The logike of the moste excellent philosopher P. Ramus martyr, newly translated, and in diuers places corrected, after the mynde of the author. Per M. Roll. Makylmenæum Scotum, rogatu viri honestissimi, M. Ægidii Hamlini.

THE SECON∣DE BOOKE OF DIALECTICKE CON∣taining the disposition. (Book 2)

CAP. I, Of the definition and deuision, of the dispo∣sition and proposition.

WE haue intreated in the for∣mer booke the first parte of Dialecticke, which is inuen¦tion: Now followethe con∣sequently the other parte, which we did name Iudgement and dispo∣sition. Disposition is a parte of Dialec∣ticke, wich teachethe to dispone and place orderly the argumentes inuented, to the ende we maye iudge well and rigthly: for we iudge of euery thing according to the disposition therof. And therfore this parte of Logicke is eyther called iudgement or disposition vnder one signification. Dispo∣sition is parted into the proposition (other∣wise called enunciation) or sylogisme and methode. Proposition is a disposition in

the which one argumente is spoken for an¦other. The proposition hathe two partes, the first is called the antecedent, the secōde the consequent: Of the which the qualities of propositions do ryse. And first the affir∣mation and the negation. The proposition affirmatiue, is when the consequent affir∣methe vpon the antecedent: as, a man is mortall. The proposition is negatiue, whē the consequente denyethe vpon the antece∣dent: as, Man is not mortall: and here ryse∣the the contradiction of propositions, when one consequente dothe bothe affirme and denie vpon one antecedent

CAP. II. Of the true proposition and false, contingent, necessarie, and impossible, and of the thre documents of artes.

THe proposition is eyther true or false. It is tru when the consequent is truly ioined with the antecedent, or truly separa∣ted from the same: as here it is truly ioined: all man are synners: and here truly separa∣ted: no man is iust. The proposition is cal∣led contingent, when the consequent be tru∣ly said of the antecedēt, so that sometyme it

maye be false: as fortune helpethe hardye men, for granting it to be true to daye, it may be false to morowe: So that the veritie of this sorte of prositions is only certain in thinges present, or past, and not in thinges to come. The proposition is necessary when the cōsequent maye at all times truly be sayde of the antecedent: as, all men are mortall. And contrarywyse, the proposition impossible, is when the consequent maye at no tyme be sayde of the antecedent: as, A man is a horse. The necessary is eyther of one kynde, or of a diuerse kynde. The neces∣sary of one kynde is when the partes are coessentiall amonge them selues, as when the generall is sayde of the speciall: as, A man is a liuing thing, or the difference of the forme, as, a man is reasonable, or the adioincte of his proper subiecte, as, A man maye laughe. And this sorte of proposition is sometyme reciprocate, when the conse∣quent, not only maye be sayde alwaye of the antecedent, and of all thinges contained vnder the antecedent, but of it self also, so that the antecedent contrariewyse may be sayde of the consequent, on the same ma∣ner: as Man is a reasonable lyuing thing.

nomber is equall or vnequall. The propo∣sition of diuerse kynde, is when the partes are not coessential: as, A man is blacke or white. And here we haue three generall documentes to be obserued in all artes and sciences. The first is that all the preceptes and rules shoulde be generall and of neces∣sitie true: and this is called a documente of veritie. The seconde that euery arte be contained within his owne boundes, and withholde nothing appartaining to other artes, and is named a documente of iustice. The third, that euery thing be taught ac∣cording to his nature, that is: generall thinges, generally: and particuler, particu∣lerly: and this is called a documente of wysdome.

CAP. III. Of the simple proposition.

THe proposition is eyther simple or com∣pounde. The simple with the whiche a simple sayng is declared: and therfore it contaynethe a simple consequent: which yf it do affirme, makethe the whole to affir∣me, and contrarywyse, yf it denyethe, the whole denyethe: as, fyer burnethe, fyer is

hotte, fyer is not water. Here, burnethe, hotte, and water, are the simple consequen∣tes: vpon the affirmation or negation of the wich dependethe the affirmation or nega∣tion of the whole. And this is the first dispo∣sition of thinges inuented, when the cause is ioyned with the effecte, as in the first example. Or the subiecte with the adioynte as in the second: Or the disagreable with the disagreable, as in the thyrd. After the which maner all sortes of argumētes maye be pronounced (except full comparisons and distributions) the agreable by affir∣myng, and the disagreable by denying.

