The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.

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Title
The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.
Author
Ursinus, Zacharias, 1534-1583.
Publication
At Oxford :: Printed by Ioseph Barnes, & are to be sold [by T. Cooke, London,] in Pauls Churchyard at the signe of the Tygres head,
1587.
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Subject terms
Heidelberger Katechismus -- Early works to 1800.
Theology, Doctrinal -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A14216.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A14216.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 6, 2024.

Pages

THE NINTH COMMANDEMENT.

THOV shalt not beare false witnesse against thy neighbour.

The drift or end of this commaundement is the ordinaunce and maintenunce of the truth among men. Neither is in this com∣mandment only bearing of false witnes forbidden, but all those thinges which are of neere affinity therewith, the generall whereof is ly∣ing. Thou shalt not beare false witnesse of thy neighbor, or against thy neighbour. In this negatiue commandement is compre∣hended an affirmatiue, which is: Beare therefore true wit∣nes of or for thy neighbour, that is, bee true, & desirous of learning & knowing the truth. The name of Truth here is taken for truenes or truth-speaking, that is, for the agree∣ment or correspondence of our knowledge or speech with the thing, whereof our speech is. True we terme the speech it selfe agreeing with the thing.

The vertues of this ninth commaundement, together with their vices.

THE chiefe & principal vertue, which is here comman∣ded, is truth. 1. Truth or truenes, is a vertue, whereby we loue true opinions & speeches, and seeke after them, & re∣ceiue them, and gladly professe and defend them, accor∣ding as both our duty, and persons, places, times, and other circumstances require, vnto the glory of God, & the safety of our neighbor. This end maketh that the Diuel cānot be said to be true, although he somtimes speak that which is

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true. For his is true, who speaketh and loueth the truth, & doth affection it for the glory of God, and the safety of his neighbour. Truth may also be defined on this wise: Truth is a firme election in the wil, whereby we constantly embrace true sentences & opinions, speak that which is true, keepe couenants & promises, & auoide al deceitful dissemblings both in speech and outward gesture. True confession is com∣maunded both in this, and in the third commaundement: as often times the same vertu is required to the obedience of diuers commandements. But in the third commandemēt true confessi∣on is required, as it is the honour and worship of God, imme∣diately respecting God: and here it is commanded, as there is a will in vs not to deceiue our neighbour, but to wishe his safety & welfare. Vnder the name of truth we comprise li∣berty of speech, which is a vertu wherby, as much as the time, place, & necessity requireth, we professe the truth freely, & boldly, & are not withdrawne through the fear of dangers.

Vnto truth, in the defect, are repugnant, 1. Al lies, vnto which appertain al guiles, dissemblings, negligence in vnderstan∣ding the truth of thinges, lies of courtesy; likewise slanders, backbitings, euil speakinges, which kindes of lying are re∣pugnaunt also vnto Fairnesse of maners & conditions. Ly∣ing, is, to speak otherwise, or to signify otherwise by outward gestures, than thou thinkest, & than the thing it selfe is. So then in this commaundement principally is lying forbid∣den. Vnto lying is referred also wilful ignoraunce, which is a ly∣ing in the mind. Officious lyes, or lyes of courtesie are to be auoi∣ded, because euil is not to be doone, that good may come of it. And al lying that doth expressely dissemble the truth, is condemned. But a truth which is vttered by a figure, is no ly whether he vnderstand it or no, with whom we deale. This is to be obserued that we bee not too rigorous in exa∣mining the actiōs of the Saints; & also, that we excuse not those things which haue no neede to be excused. 1. Obiect. That which profiteth another, and hurteth no man, is not sinne. A dutiful lie is of such qualitie. Therefore it is no sinne. Answere. The Minor is false. Reply. But yet the truth is often not to bee spoken. Answere. We must not put a difference between the hiding of the truth and lying. Obiect. God blesseth the mid∣wiues, because thy told a lie. Therefore God alloweth and liketh of

