A briefe institution of the common places of sacred divinitie. Wherein, the truth of every place is proved, and the sophismes of Bellarmine are reprooved. Written in Latine, by Lucas Trelcatius, and Englished by Iohn Gawen, minister of Gods word.

OF FREE WILL.

The Part Confirming. CAP. V.

NOw, after the Condition of man vnder Sinne, followeth the con∣sideration of humane strength, which after Sinne remayned in man, and is commonly, and vsually ex∣pounded, and noted by the Name of Free-Will. But it is needefull, we dis∣cerne the nature of this Doctrine three manner of wayes. First, commonly, and absolutely, according to the cau∣ses thereof. Secondly, in Particular, according to the state and condition of man being a Sinner. Thirdly, respectiue∣ly, and comparatiuely, according to the diverse estate of Man out of the State of Sinne, whether of his Integrity, or

redemption, or glory.

Commonly, and Absolutely, Free-will is defined to bee a naturall power, or faculty of the Soule, by it owne, and proper motion without coaction (or forcing) to chuse, or refuse the good, or the evill, which is proposed (or of∣fered) to the will, by the mind (or vn∣derstanding) to bee chosen or refu∣sed.

The Efficient Cause of this Free-will, is vsually two wayes distingui∣shed. For one is Primary, and another Neerest: The Primary (or Principall) is God, the beginning, not onely of every good in nature, but also of Na∣ture it selfe, and of the faculties, and functions thereofa 1.1. The Neerest is Free-will it selfe, that is the will of mā, which by judgement of reason going before, of it owne accord, choosing imbraceth; or refusing, shunneth, that which was objected by the mindb 1.2.

Of this will, there is vsually had a double consideration: the one, as tou∣ching the Speciall, the other as touch∣ing

the Operation. As touching the spe∣ciall, it is sayed to bee a faculty of wil∣ling, or nilling: as touching the Opera∣tion, it is sayde to bee a function, or ac∣tion of that faculty, eyther improper∣ly occupied about the ends, or proper∣ly about the meanes, that tend to the ends.

The Matter hath the nature eyther of a Subiect, or Obiect.

That which hath the nature of a Sub∣iect, (as in this place, we consider it,) is a substance created, intelligent, indued with reason, wherein namely the vnder∣standing and will are the essentiall parts proportionally: but freedome is sayde to consist, or be in these parts, as the se∣parable accident in the Subject.

That, which is of the Obiect, is ge∣nerally all that, which is put (or consi∣steth) in election (or choice.) But spe∣cially it is the moral good or evil, wher∣vnto the will of the Creature is freely carried, or which it freely escheweth. And as touching Free-will in the cause of Naturall good, the question is more

Philosophicall then Divine.

The Forme of Free-will, is the very freedome of the mind, or of the Elec∣tiue will, which (for learning sake) must three wayes be distinguished, & known. For there is one freedome in the Sub∣ject, another to the Object, and lastly another from the lett that crosseth the same: which three it is needefull that wee know, for the making of this Forme, and for the condition of mans Free-will.

First, there is required freedome in the Subiect, that is, in the will it selfe, which from her inward beginning, worketh alwayes freely, and that by reason of it owne nature, according to which a free necessity of willing is laide vpon it. So that it is not to bee called a Will which is bereft of this Freedome. For the wil hath such a reciprocacy with Freedome, as with it owne Essentiall property.

Then there is required freedome to the Obiect, eyther to both, opposite by way of disjunction, to witte, eyther mo∣rall

good, or morall evill, whereof the one is chosen, or refused before (or ra∣ther then) the other, or to eyther of thē, when onely one is offered to be taken, or refused.

Lastly, there is required freedome from the let that crosseth. For the wil of man is freede from compulsion and from necessity. From Compulsion; for what it doth, it doth the same of it owne accord. From Necessity; for, al∣beit, in respect of the Speciall, it be ne∣cessarily limited to doe eyther good on∣ly, or evill onely, or both; yet by it own inward power, it freely limiteth it selfe to the bringing forth of it owne act; yet it is needefull, that both manners of Freedome be distinguished. First, from the Freedome of right, and secondly from the Freedome of slavery: That na∣ture hath denied to man: This, the cor∣ruption of nature. He hath not free∣dome of right, who of due is Subject to another, and according to the will of the same, liueth, is moved, and wor∣kethc 1.3: Wherefore all selfe power, or

liberty ought to bee given and assigned to God alone: he hath not freedome from slavery, who through his owne fault, hath made himselfe a slaue to sinne, and the tyranny thereofd 1.4.

