The practice, proceedings, and lawes of armes described out of the doings of most valiant and expert captaines, and confirmed both by ancient, and moderne examples, and præcedents, by Matthevv Sutcliffe.

¶ The right practice, proceedings, and lawes of Armes.

CHAP. I. What causes make warres iust or vniust, and what are the effectes of lawfull warres, and what solemnities or circumstances are to be considered in defiance of our enemies, and first attempts of warres.

IT is needelesse (as I suppose) to dispute, whether it be lawfull, either for Christian Princes to make warres, or for christians to serue in warres. Those that thinke it vnlaw∣full, as men deuoyd of iudgement in religion and state, are declared long since to be both heretical, and phrenetical persons. The law∣fulnes there of is apparent, for that most godly and religious princes, as Iosuah, Dauid, Iehosaphat, Iudas Macabeus were great warriers, & their warres so allowed, that the spirit of God calleth them the warres, or battels of the Lord, neither was the same altered by Christes comming, as the Anabaptists dreame. The holya Apostle sheweth, that the Magistrate carrieth not the sword in vaine. But he should carry it in vaine, if hee might not as lawfully repell publike force, as he may punish therewith priuate wrongs. Iohn Baptist when the souldiers came vnto him, he exhorted them not to giue ouer their manner of liuing, but to con∣tent themselues with their wages, & to do wrong to no mau,b Cor∣nelius the Centurion notwithstanding his souldiers profession, hath a notable testimony of the holie Ghost, to be a man that feared God: and if he had not beene such; hee had not receiued the holie Ghost. The true seruants of God (sayth S.c Augustine) make warres, that the wicked may be restrained, and goodmen be relieued. Beside this, what state in this notable corruption, & malice of mens nature could endure any time, if warres against violent persons were vn∣lawfull?

without warres who can warrant vs against spoyle and iniury? it is the law of nature, and nations that putteth weapons in our hands for our defence; without warres ciuill lawes against rebellious subiects cannot be executed; and so should remaine with∣out edge. S.a Ambrose saith, that it is the office and parte of iustice by warre to defend our country from the enemy, our confederates, and such as by reason of their weakenes neede our aide, from spoy∣lers, and oppressors. Wherefore taking this as granted, that some warres are lawfull: let vs proceede to examine, what those things are that giue vs iust cause of warres, which is a matter much to be regarded, vnlesse we will be accompted among those tyrants that rage and vexe men without cause.

If the cause of him that warreth be good, the issue cannot be e∣uill, saithb Bernard. thec cause, as it is good or euill, so either aba∣teth and breaketh, or whetteth the souldiors courage.d and good and iust causes make men hope ro receiue fauour of God in the is∣sue, and triall.e the euent oftentimes is according to the iustice, and qualitie of the cause; andf seldome do they returne in safety, that go forth to draw their swordes in euill quarrels. Dionysius ofg Ha∣licarnassus sayth, that the Romanes therefore preuayled for the most part, for that they enterprised no warres without iust causes. contrariwise theh Gaules which accompted that iustly gotten, which they could winne with their sworde, though otherwise very valiant, receiued many great foiles. for this cause (as sayth Philip ofi Commines) Princes when they list to quarrel with their neighbors, pretend honest causes, although oft times vntrue. The French that with some colour they might receiue such as in Gas∣coigne, or Guienne rebelled against the kings of this realme, subor∣ned certaine Gascoignes, and Poicteuins to complaine of vniust ta∣xations made by the English in the dayes of Edward the third, and Richard the second. And Lewis the eleueuth of France instigated certaine rebelles to complaine ofk Charles duke of Burgundie, that vnder colour of doing iustice, he might with more reason inuade his territories. These pretenses & shewes make great disputes betwixt princes, and states, while euery man will seeme to make his cause good, and to do nothing without iust causes. Let vs therefore now consider, what causes are sufficient to iustifie the taking of armes, what are counterfeit, and insufficient.

First it is lawfull to vse ••orce, and take armes in defence of our country, true religion, our goodes or liberty.a Reason teacheth the learned, and custome instructeth all nations thus much, which euen the instinct of nature printeth in wilde and sauage beastes, that it is lawfull to repell force offered to our life, to our person, and the state with force, and by what other meanes wee can. Most iust cause therefore had the Romanes to make warres vpon the Gaules, vpon Annibal, vpon the Daues, and other barbarous nations, that came to take away their country from them; & like cause had the Greeks to withstand the Persians, & other barbarous people, that by armes would haue conquered them, and depriued them of their country and liberty. the same cause did the ancient Britons defend against the Romanes, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, though not with like successe. And seeing of late time the Spaniard came vpon our coast with fire and sword, menacing the English nation with all the cala∣mities that follow such inuasions, I thinke no man will deny, but we haue iust cause to put on armes in defence of our countrey, reli∣gion, liues, liberties, and lawes. in this case not onely our cause is iust, but the warre is of necessity to be vndertaken, which greatly hel∣peth the iustice of our cause. for as the captaine ofb Samnites said in like case, that warre is iust, whereto we are inforced, and with good cons••••nce may we take armes, when there is no safety for vs, but in armes.

It is likewise lawfull to represse pirats, and publique robbers by force of armes, if they will not yeeld themselues to be tried by order of common iustice. They are enemies of peace, & ciuil gouernment, and by the lawes defyed, and proclaimed as publike enemies of states. their bodies may be taken, and their goodes spoiled as in warres with other nations. The warres made by the Romanes a∣gainst Spartacus, who, assembling a mutinous route of rebelles and hindred al trade, was iust and necessary. in thisc case, because such do rise and assaile vs vpon a sodaine, the law of nature giueth war∣rant of defence without publike commandement or commission. neither is it onely lawful, to cleare the sea of pyrates, but also hono∣rable.d Minos made his name famous, for that he cleared the sea of pyrats, and opened the way for marchants. which fact also procured

great commendation to Pompey the Great. Moreouer, if our coun∣try be wasted and spoiled, and our goods taken away by forreiners: it is lawful by force and armes to seeke for restitution, if otherwise it cannot be obtained. Tullya accompteth that warre iust, that is made after demand of things wrongfully taken, & vniustly deteined. these quarrels often fal out betwixt borderers, theb Romans for this cause made diuers roades vpon the Sabins, Volscians, Albans and others their neighbors. Tullus Hostilius had no other causes of his warres against the same people. This hath bene the beginning of many con∣tentions betwixt vs and the Scots. of the warres betwixt thec Ro∣mans and Sabins there was no other cause, but the spoile of the Ro∣man marchants. among other causes of the third warres of thed Ro∣manes against the Carthaginians, the taking of certaine shippes, and spoiling of certaine Marchants is alledged as principall. The Switzers beganne their braules with the Duke ofe Burgundy for a loade of skinnes taken away by the Countie of Romont. likewise it is, where at a sodaine roade our goodes are spoyled, or driuen a∣way, and deteined from vs. for which cause the Romanes warred vpon thef Hetruscians & diuers of their neighbors. Iust cause there∣fore haue wee also in this respect to make warres vpon the Spani∣ard, that without destance of warre, stayed our shippes, and our marchants, and spoiled their goodes. were not mens minds ••••oled, and almost frozen with feare and age, these iniuries would inflame them. howsoeuer it is, men ought not to stay vntill the flames of our country enflame them.

In this case those that first offend do giue iust cause of warres, not those that seeke restitution by armes; as is euidentg by the example of the Romanes, and Albans, where the first iniury being offered by the Albans, made inst the cause of the Romanes. Yet if things taken away be offered againe, and satisfaction be promised to bee made for wrongs done; it is not iustice nor reason, further to prosecute the quarrel begunne. it seemeth not reason (saiethh Archidamus) to prosecute him by force, that submitteth himselfe to order of lawe. and commonly those that refuse reason when it is offered, come af∣terward to wish they had taken it, when they can not haue it. The French disdaining and scorning the great offers made by the blacke Prince, were shamefully by him ouerthrowne at the fielde of Poytiers. Thei Romanes refusing the satisfaction made by the

Samnites, receiued a notable disgrace being by composition disar∣med to saue their liues at the streites of Caudium: and Philip of Commines conceiueth, that Charles duke of Burgundy prospered neuer the better, for that he refused the humble submission, and satis∣faction of the Switzers, desiring peace at his hands.

The iniurie that is done to the subiects redoundeth to the Prince, and reproches and contumelies done to ambassadours, and messen∣gers returne vpon those that send them. both these things minister lawfull cause for Princes, & states to take armes in hand. The Ro∣manes with sharpe wars prosecuteda Mithridates, for that by one generall proclamation he had caused diuers of their people to be massacred in Asia. the same cause armed them against the Latines and Volscians. The Volscians againe inuaded the Romans, for that reprochfully their people were commaunded out of the Citie at the time of theirb publike games. The Heduans rebelled against Caesar vponc conceit of some wrong offred to their people in y^e campe of the Romanes. And among al causes of warres betwixt Princes, this is commonly inserted for one, that either their subiects are slaine, or wronged: as appeareth both in the beginnings of the Romane warres against the kings of Macedonia, and also against the people of Carthage: and the same was y^e common pretense of thed French, to inuade vs when we held Gascoigne, Guienne, and Normandy.

Yet more neere doth it touch a Prince when his ambassadours are violated, forasmuch as that iniurie is thought to be offered to his owne person. Therefore did Dauid warre vpon the children of Am∣mon for the villeny they offered his ambassadors. The shamefull re∣proche which the Corinthians offered the Romane ambassadours, was the cause of the warre betwixt the Romanes and them, and of the sacke of Corinth. Friderick Barbarosse for a scorne offered him by them of Milan, besieged and tooke their Citie. the first quarrell betweene thee Romanes, and Veians grewe vpon a proud answere which the Veian Senate made. And deare it cost the Rhodians, that taking part with Perseus, they abused the Romanes in their inso∣lent termes. The slaughter of the Romane ambassadours, was the first cause that moued them to warre vpon Gentius-king of Illyrium, and aggrauated the wrath of the Romanes against the Veians: and caused Caesar to sacke diuers cities of thef Armoricans.

The rebellion of subiects against their lawfull Princes, is also a

sufficient cause to arme the prince against them. he carieth not the sword for other purpose, but to represse the wicked and rebellious. king Dauid prosecuted not onely the rebell Ziba, but also his owne sonne Absalo•• that rose against him. the Romanes suppressed the se∣ditious Gracchi, Saturninus and Catiline. and iust cause had our Prin∣ces to subdue by armes the seditious route, that vnder the leading of Iacke Cade, Iacke Strawe, Kette, and other rebels rose against their liege and soueraigne Princes. for although rebels and pyrats, and robbers are not accompted among the number of lawfull enemies, which the Romans called hostes legitimos, nor did enioy thea right, nor were to be vsed as enemies in lawfull warres; yet is the force vsed against them most lawfull.

Moreouer it is a lawfull, and iust cause for a prince or nation to arme their people in defence of their associates, or such as flie vnto them for succour being vniustly oppressed. Deliuer those (sayth the wise man) that are drawne to death. those that are wronged (saythb Aristotle) not onely may, but ought for their honors sake, to arme in defence of themselues, their allyes, and friends, and to helpe their associates being oppressed. Cicero in his bookes de rep. alloweth those warres to be lawfull that are made aut pro fide, aut pro salute. that is, eyther for our owne defence, or for defence of our friendes, whome wee are bound by promise to helpe. and as well doeth hec charge them with iniustice, that repell not iniurie, when they are able; as those that doe wrong themselues. And if we giue credit to Saintd Ambrose, valiant men, that defend their countrey from barbarous people, and protect the weake, and shielde their associ∣ates from such as would spoyle them, doe the office of true iustice. for defence of theire confederates, the Romanes receiued this re∣ward, that they became the lordes of the world. the Romanes had no other cause to enterprise the warre against thef Samnites, but for the defence of the Campanians, which were vniustly vexed, & had yeelded themselues into their protection. The first Cartha∣ginian warres had no other originall, but for the defence of the Ma∣mertines. for the same cause likewise did they send defiance to Philipg king of Macedonia, for that he vexed, and iniuried their confede∣rates in Greece. Iosua protected the Gibeonites requiring his ayde, from the conspiracie of the kings of the Cananites. the forsaking of our associates & friends,h Sthenelaidas the Spartian calleth treason,

and disuadeth the Spartans from committing any such offence. the Romanes werea accused of treason, for that they abandoned their confederates the Saguntines being besieged by Annibal. for which fault they endured the penance of sixteene yeeres warres in Italy. neither was any thing more infamous in Charles of Bur∣gundy his actions, then his colde defence of his associat the duke of Britaine. Philip of Commines accuseth Lewes the 11. for abando∣ning his confederats of Liege. Caesar,b least all his associates in France should forsake him, was driuen with great hazard to suc∣cour his friends besieged in Gergouia. the duke of Normandy, yon∣ger brother to Lewes the 11. ouerthrewe his owne estate departing from the association of Charles duke of Burgundy. wherefore we haue not onely iust cause to warrant our proceedings against the Spaniard in defence of our confederates of France, and the lowe Countries; but also necessarie reasons to moue vs to prosecute mat∣ters more forcibly, vnlesse we meane to engage our honour, and neg∣lect our owne estate. what wisdome or honour it was to refuse them, that yeelded themselues before the surrender of Antwerpe vnto the duke of Parma, I report me to those that know those mysteries. sure nowe that we haue begunne to assist them of Holland and Zeland; it is neither honour, nor safetie so to mince at the matter, or to go backe. whatsoeuer we call our doings, it wilbe as the king of Spaine will take it, if euer be haue power to be iudge. the onely meanes to marre and crosse his sentence, is with great forces to withstand so mightie a Prince, and not longer to dally.

Breach of couenants likewise is numbred among the iust causes of warres. we put on armes (saithc one) eyther being deceiued by our enemies, that performe not promise, or being constreyned. the Romanes began their warres with Perseus king ofd Macedonia, vpon occasion of breach of the articles of peace made before, be∣twixt his father, and them: and for the like cause also renewed their warres with them of Carthage. and for the same cause warres haue bene opened betwixt vs, and the Scots, as at Muscleborough fielde vpon the deniall of the Scottish Queene promised to king Edward; and betweene the French, and vs.

Many wise princes haue an eye to their neighbours greatnesse, and perceiuing how preiudiciall their encrochments may proue vn∣to thē, haue iust cause to withstand them. Lewis the 11. sent ayde to

the Switzers, & Duke of Lorreine against Charles Duke of Bur∣gundy hauing no other cause, then the suspicion and feare of his greatnes. The truea cause of the Peloponesian warre against them of Athens was the suspicion and feare, that their neighbours had of their power and greatnes. And yet that cause was not once menti∣oned. The Princes and States of Italy of long time haue had a se∣cret league amongst them to moderate the excessiue power of the king of Spaine in that coūtrey, if at any time he should go about to encroche vpon any one of them. Herein consisted the speciallb com∣mendation of the great wisedome of Laurence Medici the elder, that during his time, he kept all the states of Italy, as it were in equall ballance, not suffering any to passe their ancient limits. And I doubt not but our gouernours in the defence of the lowe Coun∣tries haue a speciall regard, that the king of Spaine settle not him∣selfe in the quiet possession of Holland, Zeland, and the rest: least that enioying so many commodious portes, ships, mariners, and commo∣dities, he might percase afterward make that a steppe to stride ouer, or at least to looke ouer into England. Asc euery nation is neere to those that are subdued, so will the fire once enflamed embrace it, and so passe ouer to the rest, as Antiochus said to Prusias, perswa∣ding him in time to withstand the Romanes. The Romanes percei∣uing that the Samnites, after they had subdued thed Sidicins, in∣tended to warre vpon their next neighbours the Campanians; they delayed the matter no longer, nor suffered them to proceede further. time it is therefore for Christian Princes to awake, and iust cause they haue to withstand the encrochments of the king of Spaine, that vnder pretence of the Romish religion eniambeth vpon al his neigh∣bours, vnlesse they will be swallowed vp in the vnsatiable gulfe of the ambitions tyrannie of the Spanish nation.

Last of all, whosoeuer adhereth to our enemies, and aideth them with men, munitions, and victuals against vs, they are also our ene∣mies, and giue vs iust cause of warre against them. this cause moued the Romanes to defie thee Latines, that ayded their enemies; and the same is reckened among the causes of their warres against Phi∣lip kingf of Macedonia. for he did not only aide the Carthaginians with men, but also ioyned with Annibal in league against the Ro∣manes. No iust cause therefore haue our neighbours to complaine, that we haue stayed their shippes, that caried victuals, munitions,

and other commodities to the Spaniard. There is no fault but one, that as we haue stayed some, so we haue dismissed others, and haue not made prise of al by Publike authoritie, and that those of the lowe Countries do commonly trade into Spaine, for whose sake the quar∣rell is vndertaken with Spaine. The Romanes as in the treatise of peace they comprised their owne confederates; so in denouncing of warres they defied their enemies, and their associates. as is eui∣dent in that forme of defiance, which they published againsta Antio∣chus. Which y^e Greekes also obserued in the Peloponnesian warres made not onely against the principals, but also all their adherents. And it is theb common forme of defiances vsed at this day.

As for warres vndertaken throughc ambition, and anger, and such like affections, they are vniust, and the causes vnlawfull. nei∣ther are they to be excused, that forced by strong hand out of their owne countrey, doe seeke by violence to possesse that, which belon∣geth to others. For this cause y^e Romanes resisted with such force the Gaules, Germanes, Danes, Gothes, and others that came to dwell in Italy. And although such wanderers haue had good successe in diuers countreys by reason of the sinnes of the inhabitants, as the Saxons, Picts, Danes, and Normans in this land, the Franks, Bur∣guignions, and Normans in Gaule, the Lombards, & Gothes, in I∣taly, and Spaine: yet was not the cause of their warres iust. for euery one is to holde him to his owne lot, vnlesse the countrey be waste, and dispeopled; which countrey God giueth to these that can possesse it. and therefore did the Sueuians iniuriously forbid any to dwell in their waste borders: and the Spaniards haue no reason by force and lawe to keepe other nations out of the Indies, which not∣withstanding themselues are not able to people.

Yet to make iustd warres, it is not sufficient only, that the cause be iust; but that they be enterprised first, by those that haue soue∣raigne authoritie; secondly, that they be not begun especially by those that inuade others, without demaund of restitution or satisfaction, or denunciation; and last of all, that they be not prosecuted with barba∣rous crueltie. The first point is expresly set downe in termes in the Romane lawes, & allowed by consent of all nations. Thee Canons doe also confirme the same. And if it were in others power, great in∣conueniences would ensue. It is a speciall marke of soueraintie to haue power of warre & peace. In Liuy these formes are very vsuall:

Praenestinis ex S.C. populi iussu bellū indictum est. And againe, ex aucto∣ritate patrum populus Palaepolitanis bellum fieri iussit. The wars of the Romans against thea Carthaginians, Philip, Antiochus, Perseus, and others, were not enterprised but by auctoritie of the people, which in that state had soueraigne commandement in those times. Him that beganne any braules, or made peace with forreine nations of his owne priuate head,b Plato in his common wealth adiudgeth wor∣thie of death. And therefore did Hanno giue counsell to the Cartha∣ginians, that they should deliuer vp Annibal to the Romanes, for that he had begunne the warres against them without publike au∣thoritie. Those that offended in this case, by thec lawes of the Ro∣manes were in case of treason. Marcellus vpon that ground buil∣ding his reasons, would haue perswaded the Senate to deliuerd Caesar to the Gaules. And so scrupulous haue some men beene in this Realme in stirring without commission, that they doubted, whe∣ther without commaundement they might leuy forces to represse re∣bels. This percase might seeme too scrupulous, but they thought it better to be too slowe, then too forward. For theye are onely to be accompted publike enemies in warre, who by those that haue su∣preme auctoritie, are declared enemies. If any vpon priuate moti∣on fall on spoyling, they are but theeues and robbers, sayth Vlpian. And this (saithf Augustine) is the order of nature best agreeing with the peace of states, that the councill and auctoritie to make warres should rest in Princes. That warres are to be denounced on the assaylants side, diuers reasons perswade vs.g There is a iustice in warres to be obserued, sayth Tully, which iustice requireth, that warres be eyther denounced, or made after deniall of things de∣maunded, that haue beene vniustly taken from vs. He speaketh of warres made by those, that inuade others. For to defend our selues without more wordes, is lawfull by the lawes both of nature, and na∣tions: and very ridiculous it were, to threaten those that haue begun to strike vs already. Those therefore that thinke we haue no warres with the Spaniard, because they haue not heard them proclaimed, are like to those that will not ward, or strike an enemie that commeth vpon them without saying, beware. Caesar minding to assayle Ario∣uistus, sent ah defiance to him before hand. When Annibal came with an huge army into Italy, the Romanes defended themselues, without spending time about denouncing, or threatning of warres. Otherwise those that first begin warres, doe vse first to speake before

they strike, which was not only y^e course of antiquitie, but also of later times. Onely y^e king of Spaine hath thought it lawfull vnder colour of treatie of peace, without any defiance to cut our throtes, if he could. It may be, he taketh y^e Popes excōmunicatiō against y^t Prince & peo∣ple of this land for a sufficient denuntiation, or warrant to inuade vs without other circumstance. This he learned of Alphonsus a Castro, that determineth warresa against heretikes to be lawfull, which he taketh to be defied by auctoritie of the Canon. And in his determi∣nationb Baltazar Aiala, a great man among y^e Spaniards resteth: & no maruell, if they obserue no solemnities in warres against vs, whō they hold for heretikes, hauing already determined, that faithc and promise is not to be performed vnto heretikes. I neede not to de∣scribe y^e forme & wordes vsed in defiances. He that will reade y^e forme in time past vsed by y^e Romanes, let him perused Aulus Gellius. Later formes are reported in later histories, & much talked of by Heralds, that claime y^t to be part of their office. But litle seemeth it materiall to know y^t formes of defiances, seeing in these times neither forme, nor substance is strictly in this behalfe obserued. Onely thus much Prin∣ces messengers y^t goe vpon this arrand of defiance are to take heede: first, that they passe not y^e words of their cōmission, secondly that they vse no words of reproch, or scorne. It is reported y^t Frācis the 1. king of France, would not heare the Herald sent him from Charles the 5. with defiance, before he had caused a gibet to be erected to put him in mind what he should haue, if he kept not himselfe within compasse.

In executing of wars, this precept must diligently be had in remem∣brance, y^t there be no crueltie vsed. There is moderation euen in the executiō of iustice, not onely in other actions of warre. And Caesar in his victory against Pompei, cōmanded his souldiers to spare the Ro∣manes. to delight in blood, is signe of a sauage nature.e The desire of doing hurt, and crueltie in execution: a mind also implacable and sauage is iustly blamed in warres saith S. Augustine. those that yeeld themselues, are not to be slaine. Galba for that he slewe the Lusitani∣ans, after that he had taken them vpon composition, was iustly there∣fore accused by Cato. It is no victory to kil an enemie disarmed, nor iustice to kill our prisoners in colde blood. The execution done in the Generals chamber vpon the prisoners after the battel of Cognac, an. 1569. did greatly blemish his honor. Who doth not detest y^ef executi∣ons that haue bin done vpon men disarmed after cōpositiō at Mailè, Mucidan, & diuers other places during these late troubles of Frāce?

yet may not prisoners vpon this libertie presume to abuse, or attempt any matter against those that haue taken them. for then they deserue no fauour. Caesars souldiers ata Munda in Spaine vnderstanding, that if the Townesmen sallyed out vpō them, their prisoners would charge them vpon their backes, were forced to massacre them. likewise were the English forced to kill their prisoners after the bat∣tell of Poytiers, fearing least they should vse some trechecie, when the enemie made shewe to assayle them.b Women, children, and old folkes, by the orders of warre obserued nowe in the Spanish campe are exempted from the souldiers furie, in the sacke of Townes. The present French king deserueth great prayse, for suffering the poore, and impotent people of Paris to passe through his armie, although it were much to his preiudice, practice of armes required percase other rigour, as appeareth by the crueltie executed by Caesars souldiers at Auaricum, and the Sea townes of France on such kind of people, thereby to make the besieged eyther sooner to yeelde, or to spend their victuals: but this best beseemed a Christian king. The Turkes saue such for slaues. Christians therefore ought to doe that for conscience, which Turkes doe for gaine.

Of this discourse, this is the summe, that thosec warres are iust and lawfull, which are made by the soueraigne Magistrate, for law∣full and iust causes, being both orderly denounced in cas•• requi∣site, & moderatly prosecuted, to the end that iustice may be done, and an assured peace obteined. In which case it is lawfull for any man with good conscience to serue in warres: but if the warres be notoriously vniust, let euery man take heede howe hee embrewe his handes in innocent blood. The Christian souldiers that serued Iulian the Apostat, would not drawe their swordes against Christians, al∣though they willingly serued him against all others. Yet doe I not make priuate men iudges of Princes factes. but what neede any iudgment where the facte is euident? and who shall answere for men that execute Princes wicked commaundements, before Christes tri∣bunall seate? if the iniustice of warres be not notorious, the subiect is bound to pay and serue, and the guilt shall be laide to his charge that commaundeth him to serue. A good man may serue (saythd Saint Augustine) vnder a sacrilegious Prince, where the iniustice of the commandement shall bind the Prince, as the duetie of obedience doth make the souldier innocent.

Iust warres hath these effectes. whatsoeuera we take or winne from the enemie, that is iustly ours, and the same by the lawes of nations is accompted lawfull purchase.b nothing is proper by na∣ture, but either by ancient possession, and seisine, or victorie, sayth Tully. Whatsoeuer Citie therfore, or Territorie is by vs taken in iust warres, the same is ours: likewise whatsoeuer moueable goods commeth to our handes. Yet is there great difference in this case be∣twixt landes and goodes. the landes come to the Prince, or State that beareth the charge, to dispose at their pleasures, eyther amongc those souldiers by whose blood they were wonne, or els after they be rewarded, among others for the benefite of the State. Alexan∣derd Seuerus the Emperour diuided the Countrey bordering on the enemie on the souldiers that best deserued, and their children also, so long as they should continue in seruice there. The spoiles of the enemie are sometime giuen to the souldiers, certeine things one∣ly excepted.e Valerius Coruinus making a roade into Samnium, gaue all the praye to his souldiers; likewise did C. Iunius at the ta∣king of Bouian. The whole Senate of Rome gaue the sacke of Veij to the souldiers. The Spanish souldiers vse seldome to march to an assalt, but they will couenant to haue the spoyle. But if it might be obteined, the best course is, that all the spoyle brought to one place, the Generall should deuide it all, or most part among his souldiers, hauing regard to the most valiant, and hurt men which cannot be par∣takers of the spoyle, which they procured with their blood, and this was the most common practise of the Romanes. And if there should be any other course taken, these inconueniences would fall out: the Generall should haue no meanes to reward those that best deserue. for howe can he, the spoyle being not in his power to dispose: the hurt should be depriued of their part; for that they are not able to runne about to spoyle: nay the most valiant shoulde haue least part. for commonlyf the most valiant souldier is the last that putteth vp his sword to goe to spoile. and contrariwise the most cowardly and disorderly companion, may percase light vpon the greatest and ri∣chest spoyles: for winning whereof he scarse drewe out his sworde. furthermore by greedinesse of spoyle, many braue occasions are let slippe out of our handes, and many disorders fall out. Alexamenes hauing slaineg Nabis, and being entred Sparta, while he minded nothing but spoyle, suffered the enemies to gather head, and waxe

so strong, that they cut him and his companie in pieces. Last of all, diuers contentions and braules fall out about the diuision of spoiles, especially where there are diuers nations in one armie. All this cannot be remedied, vnlesse there be some better order then vsuall in preseruing the spoyle.

In time past the Romanes disposed of their prisoners, as of the rest of the spoile, and he that was taken in lawfull warres, was slaue to him that tooke him. But nowe that captiuitie is abolished among Christians, ransomes succeede in lieu of slaues, so that a prisoner taken in warres, is not made a slaue, but is ransommed according to that reasonable agreement which is made betwixt the prisoner, and his taker. The lawes of Spaine and France doe yet more particularly diuide the spoyle takē in wars. Not only the countrey, but also ships of warre taken from the enemie, belong to the Prince by thea cu∣stomes of Spaine. By the sameb customes the King hath the fifth, the captaine the seuenth part, the souldiers the rest. Sancho de Lond. compriseth their orders in certaine rimes:

Al'ausança de Francia & Castilla (saith he) el Reyno, la prouincia, & sennorio, el rey captiuo, la ciudad, ô villa es del rey, que ha exoe∣dido empoderio. Del Generall que gana, es el que pierde, el puede res∣catarle à su aluedrio. &c.

The summe of his long rimes is this: that by the customes of France and Castile, the Prince ought to haue the Kingdome, Pro∣uince, Seignorie, or Citie, and the King likewise that is taken in warres. Other prisoners belong to them that take them, except the Generall, and men of marke and qualitie. which being taken by o∣thers, are notwithstanding to be vsed to the benefite of the Prince. prouided alwayes, that he that taketh them, be honourably rewar∣ded. All the ensignes, great artillerie, munitions of warre, and trea∣sure, are likewise the Generals due. small pieces without wheeles, and pieces of small bollet belong to the master of the Ordinance. all broken pieces fall to the Gunners share. the rest of the spoyle is giuen to euery one that taketh it. This is the vse when a battell is ioyned, or a Citie is wonne. but in a roade they that loose their hor∣ses in seruice, are first to be mounted eyther on horses taken, or on the common charge. the rest is to be diuided among the souldiers; yet so, that consideration be alwayes had of those that deserue best.

If our goods be taken away by the enemie, and presently reco∣uered

againe, then they returne to the owners propertie. Thea Vol∣scians being forced to yeeld, so soone as their campe was taken, so much of the spoyles as belonged to the Latines, or Hernicans, was restored to them againe by the Romanes.

bCamillus hauing recouered Sutrium out of the handes of the Hetruscians the same day that it was taken, restored the same a∣gaine to the Citizens. Thec goods belonging to their confederats, the Romanes did commonly except out of the spoyle. The Ro∣manes after diuers yeres recouering the Territorie ofd Saguntum, restored the same to the ancient possessors thereof. Ande Scipio re∣stored diuers things to the Sicilians, which he found in the sacke of Carthage, and had beene taken from them. This right by which things lost returne to their owners, the Romanes called ius postli∣minij. which belonged tof prisoners in warre, ships, mules, carriage horses, or mares. Slauesg returning or recouered, are to be restored to their olde masters. Allh captiues returning from the enemie, re∣couer their auncient libertie and right.i Paulus the lawyer sayth, that when a Territory is recouered from the enemie, the landes re∣turne to their proper owners: and so the Romanes practised in the restoring of Verrugo, Sutrium, and diuers other Townes to the La∣tines, Sabines, Campanians and others, hauing recouered them out of the enemies hands. Yet lands lost by cowardise, or trecherie of the owners, and recouered againe without their helpe and charge, are without this case, vnlesse the Prince restore them of fauour. Those that runne to thek enemie, and traytors, were seldome receiued to mercie among the Romanes. Armes and horses of seruice lost in warres by cowardise, returne not to the owner.

These rules although by couenants and some circumstances they receiue alteration; yet for the most part they are obserued: which men of iudgement can easily discerne. And therefore leauing of further to discourse of the causes, let vs nowe discende to discourse what things are to be prouided, before warres be opened, that in our ne∣cessitie, we be not to seeke for things needefull.

CHAP. II. That before we beginne the warres, prouision is first to be made of treasure, armes, munition, shippes, cariages, victuals, and all necessarie furniture, and instruments of warre.

THe sequell and effectes of warres being so dange∣rous and pernicious, and the causes so many, and so easily offered: it behoueth al Princes and States to make sufficient prouision for warres, and al∣wayes to be ready; but especially then, when the enemie is at hand, and threatneth to inuade vs; which is now the case of England. Hea that desireth peace, must be armed for the warres, and prepared, and those obteine their right soonest, that are prouided to winne it with force, as said a certaine captaine of the Latines. Theb prouision of things necessarie is to be made long before, if thou meanest to obteine the victorie quickly. Vegetiusc exhorteth those that purpose to beginne warres, carefully to weigh and consider their store and charges. When we are in action, and stand in neede of such things, it will be then too late to wish, to stirre, to send. Warres succeede not where such loose counsels goe before.

The things that are especially to be prouided before the leuie of men are these: first mony, then armes, horses, cariages, shippes, all munitions, and furniture of warre, thirdly victuals and clothes, lastly the helpe of confederates and friends. With money braue cap∣taiues and souldiers are allured to serue, and mainteined and payed in seruice: all necessarie furniture of warre is bought, victuals and clothes prouided, intelligences with the enemie dressed, and main∣teined, & many cōmodities procured; which otherwise cannot be had. so y^td wise men doubt not to call treasure the sinewes of warre, with∣out which they neither proceede, nor mooue, vnlesse it be backward. Tit.e Quintius merily noted Philopoemens want of money, when he compared his army to a body, that had strong armes & legs, but no belly; much like vnto Philopoemen himselfe, y^t was so made. for as y^e armes, legs, & outward partes receiue nourishment from the belly, & pine away if y^e belly be euil affected & discrasied: so anf army that is not mainteined with mony, is easily broken, & dissolued of it selfe.

Contrariwise (as Archidamus the Spartan king said)a store doth as much oft times sustaine the warres, as force. Pericles persuading the Athenians not to yeelde to the Lacedemonians, whose army could not long keep the field, or continue together for want of mony, sheweth thē, that theb victory is furthered in warres, more by coūsel and store of mony, then violent inuasion. Archidamus further saith, thatc warres are as wel administred by cost & expense, as by armes, and that armes by expenses are made more availeable. The Lace∣demonians in the Peloponnesian warre increasing the pay of their marriners a small trifle a day, drewe from the Athenians their best men. What the Spanish duckats, & French crowns haue wrought of late times, both Dutch, French, Italian, & English giue testimo∣ny. Philip of Macedonia cōsulting with the Oracle by what means he might soonest onercome a certaine towne in most mens opinions impregnable, receiued this answere; If he fought withd siluer lan∣ces. Tacius thee Captaine of the Sabins for gold bought the Capi∣toll of Rome.f Asdrubal with mony corrupted the Celtiberians, & made them shamefully abandon the Romane army, which first had hired them, and afterward was ruinated by them. With a litle mo∣ney theg English army was persuaded by Lewis the eleuenth to re∣turne backe into England to our great disgrace. Money, saithh De∣mosthenes, must be prouided, and without it nothing can be atchi∣ued in warres in order. The Spartans that vsed no money a long time, were at length taught, that warre could not be managed with∣out mony. the manifold effects whereof our owne experience teach∣eth vs both at home, and abroad. for want whereof many disorders haue fallen among our forces, which haue endured much through the enemies abundance.

Yet do I not yeeld so much to treasure, as if treasure could doe all things. We read that the nakedi Scythian ouercame Cyrus and Da∣rius, notwithstanding all their riches, and the poore Greekes in thek expedition of Cyrus preuailed against the rich Persians. The army ofl Alexander well fenced with yron ouercame the huge Persian army, that was so rich in gold and siluer. and likewise them Romans armed with yron & steele vanquished the armies of the Samnites, and of Antiochus, that glistered in gold and siluer. Neither could the Carthaginian or Macedonian kings that farre surpassed the Ro∣manes in wealth, match them with force. The rich man is com∣monly

a spoyle to the well armed souldier, and Caesars poore fami∣shed troupes did driue the gallants of Pompey out of the field. The poore army of the English at the field of Poytiers, ouercame the braue caualiers of France, and a few poore nakeda Switzers ouer∣threw Charles Duke of Burgundy notwithstanding his riches and greatnes. They confessed that all their wealth would not buy the spurres of Charles his horsemen. The Spaniard is rich in golde, yet doth not the English souldiers feare him in the field. It is yron, not gold, that killeth in the encounter. Gold can doe much, but not all. and therefore were it to be wished, that wee had more contended with the Spaniard with the sword, wherwith we are able to match him, then with gold, wherein though we spend all, we cannot come neere him.

Wherefore let mony be prouided before hand, if not in such abun∣dance as others haue it; yet so much as may prouide armes, victuals, munition, horses, for a competent army. If any man aske how much, I answere withb Cleobulus, that warres in this case haue no stint, nor set bounds: this onely may suffice to shew you, that if good or∣ders were set downe and executed, it would neither be infinit, nor the charge so burdensome, as now it is.

The meanes whereby mony may be raised are diuers; either it ri∣seth vpon lands belonging to the crowne, and that either by inheri∣tance, or confiscation, or conquest; or vpon rents, or penalties, or im∣posts, or other duties belonging to the Prince; or of subsidies, taxes, contributions and loanes of subiects, or vpon our confederates, and associats, or else vpon ransoms of our enemies persons, or countries. By which means seing su large reuenues come vnto the Princes of this realme, who seeth not that this realme wanteth nothing but good order in dispensing of the treasure, and sharpe punishment a∣gainst those that purloine it: Nay if vayne expenses in apparel, ie∣wels, silkes, golden coats, and other vanities were cut off, or employ∣ed in armes, and necessary furniture of warre: there would be not onely sufficiencie, but also abundance.

The Romanes for maintenance of their publike stock had diuers inuentions and practices. Vponc euery acre of ground of a country subdued, they imposed an annuall rent. The same might haue beene done in Ireland, if it had pleased the gouernours, to conuert it to publike vses, rather then to serue priuate mens desires, which

notwithstanding by reason of their great disorders reape small com∣moditie.

They looked strictly to their impostes. Annibala after peace made with the Romanes, to encounter with the couetousnes of of∣ficers, restored the impostes at Carthage to their olde order. Philip the King of Macedonia purposing to make warres vpon the Ro∣manes, did not onely increase hisb customes, but deuised new, for the maintenance of the warres. which is to be done onely in case of necessity, lest these new deuises of Italian impostes, make the Prin∣ces odious to their subiects.

Where the ordinary reuenues were not sufficient, there wise go∣uernors haue had recourse to equall contributions, taxes, and loanes. Asdrubalc purposing to go into Italy with a supply to Annibals army, laide a taxe vpon all the people of his gouernement. The Duke of Alua in his time, and of late yeeres the Prince of Parma knew well how to put this in practise in the low Countries. When the city of Rome wanted money in the second warre with them of Carthage,d priuate men voluntarily lent mony so fast, that the de∣puties appoynted to receiue it, could not dispatch them▪ so that by this meanes the Romanes neyther wanted marriners, nor pay for souldiers. For continuance of the publike treasury they had their lands and goodes rated equally, and euery man payed according▪ which equall proportion, if it were now obserued; I dare say it would greene no good subiect to pay, albeit it were twise so much, as now they do. Euery man brought in the quantitie of his lād, and the value of it vpon his credit; likewise the summe of his rentes and money. they that onely liued vpon traffike brought in the summe of their mony, and cleare gaines yearely, with this promise, that what was left out was confiscat and forfeit, and euery false summe giuen in, was punished with double. They that were not rated or at the least nūbred, were banished, or sold for slaues. Such as had nothing, were onely numbred in the rolle. The most of this is expressely set down in their bookes of law. Forma censuali (saithe Vlpian) cauetur, vt agri sic in censum referantur. nomen fundi cuiusque, & in qua ciuitate, & in quo pagosit, & quos duos vicinos proximos habeat, & aruum quod in decem annos proximos satum erit, quot esse iugera videatur. Vinea quot vites habeat, oliuetum quot iugerum, & quot arbores habeat: pratum quoque quod intra decem annos proximos sectum

erit, quot iugerum pascua esse videantur, item sylua caedua. om∣nia ipse qui defert aestimet. illam enim aequitatem debet admittere cen∣sitor, vt officio eius congruat releuare cum, qui & in publicis tabulis delato modo ex certis causis vti non possit. Likewise Liuy where he mentioneth the taxing of the colonies by Nero and Salinator, hath these words:a duodecim coloniarum, quod nunquam antea factum erat, deferentibus coloniarum censoribus, censum receperunt, vt quantū nu∣mero mil••••ū, quantū pecuniâ valerent, in publicis tabulis monumēta ex∣tarent. If the like rate and proportion were obserued among vs, that euery man might be rated according to his lands, farmes, rents and goods equally: the burthen would be more easily borne, & lesse com∣plaint made, & more mony would come to the payment of her maie∣sties souldiers.

So many countries as were vnder the protectiō of the Romans, or confederate with thē, did contribute to the common charge. where∣in such equall taxation, and good order was vsed, that the countrey where the army was maintained, did defray the most of the charge. & good reason, seing it was for their defence. it would seeme strange to those that know not their proceedings, how Caesar did not onely maintaine his army 9. yeres in France at the charge of the country, but also enriched himselfe, and his army. The Athenians likewise after that the Greekes had driuen out theb Persians out of their country, for maintenance of their warres against them made an asso∣ciation, appointing what euery Iland or city, or territory should pay toward the charge.

Somtimes the enemies being subdued or straited, were not only driuen to pay the charge of the army, but also great summes of mo∣ny into the tresury. thec Hetruscians subdued by Decius did not only pay the souldiers stipend for one yeere; but were constrained to furnish euery souldier with two sutes of apparel. The same Liuy te∣stisteth to haue beene performed of the Samnites, and Aequians. The Volscians had truce giuen them with these conditions, that they should pay thed Roman army for a yere, & restore that which they had taken away. Cornificius in Illyrio (now a part of Sclauony) although the country was not able to maintaine an army, yet kept y^e same in order by his prudence saith Hirtius. Beside all this the Ro∣mans after the warres ended brought infinit sums into the treasury.

eScipio after the victorie obteined against Annibal, brought into

it 123. thousand pouud weight of siluer. Quintius brought 18270. pounde in siluer bullion, 84000. pounde in coyned siluer, 3714. pounds of gold, beside a shield all of golde. Aemilius Paulus after his victorie against Perseus brought in much more. I forbeare to re∣hearse lesser summes brought into the treasurie bya Furius, Heluius, Minutius, Cato, and others. And the rather, for that it was an vsuall matter, after the warres in any countrey ended, to bring great sūmes of money into the publike treasurie. If then, beside the maintenance of the armie, such store of money could be leuied of the spoyles; it is no such infinite matter, as is supposed to maintine an armie, in case the same be orderly gouerned, and well employed.

The reason that our small companies in France, and Flanders haue cost so much is, for that the same not being able to encounter the enemie in open fielde, are shut vp in some towne, and liue all vpon charge, without doing good to themselues, or hurt to the enemie. If there beb a mightie army in the fielde, what towne or countrey is not willing to redeeme the fauour of it? or what is stirring, that such power will want? if the army be a sufficient body of it selfe, and well furnished, there is no doubt, but if wise men haue the managing thereof, warres asc Cato sayd will mainteine themselues, and if not all, yet sure defray the greatest part of the charge.

The Romanes in their extremities, to furnish their souldiers in warres, diminished and cut off a great part of their priuate charge. By the lawd Oppia made in the second war with Carthage for this purpose, women were prohibited to weare diuers coloured gar∣ments, or to possesse more then halfe an ounce of gold. Thee Cen∣sors caused the ornaments of women, their coches, apparell & iewels to be valued in their taxe books▪ afterward whē disorders grew grea∣ter, the pretorf Fronto published a decree, that no mā should vse gol∣den vessel about his meate, nor that men should be defiled (I vse his word) with silken apparell. But now if gentlemen be not all be∣raied with silks, they thinke themselues defiled, & disgraced. If any such law were now enacted, who seeth not what abundance of mony might be spared? if the accōpts be iustly taken, it wil be found that the veluets, and silkes, and forraine stuffe that commeth yerely into Eng∣land would richly maintaine an army, and to spare, so that boldly I may say there wāteth rather order, then treasure for the maintenāce of our souldiers, thogh y^e number were quadruple to y^t, which now is.

To restraine the greedines of officers, both Romanes and other nations haue put diuers lawes in execution. Sucha fraudulent dea∣ling the Romanes punished with banishment. which in ancient time was the greatest penaltie that they inflicted vpon their citizens, cer∣tain heinous cases except.b Afterward such faultes were punished extraordinarily. and not onely the principals were punished, but al∣so their seruants, and ministers.c Philesius and Xanticles in the voy∣age of the Greekes with Cyrus were seuerely dealt withall for dea∣ling fraudulently, and stealing the common mony. Gylippus for the same cause wasd banished Sparta, notwithstanding his great seruice done to the common-wealth in the warres against the Athenians in Sicile. Onely of late times, and in some places the most compendi∣ous & assured way to grow rich is for men boldely to steale, & falsly to accōpt for such mony as passeth through their fingers. Therfore had theye a rich treasury in the greatest pouerty of priuate men: where∣as in our times while certaine grow great and wealthy, the publike estate seemeth to grow euery day more then other poore and beggar∣ly. When the tribute due to the Romanes could not be found in the publike treasury of Carthage,f Annibal by calling the fraudulent dealing of the officers in question, found more then sufficient to satisfie them. And if some od fellowes were in our time seased by the gorge, might they not thinke you be made to regorge that which they haue fraudulently, and closely swallowed?

It cannot be denied, but that these are compendious waies to find mony for paimēt of souldiers. but I feare me, we shal ue••er find out, or at least neuer vse these waies. and no maruell: seeing men doe so much delite to walk in bywaies. If Cato in his timeg cōplained that the commonwealth suffered much by the couetousnes of some, & riotousnes of others: much may princes of our time more iustly cō∣plaine when by couetise & extortion mē only purchase, and by vanity braue it out in riot▪h Perseus (as Liuy reporteth) for niggardise could not find in his hart to bestow any mony vpon his souldiers, though nothing imported him more. I pray God some in the end cōplaine not, that all their riches and wealth is reserued for them that seeke their ruine and ouerthrow.

Mony therfore howsoeuer it be, must be prouided in time. for with∣out it, as fire without matter, wars wax cold & cānot long be maintei∣ned▪ the same is to be deliuered to the General before hād, & to be pla∣ced

where it may best serue for the armies vse. The Cartha giniās had treasure ready at newea Carthage in Spaine to serue them in their warres in Spaine. Caesar had his store atb Nouiodunum in the territo∣ry of the Heduans, to serue him in his warres in France.

If so much cannot be prouided, as is requisit, then must men that possesse lands either serue vpon their owne charge, as the Romanes did at the first, and the Spartans did alwayes: or else those that stay at home must maintaine those that serue abroad, and a rate be laide vpon euerie shire and city, how many souldiers they shal maintaine paid. (Thec Sueuians by this means mainteined a hundred thousand men which euery yeere went out of the country to seeke aduen∣tures.) Or else like slaues and pesants vnworthy the name of En∣glish, must they serue strangers. I will not say more, for that it would be too great a shame, if this whole country coulde not main∣taine an army as well as Athens, Sparta, Argos, Thebes, Me∣gara, Locri, Tarentum, Syracusae, and other cities, and small states in Greece, Italy, Sicily, & other places. Therefore leauing these supposals, let good orders be set down, & strictly obserued; & if we be not so wise as to find the way our selues, let vs yet learn of our ene∣mies among which men of value bee aduanced to honor, and fraudu∣lent dealers be drawen vp to the gibbet.

The next care is to be had ofd armes, & all maner of furniture for the warre: of al sorts of weapons; as pikes, halberds, black bils, mus∣quets, caliuers, pedrinals, pistoies, lances, bowes & arrows, swords, and daggers: of al armes defensiue, as corsalets of proofe, & others, morions, targets of proofe, and lighter, iackets of male, and plated doublets, and other necessary peeces: of great artillery both for bat∣tery, and for the field, of horses and their furniture; of shippes, mastes, tacle, artillerie, and al prouision necessary for the sea: of carria∣ges both for ordonance, munition, and victuals, as also for other ne∣cessarie vses: of tents for encamping: of powder and bullets and all things necessary both for great and smal shot: of bridges, and boats: of spades, mattocks, axes, wimbles, baskets, & finally al other engins or prouisiō for wars. al which is to be prouided & laid vp in places neere to the enemy, & where we meane to go foorth against him. Wherein wee shall not much erre, if we follow the precedents of such as haue shewed themselues most obseruant of the lawes of Armes. Thee Romanes intending to passe into Affrike against them of Carthage,

made their prouision at Lilybeum, a port of Sicile, looking toward Affrike. Before thata Scipio transported his army into Affrike, hee made exceeding great prouision of armes, and all warrelike furni∣ture in Sicile, which the messengers that were sent to view his pro∣ceeding could not behold without admiration. landing in Affrike he had there like wise his workhouses, & storehouses of prouision. The towne of New Carthage in Spaine serued the Carthaginians for a storehouse of al maner of prouision of armes, & warlike furniture for their warres in Spaine. Liuyb saith there was infinit prouision, and 2000. workmen that wrought continually. The same towne being taken from the Carthaginians, serued Scipio for the same vse, whoc employed them in making of armes, and engins of warre most diligently. The Gaules reuolting from Caesar vsed wonderfull dili∣gence in making of armes, & prouiding of horses, & furniture of war, in eueryd city appointing what nūber of armes & weapons should be made. The kings of Macedonia had diuers armories both within & without their realme; so that althoughe Chalcis Philips storehouse for armes were burnt, yet did he not want. Philip & his son Perseus had infinit store hereof, so that they contemned the Romans in respect of thēselues. Antiochus dressed his armoiries & workhouses in Lysi∣machia, in his expeditiō against the Romans. The Romans not only had publike storehouses of armes, butf also priuate men had armes of their owne. In this land, although I doubt not, but there is far more prouision of armes, & munition then hath bin in time past; yet might there be an amends made if monopolies of pouder, & armes were ta∣ken away: and if that which is in one place too much, were placed in diuers conuenient storehouses, in euery place sufficeint; and finally, if there were so much armes in priuate mens hands, as the mosters pretend.

I neede not speake much of the prouision of shipping. it were suf∣ficient, if that we haue, were wel ordered and employed. Of the vse of ships I shall haue occasion to speake more hereafter. This may now suffice, that if the shipping of this land, and of our confederates were ioyned together, and well furnished and vsed, it woulde not be long ere peace should be offered by those, which now braue vs with threats of warre, because they see vs desirous of peace.

Cariages also & cariage horses would be prouided, not only for the drawing of ordonance & arms, but also of victuals, munitiōs, spades,

axes, mattocks, & al other neccessaries of an armie. The further y^e ar∣mie goeth from home, the more care the generall ought to haue of car∣riages to take things necessary with him.a The Heluetians before they began to march into France, prouided store of carts, and hor∣ses, and draught oxen for the purpose. The Romanes in theirb ex∣pedition against Antiochus had carriages sufficient of the Macedo∣nians. Without ac number of Camels that followed the armie la∣den with all prouision, and other carriages; Corbulo coulde not haue preuailed against the Parthians. Beside other ordinary cartesd Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, had 400. wagons laden with victuals, which were not to be distributed, but in time of ne∣cessitie. What losses and trauaile our men haue endured in Flan∣ders, Portugall, France, for want hereof, without my report, it is sufficiently knowne to souldiers.

There ought no lesse care to be had of tents, that souldiers may lie drie, and more warme then commonly they doe. For villages are not euery where to be found: nor is it fitte that souldiers should be disper∣sed in villages, when the enemie is at hande: and cabines are not so soone built, nor is stuffe in all places to bee founde to builde them with.

The Romanes to euery hundred, had both cariages, and tents as∣signed. For want whereof our souldiers are seldome well lodged, e∣specially in marching; and yet are they long about it. And where they lye, by reason of their cutting downe of woods, they leaue marks of their being there many yeeres after.

Without spades, mattocks, axes, baskets, and such like instru∣ments the souldier can neither enclose his enemie, nor fortifie him∣selfe: and therefore as very necessary things, are such instruments to be prouided, as also whatsoeuer is necessary for passing of riuers, as∣salting of townes, and other faites of armes.

I neede not make mention of horses of seruice, seeing euery man knoweth what difficulties an armie destitute of horsemen susteineth. That which shalbe sufficient shalbe spoken, when we come to speake of horsemen. Onely now I will admonish Gentlemen to haue more care of keeping races of horses, because in case of present necessi∣tie they that haue them not of their owne, shall hardly obteine them of others.

The last thing that I am here to speake of, is first to bee thought

of, I meane prouision of victuals, without which men can neither liue in warres, nor in peace. It is a faint fight that hungersterued soul∣diers doe make. Ina warres without things necessary, there is nei∣ther vse of souldier, nor captaine. He thatb prouideth not victuals beforehand is ouercome without drawing of a sword. Against other mischiefes, there are remedies; but there is no wrastling a∣gainst hunger. Want driueth men to their wittes end. When the La∣cedemonian souldiers were straited, their Generall writ thus to the Magistrates: thec souldiers are sterued for hunger, what shall we do? The twod Scipioes writ to the Romane Senate, that without supply of victuals, their army must needes dissolue. And Caesare told his souldiers, that were determined to retrayte, that without their cariages where their victuals were, they could no furth••r doe ser∣uice against the enemie. And therefore victuals must be had ready. it is too late to seeke for them in Villages, when the hungry soul∣dier is ready to sterue. Caesarf would not once moue towarde the enemie, before he had his prouision with him.g Nor would he re∣solue to besiege any towne, before he had taken order for suffici∣ent victuals for his army. His vseh was to deuide victuals to euery company for certaine dayes beforehand. The garrison townes of the Romanes were furnished with wheat, vineger, bacon, barley, and straw, for a yeere beforehand, as Capitolinus sheweth in the life of Gordian. The reason is laide downe by Tacitus, thati they might be stored with prouision against long sieges. The Colonies which were peopled with Romanes, and placed as gardes, and propugna∣cles against their enemies were stored with all things necessary. How our souldiers were furnished in Flanders and Portugall, I report me to their knowledge that endured those seruices. Beeing no better furnished, it is not to be marueiled ••hough they kept no better order.k Hungry souldiers are hardly kept within the compasse of lawes. The belly (as is commonly sayde) in this case hath no eares. The cause of all such miseries, in warres are diuers: first want of care, and good proceeding, then niggardise and miserie, thirdly fraude and deceite; last of all impunitie. Which are not to be redressed, but with contrary proceeding, and folowing the precedents of ancient warriers.

The Romanes gaue to their Generall both treasure, and authori∣tie sufficient, to prouide things necessary for the army. They brought

victuals into the army sufficient, and for feare of want layde vp a∣bundance in garners, and storehouses in strong places neere to the countrey, where their army soiourned. Opposing their for∣ces against Annibal, they chosea Clastidium for their storehouse. Caesar in the wars against thē of Auuergne brought all his prouisi∣on tob Nouiodune, because it lay neere. The Romanes caused their ships of victuals to discharge atc Chios in their warres against An∣tiochus: He chose Lysimachia for the place of his store. For the warres ofd Macedonia they made their prouision in Thessaly.e Caesar had his garners in conuenient places to supply his army in his warres against Pompey. Pompey brought all his prouision to Dyrrha∣chium.

Asdrubal entringf Spaine caried all the victuals, and store of the countrey into Asena: and Scipio likewise landingg in Afrike made newe storehouses, and filled both new and olde partly with victu∣als sent out of Sicile, and partly with those which hee got by the spoile of ye countrey. When a strong army commeth into any coun∣trey, it is no masterie for the same to findeh victuals & forrage either by feare, or force. But the companies sent into France and Flanders, being so weake, it was no marnell if they pined being pend vp or confined within some garrison, the enemie being alwayes stronger without. For the assurance of our victuals that come vnto vs, ga∣risons would be placed in conuenient distances. Caesar in the warres with thei Auuergnacs vsed 10. thousand Heduans to this purpose. Neither would he suffer anyk towne to remaine vntaken betwixt him and his victuals. For the fetching in of victuals, a conueni∣ent power of horsemen would be sent forth seconded with footemen, to forrage, and range the countrey.

Besides this the army would haue diuers cariages laden with victuals to be assigned to euery regiment, and to follow the ar∣my; as it was in the expedition of Cyrus into Persia. Such as dwell neere where our army goeth, would be summoned to bring victuals into the army, vnlesse they would haue their countrey ruinated. And as the Romanes had ayde of victuals in the warres ofl Carthage out of Sicile, in the warres ofm Macedonia out of A∣frike: and Caesar in his warres of Belgium was furnished fromn Rheims, in his warres with theo Heluetians, from the Hedu∣ans: so our associates, such especially as dwell neere, are to be

prayed to ayde vs with corne, and other prouision. But yet so that we doe not altogether depend vpon their pleasures, as we doe in the low countries, where our souldiers receiue from hand to mouth. Honest mena would haue commission and money giuen vnto them to buy prouision in places where it may be had. Finally, such as buy corrupt victuals, or vse other fraude, woulde seuerely be punished.

Further, order would be taken alwayes before hand, that supplies of victuals may follow the armie in time, least that, as in the Por∣tugall voyage, the armie be forced to returne for want, before the prouision come at it. If this be not, then ought not the armie to pro∣ceede further, then it may be assured of victuals.

Lastly, both such victuals as may bee found in the countrey, and such as are in the armie, are to be dispensed warely, at least without waste.b Souldiers (as the French saying is) liuing, or rather spoy∣ling at their owne discretion, in few dayes doe famish a countrey. The Romanes vsed to giue the souldiers certaine dayes prouision before hande, which they might not spende in fewer, as is euident both by example of Scipio sayling into Affrike in the seconde warres with Carthage, end also of Caesar in his warres in France, and by examples of diuers others.

To conclude, all those that looke for good successe in warres, must prouide both victuals, and armes, and all prouision for the warres before hand, as the precedents of the preparations made by thec A∣thenians, and Spartanes before the Peloponesian warre; ofd Sci∣pio, before his expedition into Affrike; ofe Cyrus, into Persia; off Metellus and Marius against Iugurtha; of the Spaniardes a∣gainst vs, when they came against vs with their Nauie; & in summe, of all wise people and states, that knew what perteyned to the wars, do teach vs. Charles ofg Burgundie sitting downe before Nancy without sufficient munitions, was forced to rise with a scorne. The same happened to the French beforeh Sancerre anno 1569. and must needes happen to all, that without sufficient prouision attempt matters rashly. Wise kings therefore doe forecast before hand what force, or prouision will be sufficient; fooles say, Oh had I wist; or, I neuer thought vpon it.

CHAP. III. That before we beginne warres, we are to procure what strength, or helpe wee can of our neighbours, or others: and to draw the same, as much as is possible for vs, from our enemies.

AS in priuate affaires particulars receiue mutu∣all helpe eche of other, of whom it is verified, thata two ioyning together doe more easily at∣chieue matters, then ech man single by himselfe; so in publike executions, where manie are linked together, they more easily execute, and are hard∣lier broken. Insomuch as friends andb confederates are no lesse the strength of states, then forces and treasure. Therefore did thec Sabines hearing of the preparatiues that Seruius Tullius made a∣gainst them, looke out what forreine ayde they mightadioyne vn∣to themselues. The Atheniansd and Spartanes in the Pelopo∣nesian warre did not so much stande vpon their owne strength, as the aydes, and succours of their confederates. Thee Syracu∣sans by the helpe of the Spartanes withstoode the inuasion of the Athenians made vpon them, and foyled them in diuers incounters. I neede not vse anie long discourse in this matter: it hath beene the continuall vse of the Kings of this Ilande to vse the helpe of the Burguygnions, and low Countries against France. And like∣wise haue the French relyed much vpon the ayde of the Scots a∣gainst vs.

Neither ought anie Prince, or nation so to presume of their owne strength, as that they refuse the ayde of friends. The Ro∣manes although after their victories against Annibal, at what time they beganne the Macedonian warre, they were in their prime of strength, and most flourishing estate; yet required they ayde of the Carthaginians, of Masinissa, and of the Aetolians, and others against Philip King of Macedonia. And deare it cost Perseus the King of Macedonia, that for sparing of money refu∣sed the ayde of thirtie thousand Gaules offering to serue him a∣gainst the Romanes. What hinderance it hath beene to vs, and what it may bee that the Towne of Antwerpe, and other partes of the lowe Countreyes were not receiued when they were of∣fered

vnto vs in these brawles against Philip of Spaine, I knowe not, some doubt. It may be sayd, they would not yeelde without conditions. But what purpose is it, to talke of conditions, see∣ing they would haue yeelded themselues into any princes handes, if they might haue bene receiued?

Further as we are to require ayde of our friends; so we are to with∣drawe what ayde we can from the enemie. Many reasons teach vs so to doe, which common practise doeth teach vs to be true. as the body in the distemper of the partes: so the state in the disagree∣ment of the members, is greatly weakened, and easily dissolued. The Romanes therefore as they were masters in other militarie documents, so did they diligently practice intelligence with the ene∣mies friendes, and subiectes. Before they transported their forces into Afrike, they dealt with Syphax, and assured themselues of Ma∣sinissa kings of Numidia. Before they charged Philippe king of Ma∣cedonia, they caused most of his partisans in Greece to reuolt from him. And Caesar by the helpe of part of the Gaules, which he drewe to his side, did subdue the rest, and them also afterward.

Pompey purposing to abase the power of Caesar, did first drawe from him two legions or regiments, and afterward Labienus one of Caesars chiefe friendes, and commaunders. Of this onely practice great effectes are wont to ensue. Caesar by disioyning and separa∣ting the forces and causes of the Gaules, ouercame them all. By his intelligence with the ancient Britons, hee vnderstoode the estate of the countrey, and had great helpe to atchieue his purpose a∣gainst it.

While they of the citie ofa Dinant suffered themselues to be dis∣ioyned from their associates of Liege, Charles Duke of Burgundy did easily ouercome them. If Lewis the xi. of France had not sepa∣rated, and broken the league, first betweene the Duke of Burgun∣dy and the Dukes of Britaine, and Normandy, and afterward be∣twixt king Edward the fourth, and the Duke of Burgundy: he could not haue escaped with so litle losse, nor vanquished his ene∣mies with so great gaine. We haue also domesticall examples of the same but too many, and which I cannot without some griefe remember. not with dint of sword, nor open force, but with secret practices with our associates and friendes in France, the French tooke not onely Normandy, but also Gascoyne and Guienne from

the English nation. And neuer omitting any opportunitie to trou∣ble vs, they wrought much woe vnto this land, in the dayes of King Iohn, by furthering and procuring the reuolt of the No∣bilitie.

Neither can any estate continue, that hath his partes deuided. For (as one sayth) it falleth out, that while euery man looking to his owne present safetiea suffereth his friendes to fight single, all are ouercome. By this means the Spaniard hath so much preuailed in the Low countreys, and the people haue hurt themselues. For dis∣ioyning their counsailes and forces, and refusing theb ayde of stran∣gers, they are for the most part a spoyle vnto the enemie. And if we would haue vsed greater force, and more diligence in with∣drawing from the Spaniard his associates, and subiects of Portu∣gall, of the Ilands, and of the Low countreys; hee would haue bene long ere this very gentle to deale withall. But some wise men, as they say, haue not onely not sought to cause his subiects to re∣uolt, but haue refused, and still refuse to receiue them, that holde out their hands, crauing helpe of friends and long since are weary of the Spanish tyranny.

As for those, that suppose the Spaniards to haue such holde of all the countreys which nowe they possesse, and of the inhabitants thereof, that we should but loose labour in attempting their reuolt, they seeme to be ignorant not onely of the state of his countreys, and of the Spanish gouernement, but also of the nature of things. It is well knowen with what discontentment, and grudge both the Portugals, and those of the Lowe countreys doe serue the Spa∣niard. The Portugals were ready to receiue vs at our last expedi∣tion thither, and would haue declared themselues further, if they had perceiued, that wee had bene able to defend them against the Spaniard.

The state of Milan is holden more by force, then by loue, or good title. They of Naples and Sicile haue by many signes decla∣red their great discontentment of the Spanish yoke. The Indians would reuolt, if they knewe which way. In all countreys there are euer some, that either for hope; or hatred desire change of state.

Annibal after that hee had once, or twise beaten the Ro∣manes in Italy: did afterwarde mainteine the warres for the most

part with the aydes of that countrey. And Caesar vsed the strength of the Gaules, against the rest of the nation. Vpon the first ouerthrow which Scipio gaue to the Carthaginians in Affrike, he caused most of the countrey to turne enemie against them.

Neither may we thinke that the state of Spaine is in this point, better then other nations, especially seeing the stirres in Aragon, and Grenade beside many other offers in Castile, doe declare, that there are among them many mal-contents. The Spaniard doubteth not to finde many such among vs, but it were to be wished, that we would rather make triall first, whether there were any such to be found in Spaine. When the French made their expeditions intoa Naples, they found great aydes in the countrey, some al∣so beside exspectation. Why then should Spaine differ from I∣taly?

But while we seeke to augment our forces with the succours of our associates and friendes; we are not so to rely vpon them, but that we prepare sufficient forces of our owne nation, both to resist the enemie, and if neede be to commaund our associates. therein fo∣lowing the wise proceedings of the Romanes, that neuer would ad∣mit a greater number of associates, then they had of their citizens in their army; and had alwayes an eye, that they practised not with the enemie. In this as inb other points, to distrust, is a great point of wisedome. The Scipioes did trust but too much to the aydes of the Celtiberians in Spaine. For being abandoned by them, they were exposed naked and vnprouided to the mercy of their enemies.c Tullius Hostilius did deale more wisely. For although hee had the succours of the Albans with him, yet had hee force sufficient to vanquish his enemis without them. If not; he had farre worse spee∣ded. For in the middes of the battell, he was forsaken by them. Thed Switzers that came in ayde of Lewis Sforza solde him into the handes of Lewis the xij, at Nouara, and did not onely forsake him. And of late yeres, the Protestants that eame out of Germany vn∣der the guidance of the Dukes of Bouillion, were in their greatest neede forsaken of the Lansknights, that came to ayde them. I neede not labour inueh to prooue this, seeing the great expen∣ses, that by the French and others hane beene wasted vpon the Almains of late time, doe teach vs howe little vse, or hope there is of the ayde of that nation. Of all those that folowe our en∣signes,

and ioyne together with vs those are least to be trusted, that are lately reuolted. Good it were to trie such, and then to trust them. Twoa Spaniards feining them selues fugitiues in the warres be∣twixt the Spaniards and the Venetians attempted to kill Aluian the Venetian Generall. The like was attempted by certaine Turks against Scanderbeg. The Numidians that reuolted to the Ro∣mans, a litle before their battel with Annibal at Cannae, made a great flaughter among the Romanes, after the battell ioyued. Maureuell that runagate pretending to forsake the enemie vpon some displea∣sure, would haue slaine the Admirall: but when he sawe howe that could not be done without euident danger, he slew Mouy a valiant gentleman, and so returned againe to the enemie. Neuer any did wholy rely vpon his associates, especially such as were newly come vnto him, without losse, or danger. Good it had, bene for vs not to haue looked for so much at the Portugales hands, as we did, it may be they would haue assisted vs, if we had bene the stronger, but euery one treadeth on those, that are throwen vnder foote, and thrusteth forward those that are falling.

To assure vs therefore of our associates, the safest way is to stand vpon our owne strength, and to trust more to our selues then to them: the next is by hostages, such as are well accompted of: another means is by gages of towns. Kingb Edward the third by seasing of Cherburg for pawne, assured himselfe of the king of Nauarres loy∣all dealing. The like course is taken in assuring the contract made betweene vs and the lowe countreys. I would we were in like sort assured of the townes we hold there, as he was. The reasons we haue to feare are diuers: but these in shew open; that the town•••• men of Vlishing and Briel, and the rest being armed, and in number passing our ••arrison, and giuing them victuals and munitions from hand to mouth, may force the same eyther to yeelde, or de••••rs ••t pleasure. That they haue not yet attempted it, the feare of the Spaniard 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cause. If that scruple were remoued, I feare what will full••••••, without extraordinary diligence, and better order, and more force: but to assure our selues of our associates there is no be•••••••• course then to doe them iustice. The samec both procureth friendes, & ••••inrei∣neth them in deuotion. For who will adhere 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them, which wrong them, and oppress them?d Pausanias and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by ruling their associates with rigour, and extremitie, caused them to ••••e part

the Lacedemonian armie discontent. The like effect did the coue∣tousnesse of the Athenians, that respected onely their owne profite, worke in their partisans in the Peleponesian warre. They must al∣so be defended against their enemies, if we looke to haue their helpe against our enemies. This reason moueda Caesar to hazard him∣selfe in the succouring of the Boians at Gergouia: and Iosua to come in ayde to the Gibeonites, although fraudulently they had caused him to enter into league with them. The Romanes not sending ayde to the Sag••ntines besieged by Annibal in time, lost not onely them, but the fauour of all Spaine. And vainely did wee looke for the helpe of Portugall, being not prouided to defend the Countrey against the Spaniard. To standb aloofe when our neighbours require ayde, is a course neither to helpe our friendes nor hurt our enemies. Besides the same is most dishonorable (for who doeth not despise those, in whome they see no helpe) yea and vnprofitable. for the enemie is thereby strengthened, and wee weakened.

Of the conditions and contractes of association, I shall haue oc∣casion to speake in the treatise of peace. For the endes of warres, are not onely the beginning of peace, but also of associations, and friend∣ships for the most part. Thus much onely may serue in this place, that some are onely offensiue, some offensiue, some with equall con∣ditions on both sides, some with respect to one side. and as great di∣uersities there are, as of diuers states, and conditions of things. Anniball and Philip of Macedonia, ioyned in league vpon these conditions, thatc Philip should waste the coast of Italy with his Na••i••••, and make warre vpon the Romanes by sea and land, vntill such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••s they had brought Italy in subiection, which should then belong to the Carthaginians: that the warres being there ended, An∣nibal 〈◊〉〈◊〉 passe ouer with his army into Greece, and helpe him to subdue that Countrey, and the Lands adioyning, which shoulde re∣•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••o Philip. They ofd Locres conditioned with Annibal, that 〈…〉〈…〉 helpe other both in warre, and peace. Many spe∣ciall m••••er•• •• knowe, 〈…〉〈…〉 and comprised in articles con••••∣med on both ••••des by 〈…〉〈…〉, and sometime by othe. And therefore whatsoeuer articles are agreed vpon, they are diligently, and loyally to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••erforme••. It is a sure course to winne vs credite among our neighbours, and to linke them in ••••••ine good wi•••• to∣ward vs.

CHAP. IIII.

Part 1. Of the Generall, and the partes and qualities required in him.

HItherto wee haue spoken of such preparatiues as are to bee made oft times in time of peace, but al∣wayes before the warres: nowe we are to speake of that which is the beginning, and first care, or at least act of warres. I meane the musters, and choise of captaines and souldiers. This among the Ro∣manes belonged to the Generals, which vpon the firsta mouing of warres, called all the people according to the tribes or diuisions, into a place appointed, out of them to take such numbers, and such men, as were most fitting. And most reasonable it is, that the Gene∣rall that should leade men, should haue the ouersight, and chiefe, if not onely direction in the choise of them. For who can better make choise of instruments, then such artificers as vse them in their workes? When the Generals thēselues were otherwise busied, yet didb they commit the matter to men of great authoritie and wisdome. Caesarc employed therein his counsell of warres, which also in his absence were his lieutenants. First therefore wee are to speake of the Generall, then of inferiour commaunders, and thirdly of com∣mon souldiers. In the discourse concerning the Generall, wee are to consider, first, what qualities and partes and sufficent Generall ought to haue: secondly, what instructions or councell he is to vse: and lastly, with what commission and power he ought to be furni∣shed wichall.

The principall care that a Prince or State that entreth into warres is to haue is, that there be choyse made of a sufficient Gene∣rall. I knowe that the place is for the most part graunted eyther for respect of Nobilitie, or kinred, or fauour. The Kings of this land in time past employed their children and vncles, which notwithstan∣ding prooued not the worst. Richard the 2.d in the warres against the Nobilitie, made y^e Duke of Ireland a fauourit of his, Generall; but he was not followed. The French kings may impute most part of their had successe in their warres to y^e insufficiēcie of their Generals.

In the warres of Naples Charles the 8. nameda Montpensier his lieutenant in respect of nobilitie, rather then sufficiencie: Lewis the 12. in his warres ofb Lombardy, made Chaumont his minion Ge∣nerall of his forces. But nothing did more hasten the ouerthrowe of the French causes there, thē their insufficiencie. Lewis Sforsa passing ouer diuers men of accompt, reposed all his trust inc Galeaz San∣seuerin, a man of small desert. Leo the 10. for kinred sake woulde needes employe Lorence Medici in his warres with the Duke of Vrbin, both which spedde alike. Which examples with diuers other of our time, which I will not mention, least any man might thinke himselfe interessed thereby, may moue vs to haue more care what Generals we doe employe in such seruices. In other matters, albeit fauour may take place: yet sure least ought it to swaye in choyse of the General. Nothing is more dangerous, then the euill successe of warres. What reason therefore haue Princes to chused weake men Gouernours of greatest matters in warres, seeing as in Sea causes men in greatest dangers are woont to make choyse of most skilfull Masters and Pilots? Or what impudencie is it for a man to take charge of a Shippe, that cannot see, but by others eyes, nor iudge, but by others direction? And why not likewise may they bee accompted shamelesse, that take vpon them the charge of mens liues, and goodes, which haue no iudgement, but by others report and direction? Of the weakenesse of Gene∣rals, proceede contentions betwixt the chiefe commaunders, de∣layes, needelesse expenses, disorders, disgraces, and the ouer∣throwe of Armies and States. And more shall an armie of Harts doe, guided by af Lyon, then an armie of Lyons ledde by a feare∣full Hart. Caesarsg inuincible olde souldiers were ouercome by the cowardise of Sabinus their leader. yet such was the skill of Caesar, that he could vse young souldiers, and obteine great victories by small forces. Marcellus with the reliques of the Romane armie, ouerthrowne at Canne, gaue vnto Annibal a great repulse. The Ro∣manes vnder the leading of C. Martius Coriolanush ouercame the Volscians, when the same man exiled vpon displeasure against his Countrey, tooke on him to leade the Volscians, they diuers times preuailed against the Romanes. Which sheweth what moment a skilfull captaine bringeth towarde the obteyning of victorie. And in the warres which the Romanes had against the Latines, the forces

being equall, yet the Romanes preuailed by the good direction of their Generall Fabius, whose gouernment was such, that all men confessed (asa Liuy reporteth) that what side soeuer should haue had him for their leader, the same must needes haue preuailed. In the battell of the Romanes againstb Pyrrhus king of Epeirus (nowe Albany) Fabritius acknowledged, that they were ouercome onely by the skill of Pyrrhus, more then by the force of his armie. And contrariwise, little accompt is to be made of an armie, that wanteth direction. Caesar feared not, as himselfec reporteth, the olde compa∣nies of Spaine, although otherwise much to be esteemed, because he knewe their Generals Petreius & Afranius, to be men of no me∣rite, nor skill. I haue my self heard some Spaniards greatly complain of the defectes of the Duke of Medina Sidonia the Generall of their Nauy, when they came vpon our coast. And although God was the authour, yet I doubt not, but that was some good meanes of their euill successe. Wherefore if Princes looke for good successe in their warres, let them without affection, and partialitie, make choise of a sufficient Generall, religious, skilfull, couragious, and adorned with such vertues, both for warre and peace, as the importance of the mat∣ters which he manageth requireth.

In a Generall, first I require religion: for if the Gentiles did sup∣pose that those affaires succeeded best vnto them, which theyd be∣gan in Gods name; shame it were for Christians to haue a worse conceit of that matter. And if all other matters, sure the hazardes of warre require religion in the chiefe directors. God he is Lord of Hostes, and giuer of victories; and sure it is not probable, he will giue it to those, that aske it not at his handes. God prescribed certaine exercises of religiō to his people in their wars; before them he would haue the Priestes to sound certaine siluer Trumpets. Constantine had all exercises of religion in his campe, and so proued most victo∣rious. The Spaniards in their warres assigne to euery Tertio, or Re∣giment certaine Priestes. What should I speake of those that make profession of religion, seeing thee Greekes did seldome attempt any dangerous seruice, but their captaines first consulted with their gods?f Cicero doeth attribute the good successe which the Ro∣manes had in their warres, to the religious care they had of the obseruance of holy ceremonies, and religion. Whatsoeuer mis∣hap came vnto their State, or Armie, they ascribed the same like∣wise

to the neglect, or contempt of religion. They esteemed that to be the cause of their ouerthrowe ata Allia by the Gaules, atb Thrasimene by Annibal, and in diuers other vnfortunate incoun∣ters, Machiauels diuinitie, that thinketh religion in men of warre foolerie, and proposeth that impious Atheist Caesar Borgia for a pa∣terne to a Prince, that aspireth to be great to be followed, was de∣tested euen of the barbarous nations, which in warres attempted nothing, but with religious ceremonies, as Tacitus and Caesar declare in the Gaules and Germanes, and Herodotus and Thu∣cidides in the Thracians and barbarous people. Wherefore let the Generall be religious, and a mainteiner of religion, and for∣bid blasphemies, and other impieties too too common in the com∣mon sort, if hee expect the fauour of God, and good successe in his affaires.

The Generall ought further to haue knowledge, and iudgement in matters of warre. The same is the speciall and most proper or∣nament of a General, inc whom the same is more respected, then all other morall vertues. C. Fabritus in the dangerous warres the Romanes had against Pyrrhus, in labouring thatd Cornelius a man rauinous, but very expert in warre, might be chosen Con∣sull, or Generall, declareth that the skill and experience of a va∣liant Captaine couereth other faultes. This knowledge and iudge∣ment hath many branches: the Generall ought to vnderstand as well the enemies estate, as his owne: he ought to knowe what forces, and what prouision of armes, horses, carriages, victuals, and other furniture, and munition will be sufficient, and howe he is to haue the same: he ought to take heede of the enemies trappes; to knowe howe to marche, ore lodge safely; howe to fight with aduantage, where to employe horsemen, where shotte, where other sortes of weapons, and to vnderstand the aduanta∣ges of all sortes of groundes: he hought to vnderstand the times when to fight, and advantages of weather, and Sunne: he ought not to be ignorant of any stratageme of warre, nor of treaties and conditions of truce, or peace: least as our auncesters in time past did, he loose by sleight that which before he had wonne by force: finally, in defending or besieging of Townes, in assaultes, esca∣ladaes, drawing of trenches, mines, making of batteries, for∣cing or defending of passages of riuers, or straytes: he may not

be ignorant of any point of warre; proposing to him selfe the example of Iulius Caesar, a man in all faites of armes most skifull. Whose iudgement was such, thata sitting still in his Tent in his campe at Ruspina, hee knewe what the enemie would doe, or could doe, and prescribed what was to be done against him: And deigned not to looke out, when Scipio made shewe to assault his campe. This knowledge bringeth with it consideration, and foresight. Both which ought to bee in the General: that, least hee want things necessarie; this, least he runne into the snares layd for him by the enemie. Of Aemilusb Paulus it is reported, that be∣ing chosen General for the warres in Macedonia, his minde was wholy bent on that seruice, so that he gaue himselfe no rest, nei∣ther night nor day. Captaines inc warres must looke both for∣ward and backward, and euery way whence any danger, or ad∣uantage is toward. For in warresd euery error in mortall. Many doe more matters by sleight, then by force. Charles the fifthe of France did more represse the force of the English nation by practice, then by force. The Lacedemonians when their leaders preuailedf gainst their enemies by counsell and stratagemes, sacrificed an oxe; when by open force, a cocke onley.

The next vertue required in a Generall, isg courage, and speede to execute that which is wisely determined. For vented counsels, and vented wine, doe foorthwith loose all good tasle. And cowardly captaines discourage valiant men, that suppose the danger to be as great, as their leaders, take it.h Domitius had no sooner determi∣ned with himselfe to flie away from Corfinium, but the souldiers lost courage. The cowardise of Crassus thei rich, gaue occasion to the great ouerthrowe, which the Romanes had giuen them by the Parthians. The faint heart of Titurius Sabinus, charged byk Am∣biorix, made his souldiers faint. Contrariwise, resolute men giue courage to their souldiers, and restore battels almost lost . Caesars couragious heart occasioned the victorie against Pompeyes sonnes at Munda. King Richard the third, had almost hazarded the matter at the iourney of Bosworth: if hee had but had three hundred men like him selfe, the field had beene his. But because his cause was not good, it pleased not God to giue him the meanes.l Iugurtha is by Salust commended both for prowesse, and counsell. No∣thing doeth more auaile in warres, then the example of the General.

He is a cowardly companion, that dareth not to doe, as he seeth his Generall doe. Valerius Coruinus vsed no other incouragement to his souldiers then this, that they shoulda imitate not his wordes, but his deedes, and do as they sawe him to giue them an example. Not that the Generall ought lightly to hazard his person, (for that were great temeritie) or vexe himselfe with labour, (for that were vaine) but that hee ought to shewe himselfe alwayes couragious in dan∣gers, and forwarde in labours. No lawes, nor precepts can doe herein more, then the Generals example. The Romanes folo∣wedb Cato through the drye and hotte sandes of Barbary, and shame made Xenophons souldiers march vp the hill, seeing him goe before them. Neither hath any thing more animated the French Kings souldiers of late, then the example of so valiant a Prince lea∣ding them.

They that haue skill and resolution in matters of warre, cannot chuse (if God be pleased) but haue good successe, and authoritie. For what man wisely laying his plot, and resolutely executing the same, can fayle of his expectation, or want an honourable reputa∣tion both with his owne men, and with the enemie.c And therefore what neede precepts of these matters, which is deede are rather in the power of others, then of our selues, and followe of those vertues which before I haue spoken of?

There are also other vertues required in a Generall, which al∣though they be not so necessarie as the former; yet for the execu∣tion of matters, are very requisite and profitable; as namely iu∣stice, liberalitie, courtesie, clemencie, temperance, and loyaltie. Iustice is an ornament both in warre and peace, well beseeming all Gouernours, but especially the Gouernours of armies. It is profitable to reteine the good willes of our associates, necessary for the winning of the good will of our owne souldiers. The same hath vse as well in respect of enemies, as friendes. The Faliscians besieged by Camillus, moued rather with the opinion of his iu∣stice, that sent backe vnto them the Schoolemaster, that deliue∣red into his handes the youth of the Citie, then by force, yeelded their Citie vnto him. Pyrrhus did neuer offer to treate of peace, before the Romanes had sent him backe that traytour, that offe∣red for a certaine summe of money to empoyson him.d Warres are to bee gouerned not by crueltie, but by iustice. When

a Pausanias in the Peloponnesian warre dealt rigorously with his associats, they al forsooke him. Which also happened to the Athe∣nians in the same warre for like cause. And who doth not hate the Spaniard that seldome suffereth men of qualitie, that come in his power to escape, and hath deuised a kind of proscription, by which he offereth wages and rewards to such as will kill or empoison prin∣ces, or others whom he maligneth and proscribeth? without iustice the discipline of warre cannot be maintained: neither hath the vali∣ant reward without it, nor the coward punishment. Therefore had the Romans especial regard of iustice. And iustice had in their camps a speciallb place, where it was administred.

Little needeth it, that I declare how necessary liberalitie is in warres, that both in peace, and at all times hath such efficacie to at∣tract mens fauours. The souldiers dare aduenture any thing, where there is large reward.c Nothing doth more stirre vp valiant minds, then great honors.d Euery man bestoweth labor where he looketh for profit, and reward. Therefore had the Romanes most valiant souldiers, for that they were most liberall in their rewardes. Among them, as their Generall Decius said, the highest places ande ho∣nors were giuen to valiant men for their vertue and prowesse, not to cowards for their nobilitie, or gentry. Theyf by their liberalitie made their souldiers forward in labour and danger. The Captains of the Romanes although poore themselues, yet enriched their soul∣diers. Publicola, Valerius, and Menenius Agrippa were in their time great cōmanders, yet did they not leaue behind them so much, as to discharge their funerals. But they enriched the state, and left behind them a fame of vertue, that will neuer decay. Caesarg with his great liberality had his souldiers so obsequent, that in those ciuill warres, which he had against Pompey and others, few or none could be allured by any promises to forsake him, whereas infinite of the enemies did daily reuolt, and flie vnto him. The Turks in warres are most venturous, for that they know they shall haue great recom∣pense for well doing. He that first mounted the walles of Constan∣tinople, was afterward made Bascha. And Ochiali of a poore ma∣riner for his valiant seruice was made Admirall of the Turkes nauy, and one of his counsell.

The hope that the Spaniards haue of their increase of pay, which they call Ventaias, and of preferment to higher places doth much

encourage them to aduenture. And what is the reason, that so few doe hazard themselues in these dayes but this, that the reward of hurts and long seruice is, for the most part, disgrace and beggarie? the Generall hath no means to reward the valiant: pillers and spoi∣lers waxe rich, and purchase: valiant souldiers die naked, and are v∣sed as abiects. If a pot of golde were offered vnto them, they would not refuse it, as dida Fabritius the Romane captaine, but some would rather sell their father, their countrey, yea and soule, rather then forgo it.

Nothing is more hurtefull to the proceedings of warres then miserable niggardise. Although a captaine were endued with all o∣ther vertues, yet this one fault would either suppresse them, or dis∣grace them. They woulde butb serue him to make all things more saleable, as said Pericles.c Annibal, for that through couetousnes he fell to spoile his associats, did alienate al their good willes. Per∣seus the king of Macedonia sparing of his monyd lost himselfe, and his kingdome, where if he would haue beene at any charge, he might haue had the ayde of thirtie thousand Gaules most valiant men to serue him against the Romanes.e Frederike the emperour the last of that name was of euery one contemned, and abused, for that they knew that he would rather incurre any disgrace, then spend any mo∣ny.f Galba the emperour might haue reteined the good wil of his souldiers with any small cost, or expense bestowed vpon them: but it was a death to him to spend mony. Therefore was he forsaken of his souldiers, and slaine of his enemy. While men either haue not mony, or will not spend it vpon necessary prouision before hand: cap∣taines want souldies, souldiers want armes, victuals, munitions of warre, and all things necessary. Nay they want will, and courage. For what courage can men haue when there is no hope of rewarde? By thisg meanes all military discipline is disordered, souldiers fa∣mished, forward men impouerished, the honor of military profession stained, and vnworthy persons and greedy gulles that lie fatting and purchasing at home, enriched with the spoiles of their countrey. This was the first occasion of the ruine of Rome, that all thinges were there set to sale: it was the ouerthrow of the state of theh Gabi∣ans, and I feare will be the bane of England, if it be lawfull here al∣so to do as others did, without controlment.

The Generall would likewise be courteous, clement, and gentle.

Nothing doth more please the common souldier. This was a special commendation of Charles the fift, but borrowed from antiquity. Cae∣sara among other his vertues had this commendation singular of affability and courtesie to his souldiers, of clemency to ward his ene∣mies.b Vespasian by this meanes obtained the fauor of his souldiers, and Titusc his sonne was their speciall delite.d Germanicus with his care for his souldiers, and his courteous speech bound them to loue him. The sauage mindes of mutins aree oftentimes mitiga∣ted with faire wordes, when no rigour could otherwise tame, or pa∣cifie them. Contrariwise, nothing doth more hurt sometimes, then the vntimely rigour, and austerity of the Generall. Charles Duke of Burgundy in his latter time grew so austere, and peremptory, that no man durst councell him any thing, or contrary him. The same as Philipf Commines testifieth was his vtter ruine.g Posthu∣mius for his rigour was stoned to death of his owne souldiers: which also happened to Cinna, whose vntimely austerity was the ruine of their affaires. Alexander if to his great valiantnesse hee had ioyned affabilitie and clemency, he had not in the end growen odious to his owne souldiers. Who doth not detest Annibal for his great cru∣eltie?

Temperance is a vertue that shineth in peace especially, yet hath it no small vse in the middest of warres, and being wanting in a cap∣taine doth make him want so much of perfection. For how is it like, that hee can gouerne others well, that cannot rule himselfe, nor his affection? or who can looke for modestie and sobrietie in the souldiers, where the Captaine is giuen to wine or wo∣men, and spendeth his time in riot, and excesse? let this vertue therefore be added to the garland of an absolute Captaines perfecti∣ons.

hScipio by restoring a faire woman to her husband Allucius, wonne to himselfe the heart not onely of that man, but also of the womans friends, and diuers Spaniardes. Andi Cyrus bound Abra∣data vnto him, for sparing his wife Panthea.k Alexander is renow∣med among posterity for his continency toward the wife, and daugh∣ters of Darius.

Like cōmendation, though in another subiect, dothl Epaminondas deserue, who whē his citizēs did feast, & riot, walked soberly about the wall of Thebes, to see that the enemy made no attempt against

the city. Nothing doth more hurt or hinder the proceedings of wars, then riot and intemperancy. Annibals souldiers were ouercome with the delights of Capua, whom the Romanes with force could not sub∣due. Antiochus in the midst of his preparatiues falling in loue, spent a winter in making of a match, & so lost time, and opportunitie to trans∣port his army into Italy, as Annibal aduised him. The French grew odious to them of Sicilia by reason of their insolencies, which gaue them cause to rebell, and to murder them al in one euening. The in∣temperance of the enemy giueth many opportunities to those that be watchful.a Cales was taken while the citizens lay drunken in a so∣lemne feast. The same was the destruction of Troy. Marcellus per∣ceiuing the negligent gard which the Syracusans made on a feast day at night, surprised the towne by escalade. Theb Turkes took Zere∣sana a strong town in Sclauony vpon Shrouetuesday at night, when the townesmen after their maner of their carneuall being drunke, were carelesse and secure. Much more therefore behoueth it the Ge∣neral to watch, to be sober, temperate and careful. These vertues are singularly commended in a Generall; yet may I not forget desire of true honor, loue of the countrey, and loyalty toward the Prince and Which vnlesse a Generall haue, al other excellencies do rather make him suspected, then commend him. For who can trust him that hath intelligence with the enemy, or receiueth pensiō from him: The French men do merily scoffe at some great men of our nation, that haue beene pensioners of the French Kings,c and whose acquit∣tances are extant in their Eschequer. I would to God the guise were now euery where left. C. Fabritius dwelling in a smoky house refu∣sed a great masse of gold presented vnto him by the Samnites. How much more then ought they to haue care of their honor, that dwell in the sight of the world in gorgeous houses? that great men for a paltry pension, should sell their honor, it is intollerable. For the loue of their country diuers in time past deuoted themselues to death, as the two Decii, as Curtius, as Mutius Sceuola, as Codrus, as Leonidas, and infinit others. Is the race of them now extinct, that so fewe of that sort are in our age and country to be found?

If we consider ancient times, we shall finde that those great men, whose memories continue vnto our times, were endued both with these, and many other vertues.d C. Caesar in his actions was most consideratiue, in hazard and danger most resolute, in executions

speedy, oppressing his enemies oft times before the newes of his comming were heard, painfull in labour, in dangers watchfull, in diet sober, a liberall rewarder of valiant men, a good iusticer where neede required: if al his vertues were in a Generall, what should be wanting beside religion? This Generall I propose to all those that desire honor to imitate, so neere as they can. The honorable parts of Camillus, Valer. Coruinus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Scipio, are no lesse to be set before the eies of Capteins. Annibal among y^e Africans deserueth special price. He was in his time subtil, cautelous, skilfull in al faits of armes. He was very skilful that could escape his snares. Laborious he was and watchfull, and speedy, and a strict obseruer of military orders. Ofa Cato it is reported, that in parsimony, watching and labours hee contended to passe the common ••ouldiers. Of the yonger Catob Lucan giueth this testimony, that in the painfull march tho∣row the desarts of Affrike he by his patience, and example shewed what others were to do. These things were in the old Romane cap∣tains, and as I suppose in those that succeeded them.c Vespasian is commended for a man of courage in fight, skil in incamping, and ta∣king the aduantage of the ground. Night and day he broke the e∣nemies purposes, oft by counsel, sometime by force, in diet & ap∣parel he was moderate, & scarce could you know him from a com∣mon souldier, comparable with antiquitie, if couetousnes had not blemished or rather defaced his other vertues. By such men the Romane empire grew great: by wants, and vice of the Generals the same receiued many ouerthrowes. Claudius,d who being captaine the Romanes were ouercome at sea in the first wars with Carthage, was a contemner of religion, ignorant of matters of warre, simple and cowardly. Flaminius that was slaine with his army by Annibal at the lake Thrasymene was irreligious, rash, vnskilful, impetuous, vnprouident. Varro that occasioned the great slaughter of the Ro∣manes at Cannae, was a man of no merit, nor iudgement, wilful, and vnexpert in matters of warre. Crassus the rich seeking too greedily after spoyle, was not aware in what country he marched, before bee saw himselfe inclosed by the enemies. Looke the latter emperours, you shal not find in many of them any thing worthy commendation. Maximinus a cruell tirant, in matters of warre and state was vnskil∣full. Such were most of the rest.e Ordeonius that was ouerthrowne by the Germans, being in danger, like a sluggish beast took his bed,

and (as Tacitus saith) did thence giue foorth such direction, as made most for the enemy. Wherefore seeing so many vertues are requi∣red in a captaine, and so small faultes lay him open to the enemy: it is no maruell, if perfect Generals be so rare, and hard to finde. Phi∣lip king of Macedonia wondred, that the Athenians changed their leaders so often, as hauing great choice, seeing that he in al his time, could not find anie more then one that was excellent, or answerable to his minde; and that was Parmenio. The more rare they are, the more care all wise Princes, and states ought to haue, that vnto such as they commit their armies vnto, they adioyne for a supply wise and experimented counsellers. Yea, though the Generall be neuer so wise, yet may hee not want his counsell of warres. Of this the order of our discourse leadeth vs now to speake.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 2. Of the Generalles counsell of warres.

IT were a principall point of wisedome for Princes, and states, that take warres in hand, to make choice of such a Generall, as hath such partes and vertues, as before are described: if they will not be persuaded, but will needes for fauour, or kinred, or nobi∣litie commit their affaires to men young in yeares, and greene in experience, and de∣stitute of merite, the next remedy is to ioyne with them Captaines wise, and experimented in matters of warre. If they will doe ney∣ther, then shall the wofull euents of warres teach them, which no counsell nor reason could perswade them, that warres are mana∣ged by wisedome, value, and experience, and not by fauour, no∣bilitie, nor great countenance. In the late troubles of France,a when Charles the ninth made his brother Henry de Valois his lieu∣tenant generall, to supply his want of yeares, and experience, hee assigned vnto him for his counsell the Dukes of Nemours, and Longueuille, the Marshall Cossè, Tauanes, Martigues, Car∣naualet, Losses, and others which were men of wisedome and va∣lue.

King Edward the third sending his sonne gouernor of his army into France, ioyned with him diuers experimented heades to assist him. Yea,a although the Generals themselues were men of worth, and great experience: yet both among the Romanes and other nati∣ons had they their counsels with them. Many eyes see more then one, and souldiers do more willingly execute that, which they see by wise counsell to haue beene determined wisely before.b Before any en∣terprise be begunne, it is wisedome to consult, and after consulta∣tion speedily to execute.c It is neuer good to presume vpon the e∣nemies disorders, as if they would take an euil course, but wee ought to consider and foresee in counsell, all that may happen, as if they did all that which they ought to doe, saith Archidamus. But this cannot be doone sufficiently, nor orderly without a coun∣sell of warres. Therefore had the Romanes theird legates, lieu∣tenants, or counsellors assistant vnto them, to giue counsell and to speede such matters, as were committed vnto them, more or lesse according to the importance of affaires in hand. L. Furius in his warres against the Gaules had fiue: Caesar in his warres in France had tenne: Pompey in the warres against the pyrates had fifteene legates. These serued the Generall for counsell, in his ab∣sence they supplied his place: in any seruice they had the charge ey∣ther of some part of the army, or some wing, or some regiment.

The Lacedemonians sente Brasidas, and others to assist their ad∣mirall. Cnemus in the gouernement of sea causes. When Commi∣us,f Virdumarus, Eporedorix, and Vergasillaunus were made Generalles of that army which the Gaules sent against Caesar, they had also certaine wise men assigned to them out of euery state, by whose counsell they were to proceede in the administration of the warres. Where there is no set counsell, yet is it not good to doe matters without counsell. The Romanes vsed commonly to call a counsell of their chiefe officers, colonelles, and others about them. Camillus beforeg hee charged the Gaules, he set downe in counsell howe euery thing shoulde bee perfourmed. And there∣fore no maruell (saith Liuy) if good successe ensued, seeing all thing were doone by order, and deliberation. Ser. Galba being beset by the people comming downe from the mountaines on euery side, called a counsell of his chiefe men, andh asked aduise, what euery man thought best to be done in that case. The same didi Cotta

and Titurius besieged by Ambiorix, though not with like successe. Curioa calling his counsell about him after his comming into Af∣frike, deliberated how to proceed in his matters. Good it had bene for him if he had vsed like deliberation in all his affaires. But if at a∣ny time, sure before the ioyning of battell counsell is necessary. Be∣fore thatb Scipio brought foorth his army to fight with Asdrubal, he called his chiefe men to counsell.c Cyrus before hee began the bat∣tell with his brother Artaxerxes, called the colenels, and chiefe com∣manders of the Greeks to counsel. There they set down by common cōsent what course they were to take for the obtaining of the victory. And so pretious a thing is good counsell, that not onely chiefe com∣manders, & men of authority, but also euery one that speaketh reason is to be heard.d Xenophon, to heare those that brought good intelli∣gēce, gaue order, that his familiars should awake him if he were on sleepe. He refused not to heare the counsel of any priuate souldier.

Let vs now see into what calamities they haue fallen, which refu∣sing to heare counsel did al things rashly, and vpon their owne head. Charles the Duke of Burgundy deserueth the first place, who presu∣ming of his owne wisedome, and refusing to heare all counsell, ouer∣threw himselfe and his state. He refused to heare one that came to dis∣couer vnto him the treason of Campobacho. The presumption ofe Lautrecke that would heare no counsell, nor followe any deuise but his owne, brought the forces of France before Naples to ruine. It had beene good if Richard the 2. would haue folowed the aduise of his vncle. It is reported that Charles the 5. was opinionatiue and did many things of his owne head; and the rather, for that he would seeme to imitate Caesar. But the matter I thinke is mistaken. for neither did Caesar, nor Charles the 5. things without counsell, nor can any prosper, that do proceede without aduise.

Those things standing thus: yet I know not how it commeth to passe, that in great enterprises taken in hand in these times, there is seldome any sound, or set counsell appointed. If any be: yet are they the Generals familiars, or men of no great merite, or iudgement. And which is very odious, & greatly offendeth braue men, Princes &f Generals chambers are close shut, & hard it is for a man to come to their speech whatsoeuer they haue to say. Oft times the counsell is diuided, which causeth slow resolution, weak expedition, and venteth al good counsels: a matter much to be auoyded.g Guicciardin saith,

that the contrariety of Clement the 7. his two counsellers made him ridiculous, slowe, and vnhappy in all his enterprises. yet was hee otherwise subtill, and worldly wise. Where there is emulation, and contention betwixt those of the counsel, there is nothing agreed vp∣on, vntill all opportunities be passed. Nowe and then the Generall, although good counsell be giuen, yet least hea might seeme to want or neede counsell, hee will rather take a worse course. Which was the case of the Romane captaine, through whose folly the Romanes were ouerthrowen by Vologeses. Some men also there are which mislike all counsels, but such as themselues deuise: of which nature wasb Laco the gouernour of Galba the Emperours garde. which was his owne ouerthrow, and the ouerthrow of his Prince. Such are to be excluded frō all counsel. Some there are that in counsel resolue vpon euery light rumour, and report. which causeth them oft times ridiculously to reuoke their decrees, and determinations. This light∣nes Caesar noteth in thec Gaules; & thed Senate of Rome with great grauitie reprooued, where they shew, that the Senate might not determine matters vpon rumours of priuate men, that lightly proue counterfeit. Of all otherse Aemilius Paulus most hated those, that would talke and prate, and busy themselues with matters, which they vnderstood not. And in deede it is an odious sort of men, that doeth forge false rumours, and take vpon them to prescribe the Ge∣nerals what to doe. But most dangerous counsellers are those, which are hired of the enemie. A matter not newe nor rare, but sure very scandalous. Guicciardine noteth it in the counsellf of Charles the 8. of France. The same man declareth whatg sway French Crownes did also beare among the counsellers of Charles the 5. Philip of Co∣mines reporteth that Lewis the xj. of France bestowed 16. thousand Duckets in pension vpon the English that followed Edward the 4. into France, which brake the force of that iourney. When the treaty of association was made betwixt Spaine and England, against France in the dayes of Henry the 8. the Cardinal and others would not agree, before that the Emperour Charles had giuen them cau∣tion for theh paiment of 20. thousand Duckets pension, which they receiued of the French king, and were loth to loose, howsoeuer the common wealth might gaine by it. These men call themselues Pensioners, but their true name is Traitors, hired for a litle golde to betray their Prince and Countrey. These doe ruinate all enter∣prises

against those that hire them, and therefore deserue not on ely to be thrust out of the counsell of warres, but also out of their coun∣trey. These doe make many good counsels knowen to the enemie, and therefore are no way to be trusted. Last of all through feare, or delay of resolution, or execution, many occasions of seruice passe, which are not alwayes offered vnto vs, and when they come, not easi∣ly to be pretermitted. It is not wisedome to resolue rashly, true: no more is it wisedome to consult so long, that the occasion passeth. rash men therefore, and slowe proceeders are fitter for other places, then places of counsell in warres.

