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ANd this is the beginning, both Primary & Secondary, of things created acording to their nature: now followeth the powerfull cō∣servation of the same, and the most wise ordering of them vnto their end, which by the vse of the Scripture, and the Doc∣tors
of the Church, we call Providence.
Now, whereas a double part of this Providence is wont to bee discerned, and distinguished: the one of decree, according to the eternall fore-know∣ledge, and fore-appointment of all thinges in God: the other of Executi∣on, according to the externall Admini∣stration of the same in time: and wher∣as also the consideration of the former properly pertayneth to Predestination; which is a kind of Gods operations Im∣manent: wee in respect of this latter, doe here consider, and treate of Provi∣dence, properly so called.
This Providence then is an outward and temporall action of God, whereby he keepeth all and several things, which are; and disposeth ••ll, & several things which are done, to that end, which hee hath determined according to the liber∣ty of his will, and that to the end, hee might in all, and severall things be glo∣rified.
The Efficient Cause of this Providence or governement is the same, which is of
Creation, sith the one, and the self fame beginning is of both: from & by which all things proceed & are conserved, to witte, God the Father, Sonne, and holy Ghosta 1.1.
The Father, or the loue, and goodnes of the Father, is the first beginning cause. The Sonne, in that he is the wise∣dom, and word is the working causes.
The holy Ghost, in that hee is the vertue and power of the Father, and the Sonne, is the finishing cause.
The nature of God teacheth this, whose presence, power, & operation, the scrip∣ture cōmendeth in both works:b 1.2 cōmon Nature testifyeth it, which as the commō Instrument of God being stirred by that vniversall beginning, stirreth, and being moved, moveth it selfe, and al things ac∣cording to it selfe. Our nature together witnesseth and feeleth it, because as in himselfe we haue our being, so in him∣selfe also, we liue and are moved.c 1.3
And the operatiōs of this efficient cause are according to degrees distinguished; now they are distinguished by a three∣folde
order & maner. The first is of Con∣servation: the second of Governing: The third of Ordayning to the end: of which more at large in the formall cause of providence. The Matter, about which Providence is imployed, according to the twofold consideration of the things which are subiect vnto it may be distin∣guished two wayes: one way in respect of those things which are, another way in respect of those things which are don, for after both wayes & respects, all and severall things are ruled by Gods provi∣dēce. The things which are, ought three wayes to be distinguished, first, accor∣ding to their nature: secondly, according to their Accidents: thirdly, according to their vse. Of the nature of things, whe∣ther it be that superior, or inferior, wher¦of wee treated in the place of creation, there is a double knowledge: the one common, and according to their natural form or kind: the other singular, & acor∣ding to thed 1.4 things thēselues, as they are indivisible. The Accidents, whatsoever they are, are either of common nature in
its beginning & perfection, or of singu∣lar nature in the defect and condition thereof,f 1.5 besides the course of nature.
Of things according to their vse, there is a twofold distinction: for eyther they are the ends, or the means vnto the end: but the ends are, some furthest off, and some intermediate vnto the same: the meanes are severally known two waies: first, after the manner of doing: for some are ordinary, some extraordinary, and both ordained to their proper ends: Secondly, by the quality, and essentiall condition of them: for some are necessa∣ry, and some contingent.
Of those which are necessary, there are two kinds: for some are by themselues absolutely necessary, by a necessity of the Consequent, as they call it; and some by the cause from ag 1.6 Supposition by necessity of the Consequence.
Those which are absolutely necessa∣ry, when we treate of things created, we distinguish by two degrees. The first is in the first and common beginning of na∣ture; first by themselues, and by all
things necessary, as when wee say, that twice two is foure, which vnchangea∣bly, and by an infallible necessity are true. The other degree of necessity is from nature, out of it owne inward be∣ginning, whether materiall, as when we say, that every thing compounded of contraries, must necessarily perish; or Formal, as when we say, that the fire ne∣cessarily burneth.
