A treatise of the loue of God. Written in french by B. Francis de Sales Bishope and Prince of Geneua, translated into English by Miles Car priest of the English Colledge of Doway

Of the affections of the will. CHAPTER. V.

1. THere is no lesse motion in the Intellectuall or Reasonable appetite, which is called the will, then there is in the Sensitiue or Sensuall: but those are customarily named Affections, these Passions. The Philosophers and Pagans did in

some sort loue God, their Common wealth, Ver∣tue, Sciences: they hated Vice, aspired after Ho∣nours, expected not to escape Death, or Calum∣nie, were desirous of knowledge, yea euen of Bea∣titude after Death. They did encourage them selues, to surmount the difficulties, which did crosse the way of Vertue, dreaded Blame, fled di∣uers Faultes, reuenged publicke Iniuries, disdai∣ned Tyrants, without any proper interest. Now all these Motions were seated in the Reasonable part, syth that neither the Senses, nor consequen∣tly the Sensuall appetits are capable of application to these obiects, and therefore these Motiōs were Affections of the Intellectuall, or Resonable ap∣petite, not Passions of the Sensuall.

2. How often doe we feele Passions in the sen∣suall appetite of desires, contrarie to the Affectiōs, which at the same time we perceiue in the Reaso∣nable appetite, or will. The young man mentio∣ned by S. HIEROME did fairely with his teeth cut of his tongue, and spet it in the face of that ac∣cursed woman, which inflamed him to carnalitie: did he not testifie therby an extreame Affection of Displeasure in his will, contrarie to that Pas∣sion of Pleasure, which by force she made him feele in his Concupistible, or sensible Appetite? How often doe we tremble amidst the dangers, to which our will brought vs, and makes vs remaine? How often doe we Hate the Pleasure, wherin the sensuall appetite delightes it selfe, and Loue the Spirituall good wherin it is disgusted? In this con∣fisteth the warre, which we daiely experience betwixt the Spirit, and Flesh: betwixt our exte∣riour

Man, which depends of Sense, and our inte∣riour, which depends of Reason: betwixt the old Adam which followeth the appetits of his EVE or Concupiscence, and the new Adam, which doth second heauenly wisdome, and holy Reason.

3. The STOIKES as S. AVGVSTINE, deliuers, denying that a wise-man hath Passions, doe confesse notwithstanding as may Appeare, that he had affections which they termed EVPA∣THIES, or Good Passions, or else CONSTANCIES with CICERO: for they saied, the wiseman did not Couit, but will onely; was not Light of heart, but Setledly ioyefull; that he had no Feare but onely a Foresight and Precaution; so that he was not moued but by Reason, and according to Rea∣son: for this cause they peremptorily denied that a wise-man could euer be Sorrowfull, that being caused by present Euill, whereas no Euill can befale a wise-man; syth that, no man is hurt but by himselfe, following their MAXIME. And certes THEOTIME they did not amisse to holde that EVPATHIES, or Good Affections reside in the Reasonable part of man, but they erred much in auerring, that there were no Passions in the Sensi∣tiue part, and that Sorrow did not touch a wise∣mans heart: For omitting what they them selues had experienced in this behalfe (as hath bene tou∣ched) by this meanes they might conclud that wis∣dome might depriue one of Mercy, which is a ver∣tuous sorrow, touching our hearts, and working thē to a desire to deliuer our neighbour from the euill which he endureth. Nor doth EPICTETES, the best mā amongst the Pagās follow this errour; that

Passions, doe not make Insurrections in a wise∣man, as S. AVGVSTINE doth witnesse, showing fur∣ther, that the dissension of STOIKES, and other Philosophers about this subiect, was but a meere dissension in words, and strife in language.

4. Now the Affections which we feele in Our reasonable part, are more or lesse Noble and Spi∣rituall, according as their Obiect is more or lesse Sublime, and as they are in a more eminent degree of the mind: for some of them proceede from the Discourse which we make, following the Expe∣rience of Sense; others are formed by a Discourse drawne from Humane Sciences; others rising from a Discourse which is made according to Faith, and finally there are some which haue their Origin from the simple Taste and Repose, which the Soule, hath in Veritie, and the will of God. The first, are called Naturall affections: For who is he that doth not naturally desire Health, commoditie of Meate, Drinke, and Cloth, Sweete and Agreea∣ble conuersation? The second, are named Reaso∣nable, as being altogether founded vpon the spiri∣tuall Knowledge of Reason, by which our will is excited to seeke the Tranquillitie of the minde, morall Vertues, true Honour, a Philosophicall Contemplation of heauenly things. The third sort of Affections, are termed Christian, because they issue from Discourse deriued from the Doctrine of our Sauiour Christ, which causeth in vs a Loue of voluntarie Prouertie, perfect Chastitie, the Glorie of Heauen: But the Affections of the su∣preeme degree are instiled Diuine, and Supernatu∣rall, because God himselfe doth poure them into

our hearts, and they ayme at, and tend to him with∣out the helpe of any Discourse, or naturall Light, as it is easie to conceiue; and we will hereafter speak of the Restes, and gustes which are practi∣sed in the Sanctuarie of the soule. And these su∣pernaturall Affections are principally three: the Loue of the mind towards the beautie of the my∣steries of faith: a Loue towards the profit of things promised vs in the other life; and a Loue towards the soueraigne Bountie of the thrice holy and e∣ternall Diuinitie.