The remedie of these disorders is easy, where the Generall is a man of iudgement, and execution; where otherwise, it is a matter difficult, and almost not possible. In which case it is necessary, that one be appointed with special authority next to the Generall. Men of iudgement can soone discouer trecherous counsels, and will easi∣ly correct their contentions, and whatsoeuer other faultes are com∣mon in their proceeding.

Wherefore seeing nothing auaileth more in warres, then coun∣fell: next vnto the choyse of the Generall, regarde is to be had of the choyse of a sufficient counsell of men of knowledge, experience, se∣crecy, loyaltie and other good partes fit for that place; that, as it was among the Romanes, may both aduise, and helpe the Generall. And if by the lawe of armes, no souldier may reueale any counsell to the enemie, much lesse ought such abuse to proceede from the counsel. I neede not declare how they should proceede, nor how they should couer their enterprises by contrary pretenses, asa Cyrus did going against his brother Artaxerxes, and as the Spaniards doe dayly; nor how they should speedily resolue, and presently execute. They doe not deserue to be named counsellers, that in those poynts want counsell. Nowe least contrariety of opinions which hindereth both counsell, and execution, should arise of the diuersitie of coun∣sellers affections, I wil shew that the soueraine authoritie in warres, is to be committed to one alone.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 3. Wherein is declared, that the soueraigne commaundement in matters of warres, is to be committed to one alone.

AS in a state well ordeined, so in an army well gouerned there may not be any contrariety in the chiefe commaunders. The army by Iphicra∣tes the Athenian is compared to a body, where∣of the Generall is the head. Wherefore, as it is vnnaturall anda monstrous for one body to haue two heads, so it is inconuenient, for an army to be encumbred with diuers heads of contrary disposition. Which mischiefe, seeing it can be no otherwise remedied, then by gi∣uing the soueraintie to one: the Prince is diligently to see, that the soueraintie in the army be not diuided amongst many. The Romanes albeit they had ordinarily two consuls: yet in their greatest dangers they appointed one Dictator, or Generall with absolute authoritie. The soueraine commandement of one is a helpe and meanes to di∣spatch matters quickly, to take opportunities, and vse the time of warre.b Demosthene doeth playnely declare the same by the exam∣ple of Philip king of Macedonia. While one commaundeth, he both vnderstandeth better what is wanting, and howe it is to be had: his care is greater; his proceeding more formall, and equall: his counsel more speedy, and secret. Therefore did the Romanes send but one Gouernour into their Prouinces, and employed for the most part but one Consull in the gouerument of their armies. If both: yet where they proceeded orderly, the one gauec place to the other. A matter most requisite for the dispatch of weighty matters; as it is eui∣dent in the fact of Agrippa yeelding the chieftie to his felow Quinti∣us. The Athenians for that their state was popular vsed yeerely to chuse many captaines, yet in their greatest dangers all the rest yeel∣ded to be gouerned by one. In the Marathonian fielde against Da∣rius, the supreme commandement was in Miltiades, in the battell of Salamine against Xerxes ind Themistocles, all the rest submitting themselues to be commanded by him. Seldome hath any wise nation done otherwise: if they did they payde for the most part the full price of their folly. The Romanes were ruinated by the Gaules

at the encounter ofa Allia, partly by the disorder of the chiefe com∣manders being diners, and hauing equall authoritie. Those threeb captaines that besieged Veij hauing all equal power may be a do∣cument vnto vs, how vnprofitable the commandement of diuers Generals is, for the gouernment of warres. For euery man driuing all matters to his owne endes, while one man thought one way, an other otherwise, they gaue occasion to their enemies to hurt them. By the discordec of the captaines while one refused to succour an other, the Romanes were foyled before Veij. The Aequians obser∣uing the disagreement betweene thed Romane captaines, although in force inferiour to the Romanes, yet preuailed against them. Nei∣ther was there any greater cause of the ruine of thee Athenian army in Sicile, then the contrarietie of opinions, and discorde of the three captaines sent thither with soueraigne commandement. The origi∣nall of all the disorders that fell out in the army of the Protestants in Germany, and of the victorie off Charles the fift, was the diuers opinions of the Duke of Saxony, and Lantgraue of Hesse. When the Lantgraue woulde haue foughten, the Duke was of another minde, or percase was not ready. What the one did profitably de∣termine, that the other did frustrate. From the time of this discorde the affaires of the Protestants went to wracke. The French were driuen out of the kingdome ofg Naples by a small force, by reason of the dissention of the captaines Montpensier and Percy. The enuie and contention, that fell out betwixt the French, and Hungarian cap∣taines gaue an easy victorie to Amurathes the Turke at Nicopolis. It had not bene possible for Caesarh Borgia to escape the hands of so many Princes confederate against him, but that the captaines of the aduerse army did weaken their force by their owne disagree∣ment. The Venetians were ouerthrown at Ghiaradadda only by the pluralitie of commanders. For whilei Bartholomew Aluian which was one of their Generals determined to fight, and the Count Pit∣tiglian which was the other, commanded the army to marche, the enemie charging them in this instant of their irresolution, obteined a great victorie.

The soueraigne authoritie both of matters by land, and by sea is to be giuen only to one. otherwise there can be no good correspon∣dence in both places. While Lantreckk commanded by land, and Philippin Doria by sea: the siege of Naples was discontinued, & the

towne victualled, which happened by reason of the dissention of the Generals. It hath bene no small hinderance to our affaires in the Low countreys, that those that haue commanded at land, haue not likewsie had the gouernment at sea. For by this meanes the ene∣mie hath had greater store of victuals, and our owne men greater want, when the shippes and passages were in others keeping. Nay, where the commandement is part in the Generall, and part in the States, things are yet more confused. For the States oft times victuall the enemie, yea and coutinually trade into Spaine, while our souldiers fight against the Spaniard. I will not say what inconue∣niences come of this one point neglected otherwayes, for that it would couch some men more particularly, then my meaning is. For remedy of this mischiefe the Romanes gaue to their captains power both in matters by land, and sea. Scipio as he had an army by land, so he had a Nauie by sea both in the expedition of Spaine, and Afrike. Neither could Marcellus euer haue preuailed against the citie of Sy∣racusae, if he had not besieged the towne, both by sea, and land. Caesar was enforced to goe to sea before he could subdue the sea townes of France. But what neede I vse more wordes in a matter so playne? both reason, and experience teacheth vs that manya commanders in matters of warre are not good. And therefore let there be but one soueraigne commander both by land, and sea: with what authoritie he ought to be furnished, resteth now to be discussed.

CHAP. IIII. Part.4. Of the authoritie, and Commission of the Generall.

ACcording to that opinion which Princes and States haue of their Captaines, and sometimes respect had to the danger of the times: their vse is to giue vnto them more ample, or more straite commission. But if they purpose, that their affaires shal succeed wel, of two things one is necessarie: to wit, that either they furnish them with meanes sufficient, or giue them commission to furnish and helpe themselues: and that either they doe direct them sufficiently, which is scarce possible: or els giue them leaue to take order according to the occasions offered vpon pre∣sent viewe, and varietie of times, or things. For neither can he doe

seruice vpon the enemie, that wanteth either conuenient force or meanes; nor may he, or dare he take the aduantage of time, and other circumstances, that is brideled and bound by his instructions. The Romanes although most expert in deedes of armes, whose Senate consisted for the most part of such as in their time had bene comman∣ders, and altogether of men exercised in armes; yet did not at any time prescribe their Generals what to doe; and what they should not doe; much lesse howe they should doe, or when they should doe it. Much more absurd therefore it is, that men that neuer sawe enemie, nor know the traine of warres, should take vpon them to direct Ge∣nerals what they should doe at land, or sea: and very strange it see∣meth to me, that Generals to whome armies are committed should like schooleboyes take forth such lessons, as these ignorant pedants and scriuanoes should prescribe. Warres are not made by indenture, neither can any couenant with his enemie to doe this, or not to doe it. Nor can any man conceiue, what is best to be done, but such as are present. And therefore the ordinary limitations of some commissi∣ons, doe nothing els, but binde the hands of our captaines, that they shall not vse opportunitie, or percase further and helpe the enemie. Herein therefore it is good to imitate olde warriers, at least to come so neere them, as difference of times will permit. The Romane cap∣taines had authoritie most large, and meanes sufficient. Their forces were great, their furniture and prouision plentifull. least they should exact any thing of their associats, they were furnished with all thingsa necessary, euen to theirb mules, tentes, and carriages. That which was wanting, or might more easily be had otherwhere, they had au∣thority to supply. All which consisted, & was giuen them in one word. Now captains haue many words in their commission, & litle scope, or authority. Vnder this one word imperium, they cōprised al authority necessary for the gouernement of the warres. By the same they had power to leuy men, to leade them, to employ them, as appeareth by thec commission giuen to Octauius Caesar, that afterward was called Augustus In the Prouince where they made warres, they might be∣side the number they brought with them, leuy other souldiers, & im∣pose vpon the people necessary charges for the defence of the coutry. Caesard to resist the attempts of the Heluetians, which threatned to passe through the Prouince of France subiect to the Romanes, le∣uied as many men, as he could, in his gouernement. Fuluius vnder∣standing

that thea Celtiberians gathered newe forces, he also in his gouernement, procured what helpe hee could of his subiectes, and associates. From their associates and subiects in their gouern∣ment, they had power to take victuals, carriages, shippes, and ne∣cessarie furniture of warre, as is euident in the warres that Scipio made in Spaine and Afrike, Caesar in France, Sylla and Pompey in Asia, and other Countreys. They had also power to doe iustice as well to their associates, and subiects, as to their owue souldi∣ers: otherwise they could neither haue encountred with trechery of men euill affected, nor defended their fauourers, and friendes. The defence of the Prouince, and theirb friendes both against se∣ditious mutins, and foreine inuasion was likewise committed vn∣to them, and per consequent, power giuen them to leuy power, and vse all meanes for the maintenance of their associats, and for the gouernment and execution of warres, without which they could not be defended.

Good it had bene for our Generals likewise in the Lowe coun∣treys, and other where, that their authoritie had bene also enlar∣ged. For while they had neither victuals, nor lodging, nor shippes, nor cariages, nor artillery, nor munition, nor other furniture of warre, but at the pleasure of the States, some whereof were too respectiue of their owne profite, nor could execute any man of those Countreys for treason, without their consent, it is no maruaile, if their proceedings were slowe, their executions slender, their wantes great.

Further the Romanes gaue their Generals power both to make warres by sea, and land. Do doubt they had also sufficient meanes, without which all power is frustratory. Our Captains in the Low countreys, as they haue bene weake by land, so they depended on others pleasures, for matters at sea.

In later times also the same course hath bene taken. Whenc Corbulo was sent by Nero against the Parthians, hee had power equall to that which Pompey had graunted vnto him in the warres against the Pirats. Kings, Gouernours of Prouinces, and the Offi∣cers of the Romanes were enioyned to obey him. It is the vse of all Nations both to furnish their Generals, and to authorize them sufficiently. What authoritie Annibal had, it is partly eui∣dent by his actions (for it is not to be presumed that he did matters

without authority) and partly by the wordes of Fabius perswading the Romanes to chuse a captaine equall to Annibal, a leader (sayth hee) of great authoritie by reason of his continuance, and not restrained by any limitation of times, or lawes so, but that he might doe all things, according as opportunites of warre should require. Herein Demosthenesa declareth, what great aduantage Philip king of Macedonia had aboue the captaines of the Atheni∣ans: for he was not limited by any Superiors commandement, nor restrained by termes, or time, as were they. Which thing (sayth he) is very effectuall for dispatch of matters. Those captaines (saythb Liuy) that haue absolute authoritie, and are free from impedi∣ments, and haue power ouer things and times, doe worke great effectes with their counsels.

Whosoeuer therefore for enuy, or feare, or other cause goeth a∣bout to perswade Princes to pare their Generals authoritie, and to binde them with strait conditions, hath an euill minde himselfe, and as much 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in him lyeth, ruinateth the affaires of his Prince. For what seruice can they doe that are not onely pinched in their proui∣sions, but also bound fast by their commissions? Thec commissions which Charles the fift gaue to his captaines, had this condition either expressed, or implyed, that they should proceede according to the varietie of times, and occasions notwithstanding any thing in them conteined. And some very expert, and wise men haue not doubted, seeing a manifest aduantage to goe against their Princes commissi∣on.d Triuultio although by his directions, he was first to haue care of the affaires of Genoa: yet doubted not to take Bosco, a fit place in the territory of Alexandira. And albeit that Lewis the 12. gaue his Captaines expresse charge, that they should not fight with the Spaniards: yet seeing their weakenes, and their owne manifest ad∣uantage, they fought with them, and foyled them at Cirignola. Where for their defence is alleaged, that the commaundements of the King being farre off, and not seeing the state of things, were ra∣there remembrances, then precepts to be followed. Trimoille see∣ing the danger of the state of France assaulted by diuers enemies, and also by the Switzers, madef peace & compounded with them, although he had no commssion so to doe. Of which act Guicci∣ardin guieth this testimonie, that by that accorde he saued the realme of France out of a mauifest danger. And very absurd it were, if a mā

might not doe his countrey seruice without commission. Thea safe∣tie of the state, and honor of the Prince are warrants, and exceptions of a most high nature. And for a man to doubt, to take the enemie at aduantage for feare of violating his commission, as the Spaniards say that the Duke of Medina did in his voyage for England, is nothing but to spreade a cloke to couer his owne cowardise, or insufficiencie.

Yet may not the Generall doe against his commission rashly, or without apparant cause, or sufficient order: neither may he doe all things without commission. He may not proclaime warres, or inuade any nation that is out of commission: onely if his enemie flie into an other Countrey, he may followe him. For in that caseb Manlius auoweth his warres against the Gallo-grecians, andc Fabius his voyage through the wood Ciminia. Also all such as inuade his go∣uernement, or his friends, or associats, he may prosecute without his gouernement. He may not make peace, or treate of peace with the enemie: for he is sent to make warres. He may not dimisse his armie without commandement: nay he may not proceede against the lawes of Armes. Thed Romane Dictator, although he had great auctho∣ritie, and could determine matters of life and death without ap∣peale: yet did not hee execute or iudge any, but by the lawes of Armes. That which in commō termes some cal executing by martial lawe, when innocent men are hanged without for me of lawe, or cause, may better be called martiall force, then martiall lawe. For this hath only place in warres, and redresseth disorders against militarie pro∣ceedings.e Finally the General, whatsoeuer his commission is, may not deale fraudulently in his charge, nor proceede contrary to mi∣litarie profession, and practise: in which case euery Generall is sub∣iectf to the lawe.

Very necessarie therefore it is, that Generals should haue their commissions large, both in respect of their prouision, which by this meanes may in some sort be supplied, and in respect of the expedition andg execution of warres, which ought not to be hindred, nor can conueniently be prescribed. And without large aucthoritie, neither can our owne souldiers, nor associats be well gouerned. The experi∣ence of the seruice in the Lowe Countries, and disorders at sea, which for want of power haue not bene redressed, doe minister vnto vs suffi∣cient proofe of this matter. Some will say, that it is dangerous to

commit so large power into any mans hands, especially if he should deale disloyally. But what a reason is this, because men may abuse their power, not to giue them sufficient power for those matters which are committed to their charge? Those that meane disloyally to∣ward the State, although they should haue neuer so strait limitations in their commissions, would not stand vpon termes, and wordes of lawe. And rather it giueth them occasion of discontentment, when they see themselues distrusted, then bridleth any euill purpose, if they should doe against their allegiance. And why should any man without cause suspect any noble man, that he will deale against his Countrey, hauing so many pledges of his loyaltie? but if any should be so euill disposed, yet may we not thinke, that all his army would follow him, rebelling against his Countrey. And if they should, yet is it not the force of one armie, that can preuaile against a whole king∣dome that is well gouerned. And therefore for feare of disloyaltie of some; let no man feare, or omitte to make sufficient prouision; and ra∣ther let loyall men be sought out with diligence, and disloyall men remoued, then that the necessarie prouisions of warre should be neg∣lected, or the proceeding hindred for want of aucthoritie.

CHAP. IIII. Part 5. Of the choice of Colonels, and Captaines of companies, and other officers of the armie, and their qualities and office.

DIuers other pointes concerning the place, charge, and office of the Generall, deserue also to be parti∣cularly handled; as namely, who hath authoritie to appoint Generals, in what case the Prince himselfe is to come in person into the field, how farre the Ge∣neral ought to hazard himselfe, and generally what belongeth to his office: but y^e same may partly be vnderstood, by that which hath bin spoken already, & shal more euidently be declared in this treatise, (for y^e executiō of al these matters appertaineth especially to y^e direction of y^e General.) And now we haste to speake of such mat∣ters, as cōcerne rathe the managing of warre, then questiōs of right.

It is sufficiently knowen, y^t the power to make warre or peace, is a marke of souerainty, & belongeth to the soueraine magistrat, and to those to whō he shala cōmit it. The nomination likewise of the Ge∣neral belongeth to those y^t haue soueraine power in the State. As is euident by the histories of the Romanes, Greekes, Persians, & all na∣tions,

L. Martius was chosen General by y^e reliques of Scipios armie in Spaine, but that was in case of necessitie, & endured no longer, then vnto such time, as they had other captaines sent them frō Rome. To take vpon him a charge without cōmission, is within case of treason, & sauoureth of rebellion. The Prince is not to hazard his person, nor his honor vpon euery light occasion. King Henry the 3. of France, re∣turning out of Poland, receiued a scorne at the siege of Liuron, a pal∣try Hamlet in Dauphinè, for y^t being present in person, & that being his first attempt after his returne into his kingdome, he could not at∣chieue it. The French since their King was taken by the English, do not easily suffer their kings to come in person into y^e field. But if thea state or crowne come in question, as in the warres betwixt Henry the 7. and Richard the 3. betwixt Otho, and Vitellius: Vitellius and Vespasian, then is the Princes presence required in the armie.

The third point, by y^t which hath bin spoken already may be resol∣ued. For in a General, wisdome & courage would be so tempered, that neither he hazard his person further then reason, nor doubt to execute good counsel for feare. The taking of Francis the French king by the Spaniards, & king Iohn by the English, put the Realme of France in great hazard. The death of Gaston de Fois at Rauenna, of Cyrus in the expeditiō against Artaxerxes, who died by their rashnes in y^e midst of their victories, turned to y^e losse of both their armies. Yet may not a General hide himselfe frō danger, as did y^e cowardb Vitellius. The whole office of y^e General consisteth in the speeding, & direction of all matters of warre; of which we haue occasiō to intreate in this whole discourse. And therefore for these points this may be sufficient.

Nowe for that the Generall cannot doe all himselfe, but must vse colonels, captaines, and officers, for the execution of his commande∣ments; we are to shew what paines, & care he is to haue, that they be well chosen, & doe their duety sufficiently. Colonels would be chosen of such noblemen, knights, & gentlemen, as for their yeeres, seruice, experience, discretion, manhood, and other vertues doe best deserue those places. The place of a colonel doth very well answere vnto the tribunes office in the Romane army. whose orders also we might do well to obserue in ours. By an olde custome saithc Vegetius, none was made tribune, or colonel, but such as had lead a companie of olde souldiers before. Hadrian the Emperour expresly forbaded beardles youthes to aspire to that charge.e Alexander in his ex∣pedition

against Darius, made choise of such for captaines of thou∣sands, as for their continuance in his fathers seruice, had their haire graye, and their iudgement ripe. These are employed oft times in some speciall seruice, as in the keeping of a Straite, or of a Fort, or conducting of victuals, or munition: and therefore would haue great skill in all proceedings of warre; especially in the gouernement of such things, as are committed vnto their charge. Among the Ro∣manes thea Tribune office was, in seeing to the defences of the campe, placing of gards, setting the watch, keeping the souldiers in order, exercising them, going the round, leading forth the souldiers to fetch in prouision, seeing the souldiers victuals to be holsom, hea∣ring of the complaints of souldiers, correcting smaller faultes, loo∣king to th sicke & hurt, prouiding for them, & taking their othes at their first entrance. Now these offices belong partly to y^e L. Marshal, or masters of the campe, partly to the serieant maior, partly to such inferiour captaines and officers, as haue that special charge imposed vpon them, and partly as other good orders, so these offices of colo∣nels also are eyther omitted, or slenderly exercised. Nowe this onely belongeth vnto colonels, that they haue their regiment and the cap∣taines and souldiers thereof in order, that they leade the same in ser∣uice, and doe such speciall seruices, as are committed vnto them.

Centurions, or captaines of companies, would be chosen of y^e most strong, valiant, discreete, and actiue souldiers: such especially as both know the traine of warres, & are of body able to endure labour. Their office is to leade, and gouerne their men, to looke that their bodies, armes, and clothes be in order: that they haue victuals, and things necessary, & execute such special commandements as are giuen them. There is no certaine rule of their office to be prescribed. For as there are more or fewer companies together; so they doe more or lesse. Where there are but 2. or 3. companies together, the captains do all, as chiefe cōmanders in an army: where an army standeth together, they should be the first men of their companies: out of aray they are to attend y^e generall officers commandemēts. One had custonie some haue, y^t they finger their souldiers pay, & some of thē hardly refinger it, or deliuer it where it is due. But y^e worst of all is, that vnder colour of bad dealing of some, neither captaines nor souldiers are well paid. The custome was borowed first from the Italians: and is corrected by the Spaniards, as many things els in the captaines office, which

we might do well likewise to reforme, especially y^e confusion of wea∣pons, & marshalling of y^e captaines, & their officers: which if it be not otherwise then now it is, in great armies would breede great cōfusiō.

Thesea honors are to be departed according vnto mens deserts, not wonne by ambitious suite; by labour, not by letters, & request: but this may rather seem a wish, then a precept in these times, when as places haue bin solde at the pleasure of barbers, & scriuenoes, and some giuen for y^e loue of ladies. The abuse is but too auncient, yet ne∣uer so farre inured as now. Tully at theb request of Brutus, bestowed a colonels place vpon Scaptius which he refused. And writing to Cae∣sar in the fauour ofc Trebatius, he sheweth, y^e such places were some∣times graunted of fauour but seldome without desert. He obiecteth againstd Piso as a great reproch, that he sold the places of captains, and other romes, and inferiour offices, at the request of his scribes, and slaues. Caesar ine Affrike dismissed certaine of his colonels & cap∣taines, with this speach to disgrace them, that they had gotten those places for fauour without desert. Afterward when the centurion be∣gan to take money of the common souldier for absence, and redemp∣tion of other disorders, of which Tacitusf complaineth; the centuri∣ons place began to be also set to sale: which was a great cause of the corruption of militarie discipline among the Romanes, and cannot chuse, but also worke bad effects among vs, if it be continued. There is none that buyeth his place, that willingly doth hazard his carkasse, or hath other respect then of gaine. And no maruel if y^e common soul∣diers be pilled, where y^e captaines at their entrance are so pinched.

The places ofg colonels were sometime giuen by the people of Rome, but most cōmonly, & with greatest reason, by the Generals. For otherwise if it were, how could they reward those that best deser∣ued? Therefore did Aemiliush Paulus make request, that he might bestow those places vpon men of greatest worth and merite: which said he, is for the honour also, and profite of the common wealth.

Centurions were alwayes chosen by the Generals, and by them aduanced for theiri vertue. Caesar preferred Scaeua to y^e highest cen∣turions roome in in the legion, for his noble seruice at Dyrrachium. Amongk the Greekes, those that were next in degree, succeeded in their places that were next about them, if any thing came at them.

The officers of companies, namely lieutenants, ensignes, sergi∣ants, corporals, are chosen by the captaines of companies. But much

better it were, if as some doe, so all did chuse them of their most able and valiant souldiers, without respect, or fauour.

Other officers, are chosen some for the gouernment, others for the prouision of the army. Of y^e sort are the campmasters or marshals with their serieant maior, & field coporals, colonel general, lieutenant general of the horse, scoutemasters, trenchmasters, quartermasters, and such like. Which all tend one way, & are but partes of the Gene∣rals duety, which in time past he executed by his legates, or lieute∣nants & tribunes. The master of the Ordonance, & captaine of Pio∣ners are likewise but of a late inuention, since y^e vse of artillerie came in, and souldiers through slouth began to refuse the labours of warre. The iudge and prouost marshall succeede also in a part of the Gene∣rals care for deciding and executing matters of iustice. The muster∣master likewise is of a late stampe, namely since captaines began to pay the souldiers, and Princes began to be defrauded of their num∣bers, and their treasure. Of the second sort are all Commissaries for the pay of souldiers, for victuals, armes, munition, carriages, and whatsoeuer other prouision necessary. For good choice whereof there is but one generall rule to be obserued, to wit, that all partiality and affection laid aside, such be placed in gouernment as be skilfull, loyal, valiant, diligent, and haue respect of honour, not of profite, and in offi∣ces of prouision, such as haue knowledge in such matters, & will deale faithfully. Such as ambitiously, or greedily sue for such places, are not lightly to be heard: and although they be once placed; yet if they be conuicted of insufficiencie, or negligence, or fraude, they are exem∣plarly to be punished, or at the least remoued.

CHAP. IIII. Part 6. Of musters, and choice of common souldiers.

THe Generals chiefe care, is about the choice of his chiefe officers, colonels, & captaines of companies: yet may he not neglect y^e choice euen of cōmon soul∣diers. A matter in our times either not at al, or very litle regarded. For when occasion is offered of ser∣uice: then for the most part order is giuen either to the officers of euery Parish, to take vp roges, or masterles men, or in∣habitants of prisons, such as if they had their deserts, they were to be sent rather to y^e gallowes, then to the warres for the most part: or if a greater number must be taken; to the officers in the Countrey, men

for the most part ignorant of warlike actions, and such as haue no o∣ther respect most commonly, then to disburthen y^e Parish of rogues, loyterers, pikars, & drunkards, and such as no other way can liue. A∣mong y^t which there is no honest man, but would be loth to be num∣bred. If any other be chosen, it is for some priuate respect or grudge. And of those y^t are chosen, if they haue either friendes, fauour, or mo∣ney, most of thē are dismissed. And sure when I cōsider how in forrein nations men are sent to y^e slaughter, few in nūber, vnprouided, vnfur∣nished, vnpaid, and pilled of their gouernours, contrary to all order of seruice; I must needes say, these men are the fittest to be sent. But if Princes meane to haue their honour and countrey defended, or their estate mainteined, or seruice done vpon the enemie, they must haue more regard to chuse men of more strength, honestie, and abilitie; such as haue reason to fight for their Countrey, and haue care of their ho∣nest reputation, and are ashamed of villeny, and lewde doing. For how can captaines encourage those to fight for their countrey, lands, goods, and honor, that haue neither house nor home, nor respect of ho∣nesty or shame, nor care though all were fired, so they might hooke somewhat? and yet forsooth the Generals & commanders, that of late time haue bin emploied haue bin blamed, that they haue not obserued the rules of militarie discipline among these men. As if it were possi∣ble to keepe famished men from snatching of victuals, or drunkardes from drinke, or to master men that are masterles, or to keepe rogues in order, or to make loyterours to worke, or pilferors to march in aray and keepe order, or to preserue them aliue that haue neither paye, nor prouision in time, nor one peny to helpe themselues in their neede. If they will therefore haue order kept, let them choose out men capable of gouernment, & souldiers, not rascals. With great care this abuse ought to be reformed: for it is a point very material.a Vegetius doub∣ted not to place both the strēgth of the Romane army, & the foun∣dation of the Romane Empire, in the first choise and triall of their souldiers. Therefore were the Generals either present themselues at the musters, or els did they employ men of knowledge, grauitie, and honesty, as hath bin already declared. Those y^t through couetousnesse or fauour did corrupt their orders for musters, were detested and punished.b Pedius Blaesus for this cause was ignominiously put out of the Senate. Such as sought gaine by this shamefull practise, are taxed byc Tacitus, as doing a thing rare, and not tollerable.

When this disorder grewe great, they forbad by expresse lawe, all men to take money, eyther fora choosing, or dismissing of souldi∣ers. They that answered not to their names at musters among the Romanes, were taken and imprisoned, and their goods sold, as Liuy witnesseth. In the time ofb Traianus the Emperour, one that made his sonne vnable to serue in the warres, was banished his countrey. So were it to be wished, that men of honour and skill, deputed by the Generall, were present at the musters, and that all able men would offer themselues to doe their countrey seruice: that such as choose men vnable to excuse others, or else doe dimisse sufficient men for money, were themselues dimissed and seuerely punished: and finally, that such were chosen that haue somewhat in their countrey to loose, and to carry with them for maintenance of themselues, if neede be. But this is onely to be wished, in such seruice as for good order, and sufficient number is like to prooue honourable, and when men shall be better prouided and paid, and more accompt made of them.c Now some make accompt of money, & no accōpt of men, like to the Athe∣nians, that lamented the losse of their goods, and not of mens per∣sons, which are infinitely more in value. In these disorders it is not fit, that others should be imployed in warres, then such as now are. which some cal pressed men, for that they go as willingly to seruice, as to hanging or pressing; and money imprested cōmeth eyther rare∣ly, or is taken from them. My onely hope is, that one day there wilbe better prouision, and proceeding in warres, at what time these rules may better be put in execution. In the meane time wee may learne what hath bene the practice of times past in the choyse of souldiers, and what rules ought nowe to be practised.

In the choice of souldiers, we are especially to respect three things: first, the strength of the body: secondly, the vigour and vertues of the mind: and thirdly, the maner and trade of the parties liuing. Vege∣tius, and certaine idle Italians, giue precepts concerning the climate, countrey, and diuers situations of regions, which they would haue in the choise of souldiers to be respected: but experience teacheth vs, that oft times valiant men are found in Cities, and fruitfull Coun∣tries, yea vnder hotte climates which they condemne, and cowardes in hilles and rockes, and Northren Regions, which they commend. True it is, that Northren people are commonly more valiant and venturous, then those of Asia & Afrike, that are from vs farre East,

and south. But what doth that consideration help vs, that make our leuies of souldiers not in Asia nor Affrike; but here in England, and Ireland, and thereabout? whether therefore souldiers be brought vp in the citie or country, or bred in hilles or valleis, or champaine coun∣try, in the north or south of England, I respect not: but if they haue strength of body to endure labours, and a mind vigorous and coura∣gious, and an honest disposition, and haue liued such a life, as hath beene tried somtimes in labour, I refuse them not wheresoeuer they haue beene bred. Nay I wish to haue such. Contrariwise cowards and weake persons, and men of lewd conditions, or which haue bene tenderly brought vp, I would refuse although they come from the north or hilly countries.

Pyrrhus gaue orders to his commissioners for mosters to chuse bigge and corpulent men. Marius made choise of men of great sta∣ture. But if I might be heard, I woulde neither wish such men to be sought for: (for seldome are great and bigge men able to endure trauel) nor men of a meane or short stature to be refused, if they haue strong and actiue bodies. Men of meane stature are for the most part more vigorous and couragious; they do more easily endure labors, and commonly excell great bodied men in swiftnesse and running, which is a matter in a souldier verie requisite and commendable.a Achilles was much commended for that hee was swift of foote, andb Papirius tooke his name and commendation of running.c Ve∣getius saith, it is bettet to haue stout and strong, then huge and big souldiers. Such Caesar commonly did chuse. and experience sheweth vs, that men burdened with flesh can neither endure labour, nor hurts, whereas the meane stature and habite of bodie endureth both.

For trial of the strength of a mans body, we are not only to looke vpon the lineaments, and outward proportion of the parts, but rather what the party can do in running, leaping, wrastling, & such like ex∣ercises. For oftentimes an euill-fauoured body may haue a quicke strength, and tall & big persons may prooue weake, dainty, & sickly. By the outward apparance, we may notwithstanding make a proba∣ble coniecture of a mans strength. For they that haue a likely body, and a sharp countenance, and hard flesh & sinowy armes and legs, ra∣ther then ful or fleshy, are likely to proue strong men. Yet do not or∣ders of warre admit old men past 46. vnles they be old souldiers, for that their strength is decaying, and their bodies lesse apt to labor: nor

youths vnder 20. vnlesse it be some that by triall declareth himselfe to haue strength, for that as yet they are not come to their full pitch and strength.

But that which specially commendeth souldiers, is the vigor of the mind, and good conditions, coniectured by the visage & outward behauior, but knowen only by their conuersation; which is to be lear∣ned of others. If the man be a knowen coward, or of a dull dispositi∣on, or mutinous, or giuen to drinke, or theeuery, or other disorders, howsoeuer his body seeme answerable, yet for his lewd maners hee proueth for the most part vnprofitable: and is therfore to be repelled, or blotted out of the rolle. In a souldier therefore I require first,a a vigorous and present mind, and that he be not afraide of danger, nor drawen swordes: nor that hee despaire in trouble, or thinke of death before it commeth, nor yeeld though cast downe, so long as by any possibilitie he may hope to rise againe.

Constancie also and resolution is much byb Caesar commended, and the only thing that atchieueth great enterprises. For many are the hazards of warre, and things succeede not alwayes at the first. Without obedience and obseruance of military orders, all other ver∣tues are without effect. Let the souldier therefore be obedient, and quiet. Those thatc are most obedient to lawes, prooue for the most part most valiant against the enemy. It is a principall marke of a valiant souldier, if he dare do what he is commanded by his superi∣ors. Contrariwise they that are mutinous against their gouernours, and are euer bragging, as if warres consisted in words only, are sel∣dome good souldiers, or braue men in triall. Souldiers would like∣wise be of quiet behauior, and temperate in their diet. There is no vse saidd Clearchus of an army that is riotous, and out of order.

I would likewise wish that souldiers were religious, and thinke it very requisite, if it might be obtained. The very Pagans did no∣thing before they had consulted with oracles, or sought to knowe the pleasure of God bye birdes, or entrals of beastes (for that was their ignorance) and beleeued that al euil successe in their warres came to them for neglect of religion, & Gods worship. How much more then ought Christians to be religious? There is nothing that more con∣firmeth the souldiers mind, then when he is perswaded that God fa∣uoreth him, & the goodnes of his cause. nor worketh more assured re∣solution to die, then when men vnderstand they go to a better life.

Contrariwise men of a bad conscience are alwayes timorous and doubtful. I know blasphemers, swearers, and Atheists, wil laugh at this rule. But what wonder when they laugh also at God and reli∣gion? these men will one day weepe for their laughter. I pray God that others suffer not for their Atheisme, and contempt of religion.

Finally, souldiers would be more desirous of praise thē of gaine. Such doth Xenophon report Cyrus hisa souldiers that followed him against Artaxerxes to haue beene. And no small commendation is it in souldiers, to be afraide of reproofe, and desirous of honest report. Men of honest condition & shamefast, while theyb are ashamed to fly, win the victory, & win to thēselues the reputatiō of good souldiers. Swearers, the eues, rogues, whoremongers, drunkards, do better be∣come the gaole then the campe. And ourc great cutters & hackers, in the streets of London, are seldome great hackers of the enemy.

The third point which we are to respect in the choice of souldiers, is the trade of their liuing, although not in equall degree with the o∣ther two. For many to win themselues a liuing, are oftentimes dri∣uen to follow base occupations, that otherwise are couragious, & of a liberall dispositiō, & haue bodies fit for labor. So that although the Spartans andd Romanes refused such for souldiers, as exercised ma∣nuall occupations, and kept shops, yet do I not thinke they deserue generally to be refused, but onely such of them as be weake, tender, and effeminate. All those that are hardened with labour; ase hus∣bandmen for the most part, and those that can sufferraine, heate, and cold, and vse to fare hard, and lie hard, and sleepe little prooue braue men. Our yong gentlemen & seruingmen, are easily trained, & made fit for the warres. But of al others the old souldier, if such may be had, of what trade soeuer he is, deserueth the first place. They are so farre to bee praised aboue young souldiers, as artificers excell their apprentises. A handful of tried souldiers hath oftē put to flight multitudes of men not exercised in warres: & contrariwise seldome do yong souldiors abide the chamaillis, & hammering of armes. Cae∣sars old souldiers were inuincible. And Annibals tried souldiers of Affrike, of which nation now no reckoning is made, did giue diuers foiles to the Romans; these being vnexercised, those hauing bin long indurat in wars. It were therefore to be wished, y^t more accōpt were made of valiant men, y^t haue long serued their prince, & country: in y^e choise of yōg souldiers it is sufficiēt, if the former rules be obserued.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 7. Of the Othe of a souldier.

SOuldiers enrolled, armed, and furnished, would in case orders of warre were obserued, bee charged with an othe, that they should come to the place & at time assigned, and faithfully serue their Prince and country, liuing in obedience to their gouernours and superiour officers, and those military lawes which are by the General and his counsel, or the estates of the realm ordained for the good gouernement of the army. This was vsed by the Romanes, Athenians, and other warrelike nations in time past, and is not now in our times thought inconuenient. Thea Athenians when they came to military yeares, and were enrolled in the mo∣ster rolles, did sweare that they would neither dishonour the pro∣fession of armes, nor forsake their array, but woulde defend their country and enlarge the honour of it to their vttermost power. The same is reported yet more particularly byb Vlpian, who sheweth the place, the manner, and effect of their othe, and that in the temple of Agraulos they came and swore hauing their armes on, that they would fight for their country. The wordes as Pollux hath them are in effect thus much: I will not (said he that swore) dishonour the profession of armes, I wil not forsake my Captaine, I will fight for the religion, and lawes of my countrey, in array and alone: I will saile whither I shall be appoynted; I will obey lawes and not suffer them to be abrogated: I will obserue the religion of my countrey, and so let God helpe me and defend me. Gellius out of Cincius his bookes of warre describeth the forme of the oth of the Romane soul∣diers in these wordes: Cum delectus fieret & milites scriberentur, in iusiurandum eos tribunus militaris adigebat hoc modo: in magistratu C. Laelij C. F. Cos. L. Cornelij C. F. Cos. in exercitu, decem{que} millia prope furtum nō facies dolo malo, solus ne{que} cum pluribus: pluris nūmi argentei in dies singulos, extra hastam, hastile, ligna, pabulum, vtrem, follem, facu∣lam, si quid ibi inueneris, sustuleris quod tuum non erit, quod pluris nummi argentei erit, vti tu ad C. Laelium C. F. Cos. L. Cornelium. P. F. Cos. siue ad quem eorum alter iusserit proferas, aut profitebere in triduo proximo quicquid inueneris sustulerísue dolo malo, aut domino suo cuium id cen∣sebis esse, vti quòd rectè factum esse voles, &c. The summe and effect

of which oth is, that no souldier should steale, or take any thing from any other souldier, & that whatsoeuer they found, except it were for y^e vse of warres, as weapons, or prouision for themselues, or their hor∣ses or such like, they should bring it to the Generall or to the officer thereto deputed if it were more wortha thē 6. d. Finally they swore that they should come at the day appointed, vnlesse lawfull causes did stay them, & not depart without licence. Liuy also mentioneth a forme of oth, which the Romans at first did voluntarily sweare, afterward they were driuen to do it of duety. The effect of it was,b that they should not fly away for feare, nor go out of their aray, vnles it were to take vp a weapon, or to strike the enemy, or to saue their compa∣nion. Beside this othe which cōmonly they took when they were first enrolled, they sometimes swore, that they would not returne to their tents without victory. This othe Marc. Flauolenus took, as the Ro∣manes were to ioyne battel with thec Hetruscians. Andd Labienus, & Pompeys souldiers in the encounter betwixt Pompey and Caesar in y^e fields of Pharsalia swore likewise: but al did not performe it. Some fearing the reuolt of their souldiers haue vsed to binde them by speci∣all othe not to abandon their leaders, which as Caesar reporteth, was practised by Petreius, & Afraniuse in Spaine.f The Samnites being oftentimes foyled by the Romanes, did sweare, that they would fo∣low wheresoeuer their captains did leade them, and that neyther themselues would flie out of the field, nor suffer others to flie, but would kill them presently: if otherwise they did, they cursed them∣selues, their family, and linage. The Romans placed such religion in the oth of a souldier, that some of thē thought it not lawful for others to fight with the enemy, then such as had taken the solemne othe of a souldier. Cato desired Aemilius Paulus General of the Romane army in Macedonia, that eyther he would send away his son, which toge∣ther with the regiment wherein he serued was cassed, or else woulde minister a new othe vnto him.g For that he thought it not lawful for him that was no sworne souldier, to fight with the enemy. The effect of this othe howsoeuer men make now accompt of othes, yet to them must needes be great, that esteemedh the breach of promise, and losse of their good name irreparable. When the Duke ofi Alua went about to reforme diuers disorders in the Spanish souldiers, among other points it was ordained that euery souldier should at their en∣trance take a solemne oth, to serue the king faithfully, & to be obe∣dient

to their captains and officers, and not to depart the army nor from their colours without licence in writing. The words of the or∣donance are these: Que todos los soldados despues de ser elegidos por sus capitanes, con las circūstantias que en tal'election se requiere al tiem∣po de ser admitidos por los officiales del sueldo con iuramento solenne se obliguen a seruir bien y fielmente a su mag^d, y a sus capitanes generales, a obedescer a todos sus superiores, a no partir se del'exercito, ni de sus com∣pannias sin licencia en escrito de quien se la pudiere dar. This othe is now also most necessary, when all bondes of military orders are litle enough. But vnles the souldier haue his pay, and things be gouerned according to the due practise of warre: to minister an othe to euerie poore souldier, were nothing else, but among other miseries, to bind poore mens consciences with plaine periury.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 8. Wherein is proued, that souldiers chosen of our owne nation are farre to be preferred before strangers, and hired men.

THe great dangers that haue befallen diuers Prin∣ces, and states by forraine forces, that haue come in their aide, haue giuen me occasion, as before I haue shewed, what other qualities I thought requisite in souldiers; so now to declare of what natiō I would haue them chosen; least vsing forraine forces, wee might incurre like danger. The souldiers therefore that are to be employed in defence of this realme, I would haue chosen out of the naturall subiectts of this realme. Be they English, or Welch, or Irish, so they be subiects, it skilleth not. When I compare the peo∣ple of this land with other nations, I see no reason, why I shoulde preferre any before them. And although my testimony may seeme partiall: yet the steppes of our ancestors prowesse, as yet remaining in France, Flanders, Spaine, Portugal, Scotland, and other coun∣tries cannot lie. If then those orders by which our ancestors obtai∣ned such glory, or els the rules of warre were restored; who seeth not that this nation would match any other? neither ought any man to e∣steeme the forces of this countrey, by that which hath passed of late in France, Portugal, or the Low countries, where our souldiers haue beene for the most part on the weakest side, destitute of horse, vnpro∣uided of carriages, & wanted victuals, and armes, and munitions, &

many things necessary. But seeing they haue done such things at such disaduantage, they may thinke, our men would haue done much more, if the party had bin equall, or our men better prouided and fur∣nished. Beside this, souldiers chosen of this nation, are bound with a straiter bond to their prince & country, then any stranger. They haue more reason to fight, hauing not only the defence of their prince and country, but also their religion, lawes, liberty, wiues and children cō∣mitted to their hands, they are more patient in aduersity, & haue lesse cause to reuolt. Wanting of pay or part of their pay (which God wot they may percase do oft times) they notwithstanding continue con∣stant, and loyal. If they offend hauing their wiues, children, landes, goods, and friends behinde them, they are more easily corrected. Fi∣nally, lesse pay doth content our souldiers, then any forreine natiō. I doubt not, but if that mony which hath bin cast away vpō the Dutch, and French had bene emploied vpon our poore country souldiers, the country had beene better stored with mony, and the people better pro∣uided for warres, and greater seruice done vpon the enemy.

Let vs now compare strangers vnto the subiects of this land. There is at all no trust in them.a Their handes are saleable, their heartes faithlesse. They accompt that cause best, where they may haue most hire. It is follie (saithb Polybius) and want of iudgement to put trust in strangers beeing more in number, and strength then our owne nation. The first time that euer the Romanes vsed mercenary souldiers was, when the two Scipioes were gouernours of their forces in Spaine. Those two being together with their army betrayed, and ruinated by the Celtiberians, that forsooke them in their neede, may be an euidentc document neuer to trust strangers, vnlesse wee haue force to commaund them, and constraine them. Annibald abandoned by the Spanish and Numidian horsemen was greatly weakened.e Mutines forsaking the Carthaginians, in whose succour hee came out of Numidia, disordered all their affaires in Sicile. The Romanes giuing themselues to pleasures and ease, and vsing forraine forces of Germanes, and Gaules, ruinated that huge Empire, which was left them by their ancestors. Which (as Tacitus saith) were inuincible so long as they vsed their owne souldiers. The Gaulesf reuolted from the Romanes, because they saw no strength in the Romane army, but that which was of strāgers. Of whom they presumed, that they would not ioyne with the Romans against them.

The Thessalian horsemen forsaking the Athenians in the bat∣tel ofa Tanagra, occasioned the victory to the Lacedemonians their enemies. The same had hapned to theb Lacedemonians by the trea∣chery of the Macedonians, that forsooke them when the Thracians charged them, had not the resolution of Brasidas remedied the disor∣der. The departure ofc 6000. Grisons, that left Francis the first of France before Pauy, was the beginning of his weakenesse. 2000. mercenary men leauing Maximilian the Emperor, broke his enter∣prise against the Venetians.d Fabritio & Prospero Colōna although highly aduanced by Charles the 8. of France, yet in the end reuolted to Ferdinand. In the days of Ed. the 3. Rich. the 2. Hen. the 5. and 6; the greateste losses we had in France, happened by the reuolt of the French, which our men without cause trusted. When al was lost, yet did wée retaine Caleis, vntil it was taken from vs by force, for that it was kept, & peopled by the English nation. Yet the same was al∣most betrayed by an Italian, to whom Edw. the 3. gaue it in guard. How the Germans that came into France of late in aide of the Pro∣testants, vnder the Dukes of Bouillion, & the baron Donaw behaued themselues, I report me to the memory of those poore gentlemē, that by their disloyaltie and treason, were left as a spoyle to the enemie.

Oft times strangers not only forsake their friends, but also ioyne with the enemy, & oppugne them. Thef Gaules in the 2. wars with Carthage, flew the watch of the Romanes by night, & fled, & ioyned themselues with Annibal. The Dutchmen that Charles the 8. of France, left in the kingdome ofg Naples for the defence thereof, cor∣rupted with mony tooke part with the enemy. Theb Romans betray∣ed by their associats, at one time were slain both by them, & by the enemy. The ancient Britons vsing in time past the help of the Sax∣ons, were by them driuen out of their natiue country. The like hap∣ned to thei Sequanians long before. For requiring aide of the Ger∣manes against the Heduans their neighbors, they were driuen out of their owne possessions by those that came to succour them.k Iugurtha by the trechery of certaine Thracians, that serued the Romanes in Affrike, entred the Romane campe in the night, and made a great slaughter therein. The Turkes are now in possession of Constanti∣nople, in aide whereof they first came out of Asia. Strangers are neuer satisfied with any pay, & yet seldome do they any seruice. Thel Gaules hired by the Hetruscians, carried away their mony without

doing anie seruice against the Romanes. When the French had foyled the enemy, then the hired Switzers, and Dutchmen crying for mony hindered their victory. They tooke mony (saitha Guicciardin) of al hands, & did seruice to none. It is not possible (saith he) to ma∣nage theb Switzers without infinit treasure. It is long to report al y^e discourses of their insatiable couetousnes, & treasons. Of king Edw. the 3. purposing to recouer his right in France Froissart sayth, that with great summes of mony he hired the Dutch to ioyne with him, but he got no ayde of them, nor other aduancement, but a vaine title of Lieutenant to y^e Emperor. Not long since thec Dutch calling for mony when they should fight, gaue the victorie to the Duke of Al∣ua their enemie, and betrayed their Generall the Prince of Orenge.

There is nothing more cowardly then strangers, when they come to seruice. They ared not reteined by affection nor regard promise, and shame not to flye to saue their skinnes.

Nothing can bee deuised more disorderly, nor rauinous. The Switzers tooke their owne Captains prisoners in Lombardy, and kept them as pledges vntill they had money. They rebelde against Lewis Sforza, and solde thee poore Duke for Crownes. The mer∣cenary souldiers of Laurence Medici, and Frances Maria did spoyle the Marquisat of Ancona worse, then if they had bene enemies. For these causes the French kingf Lewis the xii. said, it was better to be without Switzers, then to haue them. And in the ende Francis the first trayning 7. legions, or regiments of his owne people, determi∣ned to vse no other souldiers, then of his owne nation. the troubles of that kingdome, I thinke, are cause that the order was left off.

Those therfore that would employ mony vpon French or Dutch, rather thē vpon their own souldiers, should but dishonor their natiō, hurt the state, or affeeble their people, & bringg the Prince in distrust with his subiects without cause. Such mē in time past were thought to haue tyrannical conceirs, & wish that neither the natiue souldier should rise in honour, nor wealth, nor any subiect become better pra∣ctised in warres: and all to the ende that they may growe rich them selues and swallow downe the spoyles of their Countrey, without feare of accompts, or controlement. And many do thinke, that if the English had but had that treasure and fauour, that the Hie Dutch haue had, this State had bene better assured, and the enemie better cooled, and more honorable seruice performed.

CHAP. IIII Part. 9. Of the souldiers pay.

BVt forasuiuch as neither strangers, nor subiects can be long mainteined without pay, & because it wil a∣uayle vs nothing to leuy souldiers, vnlesse wee pay them, & mainteine them: therefore before we passe a∣ny further, let vs put those, that haue y^e gouernmēt of warres cōmitted vnto them, in minde, that some order be taken for the paiment of the souldiers. For want of pay ma∣ny disorders be committed, many opportunities pretermitted. It is not possible, considering first the pouerty of the common souldier, and then their small number, that eyther they can liue of themselues, or winne any thing from the enemy. For want of pay they spoyle their friends, and associates, yea their companions, and commit many out∣rages. and who can execute iustice vpon them, that eyther must fa∣mish, or liue vpon spoyle. For want of pay they sell their armes, their clothes, they growe sicke, weake, and vnprofitabe.

Contrariwise, if they had their pay, iustice might with more rea∣son bee executed, and their persons, armes, and clothes be kept in bet∣ter estate, and many enterprises executed, that by weakenesse & want of the souldiers are broken. Lautreck riding post, came in good time himselfe to haue setled the affaires ofa Milan, if the 300. thousande Crownes, which were promised by the French king to bee sent pre∣sently after him, had likewise come in poste. For want of pay the souldiers disbanded▪ for want of pay, occasioned by I know not what friuolous delay, the Dutchie of Milan was lost by the French. Souldiers are not payd with promises, nor wordes. The slow pro∣uision of money was the cause likewise of the rashe enterprise, and ouerthrow of the French at theb Bicock in Lombardy. The mi∣serable niggardise, and slow dispatch of the Cardinallc San. Malo Treasurer to Charles the 8. of France, which deferd necessary pay∣mentes beyond all reason, set all the affaires of the French in the kingdome of Naples in disorder, as Guicciardin testifieth, and the very things themselues declared. A very slowed marche it is, that souldiers without pay doe make. Guicciardin speaking of the enter∣prise of Naples by Lautreck sayth, that the same was hindered by nothing more, then by delayes of pay; while such summes as should haue bene deliuered before hand were payde him by piecemeale and out of time. A man cannot in this kind vse too great expedition and

diligence. nothing can be more hurtful herein then auarice and delay.

Further many mutinies & disorders proceede of this only cause. I neede not confirme it by examples, seeing there is none that hath followed the profession of armes any time, but knoweth it by his owne experience. Contrariwise due pay doeth binde the souldiers hearts to the Generall, as Liuy declareth in the examplea of An∣nibal.

Without pay souldiers can neither do seruice, nor mainteine them selues in strength, nor scarce liue. With theirb pay they finde them selues victuals, clothes, armes: with the same they succour them selues in sickenes, and when they are hurt. This was the vse in anci∣ent time, and is now practised also.

For this cause all warlike Nations haue had due care that their souldiers might be orderly payd.c Porsena when the pay day came, sate by, while all his souldiers one by one receiued their pay. For that end they appointedd Tresurers to attend on the Generall, and to pay the army. That Generals should then attend the pleasure of Tresurers was as a thing monstrous in nature. When the Romanes could not otherwise prouide for their souldiers, the Senate decreed, that thee ornaments of gold, and siluer which Numa Pompilius had consecrate, should be made into money, that they might be payd. This was iu the time of Marius. When the common wealth of Rome had no mony, the charge was layd vpon rich menf propor∣tionally. The Nobilitie and Gentry brought in, and lent sufficient. Some of the wealthiest in the neede of the State serued without pay. Theg Alexandrians in the warres against Caesar, by assigning to euery man of abilitie certaine souldiers to be kept, mainteined the warres against him. And generally such order was takē among all nations for pay of the souldiers, that in all stories Greeke and La∣tin I scarce read of any one mutiny for want of pay.

Some will percase reply and say, that there is no comparison be∣twixt the people of Rome, and vs. And that it was an easie matter for that great Empire to pay their souldiers, which to vs is so hard and grieuous: some conceiue that their souldiers were content with lesse pay, and others deeme that the charge of warres is nowe greater then in those times: matters vtterly mistaken. For not onely the Romanes, but also the Athenians, Thebans, Sam∣nites, Aequians, Volscians, Hernicans, Sabines, and many other

small States in comparison of this kingdome, mainteined, and paid great armies many yeeres. Yea when thea State and Territory of Rome was not the third part of England in bignesse, yet did the same mainteine one army against the Samnites, another in a con∣trary quarter against the Hetruscians, and the third at home against such of their neighbours, as were not perfectly to be trusted. The pay, all things considered, was then rather bigger then lesser in re∣spect of our times. Theb pay of the Romanes was for euery day a piece of money which they called Denarium, for that it conteined decemasses. Although I confesse that afterward the value of that Coyne, was enhaunced. that wayeth of our money vii.d. or therea∣boutes, as both Budey testifieth and I haue tried, by waying diuers of the Coynes, which I haue seene in Italy, and other where.

The pay of the Athenian souldiers amounted to a piece of mo∣ney which they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for euery day. So that both the pay of the Greekes and Romanes came to one reckoning. for Denarius Romanus, and the Athenian Drachma, byc accompt both of Mar∣chants, and Physitions weyed alike, and was of one value. That the Athenian pay amounted to so much, as I haue sayd, Thucidides shal witnesse, who saith, that the garrison ofd Potidaea had euery man one Drachma for himselfe, and another for his esquire, that waited on him, dayly. Consider the prices of things nowe, you shall finde that their pay was greater then either ours which giue commonly viii.d. a day, or the Spanish pay, which is iii Duckats a moneth for a man, beside their Ventajas, as they call them.

That the charge of warres is now greater, then in time past; is but an improbable surmise. For wherein ariseth the charge of an army nowe, but in victuals, armes, clothes, horses, cariages and such like, which were no lesse chargeable in time past, then now? powder wee haue nowe, and artillerie, which in time past was not found out, but the charge of their engins, and the things about them, which nowe we neede not, nor vse, was no lesse chargeable to them. So that if we had that order and proceeding, which they had: there is no doubt but wee are as well able to mainteine an armie, as they.

Why a sufficient armie should not bee mainteined and paid, I see no reason but want of military discipline. For seeing this land main∣teineth so many millions at home, there is no reason, but the same

should mainteine 30. or 40. thousand of the same number abroad, if right discipline of armes were practised. The charge of an army is most in meate, and apperell. But in these things men spend no lesse at home, then abroad. I doe thinke that albeit this land wanted mo∣ney, yet if the army were well supplyed with victuals and clothes by y^e Princes Officers, that a great armie might sufficiently be payd. For that money that should be deliuered to the souldier, would most of it come backe for victuals and clothes, of which this land (God be thanked) hath no want. The expenses of munitions, and armes, and other matters are in respect of this charge, nothing. But what should I talke of this course, when there wanteth neither money, nor other thing, but good orders well executed? The reuenues of the Crowne, the contributions of the subiects, and ayde of our friendes, are not so simple, but that there may be found maintenance sufficient, if mens good willes and loyal dealing were not wanting. Besides these if our armie were sufficient to fight with the enemie, I would thinke, there were want of skill, or good order, if the same did not aswell liue vpon the enemies spoyles, as the Princes pay.

Clearchusa mainteined his souldiers, by the contribution of the cities of Hellespont, where they lay. The Romanes transporting an army into Asia, so wisely did the Generall proceede, that he main∣teined the same with the spoyles of the Countrey, and writ backe to the Senate, that for that yeere he needed neitherb prouision, nor pay. for the victorie gaue his armie sufficient. But before Princes bring such a matter to passe, many disorders are to be redressed: men desirous of honour are to be appointed Officers: the rapines and filcheries of former times, and hereafter to, by strict Auditors and Commissioners are to be sifted out, and seuerely punished, as mat∣ters that disorder all armies.c Guicciardin shewerh it by the confu∣sion that was in the French army at Gariglian, by the default and fraude of the kings Officers for pay. If those that kill a woman or a child of no great reckoning deserue death, what doe they deserue that are the cause of the death of many valiant souldiers, and betray the Realme and their Prince into the handes of the enemie through their fraude, filcherie, and delayes? the abuses in musters must also be redressed. Wherein I vnderstand that Gouernours of late haue bene carefull, and set downe many good orders, but all commeth to this passe, that the Captaines shall pay their souldiers: which doeth

promise no good effect in this matter. It is a notorious abuse to giue the pay of the common souldier to the Centurion, or Captaine of euery band; neuer vsed by the Romanes, nor other nation. It first came in among the Italians about two hundred and fiftie, or two hun∣dred yeeres agone in their scambling warres among themselues. The reason was, for that the Prince that had warres hired the Cap∣taine out of some other State, and the Captaine he hired such souldi∣ers, as he could get. So that the Prince dealing with the Capatine must pay him, and the Captaine must pay his souldiers. Which rea∣son now ceasing, there is no cause why the abuse should continue. Further there are certaine dead payes allowed to the captaine, vn∣der colour whereof I doubt not but they will passe many dead men, or such as neuer were in mosters. It is asmuch as if he should be a∣lowed to defraude a Prince a litle, so it be but in sixe dead payes. But better it were and more honorable, if the Prince did allowe the Cap∣taine an honourable and sufficient pay, and make others the payma∣sters. It is not possible nowe that matters should in these cases be re∣dressed, seeing such as haue interest in the gaine, are made control∣lers of the offence.

Were it not better to pay euery souldier by the poll? better I say for the Prince. For if the souldiers acquitance, moster booke, pay∣masters and controllers accounts agree, he cannot lightly be defrau∣ded, either of his money, or of his numbers: better for the common souldier: for he shall haue his due. Yea better for the Captaines, for they should not be so condemned, as they are of the countrey, nor of their souldiers, and some very wrongfully: and who would for so small gaine, incurre the losse of his honour, or reputation? but thus they shall neither liue themselues, nor be able to rewarde their souldi∣ers: As if I wished them not larger pay, and w ih honester conditi∣ons. And as if they did vse to reward their men, or that belonged to them. it is the General, that should do it vpon their report, & not they.

Whena Scipio paide his souldiers in Spaine, euery man receiued himselfe his due paye, man by man. Which was the continual prac∣tise of theb Romanes. That I likewise confirmed by the example of Porsena the captaine of the Hetruscians, who stoode byc while euery man receiued his stipend. Guicciardin disputing and weying the causes why the Frenchmen in the expedition of Charles the 8. in∣to the kingdome of Naples so easily preuailed, alleageth this for prin∣cipall:

that the Kings souldiers were payed by the kings Officers, and not as the Italian vse was, by the Captaines. For which cause now at length also the Spaniard weary of this abuse, appointeth cer∣taine Officers to pay euery souldier according to thea moster roll; and diuers controllers of these paymasters.

This I thinke to be the best meanes to remedy the want of pay, the fraude of Officers, the disorders of souldiers, and coruption of false mosters: whereby many Princes haue bene greatly abused, & are like to be further, if order be not taken. Before Pauy theb French king Francis had not halfe the number of souldiers that were vpon his moster bookes, which was the principall cause of the ruine of the army, and of the taking of the king, as Guicciardin affirmeth. The same was the ruine of the army of Iulio the 2. beforec Gemuolo, and causeth many to presume further then reason, thinking their strength greater, & diuers to detest warres; the disorders are so great. This I thought necessary to speake concerning pay: more perhaps then some will like. But the commiseration I haue of poore souldi∣ers, and detestation I had of disorders, that haue happened vpon this cause in the seruice where I haue bene, and feare of worse haue ex∣torted these complaints from me, yet not to hurt any particular (God is my witnes) but generally to do my countrey good, if I could; & to admonish those whom it concerneth, to looke better vnto it hereafter.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 10. Wherein is declared, that there is no hope of good successe in warres, without a full army, and force sufficient.

THose that know with what difficultie, & miserie Officers are wont to pay 4. or 5. M. men, haue good cause to thinke it a matter very difficult to mainteine 30. or 40. M. and many percase will wonder, what I meane, to perswade the leuy of a full army, seeing the vnwillingnes, and vnreadines of this age in sending forth, and furnishing any small number of men. But notwithstanding the imagination of the first, or wonderment of the second; both the lawes and practise of armes, doeth teach vs that to obteine victorie, and to subdue our enemies a iust and full army must be employed; and that small numbers of men doe rather feede the warres, then end them, & rather anger the enemy, then hurt him. The Lacedemonians before the Peloponnensian warre consulting with y^e oracle, by what meanes they might best preuaile against their

enemies, receiued this answere, that the meanes to ouercome, was to vsea their full strength. For if an army be a perfect body, as the Athenian captaine Iphicrates was wont to say, it must haue the iust proportion of partes, and iust complement, or els it will be mon∣strous, and not able to doe the actions exspected of such a body. The Romanes therefore as in other things, so in this excelled, that they neuer dealt with any enemie, but with a full army. If the power of the enemie were great, they employed a Consulare army consisting of 4. legions of citizens, beside the aide of their associates, if lesse they vsed but two legions, with the ayde of their friendes. The greatest force that they vsually employed were two Consular armies ioyned together. The number was diuers, as the legions were greater or lesser, full or imperfect: but their greatest force amounted not past to 50. thousand, their middle to 24. thousand, their least to 12, or 15. thousand, or thereaboutes. Lesse number I doe not reade that they vsed in any seruice, and therefore proceeding with sufficient force, I maruell not, if their successe were according.

It is the vse of all nations, neither the French in their expediti∣ous into Italy, nor the Spaniard into France, or Italy vseth to send lesse then a iust army. The Duke of Alua beside 12. or 13. M. Al∣maines and those of the Low countries, brought with him 9000. Spaniards and Italians when first he came into that countrey. It is no good nor profitable course, to send 4. or 5. thousand against what soe∣uer enemie. If to famish, they are too many: if to fight, too fewe. Double that number is neither able to keepe the field, nor to besiege any citie, nor almost able to doe any enterprise of warre, vnlesse it be to defend some place for some fewe dayes, & in the end to giue it ouer being in despaire of succour. Our proceedings in France & Flanders, if mother reason wil pes wade vs, may teach vs, that this number is too little the effectes doe declare my speach to be true. Theb Lacedae∣monians so long as they sent small numbers of men against the A∣thenians, could doe no good against them, but did hurt to them∣selues. Small force doeth rather nourish and kindle the warres, then extinguish them; euen as a fewe drops sprinckled on the fixe, doeth make the same to burne more bright. and as much water powred on the fire doeth quench the same, so a sufficient army maketh an end of brawles, or at least bringeth them to triall. Nay further, a sufficient force doeth not only worke greater effect, but also is lesse charge∣able,

then warres made by these slender supplies. It may percase seem a paradoxe to some, but reason & experience doth proue it true.

These warres of our times, they haue no ende; but where a suffi∣cient armie goeth, there is an end, eyther one way or other. There is no end of charge in lingring warres: in these, if the armie preuaile, the victorie mainteineth the same; if it be ouercome, then is there an end of that armie and charge. The burthen is onely in the setting of the same out, and mainteyning of it in the meane while. But will some say, the hazard were great. Let them therefore fight valiantly, and not suffer themselues to bee skinned. They that forecast what windes will blowe, seldome sowe, or set sayle in time.

Further, a small force must needes lye in Townes, and hide their heads, where the enemie is stronger. Against y^e enemie they haue nei∣ther strength to fight, nor meanes to enterprise, & stil the Prince is at a continuall charge: and without pay y^e souldiers famish: but where a full and sufficient force arriueth in any Countrey, they commaund the same, vnlesse an armie be presently opposed against thē. They en∣rich themselues with spoiles. the fruites they lay vp for their owne store. Many confederates, some for feare, others for other causes ioyne with them, and either yeeld money, or victuals, or munitions. Whatsoeuer corne, forage, or other prouision is without walled Townes, that is theirs. It must be a Towne of some strength that dare resist them. When the armie is great, the warres mainteyne themselues, as said Cato. Scipio with the profite that he drewe out of the Countrey of Spaine, mainteined his armie there diuers yeres. Sixteene yeres did Annibal maintaine warres in Italy, at the charge of that Countrey almost without supplie of men, or money from Carthage. With the riches of France, Caesar mainteined his armie 9. yeeres in France, & enriched himself, and his countrey. Besides the charge of the army defraied, many Romane captains haue brought in great summes of money into the publike treasurie. These are the fruits of victorie: but victorie cannot be obteined without an armie.

If therefore any man hope for the end of warres, or good successe in France, Flanders, or other Countrey; let him wish that sufficient meanes were employed. There is neither honor, safetie, profite, nor hope of good hap in the course of warres commonly taken. If you will not beleeue me: then examine the proceedings of the smal companies that haue bin employed in seruice of late time: examine

the ancient and latter histories of forreigne nations, that haue had good successe in their warres. If you see nothing but disorder in the one, and reason in the other: then let captaines neuer for shame on this sort loose their men, expend their money, trifle the time, dally with the enemie, contrary to reason, and all good proceeding; but let them as in other points, so in this also returne to the true discipline, and practice of warre.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 11. Of the exercise and trayning of young souldiers, whereby they are made apte, and ready for the warres.

A Wise Generall hauing once enrolled his souldi∣ers, will not loose any one houre of time, but will either exercise them, or employ them in seruice. There is nothing in warres more pretious then time, which once passed, cannot be recalled. And whether the army be idle, or well employed, the pay and charge stil runneth on. But because it is dangerous to bring yong souldiers into the face of the enemie, before they be both fashio∣ned by exercise, & also fleshed by light encounters with the enemie: he ought both diligently to exercise them at such times, as y^e enemie gi∣ueth him leysure, & also to harden them by skirmishes and other light enterprises against the enemie, before he hazard to fight with his full forces. Therein what example can I set before him better to follow then that of Scipio, that ouercame Annibal, and in al deedes of armes shewed himselfe most vigilant and skilfull. He before he drew foorth his army out of new Carthage into the fielde, when as yet the time of the yeere was not proper for seruice, did continually diuers dayes exercise his men, aswell in fight at sea, as at land. The first day he caused all his regiments to runne in array and order of battell 4. miles: the second day he appointed euery man to make his armes cleane and fit: thea third day he caused them to diuide themselues into two partes, and in order of battel to fight the one against the other with cudgels, and blunt dartes. The same course hee tooke in Sicile, before he transported hisb army into Afrike. He caused his souldiers in order of battel to march and runne armed, and set his ships in aray within y^e harbour in such good order, as if hee were pre∣sently

to fight. Thea Volscians hauing bin oftentimes foyled by the Romanes, and determining to set vp their rest, tooke great care in arming and exercising their men, as if that were the onely meanes to harten and harden their souldiers. And sure much good doth exer∣cise and teaching, as well in warre as other artes, where the leaders are skilfull. Tit.b Sempronius by exercising his young souldiers, taught them to followe their ensignes, and keepe rankes both stan∣ding, and fighting in array of battell, and obteined by them diuers victories against the enemie.c Cato likewise in his voyage into Spaine, tooke no small paines in exercising of his men, before hee brought them to see the enemie; whereby he so fashioned them, that he gaue diuers repulses to the enemie. Tullus Hostilius, when the mindes of the Romanes were mollified ky long peace, in the dayes of his predecessor Numa, yet by exercise obteined so much, that they durst encounter, and were not inferiour to olde souldiers.

Epaminondas by framing and excercising the Thebanes, made them of a base nation, the most warlike people of Greece, and with them ouerthrewe the Lacedemonians, which from their youth vp were trayned vp in the exercise of armes. In the first warres with Car∣thage, the Romanes perceiuing that for want of skill in Sea causes, they were inferiour to the Carthaginians, practised their men in imaginarie Sea fightes, and so long exercised them therein, that at lenghth they ouercame them aswell by sea, as by land.d Statorius the Romane teaching the souldiers of Syphax to followe their leaders, and to keeperankes, and other orders of warres, in short time made them of nouices so expert, that after that Syphax doubted not to encoūter the Carthaginians. This caused Tissaphernes the Persian, to make such reckoning of Phalinus, a Grecian, for that hee wase skilfull in ordering of men, and teaching them to fight in armes. Of English men Philip of Comines giueth this testimonie, tha al∣though when they first come into France they haue small skill, yet with exercise they first come into France they haue small skill, yet with exercise they become good souldiers: and therefore seeing most of our souldiers are yong, and of small experience in warres, by reason of our long peace, they are diligently to be exercised before that they see the enemie.f Cassius the Romane according to the olde guise of the Romanes, exercised his souldiers at all idle times, albeit many of them were expert in warres.

Much more therefore ought we to exercise our young souldiers,

and that first in fat̄tes of actiuities, as running, leaping, throwing, wrastling; secondly in the vse of their weapon, & that both singly by themselues euery man, & also in company: thirdly in marching and keeping of rankes, and other exercises of warre.

By these exercises, the souldiers obteine three commidities: the body is first made actiue, and strong, and fit for labour; souldiers also learne to march in their armes, to carry some weight, to run, to work in trenches, and other necessary fortification; without which neither can the souldier rest safely in his campe, nor so easily preuaile against the enemie in the fielde. Caesar did no lesse preuaile against y^e Gaules with the mattocke and spade, then with the sword. In a short time he made huge trenches and mountes, such as thea enemie wondred at. Now because we haue forgotten the true practise of warre, our soul∣diers refuse to worke, and Princes vse the helpe of pioners, insomuch that hardly we see that brought to passe in a moneth, which Caesar could effect in fewe houres. The Romanes from their youth exerci∣sed their bodies in running, leaping, wrastling, swimming. Coruinus the Romane captaine in his youth, in these exercises wasb equall to the best. By thisc exercise they were made able to carry beside their armes, halfe a moneths victuals, and certaine stakes.

Secondly, euery souldier is made acquainted and cunning with the weapon, wherewith he serueth. The shot learneth to charge and discharge redily, and at marke. The piquier how to vse his pike, both against footemen and borsemen: the halbardier vnderstandeth the vse of his halberd both to defend, & to strike his enemie: the targetter how to manage his sword and target; and euery one learneth y^e vse of sword and dagger, for that they are common weapons. Without skill men oft times wearie themselues, breake their weapons hurt not their enemie. Thed Romane youthes learned first to vse the tar∣get, or shield and sword, (for that was their most cōmon armes,) and howe with slent blowes to breake the force of their enemies weapons, or dartes.

Afterward they practised y^e vse of all other sortes of weapons. And as absurd it is for a souldier to take on him y^t name, not knowing the vse of his armes, as for an ignorant person, to call himselfe an artifi∣cer, and yet not to know the vse of the tooles of his occupation.

Lastly by learning & vnderstanding the arrayes, & iust distances of horsemen, & footemen, & the standings of all sortes of weapons, and

the differences in marching, fighting, retiring, according to diuers sortes of groundes, & how to march to y^e assalt or defence of a Towne or place, (which may be shewed them by those that are good leaders,) Souldiers may learne howe to place themselues vpon an instant, and not as I haue seene done, runne away, or runne vp & downe like men amazed; they may also vnderstand how to cake aduantage of the enemie, howe to rally themselues being disordered, and in what place euery kind of weapon is to be sorted, & employed with most aduan∣tage. In summe, array & order may both better be kept, & more easily repayred; without whicha armes haue no vse. And as well can an armie march or fight being out of array, as a body doe the functions of the body, hauing the partes out of frame. There is certainely nothingb more beautifull in the eyes of friendes, then an armie set in order, neither is any thing more fearefull to the enemie. But this cannot be done without instruction and exercise: of which I hope our gouernours will haue more care hereafter. But (may some say) what neede so many wordes in these matters: especially if we consi∣der both the charge, & labour that hath bin spent in trayning of soul∣diers within our Realme of late time? men able (as some thinke) to encounter the most florshing armie in Christendome? against whom I haue no purpose to speake. Nay I wish with al my heart, they were so strong, and ready as is imagined. Onely I thought good to shewe first the defectes in our trayning, which I would wish were supplied, and our men better instructed; and next howe little trust there is to be put in trayned men, that neuer sawe enemie, vnlesse there be many olde souldiers mingled among them. In trayning of souldiers there∣fore in places where I haue bin, these wants I haue obserued. First, the souldiers are not alwayes best chosen: secondly, their bodies are not exercised as they should be: thirdly, they are not taught the vse of their seuerall weapons. Fewe teach souldiers the right vse of the piece, and none the vse of the pike, halberd, and sworde, and target. Fourthly, the men are rather wearied in marching vp and downe, and wheeling in ringes, and filing of rankes, which are to no vse in fighting, then instructed howe to take their places in marching, in fighting, assalting, retiring, or other deede of armes. Fifthly, there is seldome or neuer sufficient companie brought together, so that men may conceiue the reasons of the places of euery sort of weapons: horsemen are seldome seene in traynings of souldiers. So y^t hardly

can any conceiue howe things should stand, by any thing y^t is shewed. Lastly such for the most part vpon some cōmendation of some great mans letters, are employed in teaching our souldiers, as either neuer went to the schoole of armes, or know very little themselues. So that I see no other effect of training men, then expense of time & powder. And for mine owne part, I wish rather to haue men neuer exercised, then in this sort trayned. But were they better trained then they are, yet are we not to put too great trust in them. The Venetians making reckoning of the trayned men of their state (which are such like, as ours are) were abused (saitha Guicciardin) and ouerthrowen. Andb euill were the Florentines apaid, trusting in their trayned souldi∣ers. The same being appointed to the garde of Prato, a Towne of their dominion, seeing but two Spaniards to mount vpō a litle breach, threwe downe their weapons, and ranne as fast as they might out of the Towne.

Generally there is no trust in yong souldiers. A smallc companie of olde beaten souldiers, is better then a multitude of people with∣out knowledge, and experience of warres. Yong souldiers that haue not heard the noyse of battell, nor seene the slaughter of men, nor felt knockes, will hardly abide them at the first. If not in trayned souldi∣ers, much lesse in tumultuarie forces ought we to put any confidence. Thed Latines and Hetruscians seeing the Romanes range their countrey in no great number, came foorth by multitudes against them, thinking to swallowe them vp. But the first were no sooner slaine, then the rest fled. 500. olde souldiers put all the rascall route ofe Tacfarinas in Affrike to flight. At Annibals first comming into Italy the countrey people seeing the spoiles he made, had thought to haue cut a certaine out wing in pieces. But in be ginning the execu∣tion, 35. thousand were put to flight by a very sew. The Spaniards at Puente de Butgos in Galicia, assembled together in great num∣bers, fledde from vs vpon the first approche of our men. And so it is commonly in all yong souldiers. Wherefore the best is to vse olde souldiers, the next to mingle newe, and olde together, and diligently to teache them, and trayne them, before we hazard our whole state vpon them. For albeit much is in mans naturall courage, yet the same is much encreased by skill and exercise, and that not feyned, but in fight with the enemie.

CHAP. V.

Part. 1. Wherein is declared, what things are especially to be considered of those, that leade an army by land, or by sea, into a forreine countrey.

VNcertainty, and irresolution, as in other actions, so in the proceeding of warres, worketh no good effect. Time may not be spent, nor money wasted vainely. A wise captaine therefore purposing a iourney into an other countrey, wil before hand resolue, first what time is fittest to set forward, secondly what things be necessary for his seruice, that he may haue them ready against that time; and thirdly what place is fittest both to make his prouision, and to assemble his troupes in. The consideration of the time is very materiall: for neither is it conuenient to enter in the depth of Win∣ter, for that at that time forage for horses is very hard to come by; nor in the heate of Sommer, for that the time is hurtfull for mens bodyes to trauell in, Caesar entring into France in the middest of Winter, was driuen to great extremities, and albeit hee had good helpe of friendes to relieue him with victuals, and other nacessaries: yet were his souldiers and horses almost famished. Then it is hard to lye without doores: the wayes then also are very troublesome. The duke of Lancasters army arriuing ina Portugal, in the dayes of king Richard the 2. in the heate of Sommer, suffered no lesse through heate, then the other through cold. Much also did theb blacke Prin∣ces army suffer in Spaine through the heate of Sommer. Neither did the heate of the Countrey in our late voyage of Portugal further our enterprise. The most conuenient time to enter any Countrey with an army is, when the same may finde greatest store of victuals for men, of forrage for horses, and is most temperate: so that men may endure trauaile best, without endangering their health. Of thisc Caesar had respect both in his warres in France, and Affrike, and other places. And euill did it befall those, y^t without consideration of time rashly aduentured to goe in foreine seruices. He that conside∣reth not the time, must make his prouision the greater.

The place also woulde be chosen, and certainely resolued vpon, where both our prouision is to be made, & our souldiers are to be ap∣pointed to meete. The Romanes in their warres in Greece, assēbled their forces at y^e port ofd Brundusiū, sayling into Affrike against the

Carthaginians, they made their prouision & rendeuouz at Lilibaeum, which say right ouer against Afrike, as the other port was commo∣dious for those y^t sailed into Greece. Cato in his iourney intoa Spaine chose the port of Luna, as lying directly against Spaine. Annibalb purposing a voyage into Italy, assigned newe Carthage for his men to meete at. Whenc Caesar entended the inuasion of this Iland, he appointed his men to meete, and his prouision to bee brought to Caleis and Bollein. For that neither the time, nor place of meeting, was appointed certaine, I report mee what hinderance it was to vs, in the enterprise of Portugal. But greatest care would be had, first that we cary with vs force of our owne, sufficient: and secondly, that we haue prouision of armes, victuals, munitions, and all instruments of warre with vs. For in vayne looketh he for helpe of others, or of the countrey where he goeth, that is not strong of himselfe.d Banished men doe make those that goe in their succour beleeue, that they haue great parties in the countrey, and that the enterprise is easie; but there is no wisedome to giue them futher credite, then such men deserue. In Portugall we may remember, how we were abused, or rather abused our selues to thinke that the countrey would reuolt be∣fore we had beaten the Spaniard, that kept the people in subiection: and too late it is to looke for supplie from home of men or victuals, when we are presently to vse them. The Romanes although they sent diuers times succours to other natiōs, as to the Greekes oppres∣sed by the kings of Macedonia: to the Sicilians inuaded by the Car∣thaginians: yet neuer sent they lesse then a sufficient armie, furnished with all things necessarie. Caesar for that hee was driuen to leaue a great part of his armie, and prouision behinde him, both in hise voyage against Pompey, and against Scipio inf Afrike, was dri∣uen to great extremities, and omitted many opportunities before the rest of his armie came at him. Hee that hath his men, and all things ready with him, oppresseth the Countrey, before prouision can be made against him.

Yet may not the Prince that inuadeth others, so prouide against the enemie, that hee forget to couer and defende his owne Coun∣trey and Coast, and frontier Townes against all sudden enterpri∣ses. Annibal marching towardes Italy, before hand prouided oneg armie for the garde of Afrike, another for the garde of Spaine. And Caesar pursuing Pompey into Greece, committed

thea guarde of Italy, and the port townes thereof vnto Antony Ifb Syphax going out of his countrey to warre against the Romanes,had had like care, his country had not beene taken from him in his absence by Masinissa and Laelius. Hee is not wise that seeking to strike his enemy, lieth open himselfe.

But because warres spend both men, and victuals, and other prouisions, especially where there is made great resistance: wee must not onely thinke to send sufficient at the first; but also cause the same to be supplied in time. Nothing did cause Anniball toc leaue his hold in Italy, but want of succour, and supplie. The slownesse ofd Caesars supplies after his army transported into Afrike made him loose many aduantages, and sustaine diuers losses. I will not say what hurt want of supplie did vs in the Portugall action, whhen it may be imputed rather to presumption, that wee went foorth vn∣furnished; then to want of care, that wee had no supply in time. For wher to could supply haue serued, where the whole was through want disordered before? for guarde of shippes of carriage, and assu∣rance of the army, the whole nauy where the passage is by sea, is to be furnished, and to saile in warrelike sort.e Caesar for that hee was driuen to passe his army in certaine Marchant shippes without guard of shippes of warre, lost diuers of his souldiers sayling into Greece.

King Edward the third passing his army into France sailed in that warrelike sorte, that encountring the French nauy at Scluce hee ob∣tained a famous victory. If the passage be not cleared by shippes of warre keeping the seas, it is to be feared least the enemy lying in wait intercept diuers of our shippes and men passing betweene; as hath often happened in the passage betweene England, and the Low countries within these few yeares. And as at sea, so by land like∣wise the waie is to be cleared, that no enemy bee lefte vpon our backes.

The Generrall being ready to set saile with all his company; ei∣ther by ticket sealed, or else word of mouth, hee is to declare to what port he will haue his company to bend their course; to the ende that such as by tempest are seuered at sea, may yet afterwarde meete at a port.f Caesar vsed tickets.g Scipio sailing into Afrike calling two of euery ship, declared what he would haue them do, and whither to set their course. Cato hauing all his ships and men together, &

being ready to set saile fora Spaine caused proclamation to bee made, that all his shippes should direct their course to the porte neere the Pyreneies which I suppose was Emporia. Because Caesar gaue not like direction in his voiages into Albany against Pompey, and Afrike against Scipio, he sustained diuers losses. And in the voy∣age of Portugal such as lost sight of the fleet either returned, or went to Rochel, being vncertaine whither to go. That the nauy faile not of the port, euery ship is to haue a good pilot.

The better and more certainely the Generall vnderstandeth the state of the enemies country, & the ports, and defences thereof, and proceedings of the enemy: the more certaine direction he shal be able to giue. And therefore as at all times hee ought by his espialles to vnderstand what the enemy doth, and what hee prepareth: so in this time especially when hee goeth about to transporte an armie into his countrey. For this causeb Caesar sent Commius, and Volusenus into this Iland, the one to vnderstand the state of the people, the other to view the coast, and sound the Ports. Ca∣to before hee went against the enemie in Spaine, sent his espialles to vnderstand the number, the place, and proceeding of his armie.

After the arriuall of the nauy in the enemies countrey, the first care of the Generall ought to be, to seize vpon some commodious port towne, or harbour, and to fortifie the same, that both his ship∣ping may be safe there, and that both succours, and victualles may safely come thither: and last of all, that both from thence hee may safely proceede in his action, and haue a safe retraite in a storme. Caesar landing his men in Afrike fortifiedc Ruspina, and by tren∣ches and bankes made it both a good harbour for shippes, and a safe lodging for his army. The same was practised before of Scipio, who landing neere a point of land in Afrike, did first make fortificati∣ons in that place. But afterward perceiuing that Vtica thereby was more commodious, hee tooke the towne, and made that ad castle of retrait from the land, and an accesse for his shippes from sea; and a place commodious for dispatch of other marters. The reasons that moued Scipio to take newe Carthage in Spaine were these, that hee might haue a conueient porte for accesse of his shippes, and a commodious storehouse for his prouisions of warre.

Annibal made many attempts againsta Naples and Nola, that he might vse them for the same purposes lying commodiously for those that come out of his countrey. Neither had Edward the third other respect in his long siege of Caleis, but that he might haue a commo∣dious port for his shipping on that side. These causes at this present haue moued the Spaniardes that lately haue set foote in Brytaine, to fortifie Hannebon and Bluet. Little did the Macedonians vnder∣stand the practise of warre, that takingb Chalcis a very opportune port for their warres in Greece, left the same without fortification, or garrison.

That the nauy be not idle, the Generall after he hath landed his men, is to employ the same in ranging the coast, fetching in of vic∣tualles, and annoying the enemy both by land and sea. Unlesse the same be at sea, the enemy wil depriue him of succours, and victualles. Therein let him follow the precedent of Scipio in Spaine, of Caesar in Afrike.

Those that inuade the enemy by land, likewise are to seize some towne neere the enemy which may serue them for a fortresse whither to retire, and whence to sally out. Thec Persians inuading Greece, vsed the towne of Thebes as a retraite, and propugnacle against the Greekes.

The Lacedemonians to straite the Athenians fortified Eleu∣sis a bourgh in the territorie of the Athenians.d Asdrubal vsed the towne of Oringis in Spaine, as a fortresse, from whence hee made roades into the midland countrey thereabout. Sulpitius the Romane Consul in the Macedonian warre seizing ae towne that lay fitly against Macedonia, did put garrison in it, and from thence made diuers attempts against the Macedonians. Antiochusf pur∣posing to inuade Aegypt furnished Pelusium, which is the kay of that countrey, with sufficient garrison.

Yet before the army be brought in sight of the enemy, the same is to bee refreshed certaine dayes, whether it bee of their tra∣uailes by land in their march, or iactation and disease at sea.g Annibal before hee brought foorth his army to fight with the Romanes in Italy caused the same to refresh, and rest it selfe di∣uers dayes after his wearisome iourney through the Alpes. And likewise returning out of Italie into Afrike to defend his Coun∣trey against Scipio, heeh refreshed his men certayne dayes

of their trauaile at sea, before he marched against the enemy.

Whether the country be knowen to the General or not, yet ought be not to march without diligēt discouerers sent before, at any time: least of all when hee commeth into a strange country all enemy. Wherefore after hee hath setled his matters in the towne, or port which hee hath seased, and refreshed his men, let him then send forth espials and discouerers, to vnderstand the site of the countrey, and proceedings of the enemy.a Annibal before he incountred with Fla∣minius the Romane Generall, sent before him certaine men to espy his purposes, and to view the situation of the countrey, and the wayes which he was to trauaile. It is the practise of all wise Ge∣neralles. The Romanes neglecting to make this discouery were enclosed at Caudium by the Samnites, and shamefully ouercome, and Annibal himselfe trusting an ignorant guide, was almost intrap∣ped at Cales by Fabius. Curiob marching in the sandes of Afrike without knowledge of the enemies power, or the disaduantage of the country being drie, and plaine, was ouerthrowen together with his whole army by the Numidian horsemen of Iuba. Appiusc spoy∣ling the country of the Boyans without espiall sent before, & guards placed in conuenient distances; was himselfe slaine, together with his company. The meanes to escape these trappes, and ambushes is viligent espiall, and discouery.

If our army do march farre vp into the countrey; then is diligent heede to be taken, that the enemy do not cut betweene vs, and our succours or victuallers. For fauour whereof wee are to assure our selues of the passages, and to place garrisons in conuenient distances. Caesar distributed tenne thousandd Heduans in diuers townes, and fortes vpon the way, that his victualles might come to his army with safety. He tooke Vellaunodunum that lay upon the way, lest the enemy might stop the passage. The towne ofe Astapa in Spaine was taken and ruinated by L. Martius, for that the garrison of the enemies there, did spoyle the confederates of the Romanes, and in∣tercept the victuallers that came to the army. The same course didf Caesar take for the brideling of the enemy, and assurance of his vi∣ctualles in his warres against Pompey.

But because nothing is more to be feared of an army transported into a strange country, then want of victuals: therfore must the Ge∣nerals mind be intentiue, and carefull, not only for theg present, but

also for the future time. He may not thinke that hee shall alwayes finde corne and prouision in the country, especially if the enemy vn∣derstand the traine of warres. Caesar found the same by experience in his warres in France, when the enemy burned the country before him. When the Persian king vnderstood the intention of Cyrus, to be to depriue him of his crowne: he senta horsemen before to burne all things, that might profitably serue the enemy. And in the inuasi∣on which Annibal made in Italy Fabius caused all the prouision that might serue for an army to be either spoyled, or brought into strong townes in all places neere where Annibal, and his company passed. Therefore is it requisite, that store of horses, and carriages go along with the army for carriage of victualles, munitions, and other neces∣saries.

Cyrusb had foure hundred wagons laden with prouision, beside those that belonged to particulars. When in the country nothing is to be found, then may this serue. Further for fetching in of vi∣ctualles, the army ought to haue a sufficient strength of horsemen seconded with troupes of footemen for their retraite. Annibal at one roade in Italy beside infinite cattell tooke foure thousand hor∣ses, notwithstanding the strict commaundement of the Romanes, that all things should be brought into strong holdes. Whatsoeuer prouision may be found, the same is to be saued, and conueyed into those places, that best may be defended and serue fittest for the pro∣uision of our army.c Annibal brought all the corne and proui∣sion, which he found in the territorie of Metapontus, and Heraclea into Salapia. After thatd Scipio in his expedition in Afrike, had taken Vtica, he caused all the prouision, and corne that could be found in the country to be carried thither, and to be laid vp in store. The same course did Quintius take in his warres against Nabis the tyrant, and Caesar in his inuasion of thise Iland.

If the country where our army passeth doe not furnish vs with victualles, the same is vtterly to be ruinated, and burned. Which if the countrey people do perceiue, either for feare or for hope, they will succour vs.f Manlius inuading the Gallogrecians, forced all those countries where hee passed to compound for feare of spoyle, For like dreade the Frenchmen where the English armyg passed in the dayes of Edward the third did supplie the same with necessarie prouision. It is a shame (saiethh Xenophon) for him that hath a

sufficient army not to bee able to get victualles, and things neces∣sarie for the same. If the enemie shall spoyle one countrey as loo∣king for our forces that way, yet shall it be hard for him to spoile the whole, vnlesse hee meane to famish his owne people also. The Ro∣manes against thea Samnites led foorth their armies diuers wayes, whereby the enemy being made vncertain of their comming, could not preuent them, nor depriue them of prouision.

Finally, it is not possible for an army to enter any countrey, but the same shall finde some weary of the present gouernement, and de∣sirous of innouation, which may bee induced to helpe to furnish it with necessary prouision. Caesar in his warres against the Helueti∣ans, and Ariouistus, had his prouision from the Heduans, in his iour∣ney into Belgium from those of Rheimes. Arriuing here in Britaine he found both partisans, and prouision sufficient. Neither are the times nowe changed. In all estates there are some malcontents, and many desirous of alterations. If desire of innouation worke nothing, yet if our army haue good successe, the same shall procure vs friendes and meanes. After Annibals victory at Cannae most of the subiectes of the Romanes reuolted, and tooke part with him. When the Frenchmen inuaded theb kingdome of Naples, the coun∣trey either folowed them, or tooke against them, as they had pros∣perous or bad successe. And if that our successe in Portugalll had bene good, there is no doubt, but that all the country would haue re∣uolted from the Spaniardes.

The Generall aboue all things is to haue regarde, that hee spend no time vainely. Opportunitie to doe great matters seldome offe∣reth it selfe the second time. By all meanes the enemy is to be prouo∣ked to fight, while our army is strong, and his souldiers yong and vnexercised. Annibal had more paine at the first to bring the Romans to fight, then to ouercome them. If the enemy refuse to fight, he is to be pursued into some towne or straite, or else by besieging of some strong place driuen to come to succour the same. All the countrey doth followe the successe of the chiefe citie. yet forasmuch as it is not sufficient to take, vnlesse we keepe the same: there is no lesse care to bee taken in fortifying and furnishing a towne taken, then in ta∣king the same. Unlesse wee meane to loose our prize, as thec French did Nouara in the dayes of Lewis the twelth for want of prouision, and good order.

Those that haue followed this course, haue done great matters, as is euident by the examples of Caesar, Scipio, Annibal: the rest ey∣ther failed of victory, or could not maintaine their conquest. I will not specifie it by our expeditions into France, Portugal, Flanders. For that might be odious. Although those that are wise, by that which we wanted, may see what we ought to haue had, and done. But I will rather vse forraine examples. The enterprise ofa Lau∣trecke in the kingdome of Naples was broken by niggardly ex∣penses, slender preparatiues, slowe proceeding, couetousnesse of officers, disorder, and want of care about victualles, and other prouisions. The like disorder in the times of Charles the eight of France, made the French to loose the kingdome of Naples, which but lately before they had wonne. Some of the chiefe gouernours spent their time in pleasures, others minded nothing but spoyle: they furnished not their townes with victualles, nor with souldi∣ers, they pursued not the enemy so, but that they suffered him to gather strength againe. Neither may we impute the losse of Nor∣mandy, Gascoigne, and Guienne to other causes, then to disorders in warres, want of succour and supply, and too much credulitie in trusting the French, and presumption, in hoping for successe with∣out meanes.

But, may some say, to what end tendeth al this discourse, seing mē now a daies are so farre from inuading their enemies: that some can be content to leaue their friends languishing for want of help, which are ioyned neere vnto them both by bond of religion, and couenant? and what hope is there that such shall giue the charge on others, see∣ing they suffer the fire so neere their owne doores? true it is, that go∣uernours haue not beene so forward, as some would haue wished, and percase as some thinke their honour and the profite of their state re∣quired: yet haue not matters beene so carelesly neglected, as is sur∣mised. But suppose they had; yet I hope the same course will not alwayes be continued, nor that the discipline of armes shall fore∣uer be neglected of commanders.

There are yet a number left of the posteritie of those, that haue made the name of the English nation famous in France, Flanders, Spaine, and other countries: and many do now beginne to mislike, and condemne former disorders. If at anie time such men may be heard, or folowed, I doubt not, but that this

discourse may be put in practise, and such aduertisements heard, and accepted more gratefully. To annoy our enemies, and procure our own safetie, there is no better course, then to translate warres frō our own doores into the enemies countrie. Whatsoeuer wil be per∣formed, I thought it myduety not to conceale, that which I thought not onely profitable, but necessary for my countries honour: as, God willing, by many reasons I shall shew vnto you.

CHAP. V. Part. 2. Wherein is prooued, that it is farre better for the English nation, things standing as now they do, to inuade the Spaniard, or any other enemy in his owne country, then to receiue their assault, and invasion here at home, or to stay vntill we do see the enemy on our owne coast.

MAny there are, I doubt not, of a contrary minde; but especially those that enioy honour, wealth, and ease. These commonly vesire peace, and detest warres, and against such enterprises alleadge these reasons: they say wee haue neither towne, nor port in Spaine to receiue vs: that the way thither is long, and vncertaine by reason of contrarietie of windes, and that it will be hard to remedie anie disorder that shall fall out in our army by reason of the distance of the place: they alleadge further that we haue no friendes nor confederates in the countrey: and that it will be more difficult to subdue the Spaniard in his countrey, then abroad, for euery man doeth3 fight most valiantly when his wife and children, and his owne landes and goodes are in his sight. Lastly, they suppose that the number of the enemies will be such, as that an armie shall bee wearied with killing them. On the other side, if wee attend the Spaniardes comming hither (say they) they shall haue all obese things to make against them; and wee all things fauorable for vs; men, municious, and victuals sufficient; our wines, children, & country in our sight, safe places to retrait vnto. As Anteus wrastling with Hercules, so oft as he touched the earth receiued new strength after his fall: so they that in their owne countrey do•• fall,

rise againe very easily. A5 snayle so long as hee keepeth himselfe within his shell, is defensed; when he putteth out his head, he lyeth open to danger. So they that in their owne countrey may liue safe, by making enterprises abroad oft times receiue blowes, and al∣wayes lie open to danger. The6 Athenians were vtterly ouerthrow∣en in Sicile, that before that were well able to defend them selues at home. And diuers great armies of Germans and Gaules, inuin∣cible if they had bene in their owne countreys, were ruinated at∣tempting to inuade forreine countreys.

Which reasons howsoeuer they seeme plausible in the eares of those that in matters of warres proceede like snayles, and care not for any disgrace or future danger, so they may enioy present ease; yet are built on false grounds, and matters mistaken. For if we might safely rest at home, I thinke him not wise, nor sober that would seeke trouble abroad. But seeing we can not haue peace the Spaniard ha∣uing begun warres, and threatning the destruction of our state: the question is, whether is better for vs to stay vntill he come vpon vs, or to begin with him and seeke him in his owne countrey? I say this is best: my reasons are these.

He that first chargeth his enemie, hath many aduantages, it is his great foly, if hee be not well prouided of souldiers, mariners, armes, shippes, horses, and all prouisions for the warres: hee may make choyce where to charge the enemy, and proceedeth simply if he doe not there beginne, where hee findeth his enemy weakest, and most vnprouided. He may make likewise choyce of his times, & take opportunities.7 Victorie is obteined by preuention, and by the same warres are oft times diuerted, as Alphonsus king of Naples sayd, but practiced not. For if hee had not lingred matters, and had met the enemie in the way; he had not so easily bene driuen out of his state.

No man obteineth better conditions of peace, then he that first stri∣keth. Contrariwise dangerous it is to let the enemie come vpon vs. as8 diseases, so the attempts and proceedings of the enemy at the first are easily stopped, and both in time are strengthened and con∣firmed. And oft times of light beginnings as9 Tacitus sayth, great troubles arise. If thou10 suffer one iniurie, thou doest but giue thy enemy courage to offer thee another. The enemy doeth oft times trie our patience, and seeing vs patiently to endure iniuries (as

12Ancus Martius sayd) doeth contemne vs. And to13 yeelde in one thing doeth giue the enemy courage, to aske more. Nothing doeth procure more enemies, then patience and14 contempt. Warre is like a fire: if it proceede, it embraceth whatsoeuer is neere, as the Cam∣pamans sayd. If15 Alexander king of Epeirus comming in succour of the Lucanians, had had good successe: the Romanes should haue felt his force, therefore did they vse at the first to preuent matters. Vn∣destanding that Philip king of Macedonia made preparations to come ouer into Italy, they tooke paynes to meete him in his owne Countrey.

Likewise did they preuent the attemptes of Antiochus. Which course if they had taken when Annibal first besieged16 Saguntum, they had deriued the warres into Spaine, and escaped the storme, which Annibals army brought into Italy. Those that feare to assayle the enemy vpon17 hope of peace, loose oft times peace for euer. Tully feared it seeing the Romanes proceede so coldly against Antony; and the issue prooued it true.

The obiect ons that are made are of no moment. for admit we neither haue Port, nor towne, nor friende in the Spanish Domi∣nions: yet armes and victory procure all these. The coast can ne∣uer be so well garded, but that an army may alwayes haue accesse to some Port, or landing place or other.

The Romanes landed diuers times in Afrike during the warres with Carthage, and spoyled their townes and countrey: nay Caesar landed his army in Epeirus, when the enemy with an army prepared helde all the Port townes.

The Athenians made diuers descentes into Peloponesus, not∣withstanding the diligent garde, that the enemy made. Who seeth not then howe easy it is to sease a Port, or to land in Spaine the coun∣trey being almost without garde of souldiers? if any man doubted before, yet since the voyage into Portugal, I thinke there is none will make question of that matter. Neither did Scipio doubt for want of Portes, or friendes to sayle into Afrike, or the Persians into Greece, or other to inuade his enemy. For armes procure friendes, and winne Portes. so that had we no friends in Spaine, yet what resoluce man would refuse to goe against such enemies? much more therefore nowe, seeing the Portugals are discontent with the Spanish gouernment, and Spaine is so stored with men of

foreine nations, and diuers malcontents.

As for the distance, it is nothing, where there is no resistance by the way. And what reason haue we to accompt Spaine farre, when the Romanes doubted not to transport their armies not one∣ly into Afrike and Spaine, but also into Asia which is a farre lon∣ger cut. If winde and weather serue, in three dayes and three dightes the voyage may be perforified.

The difficulty of supplyes may easily be holpen with prouisi∣on made beforehand. If the army goe into Spaine well stored, there is no such haste of supply, but that it may come in good time. Why not into Spaine from England as well as from Rome into Spaine, Afrike, Asia, yea and Britein?

But the Spaniards are valiant at home, and will not giue ground fighting for their Countrey, wiues, and children. As if the Romanes a more warrelike and valiant people, did not giue ground to Annibals army in Italy; and as if the Gaules were not vanquished in diuers battels by Caesar, and the Spaniards in time past by the Carthaginians, and Romanes, and since that by the Gothes and Mores, yea and by the Portugales also their neighbours. And not onely our ancesters in the dayes of Edward the third, and Ri∣chard the second, but wee our selues also haue had triall of that ene∣mie both in Galicia, and Portugal. Hee that19 commeth to inuade others fighteth with greater courage, then those that are inuaded, by the testimonie of Annibal, and proofe of experience.20 They that haue no hope of life, nor escape but in victory, can not chuse, but fight valiantly. Contrariwise they that haue refuge, and hope another time to fight more happily, which is the case of euery man in his owne countrey, will not fight so resolutely.

