alwaies of such sort, as it dooth tend to the glorie of God.

8 But whether all things be subiect to the prouidence of God, is a matter in controuersie: * 1.19 for some saie, they be; and some saie, they be not. But, as we said before; if God haue made all things, vndoubtedlie nothing is exempted from his prouidence: for if anie thing should be ex∣empted from his prouidence, that also should be exempted from creation. It is written in the e∣pistle to the Hebrues; He vpholdeth all things by the word of his power. The Hebrue p••ase; * 1.20 The word of his power is in sted of His mightie word. This place agréeth with that which we ci∣ted out of the booke of wisdome. * 1.21 Ezechiel calleth God; The Lord of all flesh. And Moses calleth God; The Lord of spirits. And Paule saith; * 1.22 It is he that worketh all things, according to the de∣termination of his will. Also Hesiodus an Eth∣nike poet saith; In this life we can no where es∣cape from the mind of God. Yet there be some which would exempt from Gods prouidence, men and frée will, and things that either be of necessitie, or that come by chance. Cicero in his booke De fato saith; that The most ancient philo∣sophers,

such as Empedocles and Heraclitus, af∣firmed, that All things come to passe of necessi∣tie: but the Peripatetikes were of the opinion, that manie things come by chance. And Chry∣sippus as a notable vmpire, although he taught that all other things were of necessitie; yet af∣firmed, that mans will, as touching the first ele∣ction, is frée. Wherefore Eusebius in his treatise De praeparatione euangelica, said pleasantlie, that Democritus made men to be slaues; but that Chrysippus made them but halfe slaues.

Also Cicero in his second booke De diuinatione, will rather exclude all prouidence, than that men should not be frée. Which vanitie Augustine de∣riding in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, saith, that He to make men frée, had made them rob God of his glorie. So we sée, that there be some which thinke not, that all things be vnder prouidence: but in that they except man by name, which is the chéefest workemanship of God, that séemeth too contumelious a thing against God. For sée∣ing all artificers contemne trifling works of small value, but doo adorne, and haue a speciall care of those works which be excellent; who will imagin that God could despise that worke, which of all other he made most choice of? And if it should be so, in what state stand we? What refuge should we haue in aduersitie? * 1.23 Dauid saith; Cast all thy care vpon God, and he will nourish thee. And Peter saith, It is he that taketh care of you. And Zacharie; He that toucheth you, shall touch the apple of mine eie. And I (saith the Lord) am thy buckler, and thy strong wall. The Lord (saith Dauid) is my helper, and I shall not be afraid what man can doo against me. Though their tents were pitched against mee, yet my hart shall not be afraid.

* 1.24 9 But thou wilt saie, that In inferior mat∣ters, manie things are done either without or∣der, or else disorderlie: for we sée often-times the godlie to be oppressed, and the wicked to flou∣rish. Admit it be so; but is there no prouidence therefore, bicause we doo not sée the causes there∣of? If peraduenture thou shouldest be in a smithes shop, * 1.25 and séest manie tooles, some croo∣ked, some bowed, some hooked, and some sawed in; wouldest thou strait-waie condemne them all for naught, bicause they appeare not straight and handsome? I thinke not; but thou woul∣dest rather confesse thy selfe to be ignorant of the vse of them. Such an honor must be giuen to God, as when thou séest tyrants and wicked men to enioie wealth and prosperitie, thou must saie, that they be instruments of the prouidence of God, although thou canst not perceiue what God intendeth by them. Augustine saith, that God is so good, as he is able to drawe out some goodnes euen out of the wicked. Further, if there were no tyrants, what vertue & patience of martyrs should there be? God will haue some to be the triumph of his goodnes, he will haue some also vpon whom he may exercise his might and power. But perhaps thou wilt saie; Is it not enough that men be martyrs in the preparation of their mind? Indéed there be no∣ble vertues hidden in the minds of the godlie, but yet oftentimes this dooth not satisfie God: he will bring them foorth into act, that they may be séene. Wherefore our eies must be lifted vp, that we thinke not of the vngodlie, but of God. So the prophets call Nabuchadnezar, Pharao, * 1.26 and Senacherib, hatchets, hammers, sawes, and swords in the hand of God.

