The prerogative of popular government. A politicall discourse in two books. The former containing the first præliminary of Oceana, inlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections. The second concerning ordination, against Dr. H. Hamond, Dr. L. Seaman, and the authors they follow. In which two books is contained the whole commonwealth of the Hebrews, or of Israel, senate, people, and magistracy, both as it stood in the institution by Moses, and as it came to be formed after the captivity. As also the different policies introduced into the Church of Christ, during the time of the Apostles. By James Harrington.

CHAP. VIII. Whether a Commonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind, come not up unto the perfection of Go∣vernment, and have no flaw in it.

WHat a Comonwealth comming up to the per∣fection of the kind is, I have shewn both by the definition of an equal Commonwealth, and the Exemplification in all the parts.

The Definition is contained in the first of my Pre∣liminaries, which because it is short I shall repeat.

An equall Commonwealth is a Government established upon an equall Agrarian arising into the super structures or three Orders, The Senate debating and proposing, the People re∣solving, and the Magistracy executing, by an equall Rota∣tion, or interchangeable election, through the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot The Exemplification is the whole Commonwealth of Oceana. Each of which by him,

who, if his doctrine of pure and absolute Monarchy be ob∣serv'd can be no English man, is called an Irish bog; as in some sense it is, seeing the Praevaricator hath set never a foot in it, that will stand, nor hath more to say, then that where there is one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, it is impossible there should be any such Government as can be secure from sedition.

Which first is rather to make all Governments alike, then to object against any, seeing that there should not be one ambitious Poor man, or one vicious Rich man, is equally if not more improbable in a Monarchy then in a Com∣monwealth.

Secondly, That one Man alone, whether he be rich or poor should without a party be able to disturbe a Com∣monwealth with sedition, is an absurdity; nor is such a party as may be able in some sort to disturbe the Peace by robbing upon the High-way, or some such disorder always able to disturbe a Government with sedition: Wherefore this feat goes not so much upon the ability of any one man Rich or Poor, as the puissance of the Party he is able to make, and this puissance of the party goes upon the Nature of the Government and the content or discontents thence deriving to the Few, or the Many. The discontents whether of the Few or the Many derive from that which is, or by them is thought to be some bar unto their Interest, and those Interests which are the causes of sedition are three; the desire of Liberty, the desire of Power, and the desire of Riches, nor be there any more▪ for where the People through the want of bread, through violence offer'd unto their Women, or Oppression, rise up against their Governours, it relates unto the desire of Liberty, those also under the name of Religion make not a fourth but come unto One of the Three.

Now to speak in the first place of the Many, and anon of the Few, the people in an equal Commonwealth, have none of these three Interests. Not the desire of Liberty, because the whole Frame of an equal Commonwealth is no∣thing else but such a Method whereby the liberty of the People is secured unto them. Not of power, because the power which otherwise they could not exercise, is thus

estated in them. Nor of riches, because where the rich are so bounded by an Agrarian that they cannot overballence; and therefore neither Oppresse the People nor Exclude their industry or merit from attaining to the like estate, power, or honour, the whole People have the whole riches of the Nation already equally divided among them, for that the riches of a Commonwealth should not go accor∣ding unto the difference of mens industry, but be distri∣buted by the Pole were unequal; Wherefore the people in an equal Commonwealth having none of those interests which are the causes of sedition, can be subject unto no such effect.

To affirm then with the Considerer, that the whole of this Libration, is reduced to the want of power to disturbe the Commonwealth, must needs be mistaken, seeing in the Commonwealth proposed the people have the power, but can have no such interest, and the people having no such interest, no party can have any such power, it being im∣possible that a party should come to overballance the People, having their Arms in their own hands. The whole matter being thus reduced unto the want of power to di∣sturbe the Government; this according to his own Argu∣ment will appear to be the Libration in which the power whereof the Governour is possessed so vastly exceeds the power remaining with those, who are to obey (which in case of contest must be so small a party) that it would be desperately un∣reasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause. If the true Method then of attaining to perfection in Government be to make the Governour absolute, and the people in an equal Commonwealth be absolute, then there can be none in this Government, that upon probable terms can dispute the power with the Governour, and so this State by his own Argument must be free from Sedition. Thus far upon oc∣casion of the ambitious poor Man Objected. I have spoken of the Many, and in speaking of the Many, implicitely of the Few; for as in an unequal Commonwealth, for Example, England during the Peerage or Aristocracy, the Many de∣pended upon or were included in the Few; So in an E∣qual Commonwealth the Few depend upon or are included in the Many, as the Senate of Venice depends upon, or is