The Gaules in their owne countrey gaue ground, and fledde before Caesar, and other Romane Captaines, that in Italy had oft foyled the Romanes. And those Africans that in Italy were vic∣torious, coulde not withstande Scipio in Afrike. Alexander en∣tring into the middest of the Persian Empire, ouerthrewe the same vtterly.

Further it standeth with the Spaniard now, as sometime it did with the Carthaginians, & doth with al that vse mercenary souldiers. For so long as they may enioy their countrey & reuenues, & therewith hire most valiant souldiers of other nations, so long they are strong. but if

they be inuaded in their owne countrey both their reuenues will fayle, and their owne people not being exercised in warres, wil make but slender resistance. So that suppose the Spanish army in the Low countreys be strong, which notwithstanding hath bene dealt with∣all by our people, yet are wee not to looke for such souldiers in Spaine.

The Athenians inuading Sicile were ouerthrowen by the disa∣greement and insufficiencie of the Captaines, the disorders of the souldiers, and want of things necessary. which may be remedied by diligent foresight, prouision, and gouernement. But suppose some did miscary in foreine warres, shall we therefore condemne that course? there is no reason, seeing as warres at home are not condem∣ned because many nations haue bene subdued and vanquished in their owne countrey. Betwixt the Athenians or the Achaeans, & this kingdome there is no comparison in force or greatnesse. But if the citie of Athens could subdue all Sicile except one onely citie: it is no such difficult matter to inuade the Spaniard, as is supposed.

Finally some in trembling maner demaund, what if such an ar∣mie so farre caried away should miscary? which is a very ridicu∣lous point, for men to care more for those mens liues that dee wil∣lingly offer themselues to the aduenture, then they doe themselues: Seeing they dare venture nothing themselues, yet let them not en∣uie, and hinder others that will. But suppose the army should mis∣cary: yet would the losse be farre lesse, then if so many should be lost at home. For here the sequele would be great, there would be only losse of men: which God be thanked this countrey may well spare. But what simplicity is it to talke of loosing, where men goe with a resolution rather to winne then loose? neither Anni∣bal going in Italy, nor Scipio into Afrike cast any such doubt.

Suppose nowe on the other side, that the Spaniard should doe, that which hee once attempted, and God, more then our owne force would not suffer him to doe; and that an army of Spaniards were prouided to inuade vs: these things would fall out: not know∣ing where the enemie will land, all the coast must be furnished with souldiers. For to thinke, that our trayned men would be trayned together in time to make resistance, is simplicitie. And if any port be left open, as good all should be disarmed. But this would be double the charge of leuying and furnishing an army for Spaine. and the

longer the enemy holdeth vs in breath, the greater would the charge arise. and all this for any thing that I can see without ef∣fect, seeing it is neither possible to keepe an army from landing, nor safety to fight without great aduantage immediatly vpon the enemies landing.

If the enemy should land, as well he may comming with great force, we neither haue strong townes, nor many great riuers to stoppe his proceedings, nor any way to resist, but by force of men in open fielde, and howe dangerous it is to oppose yong souldiers and almost tumultuary forces against a puissant army of olde soul∣diers, the victories of Annibal in Italy, of Scipio in Afrike, of the Greekes in Persia, of the English in Spaine, and infinite Histo∣ries declare.

If the enemy be suffered to take breath, who seeth not howe hee will fortifie him selfe? if hee be suffered to range without fight, who considereth not the wracke and spoyles of the countrey that will folowe?

When the countrey is all in trouble, the reuenues both of the Prince, and priuate men either will cease, or at least be greatly di∣minished. Ferdinando king of Naples in the inuasion of his State made by the French, found it23 true. And reason may teach vs, that where the husbandmen part by the rapines of the enemy, and part by the spoyles of our owne souldiers can not enioy the fruites of their ground, their rentes can not be payde. and if rentes bee not payd, howe will our souldiers be payd? suppose then, that the charge of an army in a foreine countrey be great: yet may it well be borne, being equally diuided, so long as men enioy their liuings peaceably: if that may not be; howe shall we mainteine twise so ma∣ny souldiers at home?

If when the enemies inuade vs, malcontent persons should dis∣couer themselues, then as the number of our enemies, so the heape of our troubles would increase.

But suppose (for what danger in such a case is not to be fore∣cast?) that our army should receiue some checke: what townes haue wee, or straits to arrest the enemy? the countrey people be∣ing vnacquainted with warres, what lawes cankeepe thē in order? helpe can wee looke for none, our friendes being either not able, or not willing to helpe vs, for some seeme offended with the spoyles

of their shippes, others beare vs in hand, they will remember our slender helpe aforded to them, which notwithstanding is more then they deserued.

Other secret wounds may not be opened, neither needeth it, see∣ing as euery man may perceiue by these reasons, which already I haue brought, how easy, safe, profitable, and honourable it is to in∣uade the Spaniard, and how disaduatageous it wil be to this land, if either we stay with our hands folded together, or els deferre to charge the Spaniard with full force vntill such time, as he shall come to cut our throtes at home.

Hiero25 king of Sicile, when the Romanes were inuaded by Annibal, gaue them counsaile to transport an army ouer into A∣frike, the happy successe of Scipio doing the same fifteene yeeres af∣terward, and by that meanes making an end of the warres, doeth confirme that counsell to haue bene most excellent. If when Philip26 king of Macedonia ioyned in league with Annibal, they had not sent an army into Greece to finde him occupied at home; hardly could they haue made resistance against the force of two so mightie ene∣mies vnited together. The experience of the warres with Annibal in Italy made them more wise afterward, and speedy. For hearing of Philips of Macedonia, and Antiochus his preparatiues to transport their armies into Italy: they eased them of the paine, and met them in more then halfe way. But what neede examples of foreine nati∣ons, seeing it hath bene the vse of our ancesters to seeke their enemies alwayes abroade in their owne countreys? this course is most honorable, most safe, yea and (that which is nowe most accompted of by some) most profitable, and least chargeable for vs also. Nothing can be more honorable then to defend our religion, lawes, and coun∣trey against those that seeke to oppresse vs: no course more safe, then so to hazard, that the losse doe not endanger our state: no way more profitable then by keeping the enemy farre off, to mainteine the reuenues of the Crowne, and euery mans priuate liuing, and trade at home.

Wherefore refusing the pernicious counsell of those, that babble of I knowe not what peace; let the Spaniard rather feele the effects of warre in Spaine, then bee suffered be to drawe his vnsatiable sword in England. his malice is not lesse then it was. But hither. to God hath broken his purposes, and crossed his designements. But

if he be suffered quietly to possesse Britein; the longer wee differre our warres, the more dangerous we shall finde them, and our selues more vnable to resist. Nowe that hee hath a strong party against him in France, and that the Low countreys either stand against him, or are weary of his gouernement, and that Portugal is mal∣content with his newe tyranny, is the time to hurt him, and pre∣uaile against him. If we suffer him to settle his owne affaires, and this good opportunitie to passe, I feare, we shall often wish for the like, and hardly finde it.

CHAP. V. Part. 3. Wherein certaine aduertisements are giuen to our souldiers, that are sent in ayde of foreine nations.

THe best counsell that I can giue my countrey∣men, is to assayle the enemy in his owne coun∣trey: but seeing that I cannot (I feare) perswade them to that is best, and safest; the next good that I can doe them, is to admonish them, that being sent in small numbers to succour our friendes oppugned by our common enemy, they proceede not rashly.

First therefore wisedome requireth, that they goe strong. for that in foreine countreys they are no lesse to feare the practices of double hearted friends, then the force of open enemies. The Ro∣manes when they sent ayde to their friendes, neuer sent lesse then a full army, sufficient to encounter the enemy. In sending lesse, either they should not haue pleasured their friends, or els haue en∣dangerd their owne men. Besides this, it would haue bene dishonor to the name of the Romanes, if either they had not bene able to ouer∣come the enemy, or willing to see their friendes long languish in feare, or their souldiers ouermatched, and not able to looke out into the fielde. For this cause being required ayde of the Campanians a∣gainst the Samnites, of the Latins against the Volscians, they sent their Consuls & Generals forth with a mighty force, not only to driue

the enemie from the townes, but also to fight with him in the fielde. And taking vpon them the protection of the Sicilians against them of Carthage, they sent thither sufficient strength both by sea, and land.

Caesar going in ayde of the Heduans, and other the confederates of the Romanes in France, oppressed by the Heluetians, & Germans led with him a most braue army furnished with all things necessary. Neither was it the vse of the Romanes only, but of all nations that vnderstood the practise of armes, yea and of ours also.

The Blacke Prince in the dayes of Edward the third going into Spaine in succour of Don Pedro de Castile, led thither a most flo∣rishing army, where with he ouerthrew the power of Spaine, and re∣stored the Ring to his seate. Likewise the Duke of Lancaster in his expedition into Portugall, did not rely vpon the ayde of that nation, but caried with him a gallant army of English men. And when Ed∣ward the fourth went into France to ayde the Duke of Burgundy, be caried with him such a power, as the heartes of the French trem∣bled to see it, and the king rather by money and rewardes, then by force sought to cause them to returne. If the Romanes had sent three or foure thousand in ayde of their friendes in Sicile, or Greece, or A∣sia, and so supplyed them by litle and litle: the opinion of their wis∣dome and forces would neuer haue growen so glorious. Neither could the Prince of Parma of late times, if he had gone into France with a small force haue deliuered his confederates from danger, or els broken the purposes of his enemies in that sort hee hath. If then wee will not followe the ancient rules of warre, yet let vs not shewe lesse iudgement and value in our proceedings, then our enemie.

Whosoeuer therefore meaneth to winne honor in succour of his friends abroad, let him as much as he can endeuour to cary with him a sufficient force. Small numbers are neither esteemed of enemies, nor friends. Into the field they dare not come, for they are too fewe and too weake, being penned vp in cities they famish. If our friends be stronger then our ayde, then are they commaunded by them. If any of their leaders want gouernement, our men that are put to all hard seruices, pay the prise of their folly. If any ca∣lamitie happen to their army, our people first feele it. They shift for them selues being in their owne countrey; ours are slayne

both of enemies and friendes, and if victuals waxe scant they sterue first. I neede not shewe this by other examples, then by our procee∣dings in France, and the Lowe countries.

But suppose that by our aide, our friendes should be able to ouer∣come, or make peace with the enemy, yet are not our people more assu∣red then before. When the Protestants in the first ciuil warres by the meanes of our forces had obteined that they would, or at least tolle∣rable conditions of peace, they ioyned with our enemies, to besiege vs in Newhauen, and sent vs away without reward or thankes. The Spaniards that had restoreda Maximilian Sforza to the Duchie of Millan, the warres being ended for their reward, had like to haue had their throates cut. But they stood so much vpon their gard, that the practise of Hierome Moron, and the Marquis of Pescara could take no effect. In ancient time howe often haue our people bene delu∣ded by the Dukes of Britaine, and Burgundy, in whose aide they went to venture their liues? and doe we thinke that the people of the Lowe countries, if once they be deliuered from the feare of the Spaniard, will not turne out our garrisons, and vse vs in like sort? they will be able to doe it, and others haue done so before. Why then should we thinke our selues priuiledged?

To assure our selues therefore of our friendes, the onely meanes is to haue a force sufficient to master them, and correct their disloyaltie. The same is the only course to preuaile against our enemies, to helpe our friendes, and mainteine our selues.

If that may not be obteined, I see not how our people can main∣teine their honor: but the next course to assure them selues, is to haue cautionary townes, or hostages, or both deliuered into their handes. townes, that they may assure them selues of retraite, in case of bad dealing; hostages, that they may be assured of their good dealing. Without townes their case is desperate, if the enemie preuaile. Theb French that came to aide Galeazzo Duke of Millain, vnder the leading of the Countie of Armignac, being scattered in the siege of Alexandria, were slaine by the Pesants of the Countrey. The like happened to those poore Lanceknights, that were defeated atc Mon∣contour. Neither were the Spaniards better vsed, that came in aide of the Leaguers, being defeated by the present french king neere Dreux, anno 1589. This towne that is giuen in caution, is to be garded with a sufficient force of English, furnished with victuals and muni∣tions,

in the garde of the garrison, and not as in Vlissingen, in the kee∣ping of the townesmen, vnto whom whosoeuer trusteth, shall assured∣ly be deceiued.

Thirly, let those that haue the gouernment of our men, see that they both march, and lodge vnited, and strong, that they be not either disturbed in the night, nor betraied vnder colour of friēdship. Stran∣gers that stragle are a spoile not onely to the pesants, but to their se∣crete euil-willers. And those that lodge without defence, or suffer any to come within them in the night, are open to euery enterprise of their enemies.

That they may both lodge, and march hard together, order is to be taken, that they may haue victuals deliuered them alwaies before hand; and that they be not driuen to seeke abroad for them. To con∣clude, the onely meanes of safetie is, neither to trust enemy, nor friend: for none are abused, but they that trust dissoyall people.

If that our men can neither haue townes, nor hostages, nor victu∣als, nor good vsage, what should they be sent among such people? or why should they trust others, being not themselues trusted? or why should any succour be sent, but such as may command, and punish the dissoyall, and haue strength to stand vpon themselues?

Those therefore that are gouernours (I trust) they will maturely consider of this point. if not, let them looke for this issue: if the enemy be stronger, then are our men either to be slaine, or famished by the e∣nemie: if by our forces our friendes preuaile, then for their rewarde shall they either be turned out of the countrey with disgrace, or be fa∣mished, or cut in peeces, by their friendes.

These things considered, let vs nowe consequently proceede to de∣clare, howe an army, after that it is exercised and furnished, and that the Generals haue all due considerations both therein, and in all o∣ther prouision, and proceeding required before the marche of the ar∣my, may march orderly, and safely.

CHAP. VI.

Part. I. Of the order and aray of an army marching toward the enemy.

THe first care of him that meaneth to march safely in the enemies countrey, or where an enemie is neere, ought to be, that his troupes obserue good order, and aray: and the neerer that he approcheth to the enemy, the greater

ought his care to be. The neglect of this point onely, hath bene the o∣uerthrow of many armies. It giueth opportunitie to the enemy to as∣saile vs, and confoundeth yong souldiers, when they are ignorant how to come in order to defend themselues. Easie it is to be obserued of men that are willing, and vnderstand reason: and sharpe effects and correction it worketh on the stubborne, and wilfull. That the Ge∣neral, or his officers may put the armie in good order of march, first they are to vnderstand what is the aray of the whole armie, considered together as one whole body. Secondly, the places of euery part, as of horsemen, footemen, and of footemen, of the diuers sortes of weapons. Thirdly, the iust distances of souldier from souldier, according to eue∣ry mans qualitie and weapon. Fourthly, the places of the Generall, and other chiefe Commanders. Fiftly, of the great Ordonance, and munition. Lastly, of the cariages and baggage, and boyes and ser∣uants that attend vpon it, and likewise of marchants, and victualers, and others that followe the army for other causes, then to fight.

The armie consisteth of three partes commonly, considered especi∣ally as it marcheth. for in fighting, the orders, and parts doe much dif∣fer. The first part that marcheth wee call vantgard; the second the battell; the third, the arier ward. Euery one of these ought to be a per∣fect body of it selfe, hauing both his smal shot, and great ordonnance, and his horsemen, and his pikes, targets, and halberds placed in good order. Oft times, I know, it is otherwise, and that either horsemen, or pikes, or targets are wanting in some part, or other. But howe much of these they want, so much they want of perfection, and due proporti∣on in a iust army. For we speake not of 6 or 7 thousand (which cannot obserue this order, but had better to march vnited) but of a ful army of 24 or 30 thousand, which number marching in this order, so that one part may succour an other, I accompt, doth march orderly, and strong∣ly. If one part goe farre before an other, it may fall out, as it happe∣ned to the Protestants in the plaines of S. Clere anno 1569, that one part shall be in route, before the other can come to succour. The Romanes marched distinguished by legions, whose numbers were di∣uers, and which seldome were complete: but in effect the aray was one; saue that the Romanes commonly made but two partes of their armie, and placed their baggage in the midst, as did Caesar marching against the Neruians. In the order of the partes, and placing of horse∣men, and footemen, and sorting of weapons, the same reasons haue

place for the most part among all nations.

Before the auantgard, light horsemen by ancient prescription may challenge the first place. If they be seconded with some shot and tar∣getters lightly armed, they may be the bolder to come neere the ene∣my, and to abide his charge. These are called auantcoureurs, and serue for discouery of the enemies proceedings, and of the situation of the Countrey, and intercepting of the enemies espials, and diuers o∣ther vses. Vpon the front of the auantgard march small shot and mus∣quetiers, after them follow the armed men with the ensignes in the midst, or rather somewhat toward the first rankes. On either hand, and behind the armed men, are other companies of shot to be ranged; and without the shot somewhat auanced forward argoletiers, and then launces take their place. If the enemie make countenance, as if he would charge some part of our army with his horse; they are to be drawne toward the side where the enemie threatneth to giue the charge. but if the enemie doe flie before vs, and shunne to fight, the horsemen of the whole armie would be ioyned together, and sent to charge him on the sides or backe, and to stay his marche: as Caesar practised first against thea Heluetians, then against theb Aduati∣cans, and lastly, against Petreius hisc armie in Spaine. By which meanes he ouertooke those that were farre before him. But this hath vse where we are stronger then the enemie in horse. Howe many horsemen, or shot, or pikes, or targets, and other weapons shall march in a ranke, I referre to the iudgement of a good Sergiant maior, ac∣cording to the bredth of the waies, and approches of the enemie. The more doe march in a ranke, the lesse paine he shall haue to set them in order, when he would place them in order of battell, and the stronger the aray is.d Ten thousand Switzers in Lombardy, in the warres betwixt the Spaniards and French, marched foure score in a ranke harde by the French armie, which seeing their resolution, durst not charge them.

The same course is to be taken in the aray of the battell, and arier∣ward marching, saue that these two partes following without any great distance betweene, neede not light horsemen or auantcoureurs, especially where the enemie is before. Neither haue they such vse of shot or horsemen, as the auantgard, where they are vsed for supplies, rather then to fight in front.

In the placing of horsemen & footemen, & in sorting and employ∣ing

of diuers weapons, so that euery sort may doe best seruice, consi∣steth the speciall iudgement of a wise leader. For therein are infinite differences, according to the diuers strength of the enemie, and our owne forces; and likewise according to the diuersities of grounds, and times. Yet commonly in marching this order is obserued: first the light-horse seconded if need be, with shot and targetters, especial∣ly where the country is rough and wooddie, serue for auantcoureurs. Caliuers and musquetiers are not onely to march on the front, but also on the sides and backe of the armed men. Lances and men of armes are ranged, the outmost on the sides for the most part. Next to the shot march the pikes of that part of the armie; these would bee rāged rather in battaillions according to the fashion of the Romans, that the shot and other light armed men might saue themselues, and againe make head within the distances, then all in one front ioyned togither. But this is where the plainnesse of the ground will giue leaue. In euery battaillion the ensignes are to bee placed somewhat toward the first rankes, garded with good store of targetters and halberds well armed.

In placing and sorting of weapons, the Generall is to consider, that the charge of horsemen against shot and targetters is mortall, if they be not either garded with pikes, or haue the vantage of ditches, or hedges, or woods where they cannot reach them. In which case the shot gauleth the horse, if they come within the leuell of the piece. Shot and targetters against pikes worke good effects: pikes ioined close, and standing firme togither, doe breake the carriere of horse∣men: especially where they haue their musquetiers, placed neere by them. Archers, where they haue a defense before them, doe good ser∣uice in the field against horsemen. These things let the General haue so in mind, that he may rather take the aduantage of weapons in the encounter, then giue it to the enemie.

In marching, the distances of euery ranke from ranke, and of e∣uery souldier from his companion by him, are greater then whē they stand ranged in battell readie to fight. It skilleth not much what the distance be, so they may beare their weapons commodiously, & march seemelie: yet that euery man might know what distance is suffici∣ent, & what is most seemly, it were good that one rule were obserued. Shot, although in fighting they obserue rather a course then aray, and are to stirre vp and downe to espie where they may hit the ene∣mie:

yet that they may with more ease and speed bee drawen to ser∣uice, are to march in distance from ranke to ranke fiue or sixe foote, from shoulder to shoulder one foote, or a foote and a halfe. Argo∣letiers or Pistoliers, in march from horse to horse on the side, are distant two foote, from ranke to ranke a yarde and a halfe, or thereabout. The Lancier without bardes rideth in the same di∣stance.

Pikemen from their fellowes side by them, are distant a foote and a halfe, or two foote, from the pikemen behind and before, by reason of the length of their pikes twelue foote. Their march to their corps de gard, when they hold their pikes vpright, which the Italian calleth inalborar, is out of this rule. Of their distances in charging, or recei∣uing the charge of horse or foote, wee shall speake when we come to the place.

Halbardiers march a foote and a halfe from shoulder to shoulder, and seuen foote from ranke to ranke. The targetter may obserue the same distance from shoulder to shoulder, but hee needeth not such di∣stance from ranke to ranke.

The Generall, as he hath the commandement, so he ought to haue the care of all, and therefore ought to be in all places. But because he cannot bee in all places at one time, therefore doeth the practise of warre require, that he assigne the guiding of his three battaillions, to three of his chiefe officers and commaunders, that are men of iudgement and experience, to see and commaund in his absence all men in their battaillion to march in order. Himselfe may march with the battell, vnlesse for some cause it shall please him to march in the vantgard, or arierward. The Romanes ouer euery legion or re∣giment of fiue or sixe thousand, placed a principall commaunder, they called him Legatum: the same was of the Generals counsell, and in his absence one of his lieutenants. Euerie seuerall troupe of horsemen are to haue their seuerall commaunders, and euery com∣paine of shot likewise. All which ought to be obedient to the Gene∣rall of the horse, or Colonell of the footemen, which know the Ge∣nerals counsell. The seuerall troupes also of armed men, are to haue their seuerall commaunders: prouided alwayes that no one compa∣nie haue more then one commaunder for auoiding of confusion, and that euery of these hearken to their superiours, which vnder the Ge∣nerall haue the chiefe gouernement of euery battaillion. The Ser∣ieant

maior, and corporals of the field his officers are to acquaint e∣uery commaunder with the Generals direction, which the same is to execute.

These are therefore suffered to goe vp and downe to see things in order. For others it is not good they should leaue their a∣raie, unlesse it bee for necessarie causes, as sickenesse, the necessities of nature, and such like. The commaunders of euery troupe are to march in the head of their troupes, their lieutenants behind the same. All other colonels, captaines, lieutenants and serieants, are to keepe their ranke and araie wherein they shall be placed. For although ouer their priuate companies when they are single they commaund; yet in the armie vnited togither, they are commaunded, and onely to see those that follow them where they march to do their dueties. which consent vnlesse it be obserued, these inconueniences will ensue. By contrarie commaundements, there will fall out con∣fusion and contention: and many captaines, lieutenants, and ser∣ieants will walke out of order, and much time will be spent in set∣ting of men in their places, which euery souldier ought to doe of himselfe.

The great ordonance being parted betwixt the vantgard, bat∣tell, and rereward, sometime is drawen in head of thea pikes of eue∣rie battell: but for that it must needes trouble those that would march on to fight with the enemie, farre better it were, if all the great ordonance were drawen on the sides of the vantgard, as oft as the enemie made shew of charge, and then drawen vpon some hill, or some other place of aduauntage. In the field it doeth more trouble then seruice: the effectes of it, is but noyse and foo∣lerie, onelie that small townes should not make resistance, it is drawen along, and also for the vse that it hath in sieges, and bat∣teries.

Concerning the baggage, and those seruants and boyes that at∣tend vpon the same, and such as follow the armie, as merchants or vic∣tualers, rather to gaine then to fight: this rule is generally to be ob∣serued, that the same be placed betweene the bataillions, so that in a charge the same may best be defended, and yet not trouble the araie of the armie. The same is to be placed where there is least danger. The Greekes returning from the battell betwixt Cyrusb and Artaxer∣xes, being coasted and pursued by the enemie, placed their cariages

neere the riuer along which they marched, and their armed men toward the enemie. Caesar marchinga against the Neruians, after three partes of foure of his whole forces placed his baggage, be∣ing garded with the other fourth part following behind. At other times when there was lesse suspition of the enemie, euery legion marched by it selfe, and the baggage thereof after.b Germanicus after certaine chosen troupes, placed the first regiment or legi∣on, and after that hee caused the baggage to follow garded on ei∣ther side, and behind with the rest of the armie. If our bag∣gage and impediments be great, so much as may be spared is to be left in some strong towne. Or if the enemie bee behind, Thec baggage togither with our hurt men is to bee sent before into some place of safetie, as Caesar practised in his retraite from Dyr∣rhachium.

This is the common course, which is I thinke also best, for an armie to vse in marching. But if the enemie make countenance, or rather doe begin to charge any part of the same: then that part which is neerest him, is to be made the head or vantgard, the other two parts of the armie are to be drawen, the one on the right hand, the other on the left. If the enemie come on front, then the rankes of the auantgard are to bee doubled, or multiplied according to the capacitie of the ground. The battell and rierward are to be drawen vp, the one toward the left hand, the other toward the right, or els one part is to bee drawen vp vntill the same bee equall of front with the auantgard, and the other beyng deuided into battaillions, to serue for supplie where neede is. The shot is to bee placed part in front, and the rest on the sides, and without them ought horsemen to take their standing expecting their aduauntage, and the commaunde∣ment of their leaders. But if our horsemen bee few, and not able to match the enemies cauallerie; let them not bee to farre aduaunced, vnlesse they bee seconded, with shot and halfe pikes armed àle le∣giere: but rather let them bee reserued to chase the enemie beyng foyled by the footemen, and placed betweene either ground of ad∣uauntage, or battaillions of pikes. And this if it be done of those that haue skill, ye shall neither heare noise, nor see confusion, nor time spent about it. The souldiers of Caesar beyng suddenly charged by thed Neruians, as they were newlie come to their lodging, did e∣uerie man presently set himselfe in aray to fight. And Annibal had

so taught his souldiers, that euery one issuing out of his lodging, coulde fall in aray of himselfe, either being ready to fight or to marche. And why might not our souldiers also be so instructed, and exercised, that they might doe the like? but some want care, some skill, and some both.

Some percase will aske, Who gaue me auctoritie to prescribe? which are very simple not to see, that I prescribe nothing of mine owne, but onely declare the auncient practise of warre, and procee∣ding of most famous warriers. The Romanes vsed this course, and so did the Greekes and Carthaginians. First marched the light horse, then the light armed, after them the armed men. The baggage was placed in the midst of the armie. This order did Caesar oserue in his marche against thea Heluetians,b Belgians, and inc Spaine a∣gainst Afranius, and Petreius. The same didd Annibal practise in his marching all along Italy. The same course for the most part is obser∣ued of those that haue skill in our times, but that the differences of groundes, and diuers conditions of mens armies make them alter some circumstances. Metelluse marching against Iugurtha, placed first certaine choise companies of slingers and archers, and after them troupes of armed men, without impediments or baggage: there him∣selfe commaunded. C. Marius folowed with the horsemen, vpon both sides he placed horsemen, and light armed of his associats mingled among them, guided by certaine captaines of horse, the legions mar∣ched in the midst. Xenophon, for that a square battaile in straites is easily disordered, did deuide the square intof companies (which knowing their places in the square, marched few in a ranke in straits: and in open ground, came into their aray againe.) His horse and slin∣gers he cast out on the front, and sides. Corbulo sog marched in his voyage against the Parthians, as was both for the marche, and fight most safe and fit: in the right side marched the thirde Regiment, the sixth on the left, and the tenth in the midst, the carriages were placed betweene the Regiments, a thousande horse followed for garde of the Rierwarde, vpon the winges were the rest of the horse placed, and by them the archers and light armed footemen, When the blackeh Prince marched into Spaine, his armie was deuided into three partes, vpon the winges marched the horse, the archerie being then wel armed made the body of the battaillions.

The weakenesse of the armies of our time proceede of contempt of military arayes, and orders. The French among their footemen, haue fewe or none armed. Before the encountre at Rocheabeille Anno 1569,a the Protestants marched thus: the horsemen made the Auantgarde, on either side marched certaine troupes of shot, seconded by horsemen: after the vantgarde followed a battaillion of lansquenets, and in front of them were drawne eight field pie∣ces: after them followed diuers Regiments of shot representing the battell, and on the side thereof another battaillion of lansquenets with some other pieces. That which was the strength of the army, that is pikes, and halberds, and targets armed was wanting, and shot placed, where if they had bene charged, they could haue done no seruice. Oft times the Vantgarde marcheth, and lodgeth so farre from the rest of the partes of the army, that it is no hard matter for a vigilant man of warre to cut one in pieces, before the other can come to succour. Thisb was the death of the Prince of Condè, and ouer∣throw of his auantgarde at the battell of Cognac. And the same was the ouerthrow ofc Crassus by the Parthians, for his sonne was so farre auanced before the rest of the army, that before he could be relieued, he and his troupes were defeated. And in our times some great commaunders, albeit they had but fiue or sixe thou∣sand; yet would they needes make three partes forsooth, which is the cause of the weakenesse of the whole: the Captaines, lieuetenants, and sergiants, which are a good part of the strength of the army, stand for the most part out of ranke, and will all take vpon them to be leaders: because of contrary commaundements no man can tell where to goe: while commaunders striue together, there is great contention and noyse made. And finally a great matter made of no∣thing: and nothing made of all their seruice, and matters very easie made difficult. For if the army be a body, then euery souldier ought to be taught, that he may knowe howe to stand in his place, as euery member is placed in the body. But we haue saide ynough of the aray, now therefore let vs talke of the proceeding of an army.

CHAP. VI. Part. 2. Wherein is declared by what meanes an Army may march safely in the enemies countrey, and ouercome all difficulties, whereby either in champion, or wooddie grounds, or els in the passage of riuers, or hils and straites, the same may be disordered, or hindered.

BEside the common aray of the army in marching, which we are as nere as we can to endeuour to vn∣derstand, and keepe: if we meane to marche assured, we are also to learne the estate of the enemie, the site of the countrey, where we do marche, and how the ordinary aray is to be changed, according to the diuersitie of the grounds, to the ende that wee may both in champion, and in wooddy grounds, and also ouer riuers, and hils passe safely.

Chabrias the Athenian captaine,a said he deserued not the name of a General, that vnderstood not the estate of the enemies. And ofb Annibal Liuy giueth report, that he vnderstood what was done in the enemies campe, as well as themselues. The enemies purposes and estate we vnderstand partly by the examination of prisoners ta∣ken: partly by the report of such as flie from the enemie vnto vs: but most assuredly by our owne espials, and discouerers, which either goe disguised among the enemies, or els in warrelike sort approche his lodging, or army to see what countenance he hath. The situation of the countrey is vnderstoode, partly by cardes truely representing the hils, straits, and riuers, and partly by report of the countrey people examined seuerally, but most exactly, by men of iudgement frō some hie place viewing it.c Xenophon enquired, and learned of such pri∣soners as he had taken, both the estate of the enemies, and the diuers wayes wherby he might returne into Greece: by the same also he vn∣derstood the situation of the countreys, and maners of the people, by which he was to passe with his company. Ring Edward thed thirde being in paine to passe the riuer of Some in France, by the instru∣ction giuen him by one of his prisoners vnderstood of a foord. The Romanes by the examination of diuers prisoners taken in Afrike, vn∣derstood all the proceedings of the enemies. Yet must not we giue too great credite to such: for subtil persons do often dissemble, and de∣sperat villeines wil not sticke to lead vs into trappes. Diuers of them therefore are to be examined seuerally & streitly, and not to be beleeued

vnlesse they consent, and speake probably.a Curio lightly examining a prisoner concerning the force of the enemie, was greatly abused, and pursuing the enemie vpon his report, was himselfe, and his com∣panie ouerthrowne.

Many things are likewise vnderstood by relation of those that flie vnto vs from the enemie. By such kinde of men theb Romanes disco∣uered the preparatiues of the king of Macedonia against them. Anni∣bal partly by such, andc partly by his owne diligence, searching out matters continually by his espials, vnderstood whatsoeuer the Ro∣manes did. King Edward the 3. by Robert of Artois, that vpon some displeasure was driuen out of the Court of France, vnderstood diuers secrets of that state, as also by Godefry d'Harecourt, & the erle Mom∣fort that fled to him out of Britaine. Yet may we not giue light cre∣dence to all their words. Percase they vnderstand not matters well, or els deale doubly.d Syllanus therefore in Spaine beside the report of those that fled from the enemie, sent his espials to see what the ene∣mie did. And Annibal vsed to keepe them diligently that reported any thing, that if the reports were found vntrue, they might be punished. Thee Romane Consul hauing receiued newes, that some of his company would be defeated without present succour, and not re∣teining the messenger, fell into an ambush layde for him.

The most assured way of intelligence is by espials secretly sent, or discouerers approching the enemie. Annibalf returning out of Italy to defend his owne countrey against Scipio, sent diuers espials into his campe.g Scipio in the warres of Caesar in Afrike, sent two Getu∣lians to espie Caesars campe disguised as fugitiues. But because such persons cannot long stay there without being discouered: therefore sometimes vnder colour of parley, and sometime vnder colour of buy∣ing, or selling, or other busines, souldiers disguised like marchants espie out the enemies proceeding. Scipio while the treatie of peace continued betwixt him andh Syphax, sent diuers captaines in slaues apparel, which wandering about the enemies campe discouered the accesses, and issues of it, which being reported to Scipio, gaue him the meanes to charge Syphax in the night, being quiet and safe (as he conceiued) in his lodging.i Scipio, this mans father, before the bat∣tel with Annibal at Trebia, drew foorth his horsemen and light ar∣med, to view Annibals campe: Annibal for the same purpose came a∣gainst him with other horsmen. But because this maner of discouery

cannot be made without force, therefore dida Caesar pursuing the Heluetians, send all his horsemen in number 4000, to see what wayes the enemies marched. Theb Admirall of France hauing re∣ceiued some losse in the plaines of S. Clere, anno 1569 for want of good espiall, sent certeine horsemen to the number of sixteene, which going nere and taking some prisoners, might vnderstand the enemies resolution. but because they were so few, they were beaten backe be∣fore they could see any thing, and returned without effect. Yet we thinke we doe much when we send foorth sixe or seuen horsemen badly mounted. for some do rashly proceed without them: but both courses are contrary to the practise of warre.

The view of the countrey well described in cards both teach a wise Generall many thinges. for there he may see the tract of riuers, the distances of places, the rising of hilles, and many such opportunities. Thec Romanes in ancient time vsed, when they consulted of any action, to view the situation of the countrey layed before them. The Counte of Purlitia, in his aduertisements to Ferdinand the Emperour, and Don Sancho de Londonno stand vpon the same as a necessary point. for by view of regions described, many thinges ap∣peare, that otherwise cannot be conceiued. But much better may the countrey be discouered, if men of iudgement go before with the horse∣men to view the same, and to follow the traces of the enemies. those that obserue this course both go, & returne safely. Marcellusd sear∣ching out the lurking holes of the enemy, and placing strong gards in places conuenient, returned safely from forraging the countrey.

They that march forward blindely without either view of the countrey, or knowledge of the enemies proceedinges, are subiect to many mishaps. The Romane armie at the straits of Caudium com∣passed in by the enemy on euery side, complaineth, that likee brute beastes, going on without guide or espiall, they were carried head∣long, as it were, into a pit.f Appius spoiling the countrey of the Bo∣ians, without either discouery, or standes of men well placed, was drawen into an ambush, and slaine together with his army. This one point neglected, cost many of the Romanes their liues, in the warres with Annibal. Marcus Marcellus going himselfe with a small company to view the countrey, was himselfe drawne into am∣bush, and slaine.g Ʋocula charging the enemy without knowledge of his forces, was assoone slaine, as he went fast out of his lodging

to fight with him. The Counte of Aremberge, by the brauery of the Spaniard forced to passe the riuer, before he knew the strength of the enemy which seemed not great, was defeated with his com∣pany by the Counte Lodwike. The Admirals vantgard was bro∣ken in the plaines of S. Clere, an. 1569,b for that the same did blunt∣ly charge the enemy, of whose forces and number the same was ignorant. The carelesse march of Mouuans and Pierregourde, that were charged before they vnderstood of the enemies approch, was cause of their ouerthrow: and hath also both vnto the enemy and to vs wrought many calamities in the Low countries, which those that escaped narrowly may remember, and can report. Dangerous therefore it is to march by night, especially in countries vnknowen, and where the enemies proceedinges are vnknowen. Asdrubalc in the night lost his guide, & his way, and wearied himselfe: and being the next day forced to fight, was ouercome by the Romanes at the ri∣uer of Metaurus. Puygalliard in these late troubles of France, mar∣ching all night, most of his troupes lost their way: the rest the day following were defeated at S. Gemme, by a very few Protestants. Those that escape by policy out of straits as Annibal did at Cales, and Asdrubal in Spaine, he driuing away the corps de gard by feare of fire, the other escaping during parley of yeelding; and likewise they that haue had good successe charging the enemy at all aduen∣tures, haue bene more happy then wise.

Those therefore that march against their enemies are to discouer the countrey and affaires of the enemy diligently, and to shun night marches. but if necessity force them thereunto, yet wisedome admo∣nisheth them to vnderstand the enemies doings perfectly, to procure sure guides, and to keepe them fast: to march close together, now and then to make alta, that those that lagge, may come vp, by sure marks to know frends frō enemies, and to giue certeine & perfect directions. Which course whiled Martius did holde in Spaine, & Scipio in Afrike, he ouercame the Carthaginians, and dislodged them twise,e Scipio foiled Syphax and burnt his campe, and slew his people in the night.

The countrey, and proceeding of the enemy discouered, let vs next consider the differences of groundes. The plaine champion country is to be chosen of those that desire to fight, and are stronger then the enemy. Those that are vnwilling to fight, let them shunne such ground, so much as they can. therein there is no feare of ambushes,

nor impediment to breake the aray of the army, which in this ground is no lesse to be obserued in marching, then in fighting. The cham∣pion countrey being without hedges, or ditches, is aduantageous for horsemen, whose force in that ground, without a hedge of resolute pikes, of no number of other armes can well be susteined. Two thousanda targetters, ouertaken by Caesars horsemen vpon a plaine, were all cut in pieces; neither could Afranius their Generall succor them.b Curio Caesars lieutenant in Afrike, leauing the aduantages of the hilles, and descending downe into the plaines, being com∣passed about with Iubaes caualery, was slaine together with his ar∣my. Caesar hauing great aduantage against Afranius and Petreius in his horsemen, did force them for their safegard to forsake the plaines. For how can can an armyc march in the plaines, so long as the ene∣my with his horsemen, and light armed, chargeth the same now on the sides, and then on the backe? Caesar marching in Afrike where he was inferior to the enemy in horse, was much by their char∣ges encombred and hindred in his march. The Romanesd percei∣uing Annibals strength in horse, yeelded to him the plaines, and kept themselues vpon the higher grounds.

If therefore we desire to keepe the plaines, we must prouide a com∣petent force of horsemen to match the enemies: if we be weake in horse, let vs keepe our places of aduantages. but if necessity force vs to march through plaine and open countries, then must wee make head against the horsemen with our pikes, and mosquets, disposing our army so, that not onely the footmen, but the horsemen also may haue succour of. the battaillions of pikes, and shotte. Caesar by this meanes repulsed the enemies horse in the plaines of Afrike, and charging them with some few horse seconded with halfe pikes, put them to the gallop. If our horsemen be not too much inferiour to the enemy: then if wee mingle some shotte and halfe pikes lightly ar∣med with doublets plated, or other light armour among them, and second them with some battaillions of pikes, wee need not greatly feare to encounter the enemies horsemen. By thise mix∣ture and aray the Romanes ouerthrew the Capuan horsemen in the siege of Capua, which before that they durst not vpon euen hand encounter. Afranius had no other meanes to breake the charge of Caesarsf horsemen pursuing him in Spaine, but by opposing against them in the rierward certeine companies of halfe pikes

lightly armed, and ready, not being laden with baggage. By this onely deuice Caesar with 2000 horse all weried and faint, put 7000 ofa Pompeyes horsemen to flight. for no horsemen will endure the point of the halberd or halfe pike. The Princeb of Condey in the encounter at S. Denis, in these late troubles of France, assigning to euery company of horse a company of shot, which should dis∣charge when the enemy came to charge the Princes horse; by this deuice preuailed against the enemy, which otherwise he was not a∣ble to encounter.

Wooddy countries, and thicke bushes are not to be passed either with our horse, or pikes before we haue cleared them with our shot, and targetters, and short weapons. for as in those groundes, horse for that they cannot there fetch their carreire, and pikes by reason of their length are vnseruiceable: so they are exposed to the shot of the e∣nemy, which in such places commonly lie hidden. Thec Romanes ta∣king the Germanes with their long pikes in a certein wooddy coū∣trey, taught them that such groundes were not for them. Caesar pursuing his enemies intod the wooddes, would not follow them, before the wayes were made, and the woods cut downe.

Hilles and straits are yet more difficult to passe then woods: for in woods short weapons and shot may do seruice. in hilles and straits possessed by the enemy, neither horsemen, nor pikes, nor any sort of weapons can do seruice, but with great disaduantage. In surmoun∣ting whereof, these cautions are to be vsed: first that we do not enter a strait, before we haue assured our selues of an issue either before, or behinde, or at least on the sides. Thee Romanes not vsing this cauti∣on, entring the strait at Caudium, were so compassed in by the ene∣my on euery side, that they could neither goe forward, nor backe∣ward, but must there compound for their liues. Cornelius thef con∣sul had likewise bene entrapped and compassed about in a valley by the Samnites, if that Decius a valiant man with certeine troupes had not taken the hill aboue their heades, and driuen them from thence, by his owne danger, opening a passage to the rest of the army. If we be not assured to force the enemy before vs, yet let vs assure our selues of the highest groundes, both behinde and vpon the sides of the army, and keepe them vntill the passage before be ope∣ned. Which course Annibal taught vs by his example, passing the Alpes, and the Pyrenean mountaines. Beingg brought into a strait

by the mistaking of his guide, he forced the passage in the night, and deliuered his armie safe out. Cyrus perceiuing the danger of his armie in passing the straites and hils of Cilicia taken and kept by the enemie, remooued him thence by sending certaine troupes farre about another way to charge him on the backe.

In passing of mountaines garded by the enemie, we are further to take heed that our companies doe not march vp to the hill direct∣ly, before that our shot and light armed, haue either taken the higher ground (if any be) or els some euen ground either vpon the sides, or the backes of the enemie. Annibala perceiuing that the inhabitants of the Alpes had seased the passages: in the night time marching vp with the lustiest yong men hee had, tooke the ground aboue their heads, and so draue them from the places, which otherwise by rolling downe of stones might haue hurt his men, and stopped their passage. When Philip the king of Macedonia had lodged his armie by the banke of the riuer Aous, and at the foote of certaine mightie mountains; the Romane Generall by the direction of a shepeheard, vnderstanding the site of theb ground, sent foure thou∣sand targetters about the hils, and comming vpon his backe draue him from his ground, and had vtterly defeated his armie, had not the roughnesse, and straightnesse of the ground hindered the carri∣ere of his horsmen, and the weight of their armes, the speed of the footemen. The Persians did driue Leonidas from the straites of Thermopylae by comming vpon his backe, and taking the vpper ground. which likewise was done by the Romane Generall Acilius, when Antiochus kept the same straites, to stop the proceeding of the Romane armie. In all their expeditions through the mountaines ofc Thessalie, and Athamanie, the Romanes passed without any losse into Macedonie, for that they alwayes tooke the tops of the hils with their light armed, before they suffered their armie to descend in∣to the valleis. Xenophon returning into his countrey through the hils of the Carduchians, to passe them safely tooke this course.d His companie he deuided equallie into two partes, whereof if the first were stopped, the second auancing it selfe forward another way wanne the hill, and draue the enemies from their ground: if the enemie made head against the second, then did the first compasse the hill while that part held the enemies in breath. The araie of the armie in passing of hils and straites, is diuers from the common

order of marching: for here not the horsemen, but shot and light ar∣med targetters, and short weapons march first, and serue to discouer the enemie: they also gard both the sides and backe of the armie: next them march the horsemen and pikes, with the baggage and great ordonance in the midst.

Diuers are the dangers and difficulties, which an armie is sub∣iect vnto passing of great riuers where there is no bridge, nor easie foord, no lesse to be considered, then other impediments opposed a∣gainst an armie marching: for here the enemie commonly maketh head against vs: here he lieth in waite either to charge vs in front, or on the backe, our forces being diuided, and one part not able to succour the other. If we bee driuen to fight in the riuer, or as so••ne as we come on the other side, our armes and clothes being wet, doe hinder vs and tyre vs. If our armie passe by boates, it is to bee fea∣red least the enemie comming downe the riuer with greater vessels and boates then wee haue, doe diuide our companie likewise, and take away our meanes to passe: bridges are broken with great waters, yea with great barges, and pieces of timber sent downe the riuer, and falling ouerthwart them.a Caesar charging the Bel∣gians as they passed a riuer, cut a number of them in pieces. The Spaniards that forced to passe a riuer in the pursuite ofb An∣nibal, were likewise slayne in the midst of it by his horsemen re∣turning backe vpon them, and finding them in disorder. When thec Heluetians were all passed the riuer of Soane saue a fourth part, Caesar setting vpon them that remained, and looked for no such thing, discomfited and killed the most of them.d Labienus suffe∣ring them of Treuers to passe the riuer betwixt him and them, be∣fore they were halfe passed, set vpon them, and ouerthrew them, before the rest could passe. Thosee Protestants likewise, which for want of meanes could not passe so soone as their fellowes, were defeated at the passage of Dordonne, anno 1569. Hard it is and dangerous to passe a riuer, where there is an armie on the other side readie to debate, and denie the passage. Thef Heluetians at foordes, and by boates, often attempted to passe the riuer of Rone, but what with the height of the bankes, and trenches made, and force of men, they were repulsed. Therefore in passing of great riuers, the Generals had need to proceed discreetly: and to looke both forward and backward, that whether he passe by foords or by bridges

made for the purpose, or by boates, or peeces of timber bound toge∣ther, or skinnes blowne full of winde, or howsoeuer, he loose none of his companie, nor be troubled, as men are, that are taken vnproui∣ded. King Edward the third passed the riuer of Some at a foord, not∣withstanding the resistance made by the French: but if withall he had passed ouer some thousand, or two thousand archers, which by ap∣pointment might haue come vpon the backe of the enemie, the pas∣sage of the riuer had bene more easie, and the defence of the enemie, and escape more difficult: for by that meanes Annibal defeated the Gaules in the passage of Rone. For making she we to passe by force, those companies that he had sent about an other way, came vpon their backes, and cut many of them in peeces. The Admirall of France anno 1569, when he could not force the garde at Port de Pile, by reason of the Gabions, and Barriquadals, vnder which the enemies shot lay couered: sought, and found a passage a litle aboue the place: which the enemie had no sooner espied, but he left his stand without any great intreatie. The Prince of Orenge anno 1568, breaking the force of the streame of the riuer of Mosa, by placing horses ouerthwart, founde meanes to passe his armie ouer, before the enemie knewe where he would passe. There is no riuer, but lightly higher or lower it may be foorded.a Xenophon with his companie, not being able otherwise to passe the riuer of Ty∣gris, yet marching vp towards the head of it, founde a foorde.b Cae∣sar by deepe trenches deriuing part of the riuer of Sycoris in Spaine, made the rest so shallowe, that the souldiers might wade ouer it. Where the enemie doeth fortifie the bankes on the other side, and deny vs passage; there some part of the armie is to be sent about some other way, to come vpon the enemies backes, and to open the passage for the rest.

Annibal, when the Gaules stopped him the passage of Rone, in the night sent Hanno away with part of his armie, which mar∣ching that night fiue and twentie miles vp the riuer, and finding no resistance, vpon boates brought with him, and timber bound together passed his men; which making a signe to Annibal, that they were passed, came vpon the backes of the enemie at such time, as Annibal was ready to passe in front.c Caesar when by force he could not passe the riuer of Allier in France, the enemie still coasting him on the other side: cunningly leauing two legions

behinde a wood, and marching away with the rest of his army, when the enemy followed him, those that remained behinde, ha∣uing boates, and things ready, passed suddenly and made a bridge ouer the riuer, so that the rest of Caesars army returning, passed also at ease. Neither could the enemie remedy it, being drawne so farre from the place.a Labienus by like practise passed the riuer of Seyne, notwithstanding the enemies gard, and opposition. part of his army he led vp against the riuer of Seyne in the night with great noise: which the enemy hearing, followed, thinking that all his army had bene there. In the meane while certeine chosen companies left be∣hinde, passed the riuer in great silence in boates made of purpose, which taking the banke, gaue passage to their fellowes returning. Aemilius Paulus with a skirmish busying the mindes of the Mace∣donians, at the same time sent certeine companies about the hils to passe there the riuer of Enipeus, which comming on the enemies backes, caused them speedily to dissodge, and leaue the passage. Caesar atb another time when he could not passe the riuer of Sycoris at a foord, made certeine boates of twigs and light timber, and couered them with leather. In those boates caried 22 miles off, in one night he passed a regiment, tooke a hill, and fortified it, and there made a bridge for the passing of the rest of the armie. In the warres of Charles the 5, against the Protestants in Germany, thec Spaniards pursuing the Duke of Saxony, passed with their horsemen at a foord, and diuers of the rest swimming ouer the Elbe with their swords in their mouthes, seased the boates that were tied on the other side, and by that meanes passed ouer their fellowes. Thed Lusitanians in time past did seldome goe into the warres without girdles of skinnes, which being blowne full of wind, they easily passed any riuer. The Germanes when no way they could forcee a passage ouer the riuer of Rhein, feined as if they returned into their owne countrey: but ha∣uing marched three daies iourney, they ridde backe so farre in one night, and comming backe vpon a sudden, found the countrey peo∣ples boates tied at the riuer side, in which they passed themselues, and sent backe the boates to passe the rest of the company. Where the enemy maketh no resistance, there it is easie to passe by boate, yet the practise of warre requireth, that either for quicke dispatch a bridge be made, or els y^t trenches be made vpon the riuer side both for defence of those that passe first, and for those that stay last, and also that boates

may passe, and repasse safely vnder the fauour of some pieces placed on the bankes. How a bridge may be madea Caesar hath taught vs by the example of that, which he made ouer Rhein. Take two posts long or short according to the depth of the riuer, and couple them two foote asunder, and so driue them downe with a rammer, leaning somewhat towards two other such posts so ioyned and driuen downe 30 or 40 foote aboue them in the riuer, which fastened together with other timber below, & couered with square beames are the foundation of the bridge. Vpon diuers such couples laying timber and couering the same, with planks, and hurdles, and straw the armie hath meanes to passe. I thinke there is no carpenter, but he knoweth this kinde of worke. and therefore the rest I referre to his occupation, and worke∣manship. The bridge being made, great care is to be taken that the same be not broken; as it happened to the bridge made by the Prote∣stants ouer Garonne Anno 1569, caried away by timber & wooden milles sent downe against it. Which had not happened, if either de∣fences had bene made aboue, or els a broade place left in the bridge for such things to passe. Sometimes bridges are made of boats fastened with cables, and stayed with ancres. Such a bridge was made by the Prince of Parma ouer the riuer of Scald, and also by the Protestants ouer the riuer of Garronne 1569. At the siege of Poytiers the same yere the Protestants made a bridge ouer the water vpon emptie pipes bound fast together with ropes. Mouuans to assure his passage ouer the riuer of Rone, dressed there a litle fort on the banke; where some artillery being placed, beat the fregates that would haue hindered the passage, and defended the fort against such as would haue distur∣bed them in passing, from the land. The same course was also prac∣tised by Montbrune, and diuers others.

But as the Generall is to haue care to passe toward the enemie, so he is to haue care that he may repasse againe. Therefore did Caesar passing ouer Rhine build two forts, at either ende of the bridge one, to assure himselfe a passage. The Romane Emperour Crassus passing the riuer of Euphrates; if hee had had the like care, more of his armie percase might haue returned, then did. It was likewise a great error in the Counte Aremberge, that passing the riuer, he had no regard to assure himselfe of the bridge, which being taken frō him by the ene∣mie, he was slaine with most of his company, and depriued of retrait.

The aray of an army passing of riuers, is much according to the

opposition made by the enemie: if none be made, the common order is sufficient. If the enemie she we himselfe, the great ordonance is to be drawne to the banke on the sides of the army, & other shot likewise if they will reach so farre, to the entent the enemie may be forced to giue place. If the riuer be gueable, let the shot marche on the sides, the tar∣gets in front seconded with pikes: the horsemen may follow in the midst. And when the other side is assured: then are the impediments, and great ordonance to be passed, the rest of the army following after∣ward, the backe being armed, as the front. If the riuer be not to be pas∣sed at a forde, then a part of our army being sent about to winne some more easie passage, when that is ready to come on the enemies backs, certaine boates with some small pieces in the noses of them, and fur∣nished with shot, and targets are first to set forward with equall front, and after them other boates laden with piquiers, are to folow: the or∣donance and impediments must come in the midst, and the rest of the army afterward.

But in passing of plaines, woods, straites, mountaines, or riuers there is no course more effectual, then to vse expedition & celeritie. In all practises of warre the same is most auaileable. For by this meanes the danger is often passed, before the enemie be ready to withstande vs.a Caesar by his expedition had wōderful successe in al his affaires. He passed the hils of Auuergne, before the enemy had any suspition of his cōming. He passed his army in one day ouer the riuer of Soan, which the Heluetians could not do in many. By the same he preuen∣tedb al Pompeyes preparatiues, and draue his enemies out of Italy, before they had any respit giuen them to take breath.c Xenophon taking the tops of the hils before the enemie looked for him, passed great dangers with great ease. Montgomery in his iourney into Bearne vsed that speede, that before the enemies were assembled to re∣sist him, he had passed all the riuers, straites, and mountaines which were in his way. No marueile therefore, if they do nothing, that make such intollerable delayes in all things. Loyterers are taken in trappe, and made often to flye, because they will not runne. The army of A∣franius in Spaine, being nere to the hils, where they might haue esca∣ped Caesars hands, and marched safely; delayed time, and suffred Cae∣sars army to come betwixt them, and their safetie; which was the ruine of that company. Yet if the heauens should be ruinated, some as it should seeme, would not mend their pace.

CHAP. VII.

Part. 1. Wherein is declared what trauerses, and oppositions the defendants are to make, that thereby they may stoppe or hinder the progresse, and march of the enemy.

THis may be vnderstood in part by that, which hath bene said already. For seeing the difficulties that hinder the proceeding of an army, are either wants and weaknesse in it selfe, or oppositions made by the enemy, that taking the aduantages of hilles, or wooddes, or straits, or riuers, is alwayes ready to hurt, or hinder it: who seeth not that the stronger our oppositions are, the slower will the army be able to proceed?

The principall meanes to breake the course of an army ranging vp and downe the countrey, is want of prouision. This was the course that Fabius vsed against Annibal in Italy. To effect this, strait order is to be taken, that thea people saue themselues in places of strength, and that thither also they conuey their corne, prouision and cattell. whatsoeuer cannot be carried away, the same is to be burned, and spoiled all along where the enemy commeth. Which order Fabius caused to be proclamed, and obserued in the warres in Italy with Annibal.b Philip king of Macedonia not being able to defend the townes, & countrey of Thessalia, transported the people into other places, the townes & villages he burnt, the corne he laid vp safe, the cattell he caused to be driuen into places of strength.c Vercingetorix the captain of the Gaules seeing himselfe no way a∣ble to match Caesars army in open field, yet by spoiling the country, & burning whatsoeuer might be cōmodious for the enemy, draue him to great extremities. and percase had done more, if that the neces∣sity of poore people, & hope to defend townes of no strength had not spared much, that should haue bene spoiled. The Greeks y^t returned frō the voyage of Cyrus into Persia, were by nothing hurt more, then by the wilfulnesse of the people through whose countries they passed, which burning their prouision, which they coulde not saue, made them go far about, & suffer great want. The duke of Alua had not bene so easily rid of the army which the prince of Orenge brought into y^e Low countries, if he had not without compassion spoiled the country, & for∣ced him to returne for feare of hunger. The duke of Aumale likewise

did spoile the country where the Almaines that came to ayd the Pro∣testauts anno 1569 passed. If pitie of the poore, and fauor of friends will permit vs to execute this without respect, there is nothing more au••••lable against a strong enemy, for whatsoeuer prouision the eue∣my bringeth with him; yet if he finde no supply in the countrey, he cannot long cōtinue there.a Fabius by following this course brought Annibal with his victorious army into those straits; that had it not bene for shame and danger, that would haue followed him by fly∣ing, he would haue returned backe into France.

Lest the enemy range too farre abroad, he is to be restreined with strong garrisons placed in cownes defensible, and with a power of horsemen, these will intercept straglers, and garrisons sallying vp∣on outriders will keepe them in order. It is not the point of a wise Generall to leaue the enemy vpon his backe.b Lucterius the French capteine would willingly haue spoiled the countrey of the Romans in France, but he stayed himselfe, fearing to enter among the garri∣son townes; which hee could not doe without apparant danger. Caesarc besieged Vellaunodunum that lay in his way, for feare the garrison of the enemy left there, might doe him some annoyance. The army of the Protestants, anno 1569, retiring out of Poitou into Gascoigne, & thence into Dauphinè, receiued many algarades of the enemies garrisons in the countrey where they passed. but no∣thing doth keepe the enemy straiter, nor more hinder his march, then a power of horsemen galling him continually on the sides, and wat∣ching all opportunities. By themd Vercingetorix kept Caesars forragers very short. Cassiuellanus with hise essedarians that fought in charets, kept the Romanes from going farre on forraging the countrey. andf Fabius with his horsemen meeting at euery turne with such as Annibal had sent out to fetch in corne, and other proui∣sion, made them returne many times short home. So long as horse∣men do hang vpon the sides and taile of an army, they make but a slow march. Caesar sending his horsemen before to charge the ene∣mies last troups, did so trouble them, that he ouertooke y^eg Heluetians andh Belgians in France, & Afranius his army in Spaine, although they had gotten farre before him. himselfe and his army were so molested by the horsemen ofi Scipio in Afrike, that in foure houres he could not march much aboue an hundred paces, being driuen to stay and receiue euery charge, and stirre. as also befell the Romans

an other timea encountring the enemie in his marche. The French horsemen that coasted the Almaines, that anno 1569. came in aide of the Protestants of France, kept them from stragling: but if they had bin more, and durst haue charged them; they had staied them lon∣ger in their iourney. For if the first marche, while those that are be∣hinde fight, then are these left to the butcherie, as it happened to theb Belgians pursued by Caesar.

Further, such straites and hilles, as the enemie is to passe, if he meane to enter further into the Countrey are to be garded, and the wayes to be trenched, that both our men may haue a couer, and the enemie more difficultie in forcing the passage. Leonidas to stoppe the Persian army, kept the straites of Thermopylae: which was also practised by Antiochus against the Romanes. Philipc purposing to stop the Romane army at the straite of Aous trenched the passage, and on the higher ground placed archers, and slingers, and the rest of his army in conuenient places. But it succeeded not, for that he suffered the enemie, not onely to take the higher ground, but also to come on his backe. Which also was the ruine of Leonidas, and An∣tiochus. Those therefore that keepe hilles, and passages, are to take heede of three dangers: the first, that they suffer not the enemie to take the higher ground: the second, that they doe not so lye open, that the enemie may come on their backes: and thirdly, that their company be not vnable to abide the enemies force, or to defende the grounde committed to their charge. For in this case those that seeke to stoppe other, are often taken in trappe themselues: especially if they lye not strong, nor looke well to their garde.

If the enemie enter into a strayte, which hath but two or three is∣sues, take those issues, and garde them strongly, and thou hast the enemie enclosed, as it were in a nette. So were the Romanes enclo∣sed at Caudium, and compassed in before and behinde, & on the sides. But take heede, that thy garde be strong, and watchfull, least y^e same be forced, and all thy labour frustrated, as happened to Fabius ha∣uing enclosed Annibal at Cales, by the weakenesse of the corps de garde placed on the hill Calicula.

If the king of Macedonia had placed strong garisons in y^e straites of Athamany, and Thessaly, and shewed himselfe in head of the Ro∣manes, they couldd neuer haue issued thence without great slaugh∣ter, and losse. There is no greater tryall of a captaine, then in the

taking of the aduantage of grounds. And therefore let him proceede wisely; and cause his men to worke diligently, that his trenches be sufficient and well furnished with stones and shotte, and all things necessarie. And especially that he be not enclosed, nor beaten from the higher ground.

Woods are a good couer for any enterprise: and therefore wise cap∣taines therein doe place such companies of souldiers, as may eyther charge the enemie passing through, or by them. Yet let them take heede that they haue a place of retrait there, that going about to hurt others, they be not cutte in pieces themselues.

The surest defence against the enemies proceeding, is a riuer not to be forded ouer: but the bridges are to be broken, and the botes to be taken from the other side, and y^e bankes where they are most lowe and easy to be raysed with earth, and fensed with stakes, and the same to be garded with a competent force both of horsemen, and footemen with their sconces in cōuenient places. By this meanesa Caesar kept the Heluetians at a baye, and stopped them from passing the riuer of Rone, notwithstanding their diuers attemptes both by night, & day: & theb Romanes stopped the outcourses of Annibal. Which course if the French king had taken, the Protestants had not so easely reti∣red from the battell of S. Dennis,c anno 1567, nor had they passed so many Riuers, nor taken so many Townes so easely. But neither were the Townes garded with souldiers, nor the bridges broken, nor the bankes garded. In garding of Fordes, great care is to be taken, first that the enemie passe not ouer some other way, and so come on our backes, secondly that he force not our garde. This is preuented by good fortification, and that by diligent watch, and sufficient num∣ber of men. He that looketh not to these things, is fitter to keepe go∣slings, then the passages of Riuers.

By these meanes an army is slopped, or at least hurt, and hindred. But for that men are hardely induced to fire their owne goods, and fewe men can endure y^e lamentable flames of his countrey: and with∣out a sufficient force of men, all other meanes to stoppe an enemie are nothing; let there first be a sufficient armie leuied, and opposed against the enemie, not that I would haue the same to hazard lightly, or come to the triall: but for that he that hath an army ready, may take all ad∣uantages of Hilles, Straites, Woods, and Riuers, and cut off such as wander abroade, and execute that which priuate men will not

doe in spoyling where the enemie is to passe, as the practice of Armes requireth.a L. Licinius though inferiour in force to Asdrubal in Spaine, yet taking the aduantage of hilles and straytes, and nowe charging the enemie on the sides, then on the backes, practised on him all the precepts of warre: for which he deserued great commen∣dation. The proceeding of Monsieur the French kings brother and lieutenant, that disbanded his souldiers, and sent them into garrison, when he should haue resisted the Almaines that came to succour the Protestants anno 1569. and kept the fielde, doeth contrariwise de∣serue reproofe, as contrary to the practice of warre, and profite of his Prince. For if that Poytiers had not arrested the Protestants, and susteined the siege contrary to expectation, there had ensued great losse to his partie. In the meane while what reason had he to suffer the enemie to spoyle the countrey at his pleasure?

CHAP. VII. Part. 2. Wherein he speaketh of forraging, and stopping the enemies forragers.

HOwe the whole armie may marche assured, and what the same is to feare in marching; I haue al∣ready spoken sufficient. The same rules may also serue for direction to those that are sent foorth to spoyle the Countrey, and to fetche in corne and forrage. For whatsoeuer the Generall is eyther to obserue, or to feare in his whole armie: the same is he that leadeth a part thereof out to forrage, to obserue, and to feare. He must see, that his companie keepe good arraye, that they straggle not from the grosse of his troupes. He is further to haue good intelligence, and espiall vpon the enemies proceeding. In passing of Plaines, Woods, Hilles, Straytes, and Riuers, he is to vse more diligence, for that his strength is the lesse. Likewise he is to consider, that as he goeth safely forward; so he may also haue a sure retraite, if necessitie force him, to returne backward.

Further he is to make appointment where to meete with the rest of the army, that the same be not diuided, when the enemie is ready to charge.b Caesar charging the Germanes, while their horsemen, and some troupes of footemen were gone abroade vpon spoyle,

found them farre more easie to bee dealt withal.a Domitius sent by Caesar vpon forrage, if he had not mette with the rest of the army vp∣on an instant could not so wel haue escaped out of a manifest danger, the whole enemies power being at hand ready to charge him.

That he may doe that wherefore he goeth, he is to carry with him sithes, sicles, hookes, axes, and all necessary instruments, and to bring that he findeth safe away: he is also to haue with him store of horses and carriages. For what auaileth it to finde corne and prouision, vn∣lesse the same be carried away to our vses? And little deserue they to haue things necessarie, that will not fetche them. Theb Capuans be∣ing in distresse for want of victuals, and being willed by Annibal, to send carriages to fetche sufficient, did send so fewe, that it was nothing to relieue their neede. Afterward they wished like oppor∣tunitie to be offered againe, but in vaine. For within short time after, they were forced by famine to yeelde vp their Citie.

That his men be not disturbed in their worke by the sudden as∣saults of the enemie, let him place gardes in places conuenient for befence of those that goe abroade and worke. In this respect the pro∣ceeding ofc Marcellus that wise leader deserueth well to be follo∣wed: For in no place did he goe before he had diligently discoue∣red the same, and assured his retraite, and those that wrought by standes of men fitly placed. Appiusd ruinated himselfe and his ar∣mie, for that without search of the countrey, and order vsed in such cases, he suffered his men to wander vp and downe more mindfull of spoile, then of their owne safety. Thee forragers of the Romanes marching without suspicion, or order, or sufficient defence, were ea∣sely ouerthrowen by Perseus king of Macedonia. This hath beene the ruine of many armies, not onely of small companies, and wil be, if better order be not taken. It is a common course of the enemie with hope of spoile, to bring the army into distresse. Therefore let no man be so greedy of spoile, but that he see before into the danger; and albeit there appeare no danger, yet let him keepe most of his troupes in armes, that he be not ouerwhelmed with sudden danger.

The prouision that is to be founde, is diligently to be saued, and laide vp in those Townes that we doe holde; as in part before hath bin declared. By this meanes Annibal mainteyned his army by o∣thers labours. And much more we might haue done then we did, if in our iourney into Portugal, we could haue saued that we found in

Galicia. The cattell may he driuen along with the armie, and ought to be distributed frugally, as our neede requireth.

But as he is to spoile his enemie, so he is diligently to take heede, that he couche not his friendes, and associates; which wrought An∣nibal much woe. But what lawe against necessitie?

Seeing then that those that marche in the enemies countrey, if they proceede wisely, may not onely hurt their enemies, but also main∣teine themselues at the countries charge: it behoueth the Generall to be watchfull, to keepe order, and neuer to say, had I wist. For he that is entrapped, hardly breaketh the snares. To auoide danger, no∣thing is better then celeritie, and expedition: of which I will nowe speake more particularly.

CHAP. VIII. Wherein is prooued, that nothing in warres is more aduantageous, then expedition; or any thing more hurtfull, then delayes.

I Haue shewed this in part already. But the detesta∣tion that I haue of the delayes of our times, and da∣liance commonly vsed in martiall affaires by those that want skill, together with the exceeding losses and dangers, that Princes haue incurred, and shall further incurre thereby, it there be no redresse, hath so affected me, that although I haue spoken much, and often thereof, yet I suppose I can neuer say ynough. To number all the commo∣dities of expedition, or the hurtes of delayes in matters of warre, it is not possible, though I shoulde speake of them continually: those which come to my minde presently, I thought good to lay downe in this place.

Through expedition, the enemie is taken vnprouided: those pla∣ces that are opportune for vs, are seased: where the enemie is most o∣pen, there haue we commoditie to charge him: the malice of the ene∣mie is preuented, our speede giueth vs all leysure to prouide: our confederates and friendes, that stand in feare of inuasion are assured: matters are spedde with little charge, and good successe. Caesara hearing of the conspiracie of the Belgians, by suddein cōming vpon them, disordered all their counsels, and remedied the mis∣chiefe, before it was ripe. Another great conspiracie of allb France he dissolued, by his speede in taking the heads single, before their forces were ioyned. Neither the deapth of Winter, nor height of the

mountaines, nor colde of y^e weather did stop him. Vnlesse he had vsed incredible celerity, he coulde not so easely haue driuen Pompey & his faction out of Italy, hauing the power of the Romane Empire in his hands. But he tooke him all vnprouided, & came vpon him before he looked for him: and would not suffer him in any place to gather head. Annibala with great iourneys, and speedy marching cōming vpon Flaccus, vpon the sudden ouerthrewe him at Herdonea. Claudius Nero inb 6. daies marched frō Canusium to Sena with 6000. foote∣men, which distance our armies marche not in 16. By which expedi∣tion he holpe his companion Liuius to ouerthrowe Asdrubal, & tooke from Annibal all hope of succour.c Syllanus by no other meanes vanquished his enemies in Spaine, then by inuading them vnpro∣uided, which opportunitie his quicke speede did yeelde him. If the Romanes had succoured Saguntum in time, they had kept Annibal occupied in Spaine & auoided the waste of Italy. The smart whereof made them more quicke in the warres against Philip of Macedonia, against Antiochus & Perseus. For they no sooner heard of their pre∣paratiues, but they caused an army to be transported into their coun∣tries, to meete with them in the beginning. Warres, asd Alphonsus king of Naples was wont to say, haue good successe where we pre∣uent the enemie. In a smalle time there happeneth great alte∣ration of things, and therefore it is not safe to loose any moment of time. Oftentimes alsof victories are made more easy, by seasing of opportune places, & ioyning of confederates vnto vs to helpe our cause. The Romanes for their expedition in martiall affaires, deserue eternal honor aboue al others. A certaine Ptolomeus in Aegypt was surnamed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or lightning, for his quicke dispatch. Another was surnamed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or eagle, for his swiftnes. But they were but words of vaine flattery. This praise it was deserued in the Romanes. Scripio in one yere subduedal Afrike to y^e walles of Carthage: Paulus Aemi∣lius in a fewe moneths subuerted the Empire of the Macedonians.g Quintius leuied an army, ouercame his enemies in opē field, took 9. walled towns, & all this in one 20. dayes. In the second warres of Carthage the Senators of Rome were continually in y^e Senate to heare the desires & reports of their Generals, & to graunt dispatches. When Scipio heard y^e cowardly determination of Metellus, and his cōpanions to forsake their countrey after their ouerthrow at Cannae, he drew hish sword, & entring among them, forced them to sweare,

that they would not forsake their countrey. Which quick resolution saued his countrey. And true it is, y^ta Claudius Nero said, that expe∣dition doth make our counsels prooue safe & sure, when as delaies make thē proue rash and dangerous. Theb Romanes hauing diuers enemies, making haste fought with them one after another singly, and so ouercame them: and I would to God the longer we differre to fight with the Spaniard, we doe not finde him the stronger. Ac mis∣chiefe in the beginning is easily remedied; in time it getteth strēgth. That which comonly is obiected, that speedyd repentance foloweth rash counsell, maketh nothing against our purpose. For great diffe∣rence there is betwixt speede, and temeritie. Temeritie is in counsell rashly followed, speede is in quicke execution after mature counsell. My meaning therfore is not, that any should proceede without ma∣ture counsael: but that after resolution there should followe speedy executiō. Cōtrariwise both cōsultation without resolutiō, andf re∣solutiō without speedy execution are pernitious in martiall causes. Counselsg drawē in length by delay, waxe nought in the end. And being vented are no better then (as I said before) wine y^t hath taken vent.h Sometimes the necessities of warre so vrge vs, that they will not suffer vs to attend mens counsels. When the enemie is cōming vpon vs, & thei warres are at our doores, nothing is more pernicious thē delay. The Romanes delaying to meete with Annibal in Spaine, were afterwards forced to fight for their owne home, & countrey. The delay ofk Annibal that after his victory at Cannae brought not pre∣sently his army before Rome, was the ruine of his cause, & first be∣ginning of his decay. Likewise the delaies & slow proceeding of the Carthaginian Senate in sending money & supplies tol Annibal af∣ter his victory at Cannae, gaue heart & leisure to the Romanes to re∣paire their strength.m Delaies & dissembling after y^t once we vnder∣stand y^e enemies practices, doth helpe thē, & minister fauour to their proceedings, as Tacitus declareth by y^e example of Flaccus.n Attalus and the Rhodians hauing some vantage against Philip of Macedo∣nia folowed it not: which delay gaue him leysure to repaire his forces, & made them to be accōpted the nourishers of those warres, which if they had vrged, they might haue had the title of deliuerers of Greece themselues.o Asdrubal by staying about Placentia, lost whatsoeuer commoditie hee had before wonne by his speedy

marche. I will not say what harme our stay both here in England, and at Coronna, did vnto vs in the voyage of Portugal.

The Lauinians proceeding flowly in sending succours to their as∣sociates, were scarce out of their citie gates, when they heard newes that the Romanes had ouerthrowen them. For which small iourney one of y^e company told them, that thea Romanes would make them pay deare. Delayes of times vsed by Cecinna, Tacitusb calleth be∣craying of opportunitie.cFabius Valens going against Vespasians army, with hurtfull delayes spent times of seruice in vnprofitable consultations. The Athenians not stopping the proceedings of Phi∣lip of Macedonia at the first, suffered him to grow so strong, that all Greece could not in the end withstand his force. I pray God that de∣layes of Christian Princes to resist Philip of Spaine, doe not worke like effect in our times. Delaies are not good in any time of seruice. The times ofd warre doe not attend vpon the captaines, or counsels pleasures. Occasione presenteth it selfe vnto them vpon a sudden, but if thou embracest it not, it passeth without returning, though oft thou wish for it againe. All which notwithstanding, in our times de∣liberations in matters of warre are flowe, the arrestes vncertaine, the executions vaine. They are like the globe of Saturne that finisheth his course but once in 30. yeeres. That which others in time past called loosing of time, some call winning of time: and y^t which proceedeth ei∣ther frō feare, or couetousnes, that they begin nothing: that will they haue to proceede frō wisdome, and maturity. Fabius complained that the yeere passed, while thef Romanes were in their preparatiues a∣gainst Annibal, what would he say now if he liued to see some men neither prepare, nor beginne any thing? To excuse themselues they beare men in hand, that they stay to see how matters will fall out, and when the king of Spaine will die. Vnto whom I say for answere as one of y^e Atheniās said sometime, that they that looke for theg euēts of warre, are cōmonly a spoile to the conqueror. This course is that which as Pontius the Samnite said, neither winneth friendship, nor doth hurt to the enemie. Those y^t are slowe to helpe others, must looke for slowe friendship at others hands in their neede. But say they still, stay. It is not good to be too rash.h Fabius by his staied proceeding, restored the Romane Empire to the auncient estate, that was sha∣ken by others hastie, & heady rashnesse. Then which example there is nothing can worse fit them. Fabius in his time was a wise, and reso∣lute

cōmander, ripe in counsell, speedy in execution. Annibal could turne nowhere, but he was by him, al his deuises he speedily preuēted. Onely for this he was accompted flow, that hee woulde not rashly venture the Romane Empire vpon one battell. Yet when his col∣legue Minutius was in danger, hee was ready to succour him. He differred not to prouide an army, nor to furnish it, he would not suf∣fer the enemy to do what he list. What these men are, and what they do; I list not to report: neither is it necessary being so wel knowen. I pray God, that as in other things: so in this also, they be not vnlike Fabius. For he restored that which was shaken; these are rather like to shake that which is sound by their cold delayes.

CHAP. IX. Of orders to be obserued for the good gouernement, and assurance of the campe or lodgings of the army.

AS in diuers other pointes, so in the lodging of our army wee are farre declined from the true practice of armes. The name of Campe remay∣neth, but the thing is quite decayed, and gone. Seldome doth the army lie in the field, vnlesse it be in the sieges of townes. Wherein notwith∣standing we bestow so many as we can in houses, and villages. In marching for the most part, the companies are distributed in diuers villages, and that three or foure miles asunder; if not more. The lodgings are seldome fenced, vnlesse it be with a barriquade, or bar∣rier, or small trench ouerthwart the wayes. The watch is not so strong, nor so diligent as it shoulde bee: the confusion and noise is great: the prouision of things necessary very small, and seldome other then the souldiers can finde. The which disorders make the army to lie open to camisadoes, and many enterprises, if the enemy be strong and iudicious. For auoiding whereof the practise of warre requireth, that the army do rest in no place but vnited, nor without sufficient defence, and garde. Before that the practice of armes was brought to perfection, the army lodged, as nowe it doeth, without trenches or defenses. Pyrrhus seeing the default therein, beganne first to fortifie his campe by entrenchment. Which the Romanes receiuing from him did in short time excell their master. Onely bar∣barous

people commonly lay as before, open and without defence: which gaue the Romanes such aduantage against them. And I doubt not, but if the right order of encamping were recalled by anie man of iudgement, that he should haue like aduantage against these of our times. Many are the commondities that an army receiueth by their lodging well fortified. They fight not, but when they list, and see their aduantage: they sleepe soundly without feare, and rest safely without danger, sucha defenses are a receite to the conquerour, a refuge to the vanquished, and a porte and harbour to returne vn∣to in a storme. Many armies (saith Paulus Aemilius, he that vanqui∣shed Perseus) being foyled in open field, haue retired into their campe, and saued themselues, and afterward fallying out vpon their enemies, haue preuailed, and vanquished them. Therefore would hee no: fight with the enemy before he had entrenched his campe. Caesar albeit the was charged vpon the way by the Helueti∣ans returning backe vpon him; yet had no lesse care to fortifie his campe, then to sustaine the enemies charge. And therefore hauing set his army in order,b he commanded the baggage to be brought into one place, and the same to be entrenched by those that stoode last, and on the highest ground while the vantgarde, and the rest fought with the enemy. And such was Caesars care therein, that where the enemy was neere, he would not suffer his chiefec com∣manders, and counsell to depart from legions or regiments before the worke, & fortification of the camp was finished. Neither could the countenance of Afranius his army in Spaine, making shew as if the same would sight, deterre him, but that hed fortified his lodging, keeping the rest in armes to receiue the enemies charge. The bar∣barous Gaules by their many losses perceiuing the aduantages that the Romans had vpon them in this point, at length by the counsel of Vercingetorix their leader, began toe fortifie their camp, as they saw the Romandes do. He that doth not so lie entrenched, goeth often∣times out of his may to seeke ease for his souldiers, lodgeth with his army disioyned, looseth time and labour: and lastly may not, if hee be wise, lodge neere an enemy as strong as himselfe, that hath the vantage of ground and trenches. He that chargeth an army that ly∣eth wel entrenched, receiueth seldome honour of his rashnesse. The Frenchmen because they vnderstoode not so much before, were taught it of Prospero Colonna at the Bicocke in Lombardy. For ad∣uenturing

rashly to fight witha Prospero and his company, that lay strongly fortified within certaine bankes made for the keeping of the riuer within the channell, they were tumbled into the ditch as fast as they came vp the bankes, and many of them slaine. That such fortification may be made orderly, and strongly, diuers rules are to be obserued, and some prouision like wise is to be made more then ordinarie. First a conuenient place in the way where the ar∣my marcheth is to be marked and staked out by the Quarter-master generall, which woulde bee a man of iudgement: with him also may bee sent other men of iudgement. All these with a garde ought to goeb before, that at the comming of the army to the place euery man may knowe the gates, and the sides, and the pla∣ces of the campe. Within that presently they may begin to worke, & euerie man may know where to pitch his tent, or make his caban, & to discharge the impediments and baggage, and where the ordonance is to be placed. This may seeme intricat at the first, but with practice it may be made most easie.

Further to the end, that our men be not disturbed when they are at their worke; good espialles, and discouerers would be sent before, to see that the enemy lie not in ambush neere that place, where wee meane to lodge. Which happening to Caesar in the expeditiō against the Belgians, did more endanger him, then the enemies, open force. For his menc hauing laide downe their burthens, and being scar∣••e••ed to fetch stakes, earth and stones, ••odainly the enemy appea∣reth out from vnder a hil there by and chargeth him. The same was the ruined of Fabius his ••ieutenant. For going to take a hil alreadie possessed by the enemy without espial; he was there slaine in the place with al his comany. For defence of those that worke, one good part of the army woulde be kept in armes; especially where the enemy is neere. And those that worke are to haue euery man his sword and dagger girded to him, and his other armes fast by him. Which not only Caesar, a master in these matters, but al the Romanes generally obserued. There is no time, more p••oper for the enemies assault, nor more da••gerous for vs, then when wee are newly, come to our lodg∣ing. For then most are secure, and put off their armes, and either rest themselues or runne about to seeke things necessarie.

Thee Romanes as they were pitching their tentes were char∣ged by the Carthaginians in their warres in Spaine: and had beene

soyled, had not Scipio fearing such a matter, run through thē with his horsemen, which very opportunely hee had couered vnder a hill in the way as they came to the charge. At that time also Cae∣sar was set vpon by the Neruians, and lost diuers braue men. The Venetians were no sooner arriued in theira lodgings at Trent, and disarmed, but the enemy obseruing his time commeth vpon them, and forced them to seeke an other lodging. Yet not all: for ma∣ny were lefte behinde to take vp their lodging in that place for euer.

The place most commodious for lodging, is where our companie may not onely haue wood, water, good ayre, and for horses forrage, and if it may be some reliefe of victualles for our men: but also ad∣uantage of the ground fit to be wrought, and hardly to be taken from vs by the enemy. Wood may not be wanting for fire, stakes, and ••abans; and lesse, water for our men and cattell. A riuer also doeth oftentimes ease our men of trauell. Especially if it be deepe: For that the campe is well fensed on that quarter. Good ayre is necessa∣rie for the health our souldiers, especially when me lie long in a place. The aduantage of ground, is requisite for the defending of our lodging. Which opportunities, those that haue wanted haue beene driuen to great extremities.b Afranius his army was driuen to yeeld to Caesar in Spaine for want of water. And by like neces∣sitie Caesar forced the reliques of Pompeys army which heec besie∣ged on a hill, and excluded by trenches from the water, to flie to his mercie. Himselfe ind Alexandria had beene driuen to great extre∣mity for want of fresh water, had hee not by digging of pits found store.

In hie and drie countries water is hard to be found, vnlesse it be in valle is and deepe botcomes that shewe signes of moisture. Lau∣trecke in the fiege of Naples lodging his army in the lowe grounds brought great contagion among his people: and of New hauen and other places want of water, and the filthy keeping of our lodgings, which cannot be kept too cleane, bred the pestilence among our men, and wrought the victory to out enemies. The disaduantage of the ground at Landresie not considered by the French, had sike to haue taught them a lamentable lesson. For being lodged in the lower ground, they were continually amoyed by the artillery of the imperiall••s placed vpon a hill, that comnt••••ed the French campe,

and almost forced them to fight with great disaduantage. The Italians and Spaniardes were by the French forced to fight a∣gainst their willes ata Rauenna, in Lewis the twelft his time, for that being lodged in the lower, and open ground they were beaten with the enemies great ordonance, that continual∣ly stroke among their horsemen. Which inconuenience coulde not be remedied so, but that is was the occasion of their ouer∣throw.

But howsoeuer the place be chosen aduantageous, yet there is al∣wayes some part that lieth open, which is to bee assured with tren∣ches and palissadaes. The lesse aduantage that the nature of the ground yeeldeth: the more labour our souldiers are to take in wor∣king, and trenching the same. And that with a trench and banke sufficient, if not such as the Romanes vsed, yet such as may couer the defendants, and hinder the ascent of the assailants without lad∣ders. Caesar in theb warres against the Belgians enuironed his campe neere Soissons, with a banke twelue foote high, and a ditch eighteene foote broade. If the danger were great the Ro∣manes vsed to make their bankes higher, and trenches deeper. It would be incredible, if I should report, all those bankes, trenches, and workes which Caesar made about Alexia in France, and at Dyr∣rhachium in the warres against Pompey, and other places, and howe hee cast trenches of great depth tenne or eleuen miles compasse. Which was also the vse of all the Romanes: Whose workes yet remaining in England in diuers places, because it seemeth incre∣dible they should be doone by men, are called diuelles ditches, and supposed by them to be cast.

That this fortification may be made with more ease, and greater speed: euery man is to worke eyther with mattock, or spade. I know our men will at first refuse it, and discharge themselues vpon pi∣onniers: but why should they disdaine to doe that which the Ro∣manes did, and why shoulde anie refuse to worke to saue his life, and the liues of their company: Let them consider howe such idle fellowes, that woulde not fortifie their lodgings haue beene vsed.

cFuluis the Romane Proconsul neither for place, nor defence, nor garde lay strongly enough with his army, which was no soo∣ner brought to Annibal, but marching thither with his army, he

tooke him at vnawres, and ouerthre we him, and all his compa∣nie. La Loüe and his companie lying secure, and carelesse with∣out trench, or barriquade, had their throates cut by the garrison of Montpellier in the night being asleepe in their lodging, Anno one thousand fiue hundred sixtie and nine. Neither did the compa∣nie that vnder Napoleon Vrsinia came to the succor of Florence be∣sieged by the Prince of Orenge in the daies of Charles the fift escape better cheape; to teach others percase to make better barriquades, and trenches, and to keepe better watch. If the Protestantes durst haue charged Charles the fift before his campe was fortified at Englestat, they hadb no doubt foyled him. Neither is it suffici∣ent to trench the wayes, if wee lie open on the sides. Euerie waie must haue some defence. Strossic stiffely defending a certaine val∣ley by Rocheabeille Anno one thousand fiue hundred sixtie and nine, fensed onely in front with a weake palissade was inuested on the sides, and forced by the Protestantes. In which disastre himselfe was taken, and most of his troupes distrouped, and slaine. If his defence had beene strong in all places, hee had saued himselfe, and foyled his enemy.

Q. Cicerod one of Caesars lieutenants, by the fortifications of his campe, abode diuers assaults of the whole power of France, and held out vntill such time as Caesar succoured him. And well befell it Prospero Colonna that his lodging was strong at the Bicocke. For otherwise he and his companie had beene drawen out thence not by the eares, but by the legges. There is none so small a fortification, but it may doe vs fauour in such a case. The Spa∣niardes making a trench betweene themselues and the French ate Cirignola, and bordering the same with their shot, made them to this day remember what daunger it is to passe a trench resolutely defended.

In these late braules of France captaine Granryf lodging in Esse a village vpon the riuer of Vienne, gaue the enemy a rude wel∣come comming to see him in his lodging in the night. His safe∣tie was in a double barrier, and trench made by him at the endes of the streetes. Yet let euery man take heede howe hee presume vp∣on euery small defence, and rather let him cause his men to take more paines.

It is no base labour that is vndertaken for the defence of our

liues: and little doth he deserue his life, that will not digge a few turfes to saue it.

Ludouike of Nassau the brother to the Prince of Orenge presu∣med too much vpon a little bad ditch betwixt him, and the Duke of Aluaes army. If it had beene but sixe foote deeper hee had repulsed the enemy with great slaughter.a For idlenesse and want of skill, he and his company were ouerthrowen and driuen to take Embden for their succour. And yet not warned herewith when hee brought a supplie out of Germanie to aide his brother,b lying in a village without sufficient defence hee was charged by the enemie, and there slaine, and with him Christopher the Prince Palatins sonne, a Prince vnworthy that disastrous death, and with them most of the company,

That the campe may with more ease be trenched and fortified, the worke is equally to be diuided amongst the company. That equitie the Romanes taught vs, andc Caesar practiced, diuiding the ground among his regiments to be wrought. And shame it is among vs, seeing as the vse of warres teacheth vs the great profite of labour in banking and trenching, that wee put it ouer to a sort of men called Pionniers, vnknowen among the Romanes, whose workes were alwayesd done by souldiers. This is the cause of the great charge of Princes, and slow proceeding and slender effects of warres. Ther∣fore they that will not worke and take paines; rather then die shame∣fully: let them die. But let not the idlenesse of such preiudice the state or the safety of braue men. But let such defend themselues, as well with bankes, as with weapons, and not follow the slouthful pride of athers.

The forme of the campe is much according to the site and lying of the ground. Among the Romanes it was made for the most part foure square. But it skilleth not though it bee three or fiue square. So the bankes woulde bee made tennee or twelue foote hie, the ditch sixeteene or eighteene foote broade. The deeper the ditch, and higher the banke is, the more assured is the defence. At euerie corner especially towardes the enemy there woulde bee made a li∣tle bulwarke or platforme somewhat auanced from the cortine of the campe for the placing of the great ordonance, for defence of the ditch and cortaine, and clearing of the grounde wythout the campe. In the sides there woulde bee lefte two great

passages, or issues for the army to enter and issue; and two lesser on the outsides for the necessarie vses of the campe.

The compasse is according to the number of the armie, allow∣ing tenne foote square for euery horseman, and foure foote square for euery footeman or thereabouts. There are to be left foure broade streetes in the place, for the passing and repassing of souldiers; and for the commoditie of victuallers, and Marchantes a market place.

The Generall ought to pitch his tent in the middest of the camp, about him are his Gentlemen and garde to bee placed, if there bee not place sufficient for them in his tents. The horsemen are to be quartered in the middest of the camp, for that they are most vnreadie if any sodaine assault should happen; but in some conuenient square for the beauty of the campe. The shot and archerie are to haue their tentes next to the ring of the campe round about the same: within them are the halbardiers, targettiers, and other short wea∣pons to haue their quarter assigned: and betwixt them and the horse∣men the pikes. So that euery man may know both where to lodge directly, and what place to goe vnto, if the enemy doe charge vs. The waste places remayning are to bee assigned to the carriages, and the boyes, and seruants that followe the campe. For flaughter of beasts and necessities of nature there are two places to bee assig∣ned, eyther in some out place of the campe, or without the campe. The whole distance and compasse is rather with the iudgement of the eye, then with Geometricall instruments to bee cast out. Yet must the quarter-master take heede, both that his compasse be not too great (for that is hardly defended) and that it be not too litle. For in that case the army shall be straited.

That souldiers may bee commodioussy lodged in the field with∣out going out of the way to finde townes or villages, it is necessarie, that euery company haue theira tentes assigned to them of pub∣like charge, and carried with them in cartes. For to lodge with∣out couer in colde, raine, or heate is verie intollerable, and wood to make cabbanes sufficient in fewe places can bee found: and if it could, yet were it a matter long, for one nightes lodging to make a cabbane of boughes. Contrariwise tentes are easilie pitched, and not heauie to bee carried, nor verie chargeable to bee bought.

That the souldiers may finish their work with more speed, it were necessary likewise, that euery company had their spades, mattocks, axes, and other tooles caried along with their tentes, and baggage, that euery man presently vpon view of his lodging staked out, might know where to worke.

For ease of the souldiers a iudicious Quartermaster will chuse some place neere a wood or a riuer, or some hill, that with the natu∣rall situation of the place a small fortification may serue.

If the Quartermaster do chuse some Villages to lodge in, yet f•••• greedines of couer for his men, let him take heed how he do diuide separate the army farre a sunder. And further let euery part forti•••• the quarter where they are lodged. The cause of the ouerthrow of the Prince of Conde at Cognac, in which encounter hee lost also his life, was the distance of the lodging of the auantgarde and battell: which was so great, that the one part being charged by the enemy the other could not come to succour it, before it was too late.a Dandelot dispersing his companies in Villages, was surprised on the sudden by Martigues and put to flight: himselfe hardly escaped, most of his company were defeated: which, if his troupes had bene together could not haue happened. For his forces were foure times greater then those that ouercame them. La Louè might haue bene succoured when the enemy charged him, but that heb lodged so far from helpe, y^t before the same could come, he & his men were dispatched. The cause of y^e ouerthrow of y^e Baron Donaw, & his Almains was for that they lay dispersed, & without defence.c Xenophon, although necessity forced him in his return from the battel against Artaxerxes to lodge his company in diuers Villages: yet whensoeuer the enemy made shew to approch, hee drew them all together into one place. If so be that necessitie driue vs likewise to lodge our armie in Villages: let vs know first how vpon neede we may bring them together; and next how euery part may susteine the enemies assault, vntil helpe come to it. This I say is wrought, first by trauersing the waies, then by tren∣ching places of easy accesse. The wayes are to be trauersed by deepe ditches & banks for defence of our shot, next by palissadaes, & barres placed ouerthwart: the sides are to be viewed, and either with tren∣ches, or walles to be fortified. Those wayes that leade vs into the Village on the backside are to be dammed vp, & where there is grea∣test shew y^t the enimy wil assault vs, there gretest store of shot are to be

placed in the chambers looking that way. The carts & baggage con∣ueniently placed, may breake the force of the enemies horse, & make the accesse for footemen also more difficult. The Heluetiansa had no other defences of their lodging: neither do the Germans at this day vse any other defence or encamping, vnlesse the place naturally a∣forde it. But nothing is more weake nor vaine, where the enemy com∣meth resolutely to the charge. Scipio, his father that ouercame Anni∣bal, being foyled by the Carthaginians in Spaine through the treche∣rie of the Celtiberians that forsooke him, thought to shroude him selfe and hisb company vnder the carts, & packs, and such things as he could bring together to make a defence on. But it serued for no∣thing, but to linger the enemies victory a litle. For in such defences there is no strength. If therefore we wil neither fortifie our campe, as did the Romans; nor barre the Villages where we lodge strongly, as is the vse of wise Captaines in these dayes: I will neither warrant our troupes, nor by my wil keepe among them lying so open. Thec French king & Duke of Burgundy lying in the suburbes of Liege without trenche or barriquade, escaped very narowly in a certaine sally of the townesmen by them besieged. Besides the fortification of the campe, or lodging; it is requisite for the assurance of our com∣pany, that we place not only sentinels and scoutes within, but also good gardes at all the gates. For there is no defence nor fortification such, but it may be passed, where there is none to defend it, and garde it. Before our souldiers disarme and euery man goe to his lodging, both gardes and sentinels would be placed, and not as some vse af∣terward. those that offend in either of these pointes doe for the most part receiue sharp penance. Thed Ardeatians led by Camillus, & fin∣ding the campe of the Gaules, that a litle before had sacked Rome, without either watch, or sufficient defence, slew them downe right, without any resistance. Philip king of Macedonia lying before A∣pollonia, without either watch or good garde, was forced to raise hise fiege, and had diuers of his men slaine by a very few sallying out of the towne in the night. The negligent watch and garde of Syphax gaue opportunitie tof Scipio in the night to enter his campe and fire the same, and to make a great slaughter of his men. The like security in Nabis his campe gaue entrance to Philopoemen captaine of, the Achaeans, who fired the tentes, and slew his men, before they could make head, or wel vnderstood their danger. Theg Romanes that lay

in campe in Istria without feare, & therefore neither kept good watch, nor garde, were suddenly surprised by certaine Gaules, and driuen to runne for their liues. The army of the Capuans resting in their lodg∣ings quietly, were slaine by thea Romanes that inuaded them in the night, and tooke them without trenche, sentinel, or corps de garde. The like aduantage Curio vsing against theb Numidians that lay dispersed without defence or watch, fell vpon them in the night, and slew them. Neither is it now lesse dangerous then in time past. Don Pedro el cruel king of Spaine was slaine with his company by his base brotherc Henriques taking him in the night vnprouided, and lying without watch, or defence. The same negligence was the ru∣ine of the Protestants at Donzerre An. 1569. and of the Spaniards at Corbueil An. 1590. and hath occasioned and brought to passe many surprises, which otherwise could neuer haue taken effect. Thed Mar∣ques of Mantoua, and other gentlemen for want of good sentinels were taken by the Venetian stradiots at Scala, where they went to refresh them selues. It is an easy marter to shewe this also by our owne harmes, but that I would we should rather reforme our disor∣ders by calamities of others, then shame to heare our selues reproo∣ued, and therefore defend them. Thee meanes to assure our selues, and to deterre our enemies from these enterprises, are these: first good banks, trenches, barriquades, palissadaes, and such like defences: se∣condly strong gardes wel placed, thirdly good sentinels in conueni∣ent distances within the ring of the campe, & good scoutes on horse∣backe & foote without, fourthly good orders of the campe, y^t no stran∣ger nor person vnknowen lurke in any lodging, or other place to dis∣couer our secrets: nor that our company lodge disioyned farre asun∣der: the prouision that is to be made, is of tentes, and all instruments that serue vs for such fortification. Where the Captaine is carefull to see these things done, and the souldiers willing to labour and take paynes, & to doe them: it is not possible to hurt the army especially ••••ere the same is strong and in good estate. But if the enemy be very ••••ong, and our company weake for number, or otherwise, and no helpe can come vnto vs: then if the enemy doe assault vs in our lodgings so violently, that wee are not able long to defende them, our last remedy is to drawe our men together towarde the issues of our lodging, and so to sally out, and to charge the enemy vpon the backe, & in all places where he maketh resistance. The suddennes of

this execution if it be done resolutely, cannot but worke great effects.

Ser.a Sulpitius being not able to defend his campe any longer a∣gainst the multitude of the mountaine people, that assaulted it: sal∣lied forth vpon a sudden at all the gates thereof, and surprising his enemies on a sudden made a great carnage of them, & put the rest to flight. The same course did Caesar put in practice at the siege of Alexia. where not being able to defend his trenches and workes a∣gainst the multitude of the enemies, that in all partes assaulted him, at lengthb gathering his men together, fallied foorth vpon them, not giuing them so much as any time to take breath, much lesse to gather their forces together, and slew infinite multitudes of them being euery where dispersed, and seeking rather to enter in, then to defend them selues without. But this is not but in time of necessi∣tie to be executed, and when we haue no other meanes of defence. otherwise it is good safe fighting behinde a banke, or other defence.

Wherefore as at all times, so especially in the nightes, and care∣lesse times of others, it behoueth the Generall to beec carefull for his people. With care, watchfulnesse, and labour great enterprises may be atchieued, if want hurt vs not; and without care and labour, neither great nor litle can be done with commendation, nor can any army either marche safely, or rest safely.

CHAP. X. Wherein is shewed, that as the assaylants being entred into the enemies countrey, are to seeke that the matter may be tryed by battell in open fielde: so the defendants without great aduantage, are to auoyde the Generall tryall: and by what meanes eche of them, may effect their seuerall purposes.

HE that entreth the enemies countrey without pur∣pose to fight, and hazard, let him henceforth keepe his headd warme at home, and interteine Ladies. Such aduentures are for resolute and hardy men, as courage doeth pricke such valiant men forward: so their owne profit requireth, and necessitie for∣ceth them, so soone as they can, to come to triall. The sooner, the bet∣ter it wil be for them, at the first their men are strong, their muniti∣ons, and armes whole and good: of victualles and all things ne∣cessary they haue sufficient, if they haue not; the greater is their error. Further their men are couragious, and full of stomacke: and contra∣riwise

the enemy is neither prouided sufficiently of souldiers, nor fur∣niture of warre, especially if he looke not for it: neither is he so reso∣lute to fight. And what courage can he haue, seeing his countrey fla∣ming round about him? that this ought to be the purpose of such as inuade others, not only the example of Annibal, who by all meanes prouoked the Romanes to come to fight with him, but also of the Ro∣manes inuading the Macedonians, of Caesar warring in France, and folowing of Pompey into Epeirus, and of our Kings transporting their forces into France, and generally of all that euer knewe the trade of warre doeth teach vs.

To force the enemy to accept that, which willingly hee would shun, the meanes are these: first to pursue him, with all conuenient speed. If thy horsmen doe once ouertake any part of his army, either he must stay to succor his men, or els must he leaue them to thy mercy: if hee haue so manya stayes, thou canst not chuse, but ouertake him. To depart farre away from thee, is to yeelde the countrey into thy hands: then which it were better to hazard many mens liues. Caesar byb this meanes drew the Heluetians backe to fight with him, which they would gladly haue passed. and by thec same he so galled the Bel∣gians, that they were constreined to fight with disaduantage.d Afra∣nius would gladly haue recouered the hie countreys with his army, but Caesar did so trouble his marche with his horse men, that vnlesse he meant to flye; he could not runne from him without fighting. He that flyeth long before thee without fighting, he abandoneth a great countrey without fighting, to be spoyled of thee.