The simple proposition is eyther generall or speciall. Generall, when it speakethe ge∣nerally. And here the one parte of the con∣tradiction is not alwayes true, & the other false. For in thinges contingent they maye be bothe false: as, All man are learned: No man is learned. And in thinges also which be not contingent: as, All lyuyng thinges are reasonable. No lyuyng thing is reaso∣nable. The proposition is speciall, when it speakethe specially and of a parte. And here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other false. The speciall is eyther

indefinite, or proper: Indefinite when it speakethe of no certain thing: as, Some man is learned, whose generall contradi∣ction is, No man is learned. Proper when the consequent is sayde of some proper na∣me: as, Fabella is fayre, whose contradi∣ction is, fabella is not fayre.

CAP. IIII. Of the proposition compounde,

THe propositiō compounde is when moe sayinges then one are ioyned togeather by some coniunction. And therfore vpon the affirmation or negation of the coniunction, dependethe the affirmation of the whole proposition: and here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other is false. The compounde proposition is eyther con∣gregatiue or segregatiue: The proposition is congregatiue, when the coniunction ga∣therethe, and is eyther copulatiue or con∣nexiue. Copulatiue, when the coniunction is copulatiue, as. Bothe Eurus and Afri∣cus rusht forthe. Whose negation and con∣tradiction is, not bothe Eurus and Africus rusht forthe. And here is to be noted, that the veritie of the proposition copulatiue de∣pendethe

vpon the veritie of bothe partes: for yf one parte be false, the whole is said to be false, as in this example. Bothe man and beast are reasonable, the whole proposition is false, because the last parte is false. Here∣to maye be referred the proposition contai∣ning the relation of qualities, in the which the relation standethe in place of the con∣iunction: as.

Suche thing as slepe, and rest on grasse To wearye men appeare: The same to me, of thy swete verse The melodye so cleare.

As thoughe he woulde saye, Slepe is swete to wearye mē, so is thy verse to me. Whose negation is,

Not that which slepe, and rest on grasse, To wearye men appeare: The same to me of thy swete verse, The melodie so cleare.

CAP. Ʋ. Of the proposition connexiue.

THe proposition is connexiue, whose cō∣iunction is connexiue: as, yf thou haue faythe, thou must haue charitie: Whose ne∣gation is, not althyoughe thou haue faythe, it folowthe that thou must haue charitie.

Cicero de fratre. Neyther yf a proposition be true or false, by and by it followethe that causes are immutable. The affirmation si∣gnifiethe that yf the antecedent be, the con∣sequent must be also. The negation or con∣tradiction signifiethe, that althoughe the antecedent be, the consequent must not be therfore. Wherby we must vnderstande, that whensoeuer this sorte of proposition is true, it must be necessarye also. The ne∣cessitie is knowen by the necessarye conne∣xtion of the partes, and not by the veritie of the same: for bothe the partes maye be fal∣se, and the connexion necessarye, as this: yf a man be an horse, he hathe fower feete, is a necessary connextion. But if the connextiō be contingent, and only for his probabilitie supposed to be, there arysethe no necessarye iudgement, but only opinion: as, Terence in andria. Yf thou do that (Pamphile) this is the last daye that euer thou shalt see me. The proposition containing the relation of tyme is hetherto referred: as, when Iustice is mayntayned, then shall peace be in the Realme.

CAP. ƲI. Of the proposition segregatiue.

THe proposition segregatiue is, whose coniunction dothe segregate: and ther∣fore it speakethe only of disagreable argu∣mentes. It is parted into discerning propo∣sitions and vnioynyng. The discernyng is, whose coniunction dothe discerne. Cicero in Tusc. 5. Althoughe that by the sence of the bodye, they be Iudged, yet they are to be refer∣red to the spirite: whose negation and con∣tradictiō is, Not althoughe that by the sence of the bodye they be iudged, they are therfore to be referred to the spirite. This sorte of pro∣position is true, when bothe the partes is true and discerned also. Otherwyse it is false and ridiculous.

CAP. ƲII. Of the proposition vnioynyng.