Iob, when he was turned out of all that he had, respected not the Chaldaeans, nor the di∣uell, but said; The Lord gaue, * 1.27 and the Lord hath taken awaie. He is accounted a learned physi∣cian, * 1.28 which can drawe out vnto the outward part of the bodie the corrupt humors, which be hidden within the bodie; yet we would abhorre blanes and sores: but the physician saith, that then the sicke man beginneth to heale, when such things breake foorth. In like maner God, with his medicines and fires of persecutions bringeth into light those things, which before laie hidden in our minds. Let the wicked doo what they will, yet can they doo nothing more than is the will of God. So said Peter in the Acts as touching Pilat and Herod; * 1.29 They agreed togither, that they might doo, whatsoeuer thy will and thy counsell had decreed to doo.

10 But thou wilt saie; * 1.30 Some things be of necessitie, which cannot otherwise be than they are; doo those fall vnder the prouidence of God? Yea trulie, there is nothing created of such ne∣cessitie, but if it be referred vnto God, it hath the nature of a thing that commeth by chance. For as we said; God reacheth from end to end, and ordereth all things. What thing is of more necessitie than the course of the s••nne? And yet Iosua made the sunne to stand still. * 1.31 What thing is of more necessitie, than that the fire should burne, if fuell be applied therevnto? Therefore it hath béene an old saieng; If actiue things be applied to things passiue, the action must follow of necessitie. Yet neuertheles God brought to passe, that those thrée yoong men walked safelie in the flaming fornace. * 1.32 What is of more necessitie, than that the shadowe should followe the sunne shining? And yet God brought to passe, that when the sunne did shine, * 1.33 the shadowe went backward. But man séemed to haue béene made, and to be left in the hand of his owne counsell. * 1.34 Thou shalt keepe those things (saith Ecclesiasticus) & they shall keepe thee. I grant that man, as concerning the in∣ward causes, was so made at the beginning, as nothing could be to him of anie necessitie: but

we doo not therefore exclude the grace of God and prouidence. Let vs heare the holie scrip∣tures as touching that matter. For Ecclesiasti∣cus is not among the number of the canonicall books; * 1.35 The kings hart (saith Salomon) is in the hand of God. * 1.36 But God saith; I haue giuen them precepts. * 1.37 But he also saith; I will make you to walke in my commandements. Againe; I will giue you a new hart, * 1.38 and a new spirit. Wherefore man is not to be exempted from the prouidence of God.

11 But much lesse are those things to be ex∣cluded, which séeme to be doone by chance. * 1.39 For al∣though we can not perceiue the reason of the se∣cond causes, yet God séeth it; yea, the Philoso∣phers teach vs, that euerie cause, which they call Per accidens, that is, Comming by chance, must be reuoked vnto that which is a cause by it selfe: for that which is Per accidens, can not be anie cause. Wherfore Aristotle in his litle booke De bona fortuna, when he demanded for what cause some were fortunate, and some not? He answe∣red, that it is doone by a certeine violent moti∣on, and impulsion; whereof neuerthelesse, he that is driuen, can not yéeld a cause: hereby it commeth to passe (saith he) that some are fortu∣nate, * 1.40 and some not. Furthermore he saith, that this euent, if it be referred to our will & know∣ledge, happeneth by chance; but that inforce∣ment is a cause by it selfe. But the question is not thus dissolued. For how commeth it to passe, that this fortune is giuen to one man, and not to another? The Astrologers would supplie that, which they thought Aristotle wanted. Pto∣lome in his booke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, referreth this vnto the starres; by which (he saith) men being diuerslie borne, are carried some to prosperitie, and some to aduersitie. And this, some called, A power, * 1.41 some Constellation, and other some Particular destinie; Socrates called it Daemoniū. But whie it happeneth more to one man, than to another; & more at one time, than at another; none other cause can be assigned, but the pro∣uidence of God: which vndoubtedlie is, that all things should be referred to the glorie of God.

* 1.42 It is not you (saith Ioseph to his brethren) that sould me into Aegypt; but God sent me hi∣ther before you. So God said that he sent Saule vnto Samuel, * 1.43 although it séemed as if he had turned out of the waie to him by chance. So Christ said vnto his Apostles; * 1.44 There shall one meete you bearing a pitcher of water. These things were certeine vnto the prouidence of God, although otherwise in the sight of men, they might séeme but things comming by chance. But thou wilt saie; Be there then no second causes? Dooth God nothing by his an∣gels? We take not awaie the second causes; but we make them instruments of the proui∣dence of God: for Angels be administring spi∣rits. * 1.45 And Dauid saith; Who doo execute his will. But although God send his angels, yet he him selfe is present and principall ouer all things; If I shall ascend (saith Dauid) into hea∣uen, * 1.46 thou art there; if I go downe into hell, thou art there also. For he dooth not so giue his angels charge, as though he him selfe were ab∣sent. Which thing the poets feigne of Apollo, that he placed P••aëton in his chariot, and by that meanes all the heauens in his absence were set on fire. But sinnes, (will some man saie) depend not on prouidence. * 1.47 How sinnes be ruled by God, shall be shewed afterward. In the meane time this I saie; The cause of sinne vndoubtedlie commeth from vs: but at what time, and against whom it should breake foorth, that is in the power of God. It was wholie de∣termined by Nabuchadnezar, * 1.48 that he would oppresse some people; but that he should op∣presse the Iewes more than others, that was prouided by God.