Secondly, if the enemy hath any courage: by ranging, and spoyling, and firing whatsoeuer thou canst not saue for thine owne vse, thou shalt either drawe him foorth into the fielde, or breake his heart. By that meanes thee Romanes forced the Volscians and o∣thers, to come downe from the hilles into euen ground, and to de∣fend their countrey from rauage and spoyle. And although another time the force, and prouision of the Romane army made the enemies to shut them selues vp within their walles, as most safe for them: yet when they sawe the spoyles andf flames of their countrey; they coulde not continue their former deliberation, but were forced to come forth and fight. When Villagesg are fired, and the corne, and the countrey spoyled, he must be either very cowardly, or very hard hearted, that is not drawen foorth to fight. Flaminius the Ro∣mane

Consull could not endure to see the fires which Annibal kind∣led in Hetruria, but would needes succour the countrey, and fight with the enemy, whatsoeuer it cost him. Who can endure to see the enemy to rage, & spoyle without restraint: or who can restreine him without fight: The Frenchmen although alwayes vnwilling to deale with the English nation vpon euen hand, yet haue bene diuers times forced thereto by vs, what with indignitie to see their coun∣trey spoyled, and what with feare of further losse, and what with necessitie to defend their country. Albeit Fabius could in his time endure to see the rauage, and spoyle of his countrey: yet all haue not that singular patience.

If neither by celeritie thou canst ouertake the enemy, nor by spoyles of the countrey moue him to defend the same: yet will hee neuer endure, vntill thou hast taken some of his principall cities. Shame and necessitie wil in the end force him to come to their suc∣cour. When thea Veians being beaten before, refused to encounter the Romanes in the fielde any more: yet when they perceiued that the Romanes made toward their citie, they came foorth chusing rather to trye it in playne fielde, then to be pend vp, and fight for their houses, and walles.b Metellus forced Iugurtha to come into the fielde by besieging Zama a citie which he specially fauoured, albeit hee knew him selfe inferior in strength to the Romanes. By like meanes Caesar in Afrike forcedc Scipio to bring his forces into euen ground, least loosing a citie of importance that fauoured him, and a Captaine of name, hee should dishonor himselfe. Philip de Va∣loys to raise the siege of Calais brought with him the power of France. King Edward the third might haue fought with him if hee had would, but hee would not fight with him, but vpon aduantage. The Protestants Anno 1567. by straiting the citie of Paris of victu∣als forced the king to send a power against them to fight with them. Vnwise were they, that not vnderstanding this, had sent away a great part of their forces, which might in that battell which was fought at Saint Denys, had greatly ayded them to obteine the victo∣rie. If the siege of Poytiers An. 1569. had continued any longer, then it did: the King should haue bene forced to fight with the Prote∣stants that besieged it. But there was no neede that a Kings power should beat them, whom want, & so many disorders had beaten before.

But if the Generall of the enemies forces, be enforced to take a

towne for his safegarde: much more behoueth it them to come forth into the fielde, to relieve him if he be besieged. The whole power of France came beforea Alexia to disengage Vercingetorix their Ge∣nerall there besieged by Caesar. Whosoeuer hee is that can be con∣tent to loose a citie, and refuseth to come to fight with his enemy, cannot long endure. The reason that the Prince of Orenge so long helde out against the Spaniard, was the tyranny of the enemy, whom the people could not endure, certaine small supplyes y^t came out of England, and the Princes good will to helpe such townes as were distressed the best he could: and last of all the libertie of the sea, which the enemy could not take from him.

On the other side the defendants taking a contrary course for the safety of them selues and their countrey, ought as much, as they can, to linger and weary the enemy, and not to fight without manifest aduantage. This course the Romanes tooke, and found to be best, not only against Annibal; but also against other Barbarous nations, that came to inuade them. The same did experience teach the Gaules, and Briteins to be best against Caesar. And the generall practice of warre hath nowe confirmed it for a precept to be folowed in such cases. Whenb Sitacles King of Thracia inuaded the Macedoni∣ans, the countrey people not being able to resist fled into strong cities, and holdes: and as occasion, & aduantage was offered, from thence issued to fight with him as they could. Manyc warres that haue bene violent at the first brunt, by delayes and tedious lin∣gering haue come to nothing, sayth Tacitus. And therefore neuer is it good to fight with those that want prouision, and looke for no further supply. When the Gaules with great forces came into Ita∣ly, some would haue had the Romane Generall to fight with them foorthwith: but thed Generall thought it more wisedome to pro∣tract time. His reasons were, for that he dealt with an enemy, which euery day waxed weaker, & by reason he was in another coūtrey, had dayly more and more hinderances comming vpon him: further neither had hee prouision, nor towne of retraite, & therefore must needs be wearied with delayes, and decay of himselfe: and great folly, sayd he, were it to fight with men when they are strōg, when they may deale with them, when they are weake & feeble. When Caesar sent Crassus into Aquitany with part of his army to subdue the countrey; the enemy being taught by experience would not come

into open field, buta began to take places of aduantage, to fortifie his campe, to keepe Crassus from victuals; when the army for want should retire, then he meant to charge the same being laden with baggage, and out of aray in the marche. That which Liuy sayth of theb Boyans, we finde it true in many Northren nations: they are impatient of delayes, and if they be not fought withall, doe scatter of them selues. Those that fight with such enemies, are like to those, that hope to quench fire by throwing on of wood; when as if the fire be not supplyed with wood, it will goe out of it selfe. And there∣fore our ancesters, that haue fought with the Scots haue done vali∣antly, but wisdome would haue perswaded them, to let them dis∣solue of them selues. The Romanes by their haste in fighting with Annibal, receiued three great ouerthrowes, and brought them selues within very litle of their ruine. Pompey when he might haue ruina∣ted Caesars army for want of victuals, aduenturing to fight at the re∣quest of his army ouerthrew himselfe.

The way to weary the enemy without fight is, first with an army consisting most of horsemen, shot, targets, and halberdiers lightly armed, to coast him a farre off: next to spoyle the countrey where hee passeth, and to bring all the cattell, corne, and prouision that may any way serue his turne into strong townes: thirdly to store the townes of warre with prouision, and assure them with strong garri∣sons; fourthly to cut the bridges ouer great riuers, and to sease all narow and straite passages. The army that coasteth the enemy, al∣though it may not ioyne battell with him in euen ground, yet hath many necessary vses; and without it all other impediments are easily passed: the same doth bridle y^e enemies courses, that he dare not diuide his army to send the same on foraging: It keepeth victuals from him, and him from victuals: it defendeth the straits, and passages of riuers: it succoureth such townes as are besieged: it is ready to charge the enemy vpon all aduantages. The Atheniansc not being able to fight with the army of the Lacedemonians that came against them, tooke this course for their defence, they brought their people and all that they had into the citie; placed gardes at passages, and cut of the straglers with their horsemen. Which coursed Vercinge∣torix also vsed against Caesar in France. hee burned the countrey, droue away all the cattell, kept the passages of riuers. Thee He∣duans reuolting from Caesar kept the banks of Loyre with gardes,

and in all places where the Romanes came, charged them with their horsemen. But of this matter I haue spoken sufficient, where I shewed what trauerses made against the enemie are most effectuall. Now I am to shew how the enemie is to be wearied without fight: the meanes I haue set downe. But this caution thou must vse fur∣ther, that thou keepe thy selfe, and thy companie alwayes on the higher ground, and take heede that the enemie doe not entrap thee, nor compasse thee about. Fabius in the warres of the Romanes a∣gainst Annibal in Italie, and Licinius in the warres against Asdru∣bal in Spaine, haue by their example shewed thee what thou art to doe, and how warilie thou art to garde thy selfe, and to watch thy enemie.

These precepts haue vse in all countreys, with whatsoeuer e∣nemie thou dealest: but especiallie where the countrey is full of hils, woodes, straites, and great riuers; and also where by force is neere equall to the enemie. But if thy power be slender, or if thy countrey bee playne and open; then presume not to come neere the enemie: for thou canst not auoyd, but either thou must flie or fight. Thea Gaules pursued by Camillus, seeing themselues vnable to fight with him, had no other meanes to auoyd fight, but to flie farre from him. Neither could Asdrubal haue escaped fromb Scipio, but that he fled with his armie from him into the vtmost coast of Spaine. After thatc Caesar had once passed the riuer of Allier, which was betweene him & the enemie, Vercingetorix was cōstrained to go farre before, least he might be constrained to fight agaynst his will. For where the armies come neere each to other in eauen ground, it is hard for the one to auoyd fight where the other seeketh it. Antonie forced Cas∣sius to fight at Philippi; albeit he auoided it what he could, and had the vantage both of ground and trenches. Thed Admiral at Mon∣contour would willinglie haue passed the day without fight: but being neere the enemie, hee could neither passe the riuer with∣out disordering his armie, nor retire without manifest danger of being vtterly broken, and ruinated.

Philip of Macedonia albeit hee was encamped vpon the banke of the riuer Aous very strongly, and had most high mountaines for his defence vpon his backe: yet being charged suddenly from the vpper ground, he was both driuen to fight against his will, and foy∣led by Tit. Quintius.

Wherefore considering the losse and calamities, that come of suf∣fering the country to be burned and spoyled, the hazard that to wnes besieged by the enemie without hope of succour stand in: the discou∣ragement of our people, that see and enemie in the countrey whom they dare not encounter: I hold it a rule most certaine, that no coun∣trey nor state can well be defended against a strong enemie any long time, vnlesse the same either haue, or can procure an armie to come into the field able to encounter him, and not vnwilling also, if the same may haue any good aduantage to fight with him. And therefore all valiant men that loue their countrey, are rather to endeuour to o∣uercome the enemie by force, then dull him and wearie him by pati∣ence and delaies, which bring with them contempt of those that want an edge and force. That wee may fight with aduantage, and proceed with reason; let vs now examine and see what things are to be foreseene and considered before that the General do bring foorth his armie into the field to fight.

CHAP. XI. Conteining speciall matters to be well considered, before the Generall bring foorth his armie to fight with the enemie in open field.

MAnie things in warre are executed by force and strength of men; but seldome doeth force pre∣uaile much without counsell and direction. Counsell in all deedes of armes chalengeth a principall place, but especially in ioyning bat∣tell with the enemie. To refuse good counsell therefore in this case, is a brutish follie oftentimes seuerely punished. The Constable of France peeuishly refusing the good counsell of Coucy, that dissuaded him at that time to fight with the Turkes, was the cause of the miserable slaughter of Chri∣stians at Nicopolis.

The Frenchmen detest in their histories the pride and insolencie of a certaine Duke of Bourbon, whoa being Generall in a certaine enterprise against the Saracens in Afrike, ouerthrew the action by disdaining to heare any man speake, and refusing all counsell, but his owne; A man wise inough to ruinate any enterprise. Wise cap∣tains

therefore, as they will consider many things themselues: so I trust they will not disdaine to vnderstand the experience and aduise of others. Before a Generall doeth resolue to fight with the ene∣mie with all his force, hee is first diligently to vnderstand both the strength of the enemie, and the numbers and strength of his owne men, least presuming too much of his owne power, or contemning the enemie, he doe that which afterward hee may repent.a Francis the first of France not knowing how much hee was abused by his moster rolles, and supposing his strength to bee greater then it was, accepted of the battell of Pauie, where himselfe was taken and his armie discomfited.b Curio not knowing the great strength of the enemies horsemen, did rashly leaue the aduantage of the ground, and fight with him, that in the plaines was to strong for him, which was his ruine.

Cassius in the battell of Philippi not vnderstanding the victorie of Brutus his companion, desperately slew himselfe, and was the cause of the discouragement of his side, and the victorie of the enemie. If therefore he shall vnderstand that his enemie is too strong for him: let him keepe his aduantage of ground, and auoyd fight: if his owne power be greater, let him not delay it: for it is no lesse dishonour to let slip an opportunitie, then to aduenture rashly.

Yong souldiers are not rashly to be brought into the field against an armie exercised and beaten with long practise of warre. The Ro∣manes found this true by their owne practise in the warres with theirc neighbours, and with Annibal. Where their armie was well trained, they preuailed, their fresh souldiers could not endure the force of Annibals beaten men. Caesars old souldiers were inuinci∣ble.

With the men that Philip of Macedonia had exercised in many warres, Alexander ouerthrew the Persian empire. For it is notd number that preuaileth, but experience and skill. Thee gal∣lants of Charles Duke of Burgundie, bragged that they would doe and venture; but when they sawe their enemie, they forgot their wordes, and ranne away in the encounter with Lewis the ele∣uenth at Mont le herie. Therefore did Caesar wisely, that cary∣ing ouer with him diuers yong souldiers into Afrike,f would not put them to the triall, before he had made them better acquainted with warres.

Souldiers likewise when they are faint, wearie, hungry, or thir∣stie, fight but faintly. And therefore as there is no trust in young soul∣diers, so there is no strength in souldiers that are faint with labour, or want of victuals. Doe not therefore rashly encounter the enemie, when they men are either wearied with long marching or watching, or faint for want of meate or drinke. Thea Romanes before they en∣tred the battell, refreshed their men with victuals and rest, that if the same continued long, yet their strength might continue.b Syl∣lanus being readie to charge the enemie, commaunded his souldiers to dine first. The principall cause of the ouerthrow of the Romanes at Trebia was, that Annibal brought foorth his men to fight, fresh, hauing well dined, warmed themselues, and rested: where as the Romanec Generall brought foorth his armie fasting, and cold, by reason they passed a riuer; and wearie, for that they stoode many howers in armes before the battell began. Aemilius in the warres against Perseus in Macedonia, albeit his souldiers desired to fight with thed enemie so soone as they saw him, yet considering, that by their long march they were wearie, thirstie and faint, would not fight with the enemie that was fresh and lustie; but deferred it to the next day. Yea, although aduantage be offered: yet if oure soul∣diers be faint and wearie, it is more safe to passe it.f Clearchus see∣ing his souldiers faint and hungrie, would not charge the enemie, albeit good occasion was offered. The prince of Conde bringing his men that had watched for the most part all the night, into the field be∣fore Saint Denis, anno 1567. found what faintnesse watching wor∣keth.

Asdrubal being charged at Metaurus, when his owne souldiers were wearie and sleepie by the reason of his nights march, and his e∣nemies fresh and lustie, was ouerthrowen with a mightie slaugh∣ter. Theg Gaules gaping for thirst and heate, and being wearied with trauell and watching, were slaine or taken. Puigalliard in these late troubles of France, causing his troupes to march continu∣ally two dayes and two nights, thinking by his speed to surprise the Protestants at S.h Gemme, was himselfe the cause that his men were cut in pieces by la None, not being able for want of sleepe and rest, to doe any seruice.

But least cause hath he to venture, whose souldiers stand in feare of the enemies forces. Caesar therefore would not begin his iourney

againsta Ariouistus, and the Germanes, before he had resolued his men that stoode in feare of them, to fight. And hauing had euill suc∣cesse in one or two encounters at Dyrrhachium, which much dismat∣ed his souldiers, he remooued from thence, and would not fight vntill such time, as his souldiers were confirmed. He that doubteth any such thing in his men, is first to confirme them with hope, and report of their former valiant actions, and with declaration of the enemies wantes, and weakenes, and disaduantages: he is to encourage them with promises, and hope of rewarde, to feare them with shame, and plainely to declare vnto them, that there in no hope but in vic∣torie, and therefore, that if not for their honour, yet forb sauing of themselues, they ought to fight valiantly. Necessitiec enfor∣ceth men to fight, and the example of their Commanders ready to abide with them in all danger, maketh them ashamed to flie. Much did it encourage Caesars souldiers, when they sawe him in the bat∣tell against the Heluetians, put his horse from him, ready to take the common hazard with them: and a very coward he is, that nei∣ther with persuasion, nor example will be encouraged.

The souldiers for their persons, strength, and courage being such as they should be, the next consideration of a Generall, that purpo∣seth to fight, is, that they haue their armes fitted, and all baggage and impediments, that may hinder them remooued. Alexander be∣fore he fought withd Darius, forgat not so much as to giue order that the haire of his souldiers heades, and beardes should be cut, lest the enemie might take holde by it. Small matters you will say: but in this, not the smallest matters are to be contemned.

But yet nothing is more to be respected, then the ground, where thou purposest to abide the enemie. There is great aduantages in hedges, ditches, and the higher ground. Caesarse souldiers throw∣ing their iauelins from the higher ground, and following the same, did easily breake the rankes of their enemies troupes.f Pharnaces leading his men against the hill where Caesars armie stoode ranged, was presently thrust downe, and vanquished. Cae∣sar wondered at his rashnes. The enemie hauing seased a hill by Rome, the Consulg Seruilius mooued with the indignitie of it, did rashly cause his troupes to march vp the hill against him, which ad∣uantage the enemie taking, had ouerthrowne him, and his armie; had not his Collegue come in the instant, and fauoured his re∣traite,

Mariusa ouerthrewe the Germanes and Danes more easily, taking them mounting vp the higher ground. Certeine of the Ad∣mirall of France his companies foolishly striuing to winne the hill, neere the plaines of S.b Clere, were driuen backe with losse, and had vtterly bene defeated, if the Almanes belowe had not kept their ground, and arrested the formost of the enemies, that pursued them. A smalc aduantage in the vneauennes of the ground, is much (saith Caesar) in the furthering of the victorie. At Auaricum, albeit he had the victorie in his handes, and had foiled the enemie: yet would he not followe them up the hill for feare of the discommoditie of the ground. At Gergouia he lost many braue souldiers, that contrary to his commandement would needes pursue the enemie vp the hill. him selfe was neuer in greater danger to loose the fielde, then at Munda in Spaine: which happened by the forwardnes of his men, that needes wouldd charge the enemie, standing on the higher ground. That care that a Generall hath in the first charge of the ene∣mie, the same he ought also to continue in the pursuite of his victorie, that his men descend not downe into the lower ground, nor be too eger following them vp the hill. Thee Romanes following the e∣nemie without order, and being drawne into a lowe valley, were discomfited and slaine, the enemie turning backe vpon them. The Corinthians not looking before them in their retraite, fell in∣to af hollowe bottome of ground: which the Athenians percei∣uing, and that there was no issue out, compassed them round a∣bout with their light armed, and slingers, and stoned them all to death. The Romanes entring the straite of Caudium, were en∣trapped by the Samnites. Annibalg susteined many losses by the people of the mountaines, that tooke the toppes of the hilles, and rolled downe stones vpon his souldiers, marching along the sides of the hilles. Which difficulties.h Xenophon also prooued in passing the mountaines of the Carduchians. All difficulties which hinder the armie in marching, as woods, hilles, straites, riuers, and such like, are farre more dangerous, if they be obiected against vs in fighting. And therefore let the Generall take heede, that he be not charged in passing of riuers, or straites, or at any like disad∣uantage.

Further, let him diligently view, and search the Countrey, that the enemy haue not bestowed some part of his army in some wood, or be∣yond

some hil behinde, or on the sides of the place, to charge him with aduantage, when the battell is begun. By which meanes Annibal ouerthre we the Romanes at Trebia, and the Thrasimene lake.

Neither is it sufficient for him onely to prouide, that the enemie haue no aduantage, nor his owne souldiers any disaduantage: but he must consider also, if he may take the enemie either in trap or at any disaduantage: and that either in vneauen ground, or in straites, or pas∣sing of riuers, or any place where his army is disordered, either in lodging, or marching, or fighting. If the enemy be beaten out of the fielde by force, it is in part the souldiers praise, if he be entrapped by the Captaines pollicie, that is his hondur.

In the ioyning of the battell, the Generall is likewise to ende∣uour to take the winde, and to haue the Sunne (and Moone, if the fight be in the night) vpon his backe. The winde being fauourable driueth our darts, arrowes, and whatsoeuer we throwe against the enemie with greater force forward; and being contrarie doeth dimi∣nish their force, and stoppeth the souldiers breath, and filleth their eies full of dust. In the battell betwixt Theodosius, and Maximus the tyrant, nothing holpe thea side of Theodosius, more, then the winde that draue backe the darts, arrowes, and stones of Maxi∣mus his souldiers. Theb Romane souldiers in the battell at Cannae, hauing the winde against them, had their eies and throates filled with dust, which fauoured the Carthaginians blowing vpon their backs. The Sunne with great heate frying the bodies of the Gaules, made themc very faint, fighting on a certeine time with the Ro∣manes. Vespasians souldiers hauing thed Moone on their backe, when they fought in the night with Vitellius his army, seemed greater then they were, and did see to strike more directly. The same aduantage had the Sicilians against y^e Athenians, in that nights encounter, wherein they ouerthrewe them neere Syracusae.

The season of the yeere also, and the weather is to be considered, be∣fore we range our army to fight. Northren people endure colde better then heate. And therefore as they are to auoide fighting in the heate of the day, and summer season, so they are to chuse the coole mor∣ning or euening, and of the times of the yeere the Spring, or drie Winter, which Southren people can not brooke. The Ro∣manes protracting time vntill the heate of the day, did then charge thee Gaules, when with heate and thirst, they were of themselues

ready to faint: which occasioned vnto them a great victorie. In rai∣nie weather shot cannot doe almost any seruice: that tyme there∣fore is fittest for armed men, targetters, and such like, to charge them.

Finally, whatsoeuer maketh for the encouragement of our soul∣diers, or discouragement of the enemie, the same ought a wise Gene∣rall to deuise, and practise. The strength of the enemy is in wordes to be diminished, the goodnes of our cause, and strength of our army to be amplified. Whatsoeuera reportes may hurt the enemy, or helpe vs, are to be spread abroad. Reportes oft times preuaile as much as truth, & small matters make men in that case both feare, and hope, as said Claudius Nero. The report of a succour comming did dauntb Vitellius his army, and confirmed the enemy. Which also happe∣ned in a certeine incounter betwixt the Romanes, and Samnites. Wordes also cast out in the time of the battell, as that their Generall is slaine, or that part of the army flieth, and such like, profite much. Therefore if at any time, heere especially the skill, and iudgement of a Capteine is to shewe it selfe in taking aduantages, auoiding disad∣uantages, preuenting of mischiefes, laying ambushes for the enemy, and vsing all maner of stratagems, and deuises of warre.

Nowe hauing spent thus much time in considerations, and prepa∣ratiues of a battell, let vs come to the ranging of our battels, and to the action it selfe, in encountring, and vanquishing the enemy.

CHAP. XII.

Wherein is discoursed what aray, and course is best in charging the enemie.

THe aray of an army placed, and prepared to fight, is diuers, according to the number and qualities both of the enemies, and our owne forces; likewise ac∣cording to our strength in horsemen, or footemen, in shot or armed men; and last of all, according to the difference of groundes, and places. To part a small number into so many partes, as we doe a full armie, were rather to breake it, then orderly to part it; and a matter in shewe ridiculous. If the enemies force be greater on the corners then in the midst, we must haue consideration of that in framing and ranging our army. Horse∣men

in rough ground, in woods, straits, and hilles are vnprofitable. If the enemy be stronger then wee in horse, wee are to change the place of our horsemen, & to auance our footmen. Where the wayes are strait, we cannot spread our army, as in open field. This and o∣ther circumstances being referred to the iudgement of the Generall; let vs now consider what aray is best in open field, our army being full, and hauing all the partes thereto required. This I haue tou∣ched already where I shewed before how an army marching is sud∣denly to be drawen into order; by what rules the same may be exact∣ly performed, remaineth now to be declared.

The whole army considered without horsemen, or shot, consisteth of three partes in the front: I call them thea right corner, the mid∣dle battell, and the left corner: (the Romanes called them Dextrum cornu, mediam aciem, & sinistrum cornu) and of two or three partes from front to the backe. The first I call the front, the second the supply: the third, if there be a third, the last hope. The Romanes diuided their aray, as it was considered in depth, or from front to backe in hastatos, principes, & triarios. The shot I would haue placed both before, and on the sides, and behinde euery of these partes diui∣ded into seuerall troupes, and guided by seuerall leaders. Without the shot, the horsemen would be placed on the winges, vnlesse some speciall cause mooue vs to the contrary.

The three partes of the front may either stand ioyned together, or with some distance separated: and either may they be framed, as one body with rankes continued, or els euery of these partes may con∣sist of diuers battaillions or squares of armed men; very commodi∣ous for the seuerall vse of them, and also for the retrait of shot within the distances. The breadth and depth may be greater, or lesser ac∣cording to our number, and the ground where they stand. As the front is diuided: so likewise is the supply, and last hope in like sort. The supply would be neere so many, as the front. but it is suffici∣ent, if the last hope be halfe so many. The distances of the supply would be greater, then of the battaillions in front, which charging the enemy, are to ioyne close together, and being wearied may re∣tire within the distances of the supply. which two partes ioyned to∣gether, do then make one front. if both be foiled, then are they to be receiued within the distances of the last hope, which are largest, and all the partes to vnite their whole forces together. If any doubt of

the confusion that may arise in the retiring of the first and second bat∣tell backe to the third, then may the supply, and last hope be drawen vp vpon the sides: which will worke the very same effects.

In the midst of euery battaillion or square, somewhat toward the first rankes, would the ensignes be placed with their garders well ar∣med, and furnished with short weapons.

Euery battaillion would haue his seuerall leader, which would be the first man of the right hand in the first ranke of the square. for that the inferior leaders in a maine battell should stand out of ranke, is contrary to practise of warres. If in euery battaillion there were some part targetters contrary to the moderne vse, there might be good vse made of them, when the armies come to ioyne, both against shot and pikes.

aBefore the front of the battell are certeine troupes of shot to take their standing, which may not onely defend the head of our army: but also anoy whosoeuer offereth himselfe to the charge. If they be pres∣sed with horsemen or targetters, their retreit is within the distances of the battaillions, if the ground affoord them no other defence. From thence they are to be drawen eftsoone againe, and employed where theyr leaders shall perceiue they may doe most seruice. A ranke of mosquetiers vnder the first ranke of pikes may doe good seruice, if they be drawen into the distances when the enemy commeth to the charge.

The horsemen, if they be not strong enough to encounter the ene∣mies horse, would be seconded with certeine troupes of shot and halfe pikes. but diligently are they to take heed, that they goe not directly before the front of their owne footmen, lest retiring thence, they fall vpon their owne pikes. The great ordonance, if there be any hill in the place, either on the right hand or left hand of the army, is there best placed, both for seeing of the enemy, and for feare of disordering our men, either going to the charge, or retiring backe. If the ground be euen, it is placed in the head of our army a little before our troupes of shot. which after the same is discharged, auance themselues, while that is drawen within the distances either of the battaillions, or of the midbattell and corners. For defence of the artillery there are good gardes to be appointed, wheresoeuer it standeth.

If this order cannot be obserued: yet this rule is generally to be respected, that euery weapon, and souldier is there to be placed, where

he may most anoy the enemy, and best defend himselfe. The partes are so to be placed, that one may succour another, and one retire to an∣other. Horsemen may not come within the ground of the footmen, nor shot within the rankes of pikes, but both either on the sides, or be∣hinde the battaillions. He is most iudicious, that can bring most men to fight, and stop the way to the enemy, that he can not extend his men to hurt him. There is no company to be sent forth to ioyne with the enemy, but with some to relieue them againe, and againe, and to re∣ceiue them retiring, and stop the enemies pursute. Horsemen may not charge pikes, nor come in ground where they cannot fetch their carriere. Other rules in their speciall places shall be prescribed.

Shot in marching and standing obserue order. The distances be∣fore I haue shewed. In fighting they obserue no order, but euery man marking his enemy right before him, and shooting at him ta∣keth his best aduantage. yet if they obserue not a certeine course where the shot are many, they soone fall in disorder. Archers for that they shoot and fight standing in ranke, obserue better aray. their di∣stance from shoulder to shoulder is one foot, from ranke to ranke foure foot. Some now a dayes doe little esteeme this weapon: yet if our archers were armed with plated iackes as in time past, neither shotte could abide them in euen ground, nor pikes without shotte. Against horsemen, where they may finde defence of hedges, or ditches, or stakes, or rough ground they do very good seruice.

Pikemen against a charge of horsemen ought to stand close with the blunt end of the pike in the ground, the poynt bent vpon the horse brest. Ranke from ranke standeth not more then three foot asunder, that many endes of pikes may garde the first ranke. That the pikes may be commodiously bent and crossed, the first rankes are to bow theyr bodies. that they may the better breake the charge of the ene∣mies horse: before them they are to haue a ranke of mosquetiers, as hath bene said already.

Where the pikemen go to charge other pikes, betweene shoulder and shoulder, there would be a foot distance; betwixt ranke and ranke so much, as charging with the pikes aboue hand, and breaking the same they may vse theyr swordes, and daggers, and either in stri∣king auance forward theyr right legges, or els receiuing the enemies blowes draw backe the same. Sixe foot I thinke for that purpose to be sufficient.

The halberdieres, bilmen, and targetters would haue likewise betwixt shoulder and shoulder one foot, betwixt ranke and ranke fiue foot. In pikes and short weapons this is generally to be obserued, that they stand as close together as may be, so they may haue roome to manage themselues, and their weapons. the lesse roome may serue, considering that I would haue all souldiers to strike with the point of their weapon: and euery man to succour his fellowes before him, and on the sides.

The horsemen go to the shocke with equall front so neere as they can, and runne so close side by side as they may without hurt ech to o∣ther. If horse be distant from horse two foot, and ranke from ranke seuen foot, when horsemen goe trotting to the charge, the proportion is good. The aray of the Frenchmen that charge with single rankes is of no strength: neither the orders of the Reiters that goe to the charge in a ring. for so soone as they are inuested with lances, they are broken. and therefore I thinke the former aray better, as vsed both by antiquity, and the Italian and English caualery, which gi∣ueth ground at this day to no other.

The ancient leaders of time past, which for their skill in armes are famous to posterity, howsoeuer in some circumstances they de∣parted from these rules; yet neuer did they neglect the Generall rea∣sons of them. neither ought they to be neglected of any, as I will make manifest by particulars.

Scipio in the encounter betwixt him and Annibal in Afrike accor∣ding to the Romane guise diuided his army from front to backe into three parts placing first those which they called hastatos, next princi∣pes, last triarios. All these albeit at the first their armes were diffe∣rent, yet when the Romane empire was come to the height, were armed much after one sort with plated iackes, which they called Lo∣ricas, morions on their heads, a shield on their left arme, a sword well poynted, and sharpe by their side, and a iaueline which they cal∣led pilum in their right hand which they threw at the enemy when they ioyned battell, and then fought with their sword and target. Some had also defences for theyr thighes, and legges, and shooes plated in the soles, that they might not be pearced with nayles. The light armed by them called Velites which stood not among the armed men had onely a head piece and a target, and sword, or els if they were slingers onely a head piece, a sting, and a sword. The Triarij

that stoode last were the oldest, and most tried, and best armed soul∣diers, and next them Principes that stood before them, the hastati were yongest and of least experience, first in place, but last in accompt. The front where the hastati were placed, Scipio made not of Regiments ioyned together and placed before the ensignes, but of companies of two hundred made into litle battaillions or squares distant one from another some space, that the Elephants of the enemie receiued with∣in these distances might not disorder the aray. He placed Laelius with the Italian horsemen without on the left corner, Masinissa and the Nu∣midian horsemen on the right corner. The distances betweene the battaillions, he filled with the first troupes of the light armed which were arches and slingers, commanding them, when the Elephants came forwarde on them, either to retire behinde the first battaillions, or standing fast to the sides of them, to giue the Elephants way, and to throw their iauelins at them as they passed. Liuyes words I haue set downe for the satisfaction of those that vnderstande the tongue: which course I haue also in other examples out of him, and other au∣thors obserued. If my translation answere not worde for worde, yet doeth it answere the Romane vse of warre. The wordes I could not translate precisely, if I meant that any should vnderstand mee. the termes of warre then, and now being so different.

aInstruit deinde primos hastatos, post cos principes, triarijs postremam aciem clausit. Non confertas autem cohortes ante sua quámque signa in∣struebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se distantes, vt esset spatium, quò Elephanti hostium accepti nihil ordines turbarent: Laelium cum equi∣tatu Italico ab sinistro cornu, Masinissam, Numidásque ab dextro oppo∣suit. Ʋias patentes inter manipulos antesignanorum velitibus comple∣uit, dato praecepto vt ad impetum Elephantorum, aut post rectos refuge∣rent ordines, aut in dextram laeuámque discursu applicantes se antesig∣nanis, viam qua irruerent in ancipitia tela belluis darent.

Annibal placed first his Elephants: then the Ligurians, & Gaules hired to ayde the Carthaginians. Among their troupes and before them he placed slingers, and archers which were Mores, and of the Ilands of Maiorca, and Minorca. In the second battel he set the Car∣thaginians, and Africans, and Macedonian Regiment ioyned in one aray. and after them a litle way distant, he placed his last hope, or third battell consisting of Italians. The Carthaginian horsemen were placed on the right wing, the Numidians on the left. His error

(if any error may be thought to haue bene in such an expert Cap∣taine, and not rather in the execution of his directions) was this, that not making any distances in his second battell, for the first to retrayte into, the first battell being repulsed was for the most part slaine, and returning backe vpon the Carthaginians standing in the second bat∣tell, had almost disordered them. Percase he thought that seeing no place of retraite, they would haue fought more desperatly. But what can wearied, and hurt men doe? or who can animate men altogether discouraged? Scipio contrarywise drawing backe the hurt, and wea∣ried men of his first battaillions, auanced the second battel where those stoode which the Romanes called Principes on the one hande, and the thirde battell, which they termed Triarios on the other hande, and so ioyntly charging the enemie on front with his footemen, and on the backe with his horsemen, he foyled Annibal and his army, which be∣fore that had alwayes bene victorious.

aAnnibal primum Elephantos instruxit: deinde auxilia Ligurum, Gallorum{que}, Balearibus, Mauris{que} adiunctis: in 2 acie Carthaginenses, Afrósque, & Macedonum legionem: modico interuallo relecto sub∣sidiariam aciem Italicorum militum instruxit: equitatum circumdedit cornibus, dextrum Carthaginenses, sinistrum Numidae tenuerunt.

At Trebia Annibal brought into the field first his archery, and slin∣gers of the Ilands of Maiorca, and Minorca, about 8000. men: then his armed men: ten thousand horsemen hee disposed by the right, and left corners of the first battell, and without them his Elephants diui∣ded equally into two partes. When the Romane legions vrged the light armed, he drew them backe lightly into the spaces, betwixt the midbattell, and the right and left corner. Afterwards, hauing foyled and put to flight the Romane horsemen, the archers & slingers came forward, & charged the Romanes vpon the flanks of the armed men.

bAnnibal Baleares leuem armaturam, 8 ferme millia hominum erant, locat ante signa, deinde grauiorem armis peditem: in cornibus circumfundit decem millia equitum: ab cornibus in vtrámque partem diuisos Elephantos statuit: Balearibus cum maiore robore resisterent le∣giones, diductae properè in cornua leues armaturae sunt: Baleares pulso equite iaculabantur in latera.

The army of the Romanes and Carthaginians at the famous en∣coūter of Cannae by Liuie is thus described. On the right corner stood the Romane horsemen, and within them footemen: the horsemen of

their associats were ranged on the left corner, & within them foote∣men: in the midst were placed the Romane legiōs diuided after their vsual maner into three parts: hard before them & ioyning with them were archers and slingers placed, and before them other archers, and slingers and other light armed souldiers, of which consisted the first range of the battel. Annibal set his slingers, archers, and light armed foremost on the front of the battell, the Spanish, and French horse he placed on the left wing against the Romane horsemen, the Numidi∣an horsemen on the right. The midbattel he strengthened with foote∣men, placing the Africans equally diuided in the right, and left cor∣ner, the Gaules and Spaniards with their aray in forme of a wedge auanced somewhat forward being in the midst. The charge was be∣gunne by the archery and light armed, afterward did the left wing of the Gaules and Spanish horsemen meete with the right wing of the Romanes: then followed the encountre of the armed men.

aIn dextro cornu Romanos equites locauit, deinde pedites: laeuum cor∣nu extremi equites sociorum, intra pedites; ad medium iuncti legionibus Romanis tenuerunt iaculatores. Ex caeteris leuium armorum auxilijs prima acies facta. Annibal Balearibus aliáque leui armatura praemissa, Gallos, Hispanos{que} equites laeua in cornu aduersus Romanum equitatum, dextrum cornu Numidis equitibus datum media acie peditibus firmata, ita vt Afrorum, vtra{que} cornua essent, interponerentur his cuneo aliquan∣tum prominente medij Galli, at{que} Hispani. Pugna leuibus primum armis commissa: deinde equitum Gallorum, Hispanorum{que} laeuum cornu cum dextro Romano concurrit, deinde peditum coorta pugna.

Scipio fighting against Asdrubal in Spaine, did thus dispose his army: he strengthened both the corners of his battell (diuided from front to backe after the vsual maner) with Romane souldiers, his associats he bestowed in the midst, his horsemen and light armed hee sent out against the corps de garde of the Carthaginians placed in the gates of their campe, and in conuenient places neere. When the Carthaginians came foorth against them, hee receiued his horse∣men and light armed within his battaillions, and diuiding them in∣to two partes, placed them behinde the corners of the battell. Per∣ceiuing where the enemie was weakest, hee there beganne the charge, with that part of his army that was strongest. The first bat∣tell of the enemies being discomfited, he chargeth the midbattell with his Regiments of Romanes on the sides, with his associats that were

Spaniards in front, and on the backes with his horsmen, and so put the same to flight.

Scipio cornua firmata Romano milite, socijs in mediam aciem acceptis: equites & leuem armaturam in stationes Punicas immisit: egredientibus Poenis equitatum, & leuem armaturam in medium acceptam, diuisam{que} in partes duas in subsidijs post cornua locat. Cum cornibus vbi firma eius erat acies, Poenorum infirma pugnam incipit, ea acie fugata mediam Poenorum aciem ipse a latere, equites à tergo, Hispani à fronte adorti fuderunt.

Scipioes father encountring the same man, their armies were then thus ordered: the front of the Romane army stoode vpon three parts: the footemen after the maner of the Romanes, were part before the ensignes and part behinde: the horsemen stoode beyond both the cor∣ners of the Auantgard or first battell: Asdrubal placed the Spaniards in the midst, in the right corner hee ordered the Carthaginians, the Africans and other mercenary souldiers in the left, his Numidian horsemen hee placed fast by the Carthaginians on that wing where they stoode, the rest of his horsemen in the other corner.

Triplex stetitb Romana acies, peditum pars ante signa locata, pars post signa accepta, equites cornua cinxere. Asdrubal mediam aciem Hispanis firmat, in cornibus dextro Poenos locat, laeuo Afros mercena∣riorúmque auxilia: equitum Numidas Poenorum peditibus, caeteros A∣fros pro cornibus opponit.

Scipio, he that subdued Annibal encountring with Syphax, vsed the vsual aray of the Romanes making his army triple in breadth, and in length; the Italian horsemen he placed by the right corner of the first squadrons, the Numidians ledde by Masinissa by the left. Syphax and Asdrubal opposed the Numidian or Barbary horse a∣gainst the Italian horse, the Carthaginians against Masinissa. The Celtiberian footemen they placed in the midst opposite against the squadrons of the Romane Regiments.

cRomanus hast atorum prima signa, post principes, in subsidijs tria∣rios constituit. Equitatum. Italicum ab dextro cornu, ab laeuo Numidas, Masinissam{que} opposuit. Syphax Asdrubal{que} Numidis, aduersus Italicum equitatum, Carthaginensibus contra Masinissam locatis, Celtiberos in mediam aciem in aduersa signa legionum accepere.

In a certaine encounter in Spaine thed Romans perceiuing that the enemy had left spaces betweene the midbattel, & those squadrons that

made the corners, purposing to send out his horsemen by those spa∣ces, preuenting him, filled those spaces first with their horsmen, which both made the enemies horse vnseruiceable, and holpe to disorder his footemen. Their other aray was ordinary, saue that the horsemen made not the outmost wings, but the footemen: as appeareth by these wordes of Liuy following.

Cornua, dextrum Ilergetes, laeuum alij Hispani, mediam aciem Au∣setani tenuere. Inter cornua, & mediam aciem interualla patentia fece∣runt satis lata, qua equitatum vbi tempus esset, emitterent. Romani cùm inter cornua loca etiam patentia fecissent, hoc vicerunt, quod primi equi∣tes inter interualla miserint, quod hostium equites inutiles fecit, & tur∣bauit hostium pedites.

Yet was not the aray of the Romanes alwaies the same, as appea∣reth by that encounter which y^e Romane Proconsul & Pretor had with Mago in Liguria. The Pretors legions made the front of the armie & first squadrons, the Proconsul placed his legions behind for supply. The twelfth legion being almost cut all in peeces, the thirteenth was auanced forward to relieue it. Mago against this legion opposed fresh men, reserued behinde for supply: the Elephants comming ouer∣thwart, the first rankes of the eleuenth legion being drawen foorth, fought with them with their iauelins.

aPraetoris legiones in prima acie fuerunt: procos. suas in subsidij te∣nuit. Duodecima legione magna ex parte caesa, decimatertia legio in pri∣mam aciem inducta, Mago ex subsidijs Gallos integros legioni opposuit. hastati legionis vndecimae pila in Elephantos conijciunt.

Furius fighting with the Gaules in Liguria, placed his army in this sort. The souldiers of his associats, he diuided intob wings, and of them made the front of the battell. Two regiments he placed be∣hinde for a supply. When the right wing was almost oppressed, brin∣ging vp the two regiments on either side of it, he garded the same, and with his horsemen he charged the enemy vpon the side of his battell.

cIn alas Furius diuidens socialem exercitum eum in prima acie loca∣uit, in subsidijs duas legiones, oppressae dextrae posteà alae duas illas legio∣nes circumduxit, equites in latus hostium emisit.

When afterward the Romane Empire was enlarged, & that the Romanes began to haue diuers nations in their armies, although the generall order was still obserued, yet there happened in their armies by reason of this mixture more varietie. In the battel betwixt L. Sci∣pio,

and Antiochus in Asia, there were two legions of Romanes, two other of Latines their associats. The Romanes were ordered in the midst, the Latines in the corners of the battell. Those partes of the le∣gions which they called hastatos, Principes, & Triarios, made the front, the supply, and last hope. On the right side of this armie, the Consul ranged in squadrons 3000 footemen of other nations, that came to the aide of the Romanes, and without them somewhat lesse then 3000 horsemen. Vpon the left side which was garded with a ri∣uer running along, he placed onely foure troupes of horsemen. Two thousand Macedonians & Thracians were left behinde in the campe to garde the baggage. Antiochus his army stoode in this order: first, 16000 of the kings ordinarie souldiers, calleda Phalangitae, diuided into x squadrons, tooke their place: betweene euery squadron two E∣lephants were placed. From the front backeward, the battell contei∣ned 32 rankes of armed men. By the right side of these were placed first 1500 Gallograecians: next to them 3000 men completely ar∣med, they call them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: thirdly, a wing of a thousand horse∣men, and certeine Elephants behinde to second them. In the fourth place, the kings Garde, and by the same 1200 archers on horsebacke Dahians: And fiftly, 3000 light armed men: in the vttermost corner were 4000 slingers, and archers placed. By the left side of the kings ordinarie souldiers, were likewise 1500 Gallograecian footemen ranged, and 2000 Cappadocians, hauing like armes, and beyond them 2700 others, all sent in aide of the king. After them 3000 hors∣men all armed, and one thousand other horsemen were ranged. Be∣fore these horsemen were placed charets with hookes, and Arabians vpon Camels. And lastly, like number of horsemen, targetters, ar∣chers, and Elephants, as was on the right corner.

bRomanorum duae legiones, duae sociûm & Latini nominis erant. Ro∣mani mediam aciem, cornua Latini tenuêre. hastatorum prima signa, deinde Principum erant, triarij postremos claudebant. extra hanc iustam aciem à parte dextra auxiliarium tria millia peditum Consul instruxit. vlira eos equitum minùs 3000 opposuit: à laeua qua flumen claudebat, quatuor tantùm turmae oppositae: 2000 Macedonum & Thracum praesi∣dio castris relinquebantur. regia acies erat primò 16000 phalangitae in partes decem diuisa, inter singulas partes bini erant elephanti, à fronte introrsus in 32 ordines armatorum acies patebat. ad latus dextrum phalangitarum 1500 pedites Gallograecos posuit, his 3000 peditum lori∣catorum

(cataphractos appelant) adiunxit: addita his ala mille equitū: continens his grex elephantorum positus est in subsidijs. ab eadem parte paulùm producto cornu regia cohors erat: Dahae deinde equites sagitta∣rij 1200: tum leuis armatura 3000: extremum cornu claudebant 4000 funditores, & sagittarij. ab laeuo cornu phalangitis adiuncti erant Gal∣lograeci pedites 1500, & similiter his armati 2000 Cappadocum, inde auxiliares 2700, & 3000 cataphractorum equitum, & mille alij equi∣tes: ante hunc equitatum falcatae quadrigae, & cameli quibus Arabes insidebant sagittarij. inde alia multitudo par ei quae in dextro cornu erat equites, cetrati, sagittarij, elephanti.

Cerealis in his araie did somewhat digresse from the ancient or∣ders of the Romanes. The squadrons which were sent from the as∣sociates in his aide, were placed in front, and by them on each side his horsmen: in the second battell hee placed the legions: and last of all kept by himselfe certaine choise men to supply where sudden need re∣quired.

aCerealis equite & auxiliarijs cohortibus frontem explet: in secunda acie legiones locatae, dux sibi delectos retinuerat ad improuisa.

The armie of Caesar ranged readie to fight with Afranius, was di∣uided into three battaillions. The first consisted of 4 squadrons of the 5 legion, which was seconded by the other squadrons of the same le∣gion, the three squadrons remaining were placed for the last hope in the third battaillion. Other legions were ranged in like sort. The ar∣chers and slingers were placed before the front in the midst, the hors∣men were placed in wings on the sides.

bCaesaris acies triplex, primo 4 cohortes ex 5 legione, has subsidiariae ternae, & rursus aliae totidem, suae cuius{que} legionis sequebantur. sagittarij & funditores media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat.

I may not forget the order of Caesar, and Pompeies armies in that famous encounter in the Pharsalian fields. In the left corner of Pompeies armie were two legions placed: Scipio had the middest with his regiments that hee brought out of Syria: the regiment of Cilicia and squadrons made of the reliques of Afranius his armie in Spayne, were ranged together in the right corner: certaine other squadrons hee placed in the distances betwixt the corners and mid∣battell. All his horsemen, archers, and slingers hee placed side by the left corner of his armie. Seuenc companies hee left to garde his campe. Caesar ordered his armie in three battels,

and according to the custome of the Romanes; strengthened euery battell with three supplies (the front accounted for one which is not properly a supplie, but the front or first araie.) He made a fourth bat∣tell of Iustie yong men well armed and furnished with halfe pikes a∣gainst Pompeies horsmen. Finally, two companies he left behind for gard of the campe.

aErant in sinistro cornu (Pompeij) legiones duae, mediam aciem Sci∣pio tenebat cum legionibus Syriacis, Ciliciensis legio & cohortes Afra∣nianae in dextro cornu erant. reliquas cohortes inter aciem mediam, & cornua interiecerat: cunctum equitatum, sagittarios, & funditores in si∣nistro cornu obiecerat, 7 cohortes castris praesidio reliquit. Caesar tripli∣cem aciem instruit, & tribus promore Romano firmatam subsidijs: quar∣tam aciem instituit contra equites Pompeij: duas cohortes castris praesidio reliquit.

Neither is the victorie of Caesar against Scipio in Afrike, lesse famous, or the araie of their armies lesse remarkable. Scipio in the front of his armie, placed his legions, the Numidians he ranged be∣hind them for supplies. On the right and left corner in equal distances be ordered his elephants, after which he marrialled the light armed, and aide sent him out of Numidia: all his horsemen he placed on the right corner of the battell, and beside them an infinite number of soul∣diers light armed (as archers, slingers, targetters without corslets) all this in the space of a mile: the left side of his armie was close ioy∣ned to the towne of Vzita. Caesar in the left side of his armie, set the 9 and 7 regiment: the 30, 29, 13, 14, 28, and 26. in the midbattell: cer∣taine companies of those legions togither with certaine regiments of yong souldiers in the right corner: certaine other regiments new∣ly leuied, he placed in squadrons behind for a supplie. The last hope or third supplie or battell, he translated into the left corner of his bat∣tell, where also he placed his horsemen, and the fift legion which se∣conded his horsemen. His light armed disposed in squadrons, hee ran∣ged among the troupes of his horsemen.

bScipio collocabat in fronte legiones. Numidas in subsidiaria acie, elephantos dextro, sinistró{que} cornu aequalibus interuallis: post illos arma∣turas leues, & Numidas auxiliares substituerat, equitatū vniuersum in dextro cornu disposuit, & iuxta leuis armaturae infinitam multitudinem mille passuum spatio, sinistrum cornu oppido Vzita claudebatur. Caesar ha∣buit legionem 9 & 7 in sinistro cornu, tricesimam, vicesimam nonam,

decimam tertiam, 14, 28, 26, in media acie, aliquot cohortes earum le∣gionum, & vnà tyronum legiones in dextro cornu, tyronum legiones in subsidijs, tertiam aciem in sinistrum suum cornu transtulit, ibi equitatum collocauer at, & quintam legionem quae equitatui subsidio esset, leuem ar∣maturam inter equites interposuit.

And thus inough of the Romanes and perchance (as some will say) too much, seeing the orders of warres are now so diuers (as they thinke) from antiquitie. But these men must consider, that the rea∣sons remaine alwayes the same, and that the vse of horsemen, and footemen is now the same that was in times past, and that our shot answere to their light armed, and that alwayes one part is to succour another, and that the army must take heede, that it be not compassed round. The Greekes, yea and barbarous nations mooued with the same reasons haue in effect kept the same aray. Whena Clearchus was to fight with Artaxerxes, he placed his owne souldiers in the right corner, and those of Meno in the left, the rest were ranged in the midst. Without the corners stood the light armed, and then the horsemen equally diuided vtmost.

In the encounter of the Greekesb and Persians at Arbela, Darius on the wings placed his horsemen of diuers nations, and some pretie distance before them his charets with hookes: within them his ar∣chers and light armed: and in the midst the Greekes and Persians, which were the strength of the army. The same aray did Alexander also obserue in the front of his army: but fearing least hee should be compassed about by Darius his horsemen, he also prouided another battaillion, which if neede be might make head that way also. I need not bring many examples, seeing in all these matters there is one ge∣nerall course. Let vs therefore now compare the arayes of late time, and you shall then perceiue, that either they are like to former procee∣dings in former time, or els farre worse.

Thec blacke Prince in the fight with Henry the vsurper of Castil, diuided his army into three partes, himselfe ledde the battell, the duke of Lancaster the Vantgarde, and the king of Maiorca the rest, the horsemen were sorted on the sides: the same aray was obserued by the enemie.

When the duke of Burgundie was to fight with Lewis the 11, at Montlehery, hee placed his archers first: but because his caualery was not placed on the sides, but behinde: the same, going to the

charge, ouerranne his owne men, and killed diuers of them, and fewe or none of the enemies. In which disorder if Lewis had charged him, he could not haue failed of the victorie.

The Prince of Condè Anno 1567 remayning at S. Denys, and vnderstanding the Kings determination to driue him thence: re∣solued in the fieldes betwene Paris and S. Denys to receiue the charge in this order: he diuided his horsemen into three partes, and did se∣cond euery part with shot: with the rest of the shot Ienlis beganne the charge. Footemen armed which are the strength of the army he had none. The partes were so farre sundred, that one part could not succour another. So that if the armed men of the aduerse party had come on: both the horsemen, and footemen of the Prince had bene driuen to a poore retraite. The Constable hauing 16000 foote∣men, brought fewe or none to the encountre. Of this number 6000 Suitzers were there planted in the fielde, like so many stakes, without giuing any one blow that day.

At Moncontour the Admiral placed first hisa Reyters, and side by them certaine lances: both these hee fensed on the sides with shot: behinde these he placed a squadron of Lansquenets flanked likewise with shot, and seconded with some fewe horsemen, all which made the Auantgard. The battell consisted of shot which was likewise flanked, and seconded with shot. In the head both of the battell, and Auantgard were certaine shot placed, as enfans perdus (wee call them the forlorne hope) in which aray there was neither order, beau∣tie, nor strength. There wanted armed men in the battell. Horsemen coulde not, being so placed come to the charge, but they should runne ouer their owne men. In some they were so placed, that not the hun∣dred person could come to fight. But percase the Admirall either coulde not doe as hee would, or else carried away with the errour of the French, that put all in shot, had more of that weapon, then coulde doe seruice.

The enemies Auantgard at the same time stood vpon 4000 Suit∣zers, flanked with certaine Regiments of shot: before the Suitzers were 8 fielde pieces placed, and before the pieces the forlorne hope: beyonde the shot were ranged certaine lances. The battell being drawne vp, and ranged in equal front with the Auantgard, in fashion differed little, or nothing from the same. Much like course, sure no better hath bene vsed in all the battels that haue bene fought since

the inuention of artillery. So that we see how all wise captaines, do goe about in their arayes to resemble the proceeding of ancient time, but there is not now the like vnion of the parts, nor the like strength of the whole body, nor that orderly proceeding, that euery weapon may doe his office, nor that proportion of the front, nor order of sup∣plies, that were among ancient warriers. And by reason of vnifor∣mity in proceeding now wanting, hard it is to set men in order: hard to bring many to fight, and hardest of all to restore an array once bro∣ken. this is the cause of the weaknesse of the armies of ourtime: in disorder no army can fight, nor resist.

Wherefore of two things in this point considerable, let vs doubt neither. If the enemy be in disorder, neither let vs doubt to charge him; nor if our army be in order, let vs feare to susteine his charge.a Iubaes men being without order, were no sooner charged, but they fled. Cato in his expedition intob Spaine taking the enemy at like aduantage, and charging him as he ranne vp and downe to set his forces in array, did easily driue him out of the field. If thec Romanes as they passed the riuer before the battell of Trebia, had not bene charged by Annibal, they could not so easily haue receiued so great an ouerthrow. Annibal himselfe albeit a most expert leader, and of an army most expert in warre, yet receiued losse being char∣ged by Marcellus, in that instant when he drew his men out of the campe, to set them in order. and if by long practise his men could not haue taken their standings themselues, they had that day quite bene ouerthrowen by theird disorder. The like had also happened vnto Caesars army charged by thee Neruians, when it was dispersed, and disordered about the fortification of the campe, but that the skill of the souldiers, that could euery man fall in array of himselfe, reme∣died the disorder. The Germanes a long time vsing to charge their enemies with moref violence then order, & assailing them by squa∣drons seuerally, rather then with an ordered army; were ouerthro∣wen by the Romanes oft times: but when by long vse they had learned the Romane array, and obserued it, they preuailed against them. Those that come rather furiously then orderly to the charge, as did the French at Cressy, and Poitiers, and both French and Spani∣ards at Aliubarota in the confines of Portogall, where our ancesters of the English natiō obteined great victories, are easily ouerthrowen. Susteine the first brunt, and presently they are cooled.

Those therefore that goe to charge the enemy, let them obserue thisa course: first let them set their men in order, that euery man may know his place: secondly, let them giue certeine direction, that euery commander may know both what to doe, and in case he cannot performe so much, where to retire. Annibal not thinking of this, when he fought with Scipio in Afrike, occasionned his owne ouer∣throw. for when his first battell being wearied, would haue retired to the succor, there was no place left to retrait into: so that the same not being receiued into the second battell, began to fight with their owne fellowes, and what by the enemy and by friends was most part slaine. The French horse at the battell of Poitiers, not knowing where to retire, fell among their footmen, and holpe to set them in disorder.

Thirdly in giuing directions, let the Generall take heed, that he employ all sorts of weapons, where they may doe most seruice (this I meane particularly to declare in the chapter following.) if he send horse against pikes standing fast, or against shot being fenced with a trench; he ruinateth his horse. if he send shot against horse in open field, or pikes against shot, he vseth the matter with no iudgement.

Fourthly, let him neuer order either his whole army, or part of it without supply. Many casualties may at the first discourage our men; which being opportunely succored, may take courage againe, and begin a fresh charge vpon the enemy.b Cato in his warres against the Spaniards, relieuing his wearied men with a few fresh com∣panies encouraged them, and ouerthrew the enemies. When Cae∣sars men began to giue groūd in their battell against the Germanes,c Crassus by supplying them with a fresh company, not onely re∣stored the battell, but made all the enemies to runne. Where all the force of the army is employed at the first brunt, and no order is taken for supplies, as in a certeine battell betwixt the Romaines and Volscians: the successed seldome is good. Among other mat∣ters obiected against Fuluius accused as principall causer of the ouer∣throw of the Romaine army by Annibal at Herdonea; this was chiefe, that he did not well order his army, nor strengthen the same with supplies, nor succours.

Fiftly, looke with what part of the army himselfe is strongest, let him there begin to charge the enemy, where either by good intelli∣gence, or view of the aray, or disaduantage of the ground, or quality

of the weapons, he shall perceiue that the enemie is weakest. Caesar in thea encounter he had with the Germanes, beganne to charge them with that part of his armie, that was ordered in the right cor∣ner, for that hee sawe, that the enemies were there weakest. The same as Liuy testifieth, was obserued in a certaine battell, which the Romanes had with the Carthaginians in Spaine. He is not wise, that when he may charge the enemie on the side, will goe directly to the front, where his greatest force consisteth.

Sixtly, after that hee hath set his men in order, let him not stand long in armes, before he goeth to the charge, if he meane at all to fight. By long standing, the souldiers waxe wearie, faint, hun∣grie, and a great part of their courage is thereby abated.b Asdru∣bal coulde not haue done his men greater wrong, then to make them stand so long in armes before the battell begunne at Me∣taurus. Thereof proceeded their faintnesse, and contrariwise the courage, and strenth of the Romanes: for those being faint, these came fresh to the battell.c Annibal at the battell of Trebia would not bring foorth his men to fight, before hee perceiued the Ro∣manes to be hungrie, and almost tyred with long standing. Which encreased his owne force, and abated much of the courage, and force of the enemie.

Further, by no meanes let him suffer the enemie to preuent him in giuing the first charge. As in the beginning of warres, so in thed beginning of the battell there is great aduantage. And as Pinarius saide to his men lying in garrison in Aenna a Citie ofe Sicile, so it falleth out very often, that hee that draweth the sworde soonest, first obteineth the victorie. They that first be∣ginne, seeme to haue greater courage then those that stand still, as it were to warde their blowes. There is many aduantages in beginning the battell. They may more easely take the aduan∣tage of the winde, and Sunne, of the grounde, and of the sort of weapons wherewith they fight, then those that stand still, which are forced to turne, which way soeuer the enemie commeth. They may there beginne where the enemie is weakest, and themselues strongest, and therefore the vse of the Romanes was first to begin the charge, as appeareth both in the warres of Scipio in Spaine, and Caesar in France. A certainef Frenchman, albeit he vnderstood not the reason, yet by obseruation vnderstoode this poynt. For

sayth he, in the warres of France, it hath beene noted, that the Protestants did alwayes preuaile more charging the enemies first, then attending the enemies demarche and charge. It appeareth both in the braule at Moncontour, anno 1569. and diuers other skirmishes which they call battels. Those that charge first, take the aduantage of any disorder committed by the enemie, which others let slippe.

Whatsoeuer can be deuised to encourage our owne souldiers, or to discourage the enemie, as at all times: so especially in the hazard of battell, is to be practised by cryes, reportes, shewes, wordes spo∣ken in the hearing of the enemie, and whatsoeuer else can be ima∣gined. If there lye any wood, or hollowe grounde neere the enemie, the same is to be seased, that in the heate of the fight our men sud∣denly arising thence, may more amaze, and hurt the enemie. But of this point we shall haue better occasion to speake at large in the trea∣tise of stratagemes, and ambushes.

Least by flying of some cowardly companions, the rest might be discouraged, order is to be taken, that whosoeuer in the fight begin∣neth to turne his backe, bee presently slaine. Thea Romane Ge∣nerall by this strict commaundement and execution, appointing certaine troupes to execute it, made his armie stand resolutely. Of Attilius it is reported, that when his army beganne to giue ground byb killing the first with his owne hands, he made the rest to make head against the enemie: which Annibal likewise practised in his battel with Scipio in Afrike, albeit he had not like successe. This is the case, wherein Clearchus the Lacedemonianc saide, that soul∣diers ought more to feare their owne Generall, then the enemie.

Finally, when by his good direction, and the valiantnesse of his souldiers, the Generall shall perceiue the enemie to beginne to shrinke, and giue ground, then must he be most carefull first, that he giue him no time to recouer himselfe, or to supplie that which is broken: secondly, that hee keepe his souldirs from spoyle, vntill such time as he hath assured himselfe of the victorie. When the ene∣mie beginneth to shrinke, and to be dismaide, any little force more maketh him to runne: in a small time he recouereth himselfe againe. Therefored then is he to bee vrged with the rest of our strength that remaineth entire, and not to be suffered to escape. Scipio in the battell with Asdrubal in Spaine, when thee Carthaginians disli∣king

the party would haue retyred wholly together, did so presse them on all sides, that before they could recouer any place of safe∣tie, they were forced to change their pace, and euery man to flye for his life.

In thea battell betwixt Caesar and Pompey, when Pompeyes horsemen were driuen out of the fielde, by those halfe pikes that hee had ordeined for succour of his owne horse, with the same men he cut in pieces Pompeyes archers, and light armed men. That done, with the same troupes he charged Pompeies battell, that yet stoode firme, vpon the backe. And after he had driuen the enemie out of the fielde, yet rested he not, vntill such time as hee had taken his campe, and dispersed the reliques of his armie. Yet may some say, it is not good to presse the enemie too farre, and that a bridge of golde is to bee made to those that flie away. Gaston de fois was ouerthro∣wen and slaine pursuing the Spaniards, that retired after the bat∣tell of Rauenna. And diuers others driuing the enemie to dispaire, that otherwise would haue fledde, haue hurt themselues. But this is to be vnderstoode of an enemie that would so flye, as he would al∣so yeelde the victorie and contende no more, in which case Themi∣stocles perswaded the Greekes that meant to dissolue Xerxes his bridge, to suffer the same to continue, that thereby he might runne away. Others that meane to fight againe, are to be pursued dili∣gently with all our forces. Gaston de fois had not beene slaine, but that hee was badly followed, and too farre auaunced. Neither coulde the Spaniards haue escaped, if they had beene charged with shotte, or taken at aduantage, and kept from victuals. The Ro∣manes had so certaine an order in this point, that they doubt not to accuse theirb General of trecherie, for that when the enemie stagge∣red, hee gaue not the worde to the horsemen to charge, nor aduaun∣ced his footemen in time to supplie those y^t were wearie.c Perseus, for that hauing foyled the Romanes with his horse, and hauing the victorie in his hand, he did not pursue the rest of their troupes, and breake them, but suffered them to passe a Riuer quietly; is condemned for a man of no iudgement in warres.

The same errour was committed by the Carthaginians in Spaine, who hauing slain the two Scipioes & foyled their armie gaue them selues to rest, while the Romanes gathering head againe, were able afterwarde to matche them, and foyle them. Those that

cannot thrust the enemie downe that is already falling, will be lesse able to doe it, when he standeth vpright. And therefore let wise cap∣taines pursue their enemie to the vtmost, and not suffer him when hee once beginneth to looke backe, to turne head againe, and take breath. And in any case let him take heede, that his souldiers runne not to spoyle, before the victorie be assured, and the enemie wholly vanquished.

aAnnibal pursuing the Romanes after his victorie at Trebia, had sure ouertaken them, and disordered their rierward, had not the Numidian horsemen turned aside to spoyle the campe of the Romanes. And in the time of the Emperours of Rome, the Ger∣manes had giuen theb Romanes a mightie ouerthrowe, if leauing them, they had not contended among themselues who shoulde first goe to spoyle. But howe so euer it was in auncient time, the disorder of souldiers in this point is such, that with no lawes, nor penalties they canne bee kept from following the spoyle, which oftentimes maketh them a spoyle to their enemies.

The French at Guingast had put the Dutch to flight, and were almost in possession of the victorie: but while they ranne after the spoyle, the enemie rallied himselfe, and charging them afresh, did extorce the victorie out of their handes, and put them to flight. Atc Taro the Italians had foyled the French, returning out of the kingdome of Naples, but that in the beginning of the vi∣ctorie they fell to spoyle the baggage, which was the cause of their owne spoyle and ruine. The same was the cause of the escape of thed French, and losse of the Venetians at Treui. Gaston de fois at the taking of Brescia made proclamation, that vpon paine of death, no man shoulde fall to spoyle before li∣cence giuen: yet coulde hee not keepe his souldiers fingers in temper. The more dangerous effectes doe ensue of this disorder, the greater care ought the Generall to haue, to preuent it.

CHAP. XII. Part. 2. Wherein the vse of horsemen, pikes, halberdes, and other such wea∣pons, also of targets, small shotte, archers, and great ordonance is declared.

THat which before I promised concerning the vse of horsemen, and diuers weapons, that is nowe to be performed. A matter of great importance, and ad∣uantage, if it be well considered: and therefore not to be omitted. You that knowe the traine of armes, yeelde here the testimonie of your experience to this discourse, and if you heare any cauill against it, yet let not such as neuer marched further, then out of the kitchin, or from the dresser into the hall, or parlour, censure that which they vnderstand not.

Horsemen among the Romanes were al of one sort: barded horses with men all armed mounted on them they vsed not. If they vsed any archers on horsebacke, they were beholding to other natiōs for them. Nowe vse of late times hath brought in diuers sortes of them, which according to their armes and furniture haue diuers names. Some horse are barded, others without bardes. The Frenchmen of armes in time past vsed barded horses for feare of our arrowes. Nowe since archerie is not so much reckoned of, and bardes are but a weake de∣fence against shotte, lanciers leauing their bardes, are armed much like to the Albanian stradiots. Vpon the borders betwixt vs, and the Scots, horsemen haue staues for y^e purpose, and for their armes iackes of male. The Dutch Reitres although well armed for the most part, yet seldome vse lances, or staues, or other weapon, then pistoles, and mazes at their saddle bowe. Beside these, there is an other sort of horsemen lately come in vse. We call them carbines, pedrinals, or ar∣goletiers, which vse firelocke peeces on horsebacke, and are cōmonly armed to the proofe of their piece.

Horsemen in warres are most necessary in diuers respects. With them we range and spoile the enemies countrey: with them we fetch in victuals for our selues: with them we discouer y^e enemies procee∣dings: with them we bridle his courses, and stop his forragers: with them we both helpe to foyle him in open fielde, and pursue him flying from vs.a Caesar by the enemies horse alwayes coasting him, and ready to charge his forragers, was driuen to great extremitie for want of victuals. Inb Afrike likewise being a plaine countrey, he

suffered many algaradaes by the enemies horsemen, often char∣ging him and cutting off his victuals. If Pompey had not rashly ad∣uentured to fight with Caesar: by his horsemen, wherein he farre pas∣sed him, he had famished his armie. The Greekes in their returne frō their voyage with Cyrus, by experience learned what incommodities followe them, that march without horse in y^e enemies countrey. And this is the vse of horsemen out of fight, to witte, to cut off the enemie from victuals, to keepe him short, to discouer his proceedings, to cut off straglers; and to fetche in victuals, and prouision for our owne ar∣mie. Which he that is strong in horsemen cannot want.

In fighting with the enemie, there are diuers vses of horsemen. If we charge him on the sides, or backe: we stop his march, as before I haue shewed. With a fewe horsemen any number of shotte taken in open fielde may be disordered. The Protestants in the encounter at S. Gemme ina Poitou, with a few horsemen, defeated diuers olde companies of shotte led by Puigalliard. That was the ruine of the Prince of Parmaes ayde sent to the Duke of Mayne, by the horsemen of the present French king by Dreux an. 1589. No number of short weapons can resist the carriere of horse in a plaine ground. The Sa∣bines, saithb Liuy, were put out of their araie being suddenly char∣ged by the Romane horsemen. The Volscians andc Aequians after long fight, beganne to giue ground after that the horesemen had broken their array by charging them in the midbattell. The force of horesemen for their violence is called ad tempest. The Romanee Generall perceiuing the weakenes of the enemies battel, by char∣ging them with his horsemen, did disorder all to the ensignes, after which entrance made, he cut the rest in pieces with his armed men. The Corinthians in a certaine battell, hauing put thef Athenian footemen to flight, were accoyled, and ouerthrowen by a fewe horsemen. The reason that the horsemen preuailed so much in time past were two: first they seldome vsed any long weapons, but targets and iauelins for the most part: secondly they did then vse to charge with their horsemen, when they sawe the footemen out of array, and not otherwise, if they did wisely,g This is therefore an other vse of horsemen in the battel, to charge those that are already disordred. The fourth and last vse of them is to execute, andh pursue those that are put to flight. But those y^t leade horsemen are to proceede with great caution: they may not charge pikemen standing resolutely together.

The price of their folly that did otherwise, our men did somewhat vn∣derstand at Muscleborough field. Neither may they charge shot, or archers that haue a defence, either of a trench, or a hedge, or a wall, or certaine rankes of pikes before them. For in y^e case they make them selues markes to the enemie, whom they cannot come at. Further, they had better charge the enemie disarrayed by shotte, or other wea∣pons, then when the armie standeth close together. For against an armie well empaled with pikes, yea with halberds close set, and well backed with shotte, horse cannot preuaile, whatsoeuer a certainea French man in his glorious stile vaunteth of the strength of the French men of armes. Against men out of order in open fielde horse∣men worke great effectes, and so no doubt they haue done in these late disorderly braules of France, and did alwayes amongb barba∣rous nations, which fought out of order. But against an army well ordered, they can do but little. And any small impediment doth make them vnseruiceable. The Romanes although their pikes were not halfe so long as ours: yet did they not feare any numbers of horse. Against the Macedonian pikes, the Persian horse could doe no ser∣uice. Neither will the French horsemen looke vpon our pikes well backed with musquets, if they be wise, notwithstanding their great crakes. Nay our archers at Agincourt fielde, founde them not so rough in handling as they would seeme. Horsemen therefore in all expeditions I accompt very requisite for the causes aboue rehearsed, and for that without them, albeit we could foyle the enemie, yet we cannot kill many, nor preuaile against him, that is swifter of foote then we, asc Clearchus both said, and proued by experience in the warres against Artaxerxes. At y^e bridge of Burgos in Galicia, where the Spaniards ranne so lightly before vs, we felt what want we had of horse. Of horsemen I thinke it requisite also to haue some part lan∣ces, some light armed like to our borderers, and some carbines. The barded horsemē both for their heauines, & great charge, I thinke not very needefull. When Lucullus his men were much afraide of Ty∣granes his bardedd horses, he willed them to be of good cheere, for that there was more labour in spoyling them being so armed, then in foyling thē: they were so vnweldy. And so it came to passe. For I neuer read y^t euer they did any seruice: but in diuers places, that they were foiled.e Cyrus had diuers barded horses in his iourney against his brother, but there is not any mentiō of any seruice that they did.

Darius had multitudes of them in the encounter betwixt him and Alexandera at Arbela, and Antiochus in the battell againstb Scipio: but scarce did they giue one blowe to hinder the course of the ene∣mies victorie. The armour of thec man and the horse is so heauie, and so boisterous, that if they fall, there they lye, stopping the way to those that come after. Neither can they auoide it, but many shall lye vpon the ground, especially if the pikes stand close, and be well flanked, or backed with mosquettiers shooting ouer their heades.

If we haue fewe horsemen, or not so many, that wee may there∣with match the enemie: we are then to followe the prudent deuise of Caesar, both here in Briteine, and in Afrike, and Greece, shewed him by valiant men before him. Before Capua, the Romanes not being able to match the enemie with horse, seconded their men with certeine lusty young men armed lightly, and weaponed with short pikes. Which while their men were at the charge, did so gall the enemie with their pikes, that presently they turned visage. Caesar by reason that his shippes wherein his horse were, helde not their course, com∣ming into this Iland had onely 30. horse, yet foyling the enemie with his footemen, with those fewe horses, and the lustiest of his young men he so pursued them, that many remained behinde their company. In Afrike likewise he susteined the charge of the enemies horsemen with his footemen, and after that he had made them turne their backes, did so charge them with some fewe horsemen which he had, that they had no desire to returne thither againe. Secon∣ding his horsemen with certaine halfe pikes lightly armed, he not only repelled Pompeis horsemen in Albany, and Scipioes in Afrike; but also vanquished their forces. By the samed deuise before time, he foyled 7000. Gaules well horsed, with a very fewe of his owne ayded and seconded by his footemen.e Xenophon charging the enemie that would haue fled from him with a few carriage horses, shewed vnto vs, that bad horses serue for a shift to follow y^e chace, and run better then good footemen. In the warres of Naples, 12. Italian horsemen fighting in steccato, as they call it, with so many Frenchmen: y^e Italiansf preuailed by this meanes: In the place where they met, the Italians let fal certain iauelins, which those that were first vnhorsed, by the French tooke vp, & ioyning with their com∣panions, & striking the French in the faces, preuailed against them. The Admirall of France, at y^e encounter of S. Denis by Paris, being

ouermatched by the enemy in horsemen, placed behinde euery com∣pany, a company of shot, which following the horsemen going an easy trot to the charge, vpon the approch of the enemy auanced them∣selues forward, and discharged so thicke and full vpon him: that all his companie came not to the charge, and those that came, were more gentle in handling, then otherwise they would haue beene. This may serue those that are inferior to the enemy, in horsemen. For this nation I trust this discourse is needelesse. For albeit we haue hi∣therto had great want of horsemen in our expeditions in France, Flanders, and Portugal: yet there is no reason, that this land should want hereafter, hauing such meanes. There onely wanteth liberall mindes, and good order, that some part of that is now spent in sur∣fet, silkes, golden laces, and other vanities, may be employed in kee∣ping horses for seruice.

Lances, and Carbines haue like vse in following the victory, and chase. But while the enemy standeth, lances are best employed a∣gainst shot, and carbines against pikes. But yet must they take heed, how they do inuest them. In discouering the enemy, and fetching in of victualles, and brideling the enemies forragers, both lances, and carbins, and archebuziers on horsebacke would be ioyned toge∣ther. But carbins, and argoletiers are to take heede that they come not neere the lances of the enemy, lest they make holes in their hor∣ses sides, if no worse. Where the enemy is in disorder there al sorts of horsemen may do seruice. At Cerisoles after that the shot had made way in the enemies battell, the French entred with their horse a∣mong them, and ouerthrew them.

Pikes are the onely defence of footemen against horsemen, if they be taken in plaine ground. Yet doe I not thinke it good, that there should be such numbers of pikes in our armies, as is vsed. For that vse excepted, which I spake of, I see no other great profite they haue. For execution is seldome doone by pikes. Sometime I grant pikes do charge other pikes, but it is not the piquier, that maketh the slaughter. In woodes and shrubbie or brushie groundes, these kinde of long weapons are vnprofitable, and vnweldie. The Germanes by the disaduantage of their long pikes, ^d being taken in such ground were ouerthrowen by Germanicus, and the Romane targettiers. In straites likewise when souldiers come to lay handes, and haue prize ech on other, long pikes can∣not

not bea managed; as the experience of the Romanes fighting a∣gainst the Germanes, and Macedonians armed with long weapons teacheth vs. Further the assailants in assaults of townes, and forts haue small vse of them. For there is no vse of horsemen there great∣ly; against which pikes are good: neither do the defendants great∣ly vse them, saue in the breach. Pikemen are too heauie armed to pursue others, and without shot they cannot well garde themselues, either against shot, or targets. At Muscleborough field a fewe shot opened the Scottish squadrons of pikes, for those that folowing af∣ter inuested them. And likewise did the French arquebuziers at Cerisoles deale with the lancequenets, among whose battelles ma∣king lanes, they gaue entrance to the horsemen, that presently charged them. And so little defence there is in that weapon, that not onely the Biscaine buckelers entred within them at the battaile ofb Rauenna, where they made a foule tailliada and slaughter, but also the Counte of Carmignola, dismounting himselfe and his company, entred among the squadrons of the Switzers pikes, and cut them in peeces in an other encounter in Lombardie. The Romanes dealing with thec Macedonian pikes both in the warres with Philip, and Perseus kings of Macedonia, and of Antiochus king of a great part of Asia, neuer feared to enter vpon them with their targets, nor made reckoning of that weapon. And not with∣out cause. For who seeth not, the strength and effect of the pike being in the point, that as soone as targettiers, or other armed men enter among pikes; the piquiers throwe downe their pikes, and take them to their other weapons? the Portugalles did perceiue by the experience of that fight with the Moores where Sebastian their king was slaine, that fewer pikes would haue serued, and o∣ther weapons done better effects.

The Switzers that are for the most part piquiers, will not march anie whither without their companies of shot attending on them, for their garde. At Moncontour the Almaine piquiers abando∣ned of their shot, were miserably shot to death most of them. For this cause I would haue onely so many pikes as woulde serue for the defence of the army against the enemies horse. The French∣men haue but ten pikes to euery companie of shot, which is too lit∣tle; yea and sometimes they haue no pikes at all. But he is abused that maketh the French precedentes, and examples to followe

in any practice of warre.

The first rankes of pikes woulde bee armed with corsalets of caliuer proofe on the breast: from the twelfth ranke backeward and inward it is sufficient, if they haue anie armes or iackes of male. Brassats, and other peeces of armes, except the head-peece, gor∣geron, and corsalet, I thinke to be more, then they can eyther wel march with, or fight with. The Frenchmen in time past had some (calleda Cruppellarii by Tacitus) that were armed, as they saie, de cap en pied. at which the Romane souldiers laughed. For that they were vnable by reason of the weight of their armes, eyther to strike the enemie, or to defend themselues. Therefore did they hew them downe with billes, and pollaxes. The pike I would haue, if it might be, of Spanish Ash, and betwixt twentie and two and twentie foote long, and by his side euerie piquier would haue sword and dagger, and a dagge at his girdle, especially in the vtmost ranks.

The number of targettiers I woulde haue encreased. Not one∣ly of such as haue targets of proofe, which are vsed of those that stand in the first rankes, but also of those that haue light targets. These would be made of wood either hooped, or barred with yron. It would be three foote and a halfe in length, (for that was the measure of the Romane shield) & two foot & a half in breadth, in forme ouall. A kinde of armes now disused, but most excellent, in all seruices, saue against horsemen in the plaine field. Against archers targets are a sure defence, and dangerous to the enemy, after that men come to close.

b Scipio with his targetters cut the Carthaginian archers, and slingars in peeces.c Targets are a good defence against stones in an assault, and whatsoeuer is throwen from hand. The same are very effectuall against shot. A small number of targetters if once they come to reach shot with their swordes, put great numbers of them out of the field. Put case that some come shorte; yet sure not manie, considering that onely the first rankes of shot can discharge, and that all doe not hit, and few mortally, especially if the first tar∣gets be of proofe, and the men march resolutely to the charge. Nei∣ther can shot retire where many of them are in the field, nor saue thē∣selues in any place, but targetters wil come to them. Targetters also are mortall to the pikemen, as not onely the Romanes dealing with the Macodonian and Germane pikes, but also the Biskaines

with their bucklers in the battell of Rauenna, and Cirignola de∣clared.

Targettiers in execution are singular, and ready, and light, if their targets be light, in following the chase. They may be vsed in all seruices and all groundes. In assaults of townes, and in sal∣lies: in fighting in open field, and in streites, in woodes and in hils: in retraites, and in chases there is vse of them. Pikes and horse∣men of which the French make such reckoning, are but for plaine ground, and for some few vses: shot can doe nothing in the crowde; for that they want defensiue armes, onely targettiers armed haue this priuiledge, that in all places, and at all times they may be em∣ployed of iudicious leaders. The Romanes with their great tar∣gets, and swordes, and iauelins which they called Pila subdued the worlde. Other armes as corsalets, and iackets plated, and morions were common to others, these were proper to the Ro∣manes, and those that folowed their vse of warres.a The aduantage of their armes experience prooueth to haue beene great. The Ger∣manes excelled them in strength of bodie and stature, theb Brytaines, Gaules and Spaniards, were superior to them in number, and equall in courage: but in their furniture, and armes, and manner of fight they were inferior. All Romane souldiers both on horse, and foote for the most part vsed a kinde of targets. But the light armed wanted maled iackets, and had lighter targets; as not onely ap∣peareth by their images in marble yet to be seene at Rome: but also in theirc histories. So would I haue our targetters, some armed with light corsalets, and morions, & heauy targets, other onelie with light targets & plated doublets sufficiēt to beare y^e thrust of a sword. And if thereto some had short halfe pikes also, the same woulde bee effectuall to throwe at footemen, and good to stand against horse∣men.

Halberds and blacke billes, pertisans, borespeares, and pollaxes, and all such like weapons to be vsed in hand, haue one and the same vse with swordes and targets. But neither are the men that vse them so well defended against shot and pikes, nor is that sort of wea∣pon so effectuall. If the enemy giue ground they are proper for exe∣cution; and may be employed in open field, in straites, in woodes, in assaultes, sallies, and many seruices. Their armes are eyther corsalets, and gorgerons, or plated doublets, or iackes with skirts

for defence of the thighes, and morrions on their heades. The Ro∣manes vsed few of these weapons. The Dutch place diuers rankes of them among their pikes, and commonly they are planted by the ensignes.

The shot is diuided into mosquetters, caliuers, and archers. The vse of shot is diuers. In open field therewith wee defend our pikes, and with the same offend the enemies pikes. Where the same hath a defence against the force of horsemen, it is verie profitably em∣ployed against them. In the defence of a towne, forte, or passage, it is excellent. Likewise for the assailantes therewith to cleare the walles while their armed men mount by breach, or by scale. But the same must take heede of the force of the horse, and charge of ar∣med men, which without defence of pikes, or other naturall wall, or banke, the same cannot sustaine. The force of shot is greater in skirmish, then in set battelles. For shot if they bee driuen to stand thicke haue no vse. As the vnprofitable number of shot at the battell of Moncontour, and Dreux: and other incounters in the late warres of France, declare sufficiently. As oft as the enemies shot make coūtenance to charge our armed men, so oft must our shot encounter them: and driuing away the enemies shot, are mortall, if they strike right & thicke, among the enemies pikes. For pikes against shot & arrowes, being heauy armed haue no defence. As the disastre of thea Lacedemonians at Pylos, of the Romanes atb Trebia, of thec A∣thenians compassed by the light armed Aetolians, of Titurius Sa∣binus and hisd company at Vatuca of the Almanes ate Moncon∣tour, where heauie armed men destitute of shot and light armed were compassed about and slaine by shot, archers, and slingars, doth declare. In rainie weather they cannot doe almost anie ser∣uice. Yet some say, that at Rocheabeille firelockes did I know not what seruice in the raine. But neither in raine nor out of raine are shot assured against horse, or targets, or armed men, but where they haue a defence and retrait. So that I maruell what the French meane to bring into the field so many shot, and so few armed men. At the incounter of Rocheabeille the Protestants had 14000. shot, andf scarce anie pikes. But percase they could not otherwise do.

Archers in assaults, and defence of townes cannot do like seruice to mosquetiers, and caliuers. For neyther can they hit so right, nor so mortally. In pight fields I thinke them nothing inferiour to them.

For being armed with iackes, as they shoulde bee, when they come to gripes, they driue the shot to his feete: and shooting ma∣nie rankes one ouer an others head twelue arrowes shall fall be∣fore one boullet. For onely the first rankes of shot discharge vn∣lesse they meane to pierce their fellowes. Nowe then that the shot are disarmed, and archers armed: who seeth not that two thousand archers in open field may preuaile against three thousand shot? espe∣cially seeing as archers may keepe ranke, and not shot, and archers may fight standing thicke, but shot cannot file their rankes, if they stand thick. Archers therefore in open field may be employed against shot, and likewise against horsemen, and pikes. But if against horsemen; they must haue a defence of stakes, or trenches, or pikes. And likewise dealing against armed men, they had neede to haue a front of armed men.

The archers at Agincourt field, and at manie other battelles haue made the name of this nation famous for the seruice they did a∣gainst the enemie. But then they had a defence of stakes and tren∣ches.a Cyrus in his array placed behinde euerie dozen rankes of armed men certaine archers: by which deuise when his enemies came to ioyne battell with him hee preuailed against them, not being able to abide the arrowes that comming ouer the formost rankes light in their faces, and other bare places. And therefore whatsoeuer some say of the vse of bowes and arrowes, which they haue not seene tried, I woulde that among others, our Gene∣ralles that goe in seruice into other countries woulde also employ some archers.

Great artillery against troupes standing thicke and in euen ground worketh great effectes. But in other places, and against men ranged otherwise, the sound is greater then the hurte. At Moncontour the Kings ordonance beating among the horsemen ranged hedge-wise, did not in twentie shot hit once. Neither did it anie hurte to the footemen by reason of the vneuenesse of the ground. For eyther it fell lowe, or high. If the same be placed in the front of our armie, yet can not the same be employed past one or two volies. For at the ioyning of the battell, it ceaseth. And if our men march forward it breaketh their arrayes. If the same be placed vpon some hill, yet lying out of leuell and shooting downe∣ward, it doth no great hurt.

But let it doe the vtmost that it may, being employed by iudici∣ous gunners: yet neuer was victorie obtained by great ordonance in open field, nor the force of the enemy comming resolutely to the charge thereby stopped.a Gaston de Fois sallying out of the Ca∣stell, tooke the towne of Brescia notwithstanding the number of great peeces that in euery streete were bracked against him. And little did the Spaniardes that sacked Antwerpe Anno 1576. sally∣ing out of the cittadell esteeme the peeces, that barked against them at their first sally. The Frenchmen although they had two and twen∣tie peeces of ordonance in their campe at Nouara, wherewith they thought themselues safely garded, all the wayes and accesses be∣ing by them flanked and beaten: yetb were they broken and put out of their lodging by the Suitzers which came against them with∣out eyther ordonance, of shot. If then in streetes, and waies where artillery hath greatest force, the same notwithstanding cannot re∣pel the force of a resolute enemy, much lesse vse hath it in open field. The Admirall after the vnhappy encounter at Moncontour with the reliques of his army,c trauersed the greatest part of France, without any one peece of great ordonance. Neither did his com∣pany being diuers times encountred by the way, therefore lesse ser∣uice. Very troublesome it is in carriage, and no lesse chargeable. Guicciardin reporteth that the breach of the wheele of a canon did so long incomber the whole army, that it lost a good opportunitie, by that delay. The vse of great ordonance therefore is first in garde∣ing of towns, or passages: some litle vse it hath in flanking the sides of our campe, or defending the streets, if we lodge in villages: se∣condly in battering of walles, or opening of passages. For without ordonance sufficient euery petit castle or town wil scorne vs, or braue vs. In our battery at Coronna wee felt the want of it, but more at Lisbon. The last vse is in the field either in the front of the battell, or vpon some hill vpon the sides. Where if we can see the enemies troupes, & hit amongst them, we shal make them change the ground. The great artillery of the French beating amōg the Italian horse in their campe at Rauenna, made thē come to fight with disaduantage. The which paine the French themselues suffered in their campe at Landresie being beaten by the imperials from a hill, where they had placed their great ordonance, as before I haue shewed.

Thus you may see, how as al weapons may be profitably imploied

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with good iudgement: so without iudgement they serue for no∣thing, but to make a shewe. Now forasmuch as Stratagemes doe worke as much as weapons, and make weapons more effectuall, and because the enemy maketh least resistance, when he is most so∣dainly surprised: let vs speake of Stratagems, and ambushes, which tend also to the obtaining of victorie.

CHAP. XIII. Of Stratagemes and Ambushes.

STratagems I call those deuises, whereby the Ge∣nerall doeth eyther hurte, or discourage the ene∣my, or helpe and incourage his owne men: so called because they proceede from the Generalles head and pollicie, whom the Greekes call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ambushes the Italians call emboscate, from whence both French and wee borrowe the worde. The reason whereof is, for that in woodes for the most part such trappes are laide. The Romanes doe better terme them insidias, and the Greekes〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for that wee doe not onely lay snares for our enemies in woodes, but also in hollow groundes, and also beyond hilles, and in val∣leis and villages, and townes, and behind walles, and wheresoe∣uer we can couer our men, in such sort that we be not espied vntil we come vpon the enemie vpon a sodayne. Stratagemes are infinite, and can not bee comprised within any certaine rules. For what can be so exactly saide, but that the wit of man is able to deuise more, and saie more? some I will set downe practised by famous captains in former time, that by them our Generalles of themselues may learne how to inuent others, and not alwayes kill the enemy with downe-right blowes.

One speciall and yet common Stratageme it is, to couer our counsels and enterprises by contrary pretenses. For by this meanes the enemy looking, or warding one way, is often taken and stri∣ken mortally in an other place, and by other meanes. Annibal taking his bedde, and giuing out, that hee was veriea sicke, which rumour flying to the Romanes made them secure, in the night time led out tenne thousand men, and comming on a

sudden surprised Tarentum. To the intent that his enterprise might not be discouered, before it tooke effect, he vsed diuers other pollicies. First he sent out diuers light horsemen to range y^e countrey, & to kill such as they met, least any should escape, and giue notice of his com∣ming, and that the enemy seeing them might suppose, that they were only certaine outriders. hauing an intention to surprise Puteoli, he gaue out, that he went forth with his army to sacrifice at the lake ofa Aruerne. But in the night hee turned toward Puteoli.b Claudius Nero caused a fame to flee abroade, that he went to the countrey of the Lucanians, when in deede hee went into the part of Gallia Togata, that is now called la Marca.

Vnder colour of treaty of peace, many practices of hostility are wrought. Scipio sending men to intreat with Syphax of peace, cau∣sed some to espy his campe.c Which gaue entrance to that enter∣price, which afterward he executed in the night vpon the same. Me∣tellusd treating of peace with Iugurtha, did by fayre promises cor∣rupt most of his folowers. Both which practices the Spaniards of late time haue vsed against vs. When they entend any dangerous en∣terprise, then it is bruted, that either the king of Spaine or their chiefe Leader is dead, or sicke. Vnder pretence of warres against the Turke, An. 1588. he gathered great forces against vs, and nowe I vnderstand that newes is come of great preparatiues in Spaine a∣gainst the Turke: that our eyes may be bleared, and not see his pre∣paration against France, or vs. By the same deuise hee surprised the realme of Portugal after the death of the Cardinal king. Vnder co∣lour of parley of peace at Dunkirke hee brought his Nauy vpon our coast before we looked for it; and I may say before some were well prouided for it. These pretenses though false, yet make shewe, and are beleeued of some, and take simple people, before they be prepared. For when Scipio had put men aborde, and prouided many things, as for a siege:e Syphax beleeued, that as the brute went, he meant in deede to besiege Vtica, but being in the night inuaded, and see∣ing his campe all fired; hee learned with the losse of his army one point of warre, neuer to trust the enemy, when hee giueth out such reportes.

Some vnder colour, and during the treaty of composition haue wound them selues out of danger. Asdrubal being taken by the Ro∣manes at an aduantage promised, that if he might be assured to depart

out of that place, hee would cary his army out of Spaine: but while the Romanes were secure, thinking that he would not stirre during the treaty of composition, the man by litle and litle had gotten out of the snare into a safe ground. The king of Macedonia sending messengers to treate with the Romanes for the buriall of his souldi∣ers, that lay slayne by their campe, in the meane time of the parley remoued his campe out of a strayt, and so escaped. The Massilians be∣sieged by Caesars souldiers began to treat of composition. But when by diuers dayes vaine talke they perceiued their negligence, and se∣curitie, they sallied vpon the sudden, and burnt their engins, & works, which cost them much labour.

Vnder colour of treaty of peacea Marcellus espied the walles of Syracusae: and another time entred the towne of Salapia, seasing a gate. Nothing is more commodious for dressing of enterprises a∣gainst a towne besieged. The L.b Grey by the trechery of the French entring the trenches, and ditches of Guines during the parley escaped narowly a great danger.

Rumours of succours comming encourage our souldiers, discou∣rage the enemy. Thec Romane Consull giuing out a report at the time of the beginning of the battell, that another army was com∣ming to charge the enemy vpon the backe, made the enemy hea∣ring it to doubt, and his own souldiers to fight more courageously.

Vaine shewes doe often deceiue the enemy. Caesar mounting cer∣taine slaues, and horse boyes vpon cariage horses, and mules at Ger∣gouia, and causing them to shewe them selues a farre off, made thed enemy feare least a company of horsemen were comming vpon them to charge them vpon the backe. Which being practiced long before against the Samnites,e made them feare, & looke about. An∣nibal not being able to force the garde that kept y^e passage of Calicu∣la, binding fagots on the heads of oxen & setting them on fire, driuing them toward y^e place, what through wonderment, what through feare, made them to giue way. Martigues seeing the inconuenience of his lodging neeref Pampron An. 1568. at the shutting of the euening caused all his company to displace, & went away safely, abusing the enemy with fires made, and peeces of matches tyed among bushes. which made the enemy suppose hee had bene there still. The which practice he seemeth to haue learned of Annibal, who fearing least he shoulde bee charged as hee remoued his campe, left diuers tentes

standing toward the enemy, & some souldiers & armes, as if the rest had bin stil there, which long before had gained ground, & were gone.

Wordes making for vs comming to the enemies eares doe often strike a terror in them. Quintius thea Romane Generall crying out aloud, that the other corner of the battel of the Volscians fled, made that where he stood to flie in deede. Valerius Leuinus speaking a∣loud, & saying that he had slaine Pyrrhus with his owne hands, holpe to discourage y^e enemy. Annibal causing one of his owne men in the Romane Generals name to command the Romanes to flee to y^e hils next adioyning, had done them some hurt, but that the guile was per∣ceiued. I haue heard some say, that a certaine voyce raised in the eares of the Scots at Muscleborough field, how their company fled, made them both feare, and flie. False sounds also & signes doe often abuse those that are credulous. Annibal hauing slaine y^e Romane Consul, with his ring scaled diuers forged letters, whereby he had deceiued some, if y^e other Consul had not giuen y^e cities round about warning of it. Hauing taken Tarentū, he caused one to sound an alarme after y^e Romane note, which caused diuers Romanes to fal into his hands, and the Tarentines to imagine y^t the Romanes meant to betray them. more harme it had done, but that the trumpet sounded vnskilfully.

Suborned messengers are dangerous, if credit be giuen vnto them. A certaine Lucanian while Annibal warred w^t the Romanes in Ita∣ly, led Sempronius a famous leader among them into an ambush, promising him to bring him to y^e speech of his countrymē, of whom he feined himself to be sent vnto him.b Annibal causing them of Me∣tapontus to write letters to Fabius, as if they were purposed to deli∣uer vp their citie into his hands, had almost drawne him into an am∣bush, where with his army he lay ready to welcome him to the towne.

Men disguised like women, or like countrey people, orc armed like the enemies entring within their strength doe now and then a∣buse them, and giue their felowes meanes of entrance. Ind these late troubles of France diuers negligent Gouernors haue by these practises bene surprised.

Enemies pretending friendship play many odious partes, & there∣fore not lightly to be credited. Before the battell of Cannae certaine Numidians suborned by Annibal, pretending discontentment, and seeming to reuolt from him, in the middest of the hurly burly char∣ged the Romanes vpon the backe, and greatly preiudiced them.

Ambiorix vnder colour of friendly counsell trayned Titurius Sabi∣nus out of his strength, and taking him at aduantage flew him, and most of his company. Such wasa Sinons counsell, who as Poets feigne betrayed Troy. To auoyde these traps, these rules are to be obserued: first nob counsell is to be trusted that proceedeth from the enemy: for who can beleeue that he will counsell vs well, that see∣keth onely to doe vs hurt? secondly if any reuolt from the enemy, yet is he not to be trusted, nor suffered to remaine among vs armed, especially if he may hurt vs.

Sometime the enemy by a feined retrayt is drawen into blinde trenches set with sharp stakes, and couered with earth, boughs, & hur∣dles, or vnder walles, or banks where our shot lieth ready for him, or els into any place of disaduantage, which was the ruine of Cyrus his army by Tomyris Queene of Scithia, and diuers others, that like blinde men folow where their enemies leade them.

In summe, whatsoeuer tendeth to deceiue, and abuse the enemy, or to incourage, & giue aduantage to our own souldiers; the same ought wise leaders to deuise, & practice. Prouided alway, that they neither breake othe, nor promise nor offend against piety, or the lawes of nati∣ons. Let such vile facts be practiced of Turks, & Spaniards, that hire wicked men to kill Princes, and mainteine no othe or promise fur∣ther then their profit requireth. Such, Histories doe feinec Annibal to haue bene; and diuers of the Carthaginians; andd Lysander a∣mong the Greekes, that tooke pleasure in deceiuing of men with great othes, as some take ioy to deceiue children with small toyes. The proceedings of the Romanes were farre otherwise. They dis∣alowed his fact, that would haue betrayed Falisci, and sent him bound to Pyrrhus, y^t for money promised to empoyson him. Neither dide Cepio the Romane winne any credit, by hyring the Lusitani∣ans to kill their Captaine Viriat. This practice of killing, the Spa∣niards learn of certaine bastardly Italians, a degenerate ofspring and race issuing of y^e vagrant natiōs of Lombards, Gothes, & Vandales, and off Perseus, that had murtherers hyred for wages to kil whom he should appoint, & would haue practiced his trechery vpon y^e Romans: a man of a base disposition, and vnworthy so noble a kingdome.

Those stragegemes commonly take effect, that are practiced in matters least feared. That which no man careth for, is neglected, and least can that beg auoyded, which is least feared, as

sayth. Cyrus by diuerting the riuer, entred Babylon a way that no mā looked for him: & Scipio passing the lake, tooke new Carthage.

Great are the effects that are wrought by deuises and surprises, but they are discreetly to be gouerned, least going about to deceiue the enemy, we be our selues abused, & intrapped by double practice, as thea Italians cal it. So wasb Guerchy, and his company ouertaken in the practice about the towne of Bourges, where diuers braue men lost their liues, while the enemy that knew the practice, was ready to receiue them to their losse. King Edward the 3. vnderstanding of a plot layd by the captaine of S.c Omar, for y^e recouery of Calais new∣ly by him wonne, turned y^e same vpon the heads of those, that should haue executed it, & surprised those that would haue surprised others.

Those therefore that in stratagemes & politike surprises folow the example of others, let them see that their case be like, & their strength equall, & that the matter be handled cunningly, & executed presently. And that y^e times be wel measured, that they come neither too soone, nor too late; in which case their enterprise vanisheth to nothing.

dAmbushes likewise well placed, and managed woorke the enemie great displeasures, not onely in cutting off straglers, and such as go on forraging, but also in troubling an army marching or fighting. Annibal in passing the Alpes lost diuers of his souldiers by the incursions of the people of the Mountaines rising out of their holes, & charging his army vpon aduantages. Sempronius as hath bene shewed drawne into an ambush was slaine with his company. The like happened to Marcellus the Consull going to view the side of a hill not farre off. But of this point I haue already brought ex∣amples sufficient, where I discoursed of the danger of those that marche in the enemies countrey, without diligent discouery.

Ambushes wel layd, that our souldiers may rise out of them, & sud∣denly charge the enemy on the back, or sides as he is fighting, are yee more dangerous, then those wherein he is charged marching, By y^e same Romulus ouerthrew y^e Fidenians: for placing part of his men in ambush in certaine thickets, and vnder certain hilles neere the town, & prouoking y^e enemy to come forth of the towne; he drew him along after him vntill such time, as hee was against the ambush:c Where turning backe vpon him, and causing those that lay in ambush to charge him on the sides, hee cutte many of the Fidenians in peeces. Annibal before he encountred the Romanes at Trebia, hid

certainea horsemen in the marishes, and bushes neere to the places where the armies were to ioyne. Whence rising vpon a sudden, as the army of the Romanes passed by them, they made a great tu∣mult, and slaughter, and were in part cause of the victory. With the like practice he entrapped the Romane army at the lake Thrasimene. Behind the hilles vpon the side of the place, where he saw the encoun∣ter would be, he placed diuers light armed: and beyond the playne he caused his horsemen to lurke in the valleyes. So that Flaminius was no sooner come to the charge, but he saw his enemy in front, on his sides, and on his backe.b Philopoemen charging the enemy with his light armed, and afterwarde causing his men to flie backe, while the enemyranne disorderly after the chase, hee receiued his owne men within the distances of his armed men, and with them cut in peeces those that folowed. Demosthenes (not the Orator, but a Captaine that liued during the Peloponnesian warre) fearing lest the enemy, that in number farre passed him would compasse him round about, and charge him on the backe; in a certaine valley, and bushy ground nere the place where the enemy made shew to giue the charge, ranged both armed men, ande archers, which in the ioy∣ning of the battel rising out of their places should charge the ene∣my vpon the backe.d Caesar by taking the top of the hill where the Heluetians lay encamped with part of his force, had giuen them a greater ouerthrow, then hee did; but that the mistaking of his men, made him loose that aduantage.

It is the part of a wise leader when hee pursueth, or coasteth the enemy to take the aduantage of woods, valleys, hils, strayts, riuers, and in all places to lay traps for him, that hee may neither marche, nor fight, nor lodge without danger.

But yet in dressing of Ambushes he is to take great heede, first that y^e enemy haue no notice of his purpose, & so prouide against him. For by this means traps thēselues are oft entrapped.c Corbey of Beauois lying in waite, where he supposed Caesars souldiers would come to seeke prouision, was himselfe and his company cut in peeces by a greater number then he looked for, which Caesar sent thither ha∣uing intelligence of the matter before hand.

