A briefe institution of the common places of sacred divinitie. Wherein, the truth of every place is proved, and the sophismes of Bellarmine are reprooved. Written in Latine, by Lucas Trelcatius, and Englished by Iohn Gawen, minister of Gods word.

OF GOD AND THE Attributes of GOD,

the Part Confirmatiue. CHAP. III.

THe second Principle of holy Di∣vinity is GOD: The second wee call it, not in the order of Nature;

for nothing is before God; but of our better knowledge or vnderstanding, be∣cause as the Scripture is the first Instru∣ment of every healthfull knowledge, concerning God: so God is the first, and supreme Principle of the being of those things which serue to this know∣ledge, on whom all thinges immedi∣ately depend.

Now concerning God (whom to be, both nature and reason hath suffici∣ently taught the naturall man to make him inexcusable, as also the Scripture and Faith hath sufficiently taught the Christian man to his salvation:* 1.1) we must know two things; first, what hee is, to witte, his Nature: secondly, who he is, that is his Attributes.

The Nature of God according to the manner of divine Revelation, and measure of our knowledge, may and should bee known two wayes: the one is of the Name, the other of the thing or definition, by which two, every knowledge touching any thing is wont to bee made playne or perfect.

Whatsoever is spoken of God, cer∣taine it is that that thing is not God which is spoken of him, because hee is Ineffable (or vnable to be spoken of) yet sith a Name is the signification of that thing which might be comprehended as farre as might be: divers Names are at∣tributed vnto God in the Scriptures, whereby the Nature of God is not so much expressed, as that thing which may bee knowne of vs concerning the same.

And all those are wont to be expressed and declared in a double manner, the one Negatiue, the other Affirmatiue or Positiue.

The Negatiue names which are gi∣ven vnto God, as Incomprehensible, Infinite: remoue farre from him the im∣perfections of the Creatures.

Those which are Affirmatiue, are ey∣ther vttered Essentially, or Relatiuely, or by a Metaphor.

Essentially, whether it bee properly such as that proper and Essentiall name of God IEHOVA, and others equi∣valent

vnto the same, which cannot bee attributed, (no not Analogically) to any Creature: or commonly, which may indeede be applied to men, yet are meet for God, both for the manner of excel∣lency, as God, King, good, wise, &c. as also by meane of the cause not depen∣ding, as Creator, Redeemer, &c. all which are distinguished in God, not in respect of the Essence, but of the Ef∣fects.

Those which are sayed to bee Re∣latiue, are the names of the persons, of which there is no commeation, or con∣fusion, but are severally proper to the severall persons, to witte, the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost.

These are vtered Metaphorically, which are given to God, eyther after humane affection (or passion) as man, angrie, sleeping,, or else by a congruency and similitude, as a Lyon, a Stone, a River, &c.

From the consideration of the names of God, wee proceede to the explicati∣on of the thing, or the description of

God himselfe.

Now God is (as the Hebrewes most briefly define), IEHOVAH ELO∣HIM,b 1.2 the Lord God, that is, one Essence of three persons.

Of this discription there are two members, the one of the Essence, and the Vnity of the Essence: the other of the Persons and the Trinity of the persons, which two can neyther bee separated from the declaration of the divine Na∣ture, nor ought to bee confounded in the same: for as there is an exceeding great and indivisible vnity of the divine Essence in the plurality of the persons: (for the Essence of the Father is the Es∣sence of the Sonne and the holy Ghost:) so is there a reall and different Distin∣ction of the persons in the vnity of Es∣sence, (for to be the Father is not to be the Sonne or the holy Ghost.)

We discerne the vnity of the Essence two wayes: first by the verity of the Essence: secondly, by the manner of Vnity.

The Essence is that wherby God both

is and existeth by himselfe and of him∣selfe absolutely: for hee alone is that thing which is, and who is, that is, a being not leaning vpon any other.