Those, which are necessary by sup∣position, or by necessity of condition, or consequence, doe put one a necessity, eyther from the inward beginning, or from the outward, or from both toge∣ther. Thinges contingent are those, which may be, or not be; such as pro∣perly happen to every Individuum (or singular thing): for the power is the matter, which is capable of things pos∣sible (or contingent,) and the matter is of every singular thing, and of every In∣dividuum, which are limitted in their owne matter.
And this is the maner of those things which are: now those things, which are
don or the actiōs, are distinguished two wayes, by their beginnings and qualities; By their beginnings, because some actiōs are from a common beginning, and ar•• called Naturall, which eyther nature by it selfe effecteth, neyther is the action of will required for the same, as to liue, to quicken, &c. or effecteth them wit•• the action of naturall will, as to eate, drinke, &c. other some are from a singu∣lar beginning, and are called Volunta∣ry, which our will Intellectiue effec∣teth, not led by the instinct of nature, but by the rule of reason, whether by advise or deliberation, from which is the will electiue, or by an vnadvised moti¦on,* 1.7 from which is the Will by a cause.
By the qualities, because som are good some evill: that which is the goodnes, or evilnes of actiōs is discerned both by their own cōmon condition, according to the beginnings in actions natural, and by a singular manner, according to thei•• speciall kinde, and circumstances in actions voluntary: and all, and eve∣ry one of these, as well those which
are, as those which are done, bee sub∣iect to Gods Providence, by wayes both common and singular, as in the ex∣plication of the cause ensuing shall bee declared.
The Forme of Gods Providence, is that perpetuall Act of directing all and singular things vnto their proper ends: which act ought two wayes to be con∣sidered and discerned, to witte, com∣mon and singular; by the one, accor∣ding to the divers degrees of that act of Gods providence, by the other, accor∣ding to the singular nature and condi∣tion of the subiects vpon which it wor∣keth.
The Act of Gods providence is generaly discerned by three degrees, the declaration whereof is very necessary, for the vnderstanding of this doctrine.
The first degree is of Conservation, whereby all and severall thinges are ordinarily sustayned in the same state of Nature, and naturall properties, in which they were created.
This conservation according to the
distinction of things, which either are, or are done, is both of Existence, and of power.
The conservation of Existence, is the continuance of the substance of things, which had their being by creation, whe∣ther they be of a whole speciall kind, or of any Individuumh 1.8.
The conservation of Power is, where∣by God sustayneth and moveth the pro∣per powers of every Creature, which pertayne to the operations and perfecti∣ons thereof, by a singulari 1.9 beginning which in thinges involuntary, is a sin∣gular nature; in things voluntary is wil.
Both of them is from God, as from the vniversall beginning, on whome the beginnings, both common and sin∣gular, of thinges and actions doe de∣pend. In which dependency two things are to bee noted; the one is that the same first beginning of the conservation of things doe so worke in the inferiour beginnings, that it detracteth nothing from them, but ordinarily leaveth their Actions perfect: for God so orde∣reth
all thinges, which hee hath crea∣ted, that hee suffereth them also to ex∣ercise and doe their owne proper moti∣ons: The other is, that, that first be∣ginning worketh by those which are in∣ferior, after the manner of those Infe∣riour: for as oft as many causes Coor∣dinate (or together ordained) doe befal; the last effect followeth not the first cause, by necessity or contingence, but the neerest cause: Hence is that tearm, Fate (or Destiny) natural, so termed by Christians, which is a course and order of naturall causes, depending vpon the first cause; which vnlesse they be hinde∣red by the same, of their owne power, & nature bring forth the same effect.
The second degree is of Governing, whereby God, in whose power is su∣preme authority, disposeth of al things, consisting in his own power, ruling the same according to the liberty of his owne will.
Of this Governing, there is a three∣fold consideration; the one consisting in Commanding, the other in Doing:
the third in not Doing, which they cal Permitting: the first verily is of Do∣ctrine and Right, and therfore not pro∣per to this place, the other two, proper∣ly respect the action of Gods providēce the Action therefore of God gover∣ning is two-fold; the one performing, the other permitting.