included in Great Council, by which it is annually ele∣cted in the whole or in some part. So what was said in an equal Commonwealth of the Many or the Poorer sort, is also said of the Few or of the Richer; who through the virtue of the Agrarian, as in Oceana, or of other Orders supply∣ing the defect of an Agrarian, as in Venice, not able to o∣verballance the people can never have any power to disturbe the Commonwealth in case they had such an interest, nor can have any such interest in case they had such power. For Example in Oceana putting the case, that the Few were as powerful as it is possible they should be; that is, that the whole Land were fallen into five thousand hands. The Five Thousand excluding, the People could get no more Riches by it, because they have the whole Land al∣ready, no more Liberty by it, because they were in perfect Liberty before; nor any more power by it, because through the equality of the ballance or of their Estates, they can be no more by themselves, then an equal Commonwealth, and that they were with the people; but would be much lesse, the power or Commonwealth, in which there be Five thousand Equalls, being not greater but much less then the power or Commonwealth wherein the whole people are E∣quall: because the power or effect of a greater People is proportionably greater then the power or effect of a lesser people, and the Few by this means would get no more then to be the lesser people. So the people being no bar unto the riches, Liberty, nor power of the Five Thousand and the desire of Liberty, Riches, and Power being the only causes of Sedition, There could arise no Sedition in this Com∣monwealth by reason of the Nobility, who have no such interest, if they had the power, nor have any such power if they had the interest, the people being equally possessed of the Government, of the Arms, and far superior in Number. In summe, an equal Commonwealth consisteth but of one hereditary Order, as the people, which is by election divi∣ded into two Orders as the Senate and the Congregation in Lacedemon, or the Senate and the Great Council in Venice; for the Gentlemen of Venice, as hath been often said, are the people of Venice, the rest are Subjects. And an unequal Commonwealth consisteth of two Hereditary Orders, as

the Patritians and Plebeians in Rome, whereof the former only had an hereditary capacity of the Senate; whence it comes to passe that the Senate and the people in an equall Commonmealth having but one and the same interest, never were, nor can be at variance; and that the Senate and the people in an unequall Commonwealth having two distinct interests, never did nor can agree. So an equall Common∣wealth cannot be seditious, and an unequall Commonwealth can be no other then Seditious.

If a Man be resolved as the Considerer is, to huddle these things together, there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy; of which therefore it will be a folly to talk. For example, Lacedemon is either to be considered as not taking in the Helotes, and then in her self she was an equall Commonwealth void of any sedition, or cause of it, how much soever she were troubled with the Helotes. So the Objection made by him, of her troubles by the Helotes is impertinently urged, to shew that she was a Seditious Com∣monwealth. Or if he will needs have it, that she took in the Helots, it is undeniable that she took them in unequally, and so was unequall, whence the troubles by the Helots must needs be impertinently urged against an equall Com∣monwealth.

Again, when I alledge Venice from Piero Gradenigo, that is for the space of about four hundred years from the present date, at which time the Reformation yet in force began, as an Example of an equall Commonwealth, for him to instance in the times before, when though the Common∣wealth according to the intention, were as Equal as now, yet being not bound by sufficient Orders to give her self security of her Native Liberty, her Dukes on the one side, did what they pleased, and the inraged People on the other side banished, condemned to death, or murthered them, who sees not the Imposture? Indeed he blushes at it himself. Wherefore my Assertion being not yet knocked on the head, he promiseth to kill it better, first by the Example of Lacedemon leaving out the Helots, and next by that of Venice since the time of Piero Gradenigo.