The End is the glory of God in his Iustice, and mercy, and the Salvation, or inexcusablenesse of man.

Particularly, in the state of Cor∣ruption, Free will is defined to be, a na∣turall faculty, and power, freely, and without coaction, to chuse, and per∣forme the evill, which by the mind is offered to the will, to be chosen and performed.

The Efficient Primarie Cause is God, both in respect of the Will, and the freedome it selfe, as being the Author, and beginning of both, as touching the naturall state thereof. The neerest cause are the mind, and will of man so farre forth, as both by corruption of nature are averted from good, and converted to evill; and the vnderstanding verily proposeth and iudgeth falshood for truth; and the

will chuseth, and followeth the evill in stead of the goodc 1.5.

The Matter as it is considered in the Subiect, is the naturall, or carnal man, but as in the obiect, it is the evill, vnto which the actions of both faculties are carried.

Now, the Evill, whether you referre it to the inward, or to the outwarde actions, wee two wayes consider: ab∣solutely, and in it selfe; or Relatiuely, as having reference to another thing. The Evill absolutely is that, which is strictly forbidden of God. Relatiuely, is that, which is evill in the obiect, cir∣cumstances, and end; that is, which eyther is not truely good, or is incli∣ned vnto those thinges, which are not truely good.

But because when there is mention made of good; eyther the naturall, and morall good, as touching man; or mo∣rall, divine good, according to grace, is vnderstoode: Wee must here obserue a very great difference, when there is speech of Free-will. For the power of

a naturall man, if it be referred to the thing, which this naturall light respe∣cteth, hath indeed her inclinations to naturall good, and morall good, as tou∣ching manf 1.6; but because the com∣municating of every good, proceedeth from iudgement, and iudgement from the choice, and choyce from know∣ledge, the power of man is limitted to the good, according to the measure of the knowledge of that good in man. Now that knowledge is not true, becaus it erreth in the maner of the truth, and strayeth from the true end and scope thereofg 1.7.

Now the morall good, according to grace, which is supernaturall, is not ap∣prehended, but by a supernatural know∣ledge, which is not in the natural man: & therfore man being vnder sinne, hath neyther inclinations, nor motions to that good: for he wanteth all power to supernaturall things, even that power, which the Philosophers haue called the receptiue, or passiue power, because every power is from a beginning, but

there is no beginning in a naturall man, when there is speech of divine things) ••eyther to doe them himselfe, nor to ••ffer them to be done by an otherh 1.8: ••oth being considered in man, are from ••at beginning, of all aptnes to good, & ••so of the working thereof, which is in ••hrist. Whence it is cleare, that power 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the supernaturall good is not in the ••turall man, and that there is indeede ••me power in him, to the natural good, ••ut such, as straieth in the end, & maner, ••d that therefore to speake properly, it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 onely a power to the evill, whether it ••e such Absolutely, or Relatiue∣••i 1.9.

The Forme is the Freedome in the ••biect to the Obiect, and from the cō∣••ry impediment. For the will of man, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 touching it selfe, is most free, & freely ••itteth it selfe for the bringing forth 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the action of evill, without eyther ••y coaction, or necessity of the ••ct.

The End is the glory of God in his iu∣••••ce, and the inexcusablenes, or iust con∣demnation

of man.

Comparatiuely, Free-will is two waye•• considered, according to the twofolde condition of man, out of his State o•• Corruption, to witte; of his integritie before his fall, and of his restoring, c•••• regeneration after his fall.

In the State of Integrity, Man had a Free will, or freedome of an Electu•••• will to both Objects, without any co∣action or necessity. For he had a pow∣er, that he might sinne, and not sinne But when he came to the act of diso∣bedience, by the act, he lost the powe•• to good; because this was the nature o•• man, that hee abusing that his powe•• to good, should turne away the good from himselfe, and himselfe from th•• good into the contraryk 1.10.

In the State of Restoring, or Rege∣neration after the fall, free-will ough•• divers wayes to be considered, an•• expounded. For, whereas man in th•• state, is the common Subject of grace and sinne; Hence it commeth to passe that he hath free-will, both to good

according to Grace, & to evill, accor∣ding to Nature, which two contraries sith they cannot be in one and the same subject, in the highest degree, thence ••t followeth, that man Regenerate is to be considered according as his regene∣ration is more or lesse, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 excellent.