The Action performing is that, which of the Grecians is called (Fore-Knowledge, according to good pleasure) whereby God effectually per∣formeth in all and severall things, that which belongeth to his owne worke: Now hee performeth whatsoever is good in Nature, both common and particular, as the vniversall beginning of Nature.
The Action permitting is that which of the Grecians is tearmed (Foreknow∣ledge according to permission,) wher∣by God forbiddeth not the Actions of others; but permitteth to the will of the doer, the manner of them: Of this Permission, there are in the Scripture two kindes: the one is of
(a permission,) Simple, and Abso∣••ute, when GOD permitteth sim∣ply that, which hee might simply, and immediately hinder; as when hee permitted Adam to fall: the o∣therk 1.10 by Supposition; when God af∣ter a humane manner tempereth his permissions, according to the condi∣tion of men: such permissions as these, are very many in the Olde Testa∣ment: both are in God from his owne will, and are moved to the end, which the will of God hath fore-ap∣pointed.
The thirde Degree of GODS Providence, is of ordayning, where∣by God by his admirable Wisedome bringeth all thinges, though most out of order, vnto their due order, and proper Ende.
In this ordayning, three thinges concurre, the appointment of the End, the disposing of the meanes vn∣to the end, and the directing of the meanes disposed.
The appointment of the End: be∣cause
God limitteth as all Subiect•• with their formes; so the motions of the forms with their ends, whether pro∣per or nerest, which are of things accor∣ding to their own nature: or that last, or furthest end, which is aboue nature, to witte, Gods glory, to which all thinges tend by Gods ordayning.
This supreme end of thinges, though according to perfection signified, it be one onely: yet according to the man∣ner of signifying; which manner is from the obiects, it is two-fold: his most po∣werfull Iustice, and Grace, which in God haue the respect of chiefest good.
Vnto this double End, there is a dou∣ble disposing of the meanes, according as there is fitly laied down by the school∣men, a double intent of God the dispo∣ser: the one by it selfe, chiefly, or first intended; because aswell it selfe, as all things vnto it selfe are intended: the o∣ther by it selfe intended, but not chiefly or first: because it selfe indeed is inten∣ded, but not all thinges therevnto: the intent, after the first way, is Gods
••race; after the second, Gods iustice.
The directing of the means disposed, ••s an effectuall bringing of them along ••nto the end, by the knowne meanes of Gods wisedome, whether revealed or ••idden: now this directing of the means 〈◊〉〈◊〉 eyther by it selfe, or by accident.
And this is the manner of generall providence; which being layed downe, ••here is a more easie way and method, ••nto the particular meanes thereof, ac∣cording to the particular nature of the Subiects.
For first of all the nature of thinges, whether generall or particular, is subiect ••o Gods providence, according to al the meanes both of appointment, gover∣ning and ordayning:l 1.11 for the appoint∣ment, governing and ordayning of things naturall, so faree extend them∣selues, as them 1.12 causing of the first agent extendeth it selfe: now it extendeth it selfe as farre, as vnto alln 1.13 beings, not only as touching the beings of speciall kindes, but also as touching theo 1.14 par∣ticular thinges themselues: neyther
onely as touching the beginnings of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible.
Secondly, the Accidents of Na∣ture, whatsoever they are, which are of common Nature in their own per∣fection, are subiect to Gods Provi∣dence, after the manners already re∣membred; but those which are of particular Nature in their defect, are subiect to Gods Providence, after the manner of Governing, and Orday∣ningp 1.15.
Thirdly, all ends of things what∣soever, whether meane or supreame, are appointed, governed, and orday∣ned of God.
Fourthly, those which are meanes, whether they bee ordinary, or extra∣ordinary, the first cause vseth even them, according to their owne Na∣ture, by appointing, governing, and ordayning them.
Fiftly, concerning things necessary, and contingent, (that we may see there∣into, and in few wordes expound the
more difficult points therof) three things are to be noted.