The manner of vnity, is not of knit∣ting together, nor of the generall, nor of the speciall, nor of consent, but of number, because there cannot be many Gods.

This manner of the vnity is pro∣ved by three arguments, by the testi∣monies of Scripture, both very many and evident, even of the olde and new Testament,c 1.3 by beginning, which as it is the first, so of necessity it ought to be but one: for two or more infinite be∣ginnings are not granted by Essentiall perfection which the persons haue in com∣mon, whole in them all, and whole in each one: for the whole Godhead is e∣quall in it owne perfectiond 1.4.

Through this Identitie of Essence in the persons, or most single, and very one vnity, Christ is sayed to bee in the Father, and the Father in Christ,e 1.5 which thing of the Fathers is called an vnion of

the persons.

This Essence which is one in num∣ber and individuall, is improperly sayed to bee communicated from one person to another, whereas that of the Essence is an Essence of it selfe: and in respect of it, the three persons in the Godhead, are of themselues God: but most pro∣perly it is sayed to bee common to the three persons, not as the vniversall to the things singular, not as the ac∣cident to the Subiects, not as the cause to the Effects, not as the whole to the partes: Lastly, not as one thing to o∣thers, but as the thing to his proper manners, which are in the thing, for the persons are the manners of subsisting or divine Essence; from which they are distinguished, not by the respect alone, nor by the reall distinction, but by the degree and manner of the thing.

The name therefore of persons which was vsed of the Fathers against Sabellius, as also the name both of Es∣sence against Samosatenus and of both against the Arians, signifieth three

thinges first the (Individuum) it selfe or singular thing subsisting, intelligible, incommunicable, and not sustayned of another: secondly, the very proper∣tyes of every Individuum, by which they are distinguished from others, and which also the Schoolemen haue called Principia Individuantia: lastly, these both together, they are called subsi∣sting Individua, together with theyr properties and the manners of being, because they signifie nothing else then the Essence subsist••ng in some one Indi∣viduum, and by the property thereof severed and limitted.

These persons are three, the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost,f 1.6 di∣stinct, not by degree, state or dignity, but by order, number, and the manner of doing.

By Order, for the Father is the first person of himselfe, not of another, not in regard of Essence, but in regard of person existing,g 1.7 the Sonne is the se∣cond in respect of person, in deed, of the Father existing by eternall generation:

of which as the truth is,i 1.8 supernaturall, so likewise is the manner vnspeakeable) but as touching his absolute Essence, he ••s of himselfe, and God of himselfe, the holy Ghost is the third coeternally pro∣ceeding and comming forth from the Father and the Sonne, in regard of per∣son, but God of himselfe with the Fa∣ther and the Sonne, in regarde of Es∣sence.

By Number, for they are among themselues truly distinct, and every one by themselues, subsisting for the relati∣ons of the persons, are incommutable, and incommunicable, the Father, the Sonne and the holy Ghost, which are not names of Essence, but of relations, and persons: and the properties which from thence flow, and come forth, di∣stinguish the persons among themselus, to witte, paternity, or a not being begotten: a beeing begotten, and a proceeding, which are works,k 1.9 from within, and divided, that is proper to every person incommunicably.

By the Manner of doing: for even

in the workes, from without, which are Indivisible, the persons indeede worke the same thinges, but not after the same manner: the Father createth, the Sonne redeemeth, the holy Ghost inlighteneth: in respect of the cause & the effect, or absolute finishing equal∣ly and inseparably; but in respect of the bound distinctly or severally.

These three persons are God, three in vnity vnconfusedly, and one in Tri∣nity Indivisibly, that the Father is God all men confesse.

That the Sonne is God, three things do proue the equality of divine essence, with the Father, divine names, and the essentiall proper things of God.

The Equalitie, both Christ proveth Analogically by his workes,l 1.10 and Paul layeth it downe expresly,m 1.11 as also ve∣ry many places of the olde and new Te∣stamentn 1.12 mutually compared together, doe confirme the same.