As for him that is Regenerate, ac∣cording to the highest degree, there can be in such a one, no contrary matter, as it shall bee with man in the life to come; where free-will (if we may so speake) shall be vnto good onely, and that vnchangeably; so that a man can will nothing but good, and that also af∣terl 1.11, a good maner; but he, which is re∣generate in the inferiour degree, the contraries may be together in him, & in very deede, are together in him, the powers therefore of Free-will in man regenerate, while hee is in this life, ought diversly to be discerned both in the Subject, Obiect, and manner. The Subiect is two wayes considered, part∣ly, according to the old man, in whom he is borne: partly according to the

New, in whome hee is regenerate. Of this Subiect, there is also a double ob∣iect, the naturall evill, in respect of the olde man, the supernaturall good, in respect of the Newm 1.12. But the maner of all these is free, because as the old mā freely inclineth to naturall things, so doth the New man also to thinges which are supernaturall: in respect therefore of the matter, the Subiect is common, but in respect of the Efficient Cause, and of the beginning, repug∣nant the one to the other; on both sides there commeth a lett to the free∣dome. Whence that strife of the flesh, and the Spirite commeth, wher∣of there is mention in the seventh to the Romanes.

OF FREE-WILL. The Part Confuting.

DISTINCTIONS.

I.

THe Will or Desire is three wayes distinguished; for one is Natu∣rall, an other sensuall, another intel∣lectuall. The Naturall is a pure incli∣nation of the Essential forme, whereby man naturally laboureth towardes the perfection of himselfe, The Sensual is the power of the inferiour part of the Soule, led or moved by sense, and not by reason, to these, or those particular things: the Intellectual, is in the cre∣ature indued with reason, in respect of the Subiect, inclining the will to di∣verse obiects, which is called Reaso∣nable.

II.

THe reasonable will ought to bee discerned three wayes. For one is called naturall, whereby nature is simplie carried to desire after that thing which it apprehendeth: an other E∣lectiue, whereby the will chooseth, betweene two thinges opposite, by a separating of them. Lastly, there is a will by the cause, whereby man strai∣eth from his end,* 1.13 through an acciden∣tall error.

III.

THat which we cal (Arbitrium) (Free-will) is sometime referred to the vnderstanding, and sometime to the Will; to the Vnderstanding, eyther Contemplatiue, or Actiue, in respect of the things, which belong to deli∣beration: but to the Wil, in respect of the things which pertaine to Election. After the former manner it compre∣hendeth

the mind alone; after the lat∣ter, as of vs it is here taken, it compre∣hendeth, both mind and will.

IIII.

THere is one Freedom frō Bondage, an other from Coaction, an other from Ʋnchangeablenesse, or necessity. Freedome from Bondage, is sayd to be that, whereby one is not addicted (o•• subiect) to the slavery of sinne, or mise∣ry. From Coaction, is sayd to be that, whereby one cannot be compelled to do, or suffer any thing against his na∣turall inclination: from Ʋnchangeable∣nesse, is sayd to be that, which can frame it selfe indifferently, or contin∣gently to both opposites, and so can do, and not do, suffer, and not suffer: The first freedom is not in man corrupt; the Second is in every man, of whatsoever state and condition: The third was in man before the fall.

V.

ONe freedome is sayd to be from necessity, an other from sinne, an other from misery. The first is of Na∣ture. The second of Grace. The third of glory.

VI.

FReedome is eyther properly taken for the freedome which is in the Subject to the Object, and from the contrary impediment: or vnproperly, or Synecdochically, for one of these Liberties.

That Man cannot without faith, or the speciall helpe of God, perform any morall good, against Bel. Li, 5. de Grat. & Lib. Ar. Cap. 9.

I.

GOod Workes are two wayes vsu∣ally considered; eyther according to their outward manner, or according

to their inward: In respect of both, God is sayde to reward good workes: of the one, because they carry a shadow of civill goodnesse, which also is ac∣ceptable to God, as touching it selfe; but of the other, because they are done in faith, according to Gods Rule and Prescript, to Gods glory. Now God rewardeth, not according to the pro∣portion of merite, but according to the grace of promise; notwithstanding those places of Exodus the 1. because there is noted an antecedent, but not a cause of Gods blessing towardes the Mid-wiues. Of Ezek. 2.29. and Dani∣el, 4. because the Consequence is of no force from the outward rewarding to the quality of the Worke. For God is wont liberally to recompence an outward obedience, with an outward rewarding.

