A treatise of the loue of God. Written in french by B. Francis de Sales Bishope and Prince of Geneua, translated into English by Miles Car priest of the English Colledge of Doway

That perfect vertues are neuer one with∣out the other. CHAPTER. VII.

1. The heart is saied to be the first part of a mā, which receiues life by the vnion of the soule, and the eye the last; as contrariwise, in a naturall death, the eye begins first to die, the heart the last. Now when the heart begins to liue before the other parts be animated, life is feeble, tender, and imperfect: but still as it gets further possession in the other parts of the bodie, life is more vigorous in each part, but particularly in the heart; and we see that life being interressed in any one of the members, it is weakened in all the rest. If a mans foote or arme be agreeued, all the bo∣die is disseased, stirred, troubled, and changed. If

our stomake paine vs, the eyes, voice, and coun∣tenance are sensible of it. Such is the agreement amongst all the parts of man, for the enioying of this naturall life.

2. All the vertues are not gotten in an in∣stant, but one after another; as reason, which is as the soule of our heart, rids it selfe now of one passion, now of another to moderate and gouerne them: and ordinarily this life of our soule, takes it's beginning in the heart of our passion, which is Loue, and branching it selfe ouer all the rest, it doth euen quicken the very vnderstanding by contemplation: as contrariwise, morall or spiri∣tuall death makes its entrie into the soule by the consideration (Death enters by the windowes, saieth the sacred Text) and its last effect is to di∣stroy the good Loue, which once perishing, all our morall life is dead in vs; so that though me may indeede haue some vertues seperated from others, yet are they but at most languishing, imperfect and weake vertues, since that reason which is the life of our soule, is neuer satisfied or at ease in a soule, vnlesse it occupie and possesse all the facul∣ties and passions of the same; and being once a∣greeued or hurt in any one of our passions, or af∣fections all the rest loose their force and vigour and strangly doe pine away.

3. Marke, THEO: all the vertues are vertues, by the proportion or conformitie they haue to reason: and an action cannot be named vertuous, if it proceede not from the affection, which the heart beares to the decencie and beautie of reason. Now if the loue of reason doe possesse and ani∣mate

the mynd, it will be obedient to reason in all occurrences, and consequently will practise all the vertues. If IACOB loued RACHEL, in respect that she was Laban's daughter, why did he despise LIA, who was not onely the daughter, but euen the eldest daughter of the saied LABAN? But because he affected RACHEL, by reason of her beautie, he could neuer equally loue the poore LIA, though a fruitfull and wise maide, not being so faire in his eye. He that loues a vertue for the loue of the rea∣son and decorum that shines in it, he will loue them all, since he will find the same motiue in thē all: and he will loue each of them more or lesse, as reason shall appeare in them more or lesse res∣plendēt. He that loues Liberalitie, and not Chasti∣tie, shewes sufficiently that he loues not libera∣litie for the beautie of reason, for that is more ra∣diant cleare in Chastitie, and where the cause is more strong, the effects ought also to be the like. It is therefore an euident signe, that that heart is not carried to liberalitie by the motiue, and in consideration of reason: whence it followes that that Liberalitie which seemed to be a vertue, is but an apparance, since it proceedes not from reason, which is the true motiue of vertues, but from some other stranger-motiue. It is sufficient for a child to be borne in marriage, to beare the name, (in the eye of the world) Armes, and titles of his mothers husband: but to haue his blood and nature, he must not onely be borne in marriage, but of the marriage: Actions haue the name, Armes, and recognoiscence of vertue, because being borne of a heart endowed with reason, we