The Divine Names which are attri∣buted vnto Christ, are all those which are sayed to bee of God essentially, whe∣ther

properly he be called IEHOVA,p 1.13 or commonly hee be called GOD.

The Essential proper things of God which are attributed vnto Christ, are eyther divineq 1.14 properties, as Eternity,r 1.15 vniversall presence, omniscience,s 1.16 omnipotency,t 1.17 or divine workes, as of Creation,u 1.18 Redemption,x 1.19 Miracles,y 1.20 or divine worshippe, as Invocation, Faithz 1.21.

That the holy Spirite is God, the selfe same course of Argumentes doth proue: the equality Christ prooveth,a 1.22 the Divine Names, which are attri∣buted vnto him, are both that proper name of IEHOVAH,b 1.23 and the common of God and others,c 1.24 the same proper thinges are attributed vn∣to him in the Scripture, whether they bee the very properties, as eternity,d 1.25 vniversall presence,e 1.26 Inscience,f 1.27 om∣nipotency,g 1.28 or divine workes, as of cre∣ation,h 1.29 of redemption,i 1.30 of miraclesk 1.31 or divine worship.l 1.32.

And these three persons are one God, for although personally the Fa∣ther

be one; the Sonne be another, and the holy Ghost another person: yet Es∣sencially the Father is not one thing, the Sonne another thing, and the holy Ghost another thing.

The truth and perfection of this both Vnity and distinction, is seene in the knowledge of the Attributes or pro∣prieties both of the Essence and the persons.

We call the Proprieties of the per∣sons, thosem 1.33 marking Idiomes, or li∣miting Attributes, which comming from the persons, are not onely limi∣ted in the persons, but also doe limi∣te the persons, both in themselues & among themselues: for wee consider, as it were a double respect of those vn∣to the persons, the one personall, the other Notionall, both in relation, but in a diverse manner and degree.

The Personall respect is in those properties, which together note indeed a Relation, yet especially according to the vse which they haue obtayned in the holy Scriptures, and among the Doc∣tors

of the Church, they note and point ••ut the very subiectsl 1.34 or subsistings, as ••re the names of the persons: the No∣••ionall respect is in those properties which are called Notions or Relations: ••he vse of which is in relation alone, as ••re the names of Generation, Nativity, procession.

The Properties of Essence wee call Attributes in God, Essentiall to God, whereby both the verity of the Es∣sence clearely appeareth in it selfe, and is distinguished from others; yet so, that they really differ neyther from the Es∣sence, nor among themselues: not from the Essence, because they are so in one Essence, as that they are the very Es∣sence: for God is a simple working po∣wer, not among themselues: for that which is in God is one, and from the first vnity, every difference and every number ought vtterly to bee farre a∣way.

But because they differ neyther from the Essence, nor among them∣selues, they are no meane qualities be∣tweene

power and act; but they are in God most inward, actuall, perpetuall, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from his forme & act essentiall: whence it is, that God is a substance without composition of matter and forme, with out quality good, true, iust, &c. without quality or bound, exceeding great and incomprehensible, without motion or action, without passion pittifull, with∣out scituation of place most present, without time the first and the last, with∣out habite or addition; the Lord of all thinges: for all the properties are affirmed of God Essentially, and that both formally, and in the abstract, be∣cause of the individuall perfection of the Essence, as also subiectiuely, and in the concreate, because of the verity of God existing.

Of these properties some doe note out vnto vs the Essence, as it were a Priori, partly Negatiuely as Infini∣tiues, and partly Affirmatiuely, as simplicity: some other as it were a Posteriori, and that partly Properly, as those thinges which are in GOD

principally, and by themselues, as Power, Knowledge, Will: partly improperly, as those thinges which are spoken of God Metaphorically, or by way of translation, or according to the similitude of a humane passion, (or affection) as Loue, Anger, &c.