THe proposition vnioynyng, is a propo∣sition segregated, whose coniunction dothe vnioyne: as, eyther it is night or daye: all lyuing thinges, are eyther man or beast: whose negations are, It is not eyther daye or night: all lyuyng thingeh are not eyther man or beast: Here the negatiō declarethe, that the one parte or the other is not true of necessitie. For yf the disiunction be abso∣lutely

true, it is also necessarye, and the partes opponed imediatlie one to another. Yet althoughe the true disiunction be ne∣cessarie also, it is not requyred that the par∣tes separated be necessarye: as, This is a necessarie disionctiō: A man is eyther good or not good: and yet this, (A man is good) is not necessarie: Nor this, (a man is not good:) But the necessitie of the disiunction dependethe vpon the necessarie opposition and disiunction of the partes, & not of their necessarie veritie. The disiunction is som∣tymes with a condition, as if one shoulde aske, whether is Cleon, or Socrates come? because it was so promysed that the one shoulde only come. And therfore if the dis∣iunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but only opynable, suche as oftenty∣mes we vse in commen speakyng: as, Ouide in Leanders epistle.

Eyther happie courage shall saue me, Or deathe of carefull lyfe the ende shalle.

CAP. ƲIII. Of the Sillogisme.

A Sillogisme is a dispositiō in the which the question beyng disponed with the argu∣mēte

is necessarilie infered in the cōclusion. For if the propositiō be doubtfull, it is made a question: And to proue the question, we take an argumēt, & dispone it with the que∣stion. The Sillogisme hathe two partes: one which goethe before, another that fol∣lowethe, & maye be called, the antecedent and the consequent. The antecedent which prouethe or disprouethe the question, and hathe two partes: the proposition and as∣sumption, otherwyse called the Maior and the Minor. The propositiō is the first parte of the antecedēt, in the which the whole que¦stiō or the cōsequēt of the questiō is disponed with the argument. The assumption is the 2. parte of the antecedent, which is assumed vnder the proposition. The consequent is the last parte of the Sillogisme, which con¦tainethe the partes of the question, and con∣cludethe the same, and therfore it is called the Conclusion: yf any of those partes be absent, it is called a mutilet Sillogisme, or Entymema) if any thing be more then tho∣se thre partes, it is called a Prosillogisme. Sometyme also the order is confounded: therfore yf any doubte shall ryse throughe any of these thinges, it is good to putto that

to which is absent, and pull awaye that which aboundeth, and last to put euery thing in his owne place.

CAP. IX. Of the first forme.

A Sillogisme is eyther symple or com∣pounde. Symple when the partes of the question are disponed with the argumē∣te, so that the consequent be in the proposi∣tion and the antecedent in the assumption. The Sillogisme is affirmant, when the proposition & assumption affirmethe: And negant, when eyther the one or the other is negant. Generall, when they are bothe ge∣nerall: Speciall, when there is but one ge∣nerall: Proper, when they are bothe pro∣per. The symple sillogisme is eyther muti∣late or whole. Mutilate, when the conclu∣sion is brought in after on proposition or on assumption: as,

• All men be synners
• Ergo Socrates.

And

• Socrates is a man,
• Ergo hi is a synner.

The symple sillogisme is of two sortes: first the argumentt only goethe before, or fol∣lowethe

only. The first sorte then of this kynde is, when the argument goyng before in the proposition sometyme affirmatiuely and somtyme negatiuely, and in the assum∣ption only affirmatiuely inferethe a spe∣ciall conclusion: as, in the examples fol∣lowyng.

Affirmant generall, as.

• Constancie is a vertue:
• But Constancie is Confidence:
• Therfore some Confidence is vertue.

Negant generall, as:

• Folyshehardines is no vertue:
• But folyshehardines is Confidence:
• Some Confidence therfore is no vertue.

Affirmant speciall, as,

• A wyseman is to be praysed:
• But some wyseman is a poore man:
• Therfore some poore man is to be praysed.

Negant speciall, as:

• A foole is not alwayes happye:
• But some foole is fortunate:
• Therfore some fortunate is not alwayes happye.

Affirmant proper: as,

• Socrates is a Philosopher:
• But Soceates is a man:
• Therfore some man is a Philosopher.

Negant proper, as.

• Thersites is no Philosopher:
• ...

• But Thersites is a man,
• Some man therfore is no Philosopher.

But here, in comon speakyng to the ende we maye iudge the more easly, we vse to dis∣pone thus:

• Some Confidence is a vertue, as Constancie:
• Some is not, as, folyshehardines.

CAP. X. Of the second forme.

THe second forme is, when the argument being consequent affirmatiuely in the proposition or assumption, in the proposi∣tion definitelie: the conclusion is brought in lyke to the antecedent: as,

Generall. 1.