First, that the Nature and naturall properties of things, as they be, are from God, and that therefore according to the maner which God hath put into things, they are subiect to Gods providence.q 1.16 And thus stands the maner & nature of things, that some be necessary, some contingent; those, (the order whereof betweene the Cause and the Effect, is vnchangeable) eyther absolutely by themselues, and of their owne Nature, or by Supposition and relation to the Causes proposed; which neverthelesse, may eyther not be, or be changed: these, the order whereof, is mutable into both partes, of it owne nature indefinite, such as are the things of nature, or thinges particular, which haue the conditions of mutability, and contingency infolded among themselues, & in themselues.
Secondly, that it is an effect of Gods providence, that any thing happeneth by what manner soever, whether contin∣gently, or necessarily: and therefore
that falleth out necessarily, which Gods providence hath disposed to fall out ne∣cessarily; and that commeth to passe contingently, because such is the reason (or manner) of Gods providence: hence God being the vniversall beginning, ey∣ther mediately or immediately causeth that the things stand both wayes, and that out of causes necessary, or contin∣gent, Effects and Events necessary, and contingent are produced.
Thirdly, of what soever things, there is a contingency; of these there is also a necessity by supposition: and therfore nothing is so contingent, which may not two wayes be necessary by suppo∣sition: one way in it owne existence: for what was to be contingent, the same frō whence it proceeded, must needs pre∣sētly haue, or formerly had a being. The other way by the determined decree, & foreknowledge of God: in respect wher∣of, all thinges come to passe infallibly▪ but to speake properly, it is one thing that somewhat falleth out contingently; another thing necessarily, and another
thing infallibly: the first, and the se∣cond inferre the order of the Effect vnto the Cause: but the third is more common then both; because thinges both contingent and necessary come to passe infallibly; yet those, contingently, these necessarily.
These things layed down, it is ma∣nifest, that all things both necessary, and contingent, are every way subiect to Gods Providence. 1. of Conservation, because both haue being and power frō God. 2. of Governing; for of both, God disposeth according to the liber∣ty of his will, whether effecting, or per∣mitting. 3. of Ordayning, because God also hath prescribed an end vnto them, according to their Nature, and d••sposeth them, as meanes wisely, and bringeth them vnto the same power∣fully.
Sixtly, as concerning Actions Naturall, and Voluntary: it is to be noted, that three beginnings of actions must be considered, and proportional∣ly distinguished: the one Vniversall, is
God, the other Generall, is Nature: the third Particular: and is eyther a Natu∣rall Inclination, or Instinct, or Will Electiue.
Of these beginnings, there are par∣ticular properties: the vniversall be∣ginning is finite; the Generall is desi∣ning; the particular is defined in his Subiects: the first is from it selfe, and to it selfe: the second hath a relation vnto God, the third vnto both.
Whence it commeth to passe, that those actions, which are from the par∣ticular beginning mediately; are from God, by the generall beginning: but those which are from the generall be∣ginning, are from God immediately.
Here it is evident, that all actions, whether naturall or voluntary, are sub∣iect to Gods Providence: first, by way of Conservation: for God conserveth the Natures of thinges, and the liber∣ty of will which hee hath given man: Secondly, by way of governing: be∣cause God, as hee is an vniversall be∣ginning, effectually moveth all other
beginnings, to doe (or worke:) thirdly, by way of ordayning: because he brin∣geth and directeth all actions vnto the end, which hee hath fore-appointed to them, whether Naturall, or Volun∣tary.r 1.17
The last thing remayneth concer∣ning good and bad actions: and that the manner and efficacy of Gods pro∣viden••e in evill actions (for of the good there is no difficulty) might accor∣ding to the degrees thereof, the better be knowne, two things are to be pre∣mised.
One is, that according to the diffe∣rence of the beginnings, whereof wee haue aboue spoken, the one, & the selfe same action is both good & evill; good as touching the generall, as it is from God and common Nature: for both God and Nature of themselues, doe al∣wayes bring forth good actions: evil, according to the particular respect in man, as hee is corrupt: for every vi∣tious act taketh the necessity of the vice, from the neerest cause, which is the will
of the offender: whence is that of the Schoolemen,s 1.18 that the chiefty of eve∣ry procurement in sinne consisteth in the power of the Will, which cōmands the Act.
