The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.

The fourth Sophisme, of Contingency and liberty or freenesse.

* 1.1THat which is doone by the vnchangeable decree of god, is not done contingentlie and freely. But al thinges are doone by the vnchaungeable decree, or counsel, or prouidence of god. Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Aunswere. The Maior is either particular, and so concludeth nothing: or beeing generally vnderstoode is most false. For an effect which is the some in subiect and matter, is chaungeable and vnchaungeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of diuerse, of which togither it is produced & doth depend, and whereof some are chaungeable, some vnchaungeable.

In respect therefore of second and neerest causes, some effects are necessarie and certaine, which are produced out of causes al∣waies woorking after one sort, some are changeable. which haue a changeable cause, that is, such as is not alwaies woorking after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely the decree of god, which is vn∣changeable, all effects are vnchangeable and most certaine, euen those, which in respect of second causes, are most vncer∣taine. As, that the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent in respect both of the bones, which in their own nature might as well haue beene broken, as not broken, as also of the souldiers, who as concerning the na∣ture of their will, might haue chosen to doe either; but in respect of the decree of god it was necessary: for by his de∣cree were the wils of the souldiours so ruled, that they could not then neither would choose the contrary. Wher∣fore the vnchangeablenes of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditional, dooth not take away either the contingency of euentes, or the libertie and freenesse of a created will, but rather maintaineth and confirmeth it. For GOD accomplisheth his de∣crees by reasonable creatures, according to the con∣dition of their nature, when as by obiectes represented and shewed to their vnderstanding hee enclineth and bendeth their will, that it shoulde with free and inwarde motion choose or refuse that, which seemed good from euerlasting to GOD, and was decreed of him. For if, when God worketh well by euill creatures, there is not taken away in them, through the decree or prouidence of God, and his good woorking, that which is accidentall to them, that is, corruption: how much lesse shall that bee taken away which is essentiall vnto them, euen to woorke freely? So the blessed Angels are chaungeably good, as concerning their nature: but they are vnchaungeably and necessarily onely good, according to Gods decree and directing of them, and yet freely, so that howe much the more effectually they are mooued by the spi∣rite of God, so much the more freely, and with greater alacritie and propension they will and doe onelie that which is good. Iudas, the Iewes, Herode, Pilate, the soul∣diours

deliuered and crucified Christ freely & with great willingnes & pleasure, & yet they did whatsoeuer the hande & counsel of god had determined before to be doone. Acts. 4 28.

2. Ob. That which is done by the vnchangeable decree of god, is not don cōtingently, but necessarily: Al things are don by the vn∣changeable decree of god: nothing therefore is doone contingently, neither by fortune or chance, but al necessarily: which is the Stoicks doctrin of fate or destiny. Here before we answere to this obie∣ctiō, we must know the significatiō of the words, & the diffe∣rence between the opinion of the Stoicks and Christians.

NECESSARY is that which cannot be otherwise, than it is. CONTINGENT is that,* 1.2 which is indeede, or is done, but might notwithstanding not haue bin, or haue bin done otherwise. Neces∣sity therefore and contingency is the order which is be∣tween the cause and the effect, vnchaungeable or change∣able. And because the effectes followe of their causes vn∣chaungeably, either in respect of the nature it selfe of the causes, or in respect of som external cause, which designeth and appointeth another cause to a certaine effect: and be∣cause also the effects themselues cannot be more vnchāge∣able, than are their causes: therefore there is said to be a dou∣ble necessity;* 1.3 One absolute or simple, which is of them, whose oppo∣sites or contraries are simply vnpossible, in respect of the nature of the cause or subiect whereof it is affirmed. As are the essential & personal properties of god, to wit, god is, god liueth, god is iust wise, &c. God is the eternal father, son, & holy ghost. The other is necessity of consequence or by supposition, which is the immutability and vnchangeablenes of those effects which follow of causes: which causes being supposed or put, the effect must necessari∣ly follow, but the causes notwithstanding themselues might either not haue beene, or might haue been changed. So are those things necessary which god hath decreed that they shuld be don, in respect of the vnchangeablenes of his decree, which de∣cree yet god most freely made, that is, he might from euer∣lasting either not haue decreed it at al, or haue decreed it otherwise, according to those words, Mat. 26.53. Thinkest thou that I cānot now pray to my father, & he wil giue me mo thā twelue legions of Angels? How then should the scriptures be fulfil∣led? Likewse those things are said to be necessary, which are done indeed by such second causes, as are so made of god, that by their

owne nature they cannot doe otherwise than they doe, but yet they maie bee by God himselfe either taken away, or hindered, or alte∣red and chaunged. As the Sunne and the shadow going for∣ward, in consequence or order of nature, with the Sunne, and yet consisting and standing still in that battaile of Iosua, and returning backwards in the dayes of Ezechias: the fire burning bodies within the reach thereof which are capeable of burning, & yet not burning the three children in the fornace of Babylō: or those things which are indeed in their owne nature apt to produce a contrary or diuerse thing, or to forbeare producing of their effect: and yet not∣withstanding cannot do otherwise, because they are so mo∣ued by god, or by other causes, which although they be not changed, yet might haue bin changed, or when they work so, cannot withall not worke, or work otherwise, because two contradictories cannot bee both at one time true.