• The troubled man reasonethe not well
• The wyseman reasonethe well:
• The wyseman therfore is not troubled.

And Cicero in 3. Tuscul. As the eye (saye∣the he) being troubled, is not able to satisfie his office verie well: and the rest of the partes, yea the whole bodie being moued out of his good state, is not able to performe his office: euē so the spirite being troubled is not well disposed to exe∣cute his dewtie well and wyselie, and the dew∣tie of the spirite is, to vse reason: but the wyse

man his spirite is alwayes so disposed that it maye most perfectlie vse reason, and therfore he is neuer troubled.

Generall 2. as.

• Mortall thinges are compounde,
• The spirite or soule is not compounde:
• The soule therfore is not mortall.

As Cicero Tuscul. 1. prouethe the immor∣talitie of the soule by this sillogisme.

In the knowledge (sayeth he) of mans soule we maye not doubt (without we be most dull and ignorant in naturall thinges) But there is nothing admixt with the soule, nothing com∣pacte or made of elementes, nothing compounde or dowble: Which, if it be so, suerly it maye neither be put a sunder nor deuided, nor torne, nor pluckte in peces. For deathe is nothing els but the departing, separating and deuision of those partes, which before deathe were cou∣pled togeather by some copulation.

Speciall 1. as.

• The enuyous is not valyante,
• Maximius is valyante:
• Maximius therfore is not enuyous.

As Ouide in Elegia 3. dothe conclude,

Ill wyll and spyte full slouthfull vices be, And neuer dothe to gentle manners tende, And as the lurkyng vyperfull lowly,

Dothe alwaye crepe out throughe the lowest ground But (maxime) thy spirite is valyant And dothe aboue thy lynage reche I winne, But yet althoughe thy name be greate I grant It dothe no waye excell thy swyfte engeynne Therfore let others ouerthrowe the innocent, And let them wyshe that all men should them feare, Eke let them beare their dartes aboute the poynte, Wel dyed with bytyng venym shyning cleare: But (MAXIME) thy howse and familie, Is well accustomed all prostrate for to mende, Amonge the which I praye the haretefully, To nomber me, and so I make an ende.

Speciall. 2. as,

• A daunser is Ryotous:
• Murena is not Ryotous:
• Murena therfore is no daunser.

Which Cicero for Murena, hathe vnder this forme. Almost no sober man without he be madde dothe leape eyther when he is alone, or yet amonge a moderate and honest companie: for immoderate daunsing is the companion and follower of inordinate bāketting, pleasante & delectable places, and shortly of all delytes, and pleasant phātasies. But thou captiously takest that which most neadethe be the extreme of all vyce: and yet vnawares leauest those thinges, without the which that vyce is not to be fown∣de,

for thou shewest no filthy bankettyng, no in∣opportunate loue, no feasting: no loue of bodye: neyther any extraordinarie expences. And seyng those thinges be not to be fownde, what maye these wordes, voluptuousnes or sensua∣litie signyfie and those thinges which be vyces? Beleuest thou to fynde the vmber and shade of ryotousnes in that in the which thou caest not fynde ryotousnes it self.

Proper. 1. as,

• Agesilaus is not paynted of Apelles:
• Alexander is paynted of Apelles:
• Alexander therfore is not Agesilaus.

Proper. 2. as,

• Caesar oppressethe his natyue countreye:
• Tullius oppressethe not his natyue countreye:
• Tullius therfore is not Caesat.

CAP, XI. Of the seconde kynde of Sillogisme.

WE haue hitherto expounded the two sortes of the first kynde of the symple Sillogisme: Now folowethe the seconde. The symple sillogisme of the second kynde is, when the argument definitely goyng be∣fore in the proposition, and followyng affir∣matiuely in the assumption, the conclusion is brought in lyke to the antecedent.

Affirmant generall.

• That which is iust, is profitable,
• But that which is honest, is iust,
• Therfore that which is honest is profitable:

Which Cicero 2. Offic. concludethe thus. The Philosophers of greatest aucthoritie, yea very sharply & honestly haue by cogitation distingued these thre, which be confused. For whatsoeuer is iust, that also they esteme to be profitable: and that which is honest, the same to be iust: Of the which it is concluded, that whatsoeuer thing is honest, the same to be pro∣fitable.

Negant generall.

