The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.

Of the causes of Felicitie.

27 Now that we haue largelie inough dispu∣ted as touching the nature of felicitie, we will inquire of the cause therof. Aristotle reckoneth vp fiue causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, bicause discipline, custome, and exercise doo procéed from vs. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. * 1.1 Betwéene custome and exercise this is the difference, that custome is referred vnto vertues, which are bred by often and continu∣all actions. But exercises and labours are to be applied to a sure obteining and kéeping of ri∣ches, honour, and health; in which things ma∣nie (as it hath bin said) haue placed felicitie. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth vnto them, which haue thought that vertues are learned by applieng of doctrines. Where∣fore if there be néed of discipline, it must be learned; if of custome, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exer∣cise, there must of necessitie be no labour spa∣red; if it be expected of God, he must be praied vnto; but if of fortune, since we are able to doo nothing concerning it, all must wholie bée committed vnto the same. The Stoiks, and es∣peciallie Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in vs, or not to be within vs. By those things that are in vs, they vnder∣stand the things which we can rule by our coun∣sell, and obteine by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within vs, are the same that we haue not in our power; as no∣bilitie, health, and riches.

Whether God be the cause of felicitie, Ari∣stotle in his first booke of his Ethiks speaketh verie ambiguouslie, * 1.2 & bringeth a conditionall proposition, but absolues not the argument. If anie gift (saith he) be of God, felicitie shall be giuen of him. And he sheweth a reason of the conclusion, bicause the same hath the chéefest place among all humane things. But to the making vp of the argument, there may be ad∣ded a double minor proposition: that the fe∣licitie of the godlie, and ours is all one; But manie things are giuen vnto men by God, therefore must felicitie be expected from him. And that manie things are giuen vnto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who doo also extoll his prouidence in euerie thing: and since from him, as from the chéefe good, and fountaine of goodnes, is deriued whatsoeuer is good, we doo not once imagine, that this doth flowe without his pleasure, will, and election. * 1.3 But there bée some, and those indéed Peripatetiks, which doo déeme far otherwise of the prouidence of God: for they thinke that his prouidence, as touching particular things, stretcheth not lower than the moone; bicause so far, all things are done constantlie, and in singular order. But, as tou∣ching the things which are beneath the moone, they make prouidence to be onlie of generall things, not of particular. Wherfore they should take this for the minor propositiō; But no gifts are distributed by God vnto men, neither ther∣fore is felicitie giuen. And they saie, that gifts are not giuen by God vnto men, not bicause they acknowledge him not to be the first effi∣cient cause, from whence all good things doo a∣rise; but they take the word of giuing or besto∣wing from election, will, and frée choise. The good things, which we haue, and felicitie, they will grant doo depend of God, and of the mo∣tion of the heauen, and that they cannot other∣wise be had; but they thinke that those be not giuen by him, by a certeine distribution which he considereth of, or which he giueth by a frée disposition. For they thinke that God dealeth necessarilie, and by a naturall impulsion.

Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place aboue mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicitie is giuen of God. He affirmeth it not, bicause he saith, that this worke belongeth to another treatise; namelie, to the metaphysicks, or treatise of supernaturall things, wherein is treated of the prouidence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he denie felici∣tie to be giuen of God, least he should fall into an absurditie. For it séemes to be contrarie to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be giuen by God, and felicitie not to be giuen by him. Wherefore he teacheth it vnder a condition, namelie, If other things be had from God, feli∣citie likewise doth procéed from him: but he af∣firmeth nothing at all. But I sée not how fitlie he putteth ouer this treatise to another place;