12 The next question is, * 1.49 Whether this pro∣uidence be immutable. Whie should it not? For it is the rule of all things that be doone. It is written in the third of Malachie; I am the Lord, & am not changed. In the first of Iames; With him there is no variablenes, * 1.50 nor shadow∣ing by turning. And in the 19. of Prouerbs; There be manie cogitations in the hart of man, * 1.51 but the counsell of the Lord continueth stedfast. In the 46. of Esaie; It is I that speake, * 1.52 and my counsell abideth surelie, and I doo what so euer pleaseth me. For séeing prouidence is both the knowledge and will of God, and that those things belong to the verie essence of God, it can not be changed, except God him selfe be changed therewithall. The second causes indéed, séeing they be diuerse and sundrie, they often∣times hinder themselues; * 1.53 which thing we sée come to passe in the influences of heauen, that some of them be an impediment to others; but the will of God can not be hindred by anie vio∣lence. In old time God ordeined the ceremo∣nies of the Iewes, * 1.54 afterward he would haue them to be abrogated. How then? Is not the prouidence of God mutable? I answere; that In God is altogether one and the selfe-same will; but that he fore-sawe from the beginning, what might agrée with the diuersitie of times. Augustine to Marcellinus saith, that A husband∣man doth sometime sowe, sometime reape, and sometime compasse the soile; yet we must not saie that the art of husbandrie is therefore mutable. Vindicianus saith, that A certeine physician ministred a medicine to a sicke man, and healed him; and that he manie yeares af∣ter falling into the same disease, tooke the same medicine without the counsell of the physician:

but when he waxed woorse, he came to the physi∣cian, shewing him the matter, and began to complaine of the medicine. No maruell (quoth Vindicianus) then; for I ministred not the same vnto thée. Now when some men marue∣led thereat, and were of opinion that he vsed some inchantment; There is no such matter (saith he) for now is he of another age, and hath o∣ther humors than he had when I gaue him that his medicine. But shall not therefore the art of physick be like it self? Euen so in anie wise God, although he foresée all things, yet he hath not de∣créed, that all things should be done at one time.

* 1.55 13 Now let vs come to chance. If so be that the prouidence of God be so certeine, whether can it admit anie casualtie? Here will I first vse two distinctions, and afterward I will answere. There is one necessitie which is absolute, and an other conditionall. For when we saie, that God is wise or iust, we vnderstand that that is sim∣plie, and absolutelie necessarie. There be other things necessarie by supposition; as that which is commonlie canuassed in the schooles, to wit, that whatsoeuer is, while it is, is necessarie. Christ and the prophets fore-shewed that the citie of Ie∣rusalem should be ouerthrowne; therefore of ne∣cessitie it shall be ouerthrowne: not that this ne∣cessitie is in the nature of the citie, but bicause Christ & the prophets haue foretold it, * 1.56 who could not be deceiued. Paule saith; that There must needs be heresies: * 1.57 & Christ saith; It is necessarie that offenses come. For these causes being set downe; namelie, the corrupt natures of men, & the diuels hatred towards mankind: & the end being granted, to wit that the elect shuld be tried, it is necessarie by supposition, that it should so com to passe. * 1.58 Also things may be considered two maner of waies, either as they be in act; & in that case they haue the nature of necessitie, for they be no longer indefinite. As, to write, or not to write, is by chance: but if thou be now in the act of writing, it is no more chance, but necessa∣rie. Wherfore we saie that the knowledge of the senses is certeine, bicause the things themselues cannot otherwise be. Or else things may be considered, as they lie hidden in their causes: but séeing causes may sometime bring foorth effects, and sometimes not, therefore there is no neces∣sarie power of working in them. But if those things be referred vnto God, the reason is far o∣therwise: * 1.59 For he calleth those things which be not, as though they were; for he comprehen∣deth all time, and hath neither beginning nor en∣ding. All things also, which are to come for euer hereafter, are notwithstanding present vnto him. Here also commeth in the will of God; for we must not ascribe vnto him a bare know∣ledge; but such as is effectuall, or actuall. And by this meanes I saie, that the verie things them∣selues are to be considered as necessarie. Au∣gustine In genesi ad literam, the sixt booke, chapter 15. There be manie waies whereby man, and o∣ther things might haue béene made by God, and those meanes had some possibilitie, and no necessitie: but this is by the will of God, * 1.60 whose will is the necessitie of things. And though such things, being referred vnto God, be necessarie; yet of vs they must be weighed according to their inward and proper causes, and so be called things contingent, or that come by chance. For it is of no necessitie, that such as the efficient cause is, such also should be the effect.