• That thing which is voyde of all Counsell, can not be gouerned by Counsell:
• But loue is voyde of all Counsell:
• Loue therfore cannot be gouerned by any Counsell.

As Terēce sayethe in his Eunuche almost vnder the same forme.

Affirmant speciall.

These Cōsulls which for their vertue are cho∣sen, ought diligētly to defēde the cōmō wealthe: Cicero is chosen Consull for his vertue: Cicero therfore ought diligently to defende the Com∣mon wealthe. So the Orator 2. Agrar. con∣cludethe his owne diligence and care: For seyng all Consulls ought to haue a greate care

and diligence in kepyng of the common wealthe: Those ought most chieffly so to do, who not from their youthe, but in open place are chosen con∣sulls. My predecessors made no suertie to the people Romaine for me: They beleued my self: It is your dutye to aske of me that thing which myne office requyrethe, and to call myne owne self into iudgement. For as when I sued for this office, none of my predecessors cōmended me vnto yow: Euen so yf I offende in any thing, there is no shyfte that maye deliuer me frō yow: wherfore, if God prolōge my dayes (althoughe I am the man who is able to defende the same from their mischeuous & subtille conspiraties) this I promise vnto yow Quirites, that ye haue geuen the charge of your cōmon wealthe vnto a vigilant man, & no fearefull fellowe: To a di∣ligent man, and no Coward or feyntharted.

Negant speciall.

• He that deceyueth a louyng mayde is not to be praysed:
• Demophon is a deceauer of a louing mayde, as Phillidis:
• Demophon therfore is not to be praysed.

Phillis thus inferethe in Ouide.

For to deceaue a mayde of tender age, Which trustethe in thee, it is no vassalage, Nor craftie gloire: For her symplicitie,

Had rather haue the constant loue of thee. I Phillis bothe a louer and a mayde, Am by thy wordes (false Demophon) deceaued: God graunte therfore which dwells in heuēs hye, For thy deceipte, that thou rewarded be.

Affirmant proper.

• Octauius was Caesars heire:
• I am Octauius:
• I am therfore Caesars heire.

Negant proper.

• Anthonius is not Caesars sonne:
• Thou art Anthonius:
• Thou art not therfore Caesars sonne.

CAP. XII. Of the compounde Sillogisme.

AS yet we haue intreated of the simple Sillogisme: Now followethe the com∣pounde: The compounde Sillogisme is, when the whole question is the one parte of the proposition affirmant and compounde, and the argument the other parte. But the argument is somtyme consequent to the antecedent of the question, and somtyme it is the other whole parte of the proposi∣tion: and than it is only assumed in the as∣sumption. The compounde sillogisme is eyther ioyned or disioyned. The sillogisme ioyned is a cumpounde sillogisme, whose

proposition is ioyned with this coniunctiō, if, and suche others, and is of two sortes: The first affirmethe the antecedent, & con∣cludethe the consequent, as Cicero conclu∣dethe. 2. Diuinat.

• If there be Godds, there is a diuination:
• But there are Godds:
• Ergo there is a deuination.

Cicer. 3. offic. Suerlye yf nature prescribe that man shoulde wyshe the commoditie & fur∣therance of man, whatsoeuer he be for that he is man, of necessitie it is required according to the self same nature, that the vtilitie and profitt of all be comon: Which yf it be so, we are contayned all vnder one lawe of nature: And yf this be also, truly we are forbydden by the lawe of nature, that one shoulde misuse another. But the first is true, therfore the last is true. Here often tymes the same is not as∣sumed, but some thing greater. 1. Catal. Yf thy parētes shoulde feare thee & hate thee, so that thou couldest by no meanes appease thē, I beleue that thou wouldest get thee some waye out of their sight. Now thy natyue countrey, which is the mother of vs all, bothe hatethe & fearethe thee, & knowethe that thou thynkest nothing but her destruction and ruyne: Shalt thou neither feare her auctoritie, neither shalt

thou followe her Iudgement, neither shalt thou be afrayed of her mightie power? The same sorte of concluding is, when the proposition contaynethe a relation of tyme, as Oenone concludethe her error of folyshenes.

When Paris maye withowt Oenone be, Then Xanthus shall run backward vp the vale: Turne Xanthus, turne, run fluddes backwardly, For Paris dothe withowt Oenone dwell.

The secōde sorte of ioyned Sillogisme pul∣lethe awaye the consequent, that it may pull awaye the antecedent also.