for if this definition doo depend of prouidence, might he not in the meane time haue borowed so much of his metaphysicall treatise, as should haue béene sufficient for the explaning of his mind? This he did as touching the soule, and tooke from his treatise of natural things so much as serued vnto morall doctrine, and saith, that The soule as we shall shortlie sée, hath diuers parts. So likewise might he here haue written of this, although he had not here purposelie proo∣ued it, but taken it from some other treatise; that God by his prouidence dooth giue manie gifts vnto men; than the which gifts séeing felicitie is far more excellent, it is méet that the same also should belong vnto it. Howbeit, dissembling this, he passed it ouer, and saith it belonged to an other treatise. But I beséech you, what more conuenient place had there béene, séeing in that booke he was to treate of maners and vertues, the vnderstanding whereof dependeth altogither of the knowledge of felicitie? Now was it time to affirme thereof simplie, that he might no lesse haue expected the same of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he speaketh on this wise, he sée∣meth to shunne the hatred of vngodlines, but de∣serued no praise for a plaine and sincere confessi∣on. If he had ment well and honestlie, he should not haue vsed these ambiguities. But what should he haue doone? He could not by philoso∣phie know any thing of the will of God towards men; for whatsoeuer we knowe thereof, we are all wholie beholding for it vnto the holie scrip∣tures, and especiallie to the gospell.

28 When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicitie commeth from God, in that he would not confesse it; this neuertheles he gran∣teth, that it is a thing most diuine, that is, most perfect, which also God inioieth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certeine maner of his owne, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his owne] that God dooth giue felicitie, but not with∣out the meanes which we haue rehearsed, I meane learning, * 1.4 custome and exercise. And vn∣doubtedlie, there be certeine things giuen vnto vs by God, without anie labour or indeuour of vs. For when did euer anie man labour that he might be borne wittie, noble, or of a sound bo∣die, or of a perfect complexion? Assuredlie no man. As for other things, God so giueth them, as we should atteine vnto them by certeine means. Howbeit this must be dilligentlie con∣sidered, that if we will thinke well and godlie of the matter, euen the verie meanes are gi∣uen vnto vs by GOD himselfe: for no man shall be mooued to receiue sound doctrine, nor to take in hand a good custome nor a profitable ex∣ercise, * 1.5 vnlesse he be stirred vp by God. If feli∣citie haue those thrée things, for causes and cer∣teine principles, it may soone be common vnto manie; except those which haue not their senses perfect, which be féeble, and borne lame, and for that cause cannot atteine vnto felicitie. For there be some, which be borne fooles, and of an ill temperature of the bodie; and therefore they which be deafe, dumbe, or which be ouercome with great gréefes & weakenes, cannot learne good arts and litterature, neither are they fit for exercises; nor yet to procure vnto themselues good manners. And doctrine is not admitted for morall vertues sake; but bicause of the facul∣ties & sciences which be contemplatiue, in which things for the most part felicitie dooth consist. And bicause it is said, that felicitie is common vnto manie; hearers & readers be incouraged to thinke, that if they fall from it, it must be impu∣ted to their own default which would not learne and accustome themselues to good actions, and painfull exercises.

From felicitie he in like manner exempted children; bicause they, in respect of their age, * 1.6 which in them is verie yoong and tender, cannot execute that action to all intents and purposes. But the reason which he maketh, why they can∣not be blessed, let vs examine it as it is produ∣ced by Aristotle; There is néed (saith he) vnto fe∣licitie, both vertue, and a perfect life. Touching life, there is no controuersie; bicause as one swalowe maketh not the spring time, so one day maketh not a man happie. Wherefore, if one should become happie, it is requisite that his age be lengthened, and his time produced. There is also required a perfect vertue; for vnlesse it shall take déepe roote, it will soone slip awaie, as ha∣uing small fastening. Bréefelie, Aristotle will that a happie man should be in such a state, as he cannot easilie be remooued therefrom; whervnto all men sée, that a full age and perfect vertue is requisite. This opinion pleased the Pelagians, which placed righteousnes, and the kingdome of heauen in the power of men. Also it pleased the schoolmen; for as the Pelagians denied grace, & said that nature dooth suffice: so these men like∣wise affirming grace in bare name, haue in ve∣rie déed quite taken it awaie, as they which haue made the same common and open to all men, as though it were in euerie man, either to receiue it, or to put it from him. And when they be asked who dooth giue grace to them, which accept it, in such sort as they both desire it, and receiue it, when it is offered to them; they flie vnto frée will: and of all these is Pighius the standerd-bearer.

