The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.

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Title
The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.
Author
Ursinus, Zacharias, 1534-1583.
Publication
At Oxford :: Printed by Ioseph Barnes, & are to be sold [by T. Cooke, London,] in Pauls Churchyard at the signe of the Tygres head,
1587.
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Subject terms
Heidelberger Katechismus -- Early works to 1800.
Theology, Doctrinal -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A14216.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 27, 2024.

Pages

1 WHETHER THERE BE A GOD.

THE great miserie of mans nature cannot bee suf∣ficientlie thought vpon, that, whereas it was created to the bright knowledge and euen the verie image of god, it is fallen so farre, as not onely it is ignorant who, and what God is, but also maketh dispute, whether there bee

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any GOD in heauen or no. The causes of this euill, the Church alone doth vnderstand: the first whereof is the blindnesse and corruption of mans nature after his fall: the next the instigation of the Diuel, who would haue the whole opinion of God rased out of the minds of men: vnto which commeth the horrible confusion of mans life and humane affaires, in that often-times the wicked florish, & the godly either are oppressed by them, or while they per∣ceiue not the causes of these euils, and the secret gouern∣ment of God, they fall to doubting whether there bee any God, who hath care ouer the world and humane affaires.

But that there is a God, is proued by diuerse reasons.

1 From the beutifull & goodly order of nature, beheld in the world. Now order is instituted, but of a wise and vnderstan∣ding nature. In nature there is order. Therefore there is a superiour mind or intelligent power which instituteth and maintaineth the same.

2 From the nature and excellencie of mans minde. For it cānot possibly be, that he should bestow any thing vpon an other, which himselfe hath not, who should giue it: & that our reasonable nature must needes haue his original from an intelligent & vnderstanding nature, is manifest inough, for that the cause is not woorser or baser than the effect it bringeth. But the mind of mā is reasonable or indued with reason, & hath some cause. Therfore it hath an vnderstan∣ding cause, which is God. The Minor is proued Whatsoeuer hath a beginning is from another: because it must needes be from some thing. And of it selfe it cannot haue being or beginning, be∣cause nothing is cause of it selfe. But mans mind hath a beginning. Therefore from another; which other must needes be God.

3 From the notions of general rules or principles in the mind; as are the difference betweene honest things & dishonest, numbe∣ring, vnderstanding of consequences in discourse & reasoning, & other notions borne together with vs. For these notions of principles beeing borne in vs, and with vs, could not come by chance or from a sensible nature common to vs with brute beasts. Whereupon we frame this Syllogisme: Noti∣ons are not engendred nor haue their being, but from a cause intel∣ligent (for no man maketh another wise, who himselfe is not wise) but in men there are notions, not comming by vse, nor receiued frō

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men: Therefore they are from God. Rom. 1. God is said to haue manifested his righteousnesse to men. Likewise, Man is the image of god. Seeing then these effects are attributed vnto God as proper: there must needs be a God.

4 From the naturall notion of this principle, whereby wee af∣firme, that god is. Principles are true: Because they are di∣uine wisedome; and because, the contrary or opposite thereto beeing granted, nature is thereby destroied. But, That God is, is a principle. 1. Because euery one hath experi∣ence hereof in himselfe. 2. All wise men confesse it. 3. All nations consent in it: because they haue some religion, and about that they contend and striue. 4. Rom. 1.19. That which may be known of god is manifest in them, that is, in the minds of men, for god hath shewed it vnto them. Therefore god is.

5 The terrors of conscience which are stroken into the mindes of the wicked after they haue sinned. The torment of minde, which ensueth vpon sinnes committed, is inflicted of a iudge which knoweth both honest and dishonest thinges, detesteth those things which are dishonest, beholdeth the mindes and harts, exerciseth iudgement vpon the minds: But in al the wicked is this torment. Rom. 2.15. They shew the effect of the law writtē in their harts, their conscience also bearing witnes. Isa. 57.20.21. The wicked are like the raging sea, that can∣not rest. There is no peace, saith my god, to the wicked. Isa. 66.24. Their worme shall not dy, neither shall their fire bee quenched, Therefore there is some such iudge. But he cannot be, ex∣cept he be God: because this punishment cannot come but from God. Deutr. 4. God is a consuming fire.