Those which are in God a Priori, are given to God one and onely accor∣ding to his Essence, Action, and Vse: and they are sayed to be incommunica∣ble, as Simplicity, Infinitiues.

Simplicity is in God altogether In∣divisible and Absolute, admitting no either diversity or composition of parts, or accidents, neyther in himselfe, nor in the persons, nor in his workes: not in himselfe, because God is the same, that his Essence is, and his Essence is the same that the being of God is:m 1.35 for God is the principall, first, and pure acte, of whom all things are wrought, and by whom all thinges doe worke.

Not in the Persons, because the Essence is whole and the selfe same in them, as whole, and the selfe same

abiding in euery one, whence we say, that the Father is in the Sonne, the Son in the Father, the holy Ghost in both, & each one in euery one: not in works, because the Essence, Will, and Action, are altogether the same thing: for as the Essence of God is naturally disposed, so it willeth, and doth: and againe, as it willeth and doth, so his Essence is dispo∣sed. Neither do the Act, and the thing done differ in God, but they are the selfe-same thing, so as while one thing seemeth to be done by the Godhead, all things are together effected in one thing, and while many things, one thing is effected in many things.

By this simplicitie the exceeding great perfection of God is concluded: for that which is one, and most simple, is of all most sufficient and most content with himselfe: and therefore is both selfe sufficient for himselfe, from him∣selfe, and in himselfe, to all things, and in all things: as also to others a paterne and cause of all perfection, Nature & grace.

Infinitnes in God, is not a magni∣tude or multitude, which wee may not passe through, but an incomprehensi∣ble power, or an incomprehensiblenes of an act, whereby he is neyther from without, nor from within finite, in himself every where whole, or most in∣wardly in all things by his Essence and power.

For, by his Essence God is every where,n 1.36 or by speaking more properly, hee is every where it selfe: that is, that selfe same thing, which we call every where, being in every place without definition, dimention, or circumscription, in every time without changeablenes, whole in all thinges, whole in each thing, whole in himselfe: the manner of this Infi∣nitnes is, that it be neyther multiplyed, norrarified, and that the Essence of God be not made diverse, but the same whole and one, that it be sayed to be present with all thinges, and with each thing, yet of none contayned: according to which manner wee say, that God is every where and no where: to witte,

in that hee is contayned of none, hee is no where, but in that hee contayneth all things, he is every where.

By his power, God is every where, because by him thiso 1.37 whole frame was both perfected, and is affected: yet so, that neyther by perfecting that power of God is weakened, for it is vnmeasura∣ble and infinite, no time, no where fai∣ling, nor by affecting doth suffer; for hee is God of power super-essentiall, not onelyp 1.38 comprehending the outmost partes of all thinges, but also with it whole selfe, pearcing and passing tho∣rough the depth of all things.

That which necessarily, and as it were by an Issuing forthq 1.39 followeth v∣pon this Infinitenes, is immutability, & that which likewise followeth Immuta∣bility, is Eternity, for hee which is In∣finite, can neyther bee mooved nor changed, according to vtter and inner qualities, and whereas he hath in him∣selfe, and from himselfe the fulnesse of perfection,r 1.40 Essence and Power, hee cannot bee extended, neyther concer∣ning

Essence, nor concerning worke: hee which is immutable, is not chan∣ged into another nature, but pos∣sesseth the same whole, neyther recey∣ving, nor ever hereafter about to receyue, but without time hee is, that hee is, and that hee is not, hee never may be, & that is it which we calls 1.41 eter∣nall.

Those properties which being from that which is the latter, are in God, bee spoken indeed of God principally, and by themselues, but yet according to the proportion both of his Act, and vse in the Creatures, they are communi∣cated vnto them, and aret 1.42 ioyntly vttered of them: these therefore are in God most inwardly according to beginning and vnmoueably, but in the Creatures Accidentally, by par∣ticipation, and after a mooueable manner, as are these amongst the chiefest; Power, Knowledge, and Will.

