The practice, proceedings, and lawes of armes described out of the doings of most valiant and expert captaines, and confirmed both by ancient, and moderne examples, and præcedents, by Matthevv Sutcliffe.
Sutcliffe, Matthew, 1550?-1629.
Page  29

CHAP. III. That before we beginne warres, we are to procure what strength, or helpe wee can of our neighbours, or others: and to draw the same, as much as is possible for vs, from our enemies.

AS in priuate affaires particulars receiue mutu∣all helpe eche of other, of whom it is verified, thatatwo ioyning together doe more easily at∣chieue matters, then ech man single by himselfe; so in publike executions, where manie are linked together, they more easily execute, and are hard∣lier broken. Insomuch as friends andbconfederates are no lesse the strength of states, then forces and treasure. Therefore did thecSabines hearing of the preparatiues that Seruius Tullius made a∣gainst them, looke out what forreine ayde they mightadioyne vn∣to themselues. The Atheniansd and Spartanes in the Pelopo∣nesian warre did not so much stande vpon their owne strength, as the aydes, and succours of their confederates. Thee Syracu∣sans by the helpe of the Spartanes withstoode the inuasion of the Athenians made vpon them, and foyled them in diuers incounters. I neede not vse anie long discourse in this matter: it hath beene the continuall vse of the Kings of this Ilande to vse the helpe of the Burguygnions, and low Countries against France. And like∣wise haue the French relyed much vpon the ayde of the Scots a∣gainst vs.

Neither ought anie Prince, or nation so to presume of their owne strength, as that they refuse the ayde of friends. The Ro∣manes although after their victories against Annibal, at what time they beganne the Macedonian warre, they were in their prime of strength, and most flourishing estate; yet required they ayde of the Carthaginians, of Masinissa, and of the Aetolians, and others against Philip King of Macedonia. And deare it cost Perseus the King of Macedonia, that for sparing of money refu∣sed the ayde of thirtie thousand Gaules offering to serue him a∣gainst the Romanes. What hinderance it hath beene to vs, and what it may bee that the Towne of Antwerpe, and other partes of the lowe Countreyes were not receiued when they were of∣fered Page  30vnto vs in these brawles against Philip of Spaine, I knowe not, some doubt. It may be sayd, they would not yeelde without conditions. But what purpose is it, to talke of conditions, see∣ing they would haue yeelded themselues into any princes handes, if they might haue bene receiued?

Further as we are to require ayde of our friends; so we are to with∣drawe what ayde we can from the enemie. Many reasons teach vs so to doe, which common practise doeth teach vs to be true. as the body in the distemper of the partes: so the state in the disagree∣ment of the members, is greatly weakened, and easily dissolued. The Romanes therefore as they were masters in other militarie documents, so did they diligently practice intelligence with the ene∣mies friendes, and subiectes. Before they transported their forces into Afrike, they dealt with Syphax, and assured themselues of Ma∣sinissa kings of Numidia. Before they charged Philippe king of Ma∣cedonia, they caused most of his partisans in Greece to reuolt from him. And Caesar by the helpe of part of the Gaules, which he drewe to his side, did subdue the rest, and them also afterward.

Pompey purposing to abase the power of Caesar, did first drawe from him two legions or regiments, and afterward Labienus one of Caesars chiefe friendes, and commaunders. Of this onely practice great effectes are wont to ensue. Caesar by disioyning and separa∣ting the forces and causes of the Gaules, ouercame them all. By his intelligence with the ancient Britons, hee vnderstoode the estate of the countrey, and had great helpe to atchieue his purpose a∣gainst it.

While they of the citie ofaDinant suffered themselues to be dis∣ioyned from their associates of Liege, Charles Duke of Burgundy did easily ouercome them. If Lewis the xi. of France had not sepa∣rated, and broken the league, first betweene the Duke of Burgun∣dy and the Dukes of Britaine, and Normandy, and afterward be∣twixt king Edward the fourth, and the Duke of Burgundy: he could not haue escaped with so litle losse, nor vanquished his ene∣mies with so great gaine. We haue also domesticall examples of the same but too many, and which I cannot without some griefe remember. not with dint of sword, nor open force, but with secret practices with our associates and friendes in France, the French tooke not onely Normandy, but also Gascoyne and Guienne from Page  31the English nation. And neuer omitting any opportunitie to trou∣ble vs, they wrought much woe vnto this land, in the dayes of King Iohn, by furthering and procuring the reuolt of the No∣bilitie.