And hence is apparant the impudencie of Epicures and Academicks, who deeme al religion to be deuises of subtill men, coined to this end and purpose, that the rest of the common people might, through fear of a superiour power, be kept in good or∣der. For first, if through deceiueablenes other men beleeue that God is, and dread him; why then are these men them∣selues, who wil seem by their sharp insight to espy the guile most of al tormēted with the conscience & priuy acknow∣ledgement both of this their blasphemy, as also of other their misdeeds? Moreouer the sole and bare asseueration & word of a few could not haue bin sufficient neither to per∣suade al mankind, nether to maintain the persuasion, once

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brought in, to al succeeding ages. Neither doth that lightē the force of those argumēts, which are deducted from this notion, that there is a God; & from the conscience, in that they say, there are many found, who neither beleue there is a god, nether are moued with the conscience of their sins. For although they couet neuer so much to persuade themselues, that there is no God, yet is their conscience alwaies against them. And therefore it is most false that these men ima∣gine that any one of the wicked is free from the gnawing of his conscience. For how much the more euery one des∣piseth God and al religion, and endeuoreth to represse the prickes of conscience: so much the more is he tormented, and at euery mentioning and signifieng of God hee trem∣bleth and shaketh with horror; and how much the slowli∣er, with so much the more seuere dolor & paine is his secu∣rity shaken from him. Whereupon wee see, those, whose whole life was profane and secure, for the most part, when they are oppressed with the terror of gods iudgement, to perish in despair. Now that which is said Psa. 10. The vngod∣ly is so proud, that hee careth not for god: neither is god in all his thoughts: & Ps. 14. & 53. The fool hath said in his hart, there is no god: that this hath not this meaning, as if the wicked were void of al knowedge and fear of god, or do not confes that there is a god: but that framing vnto themselues another, than he indeed is who hath manifested himself, to wit, one that careth not for mens affairs, defēdeth not, nor deliue∣reth the good, and punisheth the wicked; they place an i∣dol in the roum of the tru God: Dauid himself doth suffici∣ciently declare, when as he describeth the same prophane∣nesse of the wicked, Ps. 10. in these words: For he hath said in his hart, tush, god hath forgotten, he hideth away his face, and he wil neuer see it.

6 From the punishmēts of the wicked, which they suffer besides the torments of conscience. For the euents of al times cōstrain men to confesse that their sins are punished with grieuous punishments in this life; & cōtrariwise the lot & end of the good to be more pleasant. Wherefore there is a minde or vnderstanding power, which discerneth honest things frō dishonest, iudge of mankind, punishing the wicked, & defē∣ding the good. And that this may not be ascribed to the

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wisedome or seuerity of magistrats or other men, this first withstādeth & hindereth, for that it must needs be that this na∣tural instinct, whereby men iudge that offender▪ are iustlie puni∣shed, must proceed from some mind which is enimy to wickednes. Again, for that oftentimes by marueilous & inexpected and vn∣looked for meanes they are drawen to the iustice and punishment of the Magistrates, whose sinnes before had beene priuy, or who seemed to haue bin able by their owne power or subtilty easily to escape their handes; and that especially, for that many, who through either the negligence or white∣liuerdnes of Magistrats are not punished by them, yet run into calamities and haue allotted vnto them ruthful ends. And whē transgressions & sins encrease too much, & their impunity, whole nations and common-wealthes with horrible and manifest examples of gods wrath perish: as the world in the de∣luge: Sodom by fier cast from heauē: Pharao in the red sea: the Iewes, & many florishing kingdomes by most lamen∣table ouerthrowes. That these things cānot come to passe by chaunce, neither any other way than by the iudgement and power of him who is Lord of mankind & nature, both Gods comminations and threatnings, and the conscience of euery one, and the order of iustice, whereby these folow and ensue vpon impiety, and the very hugenes, waight and greatnes of things doth conuince. Wherefore it is said, Ps. 58. The righteous shal reioice when he seeth the vengeāce: he shal wash his footsteps in the blood of the vngodly. So that a man shall say, Verily there is a reward for the righteous: doubtles there is a god that iudgeth the earth. And Psa. 9.16. The Lord is knowen to execute iudgemēt: now albeit the wicked florish often for a while, & the godly are oppressed, yet neuertheles exāples which are fewer in nūber, do not weaken the general rule, vnto which most euēts agree. But if it were so that fewer of the wicked did suffer punishment, yet those selfsame examples, though but a fewe, would testify that god is, & that he is displeased with the offences of others also, who seem to be lesse puni∣shed. But this is not true, no not of any of them, that they are not punished in this life. For al those who are not be∣fore the end of this life conuerted to god, if punishment do not sooner ouertake them, yet at length they die in dis∣paire, which punishment is more grieuous than all the

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euils eyther corporall or externall, and is the begin∣ning & testimonie of euerlasting punishment. Now in that this punishment is not sufficient, it doth therein agree with all euen the most tragicall cases of the wicked: and there∣fore wee are taught by the doctrine of the Church, that Gods lenitie, which he doth not seldome vse in this life to∣wards the wicked: and his seueritie, which hee seemeth to shew towardes the godly, doth not at all weaken his diuine prouidence and iustice, but rather declareth his goodnes, whiles by differring of punishment he inuiteth the wicked to repentaunce, and by exercising the godly with cha∣stisementes and crosses, hee perfecteth their saluation; and also it confirmeth the certaintie of iudgement after this life, wherein perfect satisfaction shall be made by the wicked to Gods iustice.