Power in God is that, whereby he perfectly doth all things which he wil∣leth

and all thinges which hee can will, hee can perfectly doe, this is called ab∣solute; that actuall, And both of them, are actiue.

Now God willeth by act, partly Internall and Eternall, which act is in God, eyther according to beginning, & limite, as the vnderstanding of God: or else it is indeede according to begin∣ning in God, but according to limi∣tation in another, as Providence, Pre∣destination, and in respect of this Act, the actuall power in God is called Im∣manēt (or abiding in) partly also by act externall and temporall, as Creation, Redemption, and in respect of this act, the actuall power in God is called Trā∣sient (or going forth.)

Hee can Will infinite thingesu 1.43 as his being is Infinite, and so likewise hee can doe infinite thinges which are abso∣lutely possible, and yet never shall bee determined to a certain order of things; he can then doe more thinges then hee doth, if hee will, yet he never will do them.

But as hee cannot will eyther things contrary, as evill, good, or thinges contradictory, as to be, and not to be; so can he not do, eyther contrary things which in a nature most simple and in∣commutable cannot subsist, or thinges contradictory, which in the Essence of God, voide of all falshood, and in truth most absolute and perfect, haue no place; yet not to bee able to doe these thinges is a token of power: for hee is exceeding able, who enioyeth a constant and vnchangeable power, and by no meanes departeth from that very thing which is one: for it is a point of infirmity to bee able to doe things op∣posite, and the propertie of one that is altogether powerfull, is to abide and persist in the best thing.

Knowledge in God is that, whereby he knoweth both himselfe, in himselfe, and out of himselfe, all and singular thinges by himselfe, by an indivisible and immutable act: for God alone knoweth and vnderstandeth himselfe,x 1.44 by a most inward and perfect Act, he

being infinite comprehendeth himse••fe being infinite, infinitely, and yet while by vnderstanding himselfe, he compre∣hendeth himselfe, the vnderstanding of God whereby hee comprehendeth, is not one, and that which he compre∣hendeth another: for to bee, to vnder∣stand, to comprehend, are reciprocated (or made to haue recourse each one to the other.)

Hee knoweth also out of himselfe, all thinges, and each thing, in a common and distinct knowledge,y 1.45 of the mat∣ter, of the forme, and of both their Accidentes, even of good and badde thinges: but hee knoweth indeede the good thinges by himselfe, the evill by the good opposite thereunto.

Yet hee knoweth both himselfe and other thinges by an indivisible act, in that by one act of vnderstanding and a whole looking on at once, hee com∣prehendeth the vniversall distance of thinges, both locall and temporall, possessing all thinges at once, and al∣wayes which with vs by times are vn∣foulded:

and this indivisible and present knowledge of God is vnchangeable, as well of things contingent, as of thinges neecessary, laying the condition of cō∣tingency on thinges contingent, as also the law of necessity on thinges ne∣cessary.

Will in God, is that whereby God freely and vnchangeably willeth his owne glory, as the end, and all other thinges as the meanes vnto this end, this will, for that it is of the end, and of the meanes is the first and supreme cause of thinges, comprehending with all other causes in it selfe, and subordai∣ning them to that first cause.

And albeit there is but one will in one Essence, yet by reason of the Obiectes and Effectes of good and e∣vill thinges, wee distinguish the same intoz 1.46 good Pleasure and Plea∣sure, for in respect of the good Ef∣fectes whereof God chiefly and by himselfe, entendeth the ende and meanes, wee tearme that Will his good pleasure,a 1.47 but in respect of

the evill effectes in which GOD indeed chiefly and by himself intendeth the end, yet not the meanes themselues but for the end, wee call it his plea∣sure.b 1.48.