apprehend them to be reasonable; yet haue they neither the substance nor vigour of vertue, when they proceede from a strang and adulterate mo∣tiue, not from reason. It may happen then, that a man may haue some vertues, and not all: but they shall either be vertues newly springing and as yet tender, as flowres in blossome, or else perishing and dying vertues, as faiding flowres: for in Con∣clusion vertues cannot haue their true grouth and integritie, vnlesse they be all together, as all Phi∣losophie, and Diuinitie assures vs: What Prudence I praie you THEO: can an intemperate, vniust, and cousening knaue haue, since he makes choise of vice and forsakes vertue? And how can one be iust, without being Prudent, constant and tempe∣rate: Iustice being no other thing, but a perpetuall, strong and constant will, to render to euery one his owne, and the science by which right is done, is called IVRISPRVDENTIA; and that to giue each one his owne, we must leade a wise and modest life, and remoue the disorders of intemperance in vs, thereby to render to our selues what belongs vnto vs? and the word VERTVE, doth it not signi∣fie a force and vigour properly belonging vn∣to the soule, euen as we attribute such or such a vertue or proprietie to hearbes, or precious stones?

4. But is not Prudence it selfe imprudent in an intemperate man? Force without Prudence, Iustice, and Temperance, is not force, but a mad∣nesse: and Iustice is vniust in a gilefull man, who will not vse it; in the intemperate man who per∣mits himselfe to be carried away with passion, and in the imprudent man who is not able to discerne

betweene right and wrong. Iustice is not Iustice, vnlesse it be strong, Prudent, and temperate: nor is Prudence Prudence, vnlesse it be temperate, iust, and strong: Nor Force, Force, vnlesse it be iust, prudent, and temperate: neither is Temperance, Temperance, vnlesse it be prudent, strong and iust. In fine vertue, is not perfect vertue, vnlesse it be accompanied with all the rest.

5. It is true, THEOT: that one cannot exercise all the vertues at once; because the occasions are not all presented at once, yea there are vertu, which some of God's greatest Saints had neuer oc∣casion to practise. For S. PAVLE the first Heremit, for example, what occasion could he haue to exer∣cise the pardoning of iniuries, Affabilitie, Magni∣ficence, and mildnesse? Howbeit such soules, stand so affected to the rightnesse of reason, that though they haue not all the vertues in effect, yet haue they them all, in affection, being readie, and pre∣pared, to follow and obeye reason in all occurren∣ces, without exception or reserue.

6. There are certaine inclinations which are esteemed vertues, and are not so, but fauours and aduantages of nature. How many are there, who naturally are sober, simple, milde, still, yea euen chast, and honest? Now all these seeme to be ver∣tues, and yet haue no more the merite thereof, thē bad inclinations are worthy of blame, till we haue giuen free and voluntarie consent to such naturall humours. It is no vertue to be a man of little meate by nature, yet to abstaine by choice, is a vertue. It is no vertue to be silent by nature, though it be a vertue to bridle ones tongue by

reason. Many there are, who apprehend that they haue the vertue, while they cxercise not the con∣trarie vice: One that was neuer assaulted, may truely vaunt that he neuer was a runne-away, yet hath he no ground to boast his vallour. He that was neuer afflicted may well praise himselfe for not being impatient, yet can he not bragge of his Patience: So many thinke they haue vertues who haue onely good inclinations: and whereas those inclinations are one without another, they thinke that vertues may be so too.

7. Certes S. AVGVSTINE showes in an Epistle which he wrote to S. HI••ROME, that we may haue some sorts of vertues, without hauing all the rest, and that yet we can haue no perfect ones but we must haue them all. But as for vice, we may haue some, without hauing other some, yea it is euen impossible to haue them all together; so that it followes not that he that hath lost all the vertues hath by consequence all the vices, especially since almost euery vertue hath two opposite vices, which are not onely contrarie to the vertue, but euen to one another. He that by rashnesse lost his valour, cannot at the same time be taxed of cowar∣dise: nor can he, who lost liberalitie by his prodi∣galitie, be at the same time condemned of nigard∣linesse. CATILINE, saieth S. AVGVSTINE, is sober, vigilant, patient in suffering cold, heate, and fa∣mine: so that both he and his Complices deemed that he was maruellous constant: but this con∣stancie wanted prudence, since it made choice of bad, in lieu of good; it was not temperate: for it gaue bridle to villanous beastlinesses; it was not

iust sith he made a Conspiracie against his owne Coūtrie, it was not therefore a constancie but an obstinacie, which to deceiue fooles, bore the name of constancie.