7 From a bodie politique, which is wiselie ordered by lawes. This coulde not haue beene shewed vnto men, but from a minde, vnderstanding and approouing this order, which minde is God himselfe. Moreouer, that which is not preser∣ued by humane wisedome, or by force, or naturall causes, neither yet can be ouerthrown by Diuels & the multitude of wickedmen, hath a defender more potent & mightie than these. Common-weales are not preserued by humane strength or wisedome, & are oppugned by the wicked and Diuels. Therefore they haue a superior and migh∣tier defender than all these. And this defender is God alone.

8 From the order and nature of efficient causes. For it can not bee, that the processe and race of effici∣ent causes shoulde bee of an endlesse and infinite ex∣tent: wherefore there must bee some first and princi∣pall cause, which may either mediately or immediate∣ly produce and mooue the rest, on which also all o∣ther causes may depende. Nowe that the progresse of causes, which haue their moouing and beeing eache of other, is not infinite, they shewe by this reason. If the causes of anie effect were infinite, whereof some should mooue or produce other some, one of these absurdities should follow; that either within the compasse of a finite time should bee effected infinite motions and mutations, or else at no time those infinite causes euer to attaine vnto their end, that is, vnto their purposed effect. Both which beeing manifestly false, and im∣possible,

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it must needes be that the original of mutations dependeth of some cause immutable, eternal and omnipotent.

9 From the final causes of al things. To appoint the endes of all thinges belongeth to a nature which is wise, and ad∣ministreth al things. Now al thinges are ordeined to their ends, and those also certaine. (But these endes and vses of thinges haue not their beeing by chaunce, or from a nature onely endewed with sense) Therefore from some nature which is wise and omnipotent, which is God alone.

For, that nature worketh for some end, this is so farre from remoouing the framer and artificer from it, as rather it most of all confirmeth, that there is a minde maker and framer of the woorlde, which appointed the actions of na∣ture to these ends, and nature deede intendeth to an end thtough the ordination and appointment of another, but neither vnderstandeth it, nor is moued thereby to work.

And further, that there are manie things in the world which not onlie seeme vnprofitable to all, but are also troublesome and pernicious: this also doth not infringe the generall rule, That all thinges were made to a good vse. For by reason of sinne those things nowe hurt, which would haue profited men if they had not sinned. And therefore to the godly al thinges turne to their safetie, yea that punishment it selfe, which God inflicteth by other creatures vpon mē, serueth for an vse agreeable to the wisedome and iustice of God. Many thinges also, whereby men feele discommodities, haue withal some vses acceptable, & preseruatiue to mans life. And farther there is no one thing among all things which yeeldeth not matter of agnizing and celebrating the wisedome, bounty, power, and iustice of the author.

10 From certaine and cleare significations of future euentes, which neither by humane sight or perceiueablenes, nei∣ther by naturall causes or signes coulde haue beene fore∣knowen: but only beeing reuealed by him, who hath both mankinde and the nature of all thinges so in his owne power, that nothing can bee doone but through his mo∣tion. Such are the prophecies of the deluge, of the poste∣rity of Abraham, of the comming of the Messias. Which first is thereby manifest, for that the decrees and coun∣sailes

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of that minde, which is the first cause of his owne workes, no man can knowe before himselfe: and therefore they cannot bee foreknowen of others, but beeing disclo∣sed by him. Furthermore, many Prophecies haue beene vttered in such sort, that God hath not onely foretolde things should so come to passe, but also that those thinges shoulde bee doone and brought so to passe by him, Ezech. 12. Of all thinges foretolde by him hee saith, I will speake the woorde, and I will doe it. Lasty, it must needes bee that he knoweth all things who promiseth that hee will giue aunswere concerning all purposes and euentes ne∣cessary to bee knowen, which shall bee demaunded of him, and dooth indeede perfourme this; euen as God did among the people of Israel. And therefore God himselfe alleageth this as his worke alone, for proofe of his diuinity against all forged & fained Gods. Isa. 41.23. Shew the things that are to come heereafter, that wee may knowe that you are Gods.

11 From heroicall instinctes, that is, wisedome, and excel∣lent vertue, in vndertaking and atchiuing those woorkes, which surpasse the common capacity of mans nature. Such is the felicity and happinesse of noble artificers or gouernours, in searching or polishing artes, and in finding out deuises and counsailes: Likewise the couragiousnesse of mind in performing the actions of vertue, and in mena∣ging matters: such as was in Achilles, Alexander, Archime∣des, Plato, and others.

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