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lies. Aunswere. God therefore blesseth the mid-wiues, be∣cause they feared God, & slue not the infantes of the Isra∣elites. 2. Vnto truth, in the defect, is repugnaunt vanitie or leui∣tie, which is a readines to lieng. He is vain, who lieth much, often, & easilie, and that without anie shame. A lier is he, who hath a desire to lie. Vnto truth, in the excesse, is repugnant, 1. Vn∣timely professing of the truth, which is to cast pearles to swine, and to giue that which is holy vnto dogges, as Christ saith, who by these words doth wholy forbid vnnecessarie and vntimely professing of the truth. For, as the verse hath it in the Poet, He that warneth out of time, doth harme. 2. Curiositie, which is to search after thinges vnnecessary, or vnpossible. These things may suffice for this chiefe and principall vertue of this ninth commandement. The vertues which folow, wait vpon trueth, and they all are as it were of truthes retinue.

2 Fairenesse of minde is a vertu, which taketh wel things well or doubtfully spoken or done, and interpreteth them in the better part, to wit, as farre as there are any reasona∣ble causes to induce thereto, & doth not easily conceiue suspicions, neither sticketh vpon suspicions, though they be such as are iust, & haue reasonable causes: hee doth not ground thereon, neither directeth his actions according∣ly, neither decreeth or determineth ought by them. It is defined after this manner, Faiernesse of minde is a neigh∣bour-vertue▪ vnto truth, allowing of others wils vpō proba∣ble reason, & hating all euil-mindednesse, & drawing also some things that are doubtfull to the better part; & hope∣ing in deede that which is good, but yet as touching mu∣table thinges thinking that the wils of men may change, and that a man may erre concerning anothers will, see∣ing the infoldings and secret places of mans mind are not beheld. The Extremes of this vertue, in the defect, are, Slaundering and Suspiciousnesse. Slaundering, is, not onelie falsly to criminate & attach the innocent, but also to inter∣prete things indifferently spoken in the worser part, or al∣so to interlace & coine some falshoode. Suspiciousnes, is, to take things well or ambiguously spoken in the worser part, to suspect euill thinges of those that are good, or to suspect without cause; or also to make to much of tru suspicions. It is lawful for vs somtimes to suspect, except we wil be fools.

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Mat. 10.16.17. Beware of men: be ye wise as serpentes, & innocent as doues. In the excesse, foolish Credulitie, & foolish flatterie. Cre∣dulitie, is, hastily or vnaduisedly to interprete any thing, or to assent to one without iust & probable cause: Or, to be∣leeue a thing of another, when there are manifest or pro∣bable reasons to the contrary. Flatterie or assentation, is, to praise or like things not to be praised, thereby to get either the goods or fauour of another man. Fairenesse of mind, is, an assistant or special kind of truth. Therfore it is also here together with trueth commanded.

3 Simplicitie, which is open trueth without wrinkles or fetches and compassings: or, it is a vertue which doth properly and plainly speake and doe such thinges as are true, right and declared in artes & common life. Trueth is tempered with simplicity & fairenesse of mind or condi∣tions. The extremes of simplicitie are, Fained simplicitie, and Doublenesse in manners and conuersation.

4 Constancie, which is a vertue not departing from the knowen trueth, neither altering his purpose without good and necessary causes, but constantly speaking & dooing such thinges as are true, iust, & necessarie. Or, it is a ver∣tue persisting in the trueth once found, knowen, & appro∣ued, & in the like maner professing & defending the same. Constancy is necessarie for the preseruation & mainte∣nance of the trueth. Therefore it is here also commanded. The extremes hereof in the defect, are Vnconstancie, or Light∣nesse, which is to alter true purposes & opinions without reason. In the excesse the extremes are, Pertinacie or stoicall stifnesse and rigour, which is a vice arising from a confidence in his owne wit, or from pride & ostentation, refusing to yeeld or depart from his opinion, albeit it bee such as hee seeth by strong reasons to be false, but persisting in false opinions, or vniust & vnprofitable actions.