14 If thou demand, * 1.61 Whie these two kinds of causes be in the nature of things, so as some be limited and necessarie, others indefinit and con∣tingent? Nothing else can be answered, but that God hath laid these conditions vpon all things. God bringeth foorth all things, and he limiteth and boundeth all things; but yet so, as he neither confoundeth nor destroieth the na∣ture of things. Boëtius in his Topiks saith, that Destinie is so called, of drawing to, and giuing place fitlie: for God draweth all things; but yet after a sort so giueth place, as he disturbeth no∣thing. Euen so things, although in their owne nature they incline indifferentlie on both parts; yet by God, they are made to incline more to one side than to another. The will of Saule, * 1.62 of his owne nature, was no more determined to go than to tarrie: but when God would send him vnto Samuel, that will began to incline to the one part. And therefore God put into his mind the will of his father, and brought to passe, that the same should effectuallie mooue and persuade his mind: and that all other desires of rest and ease (if anie were) that might haue reteined him at home, should be subdued. Wherfore it came to passe, that the will of Saule obeied the proui∣dence of God. But yet in the meane time, the nature of the thing was not violated; but that the will of Saule was alike frée vnto either part. Hereby it appéereth, how necessarie the grace of God is vnto vs. For our owne will, as it is all manner of waies corrupted, turneth all things to the worser part. Also there be manie things, which doo dull and blind our vnderstanding, that the will cannot easilie followe. God therefore propoundeth good vnto our vnderstanding, af∣terward he kindleth faith, & stirreth vp the will that we doo will the same effectuallie.

15 But thou wilt saie; * 1.63 Why is anie thing said to be contingent, séeing God hath alreadie determined of the one part, and so it is made a thing of necessitie? I answere; Euerie thing of his owne propertie and beginning is contin∣gent; but prouidence, which bringeth a necessi∣tie, is an outward cause, of which nothing ought to be named. I knowe there be manie, which af∣firme,

that those things which can not be done by mans power, are brought vnto that passe by God, that our will may either choose or refuse them; * 1.64 and that there the prouidence of God staieth, and goeth no further: but when as God foreséeth what euerie man will choose, and what he will refuse, his foreknowledge hindreth no∣thing at all. Howbeit, these saiengs doo not suf∣ficientlie agrée with the holie scriptures. For they teach, that God doth not prouide for things, that he will forsake them; but that (as we haue said) he may conduct them to their ends, and those ends doo serue the prouidence of God. For so saith Paule; God hath made all things according to the purpose of his will. * 1.65 So said God himselfe in Esaie; * 1.66 All things that I will, I doo. * 1.67 And Christ saith; Verelie, euen a little spa∣rowe lighteth not vpon the ground without the will of our father. I knowe that Origin, Cyrill, Chrysostome, and others being vrged by cer∣teine manifest places of the scriptures, such as these are; * 1.68 It behooued Christ to suffer; The scripturs ought to be fulfilled, do thus interpret them; to wit, that these things did not therefore come to passe, bicause God fore-sawe them; but therefore God fore-sawe them, * 1.69 bicause they should come to passe. This iudgement of theirs, if they spake as touching absolute knowledge, could not much be reprehended. For, not bi∣cause I sée a man writing, therefore he wri∣teth; but bicause he writeth, therefore I sée him writing. Howbeit, we cannot affirme a bare knowledge in God, but we must also attribute vnto him a will, whereby he directeth and orde∣reth all things. Yet shall it be true that they say, if their meaning be of the effect, or (as they saie) A posteriore, that is, of the latter. For we here∣of, that a thing is doone, doo vnderstand, that it was the purpose of God that so it should be. O∣therwise the scriptures speake verie plainelie; It behooued Christ to die; * 1.70 It behooued that the scriptures should be fulfilled. But how did it be∣hooue? By supposition; bicause God so for-sawe it: not that that necessitie was in the nature of the thing.