For the first you must know that once upon a time there was a quarrel between Cleomenes and Demaratus

Kings of Lacedemon about succession which was determi∣ned by the Ephori, that is, by a Court of Justice and not by the Sword; the like hapned in Leotychides the known bastard of Alcibiades or so confessed to be by his Mother unto divers of her Maids. Now this is a Maxime in the Politicks where the differences of Kings can go no farther, then a Court of Justice, there the Government is seditious. Most ridiculous! Is there a stronger Argument that such a Government is not Seditious? No matter give him room, Much more fatall was the contest between Cleonymus and his brother Areus the son of Acrotatus by whose war Zarax was ruin'd and Pyrrhus came into the game, who besieg'd the Capital City: the reign of Agis and Cleomenes was so full of turbulency as would put a man out of breath to re∣late. Fair, and softly was not all this after Lysander, and the Spoils of Athens and so ruin'd Lacedemon? I affirm there can be no sedition in an Equal Cmmonwealth, and he to oppose me, shews that there was Sedition in an unequal One; whether doth this Affirm his Assertion or mine?

But for better luck in Venice. This City by Mr. Har∣rington's own confession, is possest of several advantages. Yes, I say that the Commonwealth of Venice, thus Seated is like a Man in a Cittadel who thereby may be the safer from his Enemies, but nere a whit the safer from diseases. What conclusion would you expect he should infer from hence? why among these therefore there is good cause to reckon her Immunity from seditions; Doth not our Logician repeat faithfully and dispute honestly? Again, Sir, she is like a Ship ready to be boarded by Pirates, hath the Turk on this Frontier, the Pope on that, the King of Spain on ano∣ther. As if this were an Argument every Govern∣ment must not be void of Sedition, seeing there is none except they be Islands, whose frontiers are not bounded by the Territories of other Princes. Well, but since the last Reiglement (in English Reformation) in the time of Gra∣denigo; you have had three seditions in Venice, that of Marino Boccone, that of Baiamonte Tiepolo, and that of Marino Falerio.

Bodin hath been long since beaten for this like Stockfish,

and yet our Author will be serving it up for a Courtly dish. Bocconi would have kill'd the Duke, but was hanged before he could doe it. Felton kill'd a Duke, that had greater power here then the other in Venice, and was hang'd afterwards, therefore England was a seditions Go∣vernment; for this must either be undeniable for Felton's sake, or why must the other be so for Bocconi's? Again, Falerio and his Complices would have destroyd the great Council, but were hanged before they could do it. Vaux and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parliament, but were hanged before they could doe it; therefore England was in this relation a seditious Government, else why was Venice? There passeth not a Moneth but there die Rogues at Tiburn, is the Government therefore seditious? or is this one regard in which it is not? where all that so invade the Government are by virtue of the same brought unto that end, there the Commonwealth, or the Orders of it are not the Cause but the Cure of Sedition, and so these are undeniable Arguments that Venice is not seditious, where since the Reformation there hath not been a cut Fin∣ger upon this score, save onely through the conspiracy of Baiamonte, which indeed came to blows. Nor for this yet, can Venice be called a seditious Commonwealth. You find no man accusing Rome of sedition in that she had a Manlius or a Melius that dangerously affected Monarchy, because unto these her Orders, by which they suffered death assoon appli'd the remedy. But Rome was a sediti∣ous Commonwealth because the perpetual fewd that was between the Senate & the People sprung out of her Orders, and was that to which there was no Remedy to apply. Eng∣land was not a seditious Government because it had a Vaux or a Felton, but because the power antiently of the Nobility, and late of the People was such by the Orders of the same as might at any time occasion Civil war. Put the case a slave or some desperate fellow have kill'd a Great Turk, the Government for that cannot be said seditious, but in this that through the very nature of the Policy, the Janizaries at any time may do as much, it is undeniable seditious. Baiamonte's conspiracy he will not say was of this nature. It was not a disease in the bones of the Commonwealth, but a