Wherefore, if either thou aske of Aristotle, or of them; Since felicitie is thus common, as ye say, how coms it to passe, that so few obteine the same? Bicause few (saie they) will learne, few will labour, few will accustome themselues to honest and good exercises. But we will here

note a generall and a certeine proposition; To euerie nature or kind there is a purposed end, the which all that be comprehended in it may atteine. And surelie, that which Aristotle answe∣red, as touching them that haue not their per∣fect senses, be lame, and féeble, why they cannot be partakers of felicitie; namelie, bicause of their naturall defect; that proposition may be vnderstood, when the powers shall be perfect: so doo we answer, that men cannot now by themselues be perfect, bicause nature was cor∣rupted euen from the beginning, and that we haue not the powers as well of the mind, as of the bodie perfect. So that now, when we heare these things, let vs thinke that we heare Aristo∣tle, not Paule, or Christ. Here haue we thrée things that are spoken of felicitie; It is a di∣uine thing, * 1.7 it may be obtained by the thrée prin∣cipall things, which he haue alreadie rehearsed, and it is common in a maner to all men.

29 There remaineth fortune, which Aristo∣tle remooueth from the causes of felicitie; bi∣cause it is thought vnwoorthie that it should be admitted to open so excellent a gift vnto men. But before I shew the reason brought by Ari∣stotle, * 1.8 I will indeuour to declare what fortune is. As it is written in the second booke of naturall philosophie; It is an accidentall cause, and then it commeth in place, when anie thing is ioi∣ned to anie man, which is author of the effect fol∣lowing; vnto the producing of which effect, that which is ioined therevnto, worketh nothing, but onlie giueth sometimes an occasion; and the effect may well come to passe without it. This is made plaine by a similitude; If a man, by rea∣son of an ague, become temperate, we will saie that this fell out by fortune: for temperance commeth of the will as of hir own proper cause, which will bridleth the affection of lust. The ague might haue bin the occasion whereby this came to passe, but the cause it could not be. And bi∣cause these things, to wit, the will of tempe∣rate gouernement, and the ague, méete by for∣tune in one and the same man; therefore doth temperance spring by fortune from the ague. But it appeareth plainelie inough, that the fea∣uer is not by it selfe the cause of the tempe∣rance; otherwise, all that be gréeued with a fea∣uer, would become temperate. According to this maner of speaking must the sentence of Paule be examined and vnderstood; * 1.9 Knowledge puffeth vp. Pride, which immediatelie prefer∣reth our owne things aboue other mens, procée∣deth from the will; héereby we become vaine and puffed vp. And bicause knowledge giueth an occasion vnto some that this is done, there∣fore knowledge is said to puffe vp, but yet by fortune; bicause in one selfe man, are ioined together by chance these two things, to wit, the desire of passing and excelling others, and also some knowledge of things. And as these things be ioined together at all aduentures; so doth vaine puffing vp procéed by fortune from knowledge. Also it hapneth, that when vnto that effect, which we desire by it selfe, and by our owne aduise, another effect by chance is ioined therewith; then the same commeth of fortune, not purposelie, whereas we in verie déed sought for another thing. As otherwhile it hapneth vn∣to them that be diggers, that they in labouring doo finde treasure, when as they onlie intended the trimming of their vines and trées: this I saie happeneth by fortune, when as the digger sought for another matter: neither is the dig∣ging the proper and true cause of finding out the treasure; for if a man should affirme this, he must of necessitie auouch, that all diggers doo finde treasures. Adde moreouer, that all the ef∣fects of fortune doo verie seldome come to passe, and that contrariwise than falleth out in the true and proper causes, which verie seldome are hindred from bringing foorth their effects. Which things being so, it appeareth, and that manifestlie, that fortune is repugnant to rea∣son and counsell. * 1.10 Wherefore it is not méete to attribute vnto it, that it bringeth foorth felicitie. And so Aristotle concludeth, that séeing felicitie is better deriued from the causes before men∣tioned, than from fortune, it is méete that wée should determine it so to be; bicause it ought to be in the best maner that it can.