Neither can any estate continue, that hath his partes deuided. For (as one sayth) it falleth out, that while euery man looking to his owne present safetieasuffereth his friendes to fight single, all are ouercome. By this means the Spaniard hath so much preuailed in the Low countreys, and the people haue hurt themselues. For dis∣ioyning their counsailes and forces, and refusing thebayde of stran∣gers, they are for the most part a spoyle vnto the enemie. And if we would haue vsed greater force, and more diligence in with∣drawing from the Spaniard his associates, and subiects of Portu∣gall, of the Ilands, and of the Low countreys; hee would haue bene long ere this very gentle to deale withall. But some wise men, as they say, haue not onely not sought to cause his subiects to re∣uolt, but haue refused, and still refuse to receiue them, that holde out their hands, crauing helpe of friends and long since are weary of the Spanish tyranny.

As for those, that suppose the Spaniards to haue such holde of all the countreys which nowe they possesse, and of the inhabitants thereof, that we should but loose labour in attempting their reuolt, they seeme to be ignorant not onely of the state of his countreys, and of the Spanish gouernement, but also of the nature of things. It is well knowen with what discontentment, and grudge both the Portugals, and those of the Lowe countreys doe serue the Spa∣niard. The Portugals were ready to receiue vs at our last expedi∣tion thither, and would haue declared themselues further, if they had perceiued, that wee had bene able to defend them against the Spaniard.

The state of Milan is holden more by force, then by loue, or good title. They of Naples and Sicile haue by many signes decla∣red their great discontentment of the Spanish yoke. The Indians would reuolt, if they knewe which way. In all countreys there are euer some, that either for hope; or hatred desire change of state.

Annibal after that hee had once, or twise beaten the Ro∣manes in Italy: did afterwarde mainteine the warres for the most Page  32part with the aydes of that countrey. And Caesar vsed the strength of the Gaules, against the rest of the nation. Vpon the first ouerthrow which Scipio gaue to the Carthaginians in Affrike, he caused most of the countrey to turne enemie against them.

Neither may we thinke that the state of Spaine is in this point, better then other nations, especially seeing the stirres in Aragon, and Grenade beside many other offers in Castile, doe declare, that there are among them many mal-contents. The Spaniard doubteth not to finde many such among vs, but it were to be wished, that we would rather make triall first, whether there were any such to be found in Spaine. When the French made their expeditions intoa Naples, they found great aydes in the countrey, some al∣so beside exspectation. Why then should Spaine differ from I∣taly?

But while we seeke to augment our forces with the succours of our associates and friendes; we are not so to rely vpon them, but that we prepare sufficient forces of our owne nation, both to resist the enemie, and if neede be to commaund our associates. therein fo∣lowing the wise proceedings of the Romanes, that neuer would ad∣mit a greater number of associates, then they had of their citizens in their army; and had alwayes an eye, that they practised not with the enemie. In this as inbother points, to distrust, is a great point of wisedome. The Scipioes did trust but too much to the aydes of the Celtiberians in Spaine. For being abandoned by them, they were exposed naked and vnprouided to the mercy of their enemies.cTullius Hostilius did deale more wisely. For although hee had the succours of the Albans with him, yet had hee force sufficient to vanquish his enemis without them. If not; he had farre worse spee∣ded. For in the middes of the battell, he was forsaken by them. Thed Switzers that came in ayde of Lewis Sforza solde him into the handes of Lewis the xij, at Nouara, and did not onely forsake him. And of late yeres, the Protestants that eame out of Germany vn∣der the guidance of the Dukes of Bouillion, were in their greatest neede forsaken of the Lansknights, that came to ayde them. I neede not labour inueh to prooue this, seeing the great expen∣ses, that by the French and others hane beene wasted vpon the Almains of late time, doe teach vs howe little vse, or hope there is of the ayde of that nation. Of all those that folowe our en∣signes, Page  33and ioyne together with vs those are least to be trusted, that are lately reuolted. Good it were to trie such, and then to trust them. Twoa Spaniards feining them selues fugitiues in the warres be∣twixt the Spaniards and the Venetians attempted to kill Aluian the Venetian Generall. The like was attempted by certaine Turks against Scanderbeg. The Numidians that reuolted to the Ro∣mans, a litle before their battel with Annibal at Cannae, made a great flaughter among the Romanes, after the battell ioyued. Maureuell that runagate pretending to forsake the enemie vpon some displea∣sure, would haue slaine the Admirall: but when he sawe howe that could not be done without euident danger, he slew Mouy a valiant gentleman, and so returned againe to the enemie. Neuer any did wholy rely vpon his associates, especially such as were newly come vnto him, without losse, or danger. Good it had, bene for vs not to haue looked for so much at the Portugales hands, as we did, it may be they would haue assisted vs, if we had bene the stronger, but euery one treadeth on those, that are throwen vnder foote, and thrusteth forward those that are falling.