• Yf a man were immortall, he woulde be a simple sub¦stance, without composition of elementes:
• But he is neuer without the mixture of elementes.
• He is neuer therfore immortall.

Alexāder the greate asking one of his wyse men by what meanes a man might be God:

Yf (said the wyseman) he shall do those thinges which a man is not able to do.

Of the which answere I make this sillogis.

• Yf a man would be God, he must do that which is impossible for man to do:
• But the consequent can not be:
• Nor yet the antecedent therfore.

CAP. XIII. Of the disioined sillogisme.

THe disioined sillogisme is a compounde sillogisme, whose proposition is disioi∣ned:

And is of two sortes: The first takethe awaye the one, & concludethe the other: as,

• It is eyther night or daye:
• But it is not daye:
• It is night therfore.

Cicero for Cluentio. But when this choyse was offered to hym that eyther he shoulde iustly and godly accuse, or dye cruelly and vnworthely: he chosethe rather to accuse how soeuer he might, then to haue dyed after that sorte: as he woulde saye.

• Eather he must accuse or dye:
• He wyll not dye:
• He wyll accuse therfore.

The second sorte of disioined sillogisme ta∣kethe one in the proposition for the most part affirmant, and pullethe awaye the rest: as,

• It is eyther night or daye:
• It is daye:
• It is not night therfore.

And sometyme the proposition negant, af∣ter this forme,

• It is not bothe night and daye:
• But it is daye:
• It is not night therfore.

CAP. XIIII. Of the methode.

THe methode is a dispositiō by the which amonge many propositions of one sorte, and by their disposition knowen, that thing which is absolutely most cleare is first pla∣ced, and secondly that which is next: and therfore it contynually procedethe from the most generall to the speciall and singuler. By this methode we proceade from the an∣tecedent more absolutely knowen to proue the consequent, which is not so manifestly knowen: & this is the only methode which Aristotle did obserue.

CAP. XƲ. Of the illustration of the methode by examples of artes.

THe chiefe examples of the methode are found in artes and sciences: in the which although the rules be all generall, yet they are distinct by there degres: for euery thing as it is more generall is first placed. The most generall therefore shalbe first placed: thē next shall followe these which be imme∣diatly cōtained vnder the general, euery one orderly vnto the most speciall which shalbe last disponed. The definition therefore as most generall, shalbe first placed: next fol∣loweth

the distribution, which yf it be ma∣nifold, and of diuers sortes shalbe first diui∣ded into his integrall partes, next into his formes and kindes. And euery part and for∣me shalbe placed and described in the same order & place which he had in his diuision. It shalbe expedient also if the prolixt decla∣ration part them far a sonder, to gather them by a short transition, for that doth re∣create and refresh the auditor. But that the matter may be the more easily vnder∣standed we must vse some familiar example. If thou wilt aske (hauing all the defini∣tiones, diuisiones, and rules of Grammer writtē in diuers tables, & mixt out of all or∣der) what part of dialectick teachethe thee to dispone orderly these rules so confunded: first thou hast no neede of the places of inuē∣tion, seeing they be all ready found out: nei∣ther hast thou neede of the first disposition of propositions, seeing they are disponed al¦ready: neither of the secōd disposition, which is the iudgemēt of the sillogisme, seeing all thinges which might fall into controuersie is proued and concluded: only the methode doth remaine. The Logitian therefore by the lyght of this artificiall methode, shall

take a part out of this confused masse the definition (for it is most generall) and place it first of all: As, Grammer is an art which teathech to speake well and cōgrusly. Then shall he seeke out of the sayd masse the di∣uision of grammer, & shall dispone the same in the second place: Grammer is parted into two partes, Etymologie, and syntax. And thereafter he shall find out the definition of Etymologie, to the which he shall giue the thirde place. Then he shall seeke out the partes of the Etymologie, & first the most generall as letters: next syllabs & wordes. Hauing the partes, he must seeke the for∣mes: as wordes hauing number, & without number. And last he shall knyt and ioyoe togeather with short & apt transitiones the end of euery declaratiō with the beginning of the next. And so hauing defined, deuided & knyt to geather the partes of the Etymo∣logie, he shall make euery thing more ma∣nifest and playne with most fitt and speciall examples. And after the same order he shall intreate the syntax. This is a generall me∣thode obserued in all artes.