One reason, whereby Aristotle prooueth for∣tune to be no cause of felicitie is this; The chée∣fest good ought not to be referred vnto a vile and abiect cause; Felicitie is the chéefest good, & fortune is but vile among the causes; Where∣fore blessednes ought not to be reduced vnto fortune, being a cause lesse woorthie than o∣thers. And hereof dependeth the force of this argument: for although a noble cause doo other∣while bring foorth a vile effect (as we knowe that the sunne dooth not onelie bréed a man, but also frogs, fleas, and flies) yet excellent effects cannot procéed but of noble causes. Here we sée, that by euident and most manifest words Aristotle excludeth fortune, as he that would not number the same among the causes of felicitie, and taketh propositions as well out of his booke of naturall philosophie, as also out of his meta∣physicks: the verie which certeinlie he might haue doone, in affirming God to be the cause of mans blessednes. So that he excludeth from this number both God and fortune: GOD, as ouer-woorthie and too high; but fortune, as an vnwoorthie and a more vile cause. For it is a most inconstant thing, and hath no substantiall ground-worke: which neuertheles is so exclu∣ded, as it can doo nothing about the nature and

substance of felicitie; and yet vndoubtedlie it can doo somewhat about those good things which helpe vnto felicitie, & be the instruments therof. But if it be of power, concerning riches, and honours, and such like, which (as it hath béene said) doo not a little further vnto felicitie; why doo they denie them to be the cause thereof? We grant indéed, that these things doo accomplish, and doo seruice vnto felicitie, and doo such ser∣uice, as it may not be without them; but we de∣nie that it dooth properlie cause the same. For it so fareth not, that as the lacke of these things may hinder blessednes; so if they be present, they can performe and bring the same to passe. For thou shalt sée manie men that be noble, rich, strong, and in honours, who neuertheles being wicked, thou wilt not call happie. Which assu∣redlie should not come to passe, if these things were by themselues causes of happines. But if these kinds of good things be taken awaie from honest and wise men, they suffer them not to be happie, although (as it hath béene said) those things themselues are not the causes of blessed∣nes. But if thou demand, whether the good things of the bodie doo also come from fortune? I may easilie denie it; bicause fortune is affir∣med to be one of those causes, which rarelie and seldome comes in action: for scarselie within a hundred yéere it happeneth, that a digger of vine trées, or a ploughman chanceth vpon a treasure. But it is verie often giuen vnto men euen frō their birth, to haue a good constitution of their bodie, & haue giuen them sound members, and sufficient strength to accomplish their actions.

30 Another argument is alleged, which is much stronger, and that is taken from the definition of blessednes. And the sense is; bicause felicitie is an action, and that no smal action of the mind, it ought not to be expected of fortune: for the nature of minds and of vertues is otherwise, than it is of fortune. But he saith not absolute∣lie, that blessednes is an action of the mind; but he added, that it is a certeine kind of action, that is to wit, a most absolute and most perfect acti∣on; bicause it procéedeth from a most excellent vertue. Hereof dependeth the force of the argu∣ment, that neither the mind of man, nor vertue doo anie action by fortune. He againe confir∣meth felicitie not to be of fortune; bicause he said at the beginning, that the end of ciuill facul∣tie is the chéefest good; but no man doubteth, but that the same facultie worketh not by chance, or by fortune. And he prooueth, that therefore the chéefe end of man belongeth vnto that facultie, bicause therein ciuill vertue dooth verie much la∣bour, to the end it may make good citizens. Wherefore, if it vse diligence, it cannot be said to deale by fortune. For counsell, industrie, and di∣ligence are altogither repugnant vnto fortune: for the ciuill art endeuoureth to make good citi∣zens, and to be of excellent conditions, & singular qualities; first by making of good lawes, after∣ward by giuing of honours and rewards to the kéepers and faithfull obseruers of them; and on the other side, by punishing, and kéeping vnder those which doo transgresse them.

