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Certeine other Common places of Peter Martyr, and first of Free will.
* 1.1 THis word Liberū ar∣bitrium (so far as I re∣member) is not found in the holie scriptures: * 1.2 yet neuer∣theles must not that, which it sig∣nifieth, be but lightlie accounted of. For the same is euerie-where dis∣puted of, & is at this daie a great controuersie, and alwaies hath béen, among the Doctors and Diuines. Albeit, euen the Philosophers them∣selues, speaking of the soule, neuer made men∣tion thereof; but in the stéed of it they put this word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For in the mind they onlie put the vnderstanding and the will: of some is ad∣ded the memorie. Also Cicero, an excellent au∣thor of the Latine toong, neuer named Liberum arbitrium: but in his booke De fato, he once or twise named Liberam voluntatem, which is all one in effect. The Graecians called it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the word being compounded of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: and it signifieth nothing else, but a man to be at his owne libertie, and in his owne pow∣er, and cannot be constreined.
And after this maner frée will may be attri∣buted vnto God, who cannot be compelled; bi∣cause he hath no will that can be turned. Also the good angels neither can sinne, nor yet be turned from God, whom they haue before their eies. Af∣ter this maner they are said to haue frée will, yea and the diuels also. Neither is the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (so far as I knowe) in the holie scrip∣tures. The Latine word Arbitrium, consisteth of two words Arbitrium and Liberum. * 1.3 To arbi∣trate, is to estéeme, to perceiue, to be of the opi∣nion, to iudge: and Liberum we haue alreadie said, is for a man to be at his owne libertie. Wherefore it séemeth to be frée will, when the ap∣petite is of the selfe accord carried vnto that, which the vnderstanding or power of knowing shall shew it. It is indéed in the will, but it ta∣keth root in the vnderstanding: bicause it be∣hooueth, that the thing be first iudged and estée∣med, then insueth either eschewing or follow∣ing of it. Augustine oftentimes said, * 1.4 that it is a facultie both of the reason and of the will. * 1.5 Da∣mascene also said, that frée will dooth both iudge and take. Iudgement belongeth to the part of vnderstanding, but desire belongeth to the will. Reason or vnderstanding hath the place of one that counselleth: but the will desireth, taketh in hand, or refuseth.
2 Wherefore, we may thus define frée will, * 1.6 that It is a certeine facultie of the will; the which, while it followeth the part of knowing, it dooth of his owne accord refuse or desire some thing. When I saie the facultie, I vnderstand nothing else but power: least anie man thinke, that I here meane some qualitie; as though it were an habit added. * 1.7 Although that Barnard said, that frée will is a frée habit of his owne mind. Wherefore it is a power of the will, not as it is will absolutelie, according as we now dispute thereof (for we would euen felicitie, neither can we otherwise:) but it is said to be a power of the will, according as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or choise procéedeth of it. Those things that we choose, we choose for another thing: not by them∣selues, but by a certeine counsell that went be∣fore. For we choose not, except those things that were seuered: but it behoueth that this seue∣ring be doone by the vnderstanding part. This is the definition of the cause, which, if it will not sa∣tisfie, we will bring another: which is of the Ma∣ster of the sentences, in the second booke of sen∣tences, the 25. distinction. He saith, that frée will is a power of the reason, and of the will, whereby is chosen good, when Gods grace assisteth, or euill when his grace ceaseth.
The Master thought it méet to adde grace, * 1.8 least he should séeme to agrée with the Pelagi∣ans. But yet for all that, he nameth no iustifieng grace, but a preuenting grace, which may knock