Secondly those that lie in ambush must rise suddenly, and execute speedily and courageously, least the enemy putting himselfe in order, and gathering courage giue them more then they came for. Labie∣nus

had placed certaine felowes in ambush, that should haue char∣geda Caesars army, as the same passed by: but they came foorth so faintly, & irresolutely, that Caesars horsemen before they could doe any thing, had hewen them in peeces.

Thirdly let them beware least while they thinke to doe the feat, the rest of the enemies come on their backes, before they can dispatch. Theb Dardanians had well hoped to haue executed a part of the Macedonian army which they charged vpon the backe, as it pas∣sed through the countrey; but before they were aware, they were them selues charged by them that folowed after, and were taken as they say betweene the hammer and anuill, and well beaten.

Fourthly when a part of the army is sent to lie in ambush, the rest of the army ought to haue correspondence with it: that as those y^t rise vp in ambush doe charge the enemy one way, so the rest of the army may charge him another way, and alwayes be ready to succour their men. Which if they ofc Beauois had considered; they had not suffered their best men to haue bene cut in peeces without reliefe.

The reason that Ambushes doe preuaile so much are diuers: first the terrour that the same strike the enemies minde withall, comming vpon them vpon the sudden: secondly the disorder, and confusion that is in the enemies army surprised suddenly: and thirdly the vantage of ground, which they chuse, and the weaknes of the enemy where they charge him.

Therefore let all valiant souldiers to whom such executions are committed beware, how they protract time, or loose their aduantage, or by vntimely noyse, or stirre giue notice of their purpose to the ene∣my, or by stirring before the time cause the enemy to retire before he come within danger. By reason whereof I haue seen some my selfe, but haue heard of many more enterprises that haue come to nothing.

CHAP. XIIII. Wherein is shewed, how the enemy being vanquished, the victory is to be vsed, and the conquest mainteined.

HI therto we haue declared, by what meanes the enemy may be vanquished in open fielde: a marke whereat all valiant Captaines aime, and whereunto they addresse all their actions, and ••ounsels. Yet all consisteth not so in

victory, but that they deserue farre more commendation, that can vse it to purpose, and mainteine that which they winne.a Annibal had the happe to ouercome the Romanes in diuers battels, but he had not the wisdome, or happe to vse the victory. And diuers great victories hath God giuen to our nation against the Frenchmen, and many partes of France haue our ancesters possessed, but we could not vse our time, nor Gods graces: nor at this day haue we so much grounde in France, as to builde a fishers cabane in. Therefore seeing it is a miserable thing to say we haue had, when wee haue not, andb wise men no lesse consider how they may keepe, them winne: let vs see, if God would so much fauour vs as to suffer vs to winne any thing hereafter, how the victory may be vsed, and our purchase as∣sured. Least as the Spaniard foyled by sea, An. 1588. escaped with∣out pursuite, or memorable losse, saue of some shippes: so hee or any other might escape againe, so good cheape, and continually returne to inuade vs with hope of victory; at the least without feare of pur∣suite, or great losse.

Either the enemies army is altogether vanquished and dispersed; or els some good part there of is retyred entire, and whole. In both these cases what course the Generall is to take let vs nowe consider, beginning with the latter. If the enemy be not so vanquished, but that some part of his army remaineth sound, or at least vnbroken, then is the Generall to follow him, and vrge him while the terrour of the late affright is not yet out of his minde.

Caesar hauing obteined a great victory against the Heluetians,c ceased not to pursue the remaynder so long, vntill all yeelded. And afterward hauing foyled Vercingetorix in the fielde, and cau∣sed him to retire with the rest of his army; hee did notd leaue him vntill hee had forced him to take Alexia for his defence; nor then neither, vntill such time, as he had the towne and all within it yeel∣ded to his mercy.e Vanquishing Pompey in open fielde he would not suffer him to take Sanctuary in his campe, but droue him thence, and rested not, vntill he had taken his flight, nor before the reliques of his army that fledde to the hilles thereby, had yeel∣ded, being cut from water. Gaston de Fois hauing foyled the Spa∣niards at Rauenna did like a man of iudgement follow the reliques of the enemies army, the reason hee had no successe was, for that hee charged the pikes with his horsemen, which should haue bene

done with shot, and with small forces auanced himselfe too farre for∣ward, being so euill followed; which cost him his life. If he had char∣ged them with shot, and taken the way before them with his horse, or staied vntill he had taken them at aduantage in some straite, where they could not haue kept their rankes, or cut betweene them, and their victuals: without many blowes they had bene forced to yeelde. Scipio after he had vanquished Asdrubal in Spaine, and driuen him to retraite, he so followed him with his horsemen, that the man could finde no rest, vntill he came vnto the vtmost coast of Spaine. Those that after they haue victorie, giue themselues, either to plea∣sures, or to rest; for a small rest purchase to themselues great labour, and sometime losse. Ifa Pompey, after he had giuen Caesar two re∣pulses at Dyrrhachium, had vrged the reliques of his armie, not yet being recouered from their late affright, his successe had bene farre better. The Carthaginians not pursuing their victorie inb Spaine, after the death of the two Scipioes, but suffering the reli∣ques of their armies not onely to breath, but also to gather head, were themselues ouercome not long after by those, whome before they had vanquished. When such men erred, it is not maruell, if diuers errors were committed in these late French braules. After the battell of S. Denys, both Protestants, and the kings side departed quietly each from other: and at Moncontour, albeit the kings brother gaue the Protestants a great ouerthrowe, yet he suffered the Admirall to de∣part with a great part of his army, and to gather newe forces to re∣turne againe the next spring to fight againe.

But may some say, it is not good to driue the enemy to vtter de∣spaire, for that constraineth men to aduenture, and to try all meanes to escape.c Desperation (saith Liuy) caused the Aequians to aduen∣ture, and try their last refuge. The Hetruscians being entered the campe of the Romanes, and being compassed about without way to winde out, fought so desperately, that they slewe one of the Consuls, and many braue men, and had done much mored harme, had not some wiser then the rest, giuen them way to depart out of y^e campe quietly. Afterward of themselues they fell into disorder, and were ea∣sily vanquished by the horsemen, that pursued them. For this cause, Themistocles said, that a bridge of golde was to be made, for an ene∣mie that flieth, that he might depart quietly. All which I yeelde to be true, in such an enemie as flieth without purpose to returne, and

which cannot be broken without great danger. But if he purpose to returne, no danger is to be refused, nor labour to be shunned, that he may be broken: which in deede is no difficultie. For he that cannot re∣sist whole, can euill resist broken. And therefore this is a controuersie, without firme reason of the contrary cause. Yet in pursuing the ene∣mie, I would not haue him so stopped, but that he may flie, nor would I haue desperate men fought withall: but I would haue them with hunger, and disease, forced to accept of their liues, and so yeelding their armes to depart. Which if the French had practised in the con∣quest of Naples, they had not so ignominiously bene driuen out thence, by 3 or 4 thousand Bisognos, that they suffered to nestle in 2 or 3 out townes of the Countrey.

But if the enemies forces be vtterly dispersed, and dare not looke vpon vs in the fielde, then the next labour is to besiege their chiefe ci∣ties, and that presently while the smart of their woundes is yet fresh. Aswell ina good successe, as in bad, a prudent Capteine may not giue himselfe to rest. Masinissa by shewing himselfe, and his victo∣rious companie, before Cirtha, so terrified the same, especially vp∣on view of their king, that was taken prisoner, that the same yeel∣ded vnto him presently. Great is the terrour of a victorious armie, and sufficient to make any towne to yeelde. The Romanes by the terrour of their victorious troupes led by Quintius Cincinnatus, ob∣teined nine townes of the enemies in short space. Theb courage of the Volscians was so cooled, after their ouerthrowe by the Ro∣manes, that they yeelded their citie for feare, without any force. Therefore Scipio, after the ouerthrowe of Annibals army, brought his forces presently before Carthage, which he draue to accept of composition. If Annibal vpon his victorie at Cannae, had brought his victorious army before Rome, he had proceeded with more iudge∣ment. The Rhodiansc hauing vanquished the enemy in open fielde, spent time in taking of certeine paltry hamlets, and castles: where∣as if they had vrged the enemy, as they might haue done, they had taken Stratonicea the head citie of the countrey. There is no towne that dare holde out, without hope of succour.

But may some say, it is a hard labour, to take townes well forti∣fied, and manned, and stored with victuals. I grant, if armies that besiege them be such as ours, and so furnished, and the townes haue hope of reliefe. otherwise, asd Scipio said, it is a matter of more time,

then labour. For where the Countrey is spoiled, no townes can long holde out. But that may be done easily, where an army goeth vp and downe victorious without stoppe, or encounter. The reason that the townes of Holland and Zeland, haue so long holden out against the Spaniard is, that they haue both the sea open, and many good friends and fauours in England.

A victorious army not only taketh whatsoeuer towne it besiegeth, but also seaseth the whole countrey. Annibal after the victory at Can∣nae, possessed a good part of Italy. After the ouerthrow of their forces by Scipio in Afrike, the Carthaginians could not say, that they had any one towne remaining in obedience. After Caesars victorie at A∣lexia, almost all France yeelded it selfe vnto him: so well did he fol∣lowe the victorie against Pompey in Epeirus, against Scipio in A∣frike, against Afranius and Pompeyes sonnes in Spaine, that with one victorie he assured himselfe of the whole Countrey, and with one enemie fought no more, but once. The French by one victorie recouered all the kingdome of Naples, and by one ouerthrowe at Gariglian, lost it againe. Francis the first, by his victorie at Marig∣nan, came in possession of most of the Duchie of Millain, being o∣uerthrowne and taken at Pauy, he lost the same againe. The Earle of Warwike, after one victorie in the daies of Henrie the sixt, assured all England to his Prince. Edward the fourth, by one victorie recoue∣red the same againe: and if that our ancestors had well followed the victories at Cressy, Poytiers, and Agincourt, the French had not so easily dispossessed them of their holde in France. But what can∣not delaies, want of supply, and diuision worke in such cases? First therefore, the armie that is victorious, ought not to suffer the enemie to gather head, but to scatter his forces. Secondly, the same ought to besiege the chiefe Citie, and to sease the Countrey into their handes, not suffering the enemie in any place to rest. The French king after his victorie at Moncontour, besieging S. Iean d'Angeli, lost there the vigour of his armie, which might better haue bene emploied about Rochel. Thirdly, the Generals care ought to be, howe to take away the enemies subiects from them, and to depriue them of the aide of their confederats. A matter not difficult, if he proceede wisely in warre, and iustly after the victorie. for as good successe procureth to the Conquerour friends, so euery one abandoneth, and contemneth the vanquished. The

Capuans, and a great part of Italy, reuolted from the Romanes after the infortunate encounter at Cannae. Philip king of Macedonia, be∣ing ouercome by Titus Quintius, not onely sawe the departure of his confederates, and friendes; but also the rebellion of his owne subiects. After that the Carthaginians side began to decline in their warres with the Romanes; all their friendes forsooke them. The same disloyall dealing of subiects and friendes, Charles last Duke of Burgundy felt after his disastrous iourney against the Switzers at Granson. Hereupon Philip of Comines taketh occasion to tell a long tale, howe dangerous it is for a Prince to be ouercome in a pight fielde: at which if he had knowne ancient histories, he would not haue made such wonderment. For there neuer was, nor can be other successe looked for in such cases. Wherefore after the victorie, the Ge∣nerall is to practise with the friendes, and confederates of the van∣quished, and with good conditions to vnite them vnto him selfe. Heerein the opinion of the iustice, and good dealing of the Gene∣rall shall greatly further his desire; as is euident by the example of Scipio, and Annibal. For Scipio sending vnto euery Citie in Spaine, those pledges which the enemie had from them, and which he had taken from the enemie; he gotte him selfe much friendshippe: and Annibal after his victorie, dismissing such of the associats of the Romanes, as he had taken without ransome, and vsing them courteously, procured him selfe amongest them great credite of good dealing; so that many did adhere vnto him, and forsake the Ro∣manes.

Thus we see howe the victorie is to be pursued. Nowe therefore let vs see howe our conquest may be mainteined, and assured. For want of which consideration, we see whereto the victories of this na∣tion in France, and otherwhere are come, and how hardly and charge∣ably that which we haue remaining in Ireland, is kept in deuotion, and what is there to be feared, if euer any enemy with resolution and strength, doe there assaile vs. To keepe our conquest, there are two principall meanes both necessarie; Force, and Iustice: for neither without force can those that are rebellious, and desirous of innoua∣tion be repressed, nor without iustice can the peaceable be defended, or contented. That Empire (saytha Camillus) is most firme and durable, which the subiects do willingly embrace, and gladly con∣tinue. And hard it is to keepe men discontent long in subiection by

force. A countreya subdued, is kept by the same meanes that it was subdued; that is (saieth Salust) by fortitude, industrie, iustice. The vse of force is diuers: First, to repell the enemie if hee come a∣gaine, and to keepe him downe that hee looke not vp. Caesar vsed this course in the subduing of France, being alwayes readie to re∣presse the disobedient, and the same was vsed both in the subduing of Spayne and Afrike, and other countreys by the ancient Romanes. The French not hauing force readie in Naples and Milan, to encoun∣ter the Spaniards that came to molest them in their possession, soone lost prise. Secondly, force is necessarie to subdue rebels and muti∣nous persons, that may procure the trouble of the state. The Ro∣manes vntill the countrey was quiet which they had vanquished, and vntill euery husbandman and other fell to labour, kept an armie there continually: when the same was pacified, they brought away their maine force, and placed some of their souldiers inhabitants in some strong places in the countrey, which liued vpon the profites thereof, and yet kept the same in obedience. These townes they cal∣led Colonies. The Romanes hauing diuers times vanquished theb Volscians and Sabines, and yet seeing them readie to rebell, for to keepe them in order, placed Romanes in the towne of Velitri, and in the mountaines in Norba, to serue as castles among them. Afterward when they had vanquished thec Vestinians, and spoyled their countrey, consulting by what gardes they might best keepe the countrey in deuotion: They resolued to send two Colonies in∣to the countrey of the Vestinians, and the territorie neere the hill Falernum.

These townes being peopled with Romanes, and placed in countreys of new conquest, Tullie calleth propugnacles of the Ro∣mane empire. Tacitus calleth Cremona a fortresse andd propug∣nacle against the Gaules beyond Padus. This meanes also other nations haue thought fittest to keepe countreys in subiection. And therefore nothing among them was more vsuall, then to translate in∣habitants from one place into another. The kings of Syria hauing vanquished the Israelites, placed a Colonie in Samaria. The Athe∣nians taking the Islande Cythera from the Lacedemonians, re∣mooued the old inhabitants, and peopled it with their friends. And against thef Thracians in defence of their conquest, they sent ten thousand inhabitants into Strymon.

The kings of this realme peopling Caleis with English, kept the same long in their possession, which they lost not, but by force. If they had likewise peopled Rochel, Poitiers, Limoges, Burdeaux, and other townes with this nation; they would not haue bene so hard to keepe, nor readie to reuolt. not doing that, they did soone loose the same by treason. And if Colonies had now of late bene sent in∣to Ireland, not as now scattering and disunited, and few in number, but in good strength and vnited by lawes, and dwelling in townes as the Romanes did, I doubt not, but the countrey would bee better assured, and the charge farre lesser then now it is. For the charge of garrisons is great, the insolencie of garrison souldiers greater. And if an enemie come against them, their strength is nothing. If any man say, that it is hard to dispossesse the ancient inhabitants of the countrey out of their dwellings: he considereth not that rebels, and enemies are so to bee vsed; and that if they bee placed other where, it is of mercie rather then desert, which notwithstanding in all cases may not bee vsed. Hard it is, sayda Agesilaus, to be mercifull and wise both together. Yet if inhabitants when the time was, had bene sent into Ireland being voyde in some places, diuers English might haue bene placed without iniurie to any.

To maintaine a force therfore without great charge, the meane is to send Colonies of the English nations into the country conquered. But forasmuch as both garrisons, and sometimes greater forces are required for defence of it; the rentes of diuers cities, countreys and grounds are that way to bee imploied. And to this end the fruits of the roialties are to be conuerted, and corne and prouision to be laid vp in storehouses.

The Romanes taking that course, did in all places where they commaunded, finde meanes to maintaine their armies without a∣nie great exactions, yea oftentimes the fruites of the countrey were so great, that beside that charge there came much to the pub∣like treasurie.

Charlesb the eight of France, hauing conquered the king∣dome of Naples, and diuided the roialties, yea and the publike store among his Fauorites: when neede required, had almost no∣thing to maintaine his armie; and therefore as vnwoorthie of so good happe, presently lost the same agayne. Xenophon in the con∣sultation ofc Cyrus and Cyaxaris, sheweth that for maintenance

of the warres, and of countreys vanquishe: an armie must bee maintained, and that an armie cannot bee maintained, vnlesse the reuenues that maintaine it be certaine, and continuall.

That lesse force may serue; such as giue suspicion of reuolt, are to bee disarmed: soa Cyrus vsed the Lydians. The Romanes likewise would not suffer such as were their subiects tob arme with∣out their commandemēt. Futhermore, those that are like to prooue heads of factions, are to bee remooued out of the countrey: for sel∣dome doe the common people mooue, vnlesse they be stirred by facti∣ous heads. The Romanes hauing conquered the countrey of Mace∣donia, and conuerted it into a prouince, for more assurance of peace, brought away with them the lastc kings friends and Fauorites, and all his captaines, both of his armie and nauie, and likewise men of apparence and qualitie.

If so be time or sicknesse doe decaie our forces; the same are to bee supplied in time, that the rebellious take not occasion by our weakenesse to make stirres. For want of this consideration, in time past we lost our conquest in France, and all that want it, cannot chuse but loose.

For the rest, if the gouernours of countreys newlie conquered, be carefull and watchfull, & trust no man without cause, & vse equalitie in taxations, and do good iustice against raueuours, bribetakers, and rebels, they need not feare rebellion: if they doe not, all force that may bee vsed, will not long serue to keepe them in subiection. Thed Priuernatians desiring peace of the Romanes, and offering to yeeld themselues: being demanded how long they would keepe it, answered plainelie, that if the conditions were reasona∣ble, long; if vnreasonable and vniust, no longer then they were forced. For no people can long like of a gouernement, wherein they are spoyled, vexed, iniuried, and to say all in one worde, pilled, and ty∣rannised.

CHAP. XV. Containing a discourse concerning the meanes, whereby an armie that is foiled, or feareth to fight may most safely retire: and how the enemie in folowing the course of his victorie, may be stopped.

HOw an armie that is strong in the field, may safely march, fight with aduantage, and vse the victorie, I haue spoken sufficient. But because the successe ofa warres is doubtfull, and Mars (as Poets faine) fauourethb now one, then an another: To perfite this discourse, it remaineth that Ialso declare, how when blastes of winde blow contrary, wee may either retire from the enemie, that seemeth to haue prise, and fast hold on vs in marching or fighting; or els stop his course that hee proceed no further, or els our selues gather new forces.

It is a matter very difficult for an armie that is broken to rallie it selfe, and depart without vtter discomfiture where the enemie know∣eth it, and vseth his aduantage. For nothing can be more hardly re∣medied, then feare and disorder of the multitude, if once it enter throughly, or the enemie followeth speedilie. If the enemie giueth vs respite, or our forces be not altogether broken, the meanes to saue the rest, and succour those that retire, are these. First, if there be any ground of aduantage in the place, the same is to bee taken with that part of the armie that remaineth intire, which diuided into squa∣brons, may receiue their owne people flying within the distances, and repell the enemie from the higher ground. In the meane while, those that are in disorder, are to be brought into order agayne behinde those squadrons.

Thec Heluetians beyng wearried and foyled in the fight with Caesar, retyred to a hill hath by, and there making head, saued the rest. The forragers sent out by Cicero at Vatuca, being charged by the Germanes retired, and defended themselues well, as long as they kept on the higher ground. Atd Gergouia when Caesars men pressed by the enemie, and briuen from the higher ground began to flie, hee succoured them, and staied the enemies pursuite by pla∣cing other squadrous at the foote at the hill, with whom they had

no courage to encounter. Neither dida Pompeyes men that chased Caesars souldiers at Dyrrhachium pursue them, after that they once saw Antony comming with succour from the higher ground. If there be no higher ground neere to retrait vnto; the next course is for those companies that are pressed, to retire within the distances of those squadrons, that stand firme. For this cause the Romanes did alwayes so range their battels, that the squadrons of the first battell might re∣tire within the squadrons of the next, and both be releeued within the squadrons of their last. In the encounter at S. Clere Anno 1569, where the Kings Auantgard fled, the same was succored by the bat∣tell that followed, which so charged the Protestants, that pursued it, and draue them downe the hill, that if the Lansquenets that stoode at the foote of the hill had not stoode firme, many of them had there bene cut in pieces.

That aduantage which the higher ground giueth, the same a deepe trenche, or thicke hedge, or a straite like wise affordeth: so that if our squadrons, that stande firme be there placed, the rest that are discoura∣ged may runne behinde them, and take breath. The Romanes retiring oft times within the fortifications of their campe, haue there againe made head against the enemy, and saued themselues.

If neither the place where the army is ordered, nor the ranging of our battels do admit any such retraite: the last remedy is to auance forward either our horsmen, or some firme squadron of footemen, espe∣cially shot and targetters, vpon the flanke of the enemy that chaseth our men: and if hee stay not, then resolutely to charge him. In the meane time those that flie are to be rallyed againe. Annibal in that last battell which hee fought with the Romanes in Afrike, thrise ral∣lyed his forces, and so many fresh charges gaue he vnto them. If his souldiers had bene answerable vnto him, or els if the Romanes had not followed very orderly, he might percase haue broken them.b Phi∣lopoemen charging the enemy, that followed the chase of his men too egerly; did ouerthrow him. At Rauenna thec Spaniards that re∣mained after the battel vnbroken, retiring in good order, and vsing the aduantage of the ground, did so receiue the enemy that char∣ged them, that they slew the General, and diuers of his company.

Those therefore that retire, Iet them marche resolutely, and or∣derly: the shot let them approch neere to the flanks of the squadrons of pikes. There also is the defence of targetters against horse. The

pikes let them not disdeine the helpe of shot, and short weapons. The horse are to bee ranged behinde the squadrons, or on the flankes. Which if they be vnited in one body are not easily broken, nor rashly to be charged.

If being neere the enemy thou desirest to depart without fight, at least without Iosse, thy best course is to make him vncertaine of thy purpose, by pretending that which thou meanest not. By making of fires, hauging of matches in bushes, and standing of tentes, the enemy is oftentimes abused, especially in the night. That thy com∣panies may make more speede, thou art before thou beginnest to dis∣lodge, to sende thy hurt and sicke, together with the baggage and great ordonance before thee, and then to followe with the rest.a Cae∣sar departing from Pompey at Dyrrhachium, that he might not be charged at disaduantage in his marche, tooke this course. The sicke, hurt, and baggage of the campe hee sent away first garded with one Regiment. Other Regiments he caused to marche after them some good distance: with two legions that remained hee followed last. And hauing marched so much as he meant to doe that day, and making shewe to lodge there, when the enemy, that fol∣lowed was not aware, and vnreaby, hee departed presently, and that day got so much ground, that after ward hee ould neuer be ouertaken, before hee came whither hee meant to goe. If the enemy be ready in armes to follow, it is hard to goe from him, vnlesse the neerenesse of hils, or straites doe fauour thy retraite.

Lest thou be charged in retiring, with the enemies horse or shot, or disordered in some straite; great care must be vses. To represse the force of horsemen, vse either thy horsemen entermingled with some shot, or squadrons of pikes flanked with musquetiers: against shot, vse horsemen in the plaine, and shot and targetters in straites. If thou fearest to be charged in some straite, take the vpper ground with thy shot, and targets, and seeke those aduantages which before I haue shewed thee in the discourse of the vse of diuers weapons, and aduantages of ground.

To stoppe the enemies pursuite, where he must passe a straite be∣fore be come at thee, it is a good course to cut downe trees and woods, and to set them on fire. For horse will hardly passe through the fire, nor can lightly passe, but in hye wayes or made wayes. By this meanes Xenophon retired safe with his men fromb Dryla, and

thea Bellouacians escaped the handes of Caesar, in the warr••s of France.

Pompey being to take shippe at Brundusium, and fearing least if he abandoned the walles, Caesar would enter the towne, and charge his men, as they went on boord,b stopped and dammed vp all the gates and wayes saue one, and in the streetes made blinde trenches, staked them, and couered them; on the walles he placed his archery, and light armed for defence of them, vntill the rest were all shipped: when all the rest were on boord, then did these runne toward the porte, where there were boates and fregates readie to receiue them.

That there may be some ende of flying, either thou art to direct thy course to the hils, and there to make head, as aduantage is of∣fered vnto thee, or els to take some strong towne for thy safegard. The Romanes keeping with their army in the higher ground, wea∣ried Annibals victorious army, and cut betweene the same, and pro∣uision, So long as thec Gaules kept on the higher ground, and straited Caesars victuals, hee coulde not hurt them. D. Brutus in ta∣king of Mutina arrested Antonies army, that was going into France. The retraite of Vercingetorix into Alexia, stayed Caesar a great time in that siege, in which meane time the Gaules leuied newe forces. The siege of townes doe oftentimes, breake the force of an army. The Protestants finding no resistance in open fielde, were har∣rassed, and tyred out in the siege ofd Poytiers: and like hap had the aduerse party. For being victorious at Moncontour, they lost all vi∣gour, and strength at the siege of S. Iean d'Angeli.

That thou doe not receiue dishonour by retiring; two things thou art especially to haue regard vnto: first, that thou doe not leaue be∣hinde thee, thy sicke and hurt men; secondly, that thou doe not loose thy carriages, and baggage, nor leaue them. For without them, thou canst neither commodiously cary armes, nor victuals with thee, nor mainteine thy company.

To do whatsoeuer in this case is requisite, nothing is more auaile∣able, then expedition. By that thou dispatchest all impediments, thou winnest ground, thou preuentest the enemy, thou sanest thy selfe, and thy friends. And therefore if in good successe: much more in calamitie, ought we to vse all celeritie. Afranius being almost past all danger, yet for idlenesse suffered the enemy to come betweene him, and his retraite, whiche was his ruine.

These things they hinder and stoppe the enemies proceeding for sometime. But if thou meanest to driue him out of the countrey, or to hinder him for winning any more ground; newe forces must be le∣uied, and an army sent into the fielde, if not to fight with him vpon eauen grounde: yet to watche all aduantages, and to succour where neede shall require. Further thou must fortifie all townes neere, where the enemy lyeth. This was the proceeding of the Romanes against Annibal, and of the Gaules against Caesar. Philip the Kinga of Ma∣cedonia after his ouerthrow by the Riuer of Aous, encamped with his forces in tempe a place of very hard accesse; put gardes in the cities rounde about; and as any citie or castle was assailed by the enemy; so hee succourd the same with men, and other necessary prouision. But in this course two things we are to take heede of, first that we doe not take vpon vs to defend townes either weake by situation, or want of defence, or els that want things necessary for to susteine a siege. Secondly that we doe not suffer the townes that are besieged to languish without hope of supply, or succour.

For mainteyning of our credite with our friends and confederats, which commonly yeeld to follow the current of good, or bad successe: if in the fielde we receiue some checke, yet are wee as much as wee can to couer our hurtes, and diminish the credite of the enemies vic∣torie. Caesar hauing receiued some losses atb Dyrrachium, yet would hee not acknowledge them to his souldiers, but ascribed the slen∣der successe of his enterprise to errour, rather then to the enemies force. Vercingetorix after the losse of Auaricum, where a few one∣ly of many escaped, and that in pitifull plight;c apparelled them, and hid their deformitie, and diminished with the best wordes hee could the losse of the towne. The Heluetians likewise being foyled by Caesar at the passage of the riuer of Sone, did diminish the nomber of those, that were ouerthrowne, and assigned it rather to casualtie, then vertue. Nothing doeth mored discourage souldiers, then when they see the Generall himselfe by the greatnesse of the cala∣mitie discouraged. This caused the souldiers of Domitius to for∣sake him at Corfinium, and to yeelde the towne to Caesar.e Var∣ro the Romane Consul, discouering vnto the Capuans the wants of the Romanes, and the great calamitie they had receiued at Cannae, thereby thinking to mooue pity, mooued them rather to reuolt, as despairing that the Romanes could euer recouer themselues after

such an ouerthrow. Thea vgly sight of the Macedonians slaine and mangled by the Romanes, which in wisedome the king should haue couered, did greatly terrify the army, when to praise them, he shewed them openly.

Finally, as all calamities, ouerthrowes, and mishaps do proceed from contempt of religion, iustice, and military discipline; so there is no hope to repaire our losses, but by restoring the worship of God, by administring of good iustice, and strict obseruance of military or∣ders. The Romanes as they lost their city, and were ouerthrowen by the Gaules at Allia for their contempt of these things; so restoring matters to their ancient forme recouered the same againe, and after∣ward had great good successe in all their enterprises. Againe, when in the times of the latter emperours, that state was giuen ouer to all impiety, and iniustice, and vtterly neglected the lawes of armes, by which that empire had growen so great; the same fell into vtter ru∣ine. For who can expect good successe in warres, that neglect the worship of the Lord of hostes the supreme moderator of all warres? As long therefore as religion and iustice is troden vnder foot, and hy∣pocrisy, and shewes of ceremoniall reformation, and Iewish toyes goe for good religion, and the goods destinate to the seruice of God, main∣teinance of vertue, and learning, and reliefe of the poore, are made a spoile of harpyes and rauiners, and Gods ministers made a scorne of euery leud railing companion, and honors are solde for mony, and dis∣loyalty, and treason, and all villeiny redeemed with bribery, and glo∣ry is placed in stones, silkes, and strange fashions; and men of value contemned for pouerty, and vertue despised as dust, and wealth e∣steemed as felicity, and learning rewarded with almes, and valiant souldiers cast of with proud and disdainfull words, and base rascals command, and ouerrule vertue, and law with wealth and fauor; and mens skinnes are not valued at the price of dogges skinnes; and no man may do his countrey seruice, but he shall therein endanger his honor, state, and life, and no man careth for the common cause; but euery man abuseth his honor, and authority, either to enrich himselfe and his brats, or to winne money, and wealth, to spende the same a∣gaine in surfet, leachery, and excesse: so long neither can any nation haue victory, nor loosing can e∣uer recouer their losse

CHAP. XVI. Wherein is shewed how martiall men proceed in the sieges of cities or fortes.

THus hauing declared what practise of armes requi∣reth in accoiling the enemy that hasteth forward to the obteining of a full victory: I am now to returne to speake of him, that hauing driuen his enemy out of the field, maketh him to take sanctuary within some fort or city. for that is rather the beginning of victory, then the end of warres, and therefore may he not so suffer him to escape, nor lay downe armes, before he command as well in the townes, as in open field. Wherein that he may proceed orderly, and loose no labor, nor cost, which of all other actions of warre is greatest in sieges: (Thucidides reporteth that the Athenians in the siege of Potideaa spent abouea 350000 pounds sterling) first he is to consider what townes are first to be besieged, and assaulted: secondly by what meanes he may preuaile against them, and winne them.

Of townes therefore that do make resistance against vs, those are first to be besieged, where the General of the enemies is retired with his forces: if he be gone farre away: then we are next to beset those townes, which for their authority, or conuenient situation do cary with them the rest of the countrey: and if warres be so managed, that our forces will not serue both to besiege the capitall city of the coun∣trey, and to represse the courses of our enemies intercepting our vit∣tualles, then are we to go on forward orderly in the countrey, and to leaue no towne behinde vs, that may stop the conueyance of our victu∣alles. Caesar pursuing Vercingetorix made him take Alexia for his retrait, and there besieged him. Annibal to terrify the Spaniards, and to enforce them to submit themselues to the empire of the Carthagi∣nians, assaulted, tooke, and sacktb Carteia the principall city of the countrey, wherewith other small cities were so dismaid, that they submitted themselues, & paid such tribute, as he imposed on them. and translating the warres into Italy, he beset, and tookec Taurinum the head city of all the countrey at the foot of the Alpes, which made all the townes thereabout to yeeld themselues. The Athe∣nians inuading the Iland of Sicile, made the attempt against Syra∣cusae, being the head city of the countrey, first: which course both the

Carthaginians, and Romanes in the Sicilian warres pursued. The prince of Parma in the siege of of Antwerpe had like respect, and rea∣sons to make him begin there. for commonly all the countrey doth fol∣low the condition and proceeding of the capitall city. Lautrec in the enterprise of Naples, spending time in taking paltry townes by the way, when his purpose was to go directly to the siege of Naples, did tire his army, spend his men, and loose time, which the enemy spent better in arming himselfe. In our iourney to Portugall, many do likewise mislike, that setting our course for Lisbone, we turned aside to Coronna, which was no small hindrance to vs, and helpe to the e∣nemy. In besieging of small townes, there is often as much labour and cost, as in greater; and little or no gaine. Those therefore, that when they may goe to the head, are paltring about small townes, or castles, are like vnskilfull souldiers, that whē the hart lieth open with∣out defence, are still striking at the hand or foot. but if our force serue not to besiege the strongest towne of the enemies countrey, yet before we sit downe before any towne, let vs see what commodity we may get by taking it. Scipio considering that new Carthage in Spaine was a fit port for ships, and the store house of the enemy, and a place where his treasure and hostages lay, did begin the warres with the siege of that towne. Annibal made many attempts against Nola, and Naples, for the desire he had to haue a port in Italy, that lay com∣modiously against Afrike. failing of these, at length he got Taren∣tum, and Locri. For the same cause he made reckoning of Salapia. for it lay conueniently in the midst of the country, and was very com∣modious for the conueyance of victuals to his army. King Edward the third, after his victory at Cressi, sat downe before Caleis, for that it was a commodious port for his enterprises against France. Those that spend great labour in winning paltry hamlets, as did the French king that was also king of Poland, in the winning of Liuron in Dauphinè, although they winne the place, yet winne nothing but re∣pentance: and if they faile; scorne and losse.

Townes are taken diuers wayes: viz. either by siege, or by assault, or surprise, or by all, or two of these ioyned together. in euery of which, the proceeding is diuers, as the endes are diuers. The end of a siege is to strait the towne, so that either for want of victualles, water, mu∣nition, souldiers, hope of succour, health, or other commodity, the same be driuen to yeeld. The end of a surprise is slily to enter the

towne without knowledge of the enemy. The end of an assault, is to force the enemy to giue vs entrance. This diuersity of endes may teach vs both what to do, and what to auoyd.

The end of sieges being to force the enemy to yeeld for want: we are to vse all deuices and meanes to make him spend his store, and to increase his want. Alexander king ofa Epeirus, hauing a purpose to besiege Leucadia, suffered all the countrey people that would, to enter the towne, that they within might sooner spend their vi∣ctualls. When they ofb Alexia besieged by Caesar began to send out women, and children, and aged persons, such as onely serued to spend victualles; they could not be suffered to passe. The French king that now is, did otherwise in the siege of Paris, an. 1590, moo∣ued with Christianity, and pity. but the practice of warre required rather rigour in that case. Inc which hard it is, both to shew mer∣cy, and wisedome together. Where the defendants are not more po∣litike then ordinary; there the assailants may also by false shewes, and fained escaladaes make them spend their powder in vaine. In these late troubles of France, while the braue souldiers within a cer∣teine place, shotte all the night at certeine matches conueyed from place to place, and at an asse, or two, that made a stirre in the towne ditch, in the morning they began to yeeld for want of powder. Caesar by ad mine comming to the vaines of the spring that serued Vxel∣lodunum, tooke away the water from the towne, and so forced the same to yeeld.e Megabazus besieging the Athenians in the Iland Prosopis in Aegypt, by a deuice turning away the water that ran in∣to the hauen, where their ships lay, set their ships drie, and gaue en∣trance to his men, & tooke away all escape from the enemy, whose ships were on ground. The towne of Chartres in France had like∣wise for want of water, and other necessities bene driuen to great straits in the siege, an. 1568, the Protestants turning away the ri∣uer out of the channell; but that by conclusion of peace, the siege was broken vp shortly after. Caesar by keeping Pompey in a short com∣passe of ground, by his entrenchments had almost famisht all his horse, in which consisted his speciall strength. Which gard and dili∣gence if the Protestants, anno 1569, had vsed in the siege of Poi∣tiers, they had not onely famisht all the horse of the enemy, but other∣wise hurt him. but they did not so much as barre the wayes, much lesse other ground so, but that he sallied at pleasure.

There are two meanes principall to stoppe the towne besieged from victuals, and things necessarie, the one of which must necessari∣lie be vsed, if wee meane to atchieue our purpose: the first is to en∣trench the towne round about, if it be a land towne; if it stand vpon the water, then to cast a banke about it on that part that is toward the land, and with ships or boates, to garde and stop the way to the sea, or water. The second is to barre the wayes, and vpon all places of ea∣sie accesse to make in conuenient distances, sconces or fortes. The first is more laborious, but very effectuall: the second is easie, but seldome taketh effect, vnlesse time & the weaknesse of the enemie doe helpe vs. Therefore was that course alwayes vsed of antiquitie, this seldome, vnlesse it were of such as either knew not what to doe, or had not means to doe more. The Lacedemonians besieginga Platea, cast vp a banke round about the towne, the same they garded with turrets built vpon it in equal distances, and least any might climbe ouer it, they made a strong Palissade vpon it, and did sticke it ful of stakes. Theb Athenians vsed the same circumuallation about Potidaea, which they compassed round with a strong banke & deepe ditch. Be∣siegingc Miletū, that part that was toward the land, they compas∣sed with three bankes and so many ditches, and with their ships so crossed the hauen that none could enter or issue that way. Caesar v∣sed yet more labour in besieging of townes in France. Before Alexia first he made a trench 20 foote broad round about the towne. This trench was neerer to the towne then his campe by 400 pases. Be∣side that he made two other trenches without that, each of them was 15 foote broad, and behind the vtmost of the two,d a banke of 12 foote hie with a parapet, and crenels vpon it. For garde whereof he caused sharpe forked stakes to be made fast in them. Vpon the banke he built turrets round about, one of them in distance from an other 80 foote: in the ditches he pitched sharpe stakes, and them couered with hurdles, and earth. The ground betwixt the trenches he set full of sharpe stakes, and boords full of sharpe nailes with the points vpward: and all this frō his campe inward to the towne. The like trenches and banks, and turrets, he made round about his campe without, for defence against those that should come to relieue y^e towns∣mē without. Things now incredible to be reported but then cōmonly vsed. In few daies he compassed the citiee of the Aduaticans, with a banke in circuit 15 miles, in height 12 foote: vpon the same he

made turrets, & without it a deepe trench. The same proceeding he vsed in the siege of Vtica in Afrike, & long before him Scipio, besie∣ging the same towne.a Fuluius in the siege of Capua, toward the towne did make a ditch of a great breadth, and vpon it hee raised an high banke with turrets vpon the same round about the towne, and the like defences he made against the enemie without, so that not so much as a messenger could goe out, nor any succour come in for to helpe y^e townsmen. The same course another Fuluius vsed in the siege of Ambracia, as Liuie testifieth. The Gaules at length percei∣uing the great commodity that these works brought with thē in effec∣ting their purposes in sieges, albeit vnacquainted with labor, yet be∣siegingb Quintus Cicero his campe, cōpassed him in with hie banks, and deepe trenches, imitating all such works, as they had seene the Romanes to make before them. Annibal perceiuing that the castle of Tarentum which he besieged, had the sea open, perswaded the Taren∣tines to goe to sea, and to stop the passage that way, which if they could haue done, in the end percase they might haue preuailed. But the Ro∣manes were too vigilant, and sent them within succour in time. If Lautrecke likewise had compassed them of Naples round about with banks and trenches, and stopped the hauen so, that no victuals had bene brought into the towne by sea or by land, hee had not fai∣led of his enterprise in taking the citie. But now adayes our great commaunders thinke euery litle thing much, and our souldiers are so idle and proude, that they will not worke. If with certaine Pioners they cut the high wayes, and make certaine Barriquades vpon them, and erect fiue or sixe weake sconces which are euill ter∣med fortes being of no strength nor value, they thinke they haue done much, yea more then ordinarie, either by water or by land they leaue the towne open, so that seldome they come to the ende of their desires.

The French kings brother that was afterward king of Poland besieging Rochell, an. 1573. did not so much as cut the wayes so, but that the townsmen diuers times sallied out vpō him both with horse, and foote. Long was it ere his ships were come to barre the hauen, and when they were come, yet did they not so well gard it, but that both ships with munitions & victuals, and messengers entred & issued diuers times. At Poitiers besieged by the Protestants, an. 1569. mat∣ters passed farre worse. They neither barred the plaine, nor the waies

with any sufficient trenches: succours entred, horsemen and foote∣men sallied diuers times. To this passe idlenes hath brought sieges, that few take effect. But let not our souldiers be ashamed to doe that which the Romanes did, and practise of warre requireth. Nay that va∣liant prince R. Edward the 3, hath shewed them by his example, what they should doe. for besieging Caleis, he compassed it with a sufficient ditche, and banke, so that none could sally out, and for defence of him∣selfe, against such as should come with succour from without, he made the like workes outward, and in the ende preuailed. So likewise townes besieged are to be enuironed with bankes, and trenches, and with the same our campe is likewise to be fenced. The vse of the sea is to be taken from them with shippes, as Marcellus did in the siege of Syracusae, and Scipio in the siege of newe Carthage, and Vtica. If the same stand vpon riuers, the same are to be barred with bridges, asa Porsena practised in the siege of Rome, and not long since the Prince of Parma in the siege of Antwarpe.

If men will not take the paines to enuirone the towne with bankes and trenches round about, yet must all hie waies and streetes, and easie accesses, at the least, be well trenched and defended with bankes; and sconces built in diuers places for the hinderance of succours, and stopping of sallies. The Duke of Alua did so in the siege of Arlem, The Prince of Parma in the siege of Maestricht, and in diuers other places. Those which take diuers castles, or els newe builde them two or three leagues distant from the Towne which they besiege, thin∣king thereby to famish the Townesmen besieged, seldome effect their purpose. The Protestants, anno 1567, seasing Pont Charenton, Pont S. Clou, Busenual, S. Denis, & other places neere Paris, thought to keepe it from victuals, but the distances from Paris, and of one place to another, were so great, that euen the Countrey people pas∣sed out and in betweene, almost at pleasure. The practise of the Earle ofb Flanders, that tooke like course in famishing of Gant, in the dayes of Edward the thirde, was likewise made frustrate.

First therefore the townes besieged are to be enuironed either with a banke, and trenches, or els with sconces very neere to the walles. Secondly, the same are to be kept with strong gardes, and diligent watches, that none enter in, or passe out: for defence whereof, y^e banks are to be made high, and well flanked; & the ditches deepe, that they

be not easily filled.a Caesar lying before Auaricum, kept two legi∣ons alwaies ready in armes to defend his works against the sudden sallies of the Townesmen. And such was his garde and watchfulnes in his sieges, that albeit theb Aduaticans that were another time by him besieged, presuming vpon his securitie, had thought, during the treatie of peace, to force him to breake vp his siege by a sally: yet he had men sufficient ready to repel them. The Romanes neither in time of warre, nor truce, day nor night, were so secure or negligent, but that alwaies they kept good garde, and watch. Those that there in procee∣ded weakely, or negligently, haue endangered themselues, & bene oft times forced to rise without doing any thing. Lewis y^ec 11 of France, and Charles of Burgundy, lying in the suburbes of Liege, a towne by them besieged, without either good watch, or stronge garde, or defence, escaped very narrowly taking, by them that sallied in the night out of the towne. Amilcard besieging a towne in Sicily, was taken in his campe by those that sallied out vpon him in the night: which if his fortification had bene good, or his watch diligent, could not haue happened. Thee Athenians besieging Amphipolis, & lying without sufficient defence, or watch, were defeated by Brasidas the Spartan. By like negligence, succour, & victuals entred into Naples besieged by Lautreck; into Poytiers besieged by y^e Protestants; in∣to Rochel, besieged by the French king after y^e massacre, anno 1573. Philip of Macedonia, lying before Apollonia without suspicion, or de∣fence, against the enemies sallies, was forced to rise, yea and to runne, forced by the Townesmen aided by certeine Romanes. Francis the French king was taken, and his army defeated before Pauy, by those that came to the succour of the towne, which could not haue happened, if he had laien within any sufficient trenches, or had but well garded the waies, and passages. Trebonius lying before Massilia, hauing his workes and engins almost destroied and fired by the Townesmen, during the treatie of composition, teacheth vs not so to trust the ene∣mie at any time, but that we haue a sure garde, and diligent watch. That is the onely remedie against sallies from within, and succours from without.

Further, as we are by this meanes to proceede against the enemy besieged, so are we to take heede that by want, or disorder among our selues, we be not forced to depart with scorne. Caesar sate downe be∣fore no towne, but he knewe howe, and where to haue victuals, and

all prouision necessary for a siege. Thea Romanes going to besiege Capua, prouided corne and all things necessary, and tooke such order that both by sea and land they had supplies cōming to them. Caesar at the siege of Massilia, caused al stuffe necessary to be brought into his campe: neither victuals nor engins, nor instruments to worke withall, nor any thing was wanting. In all sieges the Romanes pro∣ceeded very orderly both in their prouision and gouernment. Their men lay dry in tents, strong within defenses, they had meate and vic∣tuals, the sicke and hurt had reliefe. But in our times, and also in an∣cient time for want of gouernement in these cases, many calamities haue happened, and many sieges haue bene broken. In the late siege of Rochel the kings souldiers for want of victuals were famished, for want of things necessary, and good gouernement, sickenes grewe a∣mong them. The same was the cause of the ruine of the army of Pro∣testants before Poytiers, of Lautrecks enterprise against Naples. Charles duke of Burgundy lying before Nancey, discontinued his battry for want of pouder: in the meane while succours came that raysed his siege. The siege of Charitè Anno 1569, was raysed be∣cause the Kings souldiers sate downe before it, before they had suffi∣cient prouision with them.b Amyntas lying before Memphis was discomfited, and driuen to raise his siege, for that his men were ran∣ging about the countrey, when they should haue bene ready to de∣fend their campe, and repell the enemie. The same error was com∣mitted by Francis y^e first of France before Pauy, who suffring his men to disband and straggle abroade, diminished his forces, so that he was not able to resist the enemy that came vpon him. In winter if that souldiers do not lye drie in their trenches, and lodgings, and haue fire: the weather and season forceth them to rayse their siege. This broke the enterprise of the English against Zutphan anno 1567. The same incommodities forcedc Caesar Borgia to rise from before Faenza well beaten with winter, raine, and foule weather.

Therefore ought wise Generals before they sit downe to besiege any towne, to consider the time, and to examine whether he hath suf∣ficient force and prouision to effect such a matter.d Many things are not to be attempted of wise leaders, yet being once begunne are not lightly to be giuen ouer, as Marcellus said. The towne of Secca in the kingdome of Naples being besieged and not taken by the French, assured that whole state vnto Cōsaluo, as saithe Guicciardine.

The checke we had at Coronna in our voyage of Portugall did not a litle discourage vs.aPerseuerance, and constancie in euery action of warre preuaileth much, but most in the sieges of cities, as is eui∣dent by the great patience, and constancie of Caesars souldiers in the siege of Auaricum, and Alexia. For many townes that by natu∣rall situation are inexpugnable, by hunger and thirst, and want of things necessary, are taken in continuance of time.

That the Generall may both prouide sufficiently, and know perfit∣ly how to encounter the enemy; it is requisite that hee not onely haue intelligence of his proceedings within the towne, but also of his suc∣cours comming without. For that cause hee is not onely to haue his espials and discouerers abroade, but also (if hee can) his in∣telligences within. Thebsuccours that came to Florence were by this meanes defeated, or euer they came neere. The Generall ought alwayes to be watchfull, yet shall these intelligences hurt him nothing.

That his victuals and prouision may come to him safely, the Gene∣rall that besiegeth any place, is to place garrisons in conuenient di∣stances from his campe, and to haue his horsemen to encounter such as lye at receite in the way. Thus by labour, and foresight he shall be able not ouely to keepe the enemy short; but also to prouide suffici∣ent for his owne people, so that hee may mainteine them in heath, strength, and good order.

Those that haue no firme hope to obteine the citie besieged but by famine, and want, ought notwithstanding, as occasion shall bee offered, to attempt the same by surprise also, yea and by assault. By surprise townes may be taken diuers wayes, sometime by meanes of intelligence with some friendes within the townes, sometime by Mine, sometime by escalade, and sometime by some priuie entrance. Intelligence is sometime procured by money, sometime by friend∣ship. Philip of Spaine hath no lesse of late time preuailed by money, then by force. Belike he hath learned of Philip king of Macedonia, that no castle is impregnable, where an asse laden with golde can be admitted to enter. Tarentum was taken by Annibal in the night, and againe recouered by Fabius by meanes of intelligence, which either of them had within the towne. The castle of Rome was bought by the Sabins in the time of Romulus. Byzantium was bought of certaine traytors by Philip king of Macedonia, But what neede

I bring examples of this, seeing now adayes the the practise of buy∣ing and selling of townes is a matter so common?

But let those that buy and sell, and likewise those that go about to surprise others, take heed first ofa double dealing, next that the ene∣my be not made of the party, and get notice of our enterprise. By double dealing many thinking to surprise others, haue themselues bene surprised, as before I haue declared by the example of the cap∣t••ine of S. Omar, that would haue bought Caleis of the Italian, to whom King Edward the third had committed it to be garded, and by the enterprise against Bourges, anno 1569, and diuers enterpri∣ses against Rochell, and Montauban, in these late warres of France. The surprise that Annibal entended against Salapia, was vented, and his men slaine that went about to execute it.bAppius Claudius thinking to surprise Vscana a towne in Illyrium (now Sclauony, while he neither kept pledges of the men that offered the towne, nor scut any espialles before, to vnderstand how matters went) fell into a trappe layd for him by the way, and lost 8000 souldiers. ThecSpaniards that thought to surprise Gifona a towne in the king∣dome of Naples, were no sooner entred, then they were cut in pie∣ces 500 of them: so were some of the prince of Parmaes souldiers vsed not long since at Berghenopsome.

The way to auoyd double dealing, is first to assure our selues by pledges of the wiues, or children, or friendes of those that deale with vs; secondly by examining those straitly, that seeme to make offer to giue vs entrance; thirdly by fending espialles before both into the place, and about the place, to consider if they can see, or heare any thing, that is suspicious. Fabius by strict examination of the messenger, vnderstood the treachery of them of Metapontus, that vnder colour of deliuering vp the towne, would haue drawen him into a trappe.

That our enterprise be not discouered, great celerity, and cau∣tion is to be vsed, when wee goe about to take a towne by surprise. Matters long in hammering, seldome take effect. While Marcel∣lus lingred in making his preparatiues to surprise Syracusae, in the meane time his partisans were discouered and slaine, which also happened in a certeine enterprise of the Protestants against Lyon; and of the Kinges side against Rochell in these late brabbles of France. Further wee are to chuse such a time of the night, and

such weather, as may best couer our desseins. Those that take our part within the towne are to be admonished, that they doe not be∣wray themselues by meetings, or words, or signes, that may be suspi∣cious. we must also take heed, that our company that are employed in the enterprise, do not giue any signe, or make any vntimely noyse, whereby the enemy may haue notice of our purpose. Theatowne of Diepe had bene surprised by the Protestants, an. 1569, had not one witlesse companion discharged a pistole, the sound whereof gaue the alarme in the towne before thinges were ready. Another time by fiering a chapell, the Protestants going to surprise a place, gaue the enemy notice of their comming, and leasure to prouide to enter∣teine them. Finally, appointment is iustly to be kept with our par∣tisans in the towne: we may neither come too soone, lest we be espied; nor stay too long, lest the matter be marred for want of correspon∣dence. At Lusignen, an. 1569, the faction of the Protestants disco∣uering themselues before their companions without were come, lost themselues, and marred the matter, that otherwise could not, but haue taken effect. Those that surprised the castle of Sancerre presently af∣ter the massacre of the Protestants in France, not being succoured at the time appointed, were glad to lay off holde, and to runne away.

The towne ofbVeij was surprised by Camillus conueying his souldiers into the towne vnder the ground through a mine.cSer∣uilius likewise by a mine entred the castle of Fidene. Chelar a towne in Viuaretz, in these late troubles of France, was taken by a caue that went out of the towne vnder ground to a place a prety way off. How we make mines for the most part to ruinate walles by force of powder: yet may mines be well employed to enter the towne by surprise, for conducting whereof, those that are skilfull are to be em∣ployed, that it may be digged deepe enough to go vnder the ditch, and foundation of the wall, that it be opened in the towne where there is least suspect, that the same be well vnderpropped, that the earth fall not, that the earth be conueyed away within some trench or hollow place, and that by some other worke the worke in the mine may be concealed & couered. Mines made to ouerthrow the walles ought to be made crooked, but this may be made strait, and either with one or two entrances▪ but if it be well made, if it serue not to enter the towne, it may yet serue to ouerthrow the walles. Before thou beginnest to mine, consider whether the ground be such as may be wrought. if it

be a rocke, it cannot be wrought for hardnes; if it be full of springes, then water will marre thy woorke. In both these cases, thou loo∣sest thy labour. But more shalbe said of mines, when we shall come to intreate of ruines of walles, and breaches.

Where the enemie is secure, or negligent, the Towne may percase be surprised by Escalade. Which, y^t it may take effect, diuers things before hand are to be prouided, and considered. Ladders are to be first prouided both for number, length, forme and strength sufficient: the want of ladders, cost the present French King, the losse of an opportunitie in taking Paris. Next, such places as seeme to giue most easie accesse, are to be viewed, & chosen: the ditche also is to be soun∣ded, if there be water in it, least it be too deepe: against that time of the night, when men are most quiet, our things are to be made ready: the season that is most troublesome, and darke, is fittest for our en∣terprise: sometime the state of the Townesmen giueth vs opportu∣nitie to enter. Syracusae was taken by Marcellus, while the soul∣diers and Citizens lay drunke in one of their solemne feastes. The Towne of Cales likewise was surprised byaEscalade vpon a feast day at night, when the Citizens were most secure. The Turkes vn∣derstanding the disorder of Christians in their carneuall (we call it shrofetide) chose that time tobscale a strong Towne in Sclauony, and while the Citizens lay sleepy, and drunke, entred the same. Of all the times of the night, and houre before the dawning of the day, is most fit for surprises. At that time of the night Fabius scaledcArpi. Argentueil a Town in France, a little before the dawning of the day, was scaled, and entred by the Protestants anno 1568. and by like surprise, and about the same time they tooke also Vezelay. For when men haue watched a great part of the night, and looke presently to be relieued, then are they most sleepie, and negligent: and after that the Towne is seased in the night, the day presently appearing, giueth vs meanes to assure it, and settle matters.

Diuers not measuring of times, nor duely considering these mat∣ters, haue lost great opportunities. Charles Duke of Burgūdy by thedshortnes of his ladders fayled of the taking of Beauuois. The like ouersight, as some say, hurt our men in the scaling of Lieth, in the be∣ginning of the Queenes reigne. TheeThebans entring Platea in the night, not being succoured according to their appointment, were cut in pieces by the Townesmen in the morning. Whether a

man come too soone, or too late, all is one; for if that in such cases there be not good direction, execution, and correspondence; such en∣terprises commonly come to nothing. A small error in this matter, was the cause of the death of that valiant knight syr Martin Skinke, and of the breaking of the enterprise against Neumegen.

Some haue had good hap to enter Townes by wayes not suspect, as Cyrus entred Babylon by the riuer, Scipio entred new Carthage by the lake; which the Townesmen thought a matter impossible. The Venetians tookeaBrescia from the French, entring by a grate through which the riuer issued. The Protestāts by a grateblikewise entred Nismes an. 1569. But they that followe their examples, had need to vse like diligence & speed. They chose a blustring season, & a darke night: those that entred by the grate, slewe the watch, and recei∣ued their companions in at the gate: other companies were ready to assure the Towne, which they had seased. There was good correspon∣dence betweene all parties, secrecie in proceeding, resolution in exe∣cuting. Of late time posterne gates haue beene broken open, some by gunpowder, conueyed betweene boordes and the gate; others by pe∣tars; and so diuers Townes haue bin entred, and surprised: but the Townesmen must be very weake, and negligent, and the execution very speedy, and secrete: or else such executions seldome take effect.

After that the Towne is entred by surprise; let them that are en∣tred vse diligence, and good order, that they be not themselues ei∣ther presently driuen out, or soone after surprised. Their course is first to assure themselues of the gates, walles, and rampars by pla∣cing sufficient gardes there, and next to sease the market place, and other open places with strong squadrons: the rest of the companies are to beate the streetes, and to sease such as canne make resistance against them. Hauing beaten the Townesmen, that themselues bee not beaten out, they are to prouide both men, victuals, and mu∣nitions; that which is in the Towne they are to saue, and make store of it; and lastly, to set good order for the defence and gouerne∣ment of the place surprised. Whosoeuer fayleth in any one of these pointes, encurreth oft times no small danger.

The Thebans entering into Plataea, and not assuring themselues of the gates, or of the principall Townesmen before their weake∣nesse was espied, were most of them slaine, and the rest forced to leape the walles. Alexamenuschauing slaine the tyrant Nabis, and

taken the Towne of Sparta, while he should haue seased the walles and chiefe places, and set order for the defence of the Towne, him selfe spent time in searching out the tyrants treasures, his souldiers in seeking pillage, in which meane time the enemie gathering together some force, charged him in this disorder, and in a short space cut him and his companie in pieces. In the late braules of France,aColombel hauing surprised Esscilles, a strong Castle in the frontiers of Dauphinè, lost the same within fewe dayes after, for that hee had no care to furnish it with souldiers, and victuals. Bou∣leybhauing after a long caualcade, spoyled the Towne and Faire of Milly, stayed too long in his returne, which gaue the enemie ley∣sure to sease vpon him, and make him paye his life for that he had taken. The Duke of Orleance hauing surprisedcNouara, soone lost the same againe, for that hee neither prouided more victuals, nor saued those that hee found in the Towne, nor set order for the go∣uernment of the place. Which ouersight was the cause of the losse of Naples vnto the French king Charlesdthe 8. for giuing away all the victuals that were in the newe Castle, vnto one of his courtly beggars, afterward when the Towne was besieged by the enemie, his souldiers albeit they begged apace, could not tell where to haue a bisket cake, or other victuals.

By diuers other meanes Townes may be surprised, as by men dis∣guised in womens apparell, or by souldiers disguised like clownes, or by men hid vnder strawe in cartes. Demetrias was surprised vnder colour of bringing home of a chief Citizenefrom banishment. For while his friends welcommed him home, some of his traine seased the gate, which hee together with his company defended, vntill certaine troupes of horse placed not farre off, came to them. But hee that knoweth these, and howe to proceede therein, can deuise more, and may therein see howe to proceede.

If the Towne be strong, and hard to be forced, the safest way is to proceede by siege, and surprise: if in iudgement of men experiemented the Towne be weake, and easie to be forced, he looseth time that sit∣teth about it, that by force may enter it. Those Townes I accompt hard to bee forced, whereunto eyther for height, or for water, or o∣ther inconuenience the souldier canne hardly come. A Towne si∣tuate vpon a rocke which is well walled, and flanked, can hardly be assaulted. For such grounde can neither bee mined, nor trenched.

Other Townes that are placed in eauen ground and good soyle, al∣though they be strongly fortified, yet either by breache, or scale, or mine may be entred, especially where the souldiers are neither ma∣ny, nor skilfull, nor resolute. Of such Townes that are neither well flanked, nor well manned, there is no doubt to be made, but that by a resolute charge they may be wonne.

The course that is commonly and best to be vsed in assaulting of Townes is this: after that the Generall commeth in viewe of the Town, that he determineth to assault, let him send his campe-master, or some other speciall mea of iudgement before with his horsemen, se∣conded with shot, and targets, to viewe the walles of the Towne, and the ground without the Towne, where the batterie may most com∣modiously be made, by reason of the weakenes of the walles, or ea∣uennes of the ground. If he cannot approche with his horse, he may then vse his shot, and targets, to beate those that wil offer themselues to hinder the discouery. That he faile not in iudgement, he is to vn∣derstand, that where the walles are hie, or weake, or destitute of bul∣workes, or flankers, and the ditche is narrowe, and drie, and y^e ground within and without plaine and eauen; there is a good place to make a batterie. Yea albeit the wall be strong and well flanked, yet if there be no weaker place, I would not haue him doubt to chuse that place to plant his artillery in. If by espials we vnderstād where y^e ground, and the defenses of the Towne giue vs best commoditie to make a breache, then there needeth no great viewe, but onely to see whether it be as is reported. The quality of the ground would also be consi∣dered, whether it be hard, or soft; plaine, or hilly; dry, or miry; and such like, that after the batterie once begunne, we be not driuen to re∣moue our pieces.

This being reported to the General, he is to cause the great ordo∣nance to be drawen toward the place; so that about the shutting of the euening the same may be within mosquet shot, yet couered from the Townesmens viewe, if it may be. With the same are two strong squadrons of shot to march, seconded with halberds, and targets, and supplied with some horsemen. The rest of y^e army diuided into foure partes, are to take their lodgings in foure partes rounde about the Towne. Somewhat farre from the walles, vnlesse they may couer themselues with some hill, from their shotte, or that there be Sub∣urbes about the Towne. That night euery part is to fortifie their

lodgings with trenches, palissadaes, barriquades, or such meanes as they haue.

When the day is gone, let all the souldiers that may bee spared, and for default of them, let pioners carry baskets and earth to the place chosen to plant the artillery in, that may not be aboue sixtie, or seuentie pases from the wall. There diuiding their baskets into so many partes as the master of the Ordonance purposeth to di∣uide his piecies into: let them beginne to fill their baskets ran∣ged in order as fast as they can. That they bee not molested in their worke, the squadrons of shotte sliding along by their sides, and shoo∣ting against such as shewe themselues from the walles, are to pro∣uide: against sallyes the targetters, and halberdes, are to defende them. When the baskettes are filled: then they may range their pieces behinde them. But if the baskets bee not defence suffici∣ent, as seldome they are against great shotte: then vnder couer of the baskets they are to beginne a trenche, casting the earth inwarde towarde the pieces to serue for a banke. The same trench would bee made along the curteine of the wall, the endes of the banke bending inwarde, that there the artillery may bee placed, that shooteth on slope to the curteine, and direct against the bul∣workes, or flankers.

For defence of the artillery, and those that are placed there to garde it on both sides, reason requireth, that the banke bee made with diuers corners, and that the whole compasse of grounde where the artillerie standeth, bee intrenched: but so, that there bee issues left for those within to goe within the tren∣ches, and without them. Vpon the banke, there woulde a suffici∣ent parapet bee made all alongst where the canon is ranged: fifteene or sixteene foote in newe earth is little ynough: in that the holes for the canons are to be left. In other places if the parapet bee three or foure foote thicke, it is sufficient. All along this banke, and along the trenche, are mosquetiers, and other shotte to bee ranged. The broader the trenche is, the better it will serue to co∣uer our men.

To effect this speedily, many handes are to bee employed. If there be conuenient speede vsed, the ordonance woulde bee ready to speake the next morning. But for that it is not possible, that men shoulde worke all the night, neither conueniently watche all

night: therefore both shotte, and targetters, and such as worke the first part of the night, would be relieued at midnight, and others sent in their places both to worke, and to watch.

The artillerie is to be ranged in three places. Two fourth partes woulde bee placed direct before the cortine of the wall; of the other two partes, one woulde be ranged some pretie distance off, with the noses of the pieces pointed towarde the flankers, if any be of the one hand, the other toward the bulwarks, or flankers on the other hand. Yet sometimes they may hit slope wise in the cortine of the wall, and those that are pointed against the cortine nay be discharged against the shoulders of the flankers.

If with thy pieces thou canst not see the foote of the wall, then before thou beginnest the batterie, thou must cause the counter∣scarpe, or grounde betwixt thee and the wall to bee opened, and the earth cast into the ditche of the Towne. That is to be done both before the cortine, and before the flankers. If thou doest not hitte within two foote of the bottome of the wall, thou doest but waste time, and powder. That the canon may bee mana∣ged with more ease: if the soyle bee soft, thou art to make a sole of plankes, somewhat encliuing toward the wall, for the same to runne vpon.

This being done, which is principall, wee are to dresse a mount, or caualier, as they call it, some hundred paces from the wall, or neerer, directly looking along the wall where the breach is to bee made, there placing foure or fiue pieces of artillerie, wee may beate those that present them selues to the breache to defend it, or repaire it. By the same we may discouer those that are vpon the bulwarkes, or goe in the streetes, or within worke a∣bout the breache. And therefore where the grounde afoordeth vs commoditie we may not forget to rayse such a mount, and make it formall for height, breadth, and length, with his stayres, parapets, and places for the corps de garde, that defendeth it.

So soone as the artillery is placed, and fitted, so soone the same ought to beginne to speake, and that without intermission day, or night, vntill the breach bee made reasonable, and the defences and flankers bee broken. The continuance of the batterie, and the artil∣lerie that beateth in flanke together, with the mosquetiers being placed where they may discouer the breach, doeth hinder not onely

the repayring of the breach, but also the retrenchement behinde. If thy batterie once cease, thy labour and charge increaseth. Nothing hurt Monluc more in the siege of Nyort, nor la Chatre in the siege of Sancerre, then the discontinuance of the batterie which happe∣ned by reason of want of powder. Sausar remouing his batterie at Vezelay, confirmed the Townesmen to holde out, whose heartes before fainted. Nothing did more helpe them of Rochel in the last siege, then the frequent intermission of y^e batterie. By which meanes they made defences stronger, then the walles were before.

The more artillerie is employed, the more speedy and forcible, and lesse chargeable will the battery be. The Turke in the battery of Vienna, employed aboue threescore canons, culuerins, and other pieces. At Rochel the king had fourtie, and the prince of Parma litle lesse in the siege of Scluse. He that employeth lesse then twenty can∣nons, and other pieces, cannot looke for any good effect. That some hoped with foure small pieces to batter the walles of Coronna, was without reason. Yet I will not deny, that in these late troubles of France, the Protestants with three or foure pieces tooke diuers Townes. For where the walles are bad, and within them no defen∣dants; it is not hard to take Townes either with a fewe pieces, or without pieces. But where there are men within, and walles suffici∣ent, it is better to make no battery, then a battery not sufficient.

The great artillery being placed: the canoniers are to place their pouder in safe places, and to make their bollets, rammers, waddes, charges, matches, and al these instruments fit, and ready before they begin their worke. What is the leuell, randon, charge, and effect of euery piece, euery canonier either knoweth, or ought to knowe. And therefore I neede not spend time about the declaring thereof.

While the canon is in placing, and the batterie in making, al those souldiers that are not employed about that worke, are to fortifie their quarters with bankes, trenches, and barriquades, and to barre and trenche the wayes, and to keepe good garde, or watche, that none en∣ter, or sally out: that if not with assault, yet for feare of want, the Towne may be forced to come to reason.

That against the breach bee made, all things may proceede or∣derly, ladders, mantellets, and targets, and all things requisite for the assault are to be made ready; and to bee deliuered to the com∣panies, that are to vse them.

If there be any time remayning, the same is to be employed in making of trenches, and parapets, along the enemies counterscarpe, likewise in stopping all the auenues, and wayes, whereby any may come to the succour of the Towne.

The horsemen and footemen, that may be spared from the campe, are to range the countrey, to discouer, to represse the enemie, to con∣uey victuals to the campe. All which may be done easely, if there be no time lost, nor any disorder in proceeding.

If the ground be fit to be wrought; from the trenche behinde the counterscarpe, it is no hard matter to carry a mine into the Towne, or vnder the walles. The earth, that cōmeth out of the mine, being cast into the ditch, or vp to y^e banke, shall seeme to come out of the trench, especially where there is continuall working. In making of mines, obserue these rules: first worke not, if the ground be full of springs, or rockes. TheaMacedonians going about to vndermine Lamia, were frustrated of their purpose, encountring with rockes. Second∣ly beginning to digge, make the mine crooked, that the force of the powder be not broken hauing vent backward. Thirdly see that the distance from the entrance to the wall be well measured, least the powder be placed either short of the wall, or beyond it. Arri∣uing to the foundation of the wall, the miners are first to make a broade place along the foundation of it, and to vnderproppe the earth well, that it fall not: secondly they are to place their barrels of powder, with their heads knocked of, and bored through with di∣uers holes, and to strawe powder vpon the bordes where the bar∣rels stand. Thirdly they are to conuey a match well boyled in gun∣powder in a pipe of wood, or betweene boordes, and therein also to make a traine of gunpowder from the place where fire is to be giuen to the barrels: their next care is to see the mine well stop∣ped and rammed, that the fire breake not out backward. Lastly, when men stand ready to goe to the assault, yet without danger of the mine, and when the defendants approche the breach, the fire is to be giuen. Any of these points neglected, doeth frustrate or hinder the effectes of the mine. At Rochel the place where the powder was placed being too narrow, and y^e entrance not wel stopped, y^e mine did no great effect. In y^e same siege the souldiers not being retired, when fire was giuē, many men lost their liues by their owne mine. At Co∣ronna the mine being direct, & not well stopped, y^e force of it brake out backward.

Before the assault be giuen, the breach is to be viewed, whether it be reasonable; likewise some men of iudgement are to consider, whe∣ther the flankers be ruinated sufficiently. These things appearing, and the ditch made passable; the assailantes are to march to the breach in this sorte: first certaine targetters, well armed, and with them the ensignes: after them halberdes, and pikes. On the flankes of the targetters, and somewhat before them all along the counterscarpe are shot to be placed, to beate them that offer them∣selues to the defence of the breach and wall. These are to be secon∣ded with other targetters, halberdes, and pikes; with shot like∣wise on their flankes. At the same time, if there be other breaches in the bulworkes some are to march to them also ranged in like sorte. The distances of men marching to the breach are small, for they are to march so thicke, as they can one by an other, being first to enter, & then to fight. The thinner they go, the more open they are to the e∣nemies force. In these late warres of France commonly shot hath beene placed in the first rankes of those that went to the assault, and therefore no maruell, if they neuer preuayled, where there was anie resistance. But they could not do otherwise hauing so few armed men. At that instant when the assault is to be giuen at the breach, other companies are to be appointed to scale in all places of easie ac∣cesse. The same wil trouble the enemy much, and diuert his forces. In scaling this rule is to be obserued, that while the targettiers goe to the walles, the shot beate them that stand vpon the walles.

That there may be supply where neede is, the whole army at the time of the assault is to be brought into armes, and euerie man to haue his charge assigned. Some to defend the lodgings, against a∣nie sodaine stirres: some to discouer: others to stand in their places appointed, eyther to pursue the victorie, or to fauour the retraite of their fellowes, or to go where they shalbe appointed. The more force is employed, the weaker will be the enemies resistance.

Those that purpose to preuaile by assault, are to cōsider further both time, & place, & other circūstances. To giue y^e assault, that time is most proper, whē the enemy is least prouided, which cōmonly is at y^e daw∣ning of the day, or at noone time. In theasiege of Heraclea the assai∣lants making fained shews 2. or 3. days of cōming to y^e assalt, & yet doing nothing, made the defendants so secure, that whē they came indeed with al their forces, they found them vnready, & so entred.

In the place where wee purpose to shew out vtmost force, there least noise and shew is to be made, and contrariwise greatest stirre where we meane to do least.aCaesar making shewe to enter at the place of easiest accesse, tooke the campe of the Alexandrians, sca∣ling it where they least looked for any such matter.

That the enemy haue no time to consider, our men are to go reso∣lutely to the assault, not as Monlucs men did at the siege ofbNiort, who going to the breach, paused being entred the ditch. Likewise there ought to be good correspondence, that the towne may be sca∣led, and assaulted at the breach, both together, and that euery parte may be well seconded, and supplied. If eyther the breach or walles be wonne, there let them that enter stay, vntil so many be entred as may serue to force the towne; and so placing others to garde the entrance, and to receiue the rest of their company let them march in good order, some to the market place, others to the bulworkes, and not seuer themselues before their whole companie, or so many as is requisite, be within the towne.cCaesar taking Auaricum by scale would not suffer his men to descend into the towne before hee had filled the walles with men.

If the enemy make resistance in the streetes, the houses are to bee fired neere them. By this meanesdCoriolanus made way for his men in the taking of Corioli, and the Spaniards cleared the streets in the sacke of Antwerpe. If they shewe themselues obstinate, they are to be compassed round about, and so dealt withall vpon aduan∣tage.eCamillus making proclamation that no man shoulde bee slaine, that laide downe his armes, tooke a certaine towne which he had entred quietly: which otherwise without great slaughter he could not haue obtained.

Before that euery man in the towne hath laid downe his armes, & the towne be possessed quietly, no man is to be suffered to disband, or enter houses, or to seeke pillage.

The last care of the General is, how to make vse of the towne, that is wonne. If he meane to keepe it: then ought hee diligently to re∣paire the breaches, and to saue the victuals, & lay them vp in store, & with the rest of the spoile to reward those, that best deserue. If hee meane not to keepe it, yet ought he to saue that which may be for the vse of the army, & to ruinate the walles, & to fire the towne, that the fame serue no more for a nest for the enemy to rest in. ThefDuke of

Orleance neglecting this care, no sooner had taken Nouara, but he lost it againe for want of victuals. Corbueil in France of late taken by the Prince of Parma, not hauing the breach repaired was shortlie after recouered by surprise by the kings side.

Small townes, such especially as haue no great ordonance, or no places where to employ it, are taken by zapping, or digging downe the walles, especially if they be hie and without terrasses behind. By thisameanes Caesars souldiers ruinated the walles of Massilia: andbAnnibal made a way into Saguntum. But before they approch the walles lest the enemy dig their sides with shot, or throwe downe stones vpon them, the enemy is to be beaten from the wall with shot, and the souldiers to be couered with mantellets of wood, on the sides, & ouer the head. Then with crows of iron they are al along the wall to pul out the lowest stones, & lest the same fal on them to vnderprop it with wood. The same when al is finished, is by gunpouder to be fi∣red. By this meanes the townesmen of Sancerre An. 1572. recouered the castle from certaine traitors that were there entred: &cBordet in the siege of Chartres, An. 1568. wan a corner of a raueline. That the breach be not repaired by them within, the assailants are to make thēselues ready to go to the assault in that order, which before I haue prescribed. That this course in sieges, surprises, and assaults, is ac∣cording to the true practise of armes, although in part hath bene she∣wed, yet now shall it further be confirmed, and those that haue done otherwise by their euill successe, and euill proceeding refuted, and their course reprooued.

dAnnibal pretending to goe to sacrifice at the lake of Auerne, did presently go to assault Puteoli: and in our times the Prince of Parma, making a faire shew as if he meant to besiege Ostend, did sodainely sit downe before Scluse. This practise is good in this and in all enterprises of warre. For thereby the enemy being made vncer∣taine, his forces are deriued an other way, and his care diuerted from that which should principally be cared for.

The Protestants of France, Anno 1568. purposing to besiegeeAn golesme sent Montgomery before with certaine troupes of horsemen to hinder the accesse of victuals to the towne. But farre better they had done, if before they came with their whole forces, they had not discouered their purpose. For in the meane time the townesmen prepared, and strengthned themselues.

in the siege, and taking of Saguntum Annibal proceeded in this sort.aHe enuironed the towne round with trenches: by zapping and diuers engins he made a breach: in the assault fresh men succeeded them that were hurt and wearied, vntill such time as his men for∣ced the breach. From the breach his men marched and tooke a place of aduantage: others scoured the streetes, and hauing assu∣red himselfe of the towne, in the ende he tooke the castell.

Scipio hauing enuironed the towne of new ^b Carthage in Spaine, and shaken the walles, at noone time when the enemy was at rest, sent part of his men by the lake, and scaling the towne at one in∣stant in diuers places both from the water, and the land, entred with part of his men, which gaue accesse to their fellows: which marching in order cut in peeces such as resisted, and in the end tooke the castle.

ThecRomane Consull besieging and assaulting the towne of Comimium, first compassed the same round with all his forces: a∣gainst the gates hee opposed certaine troupes to repell those that should offer to sally out. Couering his men with mantellets of wood, he broke open the gates, with others he scaled the walles, marching into the towne with his men in order, beat those that had seized the market place: and assured himselfe of the walles, and streetes. In the assault ofdZama; the Romanes hauing a signe gi∣uen them by the generall at one instant some presented the scale, o∣thers with slings, & stones beat the defendants, others zapped the walles. In the assault giuen toe••latia a towne in Greece they made shew to make all their force to enter in at the breach. But when they perceiued the townesmen to drawthither, they scaled the walles in an other place, and so entred the towne.

The common course which antiquitie vsed in sieges and assaults, as I haue declared, was to compasse the towne besieged, with banks and trenches. The hauens or riuers they dammed with ships filled ful of stones, and sunken. If the same were broad, they garded the issues withftowers built in the straitest places, vpon which they placed their engins: which Caesar practiced at Brundusium. Some∣times they crossed the riuer with boats, asgScipio did the hauen whē he besieged Vtica: and ashPorsena did in the riuer of Tyber when he besieged Rome. Before they went to assault theiwalles, they fil∣led the ditches with earth. The men that laboured, they couered with mantellets made of square timber, and fensed with occum

made of olde ropes; these planed the earth, these beganne the trenches and bankes. In working at their trenches, bankes, and mounts, no man was exempted. They neuer assaulted towne but with their whole forces, and that in all places together. Taking the towne, first they assured themselues of the walles, and gates, and from thence in good order they went to take the openaplaces of the towne. No man might depart from hisbensigne, nor run to spoile, but after a signe giuen. And therefore no maruell if they pre∣uailed for the most part, as now men faile of their purpose for the most part, being so far departed from the lawes of armes. What is now the common proceeding in sieges, batteries, and assaults, shall now appeare by the examples following.

The Protestants going about to besiege and win Poitiers, 1569. first made their approches, & quartered their souldiers in the suburbs which they took at their first arriual, for y^e most part. Next they made their trenches, mounts, & gabions for to accommodate their great ordonance. Part was placed to batter the walles, & part to beate the enemy in flanke behind the cortine. Certaine small peeces they le∣uelled against the parapet and certaine defenses made by the enemie vpon the walles. Of these peeces some were placed in houses neere the walles, others were ranged on the plaine behinde gabions, or baskets of earth, which they filled there in the night. The breach be∣ing made 20 pases wide, and very plaine, the Admirall disposed his men to go to the assault in this order: first 700. shot marched, after them 300. gentlemen marched with targets on their armes: after them followed halberds, & pikes: the rest of the army was ready in armes to succor where neede should be. But their errors were so ma∣ny, that these good orders auailed litle: first they spent time about Lusignen, and other small matters, and made not their approch, so soone as they might. In which meane time, the D. of Guise entred with his troupes, fortified diuers weake places, and prouided diuers thinges necessary: secondly, their auantgard going before the towne without direction, did nothing, but giue the enemy warning, & so re∣turned: thirdly, they neither trenched, nor barred the wayes, nor kept such ward, or gard, but that both succors entred guided by O∣noux, and diuers times the enemy sallied both on horsebacke, and on foote: fourthly, they did not take the suburbs, nor bridge of Rochere∣uill, but suffered the enemy to possesse it: yet by reason that it flanked

the breach, & stopped the water, was it most necessary to be taken. For the water being there stopped regorged vpward, & the enemy being there lodged had a ful marke at those that went along to the breach: fiftly they made their breach beyond the riuer, which by reason of the depth of it made them, to their great preiudice, differ the assalt al other things being ready, and broke their arrayes as they went ouer the bridge. They might haue done better to haue passed their troupes be∣fore & had them on the other side before they went to the breach: fur∣ther they considered not that the ground behinde the breach being hie was not to be mounted, albeit there had beene no wall. And therefore a place euil chosen to make breach in. For albeit they wan the breach yet could they not go forward vp the hill: lastly, they did neither di∣uert the enemies forces by escalades, nor went to the assault with all their forces. Of the simple prouision of victuals, and bad gouerne∣ment in matters of iustice, & discipline of armes. I wil say nothing, because such disorders are inseparable companions of ciuil warres. Yet was there not much better proceeding in the Kings campe be∣sieging Rochell, Anno 1573. which was in this sort.

The king before he sent his forces before the towne, caused two enginers to goe thither about other matters, but their purpose was to sound the hauen, & harbor, and to marke the walles, & places of the towne, & to draw a plot of it. Not lōg after he sent Biron thither with some forces, which he lodged in villages round about Rochel. Who first fortified his lodgings with trēches, terrasses, & barriquades: nee∣rer to the towne he built certain sorts at diuers corners of it. His ar∣tillery being about 40. peeces he ranged in 3. places crossing one an other. A fourth rank he planted vpon a mount to beate the cortine in flanke. For the gard of the peeces, and canoniers he caused not onely gabions of earth, but also deepe trenches, and good bankes to be made, with two pieces brought into the ditches he beat the casemates. To depriue the townsmen of fresh water he caused the condu it pipes to be cut. Monsieur with his ships that ankored in the harbor went a∣bout to depriue them of the commodity of the sea. Hauing with batte∣ry, and mines made a breach: the kings lieutenant caused diuers as∣saults to be made, in the order vsed commonly. Beside that which is common, he made diuers mantellets to couer his men, and for their easier approch, framed a bridge of wood, which from the counter∣scarpe reached to the bulworke neere the breach, But all this in vaine.

For neither were the townesmen so straited by sea or land, but that some entred and issued both the wayes. Yea sometimes they entred the trenches, and cut diuers men in peeces: the mine was euill con∣ducted. For most of the force broke out backeward vpon the assai∣lants. The assault was not generall, nor did the cōpanies march with one consent at one time: the escalade was but at one place, and that weakely performed. What for want of victualles, and good order, and what by reason of winter season the souldiers grew sicke and weake: and for want of iustice many bad examples escaped vnpuni∣shed: finally things were long delayed, and disorderly executed.

The siege, battery, and assault of Sancerre Anno 1573. passed in this sort. The enemy making his approches first planted his artillery some part about 60. pases off, and some part neerer: 6. peeces beat them in flanke being placed on a hil halfe a mile off. On the counter∣scarpe he placed diuers shot in a trench which he made there. From that trench he entred the ground comming vnder the walles with a mine: Vnder a frame of wood he brought some to zappe the point of the raueline. When the breach was made almost 80. pases wide, and the defenses euery where beaten downe, hee caused his men to march to the assault in this order: first marched the ensigne colonell of Sarrieu garded with targetters, and others well armed; behinde them and vpon their flankes marched certaine companies of shot: these being repulsed the second charge was giuen by the gentlemen of the country thereabout, which were likewise seconded by diuers troupes of shot: the escalade at the time of the assault was likewise attempted: but nothing succeeded. The causes were diuers. First the shot dragging behind left the armed men almost naked on y^e front, and sides, to the shot of the townesmen, which they shoulde haue kept occupied. Secondly the escalade was faintly executed by one poore company, that went naked to the walles. What might haue beene done by diuers cōpanies well armed, if they hoped to preuaile with one alone? Thirdly, those that marched to the breach went thinne, & dispersed, which was the cause that the shot so marked them, that all returned not to complaine. Fourthly, the breach was repayred by reason of the discontinuance of the battery, for want of pouder. Fi∣nally, the mine could not worke any effect, by reason the traine tooke not fire, as it should haue doone.

In no place do I heare of more resolution and expedition then in

the siege and assault of Chateleraud, Anno 1569. The first day that the enemy approched vnder colour of a skirmish hee caused the walles, ditches, and defences of the towne to be viewed. The ar∣tillery arriuing about midnight, he had placed, and gabionned the same in the night in two diuers rankes, and so fitted it, that by seuen of the clocke the next morning the same beganne to batter the foote of the wall. Wherein such was the diligence of the canoniers, and force of the peeces, the bullets entercrossing one another in the breach, that by two of the clocke in the afternoone in the same day the breach was 60. pases wide, and the souldiers readie to march to the assault. Wherein if the souldiers within had not bene very resolute, and the Frenchmen without very slacke in seconding the Italians that had the point of the assault, or if the escalade had withall beene presented at two or three other places: they had percase preuailed. At Xaintes, Scipio the enginer purposing to make a breach discharged a peece where he meant not to batter. Which caused the townesmen to spend their earth, labour, and prouision, where no neede was. Thenachanging the place of his peeces brought them hard to the ditch of the towne, where he made a breach threescore pases wide. To hinder the reparation thereof, he had placed foure coluerins, and diuers small peeces vpon a mount to beate them in flanke behind the breach. After that there marched to the assault first certaine shot, then fortie cuyraces of proofe, and last of all certaine other shot.

The county of Lude did thus dresse the preparatiues to the assault of Niort, Anno a thousand fiue hundred sixtie and eight. after hee had with his canons placed in two houses neere the walles, made a breach thirtie pases wide, and had raised two coluerins so high, that they might beate the defendants in flanke all along the cortine of the wall: three ensignes marched to the breach, others presented the escalade. These being easily repulsed, to the second charge marched first one principall commander, and after him twentie targettiers: then certain shot: after them folowed the ensigne colonell, and after it diuers other ensignes with a strong garde of halberdes and pikes. The rest of the army stoode ready in squadrons. The horsemen were also in armes to represse the townesmen, if they should dare to sallie. But all this serued not. For in the first charge there wanted cou∣rage, and resolution: in the second, execution. For hauing wet them∣selues in passing a little riuer, most stayed, the rest went faintly for∣ward:

in summe all the brauery which they shewed at the first, in the end prooued nothing but a brag.

If the Protestants had not proceeded more resolutely in the bat∣tery and assault of Brouage Anno 1570. they had not so soone pre∣uailed. Scipio by trenches made his approches, and within thirteene paces of the ditch placed his peeces within a certaine defence for the canoniers made of sacks of wooll, and earth. With the canon he beat the cortine, and bastion towards Oleron. With the artillery, and shot of the Venetian Carrake which hee caused to be brought along the Hauen, and to be placed hard to the Fort or Castle of the towne, he so beat them that were within, that none could come to the walles or looke out without danger. Which expedition, and resolution of the assaylants did so amaze the townsmen, that presently they be∣gan to fall to composition.

Thus wee see howe those that proceede carefully, diligently, re∣solutely, and according to the practice of warre doe seldome fayle of their purpose, but either by siege, surprise, or assault they take the townes, which they beset. Townes that cannot be taken neither by sleight, nor force at the first; yet by continuance and perseuerance, may be taken at the last by one meanes, or other, especially if they be weakened in one or two sallyes. Annibal by a deuise causing the Locrians to sally out of their towne, cut betweene them and their safety, and by taking them, made the rest to yeelde. Hee would haue trained out those that garded the Castle of Tarentum, by laying a bayt for them, but they were too wise. Romulus by a feined retrayt drawing the Fidenians some prety distance from the towne, cut most of them in peeces, and pursuing the rest entred Pelle Melle with them into the towne.

Many other stratagemes may be deuised, whereby townes may be forced, or surprised: but seeing the generall reasons are apparent by this which I haue sayd, now I will turne my speech to those that aduerse euents driue to defend them selues within townes. For prac∣tice of warre doeth teach vs not only to force others, but also where the enemy pursueth vs, to defend our selues.

CHAP. XVII. Wherein certaine obseruations are set downe good to be practiced for the defence, and good gouernment of a towne or place besieged, battered, or assaulted.

SEeing as places are taken either by want through long siege, or by intelligence, and trechery, or els by force: those to whom Princes commit their garde, are diligently to encounter these things with pro∣uision of things necessary first, then with watchful∣nes & care, and lastly by strength of men, & walles. They that take on them to defend townes neither well prouided nor fenced, howsoeuer they shew therein courage, yet doe they shewe no iote of wisedome in it; for oft times they cast away themselues, and hurt their Prince, and countrey both in the losse of so many men, & in giuing courage to the enemy. And better it were for them to conuey them selues into some place of safety, or to yeelde; then to holde out without reason. In which case the Prince cannot blame them, if they prouide for them selues. The Romanes not being able to defend cer∣taine townes of Apulia, and Lucania against Annibal, gaue them li∣cence to prouide for them selues by composition. Which also the French kings in the victories of the English nation in France per∣mitted to their people.aDomitius was blamed by Pompey for that he rashly engaged himselfe and his company in Corfinium, with∣out his commandement. It was the losse of many braue men, and a great preiudice to y^e cause. Dandelot hanged vp a certain cōpanion, that refused to deliuer vp a paltry castle without view of the canon, albeit he saw the army of the Protestants. And in deede lesse fauour doeth the practice of armes yeeld to those, that vnable to defend them selues wil notwithstanding holde out, vntill they be forced.bCaesar did not easily spare them that helde out vntill hee had shaken their walles: those that otherwise yeelded, he vsed with all clemency.

The first consideration therefore of him that hath a town commit∣ted to his gouernment ought to be, whether the same may possibly be defended against the force that cōmeth against it or no. Forcas we are not rashly to abandon a town that may be defended: so we are not ignorantly to take vpon vs the defence of towns not tenable. The Romans while Annibal ranged vp & down Italy, burnt those townes which they could not defend: the like did Philip of Macedonia. The

arest they kept with strong garrisons.bAntiochus did foolishly in abandoning Lysimachia which for the prouision, & strength that was in the place, might haue holden the army of the Romans at bay one whole yere. The like error didcPerseus king of Macedonia cō∣mit, who seeing the Romans approch forsooke those strayts which if he had kept he might haue shut them in both behinde & before. Likewise are the Gaules taxed bydVercingetorix, for that contrary to his opinion & commandement, they would needes defend Auaricū a∣gainst Caesar. Some do commend y^e French that in the defence of pal∣try townes of late yeeres haue willingly hazarded them selues; as they did in the defence of Dorat in Limages, Lusignen in Poitou, Bray vpon Seyne, Nogent & such like, which haue bene taken diuers of them by assault only of shot: but they had deserued more commen∣dation, if they had not lost them selues in the end. Let those therefore that purpose to winne honor by their actions consider what townes may be garded, what not, what are difficult to garde, before they take on them to garde them.

Great cities are hardly defended against a great force, that is able to strayt them, & keep them from victuals, & other necessaries. That Paris hath holden out of late time, the weaknes of their aduersaries, & their great succours are cause. Gant likewise in the dayes of Edward the 3. held out against the Earles of Flanders a long time. But the reason was because he could not besiege so great a city: but if that such cities may be kept from victuals, they can not long endure it. When the Protestants in An. 1567. did but hinder the repayre of the coun∣trey people to Paris, the city was in extremity, & farre greater it was in being besieged by this King. For such infinite numbers of people no prouision can serue any long time. TheeGaules andfBelgians thought to oppresse Caesar with multitude. But when they were come together, they saw that such numbers could not be maintei∣ned with victuals, & therfore not being fought withal were forced to scatter of thēselues. But against a smal force, great cities are most strong. For neither can they be straited of victuals by reason of their multitude of men, nor can they be takē by assault, being so wel able to defend the breach and repaire it. So that to a great force great cities are easy to be taken, to a small army that can not without danger compasse the same about, they are impregnable.

Contrariwise small piles or castles hardly resist a great force.

First for that there is no roome within to make retrenchments, or de∣fences against the enemies canons; secondly for that a small number of men cannot continue their resistance against a great army, where one cōpany succeedeth another: lastly for y^t the men being kept with∣in a short compasse, the ayre must needes be corrupted, & their health empayred. Q. Cicero albeit his campe was of good compasse & well fenced, and had in it 4000. men & vpward, yet he had not bene able to resist the multitude of Gaules that assaulted the same, any long time, had not Caesar succoured him. The Spaniards, presuming of the strength of La goleta besieged by the Turks were notwithstanding by the force of the canon, and multitude of men oppressed, about six∣teene yeeres agone.

Furthermore towns that are commanded by hils, or whose Terri∣torie may be drowned with water, or which haue no water within thē, or which lye so situate, that the enemy may come betweene them and succours, are hardly defended against great forces.

Other townes that are neither too great, nor too litle, nor euil situ∣ate, may be defended, so that the walles be strong & wel flanked, & the prouision of victuals, munitions, armes, souldiers and whatsoeuer is necessary, be sufficient. Prouided alwayes, that y^e Gouernor be a man of iudgement and courage, and proceede orderly. Without which all other prouision is nothing: and with which he may do much, although his other meanes be slender. But because no man can see all things himselfe, let him first adioyne vnto him a counsell of men experimen∣ted, of whose loyall dealing hee may assure himselfe. With them let him consult both of the fortifications of the towne, & of all things ne∣cessary, and see that all things be in good state before the comming of the enemy before the towne. And first that there be victuals prouided sufficient for the company, for a long siege. for whatsoeuer strong pla∣ces yeeld to hunger. TheaRomans vnderstanding of the cōming of Porsena to besiege their city, sent round about among their neigh∣bors to prouide corne, & victuals. In theirbCastles, & garrisons they had alwayes a yeeres prouision before hand. ThecAthenians vnder∣stāding the desseins of their enemies to besiege thē, stored their citie with prouision for many yeeres, & so furnished themselues at sea, that what they could not haue from the land, they might haue a∣bundantly from the sea. Besides prouision of victuals to be made, or∣der must be set, that they be wel kept in storehouses, & orderly dispen∣sed

by measure.aVercingetorix practicing this at Alexia, did cause his victuals to serue him long. AtbMassilia vnderstanding, that the towne would be besieged, they prouided corne & layd it vp in gar∣ners. In free townes in Hie Dutchland the citizens haue alwayes a yeeres prouision of victuals beforehand layd vp in publike storehou∣ses, and a strict order for the dispensing of them. Withoutcwhich that which otherwise might haue serued for many moneths, wil be spent in fewe dayes.

The towne ought to be discharged before hand of aged persons, women, & children, such except as haue for their company sufficient: when the enemy commeth before the town, it wilbe too late to do it, as the Gaules tried in the siege of Alexia, & the Florentins also besieged by the Prince of Orenge at the request of Clement the 7.

All the victuals that are in the countrey neere about are to be brought into the citie. for thereby the townsmen may be relieued, and the enemy depriued of helpe of the countrey.

Further because corne without cornemils cannot conueniently be vsed: handmils are to be prouided where the enemy may take other milles from vs. Lignieres in the siege of Chartres without his hand∣mils, had bene driuen to eate corne euil ground.

Last of all prouision is to be made of water where the towne is dry, and of whatsoeuer either for nourishment, or health is necessary.

With prouision of victuals, y^e Gouernor ought also to ioyne a care, that he haue armes, munitions, & all instruments requisit for warres ready in the towne: and stuffe also to make more. Workehouses are to be erected of armes, of powder, of weapons, & other engins: artil∣lery is to bee mounted ready; bullets, & all instruments about it are to bee prouided. Neither may hee forget store of mattocks, spades, axes, baskets, crowes of iron, ropes, timber, nor such like stuffe: nor saltpeter, brimstone, or coles to make powder withall, nor in summe, any thing necessary. want of smal things may hinder great matters.

But principally ought he to haue care, that he haue with him suf∣ficient numbers of valiant souldiers, without which all other prouisi∣on is vaine. Walles reared to the skyes are easily taken, where there are not valiant defendants within to garde them.

As other things are doing, & prouiding, he ought also to haue con∣sideration, that his walles be good, that his ditches be deepe, & broad, that his bulwarks, and defences be sufficient to flank the walles, and

defend both ditches and conterscarpe. In which workes let him not spare his friends, nor himselfe. It is a shamefull matter when men refuse to labour to defend their countrey, them selues, and their liues. When Themistocles walledaAthens, so willing the people were, that men, women, & children laboured, & euery man was content that the stones of his owne house, yea of publike houses should go to the walling and fortifying of the towne. Among the Romanes euery souldier did as well set hand to his worke, as to his weapons. we forsooth are so deinty fingered, and our souldiers so peruers, that so soone as they are enrolled, yea long before they are good souldiers, they thinke they ought to worke no more, and therefore they must haue Pionniers to doe their worke: A kinde of men which the Ro∣manes knew not, nor can be expressed in the Latin tongue. Hereup∣on it commeth, that our proceedings are so slow, and so vnsufficient. Neither can it otherwise be, where so few men set hand to the worke. Likewise so sparing some are in their expenses, y^t their Port townes for the most part lye open without defence to the spoyle of any ene∣my that shall come suddenly vpon them with any force. And no man will ruinate the corner of his garden wall to saue himselfe, and his company, and friends. But if we knewe how necessary such la∣bours were, and how as many braue actions are done with worke as with weapon, and that nothing doeth more apperteine to souldiers, then to worke fortheir owne defence, & safety; mē would neuer shew them selues so niggardly and illiberall in their expenses, nor so dain∣tie in labouring, and thereby fortifying them selues.

Further the Gouernor ought to haue a watchfull eye, that he be nei∣ther entrapped in y^e practices of dissembling friends, nor surprises of the open enemy. his best course is to trust neither. If he doubt of the townsmen, he is not only to assure himselfe by pledges, but by strong garde, hauing the gates & walles in his possession. Popilius was no sooner placed in garrison atbStratus a towne of the Aetolians, but he seased the custody of the gates, and walles into his owne hands. He is like wise to see, y^t he haue the victuals of the towne in his owne custody. The Garrison ofcMegara that kept in the castle hauing vi∣ctuals from day to day out of y^e town, when the same reuolted were driuen also to yeelde to the enemy. I neede not exemplify this by antiquity. for it is the case of Vlissing, & some other places where our men lie in garrison. Where if the townsmen at any time quarrel

with them, they shalbe constrained to yeeld for want of victuals, and other prouisions, which are in the power of others. There can be no good assurance, where the to wnsmen are able to master thee, specially if y^e enemy be without, as trecherous friends are within. And there∣fore a wise Gouernor will prouide that suchacan not hurt him, though they would. So a certaine Romane perswaded his friend to deale with the Hetruscians. Against such, a prouident Gouernor must alwayes keepe one eye waking, and appoint strong gardes, and con∣tinuall rounds, both on horsebacke and foote, and no lesse without the towne, then within. Which are to see that euery sentinel doe his du∣tie. He that doubteth y^t cownsmen must not suffer them to come nere the gates, not to talke with the enemy.bMarcellus would not suffer them of Nola to come neere the walles, or gates, the enemy being without. Neither would thecgarrison of Syracusae, that consisted of fugitiues suffer the men of the towne to come to the walles, or talke with the enemy that besieged them, or whisper together. All whis∣perings & secret meetings in such cases are suspicious. The Gouer∣nor must further take heede how he come in place, where the towns∣men may lay hands on him. ThedVaccians in Afrike inuiting y^e Go∣uernor of the towne, and certaine of his chiefe commaunders, and Captains to banquets, did there first cut their throtes & afterward setting vpon the common souldiers destitute of heads did kil them also, & so yeelded them selues to the enemy. They of Rochel did not so euilentreat the English that were there in garrison in y^e castle: but inuiting Captaine Mancell then Gouernor there to a banquet, first layd handes on him, then drawing out the souldiers vnder colour to moster them, did fayre turne them and their simple Captaine with scorne out of the towne. All parleys with the enemy, are dange∣rous, vnlesse they be managed by those that haue skill, and be loyall, and in such place where the enemy may not come neere the walles. While they of Syracusae did parley about the redemption of certaine prisouers, a certaine Romane marked the height and accesses of the walles, which gaue the Romanes meanes to enter the citie by sur∣prise. Eretria was taken by L.eQuintius while during the par∣ley of peace, his souldiers espying the negligent garde of the townsmen scaled the walles.fCasilinum was likewise taken by Marcellus his souldiers during the parley seasing a gate, and so giuing entrance to their companions.

The like happened to the towne of Charitè in France Ann. 1569. where the Protestants in the time of parley espying their opportu∣nity entred the towne through the breach, that was euil garded. In time of parleys therefore, & of feastes, & of times of greatest security, then the Gouernor is to haue greatest care.aSyracusae was taken on a night when the souldiers had kept Holiday before, and lay drunke without feare or care. Nismes was surprised in a stormy night, when a man would haue thought that none would haue looked abroad.

And if no wise Gouernor will commit any man of worth into the hands of his enemies, least if they should breake promise they might preiudice him; much lesse ought he to parley with the enemy where he may come in danger himselfe.bTiturius Sabinus going to parley with Ambrorix was by him perfidiously slaine. Paches thecAthe∣nian deteined Hippias the Gouernour of Notium that came vpon assurāce of his word to treat with him of peace, & forced him to de∣liuer vp y^e town. This was also y^e ruine ofdLiuerotto da Fermo & the Duke of Grauina & others, whom Caesar Borgia inducing by faire words to come to treat w^t him of peace, put to death at Senogallia.