CAP. XƲI. Of the illustration of the methode by examples, of Poetes, Orators, and Historiographers.

WE doo not only vse this methode in the declaration of artes and sciences, but in the expounding of all thinges which we woulde plainely sett forth. And therefore the poetes, orators & all sort of writers how oft soeuer they purpose to teach there audi∣tor, doo alwayes follow this order of metho¦de, althoughe they do not euery where insist therein. Virg. in his Georgicks parted his matter as we haue sayd into fower partes: & in the first booke he intreateth of common & generall thinges, as of Astrologie, and thinges engendred in the ayer, & of cornes and there manuring, which is the first part of his worke: then he vseth a litle transition in the beginning of the second booke:

This much is spoke of sterres and husbanding: Now will I thee Bacche begin to sing.

Next he writeth generally of trees, then specially of vines: the second translation is put in the thirde part, but more imper∣fect and without the conclusion of the thirde

booke, of oxen, hors, sheepe and dogges:

Eke thee great Pales the goddes of pasture: And thee Apollo of sheepe the gouernour, At Amphysus with praises I will sing.

And last the third trāsitiō of the fowrth part is put in the begnining of the fowrth booke:

Now by and by with songe I will you shewe Thuplandish giftes of hony made of dewe.

Here therefore we may see that the poet hath studied to place the most generall in the first place, and the next generall in the midest, and the most speciall last of all. So doth Ouide in his fastes first propone the somme of his worke, and shortly after parte the same: and last hauing declared the par∣tes, knytteth them togither with short trā∣sitions: the Orators also in there proemes, narrationes, confirmationes, and perora∣tiones labour to obserue this order which they call the methode artificiall & naturall. Here Cicero first proponeth the matter and next parteth it. Thou hast bene this fowerten yeares questor (sayeth he) Cn. Papyrius being cōsul: & I accuse thee of all thinges which thou hast done frō that daye to this daye: there shall not be one hower found voyde of thy theft, ma∣litious doyng, crueltie, and mischief. Here is

the somme: now follweth the generall par∣tition. All the yeares (sayeth he) are spent eyther in the office of the questure: in the am∣bassade made in Asia: in the office of the pre∣ture pertaining to the towne: or in the office of the preture, amonge the Siciliens. And there∣fore into these fower partes my whole accusa∣tion shalbe parted. Of the which fower par∣tes, and the least member of euery part he intreateth afterwarde, euery on in his owne order and place. And in the thirde oration knytteth togeather the first three partes with transitiones. Now (sayeth he) seeyng I haue shewne his office of questure & first digni∣tie to be full of theft & mishieuous doing, I pray you geue eare to the rest. Then after he had shewne the faultes of the Ambassade, fol∣loweth the transitiō to the office of the pre∣ture. But now let vs come (sayeth he) to that worthie preturie and to those faultes, which be more manifest to those that be here present, thē to me although I haue studied & prepared my selfe to declare the same. This transition is more imperfect lacking an epiloge. And last in the begīning of the fowerth oratiō he maketh such a trāsition to the fowerth, part which is of the preturie amōg the Siciliēs.

There is many thinges (honorable Iudges) which of necessitie I most pretermit, to thēde I maye speake a litle of these thinges committed to my charge. For I haue taken vppon me the cause of Sicilia, that charge hath pulled me to this busines. So Liuius in the beginning comprehendeth the some of seuentie yea∣res, and therafter deuideth the same by de∣cades.

CAP. XƲII. Of the craftie and secrete methode.

THis methode then in dyuers enuntia∣tiōs of one kynde, being knowen eather by there owne disposition, or the disposition of the sillogisme shalbe obserued how often soeuer the matter is clearly to be vnderstan¦ded: But when with delectation or some o∣ther motion thy chief purpose is to deceaue the auditor, then thou shall put some thing away which doth appartaine to thy matter, as definitions, diuisions and transitions: & set in there places thinges appartaining nothing to the matter: as digressiones from the purpose, & long tarying vpon the mat∣ter: but most chiefly see that in the begīning thou inuerte thy order, and place some ante∣cedentes

after there consequentes. And su∣rely this more imperfect forme of methode in respect of the exact rule obserued in the other, is not only mutilate by reason of the taking away of some of the matter: and re∣doundeth by the eking to of thinges extra∣ordinarie: but hauing some degrees of the order inuerted, is preposterous and out of all good fashion and order.

FINIS.