This will of pleasure, and good plea∣sure in God is vnchangeable, that it can neyther be deceyved nor deceiue: not bee deceyved, in respect of that secret will, according to which God foreknew, determined, and willed all things from eternallc 1.49.

Not deceiue, in respect of that re∣vealed will: according to which God hath communicated the knowledge & revelation of that eternall will, as much as is necessary for our salvation.

OF GOD AND THE AT∣tributes of GOD, the Part CONFVTING.

Distinctions for the VNITIE of ESSENCE.

I.

THe name of God is taken eyther properly, and that both essentially and personally, or improperly, & that both by way of Concession. and Imitation, when the Scripture tea∣cheth of false and fayned gods, as also Appellatiuely, and by a congruency when it treateth of gods, not by nature, but in respect of divine gifts and office.

II.

ONe and three are not opposed pri∣vatiuely, because both are truely vttered of God in a diverse respect, one in respect of Essence, three in respect of the persons.

Distinctions for the TRINITIE of the Persons, and first for the di∣stinction of them.

I.

THere is one respect of those who are both finite and divisible, who in this selfe same point are distinguished

as in persons, so also in Essence: but there is another respect of God whose Essence as it is Infinite, so is it indivi∣sible also, and therefore 〈◊〉〈◊〉 onely.

II.

THose Actions which are common in cause & effect are distinguished by the bound of the Action or Effect: for the cause of working in thinges be∣longing vnto God is the same, and the worke the same, but the manner of wor∣king is diverse.

III.

THose names which are given to the persons in the Scripture, some doe point out the persons themselues, some the properties of the persons, and some the operations extra personas, out of the persons.

The Places.

Ioh, 14.9. Ans. It is one thing to treate of the order of the persons among them selues, and another thing of the order of our knowledge vnto them.

Ibidem 10. Ans. Wee badly pro∣••ede from the Phrase and manner of ••peaking concerning the Essence, to ••hat which is concerning the person, or some thinges are spoken absolutely ••f the persons in respect of the Essence, ••nd some thinges relatiuely in that they ••re persons.

Col. 1.15. Answere. There is one ••mage Accidentall, and another Sub∣stantiall.

Secondly for the Coessence of the persons.

I.

IT is one thing to treate of the Origi∣nall beginning of the Essence, which ••n thinges pertayning to God is none, and another thing of the originall of the persons: the Sonne and the holy Ghost, haue onely the originall of per∣son, the one by generation, the other by procession eternall, but neyther of Essence

II.

HE that hath al things, & hath them by nature, & not by grace is not

lower then he of whome he hath the•• for but one of both respects can be granted to be of Inequality.

III.

A Sending and obedience take no•• away equality of power, neythe•• is he that sendeth, and hee that is se•• distinguished by properties Essentiall but Personall.

Places of Scripture.

1. Cor. 8.6. Eph. 4.6. God alone is called Father in Scripture in a double respect: first oppositely, to the Crea∣tures and counterfeyted gods, not ex∣clusiuely to the Sonne and holy Ghost: secondly, by an excellency, God alone is so called, to witte, because he is not from another, no not in respect of per∣son.

Luc. 11. the Name of Father is taken sometimes Hypostatically, when the Godhead within it selfe is described; and the persons of the God-head are among themselues distinguished, some∣••es

Essentially, when the outwarde ••rkes and benefites of God towardes Creatures, and the Church are de∣••bed,

Distinctions for the Attributes, for the simplicity of GOD.

WHatsoever is simple, it is so, eyther absolutely or by it selfe, comparatiuely, and in respect of bo∣••s; after the first manner, God is ••ple, after the second manner, the ••gels and the Soules are: but if any ••mposition seemes to bee given to ••OD, it is altogether Acciden∣••l, eyther in respect of the acti∣••s or the Subiects on which hee wor∣••th: or lastly in respect of the Propo∣••ion which concerning God is vtte∣••d.

For the INFINITNES.

