conueniencie, and doth delight the one in the o∣ther. Now this inclination doth not proceede from any knowledge the one hath of the birth of his contrarie, or of the profit of him with whom he doth sympathie: but onely from a certaine se∣cret and hidden qualitie, which doth produce this insensible contrarietie and antipathie, as also this complacence and sympathie.
2. Secondly, we haue in vs the Sensitiue appe∣tite, wherby we are moued to the inquirie and flight of diuerse things by meanes of the sensitiue knowledge we haue of them, not vnlike to Cattell wherof one hath an appetite to one thing, an other to an other, according to the knowledge, which they haue agreeable or disagreeable vnto thē, and this appetite resides, or from it floweth the Loue, which we call Sensuall or Brutall, which yet pro∣perly speaking ought not to be termed loue, but simply be called appetite.
3. Thirdly, in so much as we are reasonable we haue a will by which we are carried to the inquirie of Good, according as by discourse we know, or iudge it to be such; againe, we manifest∣ly discouer in our Soule as it is Reasonable two degrees of perfection, which great S. AVGVSTINE, and after him all the DOCTOVRS, haue named the two portions of the soule Inferiour and Supe∣riour; of which that is called Inferiour which discourseth, and deduceth consequences, as she apprehendeth and experienceth by Sense: and that Superiour, which reasoneth and drawes consequences, according to an Intellectuall know∣ledge not founded vpon the experience of sense,