* 1.71 16 But peraduenture thou wilt saie, that therefore the causes in the nature of the thing it selfe be infinit, for that I take not the perfect and full causes, in so much as I should haue added the prouidence of God. I answere; I onelie take the inward and proper causes of euerie thing, whose effects, bicause they might or might not be brought foorth by them, be things contin∣gent. But I adde not prouidence, bicause the same is an outward cause. The which being added, it cannot be auoided, but that by supposi∣tion, * 1.72 some necessitie must followe. For, Saule met with men carrieng of kids, bread, & wine: their will, in respect of the nature thereof, was infinite, either to haue giuen him, or not to haue giuen him anie thing: but God by his proui∣dence did limit that will vnto the one part. They went to Bethel, there to sacrifice; they met with Saule wearie vpon the waie, & almost dead with hunger; it séemed a courtesie to refresh him: this did God put into their minds. And if there were anie thing, which might be a let vnto this will, those things he bridled. And these things we dispute onelie concerning the wils of men: for otherwise, in other things which be contin∣gent, I knowe the means be infinite, which God is woont to vse. Another example of this mat∣ter we haue out of the 21. chapter of Ezechiel; * 1.73 Nabuchadnezar marched into Syria, and when he was now onward on the waie, at a place where two waies met, he began to consult with himselfe, whether it were better for him to lead his power against the Iewes, or else against Rabath the chéefe citie of the Ammonits. Hée drew lots therevpon, the lots did God so frame, that he brought him to Ierusalem. The nature of the thing it selfe was contingent, but the same being appointed of God became a thing of necessitie. * 1.74 Ioseph was so sold and carried into Aegypt, that as concerning the nature of the thing, it might be, that either he should liue al∣waies in bondage, or else that he should at one time or other be deliuered. But God sent dreames into the Baker and Butler; those dreames did Ioseph interpret: afterward he she∣wed Pharao a dreame, which when none of the diuinours could expound, the Butler gaue him intelligence of Ioseph: and by this meanes it came to passe, that Ioseph was deliuered out of prison. Wherefore be it thus determined (as we haue said) that all things hauing relation to the prouidence of God, be necessarie; but of their owne nature are contingent.

But thou wilt say; * 1.75 Shall th••ffects be absolute∣lie called things comming by chance, or rather of necessitie? Some there be, that for the digni∣tie of prouidence, will haue them called necessa∣rie: but I would rather call them contingent, according to their owne nature. Albeit I will not greatlie striue, so that the same necessitie be vnderstood onelie by supposition. Rightlie did some of the Gréeks name prouidence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of pass••ing through; bicause it passeth through euerie thing: others called it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, bicause nothing can escape it. Some will saie, that we receiue the opinion of the Stoiks concerning destinie. That is not true; for they defined their destinie to be a ne∣cessitie by a knitting togither of causes, and af∣firmed that the same did ouer-rule euen God himselfe. But contrariwise, we teach that God gouerneth all things, and that he vseth them to his owne glorie. But if they affirme that desti∣nie

is nothing else, but the prouidence of God; the question is onlie as touching the word, and not of the thing: as Augustine else-where hath taught. Lastlie, thou wilt saie, that by this meanes, * 1.76 there will be no place for aduisements, admonitions, and corrections, séeing that which God will, must néeds come to passe. The selfe same thing was obiected to Augustine, where∣vpon he wrote the booke De correptione & gratia. Vndoubtedlie God, although he haue decréed a thing to be doone, yet he vseth meanes in brin∣ging the same to passe. He will change the naughtie will of man; he vseth admonitions, preachings, and chastisements. For these be the instruments of Gods prouidence: so farre is it that the prouidence of God excludeth them. In this question we haue set in a maner the roots, and laid the foundations of predestina∣tion: but of it we will intreate an other time, when opportunitie shall serue.