Those that haue diuers nations together in defence of one towne, must also take heede, that there arise no grudge or discontentment a∣mong them, to make them reuolt to the enemy.eMutines the Numi∣dian vpon some discontentment offered him by the Carthaginians whom he serued, by the helpe of his countrymen seased a gate of A∣grigentum, & gaue entrance to the Romanes. The like cause toge∣ther with some corruption in the souldiers caused some English to deliuer vp Alost to the enemy. Which practices he that meaneth to a∣uoyd, must neuer trust men y^t are suspect, nor suffer strangers to watch vnited without some of such as he dare trust ioyned with them, nor let any man know his quarter before he goeth to the watch. During the siege he may not suffer bel to ring or clocke to strike, and further must keepe good watch, & make rounds diligently, & at times vncertaine.

To content all men the Gouernor is to administer iustice equally: that God may be pleased, hee is to see that God be serued religiously: and that lawes concerning religion, iustice, and military matters be strictly executed.

Sallyes are not to be made vpon the enemy rashly, nor without good cause, especialy, where y^e townsmen are not to be trusted. They of Rochel serued our countrymen an odious touch vpō such an occa∣sion

in y^e dayes of Richard y^e 2. Charles duke ofaBurgundy defeating 500. archers y^t sallied vpō him out of Piquigni, made the towne to yeeld vnto him soone after for want of men. They of Liege sallying out vpon y^e same Duke, lost their best men, which after ward they sore rued. And such was the wisedome and direction of some in the go∣uernement of Caleis besieged by the duke of Guise, that albeit they had very few men to defend such a towne, yet they would needs loose some of them going out to s••irmish with the enemie. Oftentimes sub∣till enemies drawing out the townesmen by deuises, doe make them come short home, as I declared by the practise of Romulus against the Fidenians, of Annibal against the Locrians. At Nolabdrawing out the townesmen, he circumuented a braue troupe of horsemen in an ambush laid for them. Sallies therefore are to be made onely when we haue men sufficient, and doe see the enemies negligence, or other aduantage.cDiaphanes sallying out of Pergamus vpon a corps de gard placed by Antiochus before the towne, at such time as the same was negligent, cut the same in pieces. By opportune sallies many sieges haue bene raised, as I declared by the example of Philip lying before Apollonia. Souldiers that sallie vpon aduantage, doe hinder the approches of the enemie, so that he is to win inch after inch. but whēthey sallie, let them take heed first that they go not too farre, least they be drawen into ambush; and secondly, that they haue some behind to fauour their retrait, as Aluarus Sandze obserued in his sal∣lies vpon the Mores, in defending a fort in Zerbe.

Before that the enemie approcheth, the Gouernour is to cause all houses and villages neere the towne to be ruinated and fired, and all the wood and timber as neere as may be, either to be brought into the towne, or spoyled. Lamentable (I confesse) it will be to the country, but who would not rather spoyle such things, then suffer the enemie to vse them against himselfe?

In stopping of the enemies approches, let him vse this course: first if there be any narow wayes which the enemie must passe, before hee can come before the towne, let them bee well trenched and garded: when the same cannot longer be garded for feare least the enemie cut betwixt the corps de gard and the towne, let them then retire & make head in thedcouert way behind the counterscarpe, not onely for the defence thereof, but also for defence of the playne before the towne, especiallie of that place, where the enemie meaneth to range his

pieces for the batterie. For defence whereof likewise, both the great ordonance from the bulwarkes, and other shot from the walles are to be imploied. In case the enemie by his negligence giue occasion, ei∣ther in the euening, or in the night, hee may make a sallie vpon those that labour about the plāting of the ordonance, & the gabions. If the enemie be so strong that hee is able to take away thea counterscarpe, then by traines andb casemates in the ditch, by sallies and shot from the bulwarkes and wals, he is to defend his ditch so long as hee can. And last of all being beaten out of the ditch, his last hope is in the de∣fence of his wals and bulwarkes, sustaining them with good terras∣ses of earth, and when they are beaten downe, repairing them, and when no longer they can be defended by making retrenchments be∣hind them.

For defence of a breach, this course is good, and commonly vsed. First all along where the enemie maketh his batterie, let there bee presently vpon the first shot a retrenchment made; the deeper the ditch is, and the higher the banke is raysed, the better the worke proo∣ueth: vpon the banke, or els behind the banke, let some pieces be pla∣ced in counterbatterie. In houses neere adioyning, and vpon the banke, let the small shot be disposed chicke. Against the enemies ar∣tillerie that beateth in flanke, let there be an high terrasse of earth rai∣sed. On both sides of the breach in places conuenient, the armed men are to be placed to repell such as escape the shot. If the place haue bulwarkes or towers that looke along the ditch, from thence the e∣nemie is to be galled vpon the flankes as they enter the ditch: if there be none, then mounts or terrasses are to be raysed in such places, as most commodiouslie wee may looke into the ditch, and toward the breach. Walles or bankes are to be cast vp beneath the breach in the ditch. Lastly, if store of men will permit it, a sallie of targetters and other armed men is to bee made out of the towne vpon the sides of those that are vpon the counterscarpe, or within the ditch: which no doubt will make the enemie make more speed to returne.

This or the like proceeding, both ancient and later practise of warre hath taught vs in the defence of townes besieged, and assaul∣ted. The Plataeans besieged, hauing set order for their prouision and the gouernement of their people, to repell the enemies force, raysed their walles higher in that part where the enemie made shew to assaile them. All along the mount which the enemie built without,

they made a new wall within their olde. When theaenemie went about to smother them, and to burne their engines vpon the wall, they defended themselues with their archerie and slingers, and quenched the fire with water and earth, and when they could no longer defend the towne, in a tempestuous night they passed ouer the banke which the enemie raysed against them.

The Massilians when they perceiued Caesars intention to be∣siege them:bprouided souldiers, brought corne out of the coun∣trey into the citie, erected workehouses for armes, brought their prouision into the publike store, repaired their walles, trimmed vp their ships. When the enemie began to force them, they defen∣ded themselues by diuers sallies, and engines fitted on the wals.

The like diligence did the Gaules vse agaynst Caesar besieging Auaricum: they frustrated his engines with hookescand other en∣gines, they caused his mount to sinke by vndermining. Vpon the wals they made diuers towers; by diuers sallies they hindered his workes, his mines they opened with crosse mines, and filled with great stones. The like did the Prenestinsdagainst Annibal.

Against escalades theeAduaticans besieged by Caesar, placed great stones and pieces of timber vpon the walles, and likewise they offZama to resist the enemies assault, Vpon those that set the ladders to the walles tumbled downe stones, and pieces of tim∣ber, and cast vpon them pitch & brimstone, and shot and cast dartes at them.

In the defence of new Carthage in Spaine assailed by Scipio, all things being prouided, Mago assigned to euery man his quarter & his charge, and both with engines from the wall beat the scalers, and with archerie and armed men defended the breach. The Romanes hearing of the approch of Porsena to besiege their citie, sent into o∣ther countreys to buy victuals, fortified their citie, assigned to euerie man his seuerall charge, delt well with the common sort. The same reasons alwayes continuing, the same course for the most part hath bene vsed also of late time.

Lignieres deputed gouernour of Chartres, an. 1568. which then was threatened by the Protestants to be besieged, first encouraged the people with good words, then together with y^e principal mē of the towne going about to marke the weakest places of the walles, cau∣sed rampiers and trenches to be made presently. In that worke hee

caused all the inhabitants to labour. Afterward being bet in flanke, he raised vp a terrasse neere the breach, spreading sheetes and clothes before it for to couer the workemen: for grinding of corne he caused handmils to be made, and finally set good order for the administring of matters of warre, and iustice. But if he had burnt the suburbes, and beaten downe the houses neere the wals, and defended the Rauelin by the gate Drouaize more carefully and strongly, hee had done farre better. These things being neglected, the enemie placed his ord∣nance neere to the wall in houses, from whence he discouerd y^e breach, and diuers places of the towne, and hurt diuers. He lodged his men ve∣ry commodiously in the suburbes, and taking that Rauelin, had entred the citie, if he had folowed his good hap, or kept the place.

The duke of Guise Gouernour of Poitiers, entring a litle before the siege which the Protestants laid before the town, anno 1569. spent first one day in viewing the walles, and appointing fortifications and defences to be made, which was also executed with great expedition. He tooke the next day the moster of all the souldiers, and inhabitants able to beare armes, to see what strength hee had. Afterward hee ap∣pointed officers, & orders for the storehouses of victuals. Further he set some on worke to make pouder, others to burne y^e houses nere the gates. The light horsemen he sent out to take some prisoners, & of thē to vnderstand the disseins of the enemie, & for auoiding of surprises, would not suffer bell to ring, nor clocke to strike during the siege. For defence of the breach he caused a retrenchment to be made behind the wall: against the pieces that bet his men in flanke, he opposed a tra∣uerse of earth: and directly against the breach placed certaine pie∣ces in countrebatterie. For sustaining y^e assault, he assigned to euerie man his quarter, disposed his shot vpon the wals, & in certain houses neere to beat the enemie approching both in front, & in flanke. Neere the wals he had his armed men readie, his horsemen he sent about the streetes to keepe men in order, and to send those that were there to the breach; onely this was omitted, hee burnt not the suburbes, nor spoiled the countrey round about, nor prouided cornemils, nor dischar∣ged the towne of such as were vnfit for seruice, nor of asses and iades that spent the haie so fast, that in the ende there wanted for the main∣tenance of his horse of seruice.

They of Rochel against the siege that folowed an. 1573. first forti∣fied their towne, and then set order for their gouernement: withall

they made the best prouision of victuals and munitions, they could: they sent to their friendes for succour: they hindered the approches of the enemy by diuers sallies: for defence of the breach, they made a re∣trenchment behinde, and filled the breach vp with sackes of earth, and other things. For couering those that wrought, they made a thicke smoke before the breach. Against the breach they ranged diuers pee∣ces in contrebatterie. To susteine the assalt, they placed the shot on the flankes, and walles, placed squadrons of armed men both by the breach, and in other places: with traines of powder in the ditche, they scorched the enemie that came to the breache. Vpon the formost they cast stones, fire, scalding water, hot tarre, and pitch: yet might they haue done better, if they had made better prouision of thinges necessarie: next, if they had not made so many vaine and weake sallies. If in one sallie those that went out first, had bene well seconded, they had surely raysed the siege: while they spa∣red the houses, and villages, and woods neere the Towne, they ministred many commodities to the enemie, without which hee coulde not as hee did, haue continued his siege the whole winter long.

In the siege of S. Iean d'Angeli, anno 1569, capteine Piles wan to himselfe great commendation. The towne was not strong, yet did he holde it long. The enemy wanne no ground vpon him, but it cost him deare. Vpon his first approch he made so couragious a sally, that he made the enemy to giue ground. In the place of the breach, he made a wall in the ditch before it, and a retrenchment within be∣hinde it, and casting the earth inward, raised a banke vpon it, where∣vpon he placed diuers pipes of earth, for defence of his souldiers. Vp∣on the side of the breach, he raised vp a platforme of earth, with a parapet, for sauing his men. By this meanes he susteined diuers as∣saults, and at diuers sallies cut diuers of the enemies in peeces, and cloyed and dismounted diuers Canons. If his prouision of victu∣als and munitions, and the strength of men had bene greater, he had no doubt kept the Towne still: but wanting all thinges, and his platforme being newe, and but fifteene foote thicke, and pierced by euery Canon shotte, and not able long to stand; force it was for him to accept of an honourable composition offered him by the king.

And although the Towne of Sancerre was yeelded in the ende to

the enemy, yet doe the defendants deserue to be remembred for their resolute defense, and reasonable good gouerment. When they heard that the enemy determined to besiege them, they chose a Go∣uernour, and ioyned with him a Counsell of Capteines, and the most apparent Citizens. Next, they mostred their people, enrolled them in bands, and assigned to euery man his charge and quarter, & appointed orders such as the time required. For defence of the breach, they made a retrenchment, and defended the same with gabions on the front, and sides, where they placed their shotte, to serue at the time of the assault. To susteine the assault, they ranged their shot there, and on the wals, and in a certein gallery, and other houses neere the breach. Vpon the sides of the breach, and in other places conuenient, they placed their halberds, pikes, and armed men: but wanting victuals, mu∣nitions, and men requisite for defence of such a place, they were dri∣uen to accept of a harde composition. Whereunto, if they had not spared their money in the beginning, or had sent out such as for age, and impotencie were not fit for seruice, they could not haue bene so easily forced.

The assault of Chateleraud, anno 1569, as it was forcible, so was it valiantly susteined by diuers braue men directed by Scipio the En∣giner. The breach being 80 paces wide, was so great, and the ene∣mies comming so speedy, that they could not make any retrenchment behinde it. Therefore leauing that course, vpon each side of the breach they made gabions and barriquadaes, behinde which they placed di∣uers valiant men, armed with cuyraces, and targets. The front be∣fore the breach, was sufficiently fenced with houses. In the win∣dowes of the houses, and in certeine holes made for the purpose, they placed their best shot, other shot they placed vpon the walles behinde the parapet, and in a certeine gallery that ouerlooked the breach. When the Italians that had the point, came to the assault, and had en∣tred the breach; they that were couered vnder the gabions, sallied vp∣on the first, the shot from the houses, gallery, and walles, dispatched a number of the rest.

In defence of townes besieged by the enemy, no time is to be lost, no cost, nor labour to be spared. By negligence, delaies, sparing, and want of skill of the Gouernors, many townes are lost. It grieueth me to thinke howe Caleis, Bullein, Rochel, and other Townes, which sometime this nation possessed in France, were lost by negli∣gence,

and misgouernment. But that it is the lot of all townes that that are committed to such weake persons, as beside the name haue nothing of nobility. Alcidaathat was sent to succour Miletum, by forslowing the time, suffered the Athenians to take the Towne. Montegue a strong castle in Poitou, was lost by the negligence, igno∣rance, and couetousnes of thebCapteine, that for two hundred soul∣diers which he should haue mainteined there, kept but twenty, and sought nothing, but spoile without regarde, or knowledge of the keeping of the place. The Protestants lost Bronage, a towne of great importance, for want of garrison, munitions, and victuals sent in time. What we haue lost, and are like to loose by this meanes, I had rather we should learne by others examples, and reforme it, then to blush to heare it reported, and confirmed by the examples of those that were actors.

Thus we see what is to be done in the defence b gouernment of a place assaulted or besieged, and also what is to be auoyded. But be∣cause al this serueth to small purpose, vnlesse the siege in time be rai∣sed, let vs nowe shewe howe that may be effected.

The siege is raised sometime through want, or missgouernment in the campe, when for want of victuals, or other disorder the ene∣my of his owne accord departeth. Sometime through sickenes, some∣time through the distemper of the weather, sometime through dis∣sention of souldiers; sometime he remooueth to succour his owne people, straited in some other place: sometime by sallies of the towns∣men, or succour of their friendes, he is driuen away. All those wants therfore that may mooue him to depart, are to be increased, and all those meanes that may hasten his departure, to be vsed. He is to be streited for victuals by our friendes without. Some Towne which he fauoreth is to be besieged, his waters are to be corrupted, the place where he lyeth, if it may be, is to be drowned. If he may be taken in disorder, with all our force he is to be charged, and all meanes v∣sed to call him home, or to tyre him lying before vs. The Prince of Orenge succoured Leyden, and anoyed the Spaniards, by cutting of the bankes of the riuers.

Fabiuscbeing besieged in his campe by the Hetruscians, in∣uading them vpon a sudden a little before day, killed many, & put the rest to flight. The French kings brother anno 1569, besieging

Chateleraud, caused the Protestants to raise their siege from before Poytiers, to succour their friendes there. The Aetolians entring in∣to the Citie of theaThaumacians besieged by Philip king of Ma∣cedonia, by their often sallies caused him to raise his siege.bCrispus Naeuius sallying out of Apollonia in the night, put all the Macedo∣nian armie that lay before the towne in disarray, and caused the same to dislodge. Scipiocgoing to succour his friendes besieged, passed through the enemies campe in the night, and presently sally∣ing out vpon them, forced them to relinquish their holde. The ru∣mor ofdCatoes approches with succours, caused the Celtiberians to depart from a towne which they besieged. Likewise in the yeere of our Lorde, 1569, the towne of Charitè in France was disenga∣ged, the enemie departing for feare of a bruite of great succours com∣ming to the towne, both of horse and foote, which God wot was no∣thing so.

At such time as the army riseth, the defendants haue commonly good opportunitie to cut those that lagge behinde in peeces. When Appiusedeparted from the siege of Phanotis, the Capteine of the towne following after him, and charging him in streite & trouble∣some waies, at the foote of certeine hils, cut a thousand of his men in peeces. Therefore as at other times, so then also the Generall ought to haue care, that the sicke, and hurt be sent before with a good garde, and with them the baggage of the army. then may he followe safely with the rest. By this course Caesar departed safely from before Dyr∣rachium, and in our times the Admirall from the siege of Poytiers. The French kings brother rising from Chateleraud, when his men were at the assault, as soone as he sawe they could not preuaile, he be∣gan to send away his great ordonance before, and at midnight follow∣ed with all his army.

Resteth nowe for the finishing of this discourse, concerning the defence of places, that I shewe howe any place may with labour be fortified, and what rules are to be obserued in the making of bulworkes, walles, ditches, bankes, and all sortes of fortificati∣on, not in such curious sorte, as doe the Italians, which can nei∣ther be well vnderstoode of souldiers vnacquainted with Geome∣tricall termes, nor practised in time of warres, by reason of the time required in the raysing of them: which notwithstanding may serue them in tyme of necessitie, as well as the artificiall worke∣manship

of Italians that costeth millions, and alwayes helpeth not. Yet would I not haue thinges made either rudely without propor∣tion, nor hastily without perfection, nor niggardly without thinges conuenient.

In ancient time, before the vse of gunnes was found out, the dan∣ger of walled townes was, lest they might be taken with scaling, or their walles ruinated with shaking or zapping, their defence against scaling, was the height of the walles; against shaking, the mixture of wood, and stone, and thicknesse. Caesar sheweth that the Gaules in his time fashioned their walles checker wise, filling a frame of timber with square stones. so that for euery piece of timbers head there was a square stone of that bignesse layed in the wall. To en∣crease the height of their walles, they made high towers vpon them, in distance fourescore, or an hundred paces one from another. Their defence was stones, pieces of timber, iauelines, dartes, arrowes, and whatsoeuer coulde hurt the enemy throwen from the wall. These thinges for that their force was increased by the height of the walles, therefore did they builde them high, as also to hinder the escaladaes of the enemy. Now for that great ordonance doth hurt more in flanke then forward, and shaketh any wall though ne∣uer so thicke, and those most easily that are highest; therefore the vse is to builde walles lowe, that they may the better be susteined by the terrasse behinde, and more hardly discouered by reason of the counterscarpe. for defence whereof, there are bulwarkes builded out from the wall into the ditch, that the great ordonance being there placed, may not onely shoote forward into the field, but in flanke along the ditch, and the wall.

Those townes therefore, and castles, I account to be well forti∣field, that first are strongly walled, or banked round, with bulwarkes in conuenient distances to flanke the walles, or banke; secondly, that behinde the walles haue a good rampare or terrasse, and be∣fore them a deepe and broad ditch: and last of all a sufficient coun∣terscarpe, with his couert way, with all the partes, and measures of the wall, terrasse, bulwarkes, ditch, and counterscarpe proportion∣able. Where there is either part or proportion wanting, there wan∣teth so much of the perfection, and strength, that is in such workes required. Whosoeuer therefore purposeth to fortifie a place, must haue respect first to the wall, and rampare, or to the banke, next

to the bulwarkes, thirdly, to the ditch, and lastly, to the counter∣scarpe.

The partes of the wall are these, first the foundation, then the wall to the cordon, and lastly, that aboue the cordon. Cordon I call that rowe of stones that diuideth that part of the wall that is lowest, and couered with the counter scarpe from the enemies shot, and leaneth much inward to the towne, from that which is for the most part open, and higher then the counterscarpe, and leaneth lesse inward then the lower part of the wall.

The whole height of the wall from the ditch to the top, is more or lesse according to the iudgement of the Enginer, and meanes, and time hee hath to builde it in. Prouided that it be not easily reached with ladders. it is sufficient if it be betwixt fiue and fortie or fortie foot high. of which albeit the parapet be beaten downe, yet few sca∣ling ladders will reach so high.

The foundation of the wall would be made firme, and euen, lea∣ning a little inward. if the soile be soft and moist, it must be holpen with piles of wood driuen downe thicke into the ground, and stones rammed fast betweene them. if the soile be rocky, then must the same be made plain, or at least with degrees be aten out with the picke, and made leuell, that the stones may lie orderly, saue that toward the towne as the rest of the foundation it ought to be a little lower.

The foundation of thea cortine of the wall being laid, the first stone of the wall would be layd one foot from the boord of the foundation, if no more. That part of the foundation that is without the wall the Italians call relasciato, which is nothing els in English, then that which is left of the foundation.

The wall the Italians would haue made so thicke at the foot, that in the middest there may be left a space for a man to goe along in round about the walles. this they call contramina. But it is cost to no purpose: for to vent a mine, the countermine is to be made as lowe as the foundation of the wall and lower, and rather in the ditch, if it be drie, then in the wall. The wall would be made so thicke at the foundation, that albeit in euery fiue foot of height it leane inward, and loose one foot of breadth or thickenesse, yet at the cordon it may be twelue or fifteene foot thicke. From the cordon vpward the wall is to leane inward, and to loose of his thickenesse in euery fiue one halfe foot.

The rampar or terrasse behinde the walles would be raised vntill you come within foure or fiue foot of the toppe of the wall. This vp∣permost part for that it gardeth the souldiers that are behinde it, when they turne their breasts to shoot, or strike the enemy is called parapet. If the same be not raised so high, but that the wall is seuen or eight foot higher, as it is at Luca in Italy, & in the bourg at Rome, and di∣ners places, which I haue seene: then must there be made a bancke or way vpon the inside of the wall foure foot within the toppe of it, and degrees to mount from the rampar vnto it, in diuers places.

The rampar cannot be too broad, but nine or ten pases it would be, if it be made sufficient. if it be lesse, hardly can you fit the cannon or coluerin vpon it. The height is proportionable to the wall, as be∣fore I haue shewed. Toward the towne the rampar would be made somewhat stope and pendant, that the souldiers may go vp and downe the same in all places, when need requires; in the same like wise are staires to be made in diuers places, that those that haue occasion may go vp vnto it with carriages. The side of it would be set with trees, for thereby the earth will be holden vp more firme, and the same may in time serue to many good vses.

Within euery two hundred pases or thereabout, there would be a bulwarke erected, the outward walles made in the same sort, that the walles of the cortine are made, but more thicke and high by two or three foot. These are made for gard both of the great ordonance that beat along the ditch and cortine, and that which is pointed into the fieldes. These are sometime made with two stages, or places for the ordonance, the one aboue, the other beneath; sometime with one one∣ly place, sometimes all solide without any places at all, as in Hol∣land and Zeland, for the most part. the which are rather to be called terrasses then bulwarkes, for that they onely serue to place great or∣donance vpon them to flanke the walles or bankes somewhat, but e∣specially to scoure the plaines without.

The forme of them commeth nerest to fiue square, the base where∣of is the rampar behinde that part of the walles that goeth to the ma∣king of the bulwarke, and is behinde it. If thou wouldest make a bul∣warke at any corner of a wall, measure out from the point thereof fortie pases, and draw a line of that length equally distant from the cortine of the wall on either hand. From the cortine take of ech hand 25 pases, and from that point that is 25 pases from the corner,

draw a lineadirect from the wall long two & twenty pases. From this line of two and twentie pases take tenne to serue for the ditch be∣tweene the towne wall and theb shoulder of the bulwarke. the rest serueth to make the shoulder it selfe. From this point draw a line to to that point that is fortie pases from the corner of the wall. and so thou hast the delineation of the one part or face of the bulwarke. doe the like on the other hand, and so thou hast thy bulwarke delineated in good proportion. which not being obserued in the bulwarkes of Berwike, maketh them shew crooked and deformed: but that is one of their least faults.

From the line that is fiue and twentie pases long take twelue pa∣ses on either side toward the point of the corner of the wall, and thence drawing a direct line directly to the shoulder of the bulwarke, vpon that line worke a wall all of massiue stone, and when thou art come tenne or twelue foot high, make there foure loope holes for the can∣non, and within the wall a sole for the ordonance to runne on, well planed, but somewhat inclining to the ditch. The loope holes would be a yard broad, and foure foot high. The first loope hole that is nee∣rest to the cortine, would be made foure foot distant from the said cor∣tine, that the connon placed there may serue to scoure the front of the next bulwarke that is vnto it, and the ditch and counterscarpe there∣of, being more then two hundred pases off. The other three loope holes would be made in equall distance one from another, and so farre asunder, that both the cannon may recoile without touching any thing, and that in the middest there may be made a pillar to beare the floure of the place aboue. The vse of the three pieces placed in these three loope holes, is to defend the cortine of the wall, and the ditch. and therefore the sole where they runne, is to be made so high, that with their noses they may looke somewhat downward into the ditch. In the middest of the lower place thou art to make a pillar all of massiue stone, neither so bigge that it hinder the recoiling of the can∣non, nor so little, but that it may beare the vault, and the cannon there placed aboue. In this vpper place thou art likewise to make foure loope holes, as in the place beneath: but if the same be vnco∣uered, a good parapet well crenelled will serue for the loope holes. Within the bulwarke also there would be a place made for the kee∣ping drie of the munition, and instruments occupied about the ordo∣nance, and also for keeping of armes for the souldiers. The entrance

into this place and vnto the places of the canon would be from with∣in. And that the souldiers or Canoniers may sally or goe out into the ditch there would be made a doore in the cortine of the wall neere to the first loope hoole. The like places, loope holes, and doore is to be made on the other hand of the bulwarke.

All the bulwarke saue the places for the artillery, and munition, and except, if you wil, the countermine going to the point of the bul∣warke, would be filled with earth beaten small, and wel rammed to∣gether. The wall of the bulwarke would bee made like the wall of the towne vnlesse it please them that bestowe the charge to haue it thicker: and either may it be made with cordon, or without. The pa∣rapet of the bulwarke would be more firme, then that of the wall. And in diuers places would there bee made soles for the canon to runne vpon aboue the bulwarke. The shoulder of the bulwarke being made for defence of the canon placed in the loope holes woulde bee made strong. And likewise would the point of the bulwarke be for that the enemy vseth there to make entrance with his mattocke, or zappe.

I know fewe bulwarkes are so large, or halfe so large as this that I haue described, but y^e lesser they are the more they want of strength and of perfection; and deserue in deede to be called rather terrasses, then otherwise. Those therefore that doe meane to make them strong, let them make them also large, and if they make not their terrasses with such places as I haue described, yet let them leaue some places, where to bestow the canon for defence of the ditch and cortine.

Where the wall is round, or crooked, or so long that one bulwarke cannot succour another, or that the same is so vneauen, that the cortine cannot be made proportionable for distance: there the remedy is in the midst of the cortine to make platformes, and caualiers, or mounts. The platforme is made of the same matter, and almost in the same forme that the bulwarke hath; likewise it commeth out from the wall as doeth the bulwarke. But the difference is, that it is pla∣ced in the midst of the plaine cortine, and is nothing so large as the bulwarke, nor hath those places, and loope hooles that the bulwarke hath, and serueth onely to place the ordonance vpon it aboue.

Sometimes that which platformes doe being ioyned to the wall, that doe rauelins, or terrasses deuided from the wall, which forme la Nouè commendeth, and I do not mistike: For both the charge and la∣bour is lesse, and well they may serue to strengthen some weake

place, that otherwise is not fortified. And the same being beaten, yet the wall remaineth safe.

aCaualiers or mountes are made within the walles some two or three paces, & are employed to the same purpose that platformes are. From them they differ, that the platformes are raysed in the ditche, and ioyne to the wall, where as mounts are made within. They are to be made higher then the walles to looke into the ditch to scoure the plaine or vppermost superficies of the bulwarkes on either hand, and to discouer the plaine. The forme is foure square, yet oft times broa∣der, then long. The stuffe is earth, and fagots for the most part, hol∣den vp with bordes and pieces of timber. The length is more or lesse according to the necessitie of the place, and time that is giuen vs to make it in. Some make them 180 foote broade, and long 150 the pa∣rapet would be 20 foote thicke on front and on the sides. The staires that are made to ascend the caualier, are made behinde.

The place being thus walled round with walles direct, and well flanked with bulwarkes at euery corner, either in conuenient distan∣ces, or els succorde with platformes or mounts in the midst of the cor∣tine, cannot easily beforced, if it be wel defended.

Whether it be better to haue fiue, or sixe, or more bulwarkes, a∣bout one towne, or forteresse it is hard to determine: for if the cortine be made right, and of a reasonable length, and the bulwarkes bee so placed that one may entresuccour another, how many corners soeuer the forteresse is, the same is good. Onely forteresses of foure corners and bulwarks, and much more those of three, because the bulwarkes cannot one defend another vnlesse they be made very sharpe & weake, of men of experience haue bene found defectiue. The forteresse of Porto Hercole in the territorie of Siena is of three corners, but it was so built either by reason of the ground that would admit no other forme, or for that the insufficiencie of those smal bulwarkes with three corners was not knowne when that was made.

Those that either haue not time or meanes to make walles, and bulwarkes of stone, if they will obserue the same measures and pro∣portions, may make the same very wel and strongly of earth, clay and small rubble mingled together, and either made in morter stiffened with straw, or els borne vp with small and straight sticks layd thinne in the workes. In Holland, Zeland, and other places of the low Countrie, there are diuers good fortifications made onely of turffes

of earth well layde and fastened together on the out sides, and within stuffed with earth and rubble. Onely the places for the canon which are made in bulwarkes of stone, in these kindes of fortifications are wanting, and the pointes of the bulwarkes made very weake and subiect to zapping. Yet with timber I would not doubt to make one sufficient place on either side of the bulwarke to range the canon in to beate low along the ditch and cortine; and with fagots also to make both the shoulder and point of the bulwarke as stiffe, as if were made with stone.

Those that fortifie their places only with turffes, or earth of which both the walles and bulwarkes are to consist, are thus to proceede in their worke. First the ground is to bee plained so broade as they meane to make their banke, or rampar, or bulwarke, and that would I not haue lesse then 14 pases at the bottome. Some what lower in the midst then in the outsides. The ground being plained, a ranke of turffes is to be layde outwarde, euery one a yarde or three quarters long if the earth be tough, and likewise a ranke of turffes of a worser sort inwarde to the towne. They are to be made thinne to the inside and thicke to the outside: vpon the endes of these turffes, are other wor∣ser turffes to bee layde, and the space within to be filled with small earth well rammed together. Vpon these rankes of turffes other rankes of turffes are to be layde and to be fastened together, and to be filled in the midst vntill the same come to a sufficient height. The banke is to be made leaning inwarde, the better to holde vp the earth. The earth must be digged out of the ditch al along the banke, leaning a yarde or more from the foundation of the banke, which the worke be∣ing finished, may be plained and fashioned to the banke, and may serue to make the banke seeme hie.

To make a banke of earth and hasell rods, or other brush mingled together, this is the course. First the earth is to be plained, where the foundation is to be made, then small earth well sifted and ram∣med to bee layde halfe a foote thicke, and aboue that small rods with their heads layde as eauen as may be: and to the endes of those, other rods are to be layde, and earth ouer them, this is to be done both on the outside, and inside, and so to be mingled and rammed together vntill the banke come to the full height. The banke is to be made slope for the better lying of the earth, and to bee filled with earth digged out of the ditch for ease of the labourers.

If neither turffes of earth, nor sticks may be had sufficient, then the outward crust on both sides of the ramper, would be made of morter well mingled with hay and straw, or els if the ground be stony, of stones layde in morter. The inmost part, if it be filled with earth and rubble, and well rammed; wil stand when the stones ruse downe, and beare many canon shot, if it be of sufficient thickenesse. This maner of fortification requiring no great cost, and being perfited onely with labour: greatly were it to be wished, that Plimmouth, Falmouth, and other Port townes in England were so banked, and fortified. For al∣beit in continuance of time such bankes are beaten flat, yet would they beare off any suddeine force.

When the worke is come to the height, then is the parapet to bee made 4 pases broade, if thy banke will beare it. And to mount vp the rampar, staires would be cast out in diuers places. The broader the banke is, the better the earth will lye, and the better resistance it will make. But if the same be weake in any place, then is the same to be defended with mounts from within, and rauelins without.

The measures of the bulwarkes of earth with al their parts would be either equal to those that are made of stone, or larger, because other∣wise the ditch would soone be filled with y^e rusing downe of the earth.

In making the walles and bulwarkes, the breadth also and fashion of the ditch is to be cast: for if they be done both together, the earth that is digged out of the ditch may serue to make the rampar. The ditch where it is narrowest would be 15 pases broade. If it be made narrower, it may the more easily bee filled vp by the enemy, and by the ruines of the bankes and walles. In France the ditches made in olde time are either a dos de l'asue, that is, deepe and narrow in the midst, and rising on both sides, as the ditches about Amiens, and Pa∣ris; or els a fond de cuue, that is, equally deepe in the bottome, and steepe vpon the sides. In both which the foote of the wall is open to the view, and easily battred. Neither doe the defenses made vpon the rampar on which the wal is built, which they cal fausses brayes helpe the matter. Now the wall being raysed out of the ditch, the bottome of the same would be leuell, but broade and deepe; And in the midst of it a deepe trench, which in dry ditches serueth to discouer the enemies Mines, in watry places to conuey away the water. Some for defence of their ditch haue built a wall in the midst of it, as in the ditches of Caleis: but it is to no purpose, seeing for the lownesse of it, either

with the ruines of the wall, or with earth and faggots cast into the ditches, it is soone couered.

Whether the ditch be drie or full of water, it skilleth not greatly. For as both haue their discommodities; so they haue also their com∣modities. A fortresse enuironed with a deepe water, is lesse subiect to sudden enterprises, except it be in time of hard frost. The same is more incommodious to passe, or to fill to the enemie: but the same is hurtfull to the retraite of the souldiers that sally, and keepeth them vp as it were in mue, and seldome is any ground so leuell, but that in some place or other, the water may be let out of the ditches: contrary∣wise dry ditches make fortresses more subiect to surprises, but yet they are more commodious for souldiers to sally out, and to fauour the retraite of those that come backe. If there be heapes of stones in them, the canon doeth more hurt to the enemy beating among them. Finally, the dry ditch giueth the souldiers meanes to defend their contrescarpe, which those that are enuironed with water, doe as it were yeeld vp to the enemy. There fore where the fortresse is strong, and well flanked, and manned, it is better to haue a dry ditch: where it is weake, and euill furnished with souldiers, it is better to haue dit∣ches deepe, and full of water.

The last defence which is thought of, but first lost, or wonne, is the coutrescarpe, or banke without the ditch. The same is to be fashioned according to the ditch. In the making of it, we are to respect three pointes, according to the three parts of it. First, that the same be made so plaine on the toppe, that the enemy doe not hide himselfe behinde it, and vse it for a parapet. Secondly, that toward the ditch there be made a couert or close way, foure foote broad, and foure foote and a halfe high. Wherein the souldiers lying, may hinder the appro∣ches of those, that come to viewe the walles, or full the ditch, or place their artillery; and sallying, may retire thither safely, being pur∣sued by the enemy. Thirdly, that the pendant or banke of the con∣trescarpe be made so slope, that the souldiers may goe downe in all places without breaking their armes or their legges, although they cannot come vp vpon it, but at the staires.

These are the common defences of Townes or Castles, accor∣ding to which, by the same rules others may be deuised. Of late there is an Italian, that hath deuised by certeine terrasses of earth be∣fore the walles, to keepe the enemy from battering the cortine of

the wall: and therefore he calleth them contraguardie. the same are thus to be fashioned.

The cortine of the wall is to bee made bending inwarde some eight or tenne pases from the right line in the middest. eight pases from this is a rampar of earth to bee raised all along the cortine betweene bulwarke, and bulwarke, higher then the contrescarpe, but lower then the parapet of the wall. this rampar is to haue a co∣uert way like to the contrescarpe inward, & being made low towards the ditch is there likewise to haue a parapet. the same at the endes is to be made small, so that it doe not hinder the artillery of the bulwarke to scoure the ditch. the artillery of the towne that is placed at the in∣ward angle of the cortine is to beate all along the ditch, and flanke of this contregard.

This manner of fortification hauing so many parapets and flankers, and such a thickenesse of earth, hee supposeth that no batte∣rie shall be able to force: but on the otherside hee considereth not, that the forces of the castle or towne being not great are not sufficient to furnish so many places, nor conuenient that they shoulde into so many partes bee deuided: neither doth hee thinke, that it is more easie to fortifie two townes or castles, then to builde these double de∣fenses: nor that the charge would be infinite.

It is reported, that the Castle of And warp cost a hundreth thou∣sand duckats building. what then woulde a citadel cost, that hath double the defenses, and workes, and requireth twise so many men, and twise so much ordonance? if fewe goe to the cost of fortification with stone, and content themselues with bankes of earth, it is not likely that any beside the worke of stone will make so many ter∣rasses of earth, as by the rules of this kinde of Italian fortification is required.

The Prince of Orenge in his time traced diuers bankes about such places as hee thought necessarie to bee defended; as about William stat, and others, where there is scarce any bulwarke, ca∣ualier, or good platforme. but the walles being made in and out, the inward angle of one part is made with great ordonance and mos∣quets to flanke the other. besides this, the Rampar is so large, that the artillerie placed thereon, may bee made to serue to many purposes.

He that vnderstandeth these rules, and withall the vse of the ca∣non, and all lesser pieces together with their effects: in what ground soeuer he is, may vnderstand how to defend himselfe and his compa∣nie so long as his victuals and munitions last. For example, if he be taken in plaine ground, and would there lie safelie; let him trace his bankes and trenches either fiue square, or sixe square with bulwarkes or terrasses at euerie corner like vnto a castle or towne fortified: hee may make it big, or lesse according to his number. If he be appointed to gard the passage of a riuer, hee may vnderstand how to couer his companie, that hee bee neither forced in front, nor on the banke. Such places as are aduantageous by nature as hils and straites, he knoweth how to make stronger by labour. TheaBicocke in Lom∣bardie resolutelie defended by Prospero Colonna agaynst the French, teacheth vs how hard it is to passe a banke, that is well de∣fended.

The Spaniards in their warres in the kingdom of Naples against the French hauing made betwixt themselues and the enemie a banke and ditch of no great strength, yet by that small aduantage obtained a great victorie.

These rules may also teach vs how to strengthen such townes as are alreadie walled and ditched, though weakelie, and for the vse of the canon vnprofitablie. The defences of walles made inartificial∣lie, are diuers. First, rampiers cast vp behinde the walles. Second∣lie, retrenchments with bankes made toward the towne with a strong parapet, such as before I haue described. Thirdly, plat∣formes made at the corners or on the cortine of the walles, made in such places, as our artillerie may best serue to flanke our walles and ditches.

The like effect haue mountes, raysed behinde the wall vp∣on the rampar. Fourthlie, rauelins placed from the wall forward, where the same is most straight, and the ground most euen. The same are to be made fiue square, or at least three square, and raised of earth and roddes mingled and rammed close together, about the which a broad and deepe ditch is to bee wrought. The last defence is in the depth of the ditches, and strength of the counterscarpe, which is to be wrought artificiallie all along where wee thinke the enemie will assayle vs.

When the gouernour of the towne hath vsed all possible means for

defence of himselfe and his companie, and yet through either long siege, or want of supplie, or succour can hold the place no longer, let him before hee attempt extremities, declare his estate to those that gaue him the place to gard. After that, if he neither receiue succour, nor answere, let him call the colonels, captains and chiefe citizens to counsell, and resolue in time what to doe. The first point to be resol∣ued, is, whether by any possibilitie the place may bee defended any longer, consideration had of the number of seruiceable men, of the want of victuals and munitions, and weakenesse of the place that li∣eth almost open to the enemie; likewise of the resolution of the ene∣mie, and despaire of succour. And if it appeare that the same cannot longer be defended, the next point to bee considered is, whether the same be to be yeelded vpon honourable composition, or to be destroy∣ed and forsaken. In this case the qualities of the enemie are to bee respected. For better it is, to runne into any hazard, yea and to die fighting, then to yeeld to him that perfourmeth no promise, and kil∣leth and massacreth men after yeelding. If it bee resolued, that it is best to attempt to escape by breaking through the campe, the next point to bee considered is, by what meanes, and at what time and place the same is to bee perfourmed. TheaNumidians that were left in garrison at Salapia, when the towne was betrayed, and en∣tred by the enemie, attempted to breake through the enemie. A course commendable although it succeeded not. They of Plataea dri∣uen to great extremitie by thebLacedemonians that besieged thē, when they could doe no more for want of victuals, in a darke and tempestuous night went ouer the enemies trenches and banks, and so escaped. They ofcAcerrae despairing the defence of their citie, when they sawe the enemie to begin to compasse them round a∣bout, before that his workes were continued and perfited, in the silent night passing through where least resistance was made, esca∣ped. The same was likewise attempted by thedGaules besieged by Caesar in Auaricum. The people neere the sea coast of France, de∣fended themselues so long as they were able against Caesar, & when they sawe the case desperate, conueied themselues and their goods into their ships, and so fled away. Attilius when he could no longer de∣fend the towne of Locri agaynst Annibal, counselling the townes∣men to compound with the enemie, conueied himself and the garrison away by water. Such as had meanes to escape, & chose rather to com∣pound

with the enemy, the Romanes in time past did so vtterly mis∣like, that they refused to redeeme those that had yeelded themselues after the ouerthrow of Cannae, albeit they might haue ransomed them with very little money. Yet those that purpose to breake through the enemies campe, are to resolue vpon many things before they put it in execution: first of the time, secondly of the place where they purpose to passe, that they may fill the ditch of his campe if any be, and prouide things necessary for that purpose, thirdly of the place where to re∣traite. Lastly in what order, that both they may force those that resist, and escape them that folow after.

When there appeareth no hope either to holde out, or to escape by flight, then are we to try what composition we can haue, and that ina time. So did the Romanes besieged by the Samnites in the strait at Caudium. Neither did the Romanes dislike with the garrison at Ca∣silinum that compounded with Annibal. Nay theybrewarded them for holding out so long hauing no other victuals but nuts and rootes. Nicolas Serin refusing necessary conditions of peace of∣fered him by Soliman that besieged him in Sigeth, lost himselfe and many other braue men that were with him. The fact ofcAeneside∣mus gouernour of Argos, who when he might haue escaped, the citie being surrendred, chose rather to die armed himselfe alone in the place, then to depart, is rather to be lamented, then commen∣ded, or followed.

Necessarie composition therefore, so it be in extremitie, is not to be refused. But yet while we talke of composition, we are to vse great circumspection and care; first that the garrison be not discouraged; secondly that the same growe not more secure, and carelesse; thirdly that vnder colour of parley the enemy doe not view the walles, or ditches or breach, or attempt to sease the breach or the gate, or els en∣terteine some intelligence with some within: which things how dan∣gerous they are, I haue heretofore declared. To auoyd these dangers this course is best; the necessitie of the towne, and other secrets are to be kept from the knowledge of the souldiers, who by good wordes are to be encouraged, and made acquainted with so much onely, as is necessary: secondly such men onely are to be deputed to parley, as are well knowne for their sufficiencie, and loyaltie: thirdly the place of parley is to be appointed farre from the towne, that the souldiers within heare nothing. Which was practised in diuers parleyes du∣ring

the last siege of Rochel.

In capitulations two things are especially to be respected, first that the conditions be honourable, and fauourable: secondly that the same be performed. The most reasonable composition that may be, is when they within keepe the place still, paying onely certaine money, or loosing onely some other commoditie. So Rome was redeemed from Porsena that besieged it; and so they that were besieged by the Gaules in the Capitol redeemed themselues. And Rochel escaped the more easily y^e hands of them that beesiegd the towne, by compoun∣ding for money. Contrarywise of all pointes it is most extreeme, to yeeld vp the place to the enemie. If the Saguntins would haue yeelded vp their towne to Annibal, and consented to haue dwelt some other where: they might haue saued themselues, and their goods; but they would not. There is yet a meane betwixt these two, when those that yeeld to the enemy do promise him to become his subiects, and to pay him certaine tribute, and so keepe the place vnder his dominion.

If then by any summe of money we may redeeme our selues, and our citie driuen to such extremitie, let vs not prise golde aboue safetie: on the other side if we be not in extremitie, let vs not sell our aduan∣tages for money. When I reade former histories, I cannot but won∣der at the basenesse of many of our nation, that in times past haue bene bought out of their places for money: and lament, that some accomp∣ted of, wel otherwise, should therein deale more dishonourably, & foo∣lishly then other nations. For what could be more dishonorable, then the surrender of Terwin, Torney, Bollein, & other places, or the losse of Caleis? and what more ridiculous, then that our army going to fight, should with a few French crownes be bought out, and perswa∣ded to returne?

But if the enemy will heare of no composition without surrender of the place, the next consideration is, that we may be assured of our liues, and depart with our horses, and armes without disgrace. By the capitulation of S.aIean d'Angeli the captaines and souldiers departed with their armes, horses, and baggage. Onely they were driuen to rolle vp their ensignes, and to make promise that they would not beare armes in the cause of Religion for the space of foure moneths. The garrison of Somieres surrendring the towne to the enemy were suffered to depart with their armes and goods, and had seuen dayes respit giuen them to conuey away their goods in.

Like honourable composition had our men in the late surrender of Scluce. The more resolute the garrison sheweth it selfe in standing vpon points, the more honourable their composition doth commonly prooue. And contrarywise those that will needes compound, loose both life and honor. The Romanes for the most part would not com∣pound without surrender made of the defendants armes: but the an∣cient faith and loyalty of the Romanes being now lost and gone, let it be iudged, what wisedome it is for men to put themselues into dissoy∣all mens handes all naked.

The greatest difficulty is in procuring of good assurance of the ca∣pitulation of surrender made. which is most of all to be stood vpon. For what auaileth it to haue good words without performance? In these late brabbles of France the garrisons of Mucidam, and Mailè, and diuers other places haue bene cut in pieces contrary to compo∣sition. And howsoeuer the prince of Parma dealt with our men, yet the poore townesmen of Scluce, and some of the Dutch complaine, that all points were not performed. The Protestants of France, con∣trary to the articles of peace, were shamefully massacred during the mirth and solemnities of the kinges sisters marriage. And now it beginneth to be a rule, that no faith, nor lawes of warre are to be ob∣serued to heretikes. In which rolle, seeing the Romanists doe mo∣ster all that are not of the Papall faction, it behooueth vs to looke a∣bout, how wee doe trust them. especially giuing vs such warning by the feined treaty of Dunkirke. Beside all this, a certeine Spaniard, a great man of law in the Lowe countries, affirmeth, that allacapi∣tulations wherein any thing that belongeth to the state is aliena∣ted, are voide and of no force. Which if it were true, then coulde hardly any composition of surrender be good, further then they that haue the same surrendred, keepe the same by force.

Wherefore, that wee be not heerein abused by treacherous ene∣mies, let vs see by what meanes we may assure our selues. In times past wee might trust mens wordes. if they performed not wordes, yet had they regard to writinges and seales.bCaptaine Piles for the assurance of the composition of S. Iean d' Angeli, required only the kinges hand and seale. But now such disloyalty is entred into the world, that neither with words, nor writings, nor seales, nor yet othes men can stand assured. And therefore beside wordes and writing, wise men now require sureties, pledges, and hostages. The house of

aBentiuogli in Bologna would not capitulate with Caesar Borgia, vnlesse the French king, and Florentines would giue their words, and binde themselues for performance. Thebconstable of France would not trust Lewis the eleuenth his othe without pledge. Both of Lysander in olde time, and of Lewis the eleuenth in latter times, stories affirme, that they had small regard of promise, or othe, further then their profit required. Therefore both in time past the Romanes, and of late time others haue required, and had other assurance. The garrison of Brouagec capitulating with the enemy about the surren∣der of Brouage, doubting of the performance of couenants; demanded, and obteined hostages, which were conueyed to Rochell before they gaue vp the place. they of Somieres had likewise hostages deliuered vnto them, such as they did nominate, before they did deliuer vp the towne. Without this assurance, it is not safe for any to commit their heads into their enemies handes. and farre more honorable it is to die like braue men in the field with our armes in our handes, then like sheepe to haue our throates cut in the handes of perfidious butchers. Tit.dSempronius seeing himselfe betrayed, and that he must needs die, exhorted his men to die rather fighting and doing somewhat, in which case men haue lesse apprehension of death, then vnder the kniues of executioners.

To auoid all cauilles about wordes, the sentence is to be concei∣ued plainely, and all circumstances to be expressed, as nere as may be. and the redresse of all contrauentions, if it may be, either by some meanes to be kept in our owne handes, or in the determination of ho∣norable persons. TheeLantgraue that yeelded himselfe, and came to the presence of Charles the fift, Maurice of Saxony being media∣tor betwixt them, vpon cauill about one word, was contrary to his meaning, deteined prisoner, and had bene longer, if that Maurice had not conceiued indignation, that vpon his word the good prince should be abused. All we can do in this case, is too litle. For whē princes wil quarrell, they can picke occasion, and ground themselues vpon euery small point, and make many faire pretenses: as in the dealings that passed betwixtfLewis Sforza, and the house of Medici; bewixt pope Iulio the second, and Lewis the twelft of France, and betwixt them and Ferdinand king of Spaine is euident. Of more then we haue in our owne power, we can neuer assure our selues, when we deale with perfidious enemies. And therefore let all braue souldiers consider

before hand and prouide, that they come not into these straytes, and if necessitie enforce them to compound, let them deale wisely.

CHAP. XVIII. Of the vse of the Nauy in warres, and of diuers pointes to be consi∣dered of those that commaund at Sea.

THose Nations and Cities, that haue the commaun∣dement of the Sea, howsoeuer they are foyled at land: yet can neuer be throughly vanquished, before they be beaten from y^e Sea. A matter apparant by diuers examples. The Athenians, although their countrey was all wasted, and the people driuen by the Lacedemonians their enemies, to hide thēselues within y^e walles of the Citie; yet so long as they wereastrong at Sea, not onely had all things necessarie for themselues, but also depriued their enemies of many commodities, and spoyled their coastes by diuers sudden incursions. And albeit they had no dominion in firme land: yet kept they the Ilands in subiection, so long as they kept y^e Sea. The same people before that, being inuaded by y^e Persians comming vpon them with huge array, in so much that they thought themselues vnable to resist at land, abandoned their Citie, and made themselues strong at Sea. By which meanes, in the ende they vanquished their enemies, and recouered their losses with great aduantage both of wealth, and honour. The Cities likewise on the coast ofcFrance, which is nowe called Briteine, although they could not defend themselues against Caesars forces at land, yet suffered no great losse, as long as they had ships to commaund at Sea. Their ships furnished them with things necessarie being besieged, the same conueyed the men & their goods away being distressed. Contrariwise howe strong soeuer a Nation is by land, yet cannot the same mainteine it selfe long, nor continue in reputation without a sufficient power at Sea. The Romanes were driuen to great straytes by the Pirates, that kept the rule of the Sea a great time, and continued it vntill such time, as they were driuen thence by the victory of Pompey the great. Sext. Pompeius keeping the Seas with his ships, draue Augustus, and Antony to a harde cō∣position. The Lacedemonians could not remedy the spoiles of their countrey made by y^e incursiōs of the Athenian ships, nor could Caesar haue reason of the coast Townes of France, before he had prouided a Nauy, & vanquished them at Sea. Neither shall euer y^e Spaniard ob∣teine

his purpose of y^e Low-countries so long as they can keep y^e sea: but if they faile of that, it would goe hard with them. This was the cause that made the Romanes, albeit before that vnacquainted with sea causes to arme to sea. Without their nauy they could neither haue defended their Empire against y^e Carthaginians first, nor afterward against the pyrates, nor without strength at sea coulde either Caesar haue subdued the coast townes of France, or entred this Iland. Nor could Augustus haue vanquished Pompey, nor the Lacedemonians preuailed against y^e Athenians. The experience of these nations, and great warriers, doth teach vs this conclusion, that if we meane either to mainteine the honor, & reputation of our countrey, or to defend our selues against the enemie, y^e pursueth vs, or to prosecute iniuries done vnto vs, or to aide our friends that craue our helpe, we must haue dili∣gent regard to our seafaring men, & shipping, that both may be main∣teined, & kept in order. Our owne experience, & diuers reasons may teach vs the same. Before that this Nation did vse y^e sea, first the Ro∣manes, then the Saxons, after them the Danes, & nowe last of all the Normans, haue taken & possessed diuers partes of this coūtrey. Nei∣ther could we wanting sufficient force at sea, resist them. Sithence that the kings of England haue had y^e gouernment at sea, neither haue forreine nations had like courage to inuade vs, nor haue we wan∣ted meanes to defend our selues, or aide our friends. If that our ships had not had y^e vantage of sayling, when the Spaniard came to inuade vs, or y^t we had wanted shipping, God knoweth what would haue bin the issue. How much then is it better nowe, then when our auncesters had neither nauy to defend their coasts, nor to transport their armies to pursue their right, or help their friends? in y^e daies of king Edward the 3. and Edward the 4. our nation for want of shipping, was behol∣ding to the Flemmings and Hollanders for shipping, to transport the English armie into France. The vse of y^e nauy is great in peace, greater in warres. Thereby trafique, & entercourse betwixt friends is mainteined: victuals y^t goe to the enemies are stopped, our wants of victuals, armes, munition, & other necessaries are supplied: the e∣nemies coast is spoiled, our owne defended: the coast townes of the enemies countrey, that liue vpon the sea are brought to great extre∣mities, our owne mainteined. Without y^e same neither can the trade of marchandize be mainteined, nor y^e sea townes of y^e enemie be besi∣ged, nor their country spoyled, nor can we vnderstand y^e enemies pro∣ceedings,

nor helpe, or wel defend our friēds, or our selues. For three causes especially asaFabius witnesseth did the Romanes furnish, & set out their nauy: First to spoile the coast of Afrike, next to gard the coast of Italy, but chiefly to hinder that no supply of men, victuals, or money should come from Carthage to Annibal, with whō then they had great wars. Octacilius sayling frō Sicily toward Afrike, & cōming vpon y^e coast vpon a sudden, first tooke Vtica a rich towne, and then spoiled y^e country, & returned with 130. ships laden with spoile. And all this within 3. or 4. dayes. Caius Laelius cōming with his na∣uy tobHippo on the coast of Afrike landed his men on the sudden, and at the breake of day led forth his souldiers, & mariners in war∣like manner vnder their colours, and made a great spoile, for that as in time of peace, the people of the countrey were without care. M. ValeriuscMessala sayled into Afrike, aswel to spoile the country, as to vnderstand the proceedings, and purposes of the enemie: which he learned by the examinations of diuers prisoners of good accompt, which hee tooke there.d The Romanes vnderstanding what spoiles were done vpon their coastes by Pirates, and others, sent two cap∣taines, each of them with 10. ships to defend the coastes, and to keepe the seas. These vses of shipping, although experience hath taught vs, yet many will not admit nor beleeue. For by reason of their want of skill, they thinke that neither the enemie can land here, nor we land in the enemies country. And if the enemie should attempt any such mat∣tter they verily beleeue, that y^e countrey people with their forkes, and the women with their rockes and spits will kill them downe. But li∣tle doe they knowe howe small trust there is in such defence, nor what great actions may be performed, when resolute men land in the ene∣mies countrey vpon a sudden. Which in part I haue shewed by the examples of Octacilius, Laelius, and Messala. Neither will any trained men, or small garrison, helpe the matter as nowe I shall shewe. The king ofeMacedonia did place garrisons in all the coast townes, yet was he not able to gard the countrey from spoile of the Romanes, that out of their nauy landed here, and there. The Athenians not∣withstanding that thefcountrey was well garded both with horse∣men and footemen, yet landed diuers times, and sacked and spoiled diuers townes in Peloponnesus. Neither may we thinke, that Afrike that so was spoiled by y^e Romanes, was all that while without gard. But the suddennesse of y^e inuasion preuented y^e gathering together of those, that were to make resistance.

aNasidius cōming vpō a suddē into the hauē of Messana tooke out a ship thēce in the sight of the Townesmen & other ships. Neither could the Atheniās keepe so diligētbwatch at their beacōs, but that the enemie cōming on the sudden tooke 3. ships out of the hauē of Salamine, & set y^e towne in an vprore. As for those y^t thinke it a hard matter to land quietly in y^e enemies country: they seeme to be ignorāt not only how easily we landed our men in y^e voyage of Portugal, both at Corōna & Penicha: but also of y^e easy landing of y^e Atheniās in Pe∣loponnesus, of y^e Romanes in Afrike, & in y^e coast of Spaine, & Greece. Al y^e forces of this Iland being assembled together, & seeing Caesars cōming, could not hinder his landing. Nay whē Pompey held all the port townes of the coast ofeEpeirus with strong garisons, & had a most puissant army ready, yet could he not forbid Caesar to land his army y^t came against him, & in a calme landed his men amōg rocks. Sarlabous minding to stop y^e landing of Minguetiere in y^e yle of Ole∣ron an. 1569. charged him in y^e landing, but with such disaduantage, the others men being couered in their botes & shalups, & he being on the open shore, that he & diuers men lost their liues in y^e place, the rest had no way to escape but by running. Those y^t land against those that resist them haue many aduantages, they come vpō the sudden, they haue great number of resolute souldiers, they comeprepared to fight, They stand close in their botes couered with their targets: their small shot, & their falcons or other small pieces placed in the noses of their botes doth make them way. Contrariwise souldiers are not gathered vpō a sudden, & tumultuary forces of y^e country come rather to gaze, thē to fight. Seldome do they endure blowes, & sometime they feare at y^e sound of pieces. Those y^t present themselues vpō the shore, lie opē to y^e enemies shot. Neither captaine nor souldier can come in warlike sort, being taken vpō such a sudden. The only danger of those y^t land in a forreine country is, least y^e tempest arysing, suffer them not to be shipped againe. Which happened to thedAtheniās landing in Pe∣lopōnesus. And yet going to the next harbor, they tooke the place, and staied there, vntill such time as their ships could come vnto thē. In all which time the countrey was not yet come together in such numbers, that they durst fight with them.

By the nauy y^e victuals y^t go to y^e enemie are intercepted. Nabis theeLacedemonian with a fewe ships so watched the coast, that no vi∣ctuals could come to the Romanes, that then warred against the

Macedonians in Greece. By the sameacourse the Carthaginians ly∣ing incertaine Ilands at the receite hindred the repaire of ships that brought victuals to the Romanes. Neither could they redresse this disordred before they had taken all thebIlands from them, and dri∣uen theircships out of the sea. Those y^t would defend the coast from the enemies spoiles, are to proceede in this sort. IndPromontories they are to keepe diligent watch at beacons. To vnderstand y^e ene∣mies proceeding, they are to send forth their espials in shippes of good faile. Vpon the coast they are to mainteineeforces both on horse∣backe & foote, & to place in port townes good garisons. This did the Carthaginians practise in their warres against y^e Romanes, and long before them y^e Lacedemoniās against y^e Athenians, & other na∣tions proceeded in like force. and al litle ynough. For where there is not a nauy ready furnisht to seeke out, & to fight with y^e enemie, either in one place or other cōming with great forces, he will land, & may for any resistance that can be made from y^e land vpon a sudden against such force, doe the same without danger.

But if (as in deede it is far better) we purpose our selues to inuade the enemies, & to land our men in y^e countrey, yet let vs procede more wisely, & orderly, then heretofore some men haue done, and let vs not alwaies presume vpon y^e enemies weakenes. If former examples can not instruct vs, yet may y^e smart of their losses hauing lost both many good friends, and braue men make men more resolute & more wary. First therefore let vs cōsider the time when y^e enemie is most secure, and y^e season y^t best serueth for vs, y^t we thē go not when either heat, or cold wil beate vs, & the country is least prouided to maintein vs with victuals or forrage. Secondly let vs cōsider y^e place where y^e enemie is most open, & where there is most cōmoditie for vs: further let those that attempt such enterprises prouide themselues of al things neces∣sary for such a iourney. Alas why should men be sent to sea to be fami∣shed, or among y^e enemies to be dishonored? Before things be ready, let vs not discouer our purpose. Neither let y^e Spaniard heare of our en∣terprises, before y^t men be leuied that should execute them. If thefLa∣cedemonians had repressed their anger, vntil such time as they had prouided themselues both by land & sea, as Archidamus counselled them; they had done more hurt then they did to the Atheniās. But what if such as go in such seruices cānot haue things necessary? then let them quiet themselues, & let those that are the hinderances of all

good seruice goe themselues, & fight themselues first: for by going in that sort, they doe hazard their liues, and loose their honour.

The prouision is to be made at a place certaine, which being made, all y^e souldiers are to haue their rendeuous giuen them at that place, & both they & the prouision is to be shipped, & to depart with the next faire winde y^t bloweth after that time. When we areaready to depart then is direction to be giuē vnto the chiefe of euery ship either by word of mouth, orin writing sealed, & to be opened at the sea. That the enemie do not meete vs, or crosse vs at sea, we are to vnderstād by our espials where his shipping lieth, & what it is, & in what readines.

To come vpon the sudden, the best course is, as soone as we descrie land, and see where we are, to stay vntill the shutting of the euening, and then to make toward y^e hauen, or harbor. If the weather be faire, there is no danger. Neither did the Romanes euer doubt to come on the coast in y^e night. Laelius lāded atbHippo in the night.cClaudius lurking behind a promōtory so long as it was light, landed his men in the euening, and tooke Chalcis before day. And some thinke we might haue sped better at Coronna, if we had either entred in y^e eue∣ning, or not discouered our selues so long before we entred. Neither are brauedactions hindred by anything more, then by pretence of feare. The more expedition y^t is vsed in landing, y^e greater execution is cōmonly done; and y^e longer it is delaied, the more time y^e enemie hath to resist, or rather to runne away, and conuey away his goods. If we meane to do any great executiō, our force must be y^e greater. The Ro∣manes emploied not in such enterprises lesse then an army: but if we might land but 4000. foote, and 200. horse, leauing gard sufficient for our shippes, I would thinke to doe some great matter with them.

Yet that we may speede the better, it were good to resolue and giue direction before we depart from our countrey, who should land first, and what euery man should doe presently vpon landing. Being lan∣ded, wee are to proceede in order, according to the practice of warre, sending our espials before, & placing corps de gard in conue∣nient places, to defend those that are ranging about to fetchin spoile. TheeRomanes marching dissolutely after their landing in Afrike, and thinking their comming thither was onely to spoile, and not to fight, were discharged of their burthens, & driuen to their ships with losse. Another time wandring vp and downe withoutfcare or feare, they were drawen into an ambush, and driuen backe to their

shippes with great slaughter, and shamefull flight. Which mischiefe cannot happen to those that forecast dangers, and go strong, and dis∣patch quickly, and prouide for their retrait. As did Laelius and others, whose examples I haue propoūded to be imitated in like enterprises.

Those that do not aswel prouide y^t their men may retire safely, and be orderly shipped, as y^t they may go forth orderly seldome escape dan∣ger or losse. Therefore is there a defence to be made at y^e landing, and certaine bankes & trenches to be cast, that our men may safely retire within them, & from them quietly, & without tumult take shipping, repelling those y^e come to charge them. AtaAlexandria when Caesars men being driuen frō their ground, would haue fled to their ships, they came so fast, that they sunke the botes that were ready to re∣ceiue them, so that fewe escaped, saue such as could swimme: the e∣nemie pressed so fast vpon them, and so litle order there was to fa∣uour their retrait, that was not looked for. The like disorderbhap∣pened to the remnant of Curioes souldiers in Afrike. If they would haue gone orderly, and quietly, euery man might haue bin shipped: because they striued, the botemen were afraid to set their botes to the shore. Although no enemie vrge vs, yet great losse happeneth by such tumults, as is euident by the tumultuouscretrait of Appius his soul∣diers, that ranne to their ships, and were drowned many of them by their haste, whē the enemie whō they feared, folowed not. Further, we are to appoint a time, whē euery man is to retire to his ships, that no company stay to long. And aboue althings we are to prouide, y^t our ships stand safely both against y^e attempts of the enemie, & the force of the weather, and to giue order in case they be forced before our returne to wey ancre, where to meete vs. If y^e enemie can either burne our ships or botes, or if there be not correspondence betwixt those at land, and those at sea, they both incurre a manifest danger, & therefore we are to chuse a safe place of landing, & to keepe a diligent & strōg gard. The Carthaginiās being charged by the Romanes, while their men were at shore, were ouer throwen at sea. Neither did it helpe them, that their men were in the port. For while they hasted to get on bord, & to prouide themselues to fightdthe souldiers hindred the mariners, the mariners crossed the souldiers, & all was out of order. Neuer therfore ought the ships to be left without sufficient defence. TheeGreekes that went vp the riuer of Pò to seeke spoile, were de∣feated by the pesants of the countrey, for that going on land, they

left their botes in the riuer without defence or gard, which being seased, they were cut from their retrait.

DidiusaCaesars admirall in Spaine, burnt Pompeis ships left with∣out gard, while he & his men were gone on shore to feteh in water, & other prouisiō. So he that escaped Caesars hands in the ouerthrow at Munda, was here ouertaken by his owne negligence. The samebhappened to Didius himself also. For fearing no enemie at sea, & cōming himself & his cōpany on land, his ships were suddēly fired by certaine Lusitaniās that before had serued Pompey, by whō also himselfe, and his company was slaine. Neither ought we to enter any hauen or harbour, where the enemie may barre vs in, or take vs single as we goe out. ThecAthenians taking the mouth of the har∣bour at Pylos, shut in the nauy of the Lacedemonians so, that it did them no seruice. The same stratageme the Lacedemonians put in practise against the Athenians in Sicile. For taking thedmouth of the hauen of Syracusae, where al their nauy did lie, they draue them in the end to forsake their ships, which was the beginning of that calamitie that happened to them in Sicile. The English in the daies ofeEdward the 3. finding certaine Spanish ships in a certaine ha∣uen in Briteine, seasing the mouth of the hauen at flowing water, sending certaine boates and barkes on fire among them fired them al. Polyxenidasfadmiral vnto Antiochus, taking the Rhodians with their ships in a strayte, kept them within; and when they forced to come out, which they could not doe, but two or three on front, he tooke the formost before the rest could come to succour, and so de∣stroyed the Rhodian nauy. Therfore ought we to haue no lesse care, that we may lie safely within the harbour, and goe out easely at plea∣sure, then to winne the harbour.

Thus we see the manifold vses of shipping, and howe it is to be garded and gouerned in forreine enterprises in countries abrode. Let vs nowe therefore consider howe it is to be fashioned, furnished, and gouerned, that the same may be vantageous in fight at Sea, and fitte for seruice. Wherein a principall point is, that they be made swift of sayle, & sharpe to goe neere the winde. This onely one vantage next vnto the power of God gaue the victorie to the nauy of England, and the foyle to the supposed inuincible nauy of Spaine of late time. D. Brutusgalthough in all pointes else hee were superiour to the Massilians, yet by reason their ships were lighter and swifter, could he not ouerthrowe them, although many times hee foyled them.

If they be too weake, those that are swift of sayle may safely depart, if they preuaile, no shippe can escape them by sayling. They ought likewise to bee made strong, both to abide the force of the Sea in a storme, & to beare the shaking of our owne ordonance, and the blows of the enemies. How that is to be wrought, I referre my selfe to the masters of the occupation.

Further, ships may not want victualles while they are at sea, least either hauing the aduantage, they be driuen to giue it ouer, or be∣ing taken at aduantage, they be not able to abide it out. And most absurde it were if ships that go to fight should want ordonance, mu∣nition, and armes to fight with. First therfore there ought to be good ordonance mounted on their carriages, and fitted with their rings & tacle, and al instruments necessary. Of al peeces the demy coluerine in the nose and poope is most effectuall, both for the long reach, and for that it giueth the fire all out of the ship. There woulde be store of crosse barres, chaine shot, and other bullets. How many peeces there ought to be in euery ship, it cannot be determined, considering the di∣uers makings and burthens of ships. Much lesse can it be resolued what munitions, victuals, and furniture for great ordonance must be prouided further then in general, that there must be sufficient. Beside the great ordonance there ought to be prouisiō made of mosquets, ca∣liuers, and pistoles, swords & daggers, halfe pikes, halberds, glaiues, blackbils, and other sortes of weapons, & for the defense of the soul∣diers good cuyraces and morions, and targets both of proofe & ligh∣ter. Likewise there woulde bee rampars made of wooll, and for the defense of the waste and the decke a strong netting. Beside castles made in the poope, and foredecke for garde of the ship. For which there would be made also mantellets of plankes filled with occum stuffed betweene, and moueable, that they may bee employed where neede is. The castles would also be made to take downe, that in say∣ling the ship be not hindred by them. There would also turrets, brid∣ges or frames of wood be made leaning ouer boord, that our men might more easily boorde the enemie. The toppes would bee fensed with some frame of boords lined with occum & furnished with stone & shot. But that need not be before we come to ioine. The yard arms would haue sharp hooks in thē to cut the tacle of the enemies ships.

To fire the enemies shippes there would be balles of wildefire, and other fire workes and engins deuised, and to quench the enemies fire

store of clay, vineger, and water set ready. Besides all this, axes, hammers, wimbles, & al instruments to worke withal, and in summe whatsoeuer may serue to annoy the enemy or defend our selues, the same is to be prouided.

Caesar albeit his ships were lower then those of the enemies, yet did he raise vp turrets andaframes of boordes in them, by meanes whereof, his men when they came to boording did easily enter the enemies shippes, and foyled them. By which meanes hee van∣quished the power of the Gaules at sea. If that we haue to do with the Spaniard at sea; either must we vse some such deuise, or else shall we hardly enter their shippes being so high, in respect of ours. Withbhookes in the yard armes he cut the tacle of the enemies ships in the same fight. But aboue al things there ought to be in euery ship store of valiant souldiers, and mariners, without which neither the ship, nor the furniture can be employed to purpose. I woulde onelie content me with mariners, if they were souldiers also. The Romans and Greekes that wel knew the difference betwixt them, for euerie mariner put in their ships two souldiers, which proportion the Spa∣niards obserue now, making great difference betwixt mariners and souldiers, although we do not therein make that difference, that wee should.

ThecCarthaginian shippes encountring with the Romanes were not able to make any fight for want of souldiers, albeit they had store of mariners. And in the encounters that Caesar had at sea against diuers enemies, it was not the marriner, but the legionarie souldier that gaue him the victorie. Howsoeuer it is either with ma∣riners, or souldiers, or both, our ships are to be furnished so, that both the great ordonance may be employed in the roomes below, and di∣uers be placed to do all seruices necessary in the houle of the ship, and also all the deckes and parts aboue be well manned and garded: not forgetting the tops and other places.

If men set out their ships neyther well manned, nor wel victual∣led, nor wel furnished with armes and munition of warre; what hope is there for them to vanquish the Spaniard or any other their enemies at sea?

Some, I doubt not, doe thinke to make them ducke at sea with great shot. And therefore as they prouide somewhat slenderly for that, so for other matters they goe to sea altogether vnprouided. Be∣sides

that I vnderstand that in some places the Princes shipping haue for the most part speciall instructions not to graple. Matters very ridiculous to those that haue but any small skill at sea. For it is not alwayes in their power to take and leaue, as the lamentable ex∣perience of some of late hath declared. Where the enemies shippes are swifter then thine, he may if he find thee at sea, and list to fight, force thee against thy will to fight, or to yeeld. Yea admit he hath only some ships swifter then thine, yet will it suffice to force thee to a ge∣nerall fight, vnlesse thou meanest shamefully to abandon to the ene∣mies curtesie such ships, as are slower of saile, then the rest. For we may not thinke that alwayes we shal meete with such a General, as the duke of Medina Sidonia that alwayes fled, and neuer made head againe, or with those that haue commission to flie, and not to fight. Which if we do, then beware those that are hindermost. Besides this our ships may be taken sometimes in harbour, or at some aduantage whē they cannot flie frō the enemie. Were it not expediēt in this case, that thy ships were wel prouided forgrapling, & al maner of defence? vnlesse they be so furnished, how can they abide a brunt, or stay a time vntil they be succored? or how can they be succored, vnles the succors be prouided for grapling? Finally suppose all thy nauy were swifter then the best ships of the enemy (which cannot be) and that thou had∣dest alwayes sea-roome, which cannot be hoped: yet all this maketh little to fighting, but rather to flying. The Parthians that shot backeward flying, yet did not alwayes flie, but now and then charge the enemy, if aduantage were offered. Sure in this kinde of fight of shippes there is altogether no honour, no nor profite. For how can they that flie subdue the enemy that commeth to spoile their coasts? Howe can they hinder him, but that hee may goe whither hee listeth, and returne when hee listeth, the winde and weather ser∣uing him? Suppose that by shot thou shouldest sincke a shippe, yet the men may still be saued. Those therefore that thus fight shoo∣ting, and neuer come neere, are like vnto those that strike the ene∣mie downe, but dare not set their feete vpon him, and dispatche him.

As for those that thinke to worke wonders with great shot, they doe onely feede themselues with imaginations, that the enemie is like to women or children, that feare the noise of great peeces. For other great hurte it doeth not, vnlesse it be to Marchants shippes

heauy laden, and where the men within cannot come to stop leakes. if the sea moue neuer so little, twentie to one but the shot falleth ey∣ther hie, or lowe, vnles the ships come very neere, which in fight with a nauy of ships, I suppose, no one ship wil, and many cannot for feare of grapling, which they forsweare. I would gladly knowe of these men how many ships they haue knowen to haue bin taken with this maner of fight. Don Pedroes ship, although abandoned of all her fel∣lows, yet would neuer haue yeelded, but that they within imagined they should be boorded of all the fleete. Those ships that fell among the flats before Vlishingen being a remainder of the Spanish fleete, yet abode a charge, and would not yeeld, but vpon feare they should haue beene inuested. Did not our men at Coronna beate a great Biskaine ship from the land within mosquet shot a whole day with diuers great peeces? yet could they neyther sinke the ship, nor force the men to yeeld before that with their boats they made countenance either to fire her, or to boord her. They of Rochel An. 1569. besie∣ging Brouage brought the great Venetian carrake hard to the side of the castle: whence a man might haue spit into her, not only hit her, and shot into her. Yet could not they of the castle with all their canon shot eyther sinke her, or greatly hurt her, but shee hurte them much more. By grapling I haue heard of many ouercome at sea, both in ancient time, and also of late dayes, as in the gulfe of Lepanto where the christians ouer came the Turkes; and in the encounter betwixt theaSpaniards and Philip Doria, where Hugh Moncada and ma∣ny Spaniards died of the sword, not of the bullet. But if great or∣donance could do so much as is supposed, yet where should we haue shot, and pouder to furnish the continuall shot of our shippes: when in the encounter betwixt the Spaniard and vs at sea, in one two daies most of the shippes had spent all their pouder, without any sensible losse to the enemy?

How shall we driue the Spaniard out of our ports without grap∣ling, if he come once againe as he threatneth? How can we succour any towne by him besieged by sea without fighting? Caesars shippes were heauy of saile, yet lying before Massilia, they could not be re∣moued, nor could anie victualles enter into the towne by them. Nei∣ther had the Spaniard beene so easily remooued from before Caleis, but that God stroke them with feare without euident cause.

Those that are afraide to venture their shippes of warre (a good∣ly

colour for such cowards) they may also be afraid to venture in the defence of their country. For without aduenturing not only of tim∣ber, but also of mens liues, which (howsoeuer some now in our time do not value thousands of men at the price of one rotten ship) are far more pretious, our country cannot be defended, nor the prince serued. These men therefore, let them keepe their decayed wits, and ioyntes warme, and let them not henceforth tell vs of things impossible, ri∣diculous, yea and very dangerous. For the way to hazard our ships, is not by boording, but by sparing of mony, when they are not, as they should be furnished for fight, but must needes fall into the ene∣mies hands, if euer they be taken at any disaduantage, by the break∣ing of their mastes, tearing, or burning of their sailes, or cutting of their tacle. This is a feare that neither the Romanes, nor Atheni∣ans, nor other nation euer feared; and yet fire was then as dāgerous as now. Neither the Spaniards, French, nor Dutch feare any such matter, neither do our men of warre that go to sea forecast it. Wher∣fore then should our best shippes, and such as should be best furnished feare, more then others, this course especially being so fit to make the nauy of England vnprofitable, & to giue the enemy the victory? if this be not so, let it be shewed where the Queens ships haue taken any ship of warre by canonades: but of marchants ships, & other men of warre we haue heard of diuers, that by boording haue preuailed.

Let vs therefore so prouide, that wee neede not to feare any such danger, and that we may not onely ouercome the enemy with flying, but with fighting, as our ancestors did in the dayes of Edward the third, and Henry the 8. famous kings of this land, and as our souldi∣ers and mariners would now do, if mens hands were not bound, and their hearts broken, whereas men should endeuour to encourage them, and whet them, to go forward.

In fighting at seathe Admiral, that hath his ships wel trimmed, and al things ready must haue care also further, that his cōpany may haue the aduantage of the winde, and keepe good order in the sayling of the ships, that one go not before an other, that he range his nauie with supplies, and finally that he prouide, whatsoeuer else is neces∣sary or requisite for the obtaining of victorie.

Those that haue the wind on their backes, haue thereby many ad∣uantages: their shot doth more hurte the side of the enemies ship ly∣ing vp, then the enemies shot can hurt their ships: their fire is easily

carried into the enemies vesselles; the smoke of the ordonance doth blinde the enemies. Among other things, the vantage of the winde did greatly further the victory of the Christians against the Turkes in the gulfe of Lepanto. The array and good order of the nauie doth bring with it this helpe; that one ship is not lightly enuironed by ma∣ny other, and further, that one ship is ready to succour another. And therefore as in fight at land, so at sea likewise an order, and array is to be kept of ships sailing to fight. The most common array is that the front of the battell be diuided into three parts, into the right cor∣ner or wing, into the mid battell, and into the left corner. Euery one of these are to haue other ships appointed not onely to succour those that fight, but also to fight with those that offer themselues to charge the nauie behinde.

The maner of sea fight is the same with the whole nauy, that ships meeting single do vse. First they assaile the enemy with their great shot: which would be done only whē the ships come very neere: then they charge him with the smal shot. Those that suppose themselues to be the stronger do lay hold vpon their enemies ship, & force thēselues to enter the same. In the mean while neither do they, y^t are in the tops of the ships, nor others that haue the charge of fire workes cease to do their endeuor. And that with great care lest they hurt themselues, or their fellows. TheaRhodians in their fight against Antiochus han∣ging pots of fire flaming at the end of their bowsprits, by a deuise they had, shaked the same so, that when ech boorded other, it fel in∣to the enemies ships.

In fighting disorder is greatly to be feared. Which is when our ships are entangled one in anothers tacle, or fall aboord, one vpon an other, or are singled from the rest of the company.bEleuen ships of the Athenians discomfited seuenty shippes of the Lacedemonians being in disorder, and fallen aboord one of an other. Therefore in ancient time did they keepe a curious order in their sea-fights.

The Athenians comming in aide of them of Corcyra (now Cor∣fu) against the Corinthians ranged their owne shippes in the right corner, the shippes of Corcyra were diuided into three parts, euery one of which had his seuerall commander. After a signe giuen they charged the enemy. Both sides had many armed men aboorde beside archers and slingars: and fought so egrely that after they were once grapled, they hardly fell off againe. The words of Thu∣cidides,

which I haue here set vnder, do describe the same most liue∣lie.

a〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

In the encounter betwixt the Romanes, and Antiochus his Ad∣mirall Polyxenidas, as soone as he perceiued the approch of the ene∣my, Polyxenidas extended the left wing of his nauy into the sea, in the right wing hee ranged his ships, so that the vttermost of them were neere the land: after that with equall front he sailed forward. The Romane Admirall Liuius staying for those shippes that were not come vp, ranged his ships in order, and set al things in order to fight. Himselfe grapling with two of the enemies ships, that came on ech side of his ship, caused his men to enter them.

Polyxenidas vbi appropinquare hostes cernit,bsinistrum cornu in al∣tum extendit, dextrum ad terram applicat, & aequa fronte ad pugnam procedebat. Romanus armamenta componens opperitur insequentes naues. Liuius in duas hostium naues ex vtroque latere praetoriae venien∣tes ferreas iniecit manus. Romam in hostium naues transcendunt.

In the battell of Lepanto, first werecranged certaine great gal∣liasses of the Venetians, some prety distance one from an other. Then followed the rest of the nauy ranged in three partes, and sup∣plied with others following after them. The galiasses hauing put the Turkes in some disorder, the rest of the gallies grapled euerie one with those they encountred, & the men striued to boord them.

But that euery man may know his place and charge before the nauies ioyne, good direction is to be giuen foorth. And euery man to be ranged in order, and to be exercised, that they may knowe out of what place to boord the enemy, and what company is to performe it, and how, that when men should execute, they do not stand gazing one vpon another. Nabisdprouiding for the sea, did exercise his soul∣diers and marriners with fained sea-fights. They that obserue not good order commit many faults, and hurt one another in boording. They of Rochell, An. a thousand fiue hundred seuenty two boording a gally in the night disorderly, some fel ouer boord, other killed their fellows being entred. Wherfore seing without prouision, and order nothing can be done, either at sea or land, let all things be prouided that are requisite for the strength and employment of the nauy: and

let the practise of warre in maritime causes be diligently followed, that abuses being reformed, we may vanquish those, that now scorne vs, and contemne vs.

CHAP. XIX. Wherein speciall matters concerning treaties of peace, truce, and confe∣deracies, and likewise concerning the priuileges of ambassadors and messengers, which ordinarily are mediators of peace, truce & such like treaties are handled.

AL though the ioy and triumph that is made in victo∣rie be exceeding great, yet I accompt him not wise, that when al things hang in equal ballance refuseth a reasonable peace with equal conditions, vpon hope of a doubtfull victory. All that we takeain hand is subiect to infinit chances, andbsuccesse of battell is common to both parties. Both sides haue armes, and the strength of warre consisteth but in fraile humane bodies. Neither do euents lesse answere our expectation in any thing, then in warres. Where∣fore seeing that peace is the end of warres, and seeing that wee take armes in hand, not to do wrong, but that we may recouer or obtaine our owne right: let no man refuse reason that may haue it. But be∣cause many that seeme to offer peace, haue nothing, but warres in their hearts: let vs, now that we haue shewed the practise & traine of war whose ende is peace, declare also how we may assure our selues, that we be not abused either with coloured treaties, or vnequall con∣ditions, or bad assurance of peace, which is more dangerous, then any warre. Metellus incwordes and pretense made semblant, that he would make peace with Iugurtha, but his doings were the effectes of most sharp warres. Maximilian y^e emperor being demanded what he meant to treate so much of peace with his enemy whom he deadly hated, answered, that thereby he hoped to giue him admortal woūd when least he looked for it.eSextus Pompeius by a fained shew of peace was abused by Augustus, and Lepidus was ensnared vnder colour of friendship. What the Spaniard meant by the treaty of Dunkirke, his nauy at the same time comming in hostile manner vpon our coast declareth. The very motion and mention of peace doth slake the preparatiues of warre, and while men do either hope or desire peace, theyfstand more negligently vpon their garde.

Sometime vnder colour of seekingapeace the enemy seeketh de∣layes, vntill such time as he himselfe is ready. Philip of Macedonia being foyled by the Romanes seemed very desirous of peace, that in the meane time, he might againe repayre his forces. For this causebArchidamus counselled y^e Lacedemonians rather to treat of peace, then to denounce warre vnto the Athenians, vntil such time as they were better prouided. The Ambassadors of thecTencterians and other Germans desired peace of Caesar that came against them, be∣cause a great part of their forces was from them. Sometimes tre∣chery is wrought vnder colour of treaty of peace. Metellusdduring the treaty of peace with Iugurtha corrupted most of his friendes. Scipioeto the intent his men might haue accesse into Syphax his campe, pretended the continuance of the treaty of peace, albeit he misliked the conditions, and meant nothing but to espy his campe, and to surprise him at vn wares. The messengers of thefLigurians vnder colour of treaty of peace espyed what Aemilius did in his campe. Cotysgking of Thrace vnder colour of confirming a league was drawen to a banquet, and there slaine by his enemy Rhecupo∣ris. Caesar Borgia hauing made a solemne league with the Duke ofhGrauina & other Princes of Italy, contrary to his othe slew them hauing them once in his hands.

Therefore in treating of peace wee must first see that wee slacke not our preparatiues of warre, nor defer to take any aduantage that is offered.iPerseus king of Macedonia, if a vaine hope of peace had not blinded his eyes, might then with aduantage haue begun the warres when him selfe was most ready, and the Romanes most vnready, and vnprouided.

kArchidamus albeit hee perswaded the Lacedaemonians to talke of peace, yet would he not haue them neglect to prouide for warre. For peace is not obteined with parley, or entreaty, vnlesse wee also make ready our forces.

Secondly heede must be taken, that wee trust not the enemy. None are more easily abused, then those that are light of credit. we may not therefore let the enemy see our weaknesse, or any thing that may preiudice vs; nor commit our selues into our enemies handes either during the treaty, or after the conclusion of peace. Philip of Comines noteth it as a great simplicitie in our nation, that hauing concluded peace with Lewis the French King, did so

familiarly come into Amiens, and conuerse with the French, that meant them no good. Seeing peace is so easily violated vpon light occasions; hee is not wise, that will trust the enemy too farre. That which certaine Italians perswaded Lewis Sforza, that fayth is rather to be violated, then wee sufferaany part of our State to be taken from vs, that some doe nowe put in practice. And yet breach of promise is oft timesbiustified with glorious pretenses. Wherefore seeing as experience teacheth vs y^t Princescare rather made friends in shew, then in effect, those that deale wisely doe so condition with the enemy, that if hee breake, they may haue the staffe in their owne handes to chastice him.

Thirdly great care is to be taken that wee yeelde no aduantage to the enemy. The first iniury that we receiue at the enemies handes is but a step to the next, as hath bene shewed, and he that from the top of the staires descendeth one step, shall sooner be thrust downe to the bottome, then recouer the top againe. Hee that once beginneth to fall, is easily ouerthrowen. The Africans that yeelded one little peece of ground to them of Carthage, were in the end constreined to yeelde them their whole countrey. The Germans receiued into France by the Gaules, and Saxons into this Iland by the ancient in∣habitants, did after contend with them for the possession, and right of the whole countrey.

The time to treat of peace which is fourthly to be considered, is when both parties haue tasted of the cup of calamities that warres bring with them, and yet neither part is ouerthrowen, or throughly vanquished. When things doe hang in equall ballance, then is the fittest time to treat of peace by the iudgement of Annibal, and thendmost equall conditions are liked of both parties. For being van∣quished the conquerour giueth rather then receiueth conditions: as the Romanes did to the Carthaginians, to Philip of Macedonia, to Antiochus, and to other Princes, and nations which they van∣quished.

Further wee are to looke that the conditions of peace be reason∣able. If we contend about limits, townes, or countreys, it is no ho∣nor to loose our right: if we haue wrong done vnto vs, it is no reason we should rest without satisfaction. But because conditions are di∣uers according to the causes of warre, the times, and persons that contend, and diuers other circumstances: therefore that is to be re∣ferred

to the iudgement of those, that are employed in such affayres. Whose chiefe ends should be the maiesty of God, the honor of the Prince, the safety, and profit of their countrey.

But most especiall care is to be had, that the conditions be per∣formed. without which all the treaty is nothing, but a vayne shewe of fayre wordes. This I commend as a specall matter to be consi∣dered of our nation, who although many times they were victo∣rious in the fielde against the French, yet seldome could match them in conclusions of peace: and also because it is a hard matter to as∣sure conditions of peace. The contempt of religion and true ho∣nour, and griedy desire of gayne, haue brought not onely promises, but also othes into such contempt. Yea some regard neither hosta∣ges, nor pledges, so they may take a good aduantage. TheaFrench Kings of late yeeres did so often breake with the Protestants, that they litle regarded either their worde, or their letters patents. The ordinary meanes to assure the conditions agreed vpon in treaty of peace, are diuers, first worde or promise, then writing and seale, thirdly pledges of townes, which the Protestants of France haue found to be the best assurance, and we haue chosen for the assurance of the contract betwixt vs, and the Low countrey. Charlesbthe fifth, would not trust Clement the seuenth for all his paternities holines without pledges. Fourthly hostages, of which King Edward the third accepted for confirmation of the peace agreed betwixt him, and King Iohn of France. The same is an olde practice, and was vsed both of the Romanes and Carthaginians and other nations. But forasmuch as those that list tocquarrell, neuer want pretense, I see no other assurance of peace then either so to vse the enemy, that hee can not if he would hurt thee, or els to haue armes in hand, that he can neuer breake without losse or disaduantage.

To auoyde quarrels, and to take away al iust cause of brable, it were good, that the conditions were conceiued in good termes, and set downe in writing confirmed with the seales of the Princes or States whome it concerneth.

Giulio the twelfth tookedexception against an Article agreed vpon betwixt him, and Lewis the twelfth, for that it was not writ∣ten. AndeFerdinand of Spaine by cunning interpretation of wordes, did directly contrary to his agreement with Charles the eight of France.

Further if any doubt should arise, power would be giuen to some Prince, that hath honor in recommendation, and power to compell the froward to obey, both to interpret the wordes, and also to see the agreement performed.

Lastly, as by conditions we couenant what should be done; so like∣wise in case of contrauention there should penalties bee set downe. Howsoeuer penalties be set downe, wise Princes doe not only fore∣cast, howe to cause the enemy to performe conditions, but also how, in case he should breake promise, he may be forced.

The same considerations that are vsed in treaty of peace, haue al∣so place in treaties concerning truce, and confederacies. For truce is nothing but a surceasing of hostilitie for a time, the causes of warre hanging still vndecided, whereof peace is, or ought to bee a finall conclusion. But peace is made sometime where there is no confe∣deracy. For this is among associates and friends, that may be made betweene enemies.

The conditions of peace and confederacies are diuers according to the condition, and state of the parties that are made friends. Those that are vanquished whose case isamost miserable, are not to re∣fuse any conditions, as a certaine Spaniard perswaded the Sagun∣tins. Scipio offered peace to the Carthaginians with these conditi∣ons: first that they should redeliuer vp all prisoners of warre which they had taken, likewise allbreuolters, and fugitiues: secondly that they should withdraw their forces out of Italy and Liguria, nor af∣terward meddle with Spaine, nor the Ilands betwixt Afrike, and I∣taly: thirdly that they should deliuer vp all their shippes of warre twenty excepted, and should pay 500. measures of wheate and 3000. of barly: fourthly that they should not make warres either in Afrike, or out of Afrike, without license obteined of the people of Rome: fiftly that they should restore to Massinissa such things as they had taken from him, and should pay the souldiers, and finde them victuals vntill a certaine time: sixtly that they should deliuer vp their Elephants, and in time to come tame no more: seuenthly that in 50. yeres by equall portiōs they should pay 10. thousand ta∣lents, & lastly for performance of these couenants they should giue a hundred hostages neither yonger then 14. yeres, nor aboue thirty yeeres of age: if these things were performed, then the Romanes promised that the Carthaginians should liue free according to their

lawes, and possesse such cities and countreys in Afrike as they held before the beginning of the warres.

When the Romanes had vanquished theaSamnites, they imposed vpon them a tribute, tooke from them some of their country, & en∣ioyned them to furnish them with so many souldiers, as was agreed vpon betwixt them. Which conditions with others were also im∣posed vpon Philipb of Macedonia, and Antiochusc king of Syria.

ThedThasians hauing long contended with the Athenians, af∣ter three yeeres siege yeelded, & had peace vpon these conditions, that they should pull downe the walles of their city, and deliuer vp their ships of warre, & pay such summes of money as were due be∣fore that time, forthwith, & afterward their ordinary tribute, as it should be due: and finally that they should forgoe their mines of metall, & possessions they had in the mayn land. Those y^t were van∣quished by the Romans as they were bound to helpe them, so might they not either oppugne their associats, or ayd their enemies, w^t men, mony, or victuals, albeit the same were not expressed in the articles of agreement. If they did, they prosecuted warres against them. For that was the cause of the warres botheagainst the Carthaginians, and Nabis, and Philip of Macedonia, and diuers other.

When Princes or people of equall power ioyne in league, & confe∣deracy the conditions are more equall. Such were the agreements that passed betwixt Lewisfthe 11. & Charles duke of Burgundy: be∣tweene Edward the 4. & the same Lewis, and the associats of them two. Peace or rather truce was made for 9. yeres: the conditions on the French kings part were, that he should pay certaine crownes, & that the Dolphin of France should marry king Edward the 4. his daughter, and haue part of Guienne for y^e maintenance of the two yong married folks. But other assurance then othe there passed none. Thus the French could feede vs stil with faire wordes, & buy out our aduantage with a few crownes, & therefore litle regarded our forces. The Carthaginians ioyning in league with Hierome king of Sicile agreed together, that after they should haue expulsed the Romans out of Sicile, they should diuide y^e country according to certaine limits a∣greed vpon betwixt them. Like agreement passed betwixt Annibal & Philip king of Macedonia, concerning their future conquest. In the meane time they both couenanted to oppugne y^e Romans both by sea, and land with all their force. ThegCarthaginians entred with Sy∣phax

into a stricter bond of friendship, and both promised eche to other to haue the same for friends and enemies.

Sometime it falleth out that a mighty Prince or nation doeth for some opportunity or help expected, ioyne in league with those, that in power are inferior to them. Wherein albeit y^e conditions be not equal vpon both sides, yet the weaker neither paieth tribute, nor looseth any commodity, or liberty. So the Romanes ioyned in amity with Atta∣lus, & Eumenes, and the Rodians, and in Italy with them of Caere and other townes: the Kings of England with the Dukes of Brittein, the Kings of Spaine with some weake Princes in Italy. In which agree∣ments the weake side had neede to vse great caution, that vnder co∣lour of ayd it be not oppressed, as y^e Dukes of Brittein by the French, Sforza Duke of Milan by Charles the 5. the States of y^e Low coun∣trey by king Philip, and his Predecessors Dukes of Burgundy. The Capuans made peace with Annibal on these conditions, that no foreiner either in warre abroad, or in peace at home should haue a∣ny iurisdiction ouer a citizen ofaCapua, & that no citizen of Ca∣pua should be forced to serue in warres, or to beare office against his will, nor should be subiect to any other lawes, then those of his owne countrey.

Those that are either equall or inferior in force eche to other, doe sometime ioyne in league defensiue, sometime in offensiue also a∣gainst such as are enemies to either, and that either with all their for∣ces, or with some numbers of souldiers specified, & them also either payde of those that send them, or those that vse them.

Some nations for feare of their enemies do yeeld them selues in∣to the protection of others with certaine couenants, as theybof Pisa did first to the French king, & afterward to the Venetians, & as the Duke of Ghelderland, did to the French king. In this case as the receiuer doeth binde him selfe to defend those that yeeld them selues into his armes: so they either binde them selues to pay money, or to do him seruice, or to deliuer him vp certaine townes. No mā is bound to refuse the protection of others, vnlesse it be specially couenanted: nay it is a dishonor not to protect those that are wrongfully oppressed, & much more to abandon those whom they haue takē vpon thē to de∣fend.cLewis the 12. is taxed for his base minde, for that he couenā∣ted to receiue none into protectiō, that were the subiects or did de∣pend vpon Iulio the 2. And for y^t he much more forsook the lord of

aPiombino. Likewise are the Florentins blamed for that they aban∣doned the house of Riarij at the request of the Pope. Contrariwise the Romans in nothing deserue commendation more, then that they defended all those that fled to them for protection. And in nothing did they dishonor themselues more, then in that they were so flow in suc∣couring the Saguntins.

Neither doe Princes only & free States couenant ech with other, but also subiects with their Princes, & Princes with their subiects, as the Arragonians with y^e Spanish king; the Protestants of France, with y^e French king. Wherein if they proceede no further, then to re∣quire ech of other that, which y^e lawes of nations require, it is more tolerable. But that the subiects should prescribe lawes to their soue∣raigne Princes, & binde them to inconueniences, it sauoureth rather of force, then loyaltie; and that Princes hestes should be obeyed a∣gainst reason, proceedeth of tyranny, neither can any assurance be made of such agreements.

That couenants of peace, & association may be wel conceiued and made, Princes & others are dililgently to consider vnto whom they commit y^e managing of such affaires, & to furnish them with good in∣structions: and those likewise are to haue regard, y^t they passe not their commission, & instructions. Without commission no man, vnder y^e de∣gree of those that rule in souerainty, is to make peace or league. The people ofbRome held not them selues bound with y^e treaty made at Caudium, or Numantia, being made without their autority. Princes in the choyce of Ambassadors do respect Nobility & are led sometime by fauour, but y^e euent sheweth that wisdome, experience, & vertue are rather to be regarded.cLewis the 11. sent Oliuer somtime his barber to them of Gant, and to the yong Duchesse of Burgundy, but the man was heard with scorne, and returned without effect.

Ambassadors and messengers betwixt Princes, & States, are pri∣uiledged by the lawes of all nations: insomuch that among y^e points of weapons such men are suffered to passe safe.

The Romanes not onely reuenged sharply the death of their Ambassadours slayne by thedFidenians, andeIllyrians, but also the scorne done vnto them by them of Corinth.fKing Da∣uid warred vpon the children of Ammon for no other cause, but for an abuse offerd to his messengers.gCharles Duke of Bur∣gundy, put all the garrison of the Castle of Nele to the sword,

for that they killed his messenger sent to them to treat with them of peace. And albeit some do patiently digest al abuses offred to their messengers by y^e Spaniard, who deigned not to giue thē audience, yet the Romansatooke the matter very heinously at the hands of Per∣seus king of Macedonia. The death ofbCaesars messengers sent to a city vpon the sea coast of Frauce, cost all the chiefe of the citizens their liues. The rest of that towne Ceasar sold for slaues. If any of the Romans did wrong to the Ambassadors of other nations, the Senate caused such men to be taken, & to be deliuered vnto them, y^t they might iudge them, as it pleased them selues, as is apparant not only by iu∣stice done vpon those that did iniury to the Ambassadors ofcCar∣thage, but also vpon those that had wronged certaine messengers comming fromdApollonia. Tatius neglecting to do iustice vpon those that had wronged the messengers of the Laurentins, was him selfeeslaine of them, when he came among them.

But this priuiledge as it belongeth to Ambassadors betwixt Prin∣ces, & nations; sofsome haue supposed that it belonged not to such messengers, as come from rebels. And thereupon defend the fact of Charles the 5. that imprisoned y^e messengers of the Duke of Milan, that had reuolted from him. And according to this supposall we vn∣derstand, that hard measure hath bene offerd to diuers messengers sent from the Protestants of France to the aduerse party. As if Prin∣ces should make warres with his subiects with all extremity, and not admit the lawes of nations, in matters which passe betwixt him and thē. I graunt there is a great difference betwixt publike enemies, & rebels; yet necessitie requireth oft times parley; and if y^e Prince looke to haue his Ambassadors to haue good interteinment with them, hee must likewise vse their messengers wel. The Romans practiced that in the warre which they had against theirg associates, and did not of∣fer violence to those which were sent by Antony: yet there may be I graunt such warres, that admit no entercourse of messengers, which in the warres among thehGreekes was sometime practiced: but that was inhumane cruelty, and rather hurtfull to them selues, then to the enemy.

Yet if any purpose to enioy the priuiledge of Ambassadors, hee may not passe the bounds of an Ambassadour, whose ordi∣nary office is to denounce warre, or treate of peace, or truce, or prisoners, and such matters as by Ambassadors are ordina∣rily

handled. If Ambassadours come vnder that colour to espie our proceedings, the name of their office doeth not warrant their lewd dealing. Caesaradeteined the messengers of the Tenctherians perceiuing that they came for no other purpose, but to winne time, and to espie his forces. The blackebPrince caused a messenger, that came from the French king, to cite him to appeare in the Parlia∣ment of Paris to be arested: but it was for that he came not as an Am∣bassador in matters of state, but as a somner or bailif to doe him a dis∣grace. Francis the French king the first of that name caused a gibet to be erected before hee woulde heare a certaine messenger that came from Charles the fift, fearing that otherwise hee woulde haue abused him in termes. That the Romanes did dismisse thecAmbassadors of Tarquin broching a conspiracie in Rome, and the Ambassadors of thedVolscians, that came as espials, and that her Maiestie did like∣wise dismisse Bernardin Mendoza, that was an abettor, if not a con∣triuer of great treasons wrought against her, it was of speciall cle∣mencie and fauour, rather then for that the lawes of armes require it. for they warrant none to practise treason, nor rebellion, nor to abuse a Prince, nor to do other matters, then belong to the office of Ambas∣sadors. TheeLawes of the Romans in matters of publike crimes a∣gainst the lawes of nations make ambassadors to answere notwith∣standing their priuiledge. Neither doe any writers excuse the fact of Fabius Ambustus, that being sent in ambassage to the Gaules besie∣ging Clusium, put on armes and fought against them.

