Phisicke against fortune, aswell prosperous, as aduerse conteyned in two bookes. Whereby men are instructed, with lyke indifferencie to remedie theyr affections, aswell in tyme of the bryght shynyng sunne of prosperitie, as also of the foule lowryng stormes of aduersitie. Expedient for all men, but most necessary for such as be subiect to any notable insult of eyther extremitie. Written in Latine by Frauncis Petrarch, a most famous poet, and oratour. And now first Englished by Thomas Twyne.

Of want of vertue. The .ciiii. Dialogue.

SOROW.

BVt I am without vertue.

Reason.

An hurt in deede, a iust sorowe, sauing that al other wantes may happen to be eyther natural, or casual, or violent, but this doubtlesse is voluntarie. For other are eyther in the body, or in the wyt, or in the memory, or in the speech, or in some outwarde thyng one or other, al which happen not accordyng as a man woulde wyshe, but as euery mans fortune chaunceth: but this onely consisteth in will, whiche euery one guydeth and disposeth at his owne plea∣sure. For a man can require none other good wyll of an∣other man, then he is disposed to shewe whose wyll it is, wher∣by he wylleth this thing or that thyng. Otherwyse, as de∣fectes happen vnto men, of strength, or of speeche, or of ryches agaynst their willes, so shoulde of their wylles also: neyther shoulde vertue deserue rewarde, nor vice merite punishment. But nowe, not a wyl vnto you to do this or that, but a libertie to chose this or that was geuen you at your byrth, whiche beyng applyed vnto that whiche is good, maketh you good, but conuerted vnto euill, maketh you euyll. The same may you vse as you lust, and yf you lust ye may vse it well, whiche doubtlesse is the gyft of God, as yf ye abuse it, it is a great peruersitie of the wyller: but it cannot be otherwyse cho∣sen, but that a good wyll is the roote of vertue, as an euyl wyll is the roote of vice. And thus there is none that suffereth a

want of vertue, but he that wyl, for that the greatest & cheefest part of vertue consisteth in y^e wil.

Sorow.

Yea I would haue ver∣tue, but I cannot get it.

Reason.

Many there be, that thinke they woulde haue that whiche they wyl not, and that they woulde that whiche they wyl: thus euery one deceiueth hym selfe, and ende∣uoureth to perswade not onely hym selfe but others, that he is de∣sirous of good, neyther perswadeth any more easily how delecta∣ble true vertue is, since that the false opinion of vertue so muche deliteth, that it is pleasant vnto hym to deceyue the people, and his freendes, and moreouer by them to be deceyued.

Sorow.

I knowe that I would fayne, but I cannot be good.

Reason.

Admit it be so, it sufficeth not to haue a will, vnlesse thou haue also a desire, and that not indifferent, but vehement. But you most greedily desire your owne harmes, and coldly your commodities: whereby it commeth to passe, that there be many ryche, but very fewe good. For what marueyle is it, yf your feruent intention at∣tayne sooner to the thing ye wyshe, then your slowe wyl?

Sorow.

I woulde be good yf I coulde.

Reason.

Endeuour, for thou mayest, and yf thou wouldest vnfainedly, begyn now, but eschewe slouthfulnesse. For yf the smallest thinges be not ••••gotten for nought, what mayest thou hope of vertue, then whiche there is nothyng greater, nor hygher among the affayres of men? Ima∣gine not of her as of a step out of the way from cares, but as of the redie and onely passage vnto felicitie. Be at leasure vnto her, and folowe after her with al thy force and possible myght of thy mynde, and applye not some part of thy leasure vnto her, as yf it were vnto some certayne exercise, but as vnto that whiche is the ordinarie duetie of lyfe, whiche wyl make thee blessed, and that thou shalt want nothing. Employ al thy time, and thy whole study, which thou hast often bestowed vpon most vyle thynges, and cal to thy remembrance that more holesome & effectual (then fine) saying of Marcus Varro in his booke of Satires: If thou haddest sayth he, bestowed the twelfth part of thy payne in the stu∣die of Philosophie, whiche thou hast employed in ouerseeing thy ba∣ker that he myght make thee good bread, thou haddest eare this tyme been good. Whiche I would haue thee to vnderstande thus, not that thou acknowledge thy selfe to be indebted for thy health vnto

the earthly Philosophie, whiche promiseth a continuance by fre∣quentation of the actions, which howe muche it is to be credited, they that haue experimented doo knowe: but rather vnto the hea∣uenly wysedome, whiche is a most excellent preseruer, and also the counsayles and aydes of vertue, and the health whiche thereby is purchased: and thou must also acknowledge with duetiful con∣fession, and a thankefull minde, that to be true whiche is written, No man can lyue continually, vnlesse it be geuen hym of God. And this is a poynt of wysedome, to knowe whose gyft it is, whiche, thynke to be spoken vnto thee by name, and it may be lykewyse applyed vnto all vertues.

Sorowe.

I desyre very much to be good, but I am not.

Reason.

Whether thou doo earnestly desyre or not, the effect wyll prooue: Continuance is a token of a feruent good wyll. For whether vertue be the free gyfte of God, (and truly that heauenly geuer scarsly bestoweth it vpon any but suche as constantly desyre it, and earnestly require it in hartie prayer:) or whether in so great a matter any part of humane wysedome be of force, truely so weyghtie a thyng requireth both earnest intention, and long and continual exercise. For that which is gotten by studie, commeth not suddenly, so that, which way so euer thou turne thy selfe, thou oughtest to haue a perseueryng minde. Wherefore, omitting and neglecting all other thynges, applie these matters, whiche thou shalt the more couragiously, yf thou beare in minde, and haue alwayes written before thine eyes, that to this ende, and none other, thou camest into this earthly ha∣bitation, and that this one thyng is required of thee, that by the steppes of vertue, thou clymbe vp to heauen, and that whatsoe∣uer thou doo els, is eyther needelesse, or hurtfull.