Let vs now bréefelie examine these things by the holie scriptures, * 1.11 how much they agrée with them, or how much they dissent from them. Aristotle speaketh doubtfullie of God, whether he be the authour of felicitie or no. But we con∣stantlie affirme that he is; I will (saith God vn∣to Abraham) be thine exceeding great reward. * 1.12 And least we should suspect that this is natural∣lie true, but not at the will and election of God himselfe, there followeth there the making of a couenant, wherby he chose to himselfe a certeine people; and he couenanted that he would be the God of those that beléeue. And Moses, who verie well vnderstood, that felicitie consisteth herein, that God might be vnderstood and séene, desired this of God, when he said; Shew me thy face, * 1.13 which also he obteined. And Dauid sang; * 1.14 Plea∣sures are at thy right hand for euermore. And Christ our sauiour, who is our God; * 1.15 Come (saith he) vnto me all that labour and are heauie loden, and I will refresh you. And he said speaking of his shéepe; They heare my voice, * 1.16 & I giue them eternall life. Let this be a full persuasion to eue∣rie one of vs, that our felicitie is to be expected and desired of God himselfe. As for the exercises, customes, and doctrines which Aristotle menti∣oneth, in our opinion also must not be contem∣ned; naie rather they are commanded vs in eue∣rie place of the scriptures: yet not so, that they should be the causes of our felicitie. * 1.17 For we be fréelie iustified, not of works; and eternall life is granted fréelie vnto vs.

But there be certeine means, whereby God dooth lead vs vnto him, and to the felicitie which we desire: and these means we haue from God himselfe. Wherefore it was vpon good cause said by Paule; * 1.18 It is God which giueth vnto vs both to will and to performe. But as for fortune much lesse than Aristotle did, doo we commit blessed∣nes therevnto; as we that thinke, that all our dooings are gouerned by the counsell and will of God, so as without his will, not so much as one heare can fall from our head. * 1.19 And we thinke this of all other to be most false, which is commonlie said of the Ethniks, that Euerie wise man fra∣meth to himselfe his owne fortune. Aristotle denieth that children can be happie, but we on the other side affirme them to be happie, séeing Christ said; Suffer them to come vnto me, * 1.20 & he imbraced them with great fauour, & with singu∣lar clemencie. We know indéed, that they as yet cannot be workers of excellent actions, but yet

by Christ both originall sin is forgiuen them, and a waie vnto eternall life is opened to them. Nei∣ther doo we grant vnto him, that they can not be called happie, which are afflicted with great mis∣chances; since it may be, that they which are trulie blessed, doo suffer gréeuous things for the name of Christ: neither doo those hard and hor∣rible things, which they indure, ouerthrowe that blessednes, which we men may haue while wée liue héere.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The diffe∣rence be∣tweene cu∣stome and exercise.
• * 1.2

  Whether fe∣licitie be of God.
• * 1.3

  The opinion of the Peri∣patetiks as touching prouidence.
• * 1.4

  How God dooth giue some things without a meane and some by meanes.
• * 1.5

  That felici∣tie is com∣mon vnto manie.
• * 1.6

  Children excluded from felici∣tie by Ari∣stotle.
• * 1.7

  Three things spoken of felicitie.
• * 1.8

  A plaine declaratiō what for∣tune is.
• * 1.9

  1. Cor. 8, 1.
• * 1.10

  That for∣tune is not the cause of felicitie.
• * 1.11

  How these things a∣gree with the holie scriptures.
• * 1.12

  Gen. 15, 1.
• * 1.13

  Exo. 33, 13.
• * 1.14

  Psal. 15, 12.
• * 1.15

  Mat. 11, 28.
• * 1.16

  Ioh. 10, 28.
• * 1.17

  Rom. 3, 24.
• * 1.18

  Phil. 2. 13.
• * 1.19

  Luke. 21, 18.
• * 1.20

  Mar. 10, 14.