Thus we see that Ambassadors comming from other Princes vnto vs in such matters, as belong to that office, are priuiledged; but whe∣ther our enemies ambassadors going to other princes and nations, or contrariwise comming from other princes, to our enemies, are like∣wise to be priuiledged, it is of some doubted. The French complaine, that their ambassadors sent to the Turke were slaine by the Spaniard: and some do thinke hardly of the fact of Charles the fift, that allowed it; but without cause. For y^e word Ambassador, or Messenger being a word, that hath relation to those, to whō a man is sent, there can be no bond betwixt Ambassadors & others to whom they are not sent. The Romanes deteined not onely the ambassadors of Annibal sent to Phi∣lip king of Macedonia; but also Philips ambassadors sent to Annibal. And the Athenians put the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians to death, being taken as they were sent by them to require ayde of the

king of Persia against the Athenians.

Ambassadours therefore woulde be well chosen, and discreetely ought they to handle their businesse, without curious intermedling with affayres that concerne them not. Tully iesteth at a certaine Am∣bassade consisting of three persons, one of which was an idiot, the second had a great scarre in his head, the third had the gout. This Ambassade sayd he, had neither head, brayne, nor feete. nothing ought they to speake that may preiudice the affaires of the Prince: wherein Philip of Comines noteth a certaine English Heralds ignorance, whose foolish babbling was no small hinderance to the affaires of Edward the fourth, that sent him. Charles Duke of Burgundy con∣ceiued great displeasure against Lewes the xi. for certaine foolishawordes vttered against him by an Ambassador sent from the king to his father.

The Romanes to the Ambassadors of their enemies gaue audi∣ence without the Citie, and when they had giuen them their answere, sent certaine to conduct them to their shipping, to see that they practi∣sed with no man. The like course did the Athenians followe in hea∣ring, and interteining the Ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians. Which course they may also folow, that feare least vnder such colours cunning fellowes should espye our countrey, and our doings. And if those, that haue the gouernment of garison townes haue care, that no messenger shall come into the place, but blindfold; sure reason would, that men should haue an eye also, that such messengers as come into other countreys, should neither see so much as they doe, nor haue that libertie to talke with whom they list, as now they haue. For by such meanes often time they vnderstand their estate better, then they doe themselues.

CHAP. XXI. Wherein is declared that to encourage forward men to doe valiantly, nothing is more effectuall, then reward, nor for maintenance of mili∣tarie discipline, any thing more requisit, then seuere punishment.

THe course of warres, if nothing els did perswade vs, yet sheweth vs, that after victorie obteined, or troubles ended, such as haue done valiant seruice, are to be rewarded. Wherefore albeit warres in our times admit no such order, which being ended, are the beginning of beggarie and calamitie to

many poore souldiers: yet may I not omit the ordinarie course though interrupted, and broken by men ignorant of warres, and all good order. There is nothing more effectuall to moue men to aduen∣ture their liues in the seruice of their countrey, then reward. Lawe doth much, and necessitie more, yet neither of them in this behalfe are so effectuall as reward. Byagreat honors, men are encouraged to make great aduentures. Men dobwillingly hazard, and bestow la∣bour, where there is profite, and honor looked for. Neither is there any thing so difficult, which some will not attempt, if braue seruice be recompensed with honorable rewards. As it is in al arts, and pro∣fessiōs, so it is in the profession of a soldier,cthere is best seruice where there is greatest honor for wel doing, and contrariwise where there is no reward, there is no man desireth to be singular. Lysander being demanded what maner of gouernment he liked best, answered, that, where valiant men had reward, and cowards punishment, that com∣mon wealth pleased him best. Socrates praysed that state aboue all, where most honors were giuen according to vertue and merit, and none for meede nor money. Of all lawes, saithdDemosthenes, those deserue best to be continued, which concerne the reward of good men, and the punishment of lewd lozels. And if reason cannot excite the cold affection of couetous wretches to consider the merits of va∣liant men: yet in the ende necessitie will worke it. For neitherecom∣mon wealth nor priuate house can stand, where there is neither re∣ward for wel doing, nor punishment for the contrary. The common wealth of the Romanes had neuer growen to that greatnesse, if a∣mong other their vertues their thankefulnesse to valiant men had not bene singular. Horatius Cocles that repelled the force of the He∣truscians, himselfe alone standing vpon the bridge of wood ouer Ty∣ber, had afstatue of marble erected in the place of common mee∣tings for continuance of his memoriall, and so much ground giuen him as he could compasse with his plough in one day. At the same time they gaue lāds also togMutius Scaeuola for his singular valiant∣nesse. Cornelius the Consul, for a singular piece of seruice, gaue vnto Decius ahcrown of gold, and an hūdred oxen, to euery of the soldi∣ers that went with him double allowance of victuals, an oxe & two sutes of apparell. In the warres against the Samnites, Sp. Nautius, Sp. Papyrius, 4icenturions, & one whole squadrō of targetters (the Romans call them hastatos) were rewarded with brace lets & coro∣nets

of gold by their General, Caesarafor his valiant seruice advan∣ced Scaeua to the highest place in his regiment, and gaue him two thousand pieces of mony, the whole company he rewarded with double pay and allowance, and other militarie presentes. After the winning of new Carthage in Spaine,bScipio gaue coronets of gold to those that first mounted the walles, and rewarded others euery man according to his desert. Likewise did he reward such as shew∣ed themselues valiant men in y^e warresc against Syphax & the Car∣thaginians. And after the warres were ended not only did he giue his souldiers money, but the state gaue them lands also. after the ende of warres, thedRomans diuided ordinarily to some money, to someelands. AlexanderfSeuerus diuided the contrie that was vpon the frontiers among the souldiers that serued there. At that time honors and the highest places were rewards of valiant men. Valer.gCorui∣nus doubteth not to say that with his hands he had wonne to him∣selfe great praise & three Consulships, which was the highest dig∣nitie in that state. And Decius affirmeth thathrewards were due to vertue rather then nobilitie. When by reason of their great losses the Senat of Rome was much diminished, & must be supplied, those were chosen which had theispoiles of the enemie in their house, or had for the sauing of the life of a citizen bene rewarded with a crowne. The spoyle was not then, as now it is, giuen to those, that forsaking their coulours runne after spoyle,kleauing the labour & danger to others; nor was it lawfull for any to goe before commandement gi∣uen. The Consuls did sell and diuide the spoyle, saythlLiuy, and re∣warded those especially by whose forwardnesse the enemies campe was taken, & before others, two captaines whose valiantnesse was singular. And in another placem he testifieth, y^t the soldiers had euery man a sute of apparell and 82. pieces of money giuen him. Neither were valiant soldiers forgotten no not in y^e most corrupt times for ob∣seruance of military orders, nor when the Roman empire began now to decline. Tacitusnmentioneth those rewards that were giuen to Rufus Heluius at diuers times for his seruiceoConstantine was most bountifull to his souldiers, and gaue the rewardes due to the father to his children also. neither were they bountiful to their owne men, but also such as serued with them. Marcellus presentedpBan∣tius of Nola with a horse and furniture for his good seruice.

They of Preneste for rewarde of a noble fact done by them, hadadouble pay, and fiue yeeres vacation from seruice. ThebSpa∣niards had possessions giuen them in Spayne, the Numidians in A∣frike for their faithfull seruice against Annibal. By Solons law the sonnes of those that died in seruice of their countrey, were maintained vpon the publike charge. But what maruell is it if the Romanes who are precedents of militarie orders, & the Greekes from whence learning and ciuilitie issued, rewarded their souldiers, when the most barbarous Turkes doe it, and at this day no man more then they? The most valiant men are made chiefe commanders, and of his coun∣sell. Hee that first mounted the walles of Constantinople, of a com∣mon souldier was after made Bassa. What should I speake of the great aduancement of Ariadine Barbarossa, and Dragut Reis. Ochi∣ali Bassa of a poore Mariner, is now (if he be not lately dead) one of the greatest men of that state. There is none that doeth seruice, but he is assured to haue lands & possessiōs giuen him. The Spaniards al∣so yeeld their souldiers great recompense. The common souldier is made Caporall, he is for his seruice made Serieant, the Serieant is made Ensigne, the Ensigne Captaine, who if he deserue well, is af∣terward preferred to bee Colonel, and then master of the campe. Iulian Romero, & Montdragon, & diuers of them, of common souldi∣ers, haue risen to great dignities. Beside y^e due of their place, for eue∣rie valiant act they haue their paie increased, which they cal Vētaias.

Yet this holdeth not euery where: for in some states there is nei∣ther reward, nor scarce prayse for seruice. Honour is giuen for wealth, kinred, fauour, and if any be rewarded, it is such as deserue none. By which abuses (as saiethcHirtius) the discipline of warre was cor∣rupted by Cassius in Spayne, which afterward was much increased in the times of the Emperours, who for friendship gaue great titles to men of no desert, and to valiant men were very sparing and restrain∣tiue. Euen so now in some countre is, rewards are giuen to great beg∣gers; and valiant men, if they escape hunger, and the sword of the e∣nemie abroad, yet come backe to liue in base sort at home. And so it commeth to passe as one complaineth indEuripides, That the valiant hath no more reward then the trecherous coward, and that iniuries are sure remembred, whereas good deeds are scarce thought vpon, (aseTacitus saieth.)

As valiant deeds are to be rewarded, so trecherie, cowardise, and

disobedience are seuerely to be punished. These two, antiquitie sup∣posed to be of equal force. The Gentiles, y^t for the profite they reaped of diuers things, did ascribe vnto thē diuine names, did this also in re∣ward & punishmēt.aDemocrit{us} honored thē, as two diuine things. And if in any part of the gouernment of the common wealth, punish∣ment be necessarie, sure most necessarie it is in managing of armes, & maintenāce of militarie discipline, whichbrequireth peremptorie & sharpe punishment. For if the princes commandement may without danger be neglected; & ambition & couetousnesse of particulars, cause publike matters to be neglected, delaied, and dalied with; if publike treasure may be abused to priuate vses, and that which should be em∣ploied in paiment of souldiers & other necessary vses of the common wealth, may be lent to vsurie, or spent in purchases; if such officers as are to prouide victuals, armes and munition, or els to keepe thē, may make their gaine, and accomptants giue in false reckonings, and cap∣tains and officers bring in false numbers in mosters, and neither co∣lonels obey the general commanders, nor captains their colonels and other superiors, nor inferior officers & souldiers their captains; who seeth not, that not onely the sinewes of militarie gouernment, but of state also will easilie be dissolued? The Romanes therefore as in all feates of armes and gouernement, so in this also deserued speciall commendation.

Diuers sortes of punishment did they vse, ascModestinus testifi∣eth; as for example, Reproofe, forfaitures, impositions of charge, change of degree, losse of place, dismissing with shame, yea some∣time banishment, somtime death. Therefore were those that offen∣ded punished, (as saithdMarcellus) that there might appeare a dif∣ference betwixt valiantnesse and cowardise. At theeend of warres, as they rewarded valiant men, so they forgot not to punish offen∣ders. Neither did they onely punish the common sort, but their Gene∣rals also where they deserued it; yea the Generals spared not their owne sonnes, friends, & kinsfolke. Fuluius for that by his negligence his armie was discomfited by Annibal at Herdonea, himself flying among y^e foremost, as we said, was driuē into banishment. M.fPost∣humius was fined 10000 pieces of money, for y^t by his fault, & lea∣ding the Romanes were ouerthrowen at Veij. Manlius executed his owne sonne for transgressing militarie orders. Caesar dismissed diuers colonels & chiefe commanders in Afrike, for outrages by them com∣mitted.

The more dangerous the warres were, the greater seueritie they vsed. Euen barbarous nations perceiued, that without seueritie the warres could not be administred, as Caesar maketh euident vnto vs by the example ofaVercingetorix. By the lawes of Sparta they that ran out of the field, might not returne into their country. The A∣thenians did punish a negligence in their captains that did not take vp their men that were slaine & wracked atbArginusa, but too se∣uerely. Neither was it the vse onely of two or three nations, but of all those, who by practise of armes haue won to themselues any name, or reputation. The particular penalties due to euerie militarie offence, I haue set down in y^e chapter folowing, if not to imitate in all points, yet to come as neere as we can in most. The Romanes without any table or writing set before thē, did by their continual practise of armes, know not onely all militarie lawes, but also the punishments y^t were inflicted on the transgressers of thē, as well as we know any custome of England not written: which were also to be wished in our souldi∣ers. But because by long disuse of armes, & many abuses crept in a∣mong vs, few know the lawes of warre, least any man might pretend ignorance, or thinke themselues punished otherwise then they ought; I haue for instruction of yong souldiers comprised in writing such matters as for the good gouernment of the campe and armie, & those that conuerse in the armie, I thought most necessary to be knowē and published in the campe, garrison, & other places of seruice. Neither is the course new or strange. The prince of Orenge for the good gouern∣ment of his campe before Florence in the dayes of Charles the 5, by sound of trumpetcpublished such orders as he would haue obser∣ued. The duke of Alua though otherwise cruel, yet a man skilfull in matters of warre, for reformatiō of diuers disorders crept in among thedSpanish souldiers, gaue order to Sācho de Londonno, to frame certaine statutes in writing, which being published, might giue thē particular notice of their duties. Thee Protestants an. 1568. hauing made certaine militarie lawes & orders for the gouernement of their army, did publish the same, & cause both the nobilitie & other sol∣diers to sweare, that they would obserue thē inuiolably. In imitatiō of others, I haue thought good likewise to set down a forme of mili∣tarie lawes, not that all of them are necessary for all times & places, nor y^t I could set down so many as are necessarie, but wise gouerners hauing this draught before their eyes, may chuse such as are fittest,

and apply them to their companie and other circumstances.

Howsoeuer it is, whether it be bya lawes, or without lawes: let those that haue the gouernement of souldiers, haue care of the obser∣uance of militarie discipline, without which an armie is like a bodie discrazed and disioyned, and by which, armies beforetime out of order haue bene made victorious. Before Scipioes comming into Spayne, the Romanes through their disorders had receiued many foiles of their enemies. But after that he hadbremooued those disorders, of a cowardly and disorderly multitude, hee made a most victorious armie. Like commendation did Metellus deserue in Afrike, who re∣moouing all instruments and occasions of pleasureeand slouthful∣nesse, and restoring the strict orders of the Romanes in their mar∣ching, encamping, labours and watches, brought Iugurtha to great extremitie, which before that time ouercame, and contemned the Romane forces. Corbulo by likedseueritie causing the Romane souldiers to returne to the obseruance of militarie lawes, and to en∣dure labour, and to keepe araie, and to refraine their outcourses for spoyles, obtained diuers great victories against the Parthians and others. Neither doe I doubt if the ancient orders of warres might be obserued of our English souldiers, but that they should be likewise victorious ouer all their enemies.

To doe them honour and my countrey good, I haue as neere as I could endeuoured to set them downe in termes, beginning first with matters concerning religion, which howsoeuer it is now neglected and scorned of prophane men; yet ought it both in this, and other things to haue the first place.

CHAP. XXI.

Wherein a forme of Militarie lawes requisite to be published and ob∣serued of our English souldiers and others imploied in publike ser∣uice of their countrey, is prescribed. The first part of it conteineth lawes concerning religion and morall matters.

1 EVerie Morning at the relieuing of the watch, and euerie Euening at the setting of the watch, all Captains, Souldiers & others, both in campe and garrison, either in some speciall place to bee ap∣pointed, or in their corps de garde, or those that

watch, in their garde, the rest in some other place shall assemble to heare prayers, and other exercises of Religion.

2 No enterprise shalbe taken in hand, but the companies that are to execute the same, shal first commend themselues to God, and pray to him to graunt them good successe.

3 Euery Sunday the whole company at houres appointed shal meete to serue God, so much as the necessities of warres wil permit. And for this cause a conuenient number of Ministers are to be en∣terteined, and such as abuse them, to be seuerely punished.

4 Notorious swearers, and blasphemers shalbe punished ac∣cording to the qualitie of their offence, yea with death, if their faults be heynous.

5 All abuses of Gods word, and holy Name in cursing, ban∣ning, charming and whatsoeuer other vnlawful practice, shalbe pu∣nished by imprisonment of the offenders, and death also, if the crime be heinous, and the example scandalous.

6 Many offences against God and man doe spring of dicing, carding, and other such vnlawfull games. Therefore let all dice, and eardes, and such like instruments of abuse be taken away as much as may be, and let such gamesters be admonished, and if they doe not so leaue, and reforme themselues, let them be imprisoned.

7 Common women let them be whipped out of the campe, and garrison, and such souldiers, and others as vse their company, let them be imprisoned. Officers that giue bad examples of such matters, let them loose their places. Suspicious women let them be banished the campe, or garrison.

8 For that God is greatly offended with drunkennes, and the abuses that come of it, and forasmuch also as campes, and garrisons are thereby much disordered, and many good men suffer for the a∣buse of such lewd drunkards: therefore such are to be imprisoned and fedde with bread and water, so long as the qualitie of their of∣fence shall deserue.

Annotations and interpretations of the former lawes, for the better vnderstanding of them.

[Concerning Religion.] The name of Religion, I know, will seeme strange to most of our lustie yong souldiers, that in swearing

and blaspheming place their greatest brauery, & accompt it a shame for a souldier to be religious. But seeing not onely Religion, but rea∣son also may teach them, that no good successe can be expected at Gods handes, where hee is not serued; and that such wicked men as they shew themselues to be, are rather to feare the wrath of God, then to hope for victory or other fauour; let them if they be but mother∣wise, desist from scoffing at Religion, & if they be Christian-wise, let them learne to serue him, that is Lord of armies, and giuer of victory. The very Gentiles, albeit ignorant of the true God, yet in matters of warre were most deuout, and religious. The Romanes yelded such honour to their diuines, andasoothsayers, that nothing was attem∣ted either in matters of peace at home, or in warres abroade, but af∣ter consultation with them. Before they beganne warres with any Prince or nation, they sacrificed to their God, and besought him to giue them good successe, as is euident in all their attemptsbagainst Annibal, and in their warres againstcPhilip of Macedonia anddAn∣tiochus. When after long warres Annibale departed out of Italy, they caused their temples to be set open, that euery man might pub∣likely giue thankes. They did the same vpon the report of Scipioes good successe against their enemies in Afrike. Contrarywise, they imputed their euil successe to their contempt of Religion, and ceremo∣nies, whereby then they thought they pleased God. Fabius did so in∣terpret thefcause of the calamitie happened vnto them in the ouer∣throw of Flaminius, at the lake Thrasimene. The only meanes to re∣couer Gods fauour, he declared to be reuerence of Religion, and care to please God. Camillus after the recouery of Rome out of the hands of the Gaules, discoursing of religion affirmeth, that all good successe did proceede from thegfauour of God, while he was ho∣noured, and contrarywise that they had no good successe since Re∣ligion was by them contemned. This was also the opinion of other nations. Pontius the famous captaine of the Samnites saith, that ashGod fauoureth or disfauoureth their enterprises, so they sway one way or other. The auncient English and French vsed to compasse the Church within their fortifications: or at least built a church with∣in their castles; for that they imaginedi that no fort could long holde out, vnlesse God were there serued. God promiseth to those that ob∣serue his lawes, that one of them should chase tenne, and tenne a hundred, and a hundred a thousand, and threatneth the transgressors

of them, that although they were many in number, yet they should flye many wayes before their enemies. If therefore wee hope or ex∣pect good successe in our warres; let vs first beginne with the ser∣uice of God, and let those be ashamed, that professing themselues to be Christians, yet are not so forward herein as the heathen that knewe not God; and are occupied most in abusing Religion, and pulling downe Gods Church.

1 [Euery morning &c.] Litle do they deserue fauour at Gods handes, that will not open their mouthes to craue it: neither do they deserue to be deliuered, that will not seeke helpe in danger. That therefore which is here set downe in this lawe, is nothing els, but the duetie of all Christians, yet specially commended to souldiers, con∣sidering their great negligence therein. That they may do their dutie more willingly, and knowe howe to doe it, certaine short prayers would be framed for the purpose, which in the absence or want of Mi∣nisters may be saide of the clerke of the band, or any of the company. Euery captaine ought to haue care, that his company doe herein their duetie, as the generall officers appointed for iustice, ought to see the same done in the whole campe or garrison. The penalties are accor∣ding to the faults either more or lesse, to wit, either admonition, losse of two dayes pay, or imprisonment.

2 [No enterprise &c.] As the former lawe respecteth times, so this respecteth seueral actions, and enterprises, and enioyneth soul∣diers in all matters of weight to require the helpe of God; a thing acknowledged iust of all Christians, and practised by the heathen. The Romanes departed not from the citie to goe to theawarres, but first they pacified the wrath of God, as before I haue shewed by diuers examples. The forme of Scipioes prayer loosing from the coast of Sicile, to goe into Afrike to warre against the Carthaginians, is expressed inbLiuie, the sum of it is, that God would giue him, and his company goodsuccesse, and safe returne with victorie. They did not attempt any great enterprise, but they made theircsupplications before all their gods. Fabius escaped a great danger by meanes he went not on his iourney being sent for by them of Metapontus, before that after his maner he had consulted with God. The same was like∣wise the proceeding of the Greekes.dArchidamus bringing his army

before Plataea beganne first with sacrifices to craue the fauour of God, after his heathenish maner. The like did the Greekes long be∣fore at Aulis going against Troy. Xenophon in his returne out of his voyage with Cyrus, would doe nothing before he had reconciled his company to God. And when his men were in distresse; heaen∣couraged them, and willed them to put their confidence in God, for that he was able to saue a few out of the hands of many, in what danger soeuer they were. Neither was euer any nation sobbar∣barous, as to suppose, that victory came from other, then God, or could be procured by other meanes, then Religion. Shame then is it for Christians to be lesse religious then the heathen, or to haue more irreligious conceits, then they had. The penaltie of the trans∣gressors of this lawe, howsoeuer some escape the handes of Iudges and officers, is very seuerely imposed by God himselfe, that ouer∣turneth their enterprises. By enterprises in this place, I vnder∣stande battels, skirmishes, sallyes, ambushes, and such like feates of Armes.

3 [Euery Sunday &c.] It is much to be lamented, that among other the cares of Gouernors, they haue had no due care of Religion, and the seruice of God among souldiers, nor haue made any allow∣ance for the Ministerie among them. In so much that in some gar∣risons in the low Countreyes, souldiers haue liued almost without exercise of Religion, and in campes without any due exercise of the same. This first gaue me occasion by this lawe to excite their care and the care of Generals and captaines, both for more deuotion in religious exercises, and also for better meanes. If there were to eue∣ry two Regiments one or two Ministers allowed, it were a very com∣mendable course. The Papists haue their priestes in their armies, nay the very heathen had their exercises of Religion, but in our times those that are most curious, are in this point least carefull, and reli∣gious.cThe Spaniards vnto euery tertio, or Regiment haue diuers Priestes, whom they haue in great estimation, and punish those that doe violate them either in worde, or deede. The punishment of the offenders against this lawe is arbitrary, according to the quali∣tie of the offence.

4 [Notorious swearers &c.] For that there are diuers sortes of othes, and blasphemies in degree one worse then another, there∣fore haue I left the punishment of them to the discretion of the

iudges, or officers that deale therein, respect alwayes being had to the heinousnesse of the fault. The Spaniards inflict grieuousapenalties vpon them that transgresse in this behalfe: and all Christians ought to detest and banish all abuses.

5 [All abuses. &c.] Vnder this title are comprised all profane scoffes at religion, all wicked opinions bolstered out with colours of religion. which together with other faultes seuerally named, are se∣uerely to be punished by the gouernors of campes and garrisons, be∣ing contrary to good proceedinges in warre, and in peace, for which also they are condemned by ciuill lawes.

6 [Many offences &c.] In this point many abuses are commit∣ted by our souldiers, of which insueth the displeasure of God, and ma∣ny other great inconueniences. To furnish themselues at play some sell their armes, others their apparell. At play they loose their mony, which should buy them victualles, and other necessaries. By losse some are driuen to steale, and to vse other vnlawfull practises. Some run to the enemy, and commit diuers other outrages. For this cause the Spaniard in time of seruice, doth banish allbvnlawfull games. The best remedy of all these abuses is, first to take away cardes and dice, and to forbidde them the campe or garrison; the next is to erect some other warlike exercise; the third, is punishment both of those that play, and those also that mainteine such implements of play. But as in other matters, so in this also, example is most auailable.

7 [Common women &c.] Among this number, all those wo∣men that abuse their bodies vnlawfully, are to be numbred. For a∣uoiding of which abuses, no women are to be suffered to follow the campe, nor any suspected women to keepe in the place of garrison. ThecSpaniards in their military lawes, do restreine officers, by losse of their place, and common souldiers, by other punishment, from this abuse. Among the Romane souldiers such abuses were seldome heard of. but if they were, very seuerely were they punished, and carefully reformed. Scipio the yoonger when military lawes grew in contempt among the souldiers of Spaine, did for redresse banish all women out of the campe.

8 [For that god &c.] The voyage of Portugall taught vs the inconueniences of drunkennesse by experience, but yet reason tea∣cheth vs much more. Thereof proceed quarrels, iniuries, mutinies, and many other disorders. Drunken men are vnfitte to march, to

watch, to fight, or to do any maner of seruice. too common it is not∣withstanding among common souldiers. And I would to God that captaines and officers of companies, were free from it. In whom∣soeuer it is, the same may not be passed without punishment. Where∣in that neither sober men be touched wrongfully, nor drunkardes e∣scape scandalously, I doe thinke that those deserue to be punished as drunkards, which either through drinke commit any excesse, which sober men would not commit, or els are vnfit to do the seruice requi∣red at their handes.

CHAP. XXI. Part. 2. Wherein lawes are set downe, tending to the common safetie of the state, armie, or garrison.

1 ALl souldiers, or others that conspire against the state, or Prince, or Generall, or go about to betray the Ge∣nerall, or the army, or any part thereof, or any city, or ground in possession of the state or army, shall suffer death, and torments, if the matter be heinous.

2 Such as practise, and enterteine intelligence with the enemy without direction, or knowledge of their superiors, shall be puni∣shed as traitors.

3 Mutinous and rebellious persons are to be punished with death.

4 Whosoeuer yeeldeth a towne or fort to the enemy, or mo∣tioneth any such matter, but vpon extremity, and that to the Go∣uernor, or in councell, let him be executed as a traitor.

5 No captaine, officer, nor souldier may refuse to come, being interteined in pay, nor depart the campe, or place where he is ap∣pointed to serue, if the enemy be ready to charge vs, or we ready to charge the enemy, vpon paine of death, if it be not in time of ser∣uice, vpon paine of imprisonment. Except those alwayes, that haue licence of the Generall, or chiefe Gouernour, or other lawfull cause. To hurt, and sicke persons, the Colonell of the regiment, or Iudge martiall, or other officer appointed, may giue licence, that they may depart for a time, to refresh themselues.

6 All that runne to the enemy, or attempt to do it, as traitors to their countrey, are to be put to death.

7 No man shall bewray the word to the enemy, or giue a false

word in time of seruice, nor when the enemy is nere shall sleepe in the watch, or suffer him to approch, without giuing warning, vp∣on paine of death.

8 Whosoeuer of wantonnesse, or foolery, is cause that the ene∣my hath notice of our disseins and purposes, so that some good op∣portunity of seruice is thereby omitted, is to be punished according to the quality of his offence.

Interpretations and annotations vpon the former lawes.

1 [All souldiers &c.] If conspirators deserue death, much more do they deserue the same that execute their treasons, and conspiracies.a Scipio killed all the inhabitants of Iliturgi a towne in Spaine, and burnt the towne, for that they betrayd the garrison, and reuolted to the enemy.b Orontes going about to betray Cyrus and his army to the enemy, was executed by Cyrus. This is nothing but the ordinary practice of the Romanes, which asc Tacitus affirmeth, brought such matters within the compasse of treason.

2 [Such as practice &c.] There is no surprise nor dangerous trea∣son wrought against a prince or his army, or garrisons, but the same proceedeth for the most part from secret practises, and intelligence of traitors with the enemy. Such practises therefore are not onely dili∣gently to be sought out, but also seuerely to be punished.d Marcellus executed seuenty persons of them of Nola for treason, and secret talke, and intelligence they had with Annibal. The Romanes ha∣uing notice of diuers cities in Hetruria and Vmbria, that had commu∣ned secretly with Annibal,e gaue order that both inquisition might be made, and due punishment awarded. Neither it is sufficient for any to allege that he is not subiect to our iurisdiction, for whosoeuer committeth treason against vs, be he Dutch or French, is to be puni∣shed. Quintiliusf Varus had intelligence how Harminius dealt with him treacherously, yet was slacke in making inquisition of the matter, which was the ruine of him and his company.

3 [Mutinous and rebellious &c.] Mutinous I do not call them, that vse bad words to their captaines, or that demand their due of them, although in tumultuous sort, albeit some do so take it, and haue pra∣ctised it. yet do I acknowledge that the same is a great offence, and to be punished, yet not in the degree of mutinie. Butg mutinous per∣sons are those that raise sedition, and stirre vp souldiers to rebellion

against their gouernours, whereby the common cause may receiue detriment and hindrance. Hee that raiseth sedition, and giueth cause to dangerous stirres, is to be punished with death (saith Mo∣destinus) but if hee proceede no further then to clamorous com∣plaint, then is he to be punished with the losse of his place, if he be an officer; or if no officer, with some lesse punishment, then death. Yet are not all mutinous persons to be punished in one degree. Sci∣pio when his army in Spaine mutined vnder colour of want of pay, and long seruice; with the deatha of thirtie persons which were principall moouers of the sedition, did pacifie the matter. Caesar dismissedb Fonteius, for that hee was a seditious person. Suetoniusctestifieth that hee cassed all the tenth legion for the same cause. Mutinous I account thē also, that dissuade the souldiers from perfor∣ming any seruice commanded them by the Generall, and doe thinke that they deserue no lesse punishment. The Marques of Guast cast certeine mutinous companions into thed sea in sackes, for that they dissuaded the souldiers from the enterprise of Afrike, whither Charles the fift then led them. Such mutinies are diligently to be suppressed in the beginning, with the death of the beginners, ase Ti∣berius did the mutiny of his souldiers in Pannony, or with dismis∣sing some of the principallest.f Fuluius vnderstanding of a secret mutiny among his souldiers in Capua, gaue them no leasure to ex∣ecute their purposes, and presently dismissing the most seditious, had afterward reason of the rest.

4 [Whosoeuer yeeldeth &c.] This is nothing but a transumpt out of the Romane lawes, which in like case decree likeg punish∣ment. Pinarius being first prayd, then threatned by them of Aenna, if he would not depart out of the towne where he was in garrison, tolde them that he might not do it, for that no man was toh depart, or giue vp the towne of garrison, vpon paine of death. Thei Go∣uernour of Vacca, a towne in Afrike, was condemned, and execu∣ted to death, for that he yeelded the towne to the enemy. He that yeelded Pont Charenton to the Protestants, vpon the first appea∣ring of their troupes, was executed at Paris, anno 1567, by expresse commandement of the king. Rutilius spared not his owne sonne, that by negligence lost the castle ofk Taurentum in Sicily. So that not onely treachery, but cowardise, and negligence deserueth in this case to be punished. Cotta caused a neere kinsman of his to be

beaten with rods, and afterward to serue as a common souldier for loosing a place by his default, which was giuen him in garde. The Carthaginians executed most cruelly him thata surrendred vp the castle of the Mamertines to the Romanes. There is nothing that can excuse a gouernour in this case, but necessitie, to wit, when either for want of men or victuals, or other weaknesse of y^e place, he can hold out no longer. So wasb Attilius excused that departed the citie of Locri, and the garrison of Scodra that yeelded the towne to y^e Turke, not onely excused, but relieued by the Venetians: for they held it to the vttermost. The Romanes suffered those to compound with Annibal, that were not able to resist his force. Except the case of necessitie proo∣ued by men of iudgement, in few other cases can those that surren∣der places to the enemie, be excused. In so much, that Alphonso Per∣rez (as the Spanish histories report) would rather suffer his sonne taken by the Moores to bee slayne before his face, then hee would surrender vp Tariffa into their hands, to recouer his sonne. Nay it is not lawfull without cause manifested before the counsell, so much as to parley, or motion any composition with the enemie. The women of Athens stoned Cirsilus to death, for that hec went about to per∣swade the townesmen to yeeld to the king of Persia. After the death ofd Cyrus, when the Greekes that went with him being farre from their countrey, were in distresse, one Apollonides despairing of o∣ther means, would haue had them to yeeld themselues to the mer∣cie of the enemie: but his speach seemed so vnwoorthie the pro∣fession of a souldier, that he was there disarmed, & like a base min∣ded beast laden with baggage. How many cities haue vnder colour, and in the time of parley bene betraied, I haue heretofore declared. The very motion of parley doeth daunt the courage of souldiers: and therefore such motions are not to bee made but in secret counsell, and in extremitie.

5 [No captaine, officer, nor souldier, &c.] The first part of this law the Romane souldiers when they were first enrolled, did sweare to performe; the second part is comprised in the Romane lawes a∣gainst such as depart the army without leaue. A matter very dange∣rous: for by such starting aside of souldiers, many garrisons are taken vnprouided, and many companies that are full in mosters, are very thin in time of seruice. And therefore although among vs euery cap∣taine of a companie take on him to giue licence of absence, yet is the

same against all practise of warre. By the lawes of the Romanes no man hada power to dismisse souldiers, but the General: & if other∣wise it were, y^e army might be dissolued, or at least greatly weakened without his priuitie, & the cause hindered by inferior persons trechery.

6 [All that runne, &c.] It is a great fault for a souldier in time of seruice to forsake his General. But farre greater to turne his hand against his country and friends, and to flie to the enemie. Such there∣fore deserue no fauour, being not only traitors, but enemies. The Ro∣manes punished such moreb grieuously then fugitiue slaues, and howsoeuer they compounded with others, yet alwayes excepted them. Sometime they were nailed to gibbets, sometime they werec throwen downe from hils. Those that did but endeuour to flie to the enemie although they perfourmed it not, wered put to death. Yet would I not haue them so depriued of hope of mercy, but that they may find fauour, if they with any new seruice can blot out their former offence. No man fought with more resolution against the Romanes, then these reuolters. Fabius would not suffer thee Ro∣manes to punish Altinius, that offered to restore Arpi vnto them, which himselfe before had caused to reuolt to Annibal. Marcellus knowing the purpose of Bantius, and that hee meant to flie to the enemie, yet by curtesie and liberalitie did chuse rather to draw ser∣uice from him, being a man of value, then to punish him. If then such poore men as by extremitie and want are driuen to flie to the e∣nemie, wil voluntarily returne againe and craue pardon, I would not haue them debarred from hope of mercie, which rigour is due onely to stubborne and wilful rebels.

7 [No man shall bewray, &c.] This being a difference, and somtime, as in the darke, the only difference whereby souldiers know their fellowes, great care is to be taken, that the enemie haue no no∣tice of it. In the night fight betwixt Vitellius and Vespasians soul∣diers, nothing did more preiudicef Vitellius his side, then that the enemie came to haue notice of the worde. Which happened by the often repetition of it in the darke. By the same the enemie either passeth away safe, or commeth among vs without resistance. Great punishment therefore doeth he deserue, that giueth the enemie to vn∣derstand it by simplicitie or negligence, but greater if by trecherie and false dealing. Likewise doeth he deserue punishment that neglec∣teth his watch. For seeing that the safetie of those that rest, consisteth

oft times in the watch, who seeth not that they that neglect their watch, betray their fellowes safetie? thea watchman that suffered the Gaules to enter the Capitol, while hee slept, was throwen downe from the rocke whereon the Castle stood, there to sleepe for euer. By the lawes of theb Romanes hee that slept in the watch was put to death. Epaminondas going the round slew thec watch∣man whom he found sleeping, affirming that he did him no wrong leauing him, as he found him. Yet woulde I not that any man in pu∣nishing these faults should proceede rashly, and without cause spill poore soldiers blood, that is so willingly spent in the seruice of their countrey. For if the enemie be farre off, and the danger little, this fault is much lessened.

8 [Whosoeuer of wantonnesse &c.] By two meanes especially the enemie cōmeth to haue notice of our purpose, against the wil and purpose of him that giueth the notice: first by making of noyse and signes, which may be heard or seene of the enemie being farre off; se∣condly by talking and prating of matters, that ought to be kept se∣cret. by either of which meanes many enterprises are broken, & many good counsels discouered. The practise of the protestants against the towne ofd Saumur anno 1569 was broken, by fiering of cer∣taine houses whereby the enemie had notice of their comming. A like enterprise of theirs against Diep the same yeere was discouered by discharging of a pistole. In our voyage of Portugall the Spanish horsemen that coasted our companie, had fallen into a trappe layd for them, if one rash companion had not discharged his piece too soone, & therby giuen them warning before they entred into danger. If that certaine rash fellowes had not risen vp tooe soone and discharged their pieces vpon the gallyes of the Baron la garde: both he and his company had bene taken at Tonne Charente by Rochel An. 1569. by the babble and prating of a certainef Herald sent to the French king, he knew more then was conuenient of the estate and procee∣dings of Edw. the 4. as I before haue shewed. Caesar therfore that heg might take the Gaules vnprouided, forbade his soldiers in their marche to make fiers. And Homer expressing theh courage, and good order of the Greekes, saith they marched with great silence, whereas the Troians made a noyse like a flight of cranes. Frois∣sart reporteth that in ancient time the English did take an oath,

that they should not discouer any practise, or counsel of their supe∣riors. But now (it seemeth) that custome is out of date. for no nation doth march with more noyce, or talke more willingly. Wherefore al∣though these matters may seeme trifling, yet experience sheweth what impediments they bring to our affaires. which caused mee in this place, seeing other meanes too weake to worke it: to forbid dis∣charging of pieces, firing of houses, making of noyse in the march without speciall direction; and also talking of secrete counsels of our gouernours at any time, and to wish that the same were by lawe enacted.

CHAP. XXI. part 3. Conteining lawes concerning the dueties of Captaines and soldiers yet more particularly.

1 ALl Captaines, souldiers, and others shall yeeld their obedience to the lawfull cōmandements of their superiours. Neither shall any lift his weapon against his commander correcting him, or others, for their offences orderly, vpon paine of death.

2 No Captaine nor officer of a companie shall depart the Campe, or garrison without licence, nor shall lodge or absent him∣selfe from his companie in time of seruice, or when the enemie is ready to charge, vpon paine of loosing his place. except those al∣wayes, that haue lawfull excuses of sickenesse, or hurtes, and haue appoynted sufficient deputies in their place.

3 All souldiers that wilfully absent themselues without lawfull cause from their colours, or companie, that goeth to charge, or re∣sist the enemie, deserue death.

4 No Captaine nor officer shall defraud the souldier or other person of his pay, that is committed to his handes to be deliuered vnto him vpon paine of losse of his place.

5 No Captaine nor other shall preferre, or subscribe to a false mostre rolle, or fraudulently giue in more, or other names, then he hath presently in his companie, vpon paine of imprisonment, and losse of his place.

6 No captaine, lieutenant, sergeant, nor other that ought to be armed, shall come into the field without their ordinary armes, vpon

paine of two armors to be deducted out of their pay, the one to their owne vse, the other to some other of the company that wanteth.

7 No souldier, nor other shall goe into seruice without the word, and some other marke to be knowen by, from the enemy especially in night seruice, vpon paine of imprisonment.

8 No captaine, officer, nor other priuate gentleman in pay, shall intertaine any others souldier, or seruant, without consent, or lawfull dimission from his former captaine, or master, vpon paine of losse of a moneths pay. Neither shall any souldier, or seruant depart from his captaine, or master without lawfull cause, vpon paine of imprisonment, and returning againe of souldiers to their captaines, of seruants to their masters.

9 Captaines and officers of companies shall watch and ward with their colours, and companies, vpon paine of losse of a mo∣neths pay.

10 No man shal marche with the baggage but the companies appointed, neither shall any marche out of his aray, or straggle a∣broad, or goe on pilfering when he should marche, watch, or serue, vpon paine of imprisonment. Such are also by bastonataes to bee corrected by their officers, if they be taken in the maner.

11 No companies shall goe on foraging, or make any enter∣prise against the enemy vpon priuate motion, without the know∣ledge, and direction of their generall commanders.

12 No souldier shall sell, or pawne, or lend, or loose, or giue, or cast away, or play, or otherwise make away his horse, or armes, or weapons, or furniture wherewith he is appointed to serue: nor shall suffer his horse by his default to decay, or his armes to rust, or goe to spoile vpon paine of imprisonment, and infamie both to him that offendeth, and to his abettors, and aydors.

13 No priuate captaine shall giue Passe-port to his souldier that is able to serue vpō paine of losse of his place, neither shal any souldier in time of seruice depart without Passe-port vpon paine of death.

14 No souldier nor other being once placed in aray either in marching, or fighting shall depart thence, without lawfull cause. Whosoeuer either to runne to spoile, or to fly away, doth abandon his ensigne, or standing where he is rāged to serue, shal suffer death.

15 No souldier nor others shall vse any showting or crying, or without cause discharge a piece in marching, or embatteling, or ly∣ing in ambush, vpon paine of bastonataes presently to be inflicted by the officers vpon the offenders taken in the maner, of imprison∣ment afterward.

16 No man shall giue an alarme vnto the army marching, or lodging without iust cause, and that in quiet sort, nor shall any tu∣multuously runne nor cry vpon an alarme taken, vpon such penal∣tie, as the circumstance of the offence shall require.

17 He that by negligence, or grosse ignorance killeth his fel∣low with his piece, or other weapon, let him die the death.

18 No man shall challenge another, or defie him in campe, or garrison, nor accept the challenge vpon paine of imprisonment, and disarming before his company. Neither shall any offer an iniurie to his fellow to prouoke him to fight, nor shall others priuately re∣uenge it, vpon paine of imprisonment.

19 All braules, and quarrels betwixt fellowes, are to be pu∣nished seuerely. Whatsoeuer therefore hee is that in campe, or garrison killeth any man in any sudden braule, or challenge, ex∣cept hee bee thereto forced for his owne defence, or striketh his fellowe beeing placed in array ready to fight, let him suffer death for it.

20 No souldier nor other shal fraudulently, or the euishly take any thing from any mans person, or their lodging, house, or cabane vpon paine of death.

21 When any company of souldiers shalbe lodged in any vil∣lage, or passe through it, or by any dwelling house, or other belon∣ging to our friendes, they shall not hurt, nor iniurie the people in their persons, nor goods vpon paine of death, or other grieuous pu∣nishment according to the qualitie of their offence.

22 No man shall burne any corne, hay, or forrage, or destroy any prouision, or house, barne, or cornemill, or other building that may serue for the vse of the army vpon paine of death.

22 All murthers, periuries, forgeries forcing of women, or maydens, cosinages, or other disorders, whereby the army may any way receiue disgrace, or hurt, although not comprised in these lawes, shall bee punished by such penalties, as the ciuill lawes, or els common lawes of England enioyne in such cases.

24 No souldier nor other shall be mostered, or answere in two companies, or answere to two names in one company, nor shall a∣ny victualler, or other that is no souldier, passe in mosters for a souldier, vpon paine of death.

25 No souldier that hath victualles deliuered vnto him for cer∣teine dayes, shall spoile or spend the same in lesse time, then is ap∣pointed vpon paine of imprisonment.

Annotations vpon the former lawes.

1 [All captaines, souldiers &c.] Obedience is the bond that keepeth all in order, without which neither can our owne men be go∣uerned, nor the enemy discomfited. If (saithaPapyrius) the common souldier might neglect the commandement of his captaine, the captaine of his colonell, the colonell of his superior commanders; all military proceedings would fall out of order. ThebGenerall of the Romanes killed an ensigne-bearer that refused to auance him∣selfe forward among the enemies, as he was commanded. Some spared not their owne friendes, no, nor sonnes, neglecting their com∣mandements. This generall rule therefore is to be obserued strictly, and the offenders to be punished. Neither may they or others makecresistance against those officers that punish them for their offen∣ces. Yet on the other side, I doe not authorise rash braines to kill or hurt their souldiers. There is difference betweene correction and kil∣ling. By the orders of the Spaniards, he that killeth his souldier dis∣orderly, dieth for it. By commandements in this place, are not vn∣derstood euery captaines priuate pleasures, but orderly directions in time of seruice.

2 [No captaine nor officer &c.] No man may returne into his countrey without licence; but captaines least of all for example sake. For if this were lawfull, it were not possible to keepe an army toge∣ther. Such as stay frō their garrison, & are to seeke, when they should lead their company to the charge, giue iust occasion of this law.

3 [All souldiers &c.] These are next in degree to those that flie out of the field. For when they should fight, then like traitorous co∣wards they hide themselues; and therefore deserue equall punishment with those that flie.

4 [No captaine nor officer &c.] A farre greater fault it is, that souldiers seldome haue that pay, that their prince alloweth. But

yet may not those capteines, & officers be excused, which of that which is comming to them, do cut off some part, and pinch them of the rest by diuers fraudes, and deuises. After thataCaesar had notice how Roscillus and AEgus, two captaines of horsemen, had defrauded their men of their pay, and taken from them their partes of the spoile, as soone as they perceiued it, fearing punishment, they fled to the enemy.

5 [No captaine nor other &c.] Many are the incommodities that come of false mosters. The prince is defrauded, the army weak∣ned, seruice neglected, opportunity giuen to the enemy. Neither is there any thing that in our times more dishonoreth captaines, and offi∣cers, then the suspicion had of some in this behalfe. The army of Iu∣lio the second, being in the mosterbrolles double the number that it was indeed, could doe nothing of those enterprises that were in∣tended. The abuse of mosters was the ruine ofcFrancis the first before Pauy. Guicciardine reporteth, that foure thousanddSuitzers were mostred, and payd for sixe thousand, and that Lansqueners seldome are halfe so many, as are conteined in the moster rolles; of which ensueth the spoile of princes without any effect done in ser∣uice. This abuse was not knowen in ancient time, which maketh me much woonder, that no man goeth about to remooue it: and more, that those that should reforme it, in some places doe suffer captaines to haue certeine dead payes, which is a meanes to mainteine it, and co∣uer it. To remedy this abuse, there are two meanes; first to allow captaines honourable maintenance, and to pay euery souldier by the poll, as theeRomanes did, and as the Spaniards doe, that haue their Pagadores, or Paymasters, for this purpose; the next is that the Generall cause all the army to be mostred at once, and all those that giue in false numbers, or commit any abuse heerein, to be punished most seuerely. By the lawes of France they suffer death.

[No captaine, lieutenant &c.] This law may percase to some seeme needlesse. for who would thinke, that any man woulde come into the field to fight without armes: but he that hath seene the disorder in warres in this point, and considered how many captaines, lieutenants, sergeants, which are the brauest men of their companies, do come without armes defensiue into the field, will acknowledge, I doubt not, that it is more then necessary to be thought vpon, and re∣dressed. As it is now, they onely leade men to fight, and when they

come neere, conuey themselues out of the braule, letting their soul∣diers fight if they will. In time past, centurions, and their options, or lieutenants, were the first and principall men of their rankes, and the strength of the battel; and by the vantage of their armes preuailed against their enemies. Would not then so many braue captaines, lieutenants, and sergeants now adde a great strength to the armie, if they stoode in their rankes well armed: Now standing out of array, they serue for nothing, but for cyphres in the ioyning of the battell, vnlesse it be to giue euill example, and to trouble others. The Spani∣ardes at mosters pay none, but such as present themselues be∣fore their officers with their armes, and furniture. If then in mosters, armes are to be shewed; sure more requisit it is, that men should come armed into the field. For what reason hath he to reproue, and checke his souldiers for casting away, or loosing their armes, that hath no sufficient armes himselfe:

7 [No souldier, nor other, &c.] For want of sufficient markes, and cognisances, oft times souldiers of one side hurt their fellowes, especially where diuers nations serue together. This was the death of Ponsenac, & diuers braue men an. 1569. slaine by their fellowes in a skirmish in France, and is cause of many disorders. Diligently therefore is this point to be looked vnto, especially where the enemy, and wee speake both one language. Pompey himselfe for want of ready pronouncing the worde, had like to haue bin slaine of one of his owne souldiers, in the warres against Settorius in Spaine. For this cause y^e Protestants in these late troubles in France, wore white cassakes, and the Dutch that came in their aide, scarfes of colours of their Generall.

8 [No captaine, officer, &c.] Of this cause proceede many qua∣rels among captaines, and diuers fraudes in mosters, and disobedi∣ence of souldiers to their superiors. Which cannot be auoided if offen∣ding one captaine, they may finde protection, & shelter vnder another. Therfore both y^e receiuers, & they that are receiued, deserue to be pu∣nished. By the orders of the Spanish campe, the captaine looseth his place, the souldier is banished offending herein. Among y^e Romanes such abuses were not vsuall. But if so be the souldier be euill intrea∣ted of his captaine, or the seruant by his master; then vpon proofe the lord marshall, or iudge marshal is to set order.

9 [Captaines, & officers of cōpanies &c.] For that y^e souldiers

are oft times charged while their captaines are absent, and therupon fly, or commit some other error, as men without gouernment: there∣fore area capteins & officers to watch with their companies, and to see that their soldiers depart not the place, nor there stay in disorder. They of thebgarison of Aenna could not haue escaped the dange∣rous practise of the townesmen against them, but by continuall watch day and night in armes. The Admirallccaused a certaine en∣signe to be hanged in the siege of Poytiers for that hee was found playing at cardes, while his company watched.

10 [No man shall march &c.] no man that hath care of his honor, or reputation, will be behind while his company is before: but because all are not of one mettall, and diuers regard not honor, to re∣medie the disorders in marching, this law is framed. Many inconue∣niences come of disorderly marching. the enemie hath opportunitie giuen him to charge vs: particulars that wander among the countrie people are either slaine, or taken.dScipio therefore did chastice such as he espied out of their rankes, with a Vine wand if they were Ro∣manes; with a cudgell, if they were other. Catoeriding among the ranks of his soldiers as they were marching, strooke those that were out of aray with his leading staffe, and commaunded the colonels and captains to chastise them. By greedinesse oftentimes of a litle spoile, while souldiers range out of order, an armie may be defeated. ThefSamnites bought dearelie the spoiles which they ranne after, being ouertaken by the Romanes in disorder. The Romanes there∣fore among other things when they were enrolled, did sweare that they would keepe their araie.

11 [No companie shall, &c.] Although companies do goe out with the Generals priuitie, and sufficient order be taken to second thē, and to fauour their retraite, yet many times doe some come short of home. What are then they to looke for, that goe foorth without direc∣tion or succour: that the body of the army be not weakened, & diuers good men lost by their own rashnesse, & that the enemie take not there∣by opportunitie to charge vs, let good direction be giuen, & al dangers be forecast. The Romansgin the siege of Veij, seeing many men lost by sudden skirmishes, betweene the towne and the campe, forbade their soldiers to fight any more without commandement.hPapyrius would haue executed the generall of his horse, for that hee fought contrary to his cōmandement, albeit he returned victorious, Man∣lius

punished this disobedience, by the death of his owne sonne. TheaSpaniards neither make roade nor skirmish without direction of their superior commanders.

12 [No soldier shall sell &c.] To sell away, or to throw away their armesbwas capital to the Roman soldiers. AppiuscClaudius did behead those soldiers, that throwing downe their armes fledde from the enemie. Lycurgus among the Spartans made a lawe, that no man should turne home, that turned his backe to the enemie. And therfore did they banish Archilochus y^e Poet out of their citie for that he affirmed, that it was better for a man to loose his armes, then his life. The Lacedaemonian women when they deliuered shields to their sonnesd going into the warres, exhorted them either to bring them backe againe, or to die valiantly vpon their shields. Epaminondas in the battell of Mantinea hauing receiued his deaths wound, asked if his shielde were safe. Chabrias when his ship was ready to sinke, and he might byeswimming haue saued himselfe, chose rather to die with his armes, then to saue himselfe without them. In our time few doe cary all armes into the field, & of those that do, few make con∣science to loose them. Yet did the Romanes carry beside their heauie armes both victuals, and certaine stakes, and thought it great disho∣nor to loose their armes. Very requisit therefore it were, that this law were put in practise. Further it is not sufficient to haue armes, vnlesse the same be well kept and seruiceable.fAurelian did enioyne his soldiers to keepe their armes whole, and neate. Aemiliusgrequi∣red no more of his souldiers, then that they should maintaine their bodies in strēgth, and their armes fit. ThehSpaniards haue at this day great care, that euery souldier haue all his armes, & them sound and fit for seruice, in which poynt whosoeuer offendeth, they draw him out of his ranke with shame.

13 [No priuat captaine &c.] long experience hath taught men now to haue more care in this poynt, then in time past, when any cap∣taines passeport was thought sufficient to dismisse his whole com∣pany. and great reason there is men shoulde looke vnto it. For while this was suffered, braue men were dismissed for some little mony, and weake persons receiued in their places, and the pay of diuers soldiers emboursed by the captaines, and the princesiseruice slackely perfourmed. Fuluiusk a Colonell of the Romans was ba∣nished his countrey, for that hee tooke vpon him without other au∣thoritie to dismisse a legion, whereof hee had the commaundemet.

Caiusa Matienus for that he came from the armie in Spaine with∣out pasport, was beaten vnder a gibet, & sold for one piece of mo∣ney, to signifie vnto vs, y^t such fugitiue rascals are of no more value. While in the ciuill stirres in France euery souldier came, & went at pleasure, & in the seruice in Flanders, and France, there hath not bin that order herein, y^t was requisite; neither they in France, nor others could at any time assure themselues of their number, or strength.

14 [No souldier nor other &c.] Among souldiers there can be no greater fault, then to forsake their ensignes & standing, & so to run out of y^e field. Be it for feare, or spoile, the same is grieuously to be pu∣nished.b Appius beheaded the ensigne bearers, & centurions, that fled away frō their ensignes. To those companies that fled and lost their ensignes in a certeine encoūter with Annibal,c Marcellus gaue nothing but barly to eate, the centuriōs he caused to stād with their garments loose, and swords drawen, which among their souldiers, was a great shame. Caesar did put certaine ensigne bearer frō theird places, for that they lost their groūd, in a certaine encounter with Pompey at Dyrrhachiū. Crassuse causing his souldiers that fled, to cast lots, put euery tenth man to death, which Antony did likewise execute vpō his souldiers flying frō the Parthiās. Antonius Primus,f one of Vespasians captaines, seeing an ensigne bearer turne his backe, stroke him through with a iauelin. In this case Clearchus would haue souldiers to feare their captaines, more then the enemie.

The fault of those y^t runne to spoile, is not much lesse, then of those that runne away. While those that pursued the enemie turned aside to spoile, the French were ouerthrowen at Guinguast, the Italiās atg Taro, and theh Samnites in a certaine encounter by the Romanes, that turning head vpon the victors, tooke the victorie out of their hands.i Caesar hauing ouerthrowen Pompey in open field, prayed his souldiers that they would not so set their mindes on spoile, that they would omit the occasion to atchieue the victorie, and perfite other matters. The Romanes what with reward, what with seueri∣tie, wrought so much in the mindes of their souldiers, saithk Salust, that they were more often punished for fighting without cōman∣dement, then for flying away, or forsaking their ensignes. The La∣cedemonians banished such cowardly persons. Aristotle, no souldier, but a Philosopher,l holdeth it a dishonorable thing for a souldier to flie, or to cast away his armes. A certaine souldier of Caesar, albeit

he had vanquished his enemy, yet craued pardon, for that he was dri∣uen to forsake his shield.

15 [No souldiers nor others &c.] the cries, tumult, and running vp and downe of disorderly persons do much discourage yong souldi∣ers, anda hinder them that they cannot heare the commandements of their leaders, and therefore are diligently to be auoyded.

b Aemilius perceiuing the diuers inconueniences that grew here∣of gaue all his directions to the colonels, and they to the first man of the legion, and he to the Centurions, and euery one to his fellow secretly, and quietly. Among thec Spaniards no man may cry out, nor speake loud, either marching, or embattelled in squadrons. The punishment of the offence among them is shame, and infamy. Onelie at the ioyning of the battel, it is not only lawful, but also profitable to beginne with a great noise. Of which, as it was greater, or lesser: some haue gathered ad presage either of losse, or victorie.

16 [No man shall giue an alarme &c.] False alarmes disquiet the army very much, and often trouble those that ought to rest. And therfore doth the enemy oftentimes suborne some to keep our men in continuall alarme, that more easily he may preuaile against vs being tyred and ouerwatched. Those difficulties therefore which the ene∣mie casteth in our way, let vs note increase by our vnskilfulnes, & let vs in our watches and discoueries keepe good order: and the ra∣ther, for that lodging for the most part without strong defence, and marching without diligent discouery, wee lie open to many surpri∣ses, and sodaine attempts of the enemy. The penaltie is arbitrarie, and may be more or lesse, according to the qualitie of the offence. Yet in auoyding the excesse, we must take heede that we runne not into the defect; and so for want of warning be taken vnprouided.

17. [He that by negligence &c.] If this did not fall out too of∣ten amōg our yong souldiers, that either for want of skill, or through feare not looking before them do kill, & hurt their fellowes, this law might seeme needles. But as now it is, I would thinke this law very profitable, if by this prouiso the souldiers might be made more wary. By the same not only those that hurt others negligently, but also, & much more they that hurt their felows maliciously are to be punished.

18 [No man shall challenge &c.]fThe Romanes contended a∣mong themselues rather who should kill most enemies, then who could ouercome most of their fellowes.g Those that stroke their

fellowes with their sword died for it, those that threwe stones at them, were displaced with shame. And therefore did seldome anie quarrell or braule arise among companions. Among vs nothing is more common, neither will any law serue to restraine such disorders. Yet do I not doubt, but if these lawes whereby not onely the origi∣nal, that is, iniurious wordes and deedes, but also the meanes, that is, challenges and acceptance of challenges is taken away, were exe∣cuted, and braulers punished, that these faults would be lesse com∣mon. In experience wee finde that these spadassines, and common quarellers prooue not most resolute souldiers. Many inconuenien∣ces come of these quarels. For not onely braue men are often lost, but also the common cause hindred by them. The quarrels betwixt cap∣taines and gentlemen in Tifauges Anno. 1569. caused diuers to de∣part malecontent, of which the enemy hauing notice tooke the towne disfurnished of souldiers. Thea Spaniards therefore doe ex∣presly forbid all cartels, iniurious wordes, and braules vpon great penalties, both in their armies, and garrisons.

20 & 21 [No souldier nor other shal fraudulently &c.] Those that know what necessities poore souldiers are driuen vnto, cannot chuse but pity their estate that contrary to orders of law are forced to shift. Yet for the necessitie of some, the disorder of others, that as they stole at home, so steale abroad, may not passe vnpunished.b Aurelian the emperor would not suffer his souldiers to take so much as a pul∣let, or oile, or salt, or wood from the country people. Forc souldiers, saith he, ought to enrich themselues with the spoiles of the enemie not with teares of the people, that are friends.d Tiberius caused one of his gard to be put to death for taking a peacocke out of a mans yard.e Aufidius Cassius punished rapine, and theft most ex∣tremely. Of the Turke it is reported, that he put one of his souldiers to death for taking away a poore womans milke.f Modestinus iud∣ged him worthy of death that stole his fellows armes. To restraine this disorder the Romane souldiers when they were first inrolled did sweare that they would bring to y^e general, or his deputy, whatsoeuer they should take vp. Onely certaine trifling things were excepted. Caesar setting gardes at the gates of the city ofg Leptis, that yeelded to him, kept his souldiers out, for feare they should spoile the inhabi∣tants. The Romanes most seuerely punishedh Pleminius, and others that spoiled the towne of Locri wherein they lay in garrison. And

put to death al that legion that driuing out the townsmē seized Rhe∣gium to their owne vse. The Spaniards doe diligentlya forbid such filcheries. In summe, the ancient orders of warre require, that not only souldiers, and others within the campe or garrison, possesse their armes, and goods in peace, but also that our associats, and friends be kept from spoyle.

22 [No man shall burne &c.] Many things may be found in the enemies countrey, which might greatly benefit the army, if they could be saued from the wanton spoyle of the souldier. Wherefore that souldiers fall not into needlesse wants through their owne de∣fault; let this law among others be diligently executed.

23 [All murders &c.] Such offences as by ciuil lawes are pu∣nished at home, ought to haue like punishment abroad. Yet must the Iudges and Officers that dealt herein, proceede with great discreti∣on. For small matters in time of peace, as neglecting of the watch, and disobedience against Officers, are seuerely punished in time of warres: and contrariwise great matters in time of peace, are for some euident cause neglected in warres. Fauour, and allianceb haue liew in choyce of Officers in peaceable gouernment: but in warres they that make not choyce of worthy men, worthily repent themselues. Againe in time of peace proceeding is flow, and formes are obserued: but in proceeding in martiall causes neither formalities, nor delayes are admitted. Prouided alwayes, that in cutting off formalities, and delayes iniustice be not done.

24 [No souldier nor other &c.] The fift lawe of this Chapter concerneth Captains and Officers, this is proper to souldiers and such as passe for souldiers. Both are litle ynough to redresse disor∣ders, and if there were diuers other lawes made to the same purpose, yet were it good if all could remedy the inconueniences that follow false and fraudulent dealing in mosters.

25 [No souldier that hath &c.] Military discipline is so farre growne out of vse, that men are constreined, by expresse lawes to pre∣scribe many particular matters, which otherwise might seeme either trifling or needeles. And among other things as you see, that souldi∣ers dispence and spend their victuals moderatly, or rather sparingly. for he that betime spareth not, very timely shall want.

CHAP. XXI. Part. 4. Wherein orders especially concerning the campe, or towne of gar∣rison are conteined.

1 WHosoeuer shall deale fraudulently, or negli∣gently in such matters, as are by his Camerada committed to his trust or gouernment, let him haue punishemnt according to his offence, and make double restitution out of his pay.

2 All manner of persons within the campe or garrison, after the watch is set, shall repaire to their quarter, and there vse silence, that euery man may rest. All straglers and tumul∣tuous persons, that are taken abroad after that time, shalbe cōmitted to prison, and there abide vntill their cause be examined by the of∣ficers of iustice, & order taken for their punishment, or dismissing.

3 No man in campe (or garrison in time of warre) shall lodge out of his quarter, or delay to repaire thither vpon an alarme giuen, vpon paine of imprisonment.

4 No souldier nor other shall receiue any stranger into his ca∣bine, or lodging vpon paine of imprisonment, nor shall harbour any spye, or messenger from the enemie, vpon paine of death.

5 No manner of person shall passe in, or out of the campe, or towne of garrison any other, then the ordinary wayes, vpon payne of death.

6 Women, and boyes, and such as do idlely follow the souldi∣ers, not being enterteined in pay, as much as may be, are to bee ba∣nished the campe.

7 No captaine, souldier, nor other person, in time of necessitie, and for defence of himselfe and the armie, or garrison shal refuse to worke with mattocke, spade, basket, or other instrument, vpon pain of imprisonment.

8 No souldier appointed to stand sentinell, shall depart from the place, or sleepe in the place, vpon paine of death, nor shall sitte downe vpon paine of imprisonment.

9 For keeping the campe cleane, and mainteining of mens health, some places shalbe assigned for the slaughter of beasts, & o∣thers for other necessities at the outsides of the campe, or towne of garrison, out of which places it shall not be permitted to anie to kill beastes, or doe other offices vpon paine of imprisonment. Euery

Colonel, and Captaine shall looke to the cleansing of his quarter euery third day, vpon paine of losse of a months pay; and shall cause such as cast out any garbage, or filth, and bury it not, to bee imprisoned.

10 No man shall spoile, or hurt any victualler or other person comming with prouision for the army, or any marchant that brin∣geth necessary commodities to the campe, nor shall breake open any shop, or steale any thing out of any tent, or caban, or house, vpon paine of death.

11 No man shall buy, or sell any victuals, but in the place ap∣pointed for the market, nor vntil such time as the same be reasona∣bly rated by the officers appointed, nor aboue that price that is rea∣sonably set, vpon paine of forfeiture of such victualles so bought, or solde, or the value thereof, and also imprisonment.

12 No souldier nor other shall breake down or burne any house that may serue for lodging of the company, nor shall trouble or de∣file any spring, or streame of water, that is to be vsed for the seruice of the army, vpon paine of imprisonment.

Annotations for the better vnderstanding of the former lawes.

1 [Whosoeuer shal deale &c.] Many are the commodities that proceede of camarades:a Souldiers do liue better, and cheaper in camarada then otherwise: they are linked in more strait bonds of friendship one with another: if any be sicke or hurt, his camarada taketh care of him. When they are ranged together, one doth more willingly succor another. For which cause it were to be wished, that as it is among the Spaniards, very commonly, so among vs our companies were diuided into camaradaes, and that such as violate the lawes of societi•• should be sharpely punished.

2 [All maner of persons &c.] The cries and disorders of some lewd persons that take no delight but in their owne lewdnesse, and disorder giueth occasion of this law sufficient. And all litle enough to stop their mouths, and procure others rest. In the Romane army there was in time past great quietnesse in the night: and now the Turkes after the watch set vse great silence. The wandring vp and down of souldiers, and others after that time doth couer spies: which if euery man resort to his quarter, cannot long lie hidden.

3 & 4 [No man in camp &c.] While men lodge out of order, it is hard to bring them ina the night into any order. Besides this inconuenience, while souldiers lodge out of their quarter, the same falleth out to be vnfurnished oftentimes, if the enemy should then chance to assault it, and espials cannot be discouered, nor the dangers of secret meetings auoyded. For which cause order is to be giuen, that all do lodge in their owne quarter, and giue notice to their su∣periors, if any stranger, or suspected person lodge there.

5 [No maner of person &c.] While this is neglected, the way is made easie vp to the rampire, gardes and sentinels are abused, and espials passe in and out, and are not espied. For this cause the Ro∣mans didb punish this disorder with death.

6 [Women, and boyes &c.] Infinite abuses come into the campe by these meanes. Victuals are consumed, disorder increased. And therefore as Scipio purged his campe at Numantia of all super∣fluous persons, so allowing boyes to captaines and certaine officers, the rest are to be banished as much as may be.

7 [No captaine or souldier &c.] The stubburnnesse of some, and daintinesse of others, that either refuse to worke, or thinke it not belonging to the profession of a souldier to worke, hath giuen but too iust cause of this law; which is therfore set downe, that euery man not hindred with hurts, & sicknes may know y^e it is the duty of a souldier no lesse to worke with a spade in trenches, thē to fight with the sword in the open field. The Romans, as before I haue shewed, generally set hand to the worke: which made them victorious oftentimes with∣out setting hand to the sword.c Cyrus and al his nobilitie set hands to worke, and holpe forward the cariages that were often myred, as his army marched ouer certain moores, notwithstanding the Per∣sian pride and brauery. But since our souldiers beganne to put such brauery in their silkes, it is no maruel if they haue made difficulty to mire themselues. For nothing is more contrary to silkes then mire. Yet do not the Spaniards that thinke themselues as braue as the best, thinke themselues by these labours any whit disgraced.

8 [No souldier appointed &c.] The safette of the campe, and garrison is oft reposed in the diligence of the sentinell, by whose watchfulnes others rest assured. The more seuerely therefore ought his negligence to be punished. The Romanes in time past, as before I haue shewed, and now thed Spaniards doe punish this fault with

death. Paulus Aemilius to auoyd the sleeping of sentinels, ordered, y^t they should stand, or walke, which others likewise do now practise.

9 [For keeping the camp &c.] There cannot be too much dili∣gence vsed in this behalf. The incōmodities that come of infection of the aire, occasioned by y^e filthines of the place, are so many: & the thing so loathsome. Thea Spaniards therfore in effect decree as much as we, but they obserue it far better. The Romans without law procee∣ded herein very carefully, by reason of their continuall experience.

10 11 & 12 [No man shal spoile or hurt &c.] The ancient orders of the Romanes, that carried victuals with them sufficient for their company, being out of practise, and the prouision of the armie being made now from day to day by victuallers, that for gaine folow the campe: it standeth the Generall vpon to see that they may safely come and go: and that victualles may be prouided and saued. The army of the Prince ofb Orenge that besieged Florence, had like to haue bin famished by the disorder of three or foure lewd persons, that spoiled the marchants, & victuallers that came, and went from the campe; no sooner were they hanged, but the army had al things for their mony plentifully. By the lawes of thec Spanish gouerne∣ment, such spoilers are seuerely punished, and victuals both well sa∣ued, and reasonably rated. Neither are victuals onely to be looked vnto, but also corne-mils, and houses, and granges, that may serue for the vse of the army: streames of water are to be kept cleane, not onely for the vse of men, but of cattell also.

These lawes being wel obserued, and prouision made not only of victuals, & things necessary for the whole, but also of phisick & places of ease for the sick, & hurt, I would wel hope, that matters would pro∣ceed in better order among souldiers, thē they haue done heretofore.

CHAP. XXI. Part. 5. Wherein a forme of lawes especially concerning sea causes, and ships go∣ing in publike seruice of the Prince is prescribed.

1THe ordinary practise and laws of warre concerning religion, and the state, & also concerning obedience, and peaceable conuersation betwixt fellows, which haue course in seruice at land, shal be obserued like∣wise at sea, respect being alwayes had to the diuers circumstances, which are diuers in either.

2 The execution of iustice at sea appertaineth to the Generall, or chiefe captaine with his counsell: if a ship be seuered from the rest of the company, then the punishment of faults that may not be differred belongeth to the captaine with the aduise of the most ap∣parent men in the ship. Prouided that no execution be done at sea contrary to the lawes of armes, nor that such as offend and escape at sea, do escape at land also, especially where the fault is heinous. For which cause those that haue iurisdiction at sea, are to haue their iu∣risdiction cōtinued at land, vntil such time, as offences be punished.

3 No ship shall go foorth vpon publike seruice without suffi∣cient ordonance, armes, souldiers, mariners, munition, victualles, surgeons and other necessary furniture.

4 No man shall sell away the armes, tacle, artillerie, victualles, or munitions belonging to the ship vpon paine of death.

5 Whatsoeuer ship hauing directions to come to a place cer∣taine, shall not keepe course if it be possible, nor come thither so soone as the winde wil serue, the captaine, and master, and those that are in fault shal suffer death for it.

6 Whosoeuer shall motion to do contrary to the Generals di∣rection, so long as there is possibilitie, or meanes to folow it; shall suffer imprisonment for the same: and if he persuade the company, so that the ship goeth another way, both he and those that willing∣ly yeeld to him shal suffer death for their disobedience.

7 Whatsoeuer captaine or other doth boord a ship of the ene∣mies without direction, or reasonable cause, or when commande∣ment is giuen, or a signe made of fight, doth see a ship boarded vp∣on one side, and doth not if he be able board her on the other side, or at least do what hurt he can to the said shippe, shall be dismissed from his charge, and suffer such further punishment, as the General shal thinke meete.

8 Euery particular person shal execute his charge imposed vpō him in the ship where he is placed, vpon paine of imprisonment.

9 No souldier nor other whē the enemy attempteth to board our ship, shal abandon his standing vpon paine of death.

10 No souldier nor other appointed to board the enemies ship seeing his fellowes entred, shal draw backe, or resuse to folowe in his turne, and order vpon paine of death.

11 No man shal breake open his fellowes, or others caban, or

coffer, nor shal take any thing thence, or from their persons, or hide any thing that is not his, vpon paine of death.

12 He that neglecteth his watch, or sleepeth leauing a candle or match light, or any fire in any place and putteth it not out, shall be put into the bilbowes, and haue further punishment as the of∣fence shall deserue.

13 When a ship shall be taken, then shal the spoile be brought to persons deputed by the Generall or Captaine. And whosoeuer shal hide any thing of valew from their knowledge, shal not onely loose the same, but his share of the rest also.

Notes vpon the former lawes.

1 [The ordinary practice &c.] How many voyages haue bin broken of late time for want of gouernement, euery one that is ac∣quainted with sea causes, that haue passed of late, vnderstandeth. No∣thing therefore is more requisit, then that such as go in those seruices that hereafter shalbe attempted, should haue both authority to do iu∣stice, & a forme of proceeding set before them. For this cause I haue made this light, and as it were first draught, that men of wisedome & experience seeing what is wanting therein, may adde more, and bring the same to more perfection. Those lawes that concerne treacheries against the prince and state, or against the Generall, or else concerne mutinies, disobedience, braules, murders, or else are common in ser∣uice at land, and sea, I haue not here set downe, for auoyding vnne∣cessary repetitions. Yet are they no lesse necessary at sea, then at land. And therefore let them be borrowed thence, that no militarie disorder, nor other offence escape vnpunished.

2 [The execution of iustice &c.] The want of this considera∣tion, hath bin cause that many notorious treasons and villenies haue escaped without punishmēt. I wil not name particulars, for that my meaning is rather to prouide against future disorders, then to haue the sword drawne for matters forepassed. Onely let there bee heere∣after care, that such as go to sea may be furnished with authoritie to do iustice, & that rules be set downe, that they may know what to doe.

3 [No ship shal &c.] The Admirall of France in time of peace at home hath speciall care of this matter. In ciuill warres all things are in garboile. He putteth into men of war, the tenth man,

and is at a tenth of the charge, and deserueth a tenth of thea prise. Which many do wonder how in our daies certaine officers contra∣rie to all custome do come to challenge, especially in goods taken by reprisall. Where if law might take place, neither the taker, nor other ought to haue more then hath beene taken from him in forraine countries. But if men will needes haue a tenth, yet let them haue a tenth of the care that ships may go foorth well furnished, that they be not lost, and the land disfurnished in time of seruice.

4 [No man shall sell &c.] Euery gunner, and petite officer in the Queenes ships can tell the mysterie of this law. I woulde it were so wel knowne how we might meete with their filcheries. The best means is to looke to matters narrowly, and to punish such com∣panions as offend, seuerely.

5 [Whatsoeuer ship &c.] As at land, so at sea, if colonels, cap∣taines, and masters do not execute the Generalles commaundement: there can be no performance of seruice. If ships may straggle from y^e company, and go on pilfering, or vpon euery light occasion returne, and leaue their Generall at sea, or if priuat men may take vpon them to dissuade men from doing that, which the Generall hath comman∣ded, and all this without feare of punishment, as hath bene doone in some countries, but too much heretofore in voyages at sea: there can be no better hope of successe, then hath beene had heretofore.

6 [Whatsoeuer captaine &c.] This law hath two parts: the first is against such as attempt matters without direction, by which meanes, they either endanger themselues going single, or else breake the general purpose of the action: the second is against cowards and traitors, that looke on while their fellowes fight: against which no punishment can be deuised sufficient.b Metius Suffetius was drawne in peeces by force of horses, for that while Tullus Hostilius en∣countred with the enemy, it pleased him to stand by, and giue aime. And not much lesse punishment had Laetus one of the captaines ofc Seuerus his army; for that while the rest fought, he caused his men to make alta.d Amminian Marcellin reporteth, that certaine horse∣men of the Romanes were disarmed, & had their horses takē from them, and were driuen to serue with the baggaglioes of the camp, for that they retired when their fellows went to charge the enemy. The like reason is in fight at sea. For if whē one ship entreth y^e battel, the rest do not second her, or if when one ship is charged, the rest come

not to succor: there is no hope, y^t any great seruice can be done at sea.

The lawes of this section that folow are plaine enough of them∣selues, and most of them like to those that are ordained for good ser∣uice at land; and therfore I purpose not to spend words in explaning that, whose reasons euery man may easily conceiue of himselfe.

CHAP. XXI. Part. 6. Wherein there is conteined certaine orders concerning aduētures at sea.

1 WHere men do aduenture at sea vpon their owne charge, there the prises taken are to be diuided into three parts, whereof the first belongeth to the ship and captaine, the second to the victual∣lers, the third to the souldiers and marriners, (Some allot a third part to the ship alone, but there seemeth therein to be no iust proportion.) If by reason of the charge otherwise then is ordinary bestowed, other agreement bee made, the same is to be obserued and kept.

2 Where two or more do ioyne in consort, the diuision of the prize shal be made according to the composition that is made a∣mong them: if none be made according to the greatnes and good∣nes of the ships and furniture: prouided alwayes, that where a ship is forced, those that first boord her, and doe most valiantly, be first rewarded, and their hurtes, and losses repaired at the common charge.

3 Al aduenturers that ioyne in consort, and submit themselues to one mans gouernement or to more, shall to them yeelde obe∣dience, and of them receiue iustice according to the laws of armes, and customes of sea gouernement.

CHAP. XXI. Part. 7. Wherein an order is set downe concerning the officers of the army or na∣uy, or that haue charge to make any prouision for either.

1 WHatsoeuer commissary, or officer appointed for leuy, or muster of souldiers, or prouision of vi∣ctuals, munition, armes, weapons, cariages, ships, or other matter, doth deale therein fraudulently,

or negligently, let him be imprisoned, & fined, and make satisfacti∣on; and if the crime deserue it, let him suffer death for it.

Annotations vpon this last law.

The ancient Captaines of the Romans as in skil and experience in warres: so in care also and labour farre excelled the men of our times. And therefore neither had they, nor needed they so many lieu∣tenants, and petit officers, as now are vsed, to beare together with them the seueral parts of their charge. Themselues saw their soul∣diers leuied, mostered, exercised, payd, lodged, prouided of armes, and victuals, and other necessaries, and had seldome any commissioners for leuies of men, and neuer any moster-masters, nor sergeant maior, nor special officers of iustice, nor quartermaster, nor trenchmaster, nor scoutmaster, nor commissaries for prouision of armes, nor victualles, nor such matters. For the pay of the souldiers, & sauing of the spoile they vsed aa treasurer. The tribunes or colonels did execute the office of the campmaster, and sergeant maior. The Generalles themselues with their counsell did ouersee the workes of the souldiers in their mines, bankes, trenches, and other military labours. Now the ge∣neral care of al matters belongeth to the Generall. But to assist him seuerall men are deputed to euery seuerall charge. Who if they be∣haue themselues fraudulently or negligently, his generall care auai∣leth him nothing. Great care therfore ought the to haue, that his offi∣cers be not onely loyall, but also carefull and sufficient to discharge that office, that is imposed vpon them. If they be not such; that hee see them not onely remoued, but also punished according to their de∣serts. For if souldiers be not leuied in time, or els if sufficient men be dismissed for money, & the s••umme of the people put in for souldiers, or if yong souldiers be not trained and fashioned by light skirmishes, or if y^t souldiers be famished or not furnished, or haue not their armes or victuals in order, or that military orders be not obserued, or soul∣diers vnpaid or vnprouided for by fraud, or the country ransomed by Captaines, and quartermasters, or the honour of the Prince solde for mony, or other abuse cōmitted, & finally if those that deale in these of∣fices may do what they list without punishmēt, or controlmēt, what∣soeuer labour and paines is taken otherwise, yet is it to no purpose.

Amōg the Romans those that dealt in publike charges, were very sufficient men for the most part, and dealt therein loyally. But if at

any time they did otherwise, they were most seuerely punished. L.aScipio and his Officers were condemned, & fined for ransack∣ing the friends and associates of the Romans in Asia. Aquilius hard∣ly escaped condemnation for his concussions & exactions in Spaine, and Sicile. Against the exactions, and fraudes of Officers, they fra∣med diuers lawes, whereby they not only punishedbthe offenders, but caused restitution, and reparation of damages to be made. Hee that by occasion ofcpassing his army by any city, or countrey ex∣torted any thing, was bound to restore double. The examples of those that tooke money for redemption of lodging, and passing of souldiers are rare. Tacitus dothdmention it in one Fabius Valens, as a notorious and singuler griedines, and filthy kind of gaine. That e∣quallity might be therin obserued, Arcadius &eHonorius, decreed that no souldier lodging in any mans house should haue more, then one third part therof, the rest to remaine to the owner, & his fami∣ly. No souldier by the orders of the Romans might exact so much as salt, light, or vineger, of those where he lodged. The lawes of France vpon paine of death forbid theirffurriers or quartermasters to take any money of any, either for lodging, or for sparing them for lodging.

By the law Iulia made against exactionsgof Officers, hee was banished, and condemned to make restitution, that either for choo∣sing or dismissing of souldiers receiued mony. Cassius caused a re∣uolt in Spaine by reason of the peoples discontentment. For that hehexacted mony of such, as would not go with him into Afrike, whi∣ther he pretended a voyage, that rich men being inrolled might re∣deeme them selues with great summes of mony. Of which abuse Caesar had no sooner vnderstanding, but he gaue order for to dis∣place him.

The Romanes condemned those Colonels, Captains,iand Offi∣cers, that brought in false moster rolles, or inter cepted the pay of souldiers to pay foure folde, and to loose their places. By the consti∣tutions of France such as deale inkmosters fraudulently, whether they be Officers or others, are condemned to dye: and yet all this is not sufficient to restreine the vnlawfull shiftes, and practices that are therein vsed.

The like seuerity did the Romanes vse against them that dealt fraudulently in any other military charge. M. Posthumius and other

amarchants for deceit vsed in prouision of victuals, and other neces∣saries for the army in Spaine, and for giuing in false accompts, and pretence of losse, where in deede they lost nothing, were banished the citie of Rome, and all their goods confiscate. But what should I neede to shew their iustice against fraude and deceit, when they v∣sed to punish and dismisse those, that were negligent in their charge? Caesar disarmed, and dismissedbAuienus, for that in a ship wherein he should haue transported souldiers into Afrike, hee put nothing but his owne priuate seruants, and goods. And for that diuers of his men, and ships were intercepted, and taken by the enemy, as they passed into Afrike, heecdismissed his Admirall, and others, and put them from their charge. For by their negligence hee receiued that great losse.

If then the Romanes when these offences were yet new, and rare, for repressing them vsed great diligence and seuerity: howe much more ought Princes to vse iustice, and seuerity herein, when scarce any punishment, vnles it be very peremptory, can restrein mens grie∣dy and vnsatiable desires? the principall cause of the neglect of mi∣litary discipline proceedeth from fraude, negligence, and insufficien∣cy of Officers. He therefore that desireth to bring things into order, must begin with reformation of Officers, who both first brought in, and since haue continued many disorders, in the proceeding and practice of armes.

CHAP. XXI. Part. 8. Comprising orders concerning booties, spoyles, and prisoners taken in warres.

1 AFter that the enemy is driuen out of the field, or the fortresse or towne besieged is entred, yet shall no man leaue his ranke, or ensigne to runne to spoyle before licence, or a signe giuen vpon paine of death.

2 Whatsoeuer aduenturers that serue vpon their owne charge, and are not enrol∣led in companies that receiue pay of the Prince or State, shal winne from the enemy by their owne labour: that shall they haue diui∣ded among them selues, except a fift part that goeth to the Prince. If they ioyne with other companies in consort; then shall there be

a proportion made of the spoyle according the number of aduen∣turers, and other souldiers. Prouided alwayes that no aduenturers attempt any enterprise without direction from the Generall, or lord Martiall.

3 All spoyles taken from the enemy belong to the Prince, or State, that payeth the army. And therefore whatsoeuer any souldier shall take or finde, being in value aboue ten shillings, the same is to be brought to the Generall, or his deputy vpon paine of imprison∣ment, and losse of the double value of the thing concealed. By this meanes the Generall may reward the most valiant & forward soul∣diers, & haue wherewith to make payment of the souldiers wages.

4 Euery man shall haue liberty to ransome his prisoner taken in warres at his owne pleasure. But if once he compound with his prisoner, that composition shall stand, if it be made without fraude. Also if the prisoner be a Prince, or great man, then the Generall is to haue the prisoner to make what commodity hee can of him for the benefit of his Prince and countrey; allowing to the taker either the valew of the prisoner, or an honorable reward.

Annotations vpon the former lawes.

1 [After that the enemy &c.] This hath bene already enacted in former lawes in other termes. Yet when I consider the disorders herein committed, and griedines of souldiers; I thought good more specially to prohibit their disorderly running to spoyle: of which I haue by diuers examples shewed the inconueniences.aCharles Duke of Burgundy hauing in the taking of Liege made procla∣mation against breaking of Churches, killed a certaine souldier with his owne hands, for that he tooke him in the manner doing contrary to his commandement.

2 [Whatsoeuer aduenturers &c.] This is to be vnderstoode of companies of aduenturers, not of euery single person, that shal folow the army vpon hope of spoyle: likewise of spoiles taken only by their owne prowes, and not of spoyles, which the enemy forsaketh for feare of the army. Such aduenturers we haue few in our warres, & there∣fore I say the lesse of them: yet because good it were they should be there, somewhat I thought good to say of them.

3 [Al spoyles taken &c.] Nothing is more equal, nor profitable either for y^e Prince, or the souldier, then y^t the spoyle be brought to the

Generall. For by that meanes the Prince may be eased of some part of his charge, and the souldiers the better payde & rewarded. Contra∣riwise nothing is more vnreasonable, thē that those y^t do least, should haue most, & those that do most, should haue nothing, as it falleth out when the sack of a towne is giuen to the souldiers. For a coward that entreth the last, may percase light vpon the greatest spoyle, while those that first entred can not stirre for their hurtes. Therefore did the Romanes bring all the spoyle to the Generall for the most part; andaMoses hauing vanquished the Midianites, after hee had the spoyle brought to him; diuided it among all the souldiers. Neither doeth any reason permit, but that those that watch, and fight should haue as good part, as straglers that runne to spoyle. And to permit all to goe to spoyle together were to yeelde the victory to the enemy. How hard therfore so euer it seeme to keep the souldiers from spoyle; yet doe I thinke they might easily be perswaded, if they were well dealt withall. and albeit it were a hard poynt; yet must Captaines endeuour to obteine it.

4 [Euery man shall haue &c.] It is an inhumane, and hard part to massacre such as yeelde them selues, and throwe downe their wea∣pons confessing them selues vanquished, and flying to our mercy. The Lacedaemonians in the first beginning of the Peloponnesian warre, killed as many Athenians as they caught, which the Atheni∣ans likewise practiced vpon the Lacedaemonians, to requite them: but in the end, saithbThucidides, this truelty displeased them both. The Spaniards in the beginning of their warres in the Low coun∣treys killed cruelly as many as they tooke: but when they saw them selues to be dealt withall in like sort, they repented, and perceiued that such sauage cruelty is contrary to the nature of faire warres. but if it be inhumanity to kill him, that yeeldeth, much more is it for men to kill those in colde blood, whome they haue promised to saue. Who doeth not detest the cruell slaughter of the Prince of Condè after he was taken at Bassac, and of those Gentlemen that then were taken prisoners, & stayne three dayes after in the Generals lodging? Prisoners therefore let them be saued, if it may be, and that composi∣tion that is made with them for their ransome, let it be performed.

CHAP. XXI. Part 9. Wherein certaine orders are conteined concerning the execution of Lawes and administration of iustice.

1 THat the auctours of disorders may be detected and punishment awarded accordingly, it shalbe lawfull for the iudge Marshall, or others that haue commission from the Generall, or lorde Martiall to do iustice, to enquire of the auctours, and circumstances of offences committed, by the othes of such, and so many as they thinke conuenient, and shal further vse all meanes for examination, and triall of persons accu∣sed, dilated, suspected, or defamed.

2 All causes and controuersies arising betweene Captaines, and souldiers or others within the campe, or townes of garrison, shalbe heard and discussed summarily, and execution done accor∣ding to military lawes without appeale or relation, vnlesse y^e great∣nes of the cause, or other circumstance require stay, or deliberation.

3 If any Captaine, Gentleman, or souldier declare or make his testament, or last will of goods he hath in campe, or fortresse, or which he hath gotten in seruice, the same shall be enrolled in the iudge Martials office, and executed by those that are named exe∣cutors: if no will be made, then shall his goods descend to his next kinred, or wife if he haue any. If he haue none, or if none come to demaund his goods, within one yeere: then shall his goods be be∣stowed on the poore souldiers of the regiment, or company, the di∣uision being made by two or three deputed to administer them.

4 The Prouost Martiall shal see all iudgements, sentences, and commandements of the General, high Martiall, or iudge Martiall put in execution.

5 Euery souldier, and other person shall assist the Prouost Mar∣tiall, and his Officers apprehending of malefactors, and executing of iustice, vpon paine of imprisonment, neither shall any rescue a prisoner taken, or to be taken for any capitall crime, vpon payne of death.

6 No man shall interrupt or trouble the iudge Martiall or Of∣ficers of iustice, doing their office, but vpon request made shall be ready to assist them vpon paine of imprisonment.

7 No gaoler nor prison keeper shall refuse to keepe a prisoner committed to his charge, or dismisse him being once receiued with∣out warrant, vpon like paine as hee should haue suffered, that is so dismissed▪ or suffered to escape.

8 Wheresoeuer there is not speciall order set downe in lawes already written, and published, there the ancient course of milita∣ry discipline shall be obserued, vntill such time as the Generall or the Officers appointed for the administration of iustice, cause or∣der to be taken, and by sound of drumme to be published, which shall afterward stand in force.

9 If any that is culpable of any notorious disorder do flie ouer into England, hoping thereby to escape the danger of martiall lawes; the same party vpon request made to the Iustices, Sherifes, Maiors, Baylifes, or Constables, shalbe sent backe to the campe to the Prouost martiall. And euery of them shall doe their endeuour to assist those that are sent for the apprehension of him. But if re∣quest be made for the punishment of him, then shall the same of∣fender be tryed before the Iudges, at the next assises, and by them be punished.

10 Although the warres be ended, yet are those that offend a∣gainst the lawes of armes and during that time are not punished, to be apprehended, and punished according to the same either by the Iudge Martiall, and Prouost Martiall, whose commissions are to be extended so farre, or by the Iudges of the Realme; that notorious faultes doe not passe without punishment.

Annotations.

1 [That the authours &c.] If neither state nor house can stand without iustice; much lesse can any armie be gouerned without it. Most necessary therefore are the lawes of this section: and so much the rather, for that lawe is nothing without execution. But because iustice cannot be executed vnlesse offenders be detected, therefore the first care of those that purpose to proceede orderly, is to finde out the authours of offences, and persons culpable. This is by examination and othe both of the parties principall, as farre as they are bound by lawe to answere, and of witnesses also: further where presumpti∣ons are sufficient, and the matter heinous; by racke or other paine.

The administration of iustice belongeth to the Generall, and lord Marshal, or those to whom they shall giue aucthoritie: where there is no superiour commander, to Captaines ioyning together, as it is euident by our practise, and also by the examples of the Greekes returning from the voyage with Cyrus, whichaappointed certaine Captaines iudges, and gaue them aucthoritie to determine of mat∣ters, and to punish offenders.

2 [All causes &c.] Whether the causes arise of specialties, or other contract, or act, if the parties be in campe or garison, they are there to be heard and determined.

3 [If any Captaine &c.] Many inconueniences do fall out for want of order in this behalfe. The goods of the dead are either lost, or spoyled; yea many poore men lying sicke, and in distresse, are hastened to their endes by those that gape for that they haue: the next friends of the dead haue nothing, fewe are better for any thing they haue. which I thinke would be in part remedied, if order were taken for the bestowing of their goods. Therefore were it good not that any newe inuention, but that old lawes herein should take place. By the lawes of thebRomanes, soldiers goods went to their next kinred: if they had no wife, nor kinred: yet came they not to the Prince, but were bestowed on the regiment wherein they serued. By the lawes ofcSpaine, the pay & reward that is due vnto souldiers at their death, commeth to their sonnes. And howsoeuer practice ouerruleth lawe, yet in this point the lawes of nations require, that mens last willes be perfourmed. The which that they may take effect, nothing is more requisite, then that they be enrolled, and kept in recorde, and inuentaries of their goodes likewise, whether they die testate, or intestate.

4 [No man shal interrupt &c.] The interrupting of iustice is commonly the beginning of sedition, mutiny, and rebellion. There∣fore doe thedSpaniards in their orders, decree such to bee punished with death. But because the interruption may be with wordes one∣ly, or noyse without further matter; the rigour of the lawe is by dis∣cretion to bee moderated. If any doe interrupt the ministers of iu∣stice doing their office, with force and in tumultuous maner, he fal∣leth within the compasse of lawes ordeined against sedition, and mu∣tiny, and in that degree is to be punished.

The rest of the lawes of this section are plaine, & neede execution,

rather then further exposition. Therefore what neede wee seeke for knots in rushes, or looke for stumbling blocks in so playne a way? this is the summe of all, that warres can not be managed without ex∣ecution of military orders, and obseruance of the orderly practice of armes: that maketh our forces effectuall, that mainteineth them, en∣courageth them, and maketh them victorious, victory maketh an end of warres, and assureth vs of peace, if it he followed and vsed. Peace is the end not onely of this labour of mine, but of all their labours that wish the good of their countrey. And therefore to obteine peace, we are to desire him that is Lorde of armies, that once we may see our warres artificially, and iudicially managed. Before which time he that looketh for peace with the Spaniards, vnlesse God doe worke extraordinarily: he neither vnderstandeth what belongeth to peace, nor warre.

Deo, qui Dominus est exercituum, laus, honor, & gloria in secula seculorum.