Notes

• * 1.1

  What is a thing con∣tingent, and how manie sorts there be.
• * 1.2

  Two grounds of contingence
• * 1.3

  Prudence deuided in∣to three parts.
• * 1.4

  Who is pro∣uident.
• * 1.5

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.6

  Prouidence worshipped as a God.
• * 1.7

  That there is a proui∣dence.
• * 1.8

  Why the E∣picures de∣nie proui∣dence.
• * 1.9

  Iohn. 3, 20.
• * 1.10

  What pro∣uidence is.
• * 1.11

  All the cau∣ses of pro∣uidence. No efficient cause of the prouidence of God.
• * 1.12

  Prouidence is no bare but an effi∣cient know∣ledge. Acts. 17, 28. Rom. 11, 36. Prou. 16, 1.
• * 1.13

  Matt. 10, 19.
• * 1.14

  A simili∣tude.
• * 1.15

  Whether God onlie by common influence doo rule all things.
• * 1.16

  A simili∣tude.
• * 1.17

  That God dooth go∣uerne both the superi∣our and the inferiour things. Deut. 19, 5. Iob. 14, 5.
• * 1.18

  Wisdo. 8, 1.
• * 1.19

  Whether all things be vnder the prouidence of God.
• * 1.20

  Heb. 1, 3.
• * 1.21

  Ezec. 18, 4. Num. 11, 29.
• * 1.22

  Ephe. 1, 11.
• * 1.23

  Psalm. 37, 5. 1. Pet. 5, 7. Zacharie. 2, verse. 8. Gen. 15, 1. Psal. 56, 12. Psalm. 27, 3.
• * 1.24

  If proui∣dence doo gouerne all things, why is there such a confusion of things?
• * 1.25

  A simili∣tude.
• * 1.26

  Esaie. 10, 5.
• * 1.27

  Iob. 1, 21.
• * 1.28

  A simili∣tude.
• * 1.29

  Acts. 4, 24.
• * 1.30

  Whether things of necessitie be vnder pro∣uidence.
• * 1.31

  Iosua. 10, 1••.
• * 1.32

  Dan. 3, 93.
• * 1.33

  Esaie. 38, 8.
• * 1.34

  Ecclesiasti∣cus. 15, 14.
• * 1.35

  Prou. 16. 1.
• * 1.36

  Ezec. 20. 11.
• * 1.37

  Ezec. 36. 26.
• * 1.38

  Man is not exempted from the prouidence of God.
• * 1.39

  Things by chance are vnder the prouidence of God.
• * 1.40

  Why some be fortunate and some not.
• * 1.41

  Daemoniū hath relati∣on aswell to ill fortune, as to good.
• * 1.42

  Gen. 45. 8.
• * 1.43

  1. Sa. 9. 16.
• * 1.44

  Mar. 14. 13.
• * 1.45

  Heb. 1. 14. Psal. 102.
• * 1.46

  Psal. 139. 8.
• * 1.47

  How sinnes doo depend of Gods prouidence.
• * 1.48

  Ezec. 21. 21.
• * 1.49

  Whether prouidence be vnchan∣geable. Mala. 3. 6.
• * 1.50

  Iames. 1. 17.
• * 1.51

  Prou. 19. 12
• * 1.52

  Esai. 46. 10.
• * 1.53

  A simili∣tude.
• * 1.54

  God would once haue ceremonies, and after∣ward he a∣brogated them.
• * 1.55

  Things comming by chance. A distincti∣on of neces∣sitie. Looke part 2. Art. 22. chapter. 2. and part. 3. chap. 1. Art. 49.
• * 1.56

  Matt. 24, 1.
• * 1.57

  1. Cor. 11 verse 19. Matt. 18, 7.
• * 1.58

  Two sun∣drie res∣pects of things.
• * 1.59

  Rom. 4, 17.
• * 1.60

  In what respect things be of necessitie, and in what respect con∣tingent.
• * 1.61

  Why in na∣ture some things be necessarie, and other some con∣tingent.
• * 1.62

  God ma∣keth things of equall weight to incline on the one side. 1. Sam. 9. 16.
• * 1.63

  How it can be said con∣tingent, when it is determined by God.
• * 1.64

  That God worketh our will to choose or refuse, and that proui∣dence goeth no further.
• * 1.65

  Ephes. 1, 11.
• * 1.66

  Esai. 46, 10.
• * 1.67

  Matt. 10, 29.
• * 1.68

  Luk. 24, 26. Luk. 22, 23.
• * 1.69

  Whether things com to passe bi∣cause God fore-sawe them, or contrari∣wise.
• * 1.70

  Luk. 24, 26. Iohn. 19, 36.
• * 1.71

  How causes are infinit.
• * 1.72

  1. Sam. 10, 3.
• * 1.73

  Eze. 21, 23.
• * 1.74

  Gen. 37, 28.
• * 1.75

  Whether ef∣fects be ne∣cessarie or contingent.
• * 1.76

  Whether counsels & admoniti∣ons be ta∣ken awaie by proui∣dence.