II.

A Thing is sayd to be good Equi∣vocally, and that two wayes; ey∣ther

that it is such indeed; or that it appeareth such; or else, that it is eyther good in it selfe, as touching the sub∣stance of the worke; or that it is sayde to be perfectly good in the Object, Subiect, End, and other circumstances. The Workes of the Heathen, are cal∣led good workes, eyther according to the appearance onely, or because the substance of the worke is good, though it be evill in the Subject, obiect, end, & other circumstances.

III.

THe Fathers, which seemed to attri∣bute any thing to Nature, eyther treated onely of those outward, Civill, and politicke actions, as Basil, and Au∣gustine; or of the natural good, as Chri∣sostom••: or of Workes according to the common opinion, as Hierome.

IIII.

IN the Works of Heathens, all and every of those thinges are wanting,

which are required of the Adversary for the making of a good worke: the circumstance of the end is wanting, because that is not don for God, which is not done for his commaundement, & according to his rule, or for Gods glo∣ry. The Action is defiled by the naugh∣tinesse of the cause, because whole man is whole sinne wholy, not onely as touching himselfe, but also as touching his actions. Neyther hath a good worke any proportion with the strength of nature, because to will, and to do good, is of grace, and not of nature: and so good workes are not onely hard, but also impossible to Nature: Neyther do the absurdities proue the contrary, be∣cause wee are bound of duety to doe good workes; nor are they therefore called evill, because they are done sim∣ply, but because they are not well done.

That there is no Free-will in godly, and saving actions, against Bellarmine. Lib. 6. cap. 10.11.12.

THe Freedome of Will is vsually considered two wayes in man re∣generate, according as there are in him two divers and contrary beginninges: the beginning of good, which is the Spirite, or the parte Regenerate: the beginning of evill, which is the flesh, or the part vnregenerate. Hence the freedome of will, in respect of the first beginning freely willeth good: in respect of the other, it freely willeth e∣vill: and in this sence is Free-will in man Regenerate diversly pronounced, eyther to be, or not to be.

AND

THis is the State of man, according to Nature, and his naturall condi∣tion, both in his first originall condi∣tion, and Creation, and in his change and corruption, which after followed by sinne: Now the other state of mā in this life, according to the Grace of Vocation, which is aboue Nature, is to be known and discerned.

Now, it ought to be discerned two wayes, according as the Ch••isti∣an calling, and estate, or the conditi∣on of a Naturall Christian man is in this life comprehended in two princi∣pall heades, to wit Faith, and good Works. For these are the two partes of a Christian calling, and the two most conjunct dueties of a Christian man, namely, to Belieue and to Doe; for faith imbraceth the Grace of God in Christ, good works doe testi∣fie, and performe Thanke∣fulnesse for that Grace.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Gen. 45.8. Pro. 16.1. Ier. 10.23 Phil. 2.13.
• b 1.2

  Esa. 1.19.20 Mat. 23.37 1. Kin. 3.5
• c 1.3

  Pro. 21.1 Act. 2.23.
• d 1.4

  Ioh. 8.34.
• c 1.5

  Tit 1.15 1 Cor. 2.14. Rom. 8.7. Rom. 5.6. 2. Tim. 2.26.
• f 1.6

  Rom. 1 19.20. Rom. 2.15 Rom. 2.14
• g 1.7

  1. Cor. 2 14. Ier. 13.23 Mat. 12.35. Ro. 14.23.
• h 1.8

  2. Co. 3.5. Ioh. 3.19 Phil 2.13. 1. Co. 1.18
• i 1.9

  1. Cor. 10.31. Rom. 14.20. Tit. 1.15. Ier. 13.23. Mat. 7.18. Rom. 3.10. Ioh. 3.6.
• k 1.10

  1. Cor. 3 12. 1. Ioh 3.12. 2. Pet. 1.4. 1. Cor. 15.28.
• l 1.11

  1. Cor. 13 12. Rom. 7.18
• m 1.12

  2. Cor. 3 17. 1. Ioh. 3.9. Rom. 8.2 Eph. 2.5.
• * 1.13

  voluntas per causá