CHAP. V. Part. 3. Wherein certaine aduertisements are giuen to our souldiers, that are sent in ayde of foreine nations.
THe best counsell that I can giue my countrey∣men, is to assayle the enemy in his owne coun∣trey: but seeing that I cannot (I feare) perswade them to that is best, and safest; the next good that I can doe them, is to admonish them, that being sent in small numbers to succour our friendes oppugned by our common enemy, they proceede not rashly.
First therefore wisedome requireth, that they goe strong. for that in foreine countreys they are no lesse to feare the practices of double hearted friends, then the force of open enemies. The Ro∣manes when they sent ayde to their friendes, neuer sent lesse then a full army, sufficient to encounter the enemy. In sending lesse, either they should not haue pleasured their friends, or els haue en∣dangerd their owne men. Besides this, it would haue bene dishonor to the name of the Romanes, if either they had not bene able to ouer∣come the enemy, or willing to see their friendes long languish in feare, or their souldiers ouermatched, and not able to looke out into the fielde. For this cause being required ayde of the Campanians a∣gainst the Samnites, of the Latins against the Volscians, they sent their Consuls & Generals forth with a mighty force, not only to driue Page 104the enemie from the townes, but also to fight with him in the fielde. And taking vpon them the protection of the Sicilians against them of Carthage, they sent thither sufficient strength both by sea, and land.
Caesar going in ayde of the Heduans, and other the confederates of the Romanes in France, oppressed by the Heluetians, & Germans led with him a most braue army furnished with all things necessary. Neither was it the vse of the Romanes only, but of all nations that vnderstood the practise of armes, yea and of ours also.
The Blacke Prince in the dayes of Edward the third going into Spaine in succour of Don Pedro de Castile, led thither a most flo∣rishing army, where with he ouerthrew the power of Spaine, and re∣stored the Ring to his seate. Likewise the Duke of Lancaster in his expedition into Portugall, did not rely vpon the ayde of that nation, but caried with him a gallant army of English men. And when Ed∣ward the fourth went into France to ayde the Duke of Burgundy, be caried with him such a power, as the heartes of the French trem∣bled to see it, and the king rather by money and rewardes, then by force sought to cause them to returne. If the Romanes had sent three or foure thousand in ayde of their friendes in Sicile, or Greece, or A∣sia, and so supplyed them by litle and litle: the opinion of their wis∣dome and forces would neuer haue growen so glorious. Neither could the Prince of Parma of late times, if he had gone into France with a small force haue deliuered his confederates from danger, or els broken the purposes of his enemies in that sort hee hath. If then wee will not followe the ancient rules of warre, yet let vs not shewe lesse iudgement and value in our proceedings, then our enemie.
Whosoeuer therefore meaneth to winne honor in succour of his friends abroad, let him as much as he can endeuour to cary with him a sufficient force. Small numbers are neither esteemed of enemies, nor friends. Into the field they dare not come, for they are too fewe and too weake, being penned vp in cities they famish. If our friends be stronger then our ayde, then are they commaunded by them. If any of their leaders want gouernement, our men that are put to all hard seruices, pay the prise of their folly. If any ca∣lamitie happen to their army, our people first feele it. They shift for them selues being in their owne countrey; ours are slayne Page 105both of enemies and friendes, and if victuals waxe scant they sterue first. I neede not shewe this by other examples, then by our procee∣dings in France, and the Lowe countries.
But suppose that by our aide, our friendes should be able to ouer∣come, or make peace with the enemy, yet are not our people more assu∣red then before. When the Protestants in the first ciuil warres by the meanes of our forces had obteined that they would, or at least tolle∣rable conditions of peace, they ioyned with our enemies, to besiege vs in Newhauen, and sent vs away without reward or thankes. The Spaniards that had restoredaMaximilian Sforza to the Duchie of Millan, the warres being ended for their reward, had like to haue had their throates cut. But they stood so much vpon their gard, that the practise of Hierome Moron, and the Marquis of Pescara could take no effect. In ancient time howe often haue our people bene delu∣ded by the Dukes of Britaine, and Burgundy, in whose aide they went to venture their liues? and doe we thinke that the people of the Lowe countries, if once they be deliuered from the feare of the Spaniard, will not turne out our garrisons, and vse vs in like sort? they will be able to doe it, and others haue done so before. Why then should we thinke our selues priuiledged?
To assure our selues therefore of our friendes, the onely meanes is to haue a force sufficient to master them, and correct their disloyaltie. The same is the only course to preuaile against our enemies, to helpe our friendes, and mainteine our selues.
If that may not be obteined, I see not how our people can main∣teine their honor: but the next course to assure them selues, is to haue cautionary townes, or hostages, or both deliuered into their handes. townes, that they may assure them selues of retraite, in case of bad dealing; hostages, that they may be assured of their good dealing. Without townes their case is desperate, if the enemie preuaile. ThebFrench that came to aide Galeazzo Duke of Millain, vnder the leading of the Countie of Armignac, being scattered in the siege of Alexandria, were slaine by the Pesants of the Countrey. The like happened to those poore Lanceknights, that were defeated atcMon∣contour. Neither were the Spaniards better vsed, that came in aide of the Leaguers, being defeated by the present french king neere Dreux, anno 1589. This towne that is giuen in caution, is to be garded with a sufficient force of English, furnished with victuals and muni∣tions, Page 106in the garde of the garrison, and not as in Vlissingen, in the kee∣ping of the townesmen, vnto whom whosoeuer trusteth, shall assured∣ly be deceiued.
Thirly, let those that haue the gouernment of our men, see that they both march, and lodge vnited, and strong, that they be not either disturbed in the night, nor betraied vnder colour of friēdship. Stran∣gers that stragle are a spoile not onely to the pesants, but to their se∣crete euil-willers. And those that lodge without defence, or suffer any to come within them in the night, are open to euery enterprise of their enemies.
That they may both lodge, and march hard together, order is to be taken, that they may haue victuals deliuered them alwaies before hand; and that they be not driuen to seeke abroad for them. To con∣clude, the onely meanes of safetie is, neither to trust enemy, nor friend: for none are abused, but they that trust dissoyall people.
If that our men can neither haue townes, nor hostages, nor victu∣als, nor good vsage, what should they be sent among such people? or why should they trust others, being not themselues trusted? or why should any succour be sent, but such as may command, and punish the dissoyall, and haue strength to stand vpon themselues?
Those therefore that are gouernours (I trust) they will maturely consider of this point. if not, let them looke for this issue: if the enemy be stronger, then are our men either to be slaine, or famished by the e∣nemie: if by our forces our friendes preuaile, then for their rewarde shall they either be turned out of the countrey with disgrace, or be fa∣mished, or cut in peeces, by their friendes.
These things considered, let vs nowe consequently proceede to de∣clare, howe an army, after that it is exercised and furnished, and that the Generals haue all due considerations both therein, and in all o∣ther prouision, and proceeding required before the marche of the ar∣my, may march orderly, and safely.