5 Docilitie, or a readinesse to learne, which is a vertue searching after the reasons of true opinions, easily belee∣uing, & yeelding to those that teach or shew better things, & that vpon certaine reason, & framing his will ready to assent vnto true or probable reasons, & to leaue those thinges which before he held & embraced. The same are the extremes of Docilitie, which are of constācie, wherunto

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also this Docilitie is necessarie. For Constancie without Do∣cilitie degenerateth into Pertinacie; and Docilitie without Con∣stancie degenerateth into Leuitie. Now al these vertues which haue beene numbered agree and are linked verie well one with another. For Trueth must bee tempered with Fairenesse of minde and Simplicitie, perceiued and knowen by Docilitie, preser∣ued and maintained by Constancie. And so these former ver∣tues are required to the being of truth. Now the three ver∣tues following are required to the profitable beeing of the trueth in the world.

6 Taciturnitie or silentnesse, which is a vertue withhold∣ing in silence thinges secret & vnnecessarie to bee spoken, where, when, & as far as is needful; & auoiding ouer-much babling & talkatiuenes. Or, it is such a maner of professing the truth, whereby secret thinges, whether true, or false, are kept close; & speeches vnnecessarie & vnprofitable are auoided; especially vntimely, & pernicious speeches, & such as giue offence. The extremes hereof, in the defect, are Pratling, foolish prating, and treacherie. Pratling, is, not to be able to keepe close any thing. Foolish Prating, or futilitie & follie of speech, is to speake vnseasonably, immoderatelie, & foolishly. In the excesse, Haughtinesse, Peeuishnesse, & dis∣sembling of the trueth, where are necessarie, or probable cau∣ses. Peeuishnesse, or morositie, is an ouer-much silentnesse & burying of the truth, where gods glorie & the safety of our neighbour, or our owne or others cause, or the loue of our friendes requireth vs to speake. Silentnesse without affability becommeth Morositie or peeuishnesse, and Affabilitie without Si∣lentnesse becommeth pratling, and foolish prating, babling out thinges hurtfull, vnnecessarie, vaine, or secret.

7 Affability or readines of speaking, which is a vertu gladly, & with signification of good wil hearing, answering, speaking where need is vpon a necessarie & probable cause; or it is a vertue easilie entertaining the mutual talkes of others, & giuing signification of the good wil in conferences, speech, & gestures. Or, Gentlenes, facility, affabilitie, consist in giuing care & making answere vnto others, with some significati∣on of good wil. The same are the extremes of Affabilitie, which are of Taciturnitie, or Silentnesse: likewise leuitie, Assentation, or affectated & labored affabilitie.

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8 Vrbanitie or pleasantnesse, which is a vertue of speak∣ing the trueth with a certain grace & elegancie, to teach, comfort, exhilarate, & nip or touch: or, it is a certain sauce of trueth & speech, to wit, the trueth figuratiuely vttered, either to mooue or delight others, without bitternesses, & keeping the circumstances of place, time & persons. The Extremes are, 1 Scurrilitie, and Dicacitie. Scurrilitie is ob∣scene & homly iesting, especially in serious matters. Scurra (that is a scurrulous person) is so called from the Greeke worde 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth dung: because he speaketh fil∣thinesse & dung. Dicacitie or scoffing is a vice of isting bitterly, & of deriding, bourding and exagitating others, but especially such as are miserable. 2 Stoliditie or Foolish∣nesse, & Sottishnesse or vnsauorinesse. Foolishinesse is an vntime∣ly affectation of vrbanitie. Sottishnesse is an absurd & vnsa∣uorie affectation of vrbanitie. Now Vrbanitie is an especial gift of the wit, but may notwithstanding bee gotten by ex∣perience in matters. 3 Backbyting, which spreadeth false slaunders of others, constereth doubtfull speeches in the worse part, with a desire of reuenge, & an endeuor to hurt, or to raise enuie.

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