thing that no sooner appear'd, or broke out (though it be true, there happen'd a little scratching first) then it fell off like a scab; such an accident may befall the best constitu∣tion, and Venice never had the like but once: if he could say as much of a Monarchy, he gains no advantage; yet let him say it, and prove it, I give him all. I omit many falshoods and absurdities in the proceeding of the Prevaricator, as where he intimateth the power of the Dukes to have been that wherby Venice gained I know not what, and yet to have been that also by which Falerio had like to have spoiled all: Each of which (the Duke of Venice having no power at all) is known to be false. Why should▪ I stay to put you in mind that having affirmed Venice to derive her Immunity from intestine discord no otherwise then a Ship, that is ready to be boarded by Pirates, he instanceth in such exam∣ples to the contrary, as took Occasion by the hair of a Forreign scalpe, while in those of Boccone and Tiepolo the Commonwealth by her Wars with the Genoeses and Ferrara, was put to her plunges, and in that of Falerio reduced unto the last extremity. I shall onely Note that if such suddain Flashes as these may come under the name of Se∣dition, he hath done a fine Office for Monarchy, seeing no Senate is so much exposed to like blowes, as any Prince.

Well; but for all this it is confessed that there may be such a thing as a seditious Commonwealth, in that the fewd between the Senate and the People of Rome could not be cured; what security saith he will you give us, that the like may not happen in Oceana, or that the whole body of the People being intrvsted with giving a Vote and keeping a Sword, may not by way of Counsel or Arms, fall to such work as Levelling the Five Thousand, or bringing the Agrarian from two to one Thousand pounds a year, or less, as they phansie.

To which I answer by a like question, What security will he give me that the People of any Commonwealth shall not cast themselves into the Sea? A Prince may be mad and doe so, but the people is naturally incapa∣ble of such madnesse: If men will boast of their know∣ledge in principles and yet talk of nothing but effects;

why may not a Man fly as well as a Bird? but if causes may be regarded, let him once shew how the Will seeing it is not free, nor moved without some Object, should move the people in such a manner; or for what, they ha∣ving all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had, should strive? Well, that is soon done, for the Land may come into the hands of Five thousand, and so the Booty may be great and the resistance small. Good. The Romans being the wisest of all people went no farther towards the Remedy of their grievances then to strive for the intro∣duction of an Agrarian, in which they fainted too, even to the Destruction of that Government. Except these, none have been so wise, and if there be any such thing familiar with the Nature of the people, why appeared it but once, and then vanished without effect? why did not the people for Example under the late Monarchy (when the Dominion or Freehold of the Nation, by greater shares, was in a smaller party, and they had not onely Riches, but Liverty, and Power too, to whet them on) ever so much as think of levelling Three hundred Men for the Nobility and Clergy in whom was the ballance, were no more. If it be reply'd that the people were not armed; by whom did the Barons make War with the Kings? If that they were not trusted with a Vote; what was that of the House of Commons? Let Dominion or Freehold stand upon what ballance you will, unequal or equal, from the begin∣ning of the world you shall never find a people turning Levellers: And as Reason is Experience in the root, so Experience is Reason in the branch, which might there∣fore be sufficient in the Case. Nevertheless for clearer sa∣tisfaction in a point of such Concernment, I shall endea∣ver to dig up and discover the Root of this branch, or the reason of this Experience. That which in Beasts is instinct, whereof they can give no Account, is in it self that wisdome of God whereby he provideth for them; so is it with the People, they are not Levellers, nor know they why, and yet it is, because to be levellers, were to destroy themselves. For seeing I must repeat, to repeat briefly. There is no Territory of any Extent and Populousnesse where the Re∣venue of Industry is not twice as much as the dry Rent.