GOD by speaking properly is not in a place, because he is no where ••ontayned: yet euery where, because he

contayneth and reacheth vnto al thing not in quantity but in power.

For the IMMVTABILITIE.

WHatsoever change seemes to b•• ascribed vnto God in the scrip∣tures, it is not in God, but in the thing and therefore when Repentance is vtte∣red concerning God, it signifieth n•• the affect in God, but the effect of Go•• in men.

For the ETERNITIE.

SOmewhat is sayed to bee Eternal•• eyther properly or Analogically Properly, which by Nature hath ney¦ther beginning nor ending: Analog••¦cally, which having a beginning b•• the grace and power of God, hath no•• an end, after the former manner God is eternall, after the second, the An∣gels and the Soules.

For the KNOWLEDGE.

THe Act of Knowledge in God, is indivisible, wherfore neyther fore∣knowledge, nor remembrance are not ••ncident vnto God, but in respect of vs.

For the POWER.

POwer in God takes away all that, which is eyther of finite power or want of power.

For the WILL.

THe Will of God is eyther absolute, or Conditionall, neyther are there contradictory Willes in God, sith the thinges and persons are both alike, or after the same manner.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Rom. 1.19.20.21. Ioh. 17.3.
• b 1.2

  Exod. 6.2. & 3.13.
• c 1.3

  Deut. 6.4 Esa. 44.6. 1. Tim. 2.5. 1. Cor. 8.4
• d 1.4

  Ioh. 5.26. Mat. 1.27.
• e 1.5

  Iohn. 14 10.
• f 1.6

  Esa. 63.7.8. Mat. 3.16.17. Ioh. 15.26.
• g 1.7

  Ioh. 5.7. 1. Ioh. 6.
• i 1.8

  Hyperphi∣sica.
• k 1.9

  Ad intra, ad extra.
• l 1.10

  Ioh 5.18
• m 1.11

  Phil. 2.6 Col 2.9.
• n 1.12

  Paralle∣lorum.
• p 1.13

  Esa. 43.
• q 1.14

  Esa. 9.6
• r 1.15

  Idiomata
• s 1.16

  Apoc. 1.17.
• t 1.17

  Mat. 28.20.
• u 1.18

  Apoc. 2 23.
• x 1.19

  Phil. 3.21.
• y 1.20

  Io. 5.46.
• z 1.21

  Ep. 1.1.2
• a 1.22

  Mat. 8.2
• b 1.23

  Phi. 2.10
• c 1.24

  Ioh. 15 6
• d 1.25

  Act. 1.16
• e 1.26

  1. Cor. 3.16. Act. 4 24.
• f 1.27

  Heb. 9.14.
• g 1.28

  Rom. 8.9
• h 1.29

  Ioh. ••4.26.
• i 1.30

  Heb. 3.7.
• k 1.31

  Iob. ••6 15.
• l 1.32

  1. Cor. 2.10. Rom. 1.5. Mat. 28.9
• m 1.33

  Charac∣teristica Idiomata.
• l 1.34

  Hiposta∣ses.
• m 1.35

  Eph. 5.26. 1 Ioh. 1.7.
• n 1.36

  Psa. 145.3. 1. Rin. 8.27. Ier. 23.23
• o 1.37

  Vniver∣sum.
• p 1.38

  Superfi∣cies.
• q 1.39

  Cōsecta∣rium.
• r 1.40

  I ac. 1.17 Mal. 3.6.
• s 1.41

  Psal. 90.2 Apoc. 1.8.
• t 1.42

  Ex con∣creto.
• u 1.43

  Mat. 3.9.
• x 1.44

  Mat. 11.27.
• y 1.45

  Heb. 4.13.
• z 1.46

  Benepla∣citum & placitum.
• a 1.47

  Eph. 1.5.
• b 1.48

  1 Cor. 10.5.
• c 1.49

  Rom. 9.19. Esa. 46.10.