To assure vs therefore of our associates, the safest way is to stand vpon our owne strength, and to trust more to our selues then to them: the next is by hostages, such as are well accompted of: another means is by gages of towns. KingbEdward the third by seasing of Cherburg for pawne, assured himselfe of the king of Nauarres loy∣all dealing. The like course is taken in assuring the contract made betweene vs and the lowe countreys. I would we were in like sort assured of the townes we hold there, as he was. The reasons we haue to feare are diuers: but these in shew open; that the town•• men of Vlishing and Briel, and the rest being armed, and in number passing our arrison, and giuing them victuals and munitions from hand to mouth, may force the same eyther to yeelde, or de••rs t pleasure. That they haue not yet attempted it, the feare of the Spaniard 〈◊〉 cause. If that scruple were remoued, I feare what will full•••, without extraordinary diligence, and better order, and more force: but to assure our selues of our associates there is no be•••• course then to doe them iustice. The samecboth procureth friendes, & ••inrei∣neth them in deuotion. For who will adhere 〈◊〉 them, which wrong them, and oppress them?dPausanias and 〈◊〉 by ruling their associates with rigour, and extremitie, caused them to ••e part Page  34the Lacedemonian armie discontent. The like effect did the coue∣tousnesse of the Athenians, that respected onely their owne profite, worke in their partisans in the Peleponesian warre. They must al∣so be defended against their enemies, if we looke to haue their helpe against our enemies. This reason mouedaCaesar to hazard him∣selfe in the succouring of the Boians at Gergouia: and Iosua to come in ayde to the Gibeonites, although fraudulently they had caused him to enter into league with them. The Romanes not sending ayde to the Sagntines besieged by Annibal in time, lost not onely them, but the fauour of all Spaine. And vainely did wee looke for the helpe of Portugall, being not prouided to defend the Countrey against the Spaniard. To standbaloofe when our neighbours require ayde, is a course neither to helpe our friendes nor hurt our enemies. Besides the same is most dishonorable (for who doeth not despise those, in whome they see no helpe) yea and vnprofitable. for the enemie is thereby strengthened, and wee weakened.

Of the conditions and contractes of association, I shall haue oc∣casion to speake in the treatise of peace. For the endes of warres, are not onely the beginning of peace, but also of associations, and friend∣ships for the most part. Thus much onely may serue in this place, that some are onely offensiue, some offensiue, some with equall con∣ditions on both sides, some with respect to one side. and as great di∣uersities there are, as of diuers states, and conditions of things. Anniball and Philip of Macedonia, ioyned in league vpon these conditions, thatcPhilip should waste the coast of Italy with his Nai••, and make warre vpon the Romanes by sea and land, vntill such 〈◊〉s they had brought Italy in subiection, which should then belong to the Carthaginians: that the warres being there ended, An∣nibal〈◊〉 passe ouer with his army into Greece, and helpe him to subdue that Countrey, and the Lands adioyning, which shoulde re∣••〈◊〉o Philip. They ofdLocres conditioned with Annibal, that 〈…〉 helpe other both in warre, and peace. Many spe∣ciall m••er knowe, 〈…〉 and comprised in articles con••∣med on both ••des by 〈…〉, and sometime by othe. And therefore whatsoeuer articles are agreed vpon, they are diligently, and loyally to 〈◊〉erforme. It is a sure course to winne vs credite among our neighbours, and to linke them in •••ine good wi•• to∣ward vs.