Lavv, or, a discourse thereof in foure bookes. Written in French by Sir Henrie Finch Knight, his Maiesties Serieant at Law. And done into English by the same author.

CHAP. 6.

Of Lawes Possitiue.

A And so much of Lawes Natiue.

The Law of nature and of reason, or the Law of reason primarie and secundarie, with the rules framed and collected thereupon Which three are as the Sunne and the Moone and the seuen Starres, to giue light to al the possitue laws of the world.

Possitiue are laws framed by their light, & from thence come the grounds & max∣imes of all Common Law: for that which we call common law, is not a word new & strange, or barbarous, and proper to our selues, and the law that that we professe, as some vnlearnedly would haue it, but the right terme for all other lawes. So Euripi∣des mencioneth 〈…〉〈…〉 the Common Lawes of Greece: and Plato doth define it, speaking of 〈…〉〈…〉 the reasoning facultie, 〈…〉〈…〉 saith he 〈…〉〈…〉 which being taken vp by the common con∣sent of a Countrie, is called Law. And anon he nameth it 〈…〉〈…〉 the golden and sacred rule of reason, which

we call Common Law. The place is verie notable: it openeth the originall and first beginning of the Common law, it sheweth the antiquitie of the name, in effect all one with that which since and by a later name is called Ius Ciuile (quod quisque popul{us} ipse si∣bi ius constituit, as Iustinian speaketh) it tea∣cheth Common Law to be nothing els but common reason: but what reason? not that which euerie one doth frame vnto himselfe: but refined reason. Quae cum ado∣leuit atque perfecta est nominatur rite sapientia as Tully saith, and as Plato there hath it, when it commeth to be 〈…〉〈…〉 opinio or decretum. How? 〈…〉〈…〉 generally receiued by the con∣sent of all.

Therefore Lawes positiue, which are directly contrarie to the former, loose their force, and are no lawes at all.

As those which are contrarie to the Law of nature. Such was that of the Egyptians, to turne women to marchandise, and com∣mon-wealth affaires, & men to keep with∣in dores. And of the Thracians, which ac∣counted idlenesse an honest thing, and stea∣ling verie commendable. So if it were made a law, that men might commit adulterie, forge false deeds, &c. And this is manifest vnto all men. But because the law of rea∣son is knowne onely to such as are able to iudge aright, and that but imperfectly (as

before was shewed) therefore here the case is harder, what lawes may be said agreea∣ble and what repugnant thereunto. Onely in general (which is sufficient for this place and purpose) it is truly said, & all men must agree, that lawes in deed repugnant to the law of reason, are aswell void, as those that crosse the law of nature.

Positiue lawes are sundrie and diuers, according to the seuerall and oiuers con∣stitutions of particular places and Coun∣tries.

Such among the Iewes were their Politi∣cals, deliuered by Moses, which so farre as they bee possitiue, binde vs not vnto them. Such were the antient law of the Grecians, the xij tables, & ciuil lawes of the Romans, and Such are the Common Lawes of England. And almost so many people so many Lawes. And as those lawes are diuers one from another, so one and the self same laws may be altered and changed in them∣selues. So long as no alteration is permitted against the two maine Lawes, of Nature, and Reason.