(This hath been demonstrated in Oceana.) The revenue of industry is in those that work, that is, the People: Wherefore the Revenne of the People, where their industry is not obstructed, is twofold unto that of the Nobility, holding the whole Territory in Freehold. But where their Industry is obstructed, their Revenue is nothing. Civil war being of all other the greatest obstruction of Industry, the People in taking Arms must venter all they have, for that, which if they obtain, they lose two for one; and if they obtain not, all for nothing. Wherefore a People never will, nor ever can; never did, or ever shall take Arms for Levelling. But they are instructed with a Vote; and therefore taking away the Lands of the five Thousand, or diminishing the Agrarian by way of Counsel, they need not obstruct their industry, but preserving the Re∣venue of that, may bring themselves into the possession of the Land too. This will they, this can they lesse do, be∣cause being in Counsel they must propose something for the advantage of the Commonwealth, or of themselves, as their End in such an Action. But the Land coming to be in the possession of five Thousand, falleth not into a Number that is within the compass of the few, or such an One as can be Princes, either in regard of their number, or of their estates, but unto such an One as cannot consent to abolish the Agrarian, because that were to consent to rob one another, nor can have any Party among them, or against their Common interest, strong enough to force them, or to break it, which remaining, the five thousand neither be nor can be any more then a Popular State, and the ballance remaineth every whit as equal, as if the Land were in never so many more hands. Wherefore the Commonwealth being not to be bettered by this means, the People by Counsel can never go about to level nor diminish the Agrarian for the good of the Commonwealth. Nor can they undertake it for the enrichment of them∣selves, because the Land of Oceana, as hath been demon∣strated, being levell'd or divided equally among the Fathers of Families only, cometh not to above Ten pounds a year unto each of them, whereas every Footman costeth his Master Twenty pounds a year; and there is not a

Cottager having a Cow upon the Common, but with his own labour, at one shilling a day, gets Twenty pounds a years; which the Land being levell'd, were impossible, because there would be no body able to set a Labourer on work, or to keep a Servant; wherefore neither would, nor could the People by Counsel go about any such businesse. So there being no possible cause of disagree∣ment between the Few and the Many, the Senate and the People, there can be no such effect; whence this is the government, which being perfectly equall, hath such a Li∣bration in the frame of it, that no man in or under it, can contract such Interest or Power, as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition. Yet after all this, the Praevaricator will only tell Mr. Harrington (for to deny the Conclusion, is a fair way of disputing) that this Libration is of the same Nature with a perpetual motion in the Me∣channicks. But let me tell him, that in the Politicks there is nothing Mechannick, or like it. This is but an Ideo∣tism of some Mathematician resembling his who imagined the Stream of a River to be like that of his Spiggot,

(Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille labitur & labetur in omne volubilia aevum.) The silly Swain upon a river stood, In hope the Rolling bottome of the flood Would once unwind it self, whose liquid clue The silver thread for ever shall renew.

The Mathematician must not take God to be such an One as he is. Is that of the Sun, of the Stars, of a River, a perpetual Motion? even so One generation goeth, and another cometh. Nature (saith Gallen) hath a tendency to make her Creature immortal, if it were in the Capacity of the Matter on which she hath to work, but the People never dieth; This Motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover, even God himself, in whom we live and move, and have our being; and to this Current the Po∣litician addeth nothing but the banks, to which end, or none, the same God hath halso created humane Prudence. Wherefore there is not any thing that raiseth it self against

God or right reason, if I say that it is in humane prudence so to apply these banks, that they may stand as long as the River runneth; or let this Considerer consider again, and tell me out of Scripture or Reason, why not. Mathe∣maticians, it is true, pretend to be the Monopolists of demonstration; but speak ingenuously, have they, as to the Politicks, hitherto given any other demonstration, then that there is difference between seeing, and making of Spe∣ctacles? Much more is that comparison of the Politicks, going upon certain and demonstrable Principles, unto Astrologers and Fortune-tellers, who have none at all vain and Injurious: For as in relation to what David hath said, and Experience confirmed, of the Age of Man, that it is Threescore years and Ten; I may say, that if a Man lie bed-rid, or die before Threescore years and Ten, of any Natural infirmity, or disease, it was not through any imperfection of Mankind, but of his particular Con∣stitution. So in relation unto the Principles and definition of an Equal Commonwealth yet unshaken, nay untouched by this Praevaricator, I may safely affirm, that a Common∣wealth is a Government, which if it have been seditious, it hath not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitution, which where the like hath hapned must have been unequal. My retrait unto these Principles is called running into a bogg; as if such as have no Principles were not boggs, Informis limus, Stygiaeque Paludes.

Notes

• Consid. p. 43.
• Consid. p. 60. Pausan. Lacon.
• Plut. Alc.
• Consid. p. 48.
• Consid. p. 67.
• Galen de usu partium. l. 4.