The other is, that in every Action, three thinges are to bee discerned, and distinguished; the Nature, the Sub∣iect, & the Accidentall quality of them both.
The Nature is from the Creator, which gaue it, and moveth the begin∣nings of naturall properties and acti∣ons.
The Subiect is the moving of the Action, which is according to nature, in respect whereof, every sinne is said to bee in God, subjectiuely.
The Quality is the Accident of Nature, and of the Subiect being good indeed, according to grace, but evill, according to the corruption that grow∣eth in nature, and in the Subiect, which infecteth man; and those things, which are of man, with a bodily and effectual taynt (or strayne:) whence the will,
which is the inward beginning of acti∣ons, infuseth the force of that corrup∣tion into the actions immediately.
These things layed downe, it is to bee marked, that Providence also in e∣vill actions worketh by all the wayes & and degrees.t 1.19
In the way & degree of Conserva∣tion: for it hath put into man both the beginning of Nature, which by it selfe by a naturall necessity is limitted; as also the beginning of actions, which is the will, that by it owne power li∣mitteth her motions, and freely incli∣neth them vnto whatsoeuer actions vn∣determined: againe, it sustayneth the will, as it moveth the things of nature, by a common beginning, and the acti∣ons naturall and voluntary, by a parti∣cular beginning.
By way and degree of Governing: for first, God bringeth to passe effectu∣ally the worke, that is evill, as farre foorth, as it hath a respect of good; & chiefly, it hath that, both because it is in good, subiectiuely, & because it is
vnto good reduciuely: Secondly, God remitteth the sinne, and prescribeth a bound vnto it, according to the liberty of his will.u 1.20 Thirdly, hee permitteth evill things, not that he alloweth them, but that it is no evill, to permit evils: for, sith hee which permitteth, hath power to forbid without any obligati∣on, as also he, to whome it is permit∣ted, hath power to doe without any compulsion: the Will in both parties is voluntary; in the former, without fault, in the latter without excuse.
In the way and degree of ordayning: for God ordayneth the events of sinnes vnto good,x 1.21 eyther morall (that is of punishment, and chastisement:) or Su∣pernaturall, (that is, of his glory in Iu∣stice, and mercy:)y 1.22 wherby it is cleare, that for a thing to haue being, to doe, and to bee ordayned; it is good: but for the same to bee evill, to doe evill, and to bee carried vnto evill, it is euil; that God effecth, but this God suffe∣reth to bee effected by the creature: & this is the formall cause of providence.
The end of Providence, which may easily bee gathered from the thinges a∣fore-going, is the glory of God con∣ioyned with the salvation of the Elect.z 1.23
Psal. 32.13.15. & 139.78. Ioh. 12.34.
Psal. 9 4.8. Mat. 10.29. Ier. 10.23. Prou. 6.19 Esa. 45.7.
Act. 17.28.
Indivi∣dua.
Agnata.
Ex Hypo∣thesi.
Ʋoluntas per causam.
Psa.. 19.12. & 104 19.20. &c.
Iob. 14.4 Heb. 9.27. Psal. 134.2.3.
Ex Hypo∣thesi.
Mat. 10.29.30. Luc. 12.6.7. Pro. 16, 33
Causali∣tas.
Entia.
Indivi∣dua.
Gen. 37.28. Iob. 1.21. Esa. 10.5.6. &c. Act. 2.23. Rom. 8.28
Iob. 10 10.11. Exod. 15 26. Ps. 105.17
Psal. 139.3.
Principa∣litatem Causalita∣tis omnis in peccato, consistere, penes vo∣luntatem, quae impe∣rat actum
Esa. 45.7 Lam. 3.37 Am. 3.6.
Pro. 16.9.
Rom. 8.28.
Rom. 5.20. & 11.33.
Mat. 6.26.