Notes

• a

  Rom. 13.
• b

  Act. 9.
• c

  Ad Bonifac.
• a

  Ambr. de of∣fic.
• b

  Bern. de nou. mil.
• c

  Frangit & at∣tollit vires in mi∣lite causa. Ouid.
• d

  causa iubet su∣peros melior spe∣rare secundos. Lucan.
• e

  Euentus belli velut aequus iu∣dex, vnde ius sta∣bat, ei victoriam dabat. Liui. 21.
• f

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Eu∣rip. Electr.
• g

  Lib. 2. antiq.
• h

  Ius in armis ferebant. Liu. 5.
• i

  Phil. Com. li. 4.
• k

  Philip of Com∣mines.
• a

  Hoc & ratiodo∣ctis, & mos genti∣bus, & feris na∣tura ipsa praescri∣psit, vt omnem semper vim a corpore, a capi∣te, a vita iua pro∣pulsarent. Cic. pro Mil.
• b

  Iustum bellum quibus necessa∣rium, & pia arma, quibus nulla, nisi in armis relinqui∣tur salus. Liu. 9.
• c

  ff. de iust. & iure L. furē. & ad L. Corn. de sicar. L. itaque.
• d

  Thucid.
• a

  Quod rebus repetitis geritur. offic. 1.
• b

  Romulus Al∣banis bellum in tulit, quod eorum dictator nollet res raptas redde∣te. Dion. Hal. lib. antiq. 3.
• c

  Liu. 1.
• d

  Flor. Epir.
• e

  Phil. Commin.
• f

  Tarquiniēsibus rebus nequicquā repetitis, quod agrum Rom. po∣pulati essent, bel∣lum indictum. Liu. 7.
• g

  Liu. 1.
• h

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thu∣cid. 1.
• i

  Non suae reddi∣tae res, non alie∣nae accumulatae satis erant. Liu. 9.
• a

  Appian. Alex∣andr.
• b

  Liui. 3.
• c

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• d

  Froissart.
• e

  Liu.
• f

  Bel. Gal. 6.
• a

  ff. De captiu. L. hostes.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. rhet. ad A∣lexandr.
• c

  Offic. 1.
• d

  Fortitudo quae per bella tuetur à Barbaris patriam, vel defendit infir∣mos, vel à latro∣nibus socios, ple∣na iustitia est. Ambros. de offic.
• e

  Populus Rom. sociis defendendis terrarum omnium potitus est. Cic. de rep. 3.
• f

  Visum est Cam∣panos deditos nō prodi. Liu. 7.
• g

  Romani infen∣si Philippo ob in∣fidam erga soci∣os pacem. Liu. 31. ob iniurias & ar∣ma illata sociis populi Rom. bellū indictum. Liu. 31.
• h

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. 1.
• a

  Saguntinos crules us quam Poenus hostis pro∣didit, vos soci, prodidistis. L. 1.25.
• b

  Verebarut (Cae∣sar) ne Gall••••ota deliceret, (h Ger∣gouia capta) nul∣lum in annor praesid••m elle••. Caes. 7. bel. Gal.
• c

  Plat. in Al∣cibiad.
• d

  Liu. 42.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Thucid. 1.
• b

  Guicciard. hist. lib. 1.
• c

  Vt quisque ab oppresso proxi∣mus sit, per om∣nes velut conti∣nens incendium peruadet. Liu. 37.
• d

  Liu. 7.
• e

  Latinis quod e∣orum iuuentus hostibus mixta populata esset Rom. agros, bellā indictum. Liu. lib. 6. & 7.
• f

  Liu. 31.
• a

  cum Antiocho rege, qui{que} eiu, sectā secuti sunr, bellum initum. Liui. 36.
• b

  Memoires de Fr.
• c

  Libido domi∣nandi causa belli. Salust. coniur. Catil.
• d

  What beside the cause is to be respected in law∣full warres.
• e

  C. quid culpa∣tur. 23. qu. 1.
• a

  Liu. 21.31.41.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plato 12. delegib.
• c

  ff. Ad L. Iul. ma∣iest. & L. vnic. C. vt armorum vsus.
• d

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 1.
• e

  Hostes sunt qui∣bus publicè bellū indicitur, reliqui sunt latrunculi & praedones L. ho∣stes. ff. de captiu.
• f

  cont. Faust. Manich.
• g

  Nullum bellum est iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geritur, aut antè denunci∣arum est, & indi∣ctum. Cic. of∣fic. 1.
• h

  Caesar perlega∣tos bellum indi∣xit Ariouisto. de bel. gal. L. 1.
• a

  Li. 2. de iust hae∣ret. puniend.
• b

  Aial, de iur, bel. lib. 1.
• c

  Concil. con∣stant.
• d

  Lib. 16. c. 4.
• e

  Con. Faust.
• f

  Histoire de trou∣bl. de Fr.
• a

  Hirt de bel. Hisp.
• b

  Que ningun soldado mate mu∣ger ninno vieio ni person inhabil aunque sea en la furia del vincer so pena de la vida, ni ponga la mano in tales personas. Sancho de Lon∣dono.
• c

  What warres are lawfull.
• d

  August. lib. 22. con. Faust. Man. c. 7.
• a

  § Item ea, instia••∣de rerū diuision.
• b

  Sunt autē pri∣uata nulla natu∣ra, sed aut veteri occupatione, aut victoria. Cic. off. 3
• c

  Dion. Halic. ant. lib. 2.
• d

  Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. Seuer.
• e

  Liui. lib. 7. & 9.
• f

  Ita segnior est quis{que} praedator, vt laboris pericu∣lique praecipuam partem petere so∣le••. Liui. 5.
• g

  Liuy.
• a

  Aial. lib. 1. Leg. Reg. 19. Tit. 26. Par. 2.
• b

  Reg. 29. & 30.
• a

  Volseis ad de••••∣tionem compulsis castris{que} captis praedae pars sua cognoscentibus Latinis, & Herni∣cis reddita sunt. Liu. 4.
• b

  Sutrinis sociis vrbs corum codē die Camillo duce recepta, integra reddita est. Liu. 6.
• c

  Praeda militi concessa, pecus exceptum quod intra dies 30. do∣mini cognouis∣sent. Liu. 24.
• d

  Liu. 24.
• e

  Liu. 30.
• f

  Postliminio re∣deunt haec, ho∣mo, nauis, mulus clitellarius, equus, equa. Cic. Topic. & ff. de capt. leg. 2.
• g

  ff. codem l. ab hostibus.
• h

  ff. eodem l. Postliminium.
• i

  ff. Eodem. L. si captiuus, §. ex∣pulsis.
• k

  Transsugae.
• a

  ostendite bellū pacem habebitis: videant vos para∣tos ad vim ius ipsi remittent. Liui. 6.
• b

  Diu apparandū est bellū, utvincas celeriùs. Publius.
• c

  Antequam in∣choetur bellum, de copiis expen∣sisque solicitus fiat tractatus. Veget. lib. 3. c. 3.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Demost.
• e

  Liui. 35.
• f

  Immensa pecu∣nia inter ciuiles discordias ferro validior. Tacit. 18
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. 1.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. 2.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thu∣cid. 1.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• e

  Liu. 1.
• f

  Liu. 25.
• g

  Phil. Commi.
• h

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Olynth. 1.
• i

  Iustin.
• k

  Xenoph. exp. Cyr.
• l

  Arr. Alexand.
• m

  Liu. 9. & 43.
• a

  Philip. Com.
• b

  Plutarch. A∣popth▪
• c

  Agripro pecu∣nia dati, & in iu∣gera ••sses vectiga∣l••s impo••••ti. Li. 31.
• a

  Annibal vecti∣galia negligentia dilapsa restituit. Liu. 33.
• b

  Vec••igalia auxit & noua instituit. Liu. 39.
• c

  Pecunias impe∣rat populis omni∣bus suae d••tionis. Liu. 23.
• d

  Priuatis in ino∣pia aerarii pecuni∣as conferentibus, ita vt Scribae non sufficerent, nec remige in supple∣mentum, nec sti∣pendio ••esp. egui••. Liu. 26.
• e

  ff. de censibus.
• a

  Colonies were such townes as the citizens of Rome repleni∣shed with their owne people, and depended on the mother citie.
• b

  Thucid. 1.
• c

  S••ipendium ex∣ercitui Rom. ab hoste in cum an∣num pensum, & binae tunicae in militem exactae. Liu. 9.
• d

  Liu. 9.
• e

  Liu. 30.
• a

  Liu. 34. & 35.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. paed. Cyr. 1.
• c

  Redemptori∣bus vetitis fru∣mentum parare, bellum (inquit Cato) scipsum alet. Liu. 34.
• d

  Ne qua mulie•• plus semunica au∣ri haberet, neu vestimento ver∣si colori vteretur. Liu. 34.
• e

  Liu 39.
• f

  Ne vasa aurea ministrandis ci∣bis, ne vestis seri∣ca v••ros foe daret. Tacir▪ annal. 2.
• a

  ff. Ad l. Iul. re∣petund. lex Iu. lia.
• b

  ff. Ad l. Iul. pe∣cula••. leg. pecula∣tus.
• c

  Xenoph. exp. Cyr. lib. 5.
• d

  Plutarch.
• e

  Aerarium opu∣l••••tum ••enues res priuatas. Plutar. in vit▪ Demosth.
• f

  Peculatum quo∣rundam accusans Annibal, pecuni∣am ad stipendium Romanis inuenit. Liu▪ 33.
• g

  Auaritia & lu∣xuria ciuitatem la∣borare conque∣stus est. Liu. 34.
• h

  Impetrare ab a∣nimo non potuit Perseus, vt impen∣sam in rem maxi∣mi monumenti saceret. Liu. 42.
• a

  hic pecunia ho∣stium sine qua il∣li gerere beilum non possunt, quip∣pe qui mercenari∣os exercitus alant. Liu.
• b

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• c

  Sueui 100. mil∣lia armatorum bellandi causa su∣is ex finibus edu∣cunt, reliqui qui domi remanse∣runt, se at{que} illos alunt. Caes. bel. gal. 4.
• d

  Of armes and furniture of warre.
• e

  Lily beum tent∣batur ad appara∣tum belli. Liu. 21.
• a

  Cirea arma∣mentatia & hor∣rea, alium{que} belli apparatum visen∣dū praetor, lega∣ti{que} ducti. Liu. 29.
• b

  Apparatus in∣gens belli opisi∣ces 2000. Liu. 26.
• c

  Vibs strepebat apparatu belli. ib.
• d

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7. armorum quantū quae{que} ciuitas do∣mi, quod{que} ante tempus efficiat constituit.
• e

  Chalcis hor∣teum & arma∣mentarium Phi. lippi. Liu.
• f

  Arma habent Romani quae sibi quisque paraue∣rit pauper miles. Liu. 42.
• a

  Caesar bel. gal. 1.
• b

  Liu. 42.
• c

  Comitabatur Corbulonē prae∣ter assueta belli, magna vis came∣lorum onusta frumento, Tacit. annal. 15.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. Xeno∣phon exp. Cyr. c.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 1.
• b

  Qui frumentū neçessarium{que} cô∣meatum non pa∣rat, vincitur sine ferro. Veget. lib. 3. c. 26.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Xenoph. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 1.
• d

  Liui. 23.
• e

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• f

  Re frumentaria comparata castra mouet. bel. gal. 2.
• g

  De obsessione non priùs agen∣dum consticuit, quam rem fru∣mentariam expe∣disset. Caes. com. bel. gal. lib. 7.
• h

  Vbi instabat dies quo die fru∣mentum militi∣bus metiri opor∣ceret. Caes. com. 1. & 6. bel. gal.
• i

  Vtaduersus mo∣ras obsidionis an∣nuis copiis fir∣mentur. Tacit. an∣nal.
• k

  Disciplinam seruare non po∣test ieiunus exer∣citus. Cassiod. 4. Var. lect. c. 13.
• a

  Liu. 21.
• b

  Caes bel. gal. 7.
• c

  Eo omnes ex Italia one••ariae naues dirigebant cursum. Liu. l. 37.
• d

  Liu. l. 44.
• e

  Caesar c••rtis lo∣cis horrea consti∣tuit, frumentum conquir•• iussit. de bel. ciu. 3.
• f

  Fines hostium ingrediens fru∣mentum comme∣atus{que} in vrbem Asenam conue∣xit. Liu. 23.
• g

  Horrea noua aedificata vete••a á Scipione repleta & frumento ex population: bus & commeatu Si∣culo. Liui. 29.
• h

  Formidine po∣pulationis obsides frumentum & a∣alia quae vsui fo∣rent affatim prae∣bita. Salust. bel. Iugurth.
• i

  Peditū 10000. sibi celeriter mit∣ti voluit, quò ex∣peditiore re fru∣mentaria vtere∣tur. Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• k

  Vellaunodu∣num ne quem post se hostem re∣linqueret, quo expeditiore refru∣mentaria vtere∣tur, oppugnare instituit. ibidem.
• l

  Liu. 21.
• m

  Liu. 31.
• n

  Caes. bel. gal. 2.
• o

  Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• a

  C. Cotta Ge∣nabi rei frumen∣tariae iussu Caesa∣ris praeerat. Caes. bel. gal 7.
• b

  Le soldat vi∣nant a discretion en peu de iours af∣fame tout un pais. Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 8.
• c

  Thucid. 1.
• d

  Liu. 29.
• e

  Xenoph. exp. Cy. 1.
• f

  Salust. bell. Iug.
• g

  Phil. Commin.
• h

  Hist. de troubl.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Homer.
• b

  Non exerc••tus, neque thesauri praesidia regui sunt, verùm ami∣ci. Salust. bel. Iu∣gurth.
• c

  Circumspicie∣bant ipsi externa auxilia. Liu. 1.
• d

  Thucid. 2.
• e

  Thucid. 5. & Diodor. Sicul.
• a

  Phil. Comin.
• a

  Dum pugnant singuli, vincuntur omnes. Tacit.
• b

  Resusans le se∣cours des estran∣gers. Hist de trou∣bl. de Fran. lib. 1.
• a

  Guicciard. Hist.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Epicharm.
• c

  Liu. 1.
• d

  Guicciard. Hift.
• a

  Guicciardio.
• b

  Froissart.
• c

  Amici officio & fide partuntur. Salust. bel. Iug.
• d

  Thucid. 1. & Cic. offic. lib. 1.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• b

  Haec ratio nec amicos parit nec inimicos tollit. Liu.
• c

  Liui. 23.
• d

  Locrensibus iussu Annibalis data pax. Socie∣tas eo iure sta∣bat, vt Poenus Lo∣crensem, Poenum Locrensis pace, ac bello i••••••ret. Liu. 24.
• a

  Prima belli cu∣ra agere delectus, reuocare vetera∣nos. Tacit. 18.
• b

  Coss. dum ipsi quaestionibus im∣pedicbantur, T. Maenium dele∣ctui habēdo prae∣fecerunt. Liu. 39.
• c

  Caesar per lega∣tos M. Silanum, C. Antistium, C, Sextium dele∣ctum habere in∣stituit. Caes. com. bel. gal. 6
• d

  Froissart.
• a

  Montpensier f••tto luego tonen∣ge delre, piu sti∣mato per la gran∣dozza sua, & per esser del sangue reale, che per pro∣prio valore. Guic∣ciard. lib. 1.
• b

  Guicciar. hist.
• c

  Guicciar. lib. 4.
• d

  Summo pericu∣lo summus quae∣rendus impera∣tor, vt summo periculo summus gubernator. Liu. lib. 24.
• e

  Impudentem & gubernatorem & imperatorem esse, qui cum alie∣nis oculis ei om∣nia agenda sint, postulet sibi alio∣rum capita ac for∣tunas committi. Liu. 26.
• f

  Plutarch.
• g

  Caes. comment. bel. gal. 5.
• h

  Volsci duce Martio Coriola∣no, vincentes o∣stenderunt duci∣bus potiùs, quàm exercitu rem Rom. supetiorem ••••sse. Liu.
• a

  Liu. 9.
• b

  Pyrrhus, non Epirotae, tomanos vicit. Fabritius Plutar. apophth.
• c

  De bel. ciu. lib. 1.
• d

  Ab Ioue prin∣cipium. Arat. Phaenom.
• e

  Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.
• f

  Cic. de Natur. deor.
• a

  Liu. 5.
• b

  Liu. 2.2.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. polit. li. 5. c. 9.
• d

  Aul. gel. l. 4. c. 8.
• e

  Imperatorij muneris est castris locum capere, cō∣meatus expedire, ab insidijs praeca∣nere, tempus pug∣nae eligere, aciem instruere, subsidijs firmare. Liu. 9.
• a

  Hirt. de bel. African.
• b

  Aemilius dies noctes{que} intentus ea sola quae adid bellum pertine∣rent animo agita∣bat. Liu. 4.4.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Diodor. Si cal.
• d

  Non licetin bello bis peccare.
• e

  Froissart.
• f

  Plutarch.
• g

  Virtutes impe∣ratoris praecipuae, labor in negotiis, fortitudo in peri∣culis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in pro∣uidendo. Cic. pro leg. Manil.
• h

  Caes. bel. ciu. 1.
• i

  Appain. bel. Parth.
• k

  Cas. bel. gal. 5.
• l

  Iugurtha & praelio strenuus erat, & bonus cō∣silio, quod diffi∣cile est. nam alte∣rum ex prouiden∣tia t••morem, alt••∣rum ex audacia plerum{que} teme∣ritatem efficit. Salust. bel. Iugu••.
• a

  Facta mea non dicta sequi volo, nec disciplinam, sed exemplum à me petere. Liu. 7.
• b

  Lucan.
• c

  Foelicitas rerum gestarum exerci∣tus beneuolentiā imperatoribus, & res aduersae odi∣um conciliant. Caes. de bel. ciu. lib. 7.
• d

  Iustè non mi∣nus, quàm forti∣ter bella gerimus. Liu. lib. 5.
• a

  Cic. offic. 1.
• b

  That place was called Principia. Ius dicebat in principiis. Liu. 28.
• c

  Magni animi magnis honori∣bus fiunt. Liu. 4.
• d

  Eo impenditur labor & periculū, vnde emolumen∣tum & honos spe∣ratur. Liu. 4.
• e

  Non generis, sed virtutis est praemium. Liu. 7.
• f

  Militem iis ar∣tibus fecerat & periculi, & labo∣ris auidum. viz. By liberalitie. Liu. 9.
• g

  Caes. bel. ciu. 3.
• a

  Cic. offic. 1.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thu∣cid. 2.
• c

  Praeceps Anni∣balis in auaritiam animus ad spoli∣anda inclinans quae non poterat tueri foedum con∣silium dedit cum inceptu, tum exi∣tu. Liu. 26.
• d

  Liu. 44.
• e

  Phi. Commin. 5
• f

  Constat potu∣isse conciliari ani∣mos militum quantulacunque parci senis libera∣litate. Tacit. lib. Hist. 17.
• g

  Auaritia fidem, probitatem, cete∣ras{que} bonas artes subuertit, pro his superbiam, crude∣litatem, does neg∣ligere, omnia ve∣nalia habere do∣cuit. Salust. con∣iur. Cat.
• h

  Largitionis, praedae{que} & dul∣cedine priuati cō∣modi, sensus ma∣lorum publicorū adimebatur. Liu. 1. de Gabiis.
• a

  Cic. pro Marcel.
• b

  Veste habitu{que} vix a gregario mi∣li••e discrepans. Tacit. 18.
• c

  Tacit. 21.
• d

  Germanicus circumire sauci∣os, vulnera intu∣ens, alium spe, asi∣um gloria, cun∣ctos alloquio, & cura sibi{que} & prae∣lio ••irmabat. Ta∣cit. annal. 1.
• e

  Obsequio miti∣gantur animi. Liu.
• f

  Phil. Com. li. 7.
• g

  Liu. 4.
• h

  Liu. 25.
• i

  Xenoph. paed. Cyr.
• k

  Quint. Curt.
• l

  Plutarch. in Epaminond.
• a

  Liu. 8.
• b

  Alphons. de Vlloa.
• c

  Philip Comin.
• d

  Sueton. in vit. Caes. & Plutarch.
• a

  Cato parsimo∣nia, & vigiliis & labore, cum vlti∣mis militum cer∣tabat. Liu. 34.
• b

  Monstrabat to∣lerare labores. Lucan.
• c

  Acer militae, anteire agmen, lo∣cum castris cape∣re, noctu diu{que} consilio, ac si res posceret, manu hostibus obniti, &c. Tacit. annal. 18.
• d

  Polyb.
• e

  E cubiculo & lectulo iubebat quicquid hosti conduceret. Ta∣cit. 20. Such cap∣taines he calleth Ignaua animalia.
• a

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 3.
• a

  Consilio cum legatis, & quaesto∣re communicato &c. Caesar omnes copias castris e∣duxit. Cas. bel. gal. 4.
• b

  Priùs quàm incipias consulto, & vbi consulueris maturè facto o∣pus est. Salust. de coniur. Catil.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Thucid. 1.
• d

  Legatos, i. bel∣lici consilij aucto∣res, & muneris prouincialis mi∣nistros. Cic. in Vatin.
• e

  Thucid.
• f

  Iis delecti ex ciuitatibus attri∣buuntur, quorum consilio bellum administraretur. Caes. bel. gal. li. 7.
• g

  Omnia ibi sum∣mo consilio & ratione acta sunt. Fortuna etiam vt fit, secuta est. Liu. 5.
• h

  Concilio cele∣riter conuocato, sententias exqui∣rere caepit Galba. Caes bel. gal. 3.
• i

  Caes. bel. gal. 5.
• a

  Concilio con∣uocato de summa rerum deliberare caepit. Caes. de bel. ciu. 2.
• b

  Liu. 27.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr. 3.
• e

  Guicciar. li. 19.
• f

  Difficultà grā∣dissima d'entrar' nelle camere & nudientie del rè fe ce i Francesi o∣diosi. Guicciard. lib. 1.
• g

  Lib. 16.
• a

  Ne alienae sen∣tentiae indigens videretur, in di∣uersa ac deterioca transibat. Tac. 15.
• b

  Consilii quam∣uis egregii, quod non ipse afferret inimicus. Tac. 17.
• c

  Rumoribus & auditionibus per∣moti, de summis saepè rebus consi∣lia ineunt. Caes. bel. gal. 4.
• d

  Negauit sena∣tus ad rumores à priuatis consictos Senatusconsulta facienda. Liu. 35.
• e

  Liu. 44.
• f

  Sono venali spesso i consigli di principi. Guicci∣ard. lib. 1.
• g

  Jn molti pote∣uano assai i dona∣tiui & le promes∣se de Francesi. Guicciar. lib. 16.
• h

  Guicciar. li. 15.
• a

  Exped. Cyr. 1.
• a

  Resp. benè con∣stituta quod vnū tantum est cor∣pus plura capita habere non po∣test. Tyberius a∣pud Tacit.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Olinth. 1.
• c

  In exercitu Rom. cum duo essent Coss. pote∣state pari, quod saluberrimum est in rerum magna∣rum administra∣tione, summa im∣perii concedente Agrippa penes Quintium erat. Liu. 3.
• d

  Herodot.
• a

  Liu. 5.
• b

  Tres duces de∣lectu habito pro∣fecti sunt Veios, documento{que} fu∣ere, quam pluri∣um imperium bello inutile esset. Tendendo enim ad sua quis{que} con∣silia, cum aliud a∣lii videretur, ape∣ruerūt ad occasio∣nem locum hosti. Liu. 4.
• c

  Liu. lib. 5.
• d

  Liu. 4.
• e

  Thucid. 6.
• f

  Sleidan.
• g

  Discordia di ca∣pitani fa perdere Napoli a France∣si. Guicciar. lib. 3.
• h

  Guicciard. li. 5.
• i

  Guicciard. lib. 8.
• k

  Guicciard.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• a

  Liu. 25.26.
• b

  Magistratus mulis tabernacu∣lis{que}, & omni a∣lio instrumento militari ornaban∣tur, ne quid tale imperarent sociis. Liu. 42. & 44.
• c

  Demus imperi∣um Caesari sine quo exercitus ha∣beri, res militaris administrari non potest. Cic. Phi∣lip. Decreui impe∣rium exercitum habenti. Quid est enim sine im∣perio exercitus? Cic. Philip.
• d

  Prouinciae quā maximum potest militum numerū imperat. Caes. bel. ••al. 8.
• a

  Fuluius quia armare inuentu∣tem Celliberos andiret, & ipse quanta poterat a sociis auxilia cō∣traxerat. Liu. 40.
• b

  M. Messala & L. Pisone Coss. Senatus censuit, vti quicunque Galliam prouin∣ciam obtineret, quod commodo reip. facere pos∣set, Aeduos ecte∣rós{que} amicos po∣puli Rom. defen∣deret. Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• c

  Corbuloni re∣ges praefecti prae∣tores parere iussi; potestas data qualis Pom∣pelo bello Pyrati∣co, Tacit. annal, 15.
• a

  Olynth. 1.
• b

  Duces summi liberi impedimē∣tis omnibus, do∣mini{que} rerum tē∣porum{que} trahunt consilijs cuncta. Liu. 9.
• c

  Le commissioni di Caesare, haue∣uane espressa o ta∣cita conditione, di gonuernarhi secō∣do la varietà di tempi. Guicciard. lib. 17.
• d

  Il Triuultio an∣chora che la com∣messione del rèfus∣se che prima s' at∣tendesse alle cose de Genoa, prese il Bosco nel contado d' Alexandria. Guicciard. lib. 3.
• e

  I commanda∣menti delrè essen∣do lontano, erano più ricords, che precetti. Guicci. ard. lib. 5.
• f

  Accordà co i zuitzeri senza commessione, & salue la Francia. Guicciar. lib. 5.
• a

  Salus reip. ••••∣prema lex.
• b

  Liuy.
• c

  Liuy.
• d

  Dictator opti∣ma lege creatus, summum imperi∣um belli, pacis, paenarum, sine prouocatione ha∣bebat. Pompon. in l. 2. §. popul. ff. de orig. iuris.
• e

  Si quid frau∣dulenter dux se∣cerit, de eo tene∣bitur. L. in perso∣nam. § genera∣bile. ff. de reg. iur.
• f

  ff. ad leg. Iul. maiest. l. 1. & 2.
• g

  Imperator li∣berè ad summam imperri consulere debet. Caes. bel. ciu. 3.
• a

  Quintio libe∣rum arbitrium pa∣cis, ac belli per∣missum, Liu. 32.
• a

  Si status impe∣rij, aut salus pro∣uinciarum in dis∣crimine vertatur, princeps debet in acie stare. Tacit. lib. 4.
• b

  Tacitus.
• c

  Veteri instituto ad tribunatum nemo admitteba∣tur nisi qui alam duxisset. Veget.
• d

  In vita Adriani Lamprid.
• e

  Arian. Alex, exped.
• a

  Tribunorum munus fuit ca∣strorum & exer∣citus curam ge∣rere, ne sine mu∣nimento, aut cu∣stodiis sint, per vi∣giles excubias iu∣bere, milites di∣cto audientes ha∣bere, ad exercita∣tiones ducere, vi∣gilias circumire, frumentationibus interesse, quere∣las militum audi∣re, frumentum probare, delicta leuiora coërce∣re, valetudinario∣rum & sauciorum curam gerere, mi∣lites iuramento adigere. L. officiū §. officium ff. de re milit.
• a

  Honoris aug∣mentum non am∣bitione, sed labo∣re, ad vnumquē{que} conuenit perue∣nire. Nee debet quis ad dignitatē suffragio, sed la∣boribus at{que} or∣dine numerorum prouehi. L. con∣tra Pub. C. de re milit. lib. 12. & l. 1. & 2. Cod. de offic. magist. of∣fic.
• b

  Cic. ad Attic.
• c

  Huic ego ne{que} tribunatum, ne{que} praefecturam pe∣to. Cic. ad Caes. ep. fam.
• d

  Centuriatus palàm vendidit, ordines per seruū assignauit. Cic. in Pison.
• e

  Hirt. de bel. A∣fric.
• f

  Per sordes & a∣uaritiam Fontei∣us Capito adi∣mebat, & assig∣nabat militiae or∣dines. Tacit. 17.
• g

  Populus tribu∣nos ad 4. primas legiones dixit, re∣liquos coss. Liu. 27.
• h

  Liu. 42.
• i

  Virtutis causa in superiores e∣rant ordines hu∣ius legionis tra∣ducti. Caes. bel. gal. 6.
• k

  Exped. Cyr. 2.
• a

  Lib. 1. de re milit. c. 7.
• b

  Motus senatu Pedius Blaesus ob delectum milita∣rem pretio & ambitione cor∣ruptum.
• c

  Delectum Ba∣tauorum onera∣bant ministri a∣uaritia ac luxu, senes autinuali∣dos conquirēdo, quos pretio di∣mitterent. Tac. 20.
• a

  Neque ob mili∣tem legendum dimittendúmue aes accipiat. ff. ad leg. Iul. repetund. l.
• b

  Val. Max. li. 6. ca. 3.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Pericl. Thucid. 1.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• b

  He was called Cursor.
• c

  Vtilius est for∣tes esse milites, quàm grandes. Veget. lib. 1. c. 6.
• a

  Vt audaces sint & animum habe∣ant & considen∣tiam militarem. Veget. lib. 1. c. 8.
• b

  De bel. ciu. 3.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plutar. in Agid. & Cleo.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 2.
• e

  Nil nisi auspi∣catò gerebant. Xenop. exp. Cyr. 2. Cic. de natur. deor. 3.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenop. exped. Cyr. 1.
• b

  Honestas ido∣neum reddit mili∣tem, & verecun∣dia dum prohi∣bet fugere, facit esse victorem. Veget. lib. 1.
• c

  Non ca con∣stantia gladiato∣ribus ad praelia, quae militibus. Tacit. 18.
• d

  Opificum vul∣gus & sellularii minimè militiae idoneum genus. Liu. 8.
• e

  Ex agricolis viri fortissimi. Cato de re rust. Veget. lib. 1.
• a

  Licurg. in orat. aduersus Leocrit.
• b

  In Demost. ora. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• a

  Nummus ar∣genteus Rom. was a piece of coyne somewhat more then our vi. pence.
• b

  Vbi ad decu••i∣atum aut centuri∣atum conuenis∣sent, sua volunta∣te ipsi inter se e∣quites decuriau, centuriati pedites iurabāt, sese fugae aut formidinis ergô non abitu∣ros, ne{que} ex ordi∣ne recessuros, nisi teli sumendi aut petendi, aut ho∣stis feriendi, aut ciuis seruandi causa. Liu. 22.
• c

  Liu. 2.
• d

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 3.
• e

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 3.
• f

  Samnitium mi∣lites adigebantur iuramento, diro carmine in exe∣crationem capitis familiae & stirpis composito, nisi issent in praelium, quo imperatores duxissent, & si aut ipse ex acie fugis∣set, aut si quem fugientem vi dis∣set, non extemplo occidisset. Liu. lib. 10.
• g

  Negabat ius esse, qui miles nō sit, pugnare cum hoste. Cic offic 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• h

  Famae ac sidei maiora sunt dam∣na, quàm quae ae∣stimari possunt.
• i

  Sancho de Lond,
• a

  Infidas ven••∣lés{que} manus, ibi fas vbi maxima merces.
• b

  Polyb. lib. 2.
• c

  Liu. 24.
• d

  Liu. 23.
• e

  Liu. 23.
• f

  Qua nihil in exercitu Rom. firmum nisi ex∣ternum. Tacit. 3.
• a

  Thucid. 1.
• b

  Thucid. 4.
• c

  Guicciar. 15.
• d

  Guicciar. 2.
• e

  Froissart.
• f

  Liu. 21.
• g

  Guicciar. lib. 3.
• b

  Tacit. 20.
• i

  Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• k

  Salust. bel. Iu∣gurth.
• l

  Dimissi Galli pecuniam ingen∣tem sine labore ac periculo par∣tam retulerunt. Liu. 10.
• a

  Guicciar. lib. 2. & 12.
• b

  Impossible a manegiar li Suizzerisenza denari infiniti. Guicciar. lib 9.
• c

  Hie duitch, or Germanes.
• d

  Non fide, non affectu tenentur. Sine pudore fla∣gitii fugiunt. Tacit. in vit. A∣gric.
• e

  Guicciar. li. 13.
• f

  Guicciardin.
• g

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. po∣lit.
• a

  Guicciar. li. 14.
• b

  Tardità di pro∣ueder denari, causa de larotta de Francesi à la Bic••cca. Guiccia. 14.
• c

  Guicciar. 3.
• d

  Gente d'arme ••ardi di pagamen∣ti caminauon•• lentamente. Guic∣ciar. li. 3.
• a

  Annibal largè partiendo praedā, stipendia praete∣rita cum fide ex∣oluendo, cunctos ciuium suorum, sociorum{que} ani∣mos in se sirmat. Liu. 21.
• b

  Hinc vestes, ar∣ma, tentoria. Ta∣cit. 1. & in Po∣lyb. 6.
• c

  Liu. 2.
• d

  Tacit. annal. 11.
• e

  Aurea & ar∣gentea templotū ornamenta quae Numa consecra∣uerat, ne militi∣bus stipendium deesset, conflata sunt. Val. Max. l. 7. c. 6.
• f

  Liu. 24.
• g

  Hirt. de bel. Alexandr.
• a

  Liu. li. 9. & 10.
• b

  Decem in dies assibus anima & corpus aestimatur. Tacit. 1. It is a Roman souldiers speech there.
• c

  Alciat. de pon∣derib. & mensur.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. 3.88. Steph.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xe∣noph. exped. Cyr. 1.
• b

  Liu. 40.
• c

  Auaritia di commessarij regij fraudando il re, ne pagamenti di soldati cagione della rotta di Ga∣rigliano. Guicci∣ar. lib. 6.
• a

  Citati milites nominatim, sti∣pendium ad no∣men singulis per∣solutum. Liu. 28.
• b

  Stipendium praesens omnibus militibus daba∣tur. Liu. 23.
• c

  Liu. 2.
• a

  They call them Pagadores.
• b

  Guicciar. li. 15
• c

  Guicciar. lib. 9.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. 1.
• b

  Thucid. 1.
• a

  Tertio die in modum iustae pugnae sudibus interse concur∣rerunt. Liu. 26.
• b

  Liu. 29.
• a

  Intentior quā vnquam ••nte a muniendi, exer∣cendi{que} militem cura ducibus Volscorum erat. Liu. 4.
• b

  Liu. 23.
• c

  Liu. 34.
• d

  Liu. 24.
• e

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. exped. Cyr. 2. Xenoph.
• f

  Cassius quan∣tum sine bello dabatur, reuocat priscum morem, exercet legio∣nes. Tacit. 12,
• a

  Cae. bel. gal. 2.
• b

  In ludo mili∣tari cum veloci∣tatis & viriū cer∣tamen esset, cete∣ris par. Liu. 7.
• c

  Ferebant dimi∣diati mensis ci∣baria & vallum. Cic, Tuscul. qu. 2.
• d

  Discebant Ro∣mani tractarescu∣tum, & obliquis ictibus venientia tela deflectere. Veget. l. 1. c.4.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. polit.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. oecono∣mic.
• a

  Guicciar. lib. 8.
• b

  Confidauano Piu Chenon si do∣ueua, ne fanti d'ordonnanza del su•• dominio i Fio∣rentini. Però non si prouedeuan di soldadi e sercitati. Guicciar. lib. 11.
• c

  Pluris facienda est parua vetera∣norum manus, quàm indocta, & expers belli mul∣titudo. Veget. l. 1. c. 1.
• d

  Liu. 8 & 9.
• e

  Tacit. 3.
• Liu. 21.
• a

  Froistart.
• b

  He himselfe in that iourney tooke that sick∣nesse, whereof he died.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 2. & 3.
• d

  Vti omnes ••••∣uenirent Brundu∣sium idibus Mai∣js, Liu. 36.
• a

  Cato ad Lunae portum conue∣nire iustit. Liu. 34.
• b

  Liu. 21.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 5.
• d

  Machiauel. discors.
• e

  De bel. ciu. 3.
• f

  Hirt. de bel. A∣fric.
• g

  Partiens curas inferendi & ar∣cendi belli. Liu. 2
• a

  Caes. bel. ciu. 3.
• b

  Liu. 29.
• c

  Negando sup∣plementum vos retraxistis; saide Annibal to the Senate of Car∣thage. Liu. 30.
• d

  Hist. de bel. Afric.
• e

  Caes. de bel. ciu. lib. 3.
• f

  Caesar tabellis signatis solebat dicere quem in lo••••m petiturus esset. Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• g

  Liu. 29.
• a

  Cato nauibus contractis edixit, ad portum Pyre∣nei sequerentur. Liu. 34.
• b

  Caesar antequā in Britanniam traijceret, Volu∣senum qui omnia exploraret prae∣mittit. Caes. bel. gal. 4.
• c

  Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• d

  Eandem sedem ad cetera exe∣quenda habitu∣••us erat. Liu. 29.
• a

  Liu. lib. 23.
• b

  Liu. 31.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Thucid. 1.
• d

  Oringis arx fuit Asdrubalis ad excursiones circa in mediter∣raneos populos faciendas. Liu.
• e

  Praesidium ibi imposuit. Nam e∣rat oppidum op∣portunum ad im∣petus in Mace∣doniam facien∣dos. Liu. 31.
• f

  Liu. 45.
• g

  Liu. 21.
• h

  Paucos dies ad reficiendum mili∣tem ex iactatione maritima sump∣sit. Liu. 30.
• a

  Annibal con∣sulis consilia at{que} animum, & sitū regionum, itine∣ra{que} explorauit. Liu 22.
• b

  Caes. de bel. ciu. l. 2.
• c

  Appius Boio∣rum agros popu∣lans inexplorato, riullis{que} stationi∣bus sirmatis, cae∣sus cum legioni∣bus. Liu. 31.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 7. quo expeditiore re frumen••••rià vteretur.
• e

  Liu. 28.
• f

  Caes. de bel. ciu. lib. 3.
• g

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 1.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.
• b

  Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1.
• c

  Salapiarn fru∣mentum ex a∣gris Metaponti∣no & Heracleens•• comportat Anni∣bal. Liu. 24.
• d

  Liu. 29.
• e

  Caef. bel gal. 4. frumentum com∣portat.
• f

  Liu 38.
• g

  Froissart.
• h

  Cyr. paed. 1.
• a

  Quò expeditio∣res commeatus essent, & incerti∣or hostis quà venturum bellū foret, Fabius per Soranum agrum, Decius per Sidi∣cinum legiones duxit. Liu. 10.
• b

  Guicciar. lib. ••. & 15.
• c

  Guicciard.
• a

  Guicciard,
• 3

  Ante ora patrū ante alta moenia Troiae, The Tro∣ians were most venturous. Virg.
• 5

  Tit. Quintius vsed this simili∣tude to dissuade the Achaeans frō forreine warres. Liu.
• 6

  Thucid.
• 7

  Con le preuen∣tioni & diuersio∣ni, si vincono le guerre. Guicciar. lib. 1.
• 8

  Malum nas∣cens facilè op∣primitur. Inuere∣ratum fit plerun∣que robustius. Cic. Philip.
• 9

  Tacit. annal. 4.
• 10

  Veterem fe••ē∣do iniuriam inui∣tas nouam, Liu.
• 12

  Liu. 1.
• 13

  Latinos quasi∣nihil non conce∣dentibus Roma∣nis ferociores fe∣cit. Liu. 6. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thu∣cid. 1.
• 14

  Liu. 6.
• 15

  Liu. 7.
• 16

  Cunctati Sa∣guntinis opem ferre de Italia di∣micauimus, sayd a certaine Ro∣mane Senator.
• 17

  Cauete ne spe pacis perpetuam pacem amittatis. Cic. Philip. 7.
• 19

  Maior spes est maior{que} animus inferentis vim, quám arcencis. Liu. 21.
• 20

  Illis ignauis es∣selicet qui re∣ceptum habent, vobis necesse est fortibus viris es∣se. Liu. 21.
• 23

  S'annihila∣uan, l'entrate. Guicciar. lib. 1.
• 25

  Liu. 21.
• 26

  Liu. 24.
• a

  Guicciar. li. 16.
• b

  Fro••ssart.
• c

  Anno 1569.
• a

  Caes. bel. Gal. 1.
• b

  Caes. bel. Gal. 2.
• c

  Caes. bel. ciu. 1.
• d

  Guicciar. lib. 9.
• a

  So was it at the battell of Mon∣contour, and in the battell be∣twixt the Conte Egmont and Thermes by Graueling.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 2.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 2.
• b

  Praecedunt co∣hortes, sequitur prima legio, & medijs impedi∣mentis sinistrum latus, 19. legio &c. Tacit. 2.
• c

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 3.
• d

  Caes. de bel. gal. 2.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• b

  Caes. Bel. gal. 2.
• c

  Caes. bel. Ciu. 1.
• d

  Liui. 21.
• e

  Metellus cum expeditis cohor∣tibus, item fun∣ditorum & sa∣gitta••iorum lecta manu apud pri∣mos erat. in po∣stremo C. Marius cum equitibus curabat. in vtrū{que} latus auxiliarios equites, & permi∣stos velites dis∣pertiuerat. Sa∣lust. bel. Iugurth.
• f

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Xe∣noph exped. Cyr. 3.
• g

  Corbulo viae pariter & pugnae composuerat exer∣citum, latere dextro 3 legio, sinistro, 6 incedebat, medijs decumanorum delectis: re∣cepta inter ordines impedi∣menta: te••gum mille equi∣tes tuebantur: in co••nibus pedes sagitta••ius & c••tera manus equitum ibat. Ta∣cit. 13.
• h

  Froissart.
• a

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 7.
• b

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr.
• c

  Appian. de bel. Parth.
• a

  Plutarch. Apopth.
• b

  Liuy 22.
• c

  Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr. 1.
• d

  Froisart.
• a

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 2.
• b

  Per transfugas cognitum est, quos leuitas in∣geniorum ad co∣gnoscendas hosti∣um res in omni∣bus bellis praebet. Liui. 31.
• c

  Annibalem nihil eorum quae apud hostes ge∣rebantur fallebat & perfugis mul∣ta indicantibus, & per suos explo∣rantem. Liui. 22.
• d

  Transfugis non fidens Syllanus, speculatores ad hoftem misit.
• e

  Liui. 6.
• f

  Liuy. 30.
• g

  Pro perfugis speculandi gratia in Caesaris castra mittit. Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• h

  Liui. 29.
• i

  Scipio cum equitatu iacula∣toribúsque expe∣ditis profectus ad castra hostium, ex{que} propinquo copias quantae & cuius generis essēt speculandas, ob∣uius fit Annibali & ipsi cum equi∣tibus ad explo∣randa circa loca progresso. Liui. 21.
• a

  Equitatum omnem ad nume∣rum 4000 prae∣mittit, qui vide∣ant, quas in par∣tes hostes iter fa∣ciant. Caes. bel. Gal. 1.
• b

  Histoir. de trou. de Franc. lib. 9.
• c

  Mouerat sena∣tum maximè ma∣ris terrarum{que} re∣gionis eius situm demonstrando. Liu. 32.
• d

  Exploratò cun∣firmis{que} praesidijs tuto receptu prae∣datum ierat. Liu. 23.
• e

  Non ducem lo∣corum fuisse, non exploratorem, belluarum modo caecos in foueam missos. Liu. 9.
• f

  Liu. 31.
• g

  Vocula nec ad∣uentum hostium explorauit, eo{que} simul egressus, vi∣ctus{que} Tacit. 20.
• Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 1.
• b

  Ibidem lib. 9.
• c

  Liu. 27.
• d

  Liu. 25.
• e

  Liu. 29.
• a

  Cohortes 4 c••∣tratorum à Caesa∣ris equitibus in planitie deprehē∣sae, concisae sunt. Caes. bel. Ciu. 1.
• b

  Curio ex locis superioribus co∣pias deducens, à Iubae equitatu cir∣cumfusus occidi∣tur. Caes. de bel. Ciu. 2.
• c

  Eques leuis{que} armatura nunc ab tergo, nunc ab la∣teribus occurren∣do fatigabat mo∣rabatur{que}. Liu. 28.
• d

  Equitatu me∣lior erat Poenus & ob id campi patentes quales sunt inter Padum Alpes{que} bello gerendo Romanis apti non erant. Liu. 21.
• e

  Liu. 26.
• f

  Caesaris equita∣tu Afranianos premente, expe∣ditae cohortes extremum agmen claudebant. Caes. bel. Ciu. 1.
• a

  Caes. de bel. Ciuil. lib. 3.
• b

  Histoire de trou∣bl. de France.
• c

  Tacit. Annal.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 2.
• e

  Liu. 9.
• f

  Liu. 7.
• g

  Liu. 22.
• a

  Liu. 21.
• b

  Deleri exerci∣tus Philippi po∣tuit, sed equitem angustiae▪ ••oco∣rúm{que} asperitas, peditem a••mo∣rum grauitas im∣pedijt. Liu. 32.
• c

  Liu. 32. & 46.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 4.
• a

  Belgas nostri in flumine ag∣gressi magnam corum partem conciderunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 2.
• b

  Liu. 21.
• c

  Inopinantes & impeditos ag∣gressus magnam eorum partem concidit. Caes. bel. Gal. 1.
• d

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• e

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 9.
• f

  Heluetij naui∣bus iunctis, rati∣bús{que} compluri∣bus factis, alij va∣dis Rodani per∣rūpere conati, o∣peris munitione, & militum con∣cursu & ••elis re∣pulsi. Caes. bel. Gal. 1.
• a

  Xenoph. exp. cyr. 3.
• b

  Fossis Caesar Sycorim auer∣tens vadum fecit. Caes. bel. ciu. l. 1.
• c

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• a

  Labienus mag∣no tumultu ad∣uersa Sequana partem copiarum ducens, naues ali∣quot nactus in a∣lio loco exerci∣tum t••a luxit. Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• b

  Nauibus ex le∣ui materia & vi∣minibus corio contextis 22. mil∣lia denectis legi¦one traducta col∣lem occupat & munit, pontém∣que facit. Caes. bel. ciu. 1.
• c

  Sleidan.
• d

  Lusitani sine vtribus ad exerci∣tus non eunt. Caes. bel. ciu 1.
• e

  Caes. bel. Gal. 4.
• a

  Caes. Bel gal. 4.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• b

  Caes. bel. ciu. 1.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr. 3.
• a

  Edictum pro∣ponebatur, vt qui∣o{us} oppida, castel∣la{que} immunita es∣sent, in loca tuta commigrarent, ex agris quoque vti demigrarent om∣nes regionis eius qua Annibal itu∣rus esset, tectis pri∣ùs incensis, ac fru∣gibus corruptis, ne cuius rei copia esset. Liu. 22.
• b

  Liu.
• c

  Pabulatione & commeatu Ver∣cing etorix equi∣tatu abūdans Cae∣sarem prohibere conatus est. Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• a

  Adeo{que} inopia est coactus Anni∣bal▪ vt nisi tum fu∣g•••• speciem abe∣••ndo tim••isset, Galliam repetitu∣••us suerit. Liu. 22.
• b

  Repressus & remotus Lucte∣rius quod intrare intra praesidia pe∣riculosum puta∣bat. Caes. Bel. Gal. 7.
• c

  Vellaunodunū ne quem post se hostem relinque∣ret oppugnare instituit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 7.
• d

  Caes. Bel. Gal. 7.
• e

  Pabulatores es∣sedarijs aggressus, ne latiùs vagaren∣tur, continuit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 5.
• f

  Frumentatum exeunti Annibali diuersis locis op∣portunè aderat. Liu. 22.
• g

  Caes. Bel. Gal. 1.
• h

  Omnem equi∣tatum qui nouis∣simū agmen mo∣raretur praemisit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 2.
• i

  Hirti. de bel. Afric.
• a

  Ad crebros ••∣quitum & veli∣tum tumultus signa consiste∣bant. Liu. 28.
• b

  Caes. de bel. gal. 2.
• c

  Liu. 32.
• d

  Ne Romani abnuunt se mag∣na clade pugna∣turos. Liu. 42.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• b

  Praesidia dispo∣nebant quibus locis videbatur pontes{que} rescin∣debant fluminū. Liu. 22.
• c

  Hist. de troubl. ••e Fr. l. 3.
• a

  L. Portius Li∣cinius per loc•• alta ducendo ex∣ercitum, cum modò insideret angustos saltus, vt transitū clau∣deret, modo ab latere aut tergo carperet agmen, ludificatus est Asdrubalem om∣nibus belli arti∣bus. Liu. 27.
• b

  Caes. bel. gal. 4.
• a

  Caes. bel. ciu. 3.
• b

  Socordia & negligētia Cam∣panorum in ve∣hiculis contra∣hendis ad frumē∣rum comportan∣dum, rem ab Hā∣none composi∣tam turbauit, fa∣mem{que} quae secu∣ta est fecit. Liu. 25.
• c

  Marcellus ex∣plorato, cùm fir∣mis{que} praesidijs tu∣to receptu prae∣datum ierat. Liu. 23.
• d

  Appius cum subitarijs legioni∣bus ad popu••an∣dum Boiorum a∣grum, nec explo∣ra••ò, nec statio∣nibus firmis pro∣fectus cum legio∣nibus caesus est. Liu. 31.
• e

  Liu. 42.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 2.
• b

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• a

  Magnis itineri∣bus ita vt famam praeueniret ad Herdoneam con∣tendit. Liu. 26.
• b

  Liu. 27.
• c

  Celeritate sua hostem imparatū aggressus est. Liu. 28.
• d

  Guicciar. 1.
• e

  Puncto saepè temporis maxi∣marum rerum momenta vertun∣tur. Liu. 3.
• f

  In co victoria vertitur, si & loca opportuna & so∣cij praeoccupa∣rentur. Liu. 35.
• g

  Quintius hosti∣bus caesis 9. oppi∣dis captis vicesi∣mo die quam cre∣atus erat dictatu∣ra se abdicauit. Liu 6.
• h

  Agendum, non consultandum es∣se dixit. Liu. 22.
• a

  Consilium tu∣tum celeritas, te∣merarium saepè mora facit. Liu. 27.
• b

  Maturauit Ro∣manus ne praelio vno cum Latino, Volsco{que} contē. deret. Liu. 2.
• c

  Malum nascens facilê opprimitur, inueteratum sit plerun{que} robusti∣us. Cic. Philip. 5.
• d

  Celer poenitē∣tia sequitur prae∣cipitata consilia. Liu. 31.
• e

  Primùm cōsul∣to, posteà maturè facto opus est. Salust.
• f

  Tardae & lentoe deliberationes perniciosae. Tacit.
• g

  Cunctando se∣nescunt consilia, Liu. 35.
• h

  Belli necessita∣tes non expectat humana consilia. Liu. 4.
• i

  Dilationē pati bellum vicinum non potest. Li. 1.
• k

  Mora eius diei satis creditur fuis∣se saluti vrbi & imperio. Liu. 22.
• l

  Post victoriam Cannensē cuncta segniter, & otiosè gerebat senatus Carthaginen∣sis. Liu. 23.
• m

  Flaccus primos hostis conatus per dissimulatio∣nem aluit. Tac. 20
• n

  Bellum aluere quum si institis∣sent, egregium ti∣tulum per se li∣beratae Graeciae habere potuere. Liu. 32.
• o

  Asdrubali quod celeritate intineris profectum erat, id mora ad Placentiam, dum frustra obsidet magis quàm op∣pugnat corrupit. Liu. 27.
• a

  Pro paulula via magnā mer∣cedem. Liu. 8.
• b

  Per varias mo∣ras prima prodi∣dit hostibu•• tem∣pora belli. Tac. 18.
• c

  Inutil i cuncta∣tione agendi tē∣pora consultan∣do consumpsit. Tacit. 19.
• d

  Non expectant belli tempora moras & dilatio∣nes imperatorū. Liu. 31.
• e

  Si in occasionis momento cuius praeteruolat op∣portunitas cun∣ctatus fueris, ne∣quicquam mox amissam querà∣ris. Liu. 25.
• f

  Nobis in appa∣ratu ipso, ac tan∣tùm inchoanti∣bus res annus circumagitur. Liu. 24.
• g

  Qui euentus expectamus, prae∣da victoris eri∣mus. Liu. 32.
• h

  Vnus homo no∣bis cunctando re¦stituit rem. Enni∣us.
• a

  Casta victori receptaculum, victo persugium. multi exercitus victi eruptione pugnantes hostē pepulerunt, Liu. 44.
• b

  Sarcinas in v∣num locum con∣ferri, & cum ab ijs qui in superi∣ore acie constite∣rant, muniri ius∣sit. Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• c

  Ab opere sin∣gulis{que} legioni∣bus, singulos le∣gatos Caesar dis∣cedere, nisi muni∣••is castris vetue∣rat. bel. gal. 2.
• d

  Cas. bel. ciu. 1.
• e

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• a

  Guicelardin.
• b

  Centuriones, exploratores{que} praetermittit Cae∣sar, qui locum ca∣stris idoneum de∣ligant. Caes, bel. gal. 2.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 2.
• d

  Liu. 10.
• e

  Castra ponen∣tes Romanos Poeni aggressi sunt, turbassent{que} munientes, ni ab∣diti post tumulū opportunè ad id positi à Scipione equites in effusos incurrissent. Liu. 28.
• a

  Conte de Pur∣lilia ad Ferdi∣nand.
• b

  Caes. bel. ciu. 1.
• c

  Caes. bel. ciu. 3.
• d

  Hirt. de bel. A∣lexandr.
• a

  Guicciard.
• b

  Castra in alti∣tudinem pedum 12. vallo, fossa{que} 18. pedum muni∣uit. Caesar. bel. gal. 2.
• c

  Castra procos▪ habebat nee loco satis tuto posita, ne•• praesidiis fir∣mata. hac negli∣gentia fretus cum incautum Anni∣bal opressit. Liu. 27.
• a

  Guicciard.
• b

  Natal. com. l. 1.
• c

  Hist. de troubl. de Er. li. 7.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 5.
• e

  Guicciard. li. 5.
• f

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 6.
• a

  This happe∣ued anno 1568.
• b

  Mich. ab Islael••.
• c

  Singula latera castrotū singulis attribuit legioni∣bus munienda. Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• d

  They are com∣monly termed Opera militum.
• e

  Lesse depth & bredth wil serue, but this maketh the bankes suffi∣cient.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. paed. Cyr. 2.
• a

  Histoir. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bl. lib. 4.
• b

  Hist. de troubl. lib. 12.
• c

  Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr. 3. & 4.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• b

  Liu. 25.
• c

  Philip. Com.
• d

  Ardeates Ca∣millo duce ca∣stra Gallor••m in∣tuta neglecta{que} ab omni parte na∣cti inuadunt, nus∣quam praelium, vbi{que} caedes. Liu. 5.
• e

  Liu. 24.
• f

  Liu. 29.
• g

  Liu. 41.
• a

  Liu. 23.
• b

  Caes. bel. ciu. 2.
• c

  Froissate.
• d

  Guicciar. lib. ••.
• e

  What is re∣quired in assu∣ring our lodging
• a

  Subitò cruptio∣ne omnibus por∣tis facta, neque cognoscendi, ne∣que sui colligen∣di hostibus facul∣tatē relinquunt. Caes. bel. gal. 3.
• b

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ho∣mer.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ho∣mer. I••••ad.
• a

  Eques carpe•••• do nouis••imos premendo{que} in∣iquis ad transi∣tum locis agmen detinuit. Liu. 8.
• b

  Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 2.
• d

  Caes. bel. ••iu. ••.
• e

  Cos. vastand•••• maximè ag••is ho∣stem ad conferō∣da propius castra, dimicandum{que} a∣cie exciuir. Liu. 2.
• f

  Populatione agrorum & incē∣d••js villarum coe∣git eos eg••edi v••∣be. Liu 5.
• g

  populando at∣que vrendo rec•••• hostium sata{que} in aciem extra••••. Liu. 8.
• a

  Post quam Ro∣mulum castra po∣nere, & ad vrbem necedere Veiētes accepere, egressi sunt obuiàm, vt potiùs acie de∣cernerent, quàm inclusi de tectis moenibus{que} di∣micarent. Liu. 1.
• b

  Metellus vbi se dolis fatigari vi∣det, ne{que} ab ho∣ste copiam pug∣nandi fieri, Za∣mam statuit op∣pugnate, ratus Iugurtham subsi∣dio suis ventu∣rum. Salust. bel. Iugurth.
• c

  Scipio ad ne∣cessitatem addu∣ctus dimicandi, ne per summum dedecus Thapsi∣tanos rebus suis fidissimos, & Vir∣gilium amitteret. Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Thucid. 2.
• c

  Multa bella impetu valida pe•• taedia & mo••as e∣uanuerunt, prae∣sertim vbi non est prouisum fru∣mentum, nec ma∣iores expecta••a copiae. Tacit. an∣nal. 18.
• d

  Dictatori neu∣tiquam placebat cum nulla coge∣ret res, fortunae ••o committere ad∣versus hostem quem tempus de∣••eriorem indies, & locus alien••s faceret, sine prae∣parato comm••a∣tu, sine si••mo mu∣nimento moran∣tem: ad hoc ••js animis corpori∣bus{que}, quorum omnis in impet••¦vis esset parua e∣adem languesce∣ret mora. his cō∣siliis dictator bel∣lum trahebat. Liu. 7.
• a

  Duces consu∣etudine populi Romani, loca ca∣pere, castra muni∣re, commeatibus nostros interclu∣dere instit••unt, Romanos se rei frumentar••ae ino∣pia recipientes, impeditos agmi∣mine & sub sar∣cinis insirmiore animo adoriri co∣gitant Caes. bel. gal. 3.
• b

  Boij gens ad morae taedium minimè patiens dilapsi sunt.
• c

  Thucid. 3.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• e

  Custodias ad ripas Ligeris dis∣ponere, equita∣tum{que} omnibus locis ostentare caeperunt. Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• a

  Fuga se lon∣ginqua ab hosse tutati sunt Galli. Liu. 6.
• b

  Liu. 27.
• c

  Vercingetorix ne contra suam voluntatem di∣micare cogere∣tur, magnis i••i∣neribus anteces∣sit. Caes. bel. Gal. 7
• d

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 9.
• a

  Froissart.
• a

  Guicciandin.
• b

  Caes. bel. ciu. ••.
• c

  Veterani exer∣citus tobore rex Rom. vicit. Liu. 1.
• d

  Veteres non tam numerosos exercitus habere voluerunt, quàm eruditos. Veget. l. 3. c. 1.
• e

  Philip. Comin.
• f

  Noluit conuul∣ncrari exercitum tyronmen. Hirt, de bel. Afric.
• a

  Inde cibo cor∣pora firmare iussi, vt si longior esset pugna, viribus sufficerent. Liu. 27.
• b

  Syllanus ante pugnam militem cibum capere iu∣bet. Liu. 28.
• c

  Liu. 21.
• d

  Statuit Aemi∣lius lassitudinem & sitim sentien∣tes milites inte∣gro hostinon ob∣ijcere. Liu. 44.214.
• e

  Furius lassitu∣dini militum ti∣mens, occasio∣nem rei praeclarè gerendae omisit. Liu. 31.
• f

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Xenoph.
• g

  Sitis & calor hiantes caeden∣dos capiendós{que} Gallos praebebat. Liu. 27.
• h

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 13.
• a

  Caes. bel. Gal. ••.
• b

  Virture pares, necessi••ate supe∣riores. Liu. 21.
• c

  Nusquam nisi in virtute spes est milites, Liu. 34.
• d

  Plutarch.
• e

  Milites e loco superiore pilis missis facile ho∣stium phalangem perfregerunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 1.
• f

  Pharnaces ad∣uersus collem subiens detrudi∣tur, & vincitur. Hirt. de bel. A∣lexandr.
• g

  Temerè aduer∣so Ianiculo Ser∣uilius ad castra hostium aciem e∣rexit, soedéque inde pulsus est. sed interuentu colle∣gae ipse exerci∣tusque seruatus est. Liu. 2.
• a

  Plutarch. in vita Marij.
• b

  Hist de troubl. de Fr. l. 9.
• c

  Exiguum loci ad decliuitatem fastigium, mag∣num habet mo∣mentum. Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• d

  Hirt. de bel. Hispanic.
• e

  Romanus ce∣dentem hostem effuse sequendo in locum ini∣quum pertractus acie fusus. Liu. 6.
• f

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• g

  Liu. 21.
• h

  Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr. 4.
• a

  Histor. Ecclese ast. Theodoret.
• b

  Poeni auersi∣terga tantùm af∣flante vento, in occaecatum pul∣uere à Vulturno vento hostem pugnabant. Liu. 22.
• c

  Sol ingenti ar∣dore torrebat mi∣nimè patientia aestus corpora Gallorum. Liu. 35.
• d

  Tacit. l. 19.
• e

  Liu. 9.
• a

  Fama bellum conficit, & parua momenta in spem metúmque impellunt ani∣mos. Liu. 27.
• b

  Tacit. 19.
• a

  That word cō∣meth neerest to the sence, though not to the proper signification of the word.
• a

  Ante signa mo∣dico interuallo velites eunt. Liu. 38.
• a

  Liu. 30.
• a

  Liui. 30.
• b

  Liui. 21.
• a

  Liui. 22.
• a

  Liu. 28.
• b

  Liu. 23.
• c

  Liu. 30.
• d

  Liu. 29.
• a

  Liu. 30.
• b

  Wings were so called, for that they were placed on the sides of the battell, yet were they not so alwaies.
• c

  Liu. 31.
• a

  They were ar∣med men, so cal∣led of their aray, which was a squadron contei∣ning sometime 8000, sometime more, sometime lesse.
• b

  Liu. 37.
• a

  Tacit. 21.
• b

  Caes. bel. Ciu. 1
• c

  When the le∣gion conteined 6000 foote, eue∣rie companie consisted ordina∣rily of 600, but seldome were they complete▪
• a

  Caes. de bel. Ciu. 3.
• b

  Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• a

  Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr. 1.
• b

  Arrian. exped. Alex. lib. 3.
• c

  Frois••art.
• a

  They are the most part Pisto∣leers on horse∣backe.
• a

  Auxilia Iubae impedita ac per∣turbata, quòd nul∣lo ordine essent, & sine timore i∣ter fecerant, in fu∣gam se conjiciūt. Caes. bel. Ciu. 2.
• b

  Dum Hispani trepidant acie in∣struenda: Cos. iam paratis, ordi∣natis{que} omnibus incompositos ag∣greditur. Liu. 34.
• c

  Liu. 22.
• d

  Toto passim campo pecorum modo incompo∣sitos se fuderunt. Liu. 27.
• e

  Caes. bel. Gal. 2.
• f

  Dirigūtur acies pari vtrin{que}; spe, nec vt olim apud Germanos vagis incursibus, aut disiectas per ca∣teruas, quippe longa aduersus nos militia insue∣uerant signa se∣qui, subsidijs fir∣mari, dicta impe∣ratorum accipe∣ic. Tacit. annal. 2.
• a

  What is to be especially consi∣dered and perfor∣med before our army begin the charge.
• b

  Ex secunda acie subsidiarijs co∣hortibus in pug∣nam inductis su∣os accendit, ho∣stē fudit. Liu. 34.
• c

  Crassus tertiam aciem laboranti∣bus nostris subsi∣dio misit, ita prae∣lium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga ver∣terunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 1.
• d

  Primo praelio non subsidijs fir∣mata acie &c. concursum est. ideò Romani à Volscis premun∣tur. Liu. 2.
• a

  Caesar à dextro cornu, quod eam partem minimè firmam hostium esse animaduer∣terat, praelium commisit. Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• b

  Liu. 27.
• c

  Liu. 22.
• d

  Verti in co res videbatur vtri prius arma infer∣rent. Liu. 2.
• e

  Qui prior strin∣xerit ferrum, cius victoria erit. Liu. 24.
• f

  Lez consederez remanquet, qu'en touts lez combus passez, ils ont mi∣eulx fait charge∣ans lez premiers, que quand ils, en•• attendu la des∣marcke catho∣lique. Hist, de troubl, de Fr.
• a

  Cohorti suae dictator dat sig∣num, vt quem su∣orum fugientem viderint, pro hoste habeant. Liu. 2.
• b

  Liu. 10.
• c

  Plutarch.
• d

  Orant vt per∣culsos inuadant, nec restitui aciem sinant. Liu. 29.
• e

  Liu. 28.
• a

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 3.
• b

  Ex subsidiis quòd tardiùs successissent, & signum equitibus tardiùs datum, Cos. accusatus. Liu 35.
• c

  Victor equestri praelio rex paruo momento si ad∣iuuisset, debellare potuit. Liu. 42.
• a

  Turbasset vti∣que nouissimum agmen. Liu. 22.
• b

  Obstitit vin∣centibus prauum inter ipsos certa∣men, hoste omis∣so spolia conse∣ctandi. Tacit. 20.
• c

  Guicciar. li. 2.
• d

  Guicciar. lib. 8.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• b

  Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• a

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 13.
• b

  Ab equitibus repentè inuectis turbati sunt ordi∣nes Sabinorum. Liu. 1.
• c

  In media pri∣mùm acie vinci coepti, qua prae∣missus equitatus turbauerat ordi∣nes. Liu. 3.
• d

  Procella eque∣stris. Liu. 30.
• e

  Dictator im∣misso equitatu cùm antesigna∣nos hostium tur∣baffet legionum signa properè in∣ferri iussit. Liu. 4.
• f

  Thucid. 3.
• g

  Reliquos om∣nes equites no∣stri consecuti in∣terfecerunt. Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• h

  Maxima pars ab equitibus in flumen acti sunt. Liu. 1.
• a

  Histoire de troubl. de Fr. l. 2.
• b

  Arist. polit.
• c

  Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cy. 2.
• d

  Plutarch. in Lucullo.
• e

  Xenoph. ex∣ped. Cyr. 1.
• a

  Arrian. exped. Alex. 3.
• b

  Liu.
• c

  Cataphracti in∣habiles ad resur∣gendum humi di∣labentes cadun∣tur. Tac. annal. 17
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• e

  Xenoph. exped. Eyr. 3.
• f

  Guicciard. 1.
• a Longae hast 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in syluis & inter virgulta, non tam aptae quam pila & haerentia cor∣pori tegmina & gladij. Tacit. 2.
• a

  Nec minor Germanis ani∣mus, sed genere pugnae, & armo∣rum superaban∣tur, cum ingens multitudo arctis locis praelongas hastas non pro∣tenderet, nō col∣ligeret. Tacit. an∣nal. 2.
• b

  In the dayes of Lewis the 12. of France.
• c

  Sarissae Mace∣donicae.
• a

  Cruppellarii cō∣tinuo ferri teg. mine inferendis ictibus inhabiles dolabtis & secu∣ribus à Romani•• caeduntur. Tac. 3.
• b

  Liu. 27.
• c

  Romani tela densatis excipi∣unt scutis. Liu. 28.
• a

  Germani gene∣re pugnae & ar∣morum supera∣bantur. Tac. 2.
• b

  Britanni ingē∣tibus gladiis, & breuibus cetris, à scutatis Agricolae caeduntur. Tacit. in vit. Agric.
• c

  Hic miles tri∣pedalem parmā habet, & in dex∣tra hastas, qui∣bus eminus vti∣tur, Hispaniensi gladio est cin∣ctus, quod si pe∣de collato pug∣nandum est, tran∣slatis in laeuam hastis gladium stringit, Liu. 38. & 31.
• a

  Thucid. 4.
• b

  Liu. 24.
• c

  Thucid. 3.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 5.
• e

  Histoir. de trou∣bl. de Fr.
• f

  De long bois peu ou point. Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 7.
• a

  Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 2.
• a

  Guicciard. lib. 10.
• b

  Guicciar. lib. 11.
• c

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr.
• a

  Liu. 25.
• a

  Ad lacum A••¦uerni per specie•••• sacrificandi, re••••∣sa vt tentaret Pu∣teolos, qui{que} ibi in praesid o erant descendit. Liu. 24
• b

  Consul in Lu∣canos ostendir iter cum peteret Gall. am. Liu. 27.
• c

  Liu. 29.
• d

  Salust. bel. Iu∣gurth.
• e

  Vt ab eo quod parabat, in alteri∣us rei curam cō∣uerteret animo••. Liu. 29.
• a

  Liu.
• b

  In the dayes of Q. Marie.
• c

  Liu. l. 9. & 10.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• e

  Sp. Nautius mulos detractis clitellis, alarijs impositis circum∣duxit, quod Sam∣nitibus terrorem attulit. Liu.
• f

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 5.
• a

  Quintius di∣cens Volscotum alterum cornu fugere pepulit Volscos. Liu. 1.
• b

  Liu.
• c

  Danaûm insig∣nia nobis apte∣mus. Chorabus apud Virgil.
• d

  Hist. de troubl, de Fr. l. 12.
• a

  Metuo Danaos & dona ferentes. Virg.
• b

  Inimicorum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• c

  Persidia plus∣quam Punica.
• d

  Plutarch. Ly∣sander.
• e

  Val. max. lib. 8. c. 9.
• f

  Liu. 41.
• g

  Ad id quod ne timeatur fortuna facit, minimè turi sunt homines, quia quod neg∣lexeris incautum, atque apertum habeas. Liu. 25.
• a

  Tratato dop. pio.
• b

  Anno 1569.
• c

  Froissart.
• d

  Of ambushes.
• c

  Trahuntur ad locum insidiarū: inde subito exor∣ti Romani trans∣uersam inuadunt bostium aciem. Liu. 7.
• a

  Mago Numi∣dae{que} simul late∣bras eorum im∣prouida prouida praeter∣lata acies est, ex∣orti à tergo, in∣gentem tumul∣tum, ac terrorem fecere, Liu. 21.
• b

  Liu. 35.
• e

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. 3.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 1.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 8.
• a

  Hi••t, de bel. Afric.
• b

  Liu. 41.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 8.
• a

  Vincere scis Annibal victoria v••i nescis. sa••de Maherbal vnto him. Liu. 22.
• b

  Non minor est virtus, quàm quae∣tere, parta tueri.
• c

  Caes. debel. gal. 1.
• d

  Caes. debel. gal. 7.
• e

  Caes. debel. ciu. ••.
• a

  Caes, de bel. cin. 3.
• b

  Liu. 24.
• c

  Desperatio vl∣tima audere & experiri cogebàt Aequos. Liu. 3.
• d

  Maiorem cla∣dem nisi data via fuisset dedissent. Liu. 2.
• a

  Tam secundis quàm aduersis rebus non datur spatium ad ces∣sandum, si se Lae∣lius cum equitatu victóque Syphace Cirtham praece∣dere sinat, trepida omnia se metu oppressurum. Liu. 30.
• b

  Antium pau∣cos dies circum∣fessum deditur nulla oppugnan∣tium noua vi, sed quòd iam inde ab infoelici pugna, castrisque amissis ceciderant animi. Liu. 2.
• c

  Stratoniceam recepissent Rho∣dij post victori∣am, nisi tempus in castellis recipien∣dis triuissent. Liu. 33.
• d

  Scipio vidit dissipatum bel∣lum: & circum∣ferre ad singulas vrbes arma, diuti∣ni magis quàm magni esse operis. Liu. 28.
• a

  Id firmissimum longèimperiū est quo obedientes gaudent. Liu. 9.
• a

  Imp••rium s••∣cilè••js artibus r••∣tinetur, quibus initio partum est. Sal••st. coniur. Catilin.
• b

  Ea clade con∣territis hostium animis, vt etiam vbi ea remisissee terrore aliquo te∣nerentur, & Veli∣tris auxere nu∣merum Colono∣rum Romani, & Norbae in mon∣tes nouam Colo∣niam, quae arx in pomptino esset miserunt. Liu. 2.
• c

  Tum de praesi∣dio regionis de∣populatae agitari coeptum. itaque placuit vt duae coloniae circa Vestinum & Fa∣lernum agrum deducerentur. Liu. 10.
• d

  Propugnacu∣lum aduersus Gallos trans Padum agente••. Tacit. 9.
• e

  Thucid. 4.
• f

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thu∣cid. 1.
• a

  Plutarch. apopth.
• b

  Guicciard. lib. 1.
• c

  Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 2.
• a

  Herodot.
• b

  Liu. 8.
• c

  Regis amicos. purpuratos, du∣cés{que} exe••cituu•••• praefectós{que} na∣uium. Liu. 45.
• d

  Liu.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• b

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• c

  Vulneribus de∣festi, & pedem referre, & quod mons suberat circiter mille passuum eò sere∣cipere coeperunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 1.
• d

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• a

  Antonius cum cohortibus 12 descendens exlo∣co superiore cer∣nebatur, cuius aduentus Pom∣peianos compies∣sit, nostróque firmauit. Cael de bel. Ciu. 3.
• b

  Liui. 35.
• c

  Guicciat••.
• a

  Sauciorum & aegrorum habita ratione impedi∣menta omnia si∣lentio prima no∣cte ex castris A∣polloniam prae∣mittit, Ac con∣quiescere ante iter confectum vetuit, his vna le∣gio praesidio missa est. Caes. de bel. Ciu. 3.
• b

  Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 5.
• a

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• b

  Pottas obstruit, vias platealque inaedificat, s••s••ar transuersas vijs perducir, ibique sodes, stipiésque praeacutos defi∣gir, haec ciatibus teria{que} ina quat, aditus ad portus maximis trabibus praesepit. Milites silentio naues conscendunt. ex∣pediti ex euocati•• & sagittarijs in muro collocan∣tur, quibus certo loco actuarias na∣ues relinquens signo dato reno∣cat. Caes. de bel. Ciu. 1.
• c

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• d

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr.
• e

  Caes. de Bel. Ciuil. lib. 1.
• a

  Philippus in∣tra Tempe stati∣uis positis, vt quisque locus ab hoste tentabatur, praesidia per oc∣casiones summit∣tebat. Liui. 31.
• b

  Caes. de bel. Ciu. 3.
• c

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• d

  Charles duke of Burgundy by ambassadors sent to Lewis the 11 of France, coue∣red the losse re∣ceiued at Morat. Phil. comm.
• e

  Liu. 23.
• a

  Liu. 31.
• a

  Thucid. 2. Two thousand talents of Athens passe that summe.
• b

  Carteiam vrbē opulentam caput gētis eius expug∣nat, diripit{que}. quo metu perculsae mi∣nores ciuitates sti∣pendio imposito imperium acce∣pere. Liu. 21.
• c

  Taurinum ca∣put gentis expug∣nat. Liu. 21.
• a

  Liu. 7.
• b

  Caes. de bel. Gal. 7.
• c

  Non facile est simul misereri, & sapere.
• d

  Caes. bel. Gal. 8.
• e

  Thucid. 1.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. Thucid. 2.
• b

  Thucid. 1.
• c

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Thucid. 1.
• d

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• e

  Vallo pe••um 12 in circuitu 15 millium, crebris∣cum castellis cir∣cummuniti erant Aduatici. Caes. bel. Gal. 2.
• a

  Fossa & vallo vrbem circum∣dat, castella ex∣citat modicis in∣teruallis. Liu. 25.
• b

  Caes. bel. Gal. 5.
• a

  Liu. 2.
• b

  Froissart.
• a

  Duae legiones semper pro ca∣stris excubabant. Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• b

  Caes. bel. Gal. 2.
• c

  Philip Comi∣nes.
• d

  Polyb.
• e

  Thucid. 5.
• a

  Capua obsideri caepta, quae{que}ue in eam rem opus erant, compor∣tabantur. Casili∣num frumentum conuectū, ad vul∣turni ostium ca∣stellum commu∣nitum, vt & mare, & flumen in po∣testate essent. Liui 25.
• b

  Qu. Cur. lib. 4.
• c

  Guicciard. lib. 5.
• d

  Multa magnis ducibus, vt non aggredienda, sic non deserenda. Liui. 24.
• e

  Guicciard. lib. 6.
• a

  Perseuerantia in omni genere militiae maximè tamen in obsi∣dendis vrbibus necessaria est, quatum pleras{que} munitionibus ac naturali situ inex∣pugnabiles, fame sitique ipsum tempus vincit, ex∣pugnat{que}. Veget.
• b

  Guicciard.
• a

  Trattato Do••∣pio.
• b

  Liu. 43.
• c

  Guicciard. lib. 3.
• a

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 5.
• b

  Liu. 5.
• c

  Liu. 4.
• a

  Liu 8.
• b

  Alphonso d' ••••∣loa.
• c

  Liu. 24.
• d

  Philip. Com.
• e

  Thucid.
• a

  Guicciar. li. 10.
• b

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 10.
• c

  Liu. 35.
• a

  Histoire de troubl. de Fr. l. 5.
• b

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 10.
• c

  Guicciar. li. 2.
• d

  Guicciar. lib. 1.
• e

  Liu. 35.
• a

  Liu. 36.
• a

  Liu.
• a

  Hirt. de bel. A∣lexand.
• b

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr.
• c

  Caes. de bel. gal. 7.
• d

  Liu. 2.
• e

  Liu.
• f

  Guicciar. hist.
• a

  Sub musculo milites vectibus infima saxa turris hostium conuel∣lunt. Caes. de bel. ciu. 2.
• b

  Annibal 500. Afros cum dola∣bris ad subruen∣dum ab imo mu∣rum mittit. Liu. 21.
• c

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr.
• d

  Liu. 24.
• e

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr.
• a

  Liu. 21.
• Liu. 25.
• c

  Corona cinxit vrbem omnibus copiis admotis. Liu. 10.
• d

  Romani signo dato pars eminùs glande aut lapi∣dibus pugnare, a∣lii succedere aut murum suffodere, & scalis aggredi. Salust. bel. Iu∣gurth.
• e

  Liu. 32.
• f

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 1.
• g

  Liu. 29.
• h

  Liu. 2.
• i

  Agger ab vni∣uersis coniectus, & ascensum dat Gallis, & quae in terram occulta∣nerant Romani, contegit. Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• a

  Vt quis{que} in∣trauerat eques, ad forum occupan∣dum citato equo pergebat, addi∣tum erat & tria∣riorum equiti praesidium. Liu.
• b

  Inde signo da∣to milites discur∣runt ad praedam. Liu. 25.
• a

  Histoir. de trou∣bl. de Fr. l. 13.
• a

  Cas. de bel. ciu. 1.
• b

  Se ipsos con∣seruaturum dixit Caesar, si prius∣quam aries mu∣rum tetigisset, se dedissent. Caes. de bel. gal. 2.
• c

  Nec temerè suscipienda eotū defensio est, quae tueri non potes, nec temerè dese∣renda, quae tueri potes. Liu. 34.
• a

  Cetera pra••l∣diis firmâ••unt. Liu. 34.
• b

  Liu.
• c

  Trans••untib•••• Romanis clau∣stra à fronte & tergo deseruit. Liu. 44. & 45.
• d

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• e

  Caes. bel. gal. 7.
• f

  Caes. bel. gal. ••.
• a

  Liu. lib. 2.
• b

  Tacit.
• c

  Thucid. 1.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. ••.
• b

  Caes. bel. ciu. 8.
• c

  Paucis diebu∣per licentiam ab∣sumpta sunt, quae aduersus necessi∣tates in longa suffecissient. Ta∣cit. annal. 20.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. ••.
• b

  Popilius Strati positus in praesi∣dio claues porta∣rum, custodiam{que} murorum suae ex∣templo potestatis fecit. Liu. 43.
• c

  Thucid. 4.
• a

  In eo spem po∣ne nihil moturos Hetruscos, si ne quid mouere pos∣sint praecaueris. Liu. 27.
• b

  Nolani muros portas{que} adire ve∣titi. Liu. 23.
• c

  Transfugae ne•• adire muros, nee alloqui quem∣quam passi sunt. Liu. 25.
• d

  Salust. bel. Iu∣gurth.
• e

  Liu. 32.
• f

  Casilinum inter colloquia cun∣ctationem{que} pe∣tentium fidem per occasionem captum est Mar∣cello portam oc∣cupante. Liu. 24.
• a

  Liu. 25.
• b

  Caes. bel. gal. 5.
• c

  Thucid. 3.
• d

  Guicciardin.
• e

  Liu. 26.
• a

  Phil. Comines.
• b

  Liu. 23.
• c

  Diaphanes A∣chaeus stationem Antiochi regis ad Pergamum inuadens semi∣somnem nullis stratis equis aut peditibus paratis fudit. Liu. 37.
• d

  The Italians call it Via co∣perta.
• a

  The counter∣scarpe is the banke that is made all along without the ditch of the fortresse.
• b

  Casemates are defences of earth within ditches or trenches, where the souldiers lie couered, to shoote at those that present themselues vnto them.
• a

  Thucid. 2.
• b

  Frumenti quod inuentum est in publicum con∣ferunt. Caes. bel. Ciu. 1.
• c

  Laqueis falces auet tebant. Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• d

  Transuersis cu∣niculis hostium cuniculos exci∣piebant. Liu. 23.
• e

  Caes. bel. Gal. 2.
• f

  Zamenses saxa voluere, sudes, pi∣la, picem, & sul∣phure taedam mixtamardenti mittebant. Salust. bel. Iugurth.
• a

  Thueyd. 1.
• b

  Histor. de troubl. de Fr. li. 5.
• c

  Hetruscos ca∣stra circumdan∣tes vigilia quarta erumpens in stra∣tis sternit, reli∣quos fudit, Liu. 9.
• a

  Liu.
• b

  Liu. 24.
• c

  Liu. 24.
• d

  Liu. 34.
• e

  Liu. 43.
• a

  The cortine of the wall is that distance or part of the wall that is betwixt bul∣warke and bul∣warke, turret & turret, for that it is spred for the couering of the towne.
• a

  Ad aequales an∣gulos, or ad per∣pendiculum.
• b

  The Italians call it Orecchion or Spalla del Bel∣nardio.
• a

  These Caua∣liers are terrasses of earth built without, or with∣in the walles. So called because they looke ouer the walles.
• a

  Guicciard.
• a

  Ala equitum Numidarum prae sidio Salapiae re∣licta eruptionem tentauit. Liu. 26.
• b

  Thucid. 3.
• c

  Acerrani de∣sperata tutela vr∣bis, vbi circum∣uallari vrbis moenia vide∣runt, priusquam continuarentur hostium opera, per inte••missa munimenta, neg¦lectás{que} custodias silentio noctis di∣lapsi sunt. Liu. 23
• d

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• a

  Publius Sitius ciuitatum obses∣sarum quae con∣ditiones oblatas recusarant ciues interficit. Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• b

  Liui. 23.
• c

  Liui. 32.
• a

  Hist. de troubl. lib. 10.
• a

  Baltazar Ayala de iure belli.
• b

  Hist de troubl. de Franc.
• a

  Guicciard.
• b

  Phil. Comines.
• c

  Anno 1577.
• d

  Liu. 24.
• e

  Sleidan.
• f

  Guicciard.
• a

  Thucid. 1. Exorat. Periclis.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 6.
• a

  Classem trium rerum causa pa∣rauimus, vt Afri∣cae oram popula∣retur, vt tuta no∣bis Italiae litota eslent: ante om¦nia ne supplemē∣tum cum stipen∣dio, commeatu{que} a Carthagine Annibali trans∣portaretur. Liu. 24.
• b

  C. Laelius nocte ad Hipponē Re∣gium cùm acces∣sistet, luce prima ad populandum agrum sub signis milites socios{que} nauales duxit. Omnibus pacis modo incuriosè agentibus magna clades illata. Liu. 29.
• c

  Liu. 25.
• d

  Liu. 27.
• e

  Vrbem tene∣bat regium prae∣sidium, agrum circa depopulati sunt Romani ex∣scēsione ex naui∣bus facta Liu. 37.
• f

  Thucid. 3. & 4.
• a

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 2.
• b

  Thucid. 1.
• e

  Caesar inter saxa quietam na∣ctus stationem, milites exposuit Pompeianis om∣nia tenentibus. Caes. bel. ciu. 3.
• d

  Thucid.
• e

  Liu. 34.
• a

  Classem para∣tam, instructam∣{que} ad commeatus intercipiendos habebant. Liu. 30.
• b

  Toto mari pulsis hostium nauibus magni commeatus fru∣menti Romam subuecti sunt. Liu. 28.
• c

  Liu. 21.
• d

  Carthaginen∣ses speculas per singular promon∣toria ponebant. Liu. 29.
• e

  Omnia oppida maritima praesidi∣is firmauit. Liu 35.
• f

  Thucid. 1.
• a

  Vbi omnes iam in nauibus erant, scaphas circum∣misit, vt ex omni∣bus nauibus gu∣bernatores & magistri nauium & bini milites, in forûm conueni∣rent ad mandata accipienda. Li. 29
• b

  Liu. 29.
• c

  Liu. 31.
• d

  Formidolosum dictitans impera∣tori quo prohi∣bentur plerun{que} conatus honesti. Tacit. annal.
• e

  Romani pala∣ti, & praeda gra∣ues interficiun∣tur, & ad naues compelluntur. Liu. 27.
• f

  Cum multa caede & foeda fu∣garetrò ad naues compulsisunt. Liu. 22.
• a

  Alexandrinis imminentibus, nullus dabatur in naues recep∣tus. Hirt. de bel. Alex.
• b

  Caes. bel. ciu. 2.
• c

  Liu. 41.
• d

  Omnia prae∣properè agendo militum appara∣tu nautica mini∣steria impediun∣tur: trepidatione nautarum cape∣re & aptare arm•• miles prohibetur. Liu. 22.
• e

  Liu. 10.
• a

  Hirt. de bel. Hispanico.
• b

  Ibidem.
• c

  Thucid. 3.
• d

  Thucid. 5.
• e

  Froissart.
• f

  Liu.
• g

  Caes. de bel. ciu. 2.
• a

  Turres excita∣bant in nauibus, vnde in hostium naues altiores transcendebant. Caes. de bel. gal. 3.
• b

  Vna erat mag∣no vsui res prae∣parata à nostris falces praeacutae insertae, affixae{que} longuriis, quibus funes abrumpe∣bant. Caes. bel. gal. 3.
• c

  Poenus vt soci∣is naualibus affa∣tim instructam classem, ita ino∣pem milite habe∣bat. Extemplò 7. punicae naues cir∣cumuentae, fugam ceterae coeperunt. Liu. 20.
• a

  Guicciard. hist.
• a

  Liu.
• b

  Thucid. 3.
• a

  Thucid. 1.
• b

  Liu. 36.
• c

  Natal. Come••.
• d

  Remigem mi∣litem{que}; simula∣chris naualis pug∣nae exercebat. Liu. 35.
• a

  Omnia quae a∣gimus subiecta mille casibus Scipio apud Liu. 30.
• b

  Mars belli cō∣munis, vtrinque ferrum, vtrinque humana corpora crunt. Nusquam minus quàm in bello euentus re∣spondet. Annibal apud Liu. 30.
• c

  Verbis pax nunciabatur ce∣terùm re asperri∣mum bellum e∣rat. Salust. bel. Ingurth.
• d

  Per darli colpo mortale. Guicciar.
• e

  Pompeius ab Augusto imagine pacis deceptus; Lepidus amicitiae specie. Tacit. an∣nal. 1.
• f

  Ex mentione & spe pacis neg∣ligentia, vt fit, a∣pud Paenos orta crat. Liu. 29.
• a

  Philippus de pace agendo ni∣hil aliud nisi mo∣ram & dilation•• ad vires colligen∣das qu••••rebat. Liu. 32.
• b

  Thucid. 1.
• c

  Caes. bel. gal. 4.
• d

  Salust. bel. Iu∣gurth.
• e

  Liu. 29.
• f

  Legati per spe∣ciem pacis peten∣dae speculatum ad L. Aemilium venerunt. Liu 40
• g

  Tacit. annal. 2.
• h

  Guicciard.
• i

  Perseus ni vana spes pacis occae∣casset consilia, omnia praepara∣ta, atque instru∣cta habens, cùm nihil haberent Romani, & suo maximè tempo∣re, at{que} alieno hostibus incipere bellum potuit. Liu. 42.
• k

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Thu∣cid. 1.
• a

  Guicciar. li. 4.
• b

  Cosa facile a Principi di iusti∣ficar imprese con titoli Ch'apparis∣con•• honesti. Guicciar. 16.
• c

  Principi si ri∣conciliono piu to∣sto conle dimo∣strationi che con li effetti. Guiciar. lib. 1.
• d

  Si integer quā si victus, pacem aequiorem impe∣trari posse ratus est. Liu. 30.
• a

  Histoir. de trou∣bl. de Fr. l. 3.
• b

  Guicciar. li. 10.
• c

  Nunquam cau∣sa deerit cur vi∣cti pacto non stent. Liu. 9.
• d

  Guicciar. lib. 8.
• e

  Guicciar. lib. 2.
• a

  Vae victis. Brē∣nus apud Plut. in vita Camilli.
• b

  Transfugas. Liu. 3••.
• a

  Liu. 8.
• b

  Liu. 33.
• c

  Liu. 38.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Thucid. 1.
• e

  Liu.
• f

  Philip. Com.
• g

  Data vltrò ci∣tro{que} fide cosdē amicos inimicos∣{que} habituros iu∣reiurando affir∣matur. Liu. 29.
• a

  Liu. 23.
• b

  Guicciar. li. 3.
• c

  Guicciar. li. 8.
• a

  Guicciar. lib. 5.
• b

  Liu.
• c

  Phil. Commin.
• d

  Liu. 4.
• e

  Florus.
• f

  2. Reg. 20.
• g

  Phil. Comm.
• a

  Liu. 42.
• b

  Quò diligen∣tiùs in reliquum tempus ius Lega∣torum à barbaris conseruaretur, omnem senatum Caesar necauit, re∣liquos sub coro∣na vendidit. Caes. bel. gal. 3.
• c

  Qui Legatos Carthaginensiū pulsauerant, Car∣thaginensibus traditi. Liu. 38.
• d

  Val. max. l. 6.
• e

  Liu. 1.
• f

  Bodin. de la re∣pub. l. 1.
• g

  Bello sociali.
• h

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 4.
• b

  Froissart.
• c

  Lin. lib. 2.
• d

  Dionis. Halic. lib. 6.
• e

  Doctores in L. vlt. ff. de legati∣onibus.
• a

  Phil. Comin.
• a

  Magni animi magnis honori∣bus siunt. Liu. 4.
• b

  Eo impenditur labor & pericu∣lum, vnde emo∣lumentum atque honor speratur, nihilque non ag∣gressuri sunt ho∣mines, si magnis conatibus magna praemia propo∣nantur. Liu. 4.
• c

  Honos alit ar∣tes &c. iacent{que}; ea semper quae apud quosque improbantur. Cic. Tuscul.
• d

  Demosth. ad∣uers. Leptin.
• e

  Neque domus, neque resp. stare potest, si in ea nec rectè factis prae∣mia extant vlla, nec supplicia pec∣catis.
• f

  Statua in com∣itio posita, agri quantum vna. die circumarauit, da∣tum. Liu. 2.
• g

  Mutio Scaeuolae ager trans Tybe∣rim virtutis cause datus. Liu. 2.
• h

  Liui. 7.
• i

  Liu. 10.
• a

  Caesar S••aeuam ad primipilū tra∣duxit, 2000 aeris dedit, cohortem duplici stipen∣dio, & frumento donauit, & aliis militaribus do∣nis. Cas. de bel. ciu. 3.
• b

  Liu. 26.
• c

  Liu. 29.
• d

  Agri veteribus mil••tibus qui auspicio Scipio∣nis in Africa bellum perfe∣cissent diuisi. Liu. 31.
• e

  Romulus mi∣litibus agros captos diuisit. Dionis. Halic. l. 2.
• f

  L. in agris. ff. de acquir rer∣domin.
• g

  Hac dextra mihi tres consu∣latus summám∣que laudem pe∣peri. Liu. 7.
• h

  Non generis sed virtutis est praemium. Liu. 7.
• i

  Senatores le∣cti ex ijs qui spolia ex Rom. hoste sixa domi haberent, aut ciuicam coro∣nam accepis∣sent. Liui 23.
• k

  Liui. 6.
• l

  Praedam. coss. vendiderunt di∣uiserúnt que. Liu. 25.
• m

  Data ex prae∣da militibus aeris octogeni bini, sagáque & tunicae, praemia illa tempestate haudquaquam spernenda. L. 10.
• n

  Tacit. annal. 3.
• o

  Constantinus filios in paternam militiam vocabat. l. 1. & 2. C. de fil. off. militis. 12.
• p

  Liu. 23.
• a

  Liu 23.
• b

  Ager Hispani•• in Hispania, Nu∣midis in Africa post bellum vir∣tutis causa datu•• est. Liu. 23.
• c

  Largitionibus corrumpitur mi∣litaris disciplina. Hirtius de bel. Alex.
• d

  Eurip. Hecuba.
• e

  Procliuius est iniuriae, quàm be∣neficio vicem ex∣soluere. Tac.
• a

  Diogen. Laert.
• b

  Abscisso & a∣spero castigatio∣nis genere disci∣plina militaris in∣diget. Liu.
• c

  L. poenae. ff. de re milit.
• d

  Ne discrimen omne virtutis, & ignauiae pereat. Liu. 24.
• e

  Ita bello gesto praemio poená{que} pro cuiusque me∣rito persolutis Romam rediere. Liu. 8.
• f

  M. Postumius quòd eius ductu & culpa malè ad Veios pugna∣tum erat, decem millibus aeris damnatur. Liu. 4.
• a

  Summae dili∣gentiae summam seueritatem addit Vercingetorix. Caes. de bel. Gal. 7
• b

  Thucid.
• c

  Caualier Ci∣cuta.
• d

  Se debrian pro∣mulgar algunos estatutos con cuya osseruantia los soldados particu∣lares, y priuados no hisiessen desor∣den alguna. Sanch. de Lond.
• e

  Puis auoir fait quelques ••ix mi∣litaires, & sta∣tuts politics firent iurer la noblesse, soldats, & autres de les entretenir inutolablement. Histoir. de troubl. de Fr. l. 4.
• a

  Res militaris legibus in tuto collocata. L. 1. Cod. de Iustin. cod. confirmand.
• b

  Scipio minor militarem disci∣plinam reuocans pulcherrimam tulit de Hispanis victoriam. Plor. epit. Liu. l. 58.
• e

  Metellus ad∣iumenta ignauiae sustulit, &c. Sa∣lust. bel. Iugurth.
• d

  Legiones Cor∣bulo operum, & laboris ignaras populationibus laetantes ad ve∣terem morem reduxit. Tacit.
• a

  Sacerdotio au∣gurum tantus ho∣nos accessit, vt nihil belli, do∣mique postea, nisi auspicatò ge∣reretur. Liui. 1.
• b

  Liui. 22. & 23.
• c

  Romani bello Philippo indicto à precatione, & re diuina inchoa∣runt. Liui. 31.
• d

  Res diuinas fa∣ciebant, & sup∣plicationes. Liui. 36.
• e

  Praetor extem∣plò edixit, vt aedi∣tui sacras aedes tota vrbe aperie∣rent, vt salutandi Deos agendique gratias per totum diem, populo po∣testas fieret. Liui. 30.
• f

  Q. Fabius Max. ab dijs ex∣orsus edocuit pa∣tres plus negli∣gentia caeremo▪ niarum, auspicio∣rumque temeri∣tate, quam in∣scitia peccatum à Flaminio esse. Liui. 22.
• g

  Intuemini ho∣rum deinceps an∣norum vel se∣cundas vel se∣cundas res, vel aduersas, inuenie∣tis omnia pros∣pera euenisse se∣quentibus Deos, aduersa spernen∣tibus Liui. 5.
• h

  Rerum huma∣narum maximum momentum est, quam propitijs rem quam aduer∣sis agant dijs. Li∣ui. 9.
• i

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 5.
• a

  Priùs quàm ab vrbe moue∣runt, prodigia procurarunt. Liui 24.
• b

  Dij deae{que} quae maria coli∣tis, vos precor, quaeso{que} quae in meo imperio gerentur ea mihi, populo, plebíque Romanae, socijs, nominique La∣tino &c. bene verruncent, ea{que} vos omnia bene iuuetis, sal∣uos victis perduellibus domos reduces sistatis. Liui. 29.
• c

  Supplicatio circa omnia puluinatia decreta. Liui. 27.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thucid. 2.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 3.
• b

  Caes. bel. Gal. 1. & 4.
• c

  Que ningun s••ldado p••nga las manos en ningun sacerdote, o reli∣gioso, ni le tratarè mal'de palabra, so pena de ser casti∣gado ala calidad del delicto, Sanch. de Lond.
• a

  Ningun solda∣do rintegue, ni bla∣spheme, so pena porla primera vez de treinta pias d•• drision, por la se∣conda vez sesenta, de mas de ser tra∣hido a la verguen∣ca c••n vna morda∣za a la lengua, y por la tercera, pue∣sto en Galera per∣petua, ••a volun∣dad. Sanch. de Lond.
• b

  Que ning•••• soldado iuegue a iuegos illicitos. Sanch. de Lond.
• c

  Que ningu•••• soldado tenga in casa muger s••∣spechosa &c. San. de Lond.
• a

  Liu. 28.
• b

  Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 1.
• c

  Tacit. 1. & l. 3. § in bello. ff. de re milit.
• d

  Supra 70 No∣lanos damnatos proditionis, quod colloquia cum hoste habuissent, securi percussit. Liu. 24.
• e

  Liu. 28.
• f

  Tacit.
• g

  Qui atrocē mi∣litum seditionem concitat capite plectendus est. l. 1. ff. ad leg. Iul. maiest. sin verò intra vociferatio∣nem & leuē que∣relam seditio mo∣ta sit, gradu mili∣tiae dejiciendus est. l. 3. ff. de re milit.
• a

  Liu. 28.
• b

  Hirt. de bel. Afrie.
• c

  Sueton. in Cae∣sar.
• d

  Paul. Iouius.
• e

  Tacit. ••.
• f

  Liu. 25.
• g

  Lege Iulia ma∣iestatis tenetur, qui arcem nó te∣nuit, aut castra hostibus conces∣sit. l. 3. ff▪ ad leg. Iul. maiest.
• h

  Praesidio dece∣dere apud Roma∣nos capitale. Liu. 24.
• i

  Qui Vaccam a∣miserat condem∣natus verberatús∣que poenas capite soluit. bell. Iu∣gurth. Salust.
• k

  Val. max. l. 2. c. 7.
• a

  Polyb.
• b

  Liu. 27.
• c

  Iustin.
• d

  Expedit. Cyr. Xenophon.
• a

  Solus dux ex∣ercitus missio∣nem dare potest. l. 1. ff. de his qui notantur infam.
• b

  De perfugis grauiùs, quàm de fugitiuis consul∣tum, nominis La∣tini qui erant se∣curi percussi, Ro∣mani in crucem sublati. Liu. 30.
• c

  Perfugae om∣nes virgis in co∣mitio caesi, ac de saxo deiecti. Liu. 24.
• d

  Volens trans∣fugere qui depre∣hensus est capite punitur. l. deser∣torem ff. de re¦milit.
• e

  Liu. 23.
• f

  Tacit. 18.
• a

  Liu. 5.
• b

  l. Qui excubias ff. de re milit.
• c

  Plutarch. in Epaminonda.
• d

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 5.
• e

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 11.
• f

  Philip. Co∣mines.
• g

  Caes. bel. Gal. 7.
• h

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Homer. 3.
• a

  Liu. 24.
• b

  Dictator signi∣ferum cunctan∣tem signum vt iussus erat infer∣re, occidit. Liu. 4.
• c

  Que si algun sol∣dado hiriere a al∣gun officiale espe∣cialmente su su∣perior muera por¦ello.
• a

  Stipendio equi∣tes fraudātes Cae∣sarem veriti trans∣sugerunt. Caes. bel. Ciu. 3.
• b

  Guicciard. l. 9.
• c

  Guicciard. l. 15.
• d

  Guicciard. l. 17.
• e

  Liu. 28.
• a

  Que se Huuie∣ren de Leuar vanderas a las guardias vayan los capitanes, offi∣ciales, y^• soldados con todas sus ar∣mas en orden, pena de castigo arbi∣trario.
• b

  Eam fraudem noctes, ac dies perstando in ar∣mis vitastis. Liu. 24.
• c

  Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 8.
• d

  Scipio Roma∣num extra ordi∣nem deprehen∣dens vite, extra∣neum fuste cae∣debat. Flor. E∣pit. Liu. 58.
• e

  Siquis extra or∣dinem auidiùs procurrit, & ipse interequitans sparo percutit, & tribunos, cen∣turiones{que} casti∣gare iubet. Liu. 34.
• f

  Samnitium e∣quites auiditate praedae impetum faciunt in impe∣dimenta; iis prae∣pediti caesi sunt. Liu. 8.
• g

  A procursatio∣nibus quaemultae temerè inter mu∣rū & vallū fiebāt, edicto ne quis in∣iussu pugnaret, ad opus milites traducti. Liu. 5.
• h

  Papyrius vin∣centem magistrū equ••tum quòd iniussu pugnaue∣rat, caederevolu∣it. Liu. 8.
• a

  Que ningun soldado vaya a correre sin ordeny licencia de quin si la pudiere dar∣que ningun solda∣do traue escara∣muza, o vaya a saccomanno sin orden so pena da to castigo arbi∣trario. Sanch. d•• Lond.
• b

  Arma in bello alienare, aut a∣mittere, capitale. l. 3. § miles ff. de re milit.
• c

  Appius armis amissis fugientes milites verborum insuper addita contumelia securi percussit. Liu. 2.
• d

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• e

  Aemil. prob.
• f

  Arma tersa sint, ferramenta sana. Vopisc. in Aurelian.
• g

  Arma habeat miles apta cor∣pus pernix. Liu. 44.
• h

  Que ningun soldado sin legiti∣mo impedimento dexe de lleuar, en la orden todas las armas, con que estuuiere obliga∣do a seruir s•• pe∣na de ser sacado de la hilera Vergō cosamente.
• i

  Exercitum cō∣sul infrequentem commeatibus datis per abitio∣nem culpabat. Liu. 40.
• k

  Liu. 40.
• a

  C. Matienus quòd exercitum in Hispania de∣seruisset, sub fur∣ca caesus nummo sestertio veniit, Florus 55. l. epit. Liu.
• b

  Liu. 2.
• c

  Cohortibus quae signa amise∣rant hordeum dari iussit, centu∣riones{que} manipu∣lorum quorum signa amissa fue∣rat, districtis gla. dijs discinctos destituit. Liu. 27.
• d

  Caes. bel. ciu. 3.
• e

  Appian. Alex.
• f

  Vexillarium fu∣gientem transuer. berauit hasta. Ta∣cit. 19.
• g

  Guicciard 1.
• h

  Liu. 8.
• i

  Caesar à militi∣bus contendit, ne in praeda occupa∣ti reliqui negotij gerendi facultatē dimitterent. Caes. de bel. ciu. 3.
• k

  In bello saepiùs vindicatum est in eos, qui contra imperium in ho∣stem pugnaue∣rāt quàm qui sig∣na reliquere, aut pulsi loco cedere ausi sunt. Salust. coniur. Catil.
• l

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A∣rist. thetoric. 2.
• a

  Caes. bel. gal. 5.
• b

  Aemilius cum clamoribus om∣nia confunderen∣tur tribunos mi∣litum Primipilo legionis secretū edere imperium iussit, singulos proximo cui{que} dicere. Liu. 44.
• c

  Que ningun soldado gritte. ni hable en la ord••n. &c. so pena de ser sacado de la hilera vergonço∣samente. Sancho de Lond.
• d

  Veget.
• e

  Que ninguna persona de arma falsa sin' erden ded que se la pudiere dar, so pena de la vida.
• f

  In l. 18. & 19.
• g

  Commilitonē gladio ferire ca∣pitale erat, lapide percutiens mili∣tia reijciebatur. l. 3. §. qui alie∣na. ff. de re milit.
• a

  Qualquiera persona que hizie∣re o fixare carte∣les o dixiere pala∣bras escandalosas, de las quales pue∣de causarse tu∣multo, o motin, muera por ello. Que ningun sol∣dado sobre enemi∣stad, o pendentia vieia durante la guerra, y iornada rinne, nitrate, ni por pendentia nu∣eua desafie a otro so pena de la vida al prouocante, y destierro al prouo∣cado.
• b

  Nemo pullum alienum rapiat, ouem nemo con∣tingat, oleum, salem, lignum, nemo exigat. Vo∣pisc. in vita Au∣rel.
• c

  De praeda ho∣stium non lachry∣mis prouincialiū habeat. Vopisc. ibidem.
• d

  Sueton. in Ty∣ber.
• e

  Tacit. annal.
• f

  L. 3. § qui a∣liena ff. de re mi∣lit.
• g

  Leptitanis se tradentibus cen∣turiones ad portā posuit, ne quis miles ingredere∣tur. Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• h

  Liu. 29.
• a

  Que ningum soldado dentro ni suera del cam∣po, tome, ni quite cosa alguna a per∣sona alguna.
• b

  Aliter in ardo∣re belli, aliter in pace iudicandum saith Fabius. Liu. 24.
• a

  De Camara∣das procede poder∣se sustentar meior con el s••eldo que estando cadauno de pors••••y assimis∣mo grande ami∣stad con otras muchas vt••lida∣des.
• a

  Qua todos los soldados acudan a us vanderas con gran diligentia encommenaeando acoger los atam∣bores.
• b

  Si quis vallum transcenderit, aut per murum ca∣stra ingreditur, capite punitur. ff.dere milit. l.
• c

  Xenoph. exped Cyr. 1.
• d

  Que ningun soldado dexe la sentinela so pena de la vida ni a parte del lu∣gar, ni se siente sopena de castigo.
• a

  Ningun solda∣do ni otra persona eche immunditias y es••rementos dë∣tro de los quarte∣les so pena de ca∣stigo arbitrario.
• b

  Caualier Cicu∣ta.
• c

  Que ningun soldado ni otra persona salga a lo•• camin••s ni a par∣te alguna a to∣mar las victual∣las, ni a impedir los conductores dellos, ni a rom∣per o quemar los molinos, villas, granias, cazare, y lugares de la co∣marca, ni compre victuallas fuerae de las plaças, qu•• para venderlas fuerē senna ladas, y despues deapre∣ciadas per los offi∣ciales.
• a

  Popelliniere in a treatise con∣cerning y^e admi∣taltie of France.
• b

  Liu. 1.
• c

  Herodian.
• d

  Lib. 25.
• a

  They called him Quaestorem.
• a

  Liu. 38.
• b

  ff. ad leg. Iul. repetunda••um.
• c

  Qui occasione transitus ab vibi∣bus, vel praediis per concussionē quid accipit, te∣netur in ••upium▪ Authent de trā∣sit milit▪ col. 10.
• d

  Irinerum spa∣tia & statiuorum mutationes ven∣ditauit. Fab. Va∣lens foedis pacti∣onibus. Tacit. an∣nal. 17.
• e

  Tertia pars do∣mus mil tibus assignabatur. l. 2. Cod▪ de metat▪ & epid.
• f

  Petr. Gregor. Tholos. Syntag. iuris.
• g

  Lege Iulia re∣petundarum te∣netur qui ob mi∣litem legendum, mittendumue pecuniam acce∣perit. l. eadem. §. lege Iul. ff ad leg. Iul. repetundarū.
• h

  Hi••t▪ de bel. A∣lexandr.
• i

  Tribunus, Cē∣turio, vel alius, qui refert falsuna numerum mili∣tum, stipendia in∣tercipiens con∣dēnatur in qua∣druplum, & d••g∣nitate priuatur▪ l▪ vlt. § pro limi∣taneis. Cod. de offic. praefect. A∣fric.
• k

  Petr. Greg. Tholos. Syntag. iuris.
• a

  Liu. 25.
• b

  Hirt. de bel. Afric.
• c

  Quos apud Thapsum custo∣diae causa esse, iusserat ob negli∣gentiam ignomi∣niae causa dimit∣tendos ab exer∣citu curauit. Hirt. de bel. A∣fric.
• a

  Phil. Comm.
• a

  Nomb. 13.
• b

  Thucid. 2.
• a

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 5.
• b

  Bona militis qui successorem non habet, defe∣runtur legioni, nō admisso fisco. l. siquis. § eius. ff. de iniust. rupt. irrit. test. l. 2. Cod. de haered. decur.
• c

  Baltazar Ayala de iur. bel.
• d

  Que ningun soldado impida a los ministros de iustitia, el exer∣citar sus officios so pena de la vida, Sanch, de Lond.