FORTVNE and CHANCE are sometimes taken for the e∣uents themselues or effects which follow causes that are causes but by an accident, by reason of such causes,* 1.4 as are causes by and in themselues, but not knowen to vs: as when wee say, good or e∣uil fortune, happy or vnhappy chance: sometimes they sig∣nify the causes of such euents, either the manifest causes, which are causes but by an accident (as when any thing is said to be don by fortune or by chance) or the hidden and vnknowen causes, which are causes by and in themselues: As it is said in the Poet: Omnipotent fortune and fate ineuitable. And they are wont to cal that fortune which is a cause by an accident in voluntary agents, whose actions haue some euent, that seldom happeneth, besides their appointment: As he that digging with purpose to builde, fin∣deth treasure. Chaunce they call an accidentall cause in naturall agentes, whose motions haue effects neither proper to them, neither alwaies hapning, & that without any manifest cause directing it, as if a tile falling from a house kill one that passeth by.

By the name of FATE or destiny,* 1.5 somtimes is vnderstoode the decree & prouidence of God: As that of the Poet, Leaue off to hope that the fates of the gods are moued with entreaty. But the Stoickes by this woorde vnderstoode the immu∣table connexion and knitting of all causes & effectes, depen∣ding of the nature of the causes themselues, so that neither the second causes are able to woorke otherwise than they woorke,

neither the first cause can woorke otherwise, than doe the second, and therefore all effectes of all causes are absolutelie necessa∣rie. This opinion of the Stoickes, because it spoileth God of his libertie and omnipotency, and abolisheth the or∣der and manner of woorking in second causes disposed by Gods diuine wisedome, not onely founder Philosophy, but the Church also reiecteth and contemneth, and doth openly professe her dissenting from the Stoickes. First, be∣cause the Stoicks tie god to second causes, as if it should be necessa∣ry for him so to woorke by them, as their nature dooth beare and suffer. But the Church teacheth, that God worketh not ac∣cording to the rule or lore of second causes, but second causes according to the prescript of GOD as beeing the chiefe and most free gouerner and lord, and therefore are subiect and tied to his wil & pleasure. Secondly, the Stoikes were of opinion, that neither God nor second causes can doe any thing of their owne nature otherwise than they do. The church affirmeth, that not only second causes are made & ordai∣ned by god, some to bring forth certaine & definit effects, some variable and contrary; but God himselfe also coulde from euerlasting either not haue decreed, or haue decreed & wrought otherwise, either by second causes, or without them, and by them either changeable in their own nature, or vnchangeable, al things whose contrary are not repug∣nant to his nature: & that hee hath so decreed them, and doth so work them, not bicause he could not otherwise, but because it so pleased him, as it is said Ps. 115.3. Our god is in heauen, he doth whatsoeuer he wil. And Luk. 1.37. With god shal nothing be impossible: that is, which is not against his nature, or whereby his nature is not ouerthrowen, as it is saide 2. Tim. 2.

Out of this then which hath beene spoken we answere vnto the argument which was, That which is done by the vnchaungeable decree of God, is not done contingently but ne∣cessarily. All thinges are doone by the vnchangeable decree of God; nothing therefore is doone contingently, neither by fortune, or chaunce, but all necessarily. First wee say, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses, when the opi∣nion of the Stoicks is obiected to the Church. For albeit the church confesseth al euents, in respect of gods prouidence, to be

necessary; yet this necessity is not a Stoical fate & destiny, because the church defendeth against the Stoikes both li∣berty in god gouerning things at his pleasure, & a chāge∣ablenes in second causes, & sheweth out of gods word that god could both nowe doe, and from euerlasting haue de∣creed many things, which neither hee doth, nor hath de∣creed. And therefore the church also hath absteined from the name of fate,* 1.6 least any should suspect her to maintaine with the Stoicks an absolute necessity of al things. Secōdly if remouing stoicisme, yet notwithstāding the necessity of al things & the abolishing of cōtingency, fortune, & chance, be obiected: we make aunswere to the Maior by distinguishing the words, For those things that are done by the prouidence & de∣cree of god, are done indeed necessarily, but by that neces∣sity which is by supposition, or of consequence, not by sim∣ple necessity or absolute. Wherefore it followeth that all things come to passe, not by simple & absolute necessity, but by that of supposition or consequence. And necessitie of consequence doth not at al take away contingency. The reason hereof is this: Because the same effect may haue causes whereof some may produce it by an order changeable, some by vnchangea∣ble order, & therefore in respect of some it is contingent, & in re∣spect of some, necessary. For as the originals or causes of con∣tingency in things are that liberty which is in the will of god, and Angels, and men, and the mutable nature of the matter of the elementes, together with the readinesse or inclination thereof to diuers motions and formes: so the cause of absolute necessitie in God is the very vnchangeable nature of god; but the cause of that necessitie which is onely by consequent, is the diuine prouidence or decree comming between those things which are in their own nature mu∣table, & also the nature of things created, which is framed and ordained of god to certaine effects, and yet subiect to the most free wil & gouernment of god, either according, or besides, or contrary to this order which himselfe hath made. In respect therefore of second causes, some things are neces∣sary, which are done by causes woorking alwaies after one sort, as the motion of the son, the burning of any matter put vnto the fier, if it be capeable of burning: some thinges are contingent, which haue causes working contingently,

that is, apt and fit to produce or to forbeare producing di∣uerse & contrary effects: as the blasts of windes, the locall motions of liuing creatures, the actions of mens wils. But in respect of the first cause: that is, of the wil of god, all thinges which are, or are doone in Gods externall and outward woorks, are partly necessary, partly cōtingent: necessary, as euē those things which haue second causes most chaungeable: as that the bones of Christ on the crosse were not broken by the soul∣diers, by reason of the vnchangeablenes of the decree & prouidence of God: contingent, (by reason of the liberty of his eternal and vnchangeable decree, and the execution thereof) euen those thinges which, as concerning their owne nature, haue second causes most vnchangeable, as the motion of the sunne & shadowes.

* 1.7If therefore by contingency they meane the changeablenesse of effects, which they haue by the nature of second causes, or by the power and libertie of God; it doth not follow that things are not contingent, because of that necessity which they haue by the prouidence of God. For this dooth not take away, but preserueth rather the nature, order, & maner of woor∣king in second causes ordeined by God. But if by contingen∣cy they mean the changeablenes of second causes and effects, so flo∣ting and wauering, that they are not ruled and gouerned by Gods prouidence, any such contingency the Scripture dooth not admit or approue.

* 1.8Hereby we also vnderstand, when it is demanded concerning the motions & effects of creatures, whether they are to be termed necessarie or contingent, that some verily are more rightly & properly called contingent than necessarie, though both contingent & necessary are wrought by diuine prouidēce. For they are rather to bee called such as they are of their own nature & by the nature of their neerest causes, than as they are in respect of Gods prouidence, which is a cause more remoued, & farther off. And nothing is more either certaine or manifest, than that according to the nature of second causes, some thinges should bee changeable, some vnchangeable: yet by the power of God, though al things in the creatures may bee changed, they are made not∣withstanding vnchangeable, because of the certaintie of his decree and diuine prouidence.

So likewise we answere. concerning fortune & chance.* 1.9 For if by these names be vnderstood such causes or euents by accident, as haue no cause which is proper and by it selfe a cause, they ought to be far abandoned from the church of Christ. But if wee vnderstand thereby a cause which is by it selfe a cause & proper, though vnknowen to our senses and reason, or such causes by acci∣dent which haue notwithstanding some secret proper cause adioi∣ned, nothing hindereth (in respect of second causes, which are causes by accidēt, & in respect of our iudgemēt where∣by we attain not to the proper, & that which is by it selfe the cause of these euents) that to be, or to be a thing fortu∣ning or don by chance, which in respect of gods prouidēce commeth to passe by his most accurate and vnchangeable counsel & decree; according to those sayings, Matth. 10.29. One sparowe shal not fal on the ground without your father. And Pro. 16 33. The lot is cast into the lap, &c.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Gods gouern∣ment doeth not take away, but establish the li∣berty of the cre∣atures will.
• * 1.2

  The difference between neces∣sarie and con∣tingent thinges.
• * 1.3

  The difference betweene abso∣lute necessitie, and necessitie of consequence or supposition.
• * 1.4

  Fortune and chaunce.
• * 1.5

  Fate or destinie. The difference between the stoickes and th•• churches do∣ctrine concer∣ning Gods pro∣uidence.
• * 1.6

  Necessitie of consequence or supposition doth not take away contingency.
• * 1.7

  What contin∣gencie is denied.
• * 1.8

  Whether the motions of a cre∣ature are contin∣gent or neces∣sarie.
• * 1.9

  